From Red to Blue

Security Strategies in Azure

whoami

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 - NSA
 - US Navy/Government Trainer
 - Government and Commercial Penetration Testing/Red Teaming
 - Stage 2 Security / Ultraviolet Cyber
 - Black Hat, BSides Speaker/Trainer

Azure Basics

- Authentication: Entra ID
- Compute: Virtual machine
- Block Storage: Azure Blobs
- Serverless Applications: Azure Functions
- Container Compute: Container Service
- CDN: Delivery Network
- Data Warehouse: SQL Warehouse

Entra ID (Formerly Azure AD)

What it is:

- Authentication Platform
 - Security Assertion Markup (SAML)
 - Open Authorization (OAuth)
 - Web Service Federation (WS-Fed)
 - OpenID Connect (OIDC)
- User/Permissions Management

What it isn't


- Active Directory
 - LDAP/Kerberos
 - Tree based organization
 - Group Policy

Entra ID and On-premise Active Directory

- Azure AD-Connect
 - Password Hash Synchronization (PHS)
 - Hash of password hash is stored in Entra ID
 - Password write-back
 - Resilient: Functions if on-prem is down
 - Pass Through Authentication (PTA)
 - All authentication is proxied through on-premise host
 - Fails if on-premise host is down
 - On-premise agent is a target for mimikatz and other attacks

Entra ID and On-premise Active Directory

- Azure AD-Connect
 - Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS)
 - Invite Entra ID to be a tenant of on-premise Active Directory
 - Very few cases where this is necessary



Is a Domain Managed by Entra ID?

https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=<user@domain.com>&xml=1

Unmanaged

Managed


Check for Valid Account Name

- https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType
 - POST Request {"Username":"<someUserName>"}
 - Valid: IfExistsResult:0
 - Invalid: IfExistsResult:1
- See also o365creeper (https://github.com/LMGsec/o365creeper)

Service Principals

- Entra ID equivalent of Service Accounts
- Tied to Application Instance
 - Remove the Application Instance, remove the credentials
- Credential Models
 - Username/Password
 - Certificate

Managed Service Identity (MSI)



MSI

Managed Service Identity URL is used to generate a token which can be used when authorizing to other Azure Services. When activating Managed Service Identity on your Function App, two environment settings are added to the configuration of your Function app service.

Use "SET" command to find the storage creds

MSI_ENDPOINT: the local URI for which your app can request tokens
MSI_SECRET: the secret used to request a token from the MSI_ENDPOINT

Often used with Key Vault

Azure Key Vault

Secrets, Keys, Certificate Management

Create a resource group, which is a logical container into which Azure resources are deployed and managed:

az group create --name "ContosoResourceGroup" --location eastus

Create a Key Vault, which is a logical group of secrets:

az keyvault create --name "Contoso-Vault2" --resource-group
 "ContosoResourceGroup" --location eastus

Add & View a Secret to the Key Vault:


- az keyvault secret set --vault-name "Contoso-Vault2" --name
 "ExamplePassword" --value "Pa\$\$w0rd"
- az keyvault secret show --name "ExamplePassword" --vaultname "Contoso-Vault2"

Three ways to authenticate to Key Vault:

- Managed Identities (aka MSI)
- Service Principal and Certificate
- Service Principal and Secret (aka password)

Consent Grant

- Users and Admins can grant permissions to OAuth Applications
 - Permissions can be active even when the user is not actively using the app



Consent Grant


- A Phished user may unwittingly provide access to
 - Users and Groups
 - User data such as mail and calendars
 - Service Principals

Defense

- Restrict to Publisher Verified Apps (Microsoft publisher validation)
- Consent workflow for additional scrutiny
- Audit Applications and permissions


Guests & Guest Sync

- External Users can be invited as Guests and assigned permissions
- An external group can be given access and automatically approved with Cross-tenant Synchronization



Conditional Access


- Criteria for Authentication
 - Source IP/Geo
 - Device type
 - Destination
 - Risk



MFA & Passwordless

- Microsoft Authenticator App
 - Number matching
- SMS/Phone call
- TOTP Token
- Windows Hello with PIN/Biometrics
- FIDO2
- Certificate Based

Azure AD Management APIs



Graphrunner

- Explores Azure and M365 using Graph API
 - Mail/Contacts
 - Teams Content
 - SharePoint

https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-graphrunner/

AADInternals

- Hacking Toolkit for Entra ID
 - Graph API
 - Authentication
 - Unauthenticated Recon

• AADInternals.com

Road Tools

- Roadrecon: Data collection tool via Graph API
 - Entra ID
 - Applications
 - Service Principals
- RoadTools GUI: Explore collected data
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools



Stormspotter

- Developed by Azure Red Team
- Explores and graphs Azure resources
 - Subscriptions
 - Resource Groups




https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter

Guides


- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/
- https://pentestbook.six2dez.com/enumeration/cloud/
- https://github.com/dafthack/CloudPentestCheatsheets
- PayloadsAllTheThings:
 - https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and
 %20Resources/Cloud%20-%20Azure%20Pentest.md
- https://github.com/vengatesh-nagarajan/Cloud-pentest
- https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/Awesome-Cloud-PenTest
- https://github.com/kh4sh3i/cloud-penetration-testing

aCloudGuru.com / Pluralsite



Great Information on AWS, Azure, GCP, & K8s


CSA: Cloud Penetration Testing Playbook



The target audience of this document are penetration testers and cloud / cloudbased systems security practitioners. However, the first few pages will provide CIOs, CISOs and Senior Management an understanding of what cloud penetration testing is, its scope, its context, its objectives and how it fits within a cybersecurity strategy. Developers and Architects will also find this document useful while designing secure (public cloud based) systems.

BadZure: Vulnerable Entra ID

- BadZure is a PowerShell script that uses the Microsoft Graph SDK to set up Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) tenants, populating them with various entities and introducing common security misconfigurations. This creates vulnerable tenants with multiple attack paths.
- It automates the creation of entities like users, groups, application registrations, service principals, and administrative units.
- To simulate real-world security misconfigurations, it randomly assigns Microsoft Entra ID roles, Graph permissions, and application ownership privileges to randomly picked security principals, creating unique attack paths.
- BadZure provides two methods of initial access to the vulnerable tenants it creates, simulating account takeover scenarios.
- The tool is designed for security practitioners interested in exploring and understanding Microsoft Entra ID security.




AzureGoat

TL;DR:

Focused on Azure





Questions?

- Slides will be posted later
 - https://github.com/rDmKW5nQ/2023_Bsides_RedRocks

