



# SPIFFE AND SPIRE IN PRACTICE

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# AGENDA

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- 1 RECAP: SPIFFE AND SPIRE
- 2 SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION
- 3 BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH
- 4 AUTHENTICATE SECURELY TO COMMON PLATFORMS
- 5 AUTHENTICATION FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY
- 6 REDUCING THE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS

# **SPIFFE AND SPIRE INTRODUCTION**

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# INTRODUCING SPIFFE AND SPIRE

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


Open-source specification and toolchain for service identity



CLOUD NATIVE  
COMPUTING FOUNDATION

Part of CNCF



Integrated into various open-source projects




Bloomberg



Extensive contributions by HPE and other top tech companies

# CROSS-SERVICE COMMUNICATION IS EXPLODING

Increasing attack surface & risk of leakage across untrusted networks




A screenshot of a news article from ZDNet. The headline reads: "Over 100,000 GitHub repos have leaked API or cryptographic keys". Below the headline, there is a sub-headline: "A hacker gained access to 100 million Capital One credit card applications and accounts". The article is attributed to Rob McLean, CNN Business, and was updated at 5:17 PM ET on Tuesday, July 30, 2019.


Long-lived service credentials exist across applications, repositories, platforms, and tools, making them ripe for theft.

# CROSS-SERVICE COMMUNICATION IS EXPLODING

Increasing operational complexity and reducing developer velocity




# SOLVING THE “BOTTOM TURTLE”



SOURCE: SOLVING THE BOTTOM TURTLE: [WWW.SPIFFE.IO/BOOK](http://WWW.SPIFFE.IO/BOOK)

# SOLVING THE “BOTTOM TURTLE”



# SPIFFE KEY CONCEPTS

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## SPIFFE ID



Standard format for a service identifier

spiffe://trustdomain/service

## SPIFFE VERIFIABLE IDENTITY DOCUMENT



Cryptographically verifiable document  
asserting a SPIFFE ID

## TRUST BUNDLE



Set of public keys used to verify SVIDs

## WORKLOAD API




Local API for workloads to retrieve their  
SPIFFE IDs, SVIDs, and Trust Bundles

# SPIRE

## Core Differentiators

### MULTI-FACTOR ATTESTATION



Has it been signed by the CI/CD pipeline?



Is it known to trusted middleware or schedulers?



Is the machine a member of a known network or cluster?



Can we affirm the integrity of the machine it runs upon?

- Real time, attestation engine issues and validates cryptographic service identities (SPIFFE) based on multiple factor policy
- Eliminates the need for secret management

### AUTOMATED LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT



- Automatically issues, distributes, and renews short-live credentials
- Reduces operational overhead associated with credential management

### EXTENSIBLE, WEB-SCALE ARCHITECTURE



- Easily extends to identity providers, certificate authorities, and systems
- Designed for dynamic, distributed environments

# **SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION**



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
# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION

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
Cloud or Kubernetes Platform




# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION




# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION



# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION



# IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS



## SERVICE MESH COMPARISON

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- Works across different service meshes and outside service meshes
- Can do hardware-level or cloud-level attestation
- More fine-grained control over certificates



## UBER: SECURING NEXT-GEN AND LEGACY INFRASTRUCTURE

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“SPIRE is now a key component of Uber's next infrastructure, but we are also using a side-car approach to **retrofit authentication into legacy infrastructure**. While SPIFFE and SPIRE are commonly known to work in modern, cloud native architectures, we can adapt the projects to our proprietary legacy stack quickly. SPIRE can **provide a critical bridge of trust within Uber's next-gen and legacy infrastructure** and positively impact internal security and developer efficiency”


Ryan Turner, Software Engineer 2, Uber

# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH


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
# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH



# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH



# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH



## SOME EXAMPLES

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- AWS App Mesh
- GreyMatter
- Istio
- Kuma
- Network Service Mesh
- NGINX Service Mesh
- Open Service Mesh



**AUTHENTICATE SECURELY  
TO DATABASES OR CLOUD PLATFORM**

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
## AUTHENTICATE TO COMMON DATABASES OR CLOUD PLATFORMS

Reduce reliance on passwords or API keys

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Using usernames/passwords or tokens to access resources outside Kubernetes e.g. Datastores

- Risk of breach is higher
- Need to generate/manage credentials




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
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### With SPIRE you can:


- Eliminate the need to generate and manage distinct shared secrets for each cloud platform for each application.
- Scale, secure identity-driven authentication across all cloud providers and platforms.



# AUTHENTICATE TO AWS



# AUTHENTICATE TO POSTGRESQL



**Spiffe-helper pushes certificates into PostgreSQL  
Services can authenticate as PostgreSQL users**

## SCROOGE MCBANK: CUSTOMER PORTAL

Your current balance is 9.65


Description	Debit	Credit
Daily parking	\$20	
Gliderport Paragliding	\$165	
San Diego Zoo Daily pass	\$65	
Airline Compensation		\$300
Carne Asada Street Tacos	\$24.65	
Coin-Op Game Room	\$35	

# AUTHENTICATION FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY MODEL

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# PERIMETER SECURITY




As we add:

- services
  - datacenters
  - clouds
  - regions inside clouds
- perimeter security becomes increasingly untenable

# CLOUD AND CONTAINERS DRIVING ADOPTION OF ZERO TRUST

Traditional network based security models don't work in modern software architectures

**Perimeter based**



**Zero Trust**




- Attempts to build a trusted “wall”
- Relies on IP addresses or physical locations
- Difficult to implement for today's dynamic environments

- Assumes “bad guys” are everywhere
- Uses cryptographic identities for authenticating every system/user
- Enables universal enforcement across hybrid infrastructures



# SPIFFE IS FOUNDATIONAL FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY MODEL



Each service gets its own

- unique
- secure
- provable

identity

## ANTHEM: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR ZERO TRUST IN HEALTHCARE

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“We **could not rely on traditional parameter-based** security tools and processes to secure our next-generation applications and infrastructure. **Zero trust**, a fine-grained, automated approach to security, made a lot of sense to us, especially in the future, as we plan to **operate across organizational boundaries and cloud providers**. Identity and authentication for both users and services are among the zero trust security model’s core principles. Zero trust allows us to rely less on network-based controls than authenticating every system or workload. **SPIFFE and SPIRE have enabled a foundational authentication layer** for our zero trust security architecture. They allow each workload to cryptographically prove “who they are” before they start communicating”

Bobby Samuel, VP AI Engineering, Anthem


## **REDUCING THE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS**

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


# CHALLENGE : REDUCE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS

Attackers can insert new containers or workloads




# SOLUTION: BINARY ATTESTATION WITH SPIRE



- Each time the CI/CD system builds a container image, it sends the container hash to SPIRE
- SPIRE then checks the container hash each time it grants an identity document
- This guarantees attackers can't insert new containers, modify containers in the container registry, or bypass CI/CD security checks


# CHALLENGE : SERVICE DISRUPTION DUE TO MISCONFIGURATION

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# SOLUTION: REDUCE RISK OF MISCONFIGURATION

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## SEPARATE TRUST DOMAINS

Use separate SPIRE domains for dev and prod workloads, in order to ensure isolation of prod workloads.

## TRANSPARENT AUTHENTICATION HAS SIMPLIFIED OPERATIONS

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“With SPIRE we can deploy a **consistent**, “dial-tone” authentication across all our platforms. The burden of authentication and security is now **encapsulated from the developers** so they can focus on business or application logic. This has improved our deployment velocity overall. We are also **less likely to get “production errors” due to configuration** issues such as using development credentials in production. Standardized authentication with SPIRE has also **simplified compliance and audit** since we have mutual TLS across trust domains and platforms.

Eli Nesterov, Security Engineering Manager, ByteDance

# THANK YOU

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Slack.spiffe.io



SPIFFE.io



spiffe.io/book



github.com/spiffe

