



Lecture 06: Control-Flow Hijacking Attacks and Defenses

Professor Adam Bates
CS 461 / ECE 422
Fall 2019



Goals for Today

- Learning Objectives:
 - Consider and evaluate defenses to binary exploits
- Announcements, etc:
 - Office hours all the time! M-F 5-7pm, 4405 Siebel
 - MP1 is live!
 - Checkpoint #1: **Due TODAY Sept 9th at 6pm**
 - Checkpoint #2: **Due Sept 18 at 6pm**



Reminder: Please put away devices at the start of class



Control Flow Hijacking

- Control Flow Hijacking: Altering control flow of a target program to cause it to do what attacker wants
- Aleph One stack buffer overflow attack: overwrote function return address on stack to point to shellcode in buffer on stack
 - One of the simplest control flow hijacking attacks
 - Stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist today!

Defenses & Counter-Attacks



- *Last Class:* Stack canaries
 - Counter-Attack: Other forms of control flow hijacking
- Data Execution Prevention (DEP,W^X)
 - Counter-Attack: Return-to-libc
 - Counter-Attack: Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
 - Counter-Attack: Memory disclosure vulnerabilities
 - Counter-Attack: Heap Spray and JIT Spray

Stack Canary


- Idea: detect return address overwrite
 - Place special value (canary) before return address on the stack
 - Check canary before executing ret
 - If buffer overflows, canary is destroyed before return address
 - Can be automatically inserted by compiler
 - –GCC and Clang: `-fstack-protector`





Stack Canary in Action

```
pushl %CANARY    # not a real register
pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
subl $16, %esp
pushl 8(%ebp)
leal -16(%ebp), %eax
pushl %eax
call mystrcpy
addl $8, %esp
leave
popl %eax
xorl %eax, %CANARY
•jne _canary_fail # if %eax ≠ %CANARY
ret
```







Control Flow Hijacking Attacks

- **Altering control flow** of a target program to cause it **to do what attacker wants**
- Not “injecting code to do what attacker wants”
- Alternate strategy:
 1. Identify a code pointer that is eventually loaded into PC
 2. Overwrite code pointer (memory write vulnerability)
 3. Divert PC to code that will do useful work (for attacker)
- In Aleph One attack:
 - Code pointer: return address on stack
 - Memory write vulnerability: buffer overflow
 - Divert PC to shellcode in stack buffer

Code Pointers

- Return from procedure (ret instruction)
 - Return addresses on call stack
- C-style function pointers
 - Driver function dispatch tables
 - Some libc functions
- **C++ virtual method calls**
 - Special case of function pointers





Class Polymorphism

- C++ classes are polymorphic: pointer to an object may point to an instance of the class or any of its derived classes (subclasses)

```
class Shape {  
    virtual float area(void);  
};
```

```
class Circle : Shape {  
    float r;  
    Circle(float r);  
};
```

```
class Rect : Shape {  
    float w, h;  
    Rect(float w, h);  
};
```



Class Polymorphism

```
class Shape {  
    virtual float area(void);  
};  
  
class Circle : Shape {  
    float r;  
    Circle(float r);  
};  
  
Circle::Circle(float r) {  
    this.r = r;  
}  
  
float Circle::area(void) {  
    return PI * r * r;  
}  
  
class Rect : Shape {  
    float w, h;  
    Rect(float w, h);  
};  
  
Rect::Rect(float w, float h) {  
    this.w = w;  
    this.h = h;  
}  
  
float Rect::area(void) {  
    return w * h;  
}
```



Class Polymorphism

```
class Shape {  
    virtual float area(void);  
};  
  
class Circle : Shape {  
    float r;  
    Circle(float r);  
};  
  
Circle::Circle(float r) {  
    this.r = r;  
}  
  
float Circle::area(void) {  
    return PI * r * r;  
}  
  
Shape* s1 = new Rect(3,4);  
Shape* s2 = new Circle(5);  
cout << s1.area(); // calls Rect::area()  
cout << s2.area(); // calls Circle::area()
```

```
class Rect : Shape {  
    float w, h;  
    Rect(float w, h);  
};  
  
Rect::Rect(float w, float h) {  
    this.w = w;  
    this.h = h;  
}  
  
float Rect::area(void) {  
    return w * h;  
}
```



Virtual Method Dispatch

```
Shape* s1 = new Rect(3,4);
Shape* s2 = new Circle(5);
cout << s1.area(); // calls Rect::area()
cout << s2.area(); // calls Circle::area()
```

- Compiler needs to know which `area()` method to call in each case
- Virtual classes have additional invisible member variable: virtual function table pointer
- Compiler uses virtual function table to call the right virtual method during a virtual method call

C++

```
class Shape {
    virtual float area(void);
};
```

```
s1->area();
```


C equivalent

```
struct Shape {
    struct Shape_vtab * vtab;
};
```


```
struct Shape_vtab {
    float (areafp*)(Shape * this);
};
```

```
s1->vtab->areafp(s1);
```


Circle



Circle_vtab



Circle_area()





C++

```
Circle::Circle(float r) {  
    this.r = r;  
}  
  
Circle::area(void) {  
    return PI * r * r;  
}
```

C equivalent

```
struct Circle {  
    struct Circle_vtab * vtab;  
};  
  
struct Circle_vtab {  
    float (areafp*)(Shape * this);  
};  
  
float Circle_area(Circle * this) {  
    return PI * this->r * this->r;  
}  
  
const struct  
Shape_vtab circle_vtab = {  
    &Circle_area  
};  
  
void Circle_ctor (  
    Circle * this, float r) {  
    this->vtab = &circle_vtab;  
    this->r = r;  
}
```

C++

```
Circle::Circle(float r) {
    this.r = r;
}

Circle::area(void) {
    return PI * r * r;
}
```

function pointer!

C equivalent

```
struct Circle {
    struct Circle_vtab * vtab;
};


struct Circle_vtab {
    float (areafp*)(Shape * this);
};

float Circle_area(Circle * this) {
    return PI * this->r * this->r;
}

const struct
Shape_vtab circle_vtab = {
    &Circle_area
};


void Circle_ctor (
    Circle * this, float r) {
    this->vtab = &circle_vtab;
    this->r = r;
}
```

VTable Hijacking



- Overwrite pointers in virtual function table
- Overwrite virtual function table pointer (`vtab`)
 - Point to your own virtual function table

VTable Hijacking



- Stack buffer overflows now less common
 - Easy-to-find bugs getting fixed
 - Use of unsafe functions deprecated
- VTable hijacking has grown in popularity
 - Common attack vector for many modern control flow hijacking exploits

Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends (Microsoft, 2013)




Figure 5. The distribution of CVE vulnerability classes for CVEs that are known to have been exploited

Memory Write Vulnerabilities



- Integer overflow and conversion
- Use-after-free and double-free
- Format string vulnerabilities
- Data structure consistency



Signedness Bugs

- What's wrong with this code??
- What happens when you call `copy_something(mybuf, -1)`?

```
extern void * memcpy(void * dst, const void * src, size_t n);

int copy_something(char *buf, int len) {
    char kbuf[800];

    if(len > sizeof(kbuf)) {           // always true
        return -1;
    }

    return memcpy(kbuf, buf, len);     // len cast to size_t
}                                     // which is unsigned
```

Based on “Basic Integer Overflows” by blexim, *Phrack* volume 0x0b, issue 0x3c, phile #0x0a of 0x10



Signedness Bugs

- What's wrong with this code??
- What happens when you call `copy_something(mybuf, -1)`?

```
extern void * memcpy(void * dst, const void * src, size_t n);

int copy_something(char *buf, int len) {
    char kbuf[800];

    if(len > sizeof(kbuf)) {           // always true
        return -1;
    }


    return memcpy(kbuf, buf, SIZE_T(F1));
}
```

Based on “Basic Integer Overflows” by blexim, *Phrack* volume 0x0b, issue 0x3c, phile #0x0a of 0x10

Defense: Data Execution Prevention



- Observation: attacker jumped to shellcode on stack
 - Shellcode was in buffer that overflowed and overwrote RA
- But instructions normally never executed on from the stack
 - What if we prevent execution from stack?



Data Execution Prevention (DEP)



- Text (code) region is executable, not writable
- Data memory regions are non-executable
- Also called W^X (write xor execute)
 - Memory is writable or executable, never both
- NX bit (no execute) in hardware page tables
 - Intel: XD (execute disable) bit
 - AMD: Enhanced Virus Protection
 - ARM: XN (execute never) bit

Data Execution Prevention (DEP)

- Attempting to execute instructions from stack, heap, or static buffers causes exception
- No way to execute shellcode... right?



Data Execution Prevention (DEP)



- Attempting to execute instructions from stack, heap, or static buffers causes exception
- No way to execute shellcode... right?
- We could still execute code that is already there, but is that useful?
- Isn't application code "good code"?
- Can "good code" do "bad things"?




Return-to-LIBC

- Aleph One wanted to execute a shell
 - `execv` system call with “/bin/sh” as argument:

```
int execv ( const char *path,
             char *const argv[ ] );
```
- Calling `execv` in C actually calls a wrapper function in libc that makes the system call
- But (what if) libc is already loaded into memory!

Return-to-LIBC

- Overwrite return address with address of execv
- Executing ret will transfer control to execv function that will make system call
- Need to set up arguments to execv on the stack



Chaining Function Calls

- What happens after we jump to a function via `ret`?

func0:

...
• `ret`

func1:


...
`ret`

func2:

...
`ret`

func3:

...
`ret`



Chaining Function Calls

- What happens after we jump to a function via `ret`?
- ESP points to address on stack of next function to run

func0:

...

ret

func1:

• ...

ret

func2:


...

ret

func3:

...

ret



Chaining Function Calls

- ESP points to address of next function to execute
- When func1 finishes it returns to func2

func0:

...

ret

func1:

...

•ret

func2:


...

ret

func3:

...

ret



Chaining Function Calls


- ESP points to address of next function to execute
- When func1 finishes it returns to func2, and so on

```
func0:  
...  
ret
```

```
func1:  
...  
ret
```



```
func2:  
• ...  
ret
```

```
func3:  
...  
ret
```




Chaining Function Calls

- ESP points to address of next function to execute
- When func1 finishes it returns to func2, and so on
- Functions will be ret-called in top-to-bottom stack order
- This allows us to chain multiple functions



Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

- **Observation:** We don't actually need to ret-call a real function...
- Any code that does something useful and ends in ret instruction will work
- Does not even need to be code emitted by compiler, just executable memory!
- Fragments of useful code ending in ret are called **gadgets**



return
OriEntEd
PROGRAMmNg

ROP Workflow

- Dump executable portions of target program
- Identify byte sequences ending in 0xC3 (ret)
- Figure out what each gadget does
 - <https://onlinedisassembler.com/>
- Chain together useful gadgets

```
0x0808e099 : pop ebx ; pop esi ; sub eax, 0x10 ; pop edi ; ret
0x08052131 : pop ebx ; pop esi ; sub eax, edi ; pop edi ; pop ebp ; ret
0x0808da30 : pop ebx ; pop esi ; xor eax, eax ; pop edi ; ret
0x080e2ed3 : pop ebx ; push cs ; adc al, 0x41 ; ret
0x080e3779 : pop ebx ; push cs ; adc al, 0x43 ; ret
0x080481a9 : pop ebx ; ret
0x080d7ebc : pop ebx ; ret 0x6f9
0x08099947 : pop ebx ; ret 8
0x080d539d : pop ebx ; retf
0x080a7b51 : pop ebx ; sar eax, 2 ; pop esi ; pop edi ; ret
0x0806c357 : pop ebx ; sub eax, 1 ; pop esi ; pop edi ; ret
0x0808c3c0 : pop ebx ; sub eax, esi ; pop esi ; pop edi ; pop ebp ; ret
0x0808ecc6 : pop ebx ; sub eax, esi ; pop esi ; pop edi ; ret
0x080b52a8 : pop ebx ; xor eax, eax ; pop esi ; pop edi ; pop ebp ; ret
0x08068e20 : pop ebx ; xor eax, eax ; pop esi ; pop edi ; ret
0x08063340 : pop ebx ; xor eax, eax ; ret
0x0804af03 : pop ecx ; add dword ptr [eax], eax ; add byte ptr [edi], cl ; retf 0x5389
```





Finding Gadgets

```
compy$ objdump -s /bin/ls
```

...

Contents of section .text:

...

804a530	2404a120	430608c7	44241800	000000c7	\$.. C...D\$.....
---------	----------	----------	----------	----------	-------------------

804a540	442414 c3	b90508c7	442410d3	b9050889	D\$.....D\$.....
---------	------------------	----------	----------	----------	------------------

...

804ad80	5c240489	0424e855	8b000085	c00f8462	\\$...\$.U.....b
---------	----------	----------	----------	----------	------------------

804ad90	10000039	c30f8595	0900008b	0d2c4406	...9.....,D.
---------	----------	-----------------	----------	----------	--------------

...

804c2e0	8b5c2410	8b168b4e	04334b04	331309d1	. \\$....N.3K.3...
---------	----------	----------	----------	----------	--------------------

804c2f0	740e8b1c	248b7424	0483c408	c38d7600	t...\$.t\$.....v.
---------	----------	----------	----------	-----------------	-------------------



Finding Gadgets

```
compy    44    inc %esp  
... 24 14    and $0x14, %al  
Conte    c3    ret
```

...	804a530	2404a1	430608c7	44241800	000000c7	\$.. C...D\$.....
	804a540	442414 c3	b90508c7	442410d3	b9050889	D\$.....D\$.....
...	804ad80	5c240489	0424e855	8b000085	c00f8462	\\$...\$.U.....b
	804ad90	10000039	c3 0f8595	0900008b	0d2c4406	...9.....,D.
...	804c2e0	8b5c2410	8b168b4e	04334b04	331309d1	. \\$....N.3K.3...
	804c2f0	740e8b1c	248b7424	0483c408	c3 8d7600	t...\$.t\$.....v.

Finding Gadgets

```
compy    44    inc %esp  
...     24 14    and $0x14, %al  
Conte    c3    ret
```

...

804a530	2404a1	430608c7	44241800	000000c7	\$.. C...D\$.....
804a540	442414c3	b90508c7	442410d3	b9050889	D\$.....D\$.....

...

804ad80	5c240489	0424e855	8b000085	c00f8462	\\$...\$.U.....b
804ad90	10000039	c30f8595	0900008b	0d2c4406	...9.....,D.

...

804c2e0	8b5c2410	.68b4e	04334b04	331309d1	. \\$....N.3K.3...
804c2	10 00	adc %al, (%eax)		408 c38d7600	t...\$.t\$.....v.
	00 39	add %bh, (%ecx)			
	c3	ret			

Finding Gadgets

```
compy    44    inc %esp  
...     24 14    and $0x14, %al  
Conte    c3    ret
```

```
...  
804a530 2404a1 41    8b 1c 24    mov (%esp), %ebx  
804a540 442414c3 b9 8b 74 24 04    mov 0x4(%esp), %esi  
...     83 c4 08    add $0x8, %esp  
804ad80 5c240489 04    c3    ret  
804ad90 10000039 c1 . . . . . , D.
```

```
...  
804c2e0 8b5c2410 .68b4e 04334b04 1309d1 .\$.N.3K.3...  
804c2 10 00    adc %al, (%eax) 408 c38d7600 t...$.t$....v.  
     00 39    add %bh, (%ecx)  
     c3    ret
```



Finding Gadgets

- Gadgets may be code that is not generated by the compiler
 - This gadget is a byte sequence that was *not* intended to be code
- Any suffix of a gadget is also a gadget

```
        44    inc %esp  
24 14    and $0x14, %al  
        c3    ret
```

```
        24 14    and $0x14, %al  
        c3    ret
```




Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- What can I do with these?

8b 1c 24	mov (%esp), %ebx	89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
8b 74 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %esi	31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp),
c3	ret	%edi	
		89 1f	mov %ebx,(%edi)
b8 01 00 00 00	mov \$0x1, %eax	89 0a	mov %ecx,(%edx)
8b 34 24	mov (%esp), %esi	8b 54 24 20	mov
8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi	0x20(%esp),%edx	
83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	89 32	mov %esi,(%edx)
c3	ret	83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
		5b	pop %ebx
c9	leave	5e	pop %esi
c3	ret	5f	pop %edi
		5d	pop %ebp
		c3	ret

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Set ESP and EBP to arbitrary value





Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

G000: 8b 1c 24	mov (%esp), %ebx	G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G003: 8b 74 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %esi	G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G007: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp),
G00a: c3	ret	G108: %edi	
		G10a: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G100: b8 01 00 00 00	mov \$0x1, %eax	G10c: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G105: 8b 34 24	mov (%esp), %esi	G110: 8b 54 24 20	mov
G108: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi	G112: 0x20(%esp), %edx	
G10c: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G115: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G10f: c3	ret	G116: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
		G117: 5b	pop %ebx
G200: c9	leave	G118: 5e	pop %esi
G201: c3	ret	G119: 5f	pop %edi
		5d	pop %ebp
		c3	ret



LOW

%esp →



HIGH

- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

G000: 8b 1c 24	mov (%esp), %ebx	G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G003: 8b 74 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %esi	G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G007: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G00a: c3	ret	G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx,(%edi)
		G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx,(%edx)
		G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G100: b8 01 00 00 00	mov \$0x1, %eax	G110: 89 32	mov %esi,(%edx)
G105: 8b 34 24	mov (%esp), %esi	G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G108: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi	G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G10c: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G116: 5e	pop %esi
G10f: c3	ret	G117: 5f	pop %edi
		G118: 5d	pop %ebp
		G119: c3	ret
G200: c9	leave		
G201: c3	ret		



Other gadgets from /bin/ls

LOW

%esp →



HIGH

- Write four byte value X to location Y ?


G000: 8b 1c 24	mov (%esp), %ebx	G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G003: 8b 74 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %esi	G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G007: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G00a: c3	ret	G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx,(%edi)
		G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx,(%edx)
		G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G100: b8 01 00 00 00	mov \$0x1, %eax	G110: 89 32	mov %esi,(%edx) ←
G105: 8b 34 24	mov (%esp), %esi	G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G108: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi	G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G10c: 83 c4 08	add \$0x8, %esp	G116: 5e	pop %esi
G10f: c3	ret	G117: 5f	pop %edi
		G118: 5d	pop %ebp
		G119: c3	ret
G200: c9	leave		
G201: c3	ret		

use this
to write to
memory



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls



- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

Want:


- X in $\%esi$
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx) ←
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

use this
to write to
memory



LOW



- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$
- Y in $\%edx$

G100:	89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102:	31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104:	8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108:	89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a:	89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c:	8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110:	89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112:	83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115:	5b	pop %ebx
G116:	5e	pop %esi ←
G117:	5f	pop %edi
G118:	5d	pop %ebp
G119:	c3	ret

use this to
load %esi



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi ←
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret





LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:


- X in $\%esi$
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

c3

•ret

%esp →



HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	•pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

c3

ret

%esp →



HIGH



LOW


Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	•pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret



HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls


- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

will execute also





LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →



HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116
X
DON'T CARE
DON'T CARE
HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

use this to load %edx

G116
X
DON'T CARE
DON'T CARE
HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

G100:	89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102:	31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104:	8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108:	89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a:	89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c:	8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110:	89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112:	83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115:	5b	pop %ebx
G116:	5e	pop %esi
G117:	5f	pop %edi
G118:	5d	pop %ebp
G119:	c3	•ret

%esp →

use this to
load %edx



G116	X
	DON'T CARE
	DON'T CARE
G10c	

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$

<p>G100: 89 ea</p> <p>G102: 31 c0</p> <p>G104: 8b 7c 24 04</p> <p>G108: 89 1f</p> <p>G10a: 89 0a</p> <p>G10c: 8b 54 24 20</p> <p>G110: 89 32</p> <p>G112: 83 c4 0c</p> <p>G115: 5b</p> <p>G116: 5e</p> <p>G117: 5f</p> <p>G118: 5d</p> <p>G119: c3</p>	%esp →	<p>mov %ebp, %edx</p> <p>xor %eax, %eax</p> <p>mov 0x4(%esp), %edi</p> <p>mov %ebx, (%edi)</p> <p>mov %ecx, (%edx)</p> <p>•mov 0x20(%esp),%edx</p> <p>mov %esi, (%edx)</p> <p>add \$0xc,%esp</p> <p>pop %ebx</p> <p>pop %esi</p> <p>pop %edi</p> <p>pop %ebp</p> <p>ret</p>
--	--------	--

G116
X
DON'T CARE
DON'T CARE
G10c
HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$
 - Y in $0x20(\%esp)$

G100: 89 ea mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0 xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04 mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20 •**mov 0x20(%esp),%edx**
G110: 89 32 mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b pop %ebx
G116: 5e pop %esi
G117: 5f pop %edi
G118: 5d pop %ebp
G119: c3 ret

%esp →





LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ?

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0 xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04 mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20 mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32 •
 mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b pop %ebx
G116: 5e pop %esi
G117: 5f pop %edi
G118: 5d pop %ebp
G119: c3 ret

%esp →



HIGH



Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

<code>G100: 89 ea</code>	mov %ebp, %edx
<code>G102: 31 c0</code>	xor %eax, %eax
<code>G104: 8b 7c 24 04</code>	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
<code>G108: 89 1f</code>	mov %ebx, (%edi)
<code>G10a: 89 0a</code>	mov %ecx, (%edx)
<code>G10c: 8b 54 24 20</code>	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
<code>G110: 89 32</code>	mov %esi, (%edx)
<code>G112: 83 c4 0c</code>	•add \$0xc,%esp
<code>G115: 5b</code>	pop %ebx
<code>G116: 5e</code>	pop %esi
<code>G117: 5f</code>	pop %edi
<code>G118: 5d</code>	pop %ebp
<code>G119: c3</code>	ret

%esp →

G10c

X

DON'T CARE

DON'T CARE

G116

Y



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)%esp →
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	•pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

G116	
X	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
G10c	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
Y	
HIGH	



LOW


Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx,(%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx,(%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi,(%edx)%esp →
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	•pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret





LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp %esp →
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	•pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

G116	
X	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
G10c	
DON'T CARE	
Y	

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	•pop %ebp
G119: c3	ret

%esp →

Y

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx,(%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx,(%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi,(%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116

X

DON'T CARE

DON'T CARE

G10c

DON'T CARE

Y

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116

X

DON'T CARE

DON'T CARE

G10c

DON'T CARE

¿G119?

Y

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116	
X	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
G10c	
DON'T CARE	
¿G119?	
Y	

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓

```
G100: 89 ea      mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0      xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04  mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f      mov %ebx,(%edi)
G10a: 89 0a      mov %ecx,(%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20  mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32      mov %esi,(%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c    add $0xc,%esp
G115: 5b         pop %ebx
G116: 5e         pop %esi
G117: 5f         pop %edi
G118: 5d         pop %ebp
G119: c3         •ret
```

%esp →

Y

G116
X
DON'T CARE
DON'T CARE
G10c
DON'T CARE
HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓
- Consume Y , then ret

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116

X

DON'T CARE

DON'T CARE

G10c

DON'T CARE

Y

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓
- Consume Y ,
then `ret`

G100: 89 ea	mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0	xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04	mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f	mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a	mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20	mov 0x20(%esp), %edx
G110: 89 32	mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c	add \$0xc,%esp
G115: 5b	pop %ebx
G116: 5e	pop %esi
G117: 5f	pop %edi
G118: 5d	pop %ebp
G119: c3	•ret

%esp →

G116	
X	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
G10c	
DON'T CARE	
G118	
Y	

HIGH



LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓
- Consume Y ,
then `ret`

```
G100: 89 ea      mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0      xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04 mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f      mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a      mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20 mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32      mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c    add $0xc,%esp
G115: 5b          pop %ebx
G116: 5e          pop %esi
G117: 5f          pop %edi
G118: 5d          •pop %ebp
G119: c3          ret
```

%esp →

G116	
X	
DON'T CARE	
DON'T CARE	
G10c	
DON'T CARE	
G118	
Y	

HIGH



LOW


Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write X to location Y ? ✓

Want:

- X in $\%esi$ ✓
- Y in $\%edx$ ✓
- Consume Y ,
then `ret` ✓

```
G100: 89 ea      mov %ebp, %edx
G102: 31 c0      xor %eax, %eax
G104: 8b 7c 24 04 mov 0x4(%esp), %edi
G108: 89 1f      mov %ebx, (%edi)
G10a: 89 0a      mov %ecx, (%edx)
G10c: 8b 54 24 20 mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32      mov %esi, (%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c    add $0xc,%esp
G115: 5b          pop %ebx
G116: 5e          pop %esi
G117: 5f          pop %edi
G118: 5d          pop %ebp
G119: c3          •ret
```





LOW

Other gadgets from /bin/ls

- Write four byte value X to location Y ?

%esp →	G116	
	X	
	DON'T CARE	
	DON'T CARE	
	G10c	
	DON'T CARE	
	G118	
	Y	
	...	

```
G10c: 8b 54 24 20    mov 0x20(%esp),%edx
G110: 89 32          mov %esi,(%edx)
G112: 83 c4 0c        add $0xc,%esp
G115: 5b              pop %ebx
G116: 5e              pop %esi
G117: 5f              pop %edi
G118: 5d              pop %ebp
G119: c3              ret
```



Return Oriented Programming

- Gadgets serve the role of instructions
- ROP programs assembled from gadgets
- There are ROP compilers to automate this

	Normal programming	Return-oriented programming
Instruction pointer	<code>%eip</code>	<code>%esp</code>
No-op	<code>nop</code>	<code>ret</code>
Jump	<code>jmp addr</code>	<code>movl addr, %esp</code>
Variable storage	Registers and memory	Memory


Return Oriented Programming



- Effectively defeated DEP as an effective defense against control flow hijacking
- Also used for attacking Harvard architecture systems (separate program and data memory)
- Vibrant area of research
 - –Persistent ROP, ROP without returns, etc.

Another Approach

- Aleph One needed to know where shellcode will be placed on stack
- ROP needs to know address of gadgets
 - May also need to know location on stack
- Can we make it harder to find these locations??






- Randomize location of stack, heap, and code
- Locations must be not be known to attacker
 - Randomize on every launch (best)
 - Randomize at compile time
- Implemented (in some form) on most Oses
- Binaries must be compiled to support ASLR
 - Code must be position independent
 - GCC and Clang: -fPIE


32-bit PAX ASLR

- Implementation of ASLR for Linux userspace

PaX ASLR process memory layout




Traditional layout





32-bit PAX ASLR (x86) Base Addresses

Stack:



Mapped area:



Executable code, static variables, and heap:





Control Flow Hijacking Attacks

- **Altering control flow** of a target program to cause it **to do what attacker wants**
- Strategy:
 1. **Identify a code pointer that is eventually loaded into PC**
 2. **Overwrite code pointer (memory write vulnerability)**
 3. **Divert PC to code that will do useful work (for attacker)**
- ASLR blocks step 3 because attacker does not know where the shellcode (or ROP gadgets) are located
- ASLR may also block step 2 if memory write vulnerability requires knowing a specific destination address to write to

Attacking ASLR

- Guess!
 - May be feasible on 32-bit systems: e.g. $2^{16} = 65,536$ possible PaX code offsets






Attacking ASLR

- Guess!
 - May be feasible on 32-bit systems: e.g. $2^{16} = 65,536$ possible PaX code offsets
- Use a memory disclosure vulnerability to see parts of target memory
- Stack is a rich source of pointers to stack, heap, and text (code)

```
struct packet {  
    unsigned int len;  
    char data[256];  
};  
  
void buggy(const void * ptr, size_t len) {  
    struct packet pkt;  
  
    if (len < 256) {  
        pkt.len = len;  
        memcpy(pkt.data, ptr, len);  
        send(&pkt, sizeof(pkt));  
    }  
}
```

Heap Uncertainty


- Location of memory returned by malloc hard for attacker to predict: depends on sequence of previous calls to malloc and free
- Allocator uncertainty and ASLR make it hard to know exact location of heap shellcode





Heap Spray

- Allocate many instances of shellcode on the heap
- Prefix shellcode with NOP sled so that jump into NOP region will reach start of shellcode
- NOP sled and spray (many objects) compensate for address uncertainty by creating larger “target” for jump





Heap Spray

Mapped area:



Executable code, static variables, and heap:



- Max heap size is 1GB in 32-bit mode (PaX ASLR)
 - Lowest heap addr: 0x00000000
 - Highest heap addr: 0x3fffffff

Heap Spray

Mapped area:



Executable code, static variables, and heap:



- Max heap size is 1GB in 32-bit mode (PaX ASLR)
- Allocate 750 objects of 1MB in size
 - Each object is NOP sled + shellcode
 - A jump to 0x20000000 will land in NOP sled with high probability



Heap Spray

- Heap spray requires attacker to be able to allocate objects on the heap — how?
 - Provide as input to target program
 - User input loaded into a heap-allocated buffer
- Browsers are popular targets:
 - Victim users visits malicious Web site
 - Malicious site serves JavaScript to browser
 - Heap objects allocated from within JavaScript
 - Use control flow vulnerability to jump to heap



Control Flow Hijacking Attacks

- **Altering control flow** of a target program to cause it **to do what attacker wants**
- Strategy:
 1. **Identify a code pointer that is eventually loaded into PC**
 2. **Overwrite code pointer (memory write vulnerability)**
 3. **Divert PC to code that will do useful work (for attacker)**
- ASLR blocks step 3 because attacker does not know where the shellcode (or ROP gadgets) are located — **everywhere in heap!**
- ASLR may also block step 2 if memory write vulnerability requires knowing a specific destination address to write to — **spray!**



Heap Spray

- Ok, but what about DEP?
 - –Prevents us from executing code on the heap
- ROPspray? — not a thing :(
 - –Overwritten code ptr must point to existing code
- Memory disclosure vulnerabilities to get text segment or libc location

Just-in-Time Compilation



- Just-in-time (JIT) code compilation is used to improve JavaScript performance in browsers
 - JIT compiler output is executable native code
- Output is in executable memory!
 - JavaScript code is untrusted, JIT generated native code is not arbitrary native code
- Can't write shellcode in JavaScript because JavaScript limited in what it is allowed to do



JIT Spray

- Compiler-generated code may have unintended sequences of native code
 - E.g. from JavaScript string and integer literals
- Carefully crafted JavaScript can produce native NOP sled + shellcode after JIT!
- Create many instances of JITed code
- Use control flow hijack to jump to this code
- Used to exploit Web browsers



The Eternal War in Memory...

- **Altering control flow** of a target program to cause it **to do what attacker wants**
 1. **Identify a code pointer that is eventually loaded into PC**
 - **Return address on stack, virtual function pointers**
 2. **Overwrite code pointer (memory write vulnerability)**
 - **classic buffer overflows**
 - **stack canaries, finding + fixing bugs in code**
 - **Non-stack buffer overflows and other memory write vuln**
 3. **Divert PC to code that will do useful work (for attacker)**
 - **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
 - **Return-to-libc and return-oriented programming (ROP)**
 - **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)**
 - **Memory disclosure vulnerabilities**
 - **Heap Spray and JIT Spray**

The Eternal War in Memory...

- Anyhow, time to move on.

