Getting Started with Runtime Security using Falco

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Loris Degioanni CTO, Founder Sysdig





Open by design

- Founded by Wireshark co-creator
- Contributed Falco to CNCF
- Supported open-source sysdig (10M+ downloads)

Ecosystem integration

- · Cloud-native security and monitoring
- Provides visibility and control for secure operations

- Strong momentumCustomer expansion mirrors cloudnative adoption
- Trusted by the largest enterprises



Agenda

- Runtime security overview
- Comparing runtime security technologies
- Falco overview and rules
- Demo
- History and roadmap



Runtime Security Overview



Why runtime security?



Detect malicious behavior

- Drift from image scanned
- ☐ Only present in runtime
- \square Unknown/0-day threats



Incident response

Alert on detections right when they happen




Forensics

Audit activity and gain knowledge of extent

Compliance with security frameworks from PCI, NIST, SOC




How runtime security fits into the workflow



Continuous Compliance (PCI, NIST, CIS, etc)


Comparing Runtime Security Collection Technologies







LD_PRELOAD





Pros vs Cons: LD_PRELOAD




 Can be applied to serverless and non-privileged environments



- Not accurate, as it is an out of kernel based instrumentation
- Can crash the target process
- Limited support (e.g. doesn't work with Go)
- Requires instrumenting every container



ptrace





Pros vs Cons: ptrace




- Accurate
- Language and stack independent
- Safer than LD_PRELOAD b/c it leverages the Operating System



- Inefficient
- Requires instrumenting every container



Kernel based instrumentation





Pros vs Cons: Kernel instrumentation




- Greater accuracy
- Performance without compromise
- Highly scalable (doesn't need to run in every container)



 Limited ability to collect data in serverless environments (Fargate, Lambda)



Enriched Context via Cloud/K8s Metadata instrumentation





Falco: Open-source runtime security engine



What is Falco?

- O Runtime security engine
- O Observability from the kernel
- O Built on kmod/eBPF
- O Consumable / Modular









Cloud Native Runtime Security



Container-centric Runtime Security

- Kernel Events as source of truth
- Enriched with metadata
- Assert against rules at runtime
- Alert/Alarm during violation events

CNCF Incubating Project

- Jan 2016 First Commit
- Oct 2018 Donated CNCF
- Dec 2019 Promoted to Incubation







Core Principles



Community Driven

- Deeply integrated with Kubernetes and CNCF communities
- Decision making in the open
- Integrations built and supported by the community



End-Users

- Consumers of Falco and the Falco ecosystem
- Contributors to the Falco ecosystem
- PCI Compliance, SOC2, HIPAA
- Observability, CVEs, Exploits, 0Day events



Vendors

- Sysdig Secure (scale)
- SumoLogic
- SkyScanner (scale)
- PCI Compliance, HIPAA
- Kubernetes Audit
- Application Integration



Falco in Production at shopify

Production Environment

- Running Falco in PCI-compliant environment on AWS EC2 / EKS
- Every day, Falco protects \$100-150M in Shopify transactions
- Falco enabled PCI-compliant lift and shift to AWS from data center

Involvement with Open Source

- Integrated with Falco community and maintainers
- Deploys Falco artifacts regularly as released
- Presented production use case at KubeCon Europe Virtual keynote (see the replay on CNCF's YouTube channel)








Falco in Production at skysconner


Production Environment

- Running Falco with 2,000+ nodes across 30 clusters powering 160+ services on AWS Lambda
- Core requirements: detect malicious activity at scale without hindering performance, integrate with service mapping tools
- Read their use case Medium, 1/29/20
 https://medium.com/@SkyscannerEng/kubernetes-security-monitoring-at-scale-with-sysdig-falco-a60cfdb0f67a

High Level Architecture




Falco Architecture




API Layers









Falco Rules



Rule Examples

A shell is run in a container	container.id != host and proc.name = bash
Overwrite system binaries	fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin) and write
Container namespace change	evt.type = setns and not proc.name in (docker, sysdig)
Non-device files written in /dev	(evt.type = create or evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT) and proc.name != blkid and fd.directory = /dev and fd.name != /dev/null
Process tries to access camera	evt.type = open and fd.name = /dev/video0 and not proc.name in (skype, webex)



Sample Rule: DB spawns a shell

```
- rule: Database spawns a shell
  condition: >
    proc.pname in (db server binaries) and spawned process
    and not proc.name in (db server binaries)
    and not postgres running wal e
 output: >
   Database-related program spawned process other than itself
    (user=%user.name program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
  source: syscall
 desc: >
   Database-server program spawned a new process other than itself.
    This shouldn't occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
 priority: WARNING
  tags: [process, database]
```

Lists and Macros

```
- list: sensitive file names
  items: [/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
/etc/pam.conf, /etc/security/pwquality.conf]
- macro: sensitive files
  condition: >
    fd.name startswith /etc and
    (fd.name in (sensitive file names)
     or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d,
/etc/pam.d))
```



Falco MITRE Rule Matrix								
Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Exfiltration	
DB program spaw ned process	Modify Shell Configuration File	Launch Privileged Container	Clear Log A ctivities	Read sensitive file trusted after startu	Read Shell Configurat	Launch Privileged C ontainer	System procs network activity	
Run shell untrust ed	Schedule Cron Jobs	Non sudo s etuid	Delete Bash History	Read sensitive file untrusted	Read ssh information	Launch Sensitive Mo unt Container	Interpreted procs inbo und network	
Terminal shell in c ontainer	Update Package Reposito			Search Private Key s or Passwords	Read sensitive file un trusted	Launch Disallowed Container	Interpreted procs outbound network	
Netcat Remote Co de Execution in C ontainer	Write below binary dir Write below monitored dir				Contact K8S API Serv er From Container		Unexpected UDP Traffi	
	Write below etc Write below root Write below rpm database				Launch Suspicious N etwork Tool in Contai ner		Launch Suspicious Ne twork Tool in Containe r	
	Modify binary dirs Mkdir binary dirs				Launch Suspicious N etwork Tool on Host		Launch Suspicious Ne twork Tool on Host	
	<u>User mgmt binaries</u>							
	Create files below dev							
	Launch Package Manage ment Process in Containe							
	Remove Bulk Data from Disk Set							
	Create Hidden Files or Dir ectories		info at:	# I / '			9 91	
	Setuid or Setgid bit	https:	//sysdig.co	m/blog/mitre-att	ck-tramework-for-	container-runtime	<u>-security-with-sysd</u>	


Demo



Falco Releases and Roadmap



Falco's History



Recently Added Features

- Rules Improvements
 - O PSPs, MITRE framework, cryptoming
- gRPC input/output interface
- Integrations
 - O Prometheus, Slack, ElasticSearch, AWS Lambda
- Helm Chart
- ptrace instrumentation



Roadmap

- Expand our community by delighting our users
- Lowering the barrier
 - O Stability
 - O Ease of deployment
 - O Performance
- Integrations
- Platform coverage
 - O AWS Fargate



Resources

The Falco project
falco.org
github.com/falcosecurity/falco

Try it yourself https://falco.org/docs/installation/

Join the community https://github.com/falcosecurity/community

Questions?

