

TECHNICAL LEADERSHIP

Ruth Malan

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Technical Leadership Workshops

See ruthmalan.com for schedule and more information.

Upcoming:

- October 17 and 24, 2023 at 12 PM – 3 PM Eastern Time



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Decisions

*Leadership and
decision making*

*Decisions constrain
and enable*

*When do we make
them?*

*Forces and
Tradeoffs*

Mental Models

Context

*How do we make
decisions?*

Significance



*Experiments and
Feedback*

Communication

DECISIONS

Kinds of Decisions

- Distinctions, considerations
- ## Making Decisions
- How we make decisions
 - Context and tradeoffs
- ## Socializing Decisions



Decisions Across Boundaries


Recall: Leadership plays a role when we're trying to do something bigger than what we can accomplish alone.

We can't have everyone making every decision; it's not feasible or practical or desirable. And, typically, we value moving decision making to those who have necessary perspective and insight into options and impact. This also means that some decisions — those that need perspective across boundaries — need to be made at broader scope.

As scope of decision impact increases, what is riding on them is all the more critical.

The demands on expertise and experience, increase with impact. Further, as the scope or span of impact increases (that is, the decision has impact across team and other organizational or system boundaries), so too do the organizational challenges. Decisions with organizational (strategy, team, etc.) impact, need to be made with wisdom (understand impact of choices), strategic acuity, and keen organizational sensibility. Those with technical impact, require technical wisdom.

Leaders make decisions that set context for further decisions. They enable something strategic, but also constrain and shape — but only as essential to system outcomes. And decisions that cross contexts or boundaries, need leadership — to help others understand the need and outcomes, and consequences, and what their role is in making the decision effective. Leaders communicate strategic intent and decisions, and foster organizational will and goodwill, to facilitate work towards coherent strategic outcomes.



We need to make decisions.

Decisions Constrain

'Limiting or closing off alternatives is the most common understanding of the term "constraint."

— Alicia Juarrero



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Image from video from LeanUX 2015

Constraints are limitations we need to be aware of. They restrict choices open to us.

Decisions Reduce the Options Space

Decisions constrain—they eliminate options. Alicia Juarrero observes that this is what we commonly mean by constraint—this limiting or closing off of alternatives; this altering of the probability distribution of available alternatives. But! In so doing, Alicia notes, they make the system "diverge from chance, from randomness."

Illustration of Constraints that Limit

"The connection of the tibia and the peronei to the knee joint constrains the movement of the lower leg in such a way that it makes no sense to examine the tibia's physiology, for example, independently of the knee. The tibia's connection to the knee gives the former characteristics which it wouldn't have otherwise: it can move in some ways but not others. The constraints which the connections subject the lower leg to reduce the number of ways in which the leg can move: it can bend backwards but not forwards, for example. In this example a constraint is a reduction of the leg's state space. This is the most common understanding of the term "constraint" . "


— Alicia Juarrero, "Causality as Constraint"

Not Make Decisions?

"Questions about whether design is necessary or affordable are quite beside the point: design is inevitable.

The alternative to good design is bad design, not no design at all."

— Douglas Martin



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Decisions will be made -- Implicitly or Explicitly; Intentionally or Accidentally,

The question is not "do we have a strategy?" or "does the organization, product or system have an architecture?" What we have is more or less intentional, more or less emergent, and more or less accidental. If we're not making big decisions (intentionally), we're allowing a myriad small decisions, some implicit and not reflectively weighed and checked, to add up, to determine strategy or architecture. So the question is not do we have a strategy or design. But rather "how good is it?" Can it be better? How so?

For example, if we want agility, we need to design and guide evolution for agility, for change and for responsiveness. We need to do this for the organization (teams, organizational and team dynamics, ..) and for the systems (architecture and design) and for the development, deployment and operations environment.


"Every software-intensive system has an architecture. In some cases that architecture is intentional, while in others it is accidental. Most of the time it is both"

— Grady Booch

Constraints Restrict, But

“But if all constraints restricted a thing's degrees of freedom in this way, organisms (whether phylogenetically or developmentally) would progressively do less and less.”

— Alicia Juarrero



While True, ...

Constraints close off avenues, restrict the degrees of freedom, but if this was all they did, systems, including organisms, would just do less and less, as they became more constrained (Alicia Juarrero).

From Alicia Juarrero's talk (Deliberate Complexity Conference):

Constraints are conditions or factors that raise or lower barriers to energy, matter, and information flow – without themselves directly transferring energy. Example: an organism's vasculature does not impart energy directly; it channels and organizes energy flow.

Context dependent constraints enable complexity: some constraints link separate and independent elements and processes such that they become conditional on one another. They become inherently context-dependent. Enabling constraints facilitate the weaving together of interdependencies (among parts, and between parts and context). Examples: synchrony, entrainment, alignment. Enabling constraints self-organize interdependent, coherent, coordination dynamics (to create/enable new coherent dynamics). As a result, a complex system is embedded (not just plunked) in a context (temporal as well as spatial).

Source: Video of Alicia Juarrero's talk at the Deliberate Complexity online conference in 2022: Complexity is not Complication, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmtjQZCIsqY>

Also recommended: Constraints that Enable Innovation - Alicia Juarrero
<https://vimeo.com/128934608>

“Think of constraints not just as restrictions, but as changes in probability of what's going on, changes in the likelihood of something”

— Alicia Juarrero

Constraints Enable

"constraints not only reduce the alternatives — they also create alternatives. Constraints, that is, can also create properties which a component exhibits in virtue of its embeddedness in a system, properties it would otherwise not have."

— Alicia Juarrero
"Causality as Constraint"

ALICIA JUARRERO

CAUSALITY AS CONSTRAINT

INTRODUCTION

Suppose you are trying to arrange furniture you already own in your new house. "Each piece of furniture has some weak constraint associated with it. For example, the bed must go against a wall because the headboard is rickety; two small tables go on either side of the bed; the couch is missing its back legs and so sits on books, which means it must go against a wall so that the back is visible; and so on. The constraints are not strict, though. Furniture pieces are not rigid, so each one can be satisfied in many ways: the bed, for example, can be put against one or several walls. However, once the bed is placed, the entire arrangement may be determined: there may be only one other wall large enough for the couch, the tables must go next to the bed, and so forth" (Koesten & Koening, 1992).

How does one determine the balance between the constraints and the particular furniture arrangement that results? Despite deliberately sidestepping causal language in formulating that question, it is difficult to avoid the sense that "simultaneous constraint satisfaction" is what Koesten & Koening's example is somehow referring to for the way the furniture gets arranged. This example suggests that constraints satisfy at least one oft-cited requirement of causal relationships: constraints support what philosophers call "counterfactual conditionals": "that if A were to happen, then B would happen". In his explanation of how constraints work, Salthe says that the resulting furniture arrangement would not be what it is. And yet it is clear that the furniture arrangement in the case the furniture arrangement the same way cue sticks cause balls to move. As Salthe says, although constraints carry information that has meaning for the entities involved in making them true, the information is not dynamically involved in the process (Salthe, 1985, p. 7).

The concept of constraint was first used formally in the Physical Mechanics. Although never actually defining it, Lindsay uses the term in his introductory textbook first to refer to the way in which the motion of a simple pendulum or a particle on an incline is constrained (Lindsay, 1919, p. 10). He compares this kind of motion to movement to move along some specific curves or surfaces" (*ibid.*, p. 239, my emphasis). Later on, in his explanation of oscillations, Lindsay states that "some of the most important cases of constrained motion are those in which particles are connected by rods, strings, etc., and cannot move except while so connected". In his explanation of D'Alembert's principle, Lindsay states: "If the masses were free to move in any direction (i.e. if they were not connected in any way or forced to move along certain curves or surfaces) ... " (*ibid.*, p. 251); and in his discussion of Gauss' Principle of Least Constraint Lindsay states that "systems being subjected to certain constraints (i.e. to masses which perhaps constrained each other to move on certain paths, or constrained to move along certain curves or surfaces) ... " (*ibid.*, p. 254). I assume that in the last clause the word "constrained" means, as in the earlier quotes, either

G. Van de Vyver et al. (eds.), Evolutionary Systems, 233–242.
© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Constraints Create Alternatives

"Constraints not only reduce alternatives—they also create alternatives." If we take (Alicia Juarrero's example of) language, the constraints of syntax allow meaning to emerge.

Wholes arise from Constraints, and Wholes give rise to Constraints

"parts interact to produce novel, emergent wholes; in turn, these distributed wholes as wholes regulate and constrain the parts that make them up"

— Alicia Juarrero, "Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System"

Juarrero (1999) distinguishes governing from enabling constraints: governing constraints regulate and restrict, while enabling constraints make a new level of complexity possible.

Context-sensitive constraints [...] synchronize and correlate previously independent parts into a systemic whole

— Alicia Juarrero

By curtailing the potential variation of component behavior, [...] context-dependent constraints paradoxically also create new freedoms for the overall system.


— Alicia Juarrero

We need to make decisions. But when...?

Last Responsible Moment

"the last responsible moment
[:] the moment at which failing
to make a decision eliminates
an important alternative."

— Mary and Tom Poppendieck



Last Responsible Moment

Jeremy Miller on delaying decisions until the last responsible moment:

"The key is to make decisions as late as you can responsibly wait because that is the point at which you have the most information on which to base the decision."

And Jeff Atwood:

"Deciding too late is dangerous, but deciding too early in the rapidly changing world of software development is arguably even more dangerous. Let the principle of Last Responsible Moment be your guide."

*"delay commitment until the **last responsible moment**, that is, the moment at which failing to make a decision eliminates an important alternative. If commitments are delayed beyond the last responsible moment, then decisions are made by default, which is generally not a good approach to making decisions."*

— Mary and Tom Poppendieck

YouArentGonnaNeedIt (often abbreviated **YAGNI**, or YagNi on this wiki) is an ExtremeProgramming practice which states:

"Always implement things when you *actually* need them, never when you just *foresee* that you need them."

Source: <http://c2.com/xp/YouArentGonnaNeedIt.html>

Source: <https://blog.codinghorror.com/the-last-responsible-moment/>

Earliest Responsible Moment

"I prefer to make decisions when they have positive impacts. Making decisions early that are going to have huge implications isn't bad or always wasteful. Just be sure they are vetted and revisited if need be."

— Rebecca Wirfs-Brock

The Responsible Designer

Agile Architecture Myths #2
Architecture Decisions Should Be Made At the Last Responsible Moment

Creating Ground Under the Feet

Strategy and architecture decisions create context for further decisions, establishing relationships and reducing the decision space. This is good. It reduces the overload of overwhelming ambiguity and uncertainty, by narrowing the space and putting stakes in the ground. Now we can probe and test, to see how we're doing. We make certain key decisions early, to "put ground under our feet." Huh? Ground? Metaphorically speaking, but to be able to move forward, we have to start to shape the space, gain traction. More metaphors.

We have to decide what we are going to do (next, and at all, and if we want to be proactive about cohesive and concerted action, where we are headed), and how. We may make ad hoc decisions

"I believe that you can and should look ahead. And that most developers, given half a chance, are pretty good at incorporating past experiences and making anticipatory design choices."

— *Rebecca Wirfs-Brock*

implicitly on the fly without considered reflection, but some of our decisions are going to cleave the design space, ruling some opportunities out. This will be true whether they are implicit or explicit, considered, reasoned and probed, or made on the fly on guesses or without even knowing there were other choices we could have made. Better, if we anticipate they'll be highly consequential, if well considered.

You know the adage: "What's the best time to plant a tree? 20 years ago. What's the second best time? Now." Well, that's true, unless we

don't need a tree. And there isn't something more critical to do now. But the point is important: trees can't be moved so they constrain and set context for other landscaping decisions and they take a long time to grow, so to have the benefit of a bigger tree, we need to start as soon as we can.

"Nothing is built in stone; all is built in sand. But we must build as if the sand were stone."

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

Irreversible Decisions

"Some decisions are consequential and irreversible or nearly irreversible [...] and these decisions must be made methodically, carefully, slowly, with great deliberation and consultation."

— Jeff Bezos



To our shareholders:

This year, Amazon became the fastest company ever to reach \$100 billion in annual sales. Also this year, Amazon Web Services is reaching \$10 billion in annual sales if... doing so at a pace even faster than Amazon achieved.

What's going on here? Both were planted as tiny seeds and both have grown exponentially without significant acquisitions into meaningful and large businesses, quickly. Hopefully, the two could hardly be more different. One serves consumers and the other serves enterprises. One is famous for being boxes and the other for AWS. Is it only a coincidence that two such dissimilar offerings grew so quickly under one roof? Luck plays an unusual and very ordinary role in success, but there are other factors that support the rapid growth and the connection between these two businesses. Under the surface, the two are not so different after all. They share a distinctive corporate culture. We call it "customer obsession." It's not just a marketing slogan. It's a way of life. It's talking about customer obsession rather than competitive obsession, eagerness to invent and pioneer, willingness to fail, the patience to think long-term, and the taking of professional pride in operational excellence. Though that lens, AWS and Amazon retail are very similar indeed.

A soul about corporate cultures, for better or for worse, they are enduring, stable, hard to change. They can be a source of strength, but also a source of inflexibility, of resistance to change, but also of stability. If you're discovering it, uncovering it, —not creating it. It is created slowly over time by the people and by events — by the choices we make, by the way we act, by the way we treat our customers, by the way we treat our culture; it will fit certain people like a custom-made glove. The reason cultures are so stable in time is because people self-select. Someone energized by competitive and may select to be happy in one culture, while someone who loves to invent and pioneer may select to be happy in another culture. This is why we've built two very slightly distinctive corporate cultures. We never claim that our approach is the right one... just that it's ours... and over the last 20 years, we've attracted a large group of like-minded people. Folks who find our approach emerging and meaningful.

One area where I think we are especially distinctive is failure. I believe we are the best place in the world to experiment, and if you know in advance that it's going to work, it's not a good experiment. Most large organizations make the mistake of failing fast, but failing often. We've learned that it's better to fail often and learn from those. Optimistic returns often come from betting against conventional wisdom, and conventional wisdom is usually right. But there are times when conventional wisdom is wrong. And when it's wrong, it's often going to be wrong nine times out of ten. We all know that if you swing for the fences, you're going to strike out a lot, but you're also going to hit some home runs. The difference between baseball and business, however, is that baseball is a game of statistics. You can't really tell if you're hitting home runs until you've hit them. In business, the most runs you can get is four. In business, every once in a while, when you step up to the plate, you can score 1,000 runs. This long-tailed distribution of returns is why it's important to be bold. Big winners pay for many experiments.

AWS, Marketplace and Prime are all examples of bold bets at Amazon that worked, and we're fortunate to have these three big pillars. They have helped us grow into a large company, and there are certain things that only large companies can do. With a tip of the hat to our Seattle neighbors, no matter how good an entrepreneur you are, you can't just start a company and expect it to fly. You need a scale to help your company to fly in anyway. Used well, our scale enables us to build services for customers that we could otherwise never even contemplate. But also, if we're not vigilant and thoughtful, size could slow us down and diminish our inventiveness.

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"One common pitfall for large organizations — one that hurts speed and inventiveness — is "one-size-fits-all" decision making."

—Jeff Bezos

No "One Time to Rule Them All" Decision Making

Strategy and architecture are about scope and impact, and not something that is simply determined by being done upfront — that is, by timing. Rather, the other way round. If it's strategically or structurally significant, we want timing to factor in decision making. Is this something we need to pay attention to now? Why?

No "One-Size Fits All" Decision Making Either

In his 2015 letter to Amazon shareholders, Jeff Bezos made this important distinction between irreversible and reversible decisions, emphasizing that consequential irreversible decisions need to be made with great deliberation and consultation.

Source: <https://www.sec.gov/Archives>

**Not all decisions are equal.
What differences make a difference?**

Irreversible Decisions

"If you walk through and don't like what you see on the other side, you can't get back to where you were before."

— Jeff Bezos



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Attending to Irreversible, Consequential Decisions

We need to make those decisions deliberately, attentively

Shane Parrish collected together a useful series of decision making heuristics in a twitter thread. Here are several (the numbers are Parrish's) that we've selected for their bearing in the case of more consequential decisions [and we've added a few notes]:

17. Put things on a reversibility/consequence grid — irreversible and high consequence decisions likely require more time. The rest of the time you can usually go fast.

10. The rule of 5. Think about what the decision looks like 5 days, 5 weeks, 5 months, 5 years, 5 decades.
11. Let other people's hindsight become your foresight. [Do the research; draw on expertise.]
13. Ask what information would cause you to change your mind. If you don't have that information, find it. If you do, track [it] religiously.
22. Walk around the decision from the perspective of everyone implicated (shareholders, employees, regulators, customers, partners, etc.)
26. Ask yourself "and then what?" [and "what if?" and "what else?"]

Source: Shane Parrish (@farnamstreet), on twitter, 5 Aug, 2018

<https://twitter.com/farnamstreet/status/1026105498372845571>

Reversible Decisions

“But most decisions aren’t like that – they are changeable, reversible – they’re two-way doors.”

— Jeff Bezos



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Reversible Decisions

It's worth highlighting two takeaways from Bezos's insights here:

- where we can, make decisions reversible — reduce the cost of change.
- pay particular attention to consequential irreversible decisions — attend to those that have high cost of change

"If you're good at course correcting, being wrong may be less costly than you think"—Jeff Bezos

Reversibility Approaches

In *Taming Complexity with Reversibility*, Kent Beck outlines several approaches used at Facebook for making changes smaller, and getting feedback more rapidly, so decisions can be tried out and assessed, and reversed if they don't pan out well (enough), before they become entangled in other decisions, expectations and habits. These include:

- *Development servers*. Each engineer has their own copy of the entire site. Engineers can make a change, see the consequences, and reverse the change in seconds without affecting anyone else.
- *Code review*. Engineers can propose a change, get feedback, and improve or abandon it in minutes or hours, all before affecting any people using Facebook.

- *Internal usage*. Engineers can make a change, get feedback from thousands of employees using the change, and roll it back in an hour.

Source: Kent Beck, *Taming Complexity with Reversibility*

In part, these satisfy the second of Palchinsky's Principles:

"when trying something new, do it on a scale where failure is survivable" — Peter Palchinsky

(ir)Reversible Decisions

A significant decision that may be reversible to begin with, tends (over time) to become “entangled” with other decisions, and less readily backed out of.

The system isn't just coupled, but coupled to past assumptions.



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(ir)Reversible Decisions

We have this interplay between decisions made early or next, to bring the benefit of those decisions forward, and decisions deferred to retain options. Even decisions about where we start, have consequences. We canalize pretty quickly. That is, we reduce the space of designs that are reachable. We gain an identity, internally and in the market. That shapes in ways we notice and don't — we make assumptions about value to customers and users, about system capabilities we're creating and so need to build in our teams, and so on. Sure, we (or the market) test(s) our theory of value — in so doing, shoring up the assumptions we proceed on. As users integrate our system into their workflows and systems, they build up expectations or assumptions about how things work, and ought to. As do we. There are a myriad ways our systems become coupled and resist change. Pretty soon, we call them “legacy systems” in that wry sense of a legacy we both value (or at least depend on) and regret. Change becomes costly (in various terms, including economic, but also factors such as capabilities and expertise we've built and no longer need which has technical, social and emotional impacts that require substantive organizational/political will) and hard. It rends and ripples through the systems of interconnected, inter-reliant systems.

Leading is about creating conditions for decision courage (we need to make some, now and soon) and decision scrutiny (we need to bring impacts into view and figure out what to do). Judgement and discernment factors. Including discernment about the scale and scope of the decision and its impacts. We're talking here about decisions of substantive consequence and non-local impacts.

The challenges of “modernizing” aging systems go well beyond “the technology”—the entanglements that create inertia are not just in “the code” and “the stack”... They run deep—into assumptions about our very identity, even.

Decision Making

'You need strategies that help rule things out. That's the opposite of saying, "This is what my gut is telling me; let me gather information to confirm it."

— Gary Klein

Conditions for Intuitive Expertise
A Failure to Disagree

David Kahneman
Gary Klein
Princeton University
Applied Research Associates

This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often mentioned in the literature: the naturalistic decision-making (NDM) and the intuitive decision-making (IDM). Starting from the observation that intuition and expertise are often confused, and sometimes favored, the authors attempt to map the domain of NDM and IDM. They find that NDM is based on overconfidence and biased impressions. They conclude that the two approaches are not compatible. NDM requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's representativeness of that environment. In contrast, IDM requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's representativeness of that environment. Subjective expertise is not a reliable indicator of judge merit or performance.

Keywords: intuition, expertise, overconfidence, heuristics, judgment

In this article we report on an effort to compare our views on the issues of intuition and expertise and to discuss the evidence for our respective positions. When discussing intuition and expertise, we have to consider both the general issue and specific issues such as the nature of intuition and with good reason. One of us (DK) has spent much time and effort on the question of how to teach people to rely on expert intuition in executive decision making and identified the need for a better understanding of intuition. Another scholar and practitioner who study naturalistic decision making (NDM). The other (DK) has spent much of his career trying to understand the nature of expertise and how it was commonly found to be flawed, to be identified with the "business school" view of management.

A surprise awaited us when we got together to consider our views on intuition and expertise. We were mostly in agreement, but there were some differences. Our shared beliefs are much more specific than the common place view of intuition and expertise. We accept the common rate and sometimes off the mark. We accept the commonplace, of course, but we also have similar opinions about more specific issues. For example, we believe that skilled intuitive judgment develops with experience? What are the characteristics of an expert? Can experts produce overconfidence than genuine skill? Because we largely agree on these points, we have decided to favor generally similar recommendations to organizations seeking to develop intuition and expertise.

In spite of all this agreement, however, we find that we are still separated in many ways: by divergent attitudes, preferences about facts, and feelings about fighting words such as "intuition" and "expertise." We believe that these differences must be taken seriously.

We begin with a brief review of the origins and development of the two perspectives on intuition and expertise. This is followed by a discussion of the most prominent points of contrast between the two perspectives (Kahneman & Klein, 1999; Klein, 1993; Hill-Grove, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Peters & Kahneman, 1994). Next we present some claims that are often made about the two perspectives and develop, followed by several suggestions for ways to improve each perspective.

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Decisions Are Perfectly Rational, Right?

"Rigor is not a substitute for imagination."

— Gary Klein

"I worry about leaders in complex situations who don't have enough experience, who are just going with their intuition and not monitoring it, not thinking about it."

— Gary Klein

This is the opening to "The Art of Decision-Making" in The New Yorker:

'In July of 1838, Charles Darwin was twenty-nine years old and single. Two years earlier, he had returned from his voyage aboard H.M.S. Beagle with the observations that would eventually form the basis of "On the Origin of Species." In the meantime, he faced a more pressing analytical problem. Darwin was considering proposing to his cousin Emma Wedgwood, but he worried that marriage and children might impede his scientific career. To figure out what to do, he made two lists. "Loss of time," he wrote on the first. "Perhaps quarreling. . . . Cannot read in the evenings. . . . Anxiety and responsibility. Perhaps my wife won't like London; then the sentence is banishment and degradation into indolent, idle fool." On the second, he wrote, "Children (if it Please God). Constant companion (and friend in old age). . . . Home, & someone to take care of house." He noted that it was "intolerable to think of spending one's whole life, like a neuter bee, working, working. . . . Only picture to yourself a nice soft wife on a sofa with good fire and books and music perhaps.'

Beneath his lists, Darwin scrawled, "Marry, Marry, Marry QED."

— Joshua Rothman

Darwin's decision and reasoning aside, it demonstrates how we think decisions are made: we list and weigh reasons. And demonstrate the superior approach to take. Gary Klein makes the case that experts tend not to do this (though novices might), especially not under (time) pressure. Still, when it comes to decisions of consequence to organizations and system design, we do well to better understand what's at stake, what's impacted and how, as well as what options or solution approaches we might take.

A Simple Model of a Decision

Decision



What we will do,
what approach we will take

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Decisions

We're talking about how we make better (system architecture, organizational architecture, strategic, etc. -- consequential) decisions. So let's start there. With a decision, which we'll model, as one does, with black box or abstraction.

How does a decision come into view?

As a sidebar:

Recall our discussion of scope of complexity and timespan of discretion in the opening module. When our decisions are local and have immediate effect (eg., code in the context of TDD), we are getting feedback on our actions in short cycles. Sure, the ultimate impact on some key properties like understandability and changeability, will take time to play out, but we get immediate feedback on our approach to addressing the "problem" as we understand it. As the timespan of discretion (decision frame) increases, the longer it takes to get feedback. (Though we will seek intermediate feedback, like leading indicators, and test our theory with experiments and probes, etc.). But there is another shift: the number of people involved, to achieve the outcome shifts significantly as we go to greater scopes of complexity. This means coherence and common ground, and system integrity, is impacted by more people (and (sociotechnical) systems), across more diverse responsibilities and "agendas" (in the "political" sense, too).

Decision: Outcome



To achieve some outcome (have some stated positive impact, meet a goal), address some issue or challenge

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Outcomes

A decision is oriented to, motivated by and focused on, some outcome. This could be framed in the positive. It may be a capability we need to build for users or the business or for the system (logging, or co-ordination and consistency mechanism, etc.), or a system property (quality attribute) we want to improve (scaling or latency or some other aspect of availability as we improve as demand grows or grows in new regions, etc.).

Or it may be some issue (or risk) we face in the dev or devOps organization, that we want to address. (This is often enough the case, that some decision templates use "issue" rather than "outcome" and it may even be separated out.)

This is the problem statement or frame that the decision addresses. The framing of the outcome or problem is itself a (set of) judgment call(s).


Speaking of judgment calls, can we stop here? Is it enough to identify an outcome, goal or issue and a decision, or approach to addressing it?

Experience

"Their experience let them identify a reasonable reaction as the first one they considered, so they did not bother thinking of others. They were not being perverse. They were being skillful."

– Gary Klein

Recognition-primed decisions (RPD)



The difference between singular and comparative evaluation is linked to the research of Herbert Simon, who won a Nobel Prize for economics. Simon (1957) identified a decision strategy he calls satisficing: selecting the first option that works. Satisficing is different from optimizing, which means trying to come up with the best strategy. Optimizing is hard, and it takes a long time. Satisficing is more efficient. The singular evaluation strategy is based on satisficing. Simon used the concept of satisficing to describe the decision behavior of businesspeople. The strategy makes even more sense for foreground commanders because of their immense time pressure.⁴

But there was still the second puzzle. If they did not compare one course of action to another, how did they evaluate the options? All of the evaluation procedures we knew about required contrast: looking at the

TECHNICAL DECISIONS

Expertise and Decisions

Gary Klein and colleagues have studied experts and the way they make decisions, coming to the conclusion that often experts make decisions not by extensive analysis, but based on experience recognizing situations, and reaching for a workable solution in that situation, and proceeding. And he points out this isn't being perverse, it's being skillful. So where we have seen something play out multiple times, and have learned a reliable response set, that may be enough. We make all manner of satisficing decisions in the course of doing things.

In an interview with McKinsey's *The Quarterly*:

Gary Klein: It depends on what you mean by "trust." If you mean, "My gut feeling is telling me this; therefore I can act on it and I don't have to worry," we say you should never trust your gut. You need to take your gut feeling as an important data point, but then you have to consciously and deliberately evaluate it, to see if it makes sense in this context. You need strategies that help rule things out. That's the opposite of saying, "This is what my gut is telling me; let me gather information to confirm it."

*The Quarterly**: "Is intuition more reliable under certain conditions?"


Gary Klein: "We identified two. First, there needs to be a certain structure to a situation, a certain predictability that allows you to have a basis for the intuition. If a situation is very, very turbulent, we say it has low validity, and there's no basis for intuition. [...] The second factor is whether decision makers have a chance to get feedback on their judgments, so that they can strengthen them and gain expertise. If those criteria aren't met, then intuitions aren't going to be trustworthy."

Most corporate decisions aren't going to meet the test of high validity. But they're going to be way above the low-validity situations that we worry about. Many business intuitions and expertise are going to be valuable; they are telling you something useful, and you want to take advantage of them."

Daniel Kahneman: "One of the problems with expertise is that people have it in some domains and not in others. So experts don't know exactly where the boundaries of their expertise are."

Source: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/strategic-decisions-when-can-you-trust-your-gut>*

Decision: Alternatives



"If you haven't thought of three possibilities, you haven't thought enough."

— Jerry Weinberg

TECHNICAL DECISIONS

For Significant Decisions

For strategically or architecturally significant decisions, we want to explore what our options are. That is, if we're making a technology choice that will shape other choices in an impactful way, or we're coming up with, designing, an approach to building a system capability or mechanism, or addressing some critical issue or challenge, we want to be intentional about it, to bring consideration to bear, and also to be able to visit and revisit our reasoning. So we bring options or alternatives into view.

"architecturally significant" decisions: those that affect the structure, non-functional characteristics, dependencies, interfaces, or construction techniques'

"One ADR describes one significant decision for a specific project. It should be something that has an effect on how the rest of the project will run."

— Michael Nygard, Documenting Architecture Decisions

each option considered, described briefly, with pros and cons. Typically the option proposed / adopted comes first in this list. You may want to describe why the other alternatives were not chosen, as it is part of the reasoning/argumentation (later when looking back at the decision, others can see which objections were already taken into account). — source?

While we're at it, think of 3 ways we might be wrong!

"Some things are simply terrible choices, decisions, or options.

This is not a tradeoff situation, this is simply acting wisely."

— Eb Ikonne


Characteristics of architects:

"High tolerance for ambiguity"

"The willingness to backtrack, to seek multiple solutions"

— Eb Rechtin

Forces and Constraints: Decision



“A force [...] is [...] anything that has a potential non-trivial impact of any kind on an architect when making decisions.”

— Uwe van Heesch et al

Forces, Considerations, What Impinges

Whether we’re weighing options or developing alternative approaches, the situation has a bearing — we need to identify and characterize the relevant forces, contributing factors, governing variables, complications, assumptions, constraints.


“A force [...] is [...] anything that has a potential non-trivial impact of any kind on an architect when making decisions.” We’re using force to mean something *impactful*, impinging on an architectural problem. Forces arise in the system or its environment — the operational, development, business, organizational, political, economic, legal, regulatory, ecological, social, etc.) context or situation.

“Forces arise from many sources; most often from requirements, but also from constraints, architecture principles and other “intentions” imposed upon the system; including personal preferences or experience


of the architect(s) and the development team; and business goals such as quick-time-to market, low price, or strategic orientations towards specific technologies (see [9] for an empirical study on influence factors on software architecture).”

“The architect evaluates each architectural decision alternative in the context of the forces. As a result of the evaluation, a force can have a positive, negative, currently unknown, or neutral impact on the architect with respect to a decision; it either attracts the decision maker towards a specific decision alternative, or it repels the decision maker from an alternative, or it has no effect.”

— Uwe van Heesch, Paris Avgeriou, Rich Hilliard
Forces on Architecture Decisions – A Viewpoint



Decision: Consequences



"nothing you do has just one effect"

— Michael Nygard

Consequences and Second Order Effects

As we're coming to understand the friction, forces, and constraints in play, we gain more insight into our purpose or outcome. Further, in addition to the outcome or positive impact we're directing our attention to achieve by making this decision, and the forces and demands impinging on it, we also need to discern or surface, take into account, and weigh, the effects or consequences of the decision and arguably, the consequences of the consequences or second order effects.

"Second-order thinking is the practice of not just considering the consequences of our decisions but also the consequences of those consequences. Everyone can manage first-order thinking, which is just considering the immediate anticipated result of an action. It's simple and quick, usually requiring little effort. By comparison, second-order thinking is more complex and time-consuming. The fact that it is difficult and unusual is what makes the ability to do it such a powerful advantage." — fs.blog

Consequence Scanning is an important approach to discovering the wider impacts of our technical products and choices. Ask:

- What are the intended and unintended consequences of this product or feature?
- What are the positive consequences we want to focus on?
- What are the consequences we want to mitigate?

More at <https://doteveryone.org.uk/project/consequence-scanning/>

"If you give a mouse a cookie,"

"he's going to ask for a glass of milk."

"When you give him the milk,"

"he'll probably ask for a straw"

"When he's finished, he'll ask for a napkin."

"Then he'll want to look in the mirror

To make sure he doesn't have a milk mustache."


— Laura Numerof

Tip: Document Decisions

Title: short noun phrase

Context: desired outcomes and the forces at play
(probably in tension)

← **Alternatives**



Decision: describes our response to these forces

Status: proposed, accepted, deprecated or superseded

Consequences: describes the resulting context, after applying the decision

From: Michael Nygard, Documenting Architecture Decisions, Nov 2011

Architecture Decision Records

ADRs are a way to share decision reasoning. Examples of ADRs at:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20210506014629/https://upmo.com/dev/decisions/0010-som-synthetic-monitoring.html>

From Michael Nygard's ADR Blog Post:

Title These documents have names that are short noun phrases. For example, "ADR 1: Deployment on Ruby on Rails 3.0.10" or "ADR 9: LDAP for Multitenant Integration"

Context This section describes the forces at play, including technological, political, social, and project local. These forces are probably in tension, and should be called out as such. The language in this section is value-neutral. It is simply describing facts. [Note: Nygard puts alternatives in context.]

Decision This section describes our response to these forces. It is stated in full sentences, with active voice. "We will ..." Justify the decision.

Consequences This section describes the resulting context, after applying the decision. All consequences should be listed here, not just the "positive" ones. A particular decision may have positive, negative, and neutral consequences, but all of them affect the team and project in the future.


The consequences of one ADR are very likely to become the context for subsequent ADRs. This is also similar to Alexander's idea of a pattern language: the large-scale responses create spaces for the smaller scale to fit into.

"In practice, our projects almost all live in GitHub private repositories, so we can exchange links to the latest version in master. Since GitHub does markdown processing automatically, it looks just as friendly as any wiki page would."

— Michael Nygard

*"Writing about your decision forces you to explain your thinking." — fs.blog,
Creating a Decision Journal*

Consequence Scanning



Source: <https://doteveryone.org.uk/project/consequence-scanning/>

In a Consequence Scanning event you will answer the following three questions about your product:

- What are the intended and unintended consequences of this product or feature?
- What are the positive consequences we want to focus on?
- What are the (negative) consequences we want to mitigate?

from **doteveryone**
TECHTRANSFORMED

Consequences Prompts from TechTransformed:

What could this mean to the consumers of your product? Have you considered security, reliability, support & monitoring, understandability?

What could this mean for wellbeing or relationships? Who else does your user experience your product with?

What could this mean if everyone in the world were doing it? How could this affect the communities you operate in?

What could this mean to people in their professional life? How could this affect different markets?

Source: <https://doteveryone.org.uk/project/consequence-scanning/>

See also: *Responsible Tech Playbook* from Thoughtworks

<https://www.thoughtworks.com/about-us/social-change/responsible-tech-playbook>

I also highly recommend following Alba Villamil on twitter. This thread for example:

<https://twitter.com/albanvillamil/status/1626953837532545024>



Decisions Are Trade-offs

“For me, “engineer” means knowing that all decisions are tradeoffs. It means considering both upsides & downsides of each technical choice, and doing so with explicit consideration of the larger system context.”

– Sarah Mei



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"When you build a bridge, you don't build it as a perfect structure that will never collapse. Instead you build it to withstand 500 year winds, 200 year floods, 300% expected maximum load, etc. If you didn't make these design trade-offs, every bridge would be solid concrete [...] Engineering is all about making these compromises"

Decisions Entail Tradeoffs and Tradeoffs Don't Stay Their Lane ↖_(ツ)_↗

As a manager in IT or product development, our decisions don't just impact teams but the systems they create. We see this in Conway's Law:

“The basic thesis [...] is that organizations which design systems [...] are constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations.”

-- Melvin Conway, *How Do Committees Invent?*, 1968

Likewise, as an architect, the choices we're making are technical, but the impacts don't remain neatly in the technical space. The tradeoff space isn't just about qualities that impact developer experience, or security properties or operational complexity, but user experience and partner experience through properties of the system in use. And more. So we investigate the upsides and downsides of our technical decisions, in these various contexts.

We want to surface the trade-offs inherent in our decisions, both to better understand the decision space, and because we may be able, or need, to contend with the downsides of these decisions explicitly, to offset them.

Pragprog.com/articles/the-art-of-tradeoffs

An Example

Read (next slide) and identify

- the Decision
- the Outcome(s)
- Forces (identified, and not)
- Consequences (identified, and not)

Spotify

This organization structure, combined with the global-ish nature of JavaScript in the browser, has made us build the desktop client UI out of many small, self-contained web apps called *Spotlets*. They all run inside Chromium Embedded Framework, each app living within their own little iframe, which gives squads the ability to work with whatever frameworks they need, without the need to coordinate tooling and dependencies with other squads. While this approach has the disadvantage that we have many duplicate instances of different versions of libraries, increasing the size of the app, but it offers the massive advantage that introducing a library is a discussion between a few people instead of decision that involves ~100 people and their various needs. Not only would such a big discussion extremely time-consuming and hard, it would also force us to use a least-common-denominator approach to picking libraries, instead of picking the ones specifically tailored to the problem domain of each squad. Considering the size of a single song compared to the size of a JavaScript library, this trade-off is a no-brainer for us.

Matias Petter Johansson, on Quora (2017)

We're going to consider an example

A remote presentation like this has some advantages in terms of screen distance, but for those who can't read the screen we will recap some of the main points in just a bit. Now, though, we will take a moment to allow a chance to read the text on the next slide, and identify the decision, the outcome, the forces impinging on this situation (those identified in the description, and those your experience is prompting) and consequences or effects of this decision.

Weigh tradeoffs

To make better decisions, we need to weigh and resolve the inherent tradeoffs — the upsides and downsides of the choice or approach.

That is, to make tradeoffs intentionally, we need to identify and characterize the tradeoff space. What is relevant to the decision is a (set) of judgment calls. How we balance and resolve the tradeoffs is again a set of judgment calls (though of course there may be precedent in the industry, or in our experience, that gives us more to go on).

"strive for the least worst combination of trade-offs"

— Neal Ford et al

Spotify

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Mattias Petter Johansson, on Quora (2017)

Example

Let's spend a moment and read the discussion (see slide above) from Mattias Peter Johansson on Quora, about Spotify (written in 2017).

Ref: <https://www.quora.com/How-is-JavaScript-used-within-the-Spotify-desktop-application-Is-it-packaged-up-and-run-locally-only-retrieving-the-assets-as-and-when-needed-What-JavaScript-VM-is-used>

One thing to note, is that this was written 5 years ago, about the past; things evolve.

Spotify Decision Divergence <hr/> Team autonomy	<p>This organization structure, combined with the global-ish nature of JavaScript in the browser, has made us build the desktop client UI <u>out of many small, self-contained web apps called <i>Spotlets</i></u>. They all run inside Chromium Embedded Framework, each <u>app living within their own little iframe</u>, which gives squads the ability to work with whatever frameworks they need, without the need to coordinate tooling and dependencies with other squads. While this approach has the disadvantage that we have <u>many duplicate instances of different versions of libraries, increasing the size of the app</u>, but it offers the <u>massive advantage</u> that introducing a library is a discussion between a few people instead of decision that involves ~100 people and their various needs. Not only would such a big discussion extremely time-consuming and hard, it would also force us to use a least-common-denominator approach to picking libraries, instead of picking the ones specifically tailored to the problem domain of each squad. <u>Considering the size of a single song compared to the size of a JavaScript library</u>, this trade-off is a no-brainer for us.</p>
	Måttias Petter Johansson, on Quora (2017)

What do we Notice?

Our point here isn't to criticize Spotify's choices in that timeframe and point of the evolution (in the market and of the technology and organization), but to appreciate how, even in this narrative format, so much of the decision and considerations are being conveyed, and to explore the decision.

The decision: to use Spotlets, or small, self-contained apps within their own iframe

The outcome: increased team independence or autonomy

Positive effects (or forces): reduced cross-team coordination; speed of movement (so speed of learning)

Negative effect (or force): duplicate instances of different versions of libraries

Negative consequence: reduced cross-team communication; divergence among teams as a result

(These social costs and consequences are not just as a result of this decision, but the decision is part of a reinforcing loop.)

Negative consequence (not surfaced; potentially future): multiple versions of licenses and purchasing and security headaches (knowing what patches to roll out where)

Tradeoff? size of songs so dominates size of app, that they could make this decision to support team autonomy without perceived cost to user.

We see that allowing duplicate instances of different versions of various libraries enabled Spotify squads (teams) considerable independence, removing the need to coordinate with other squads on libraries and versions. Because song size so dominates considerations that it generally falls beneath the threshold of sensitivity for the user, the tradeoff of team freedom for app size is easily (in their view) within the design acceptance envelope.

So in this case, a technical decision is being made for organizational gain (lowering team coordination costs and increasing team's degrees of freedom) at the expense of app size, which works as long as it's below the app user's tolerance threshold for resource consumption.

Decision Space and Pareto Front

"Tradeoffs only occur when you reach [a] Pareto frontier."

— Donald Reinertsen

Pareto efficiency

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Pareto efficiency or **Pareto optimality** is a situation where no individual or preference criterion can be made better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off. The concept is named after **Vilfredo Pareto** (1848–1923), Italian civil engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution. The following three concepts are closely related:

- Given an initial situation, a **Pareto improvement** is a new situation where some agents will gain, and no agents will lose.
- A situation is called **Pareto dominated** if there exists a possible Pareto improvement.
- A situation is called **Pareto optimal** or **Pareto efficient** if no change could lead to improved satisfaction for some agent without some other agent losing or, equivalently, if there is no scope for further Pareto improvement.

Pareto Front


What we're seeing in this example, is that, with respect to team degrees of freedom and app size on the one hand, and song size and by implication user experience and space and cost concerns, a Pareto Front has not been reached. These things aren't being traded off for one another. We can improve team independence without decreasing user experience in an appreciable way. Yet.

"A threshold effect exists when there is a critical level of effort necessary to affect the system. Levels of effort below this threshold have little payoff."


— Richard Rumelt

Impact of the Decision

... and impact on other humans/creatures/planet



UX and cost to user (/customer)



Experience of others, including security and operations, and cost to business

devX and cost of change

Different Impact in Different Areas

What this example highlights, is what was being paid attention to in the decision — what forces and tradeoffs were drawn into explicit consideration, and what was not, possibly because it wasn't yet a significant active force. And in particular, this important point: impacts (positive outcomes, as well as other positive and negative effects) and consequences (including downstream and future consequences) are borne by different sets of "stakeholders" – not just different persons or internal groups, but users (downloading the app and listening to songs), customers (paying the bills), people in different regions of the world, with different bandwidth and cost constraints. As well as different stakeholders within the organization, and not limited to developers.

How do we determine these impacts, and how far do we go, seeking to understand consequences? What responsibility do we take, for taking consequences into account? And how far out do we look, to sense how the situation might evolve, and monitor this evolution? We draw on experience to discern forces and anticipate consequences (André Henry). Our direct technical experience, seeing how things have worked out or not, and what they cost in human and environmental terms, and more. And what we learn from others (when we seek more diverse input to discern and anticipate impacts and options outside our area of experience, as well as from research and reading), and how both feed our imagination and ability to conceive and anticipate more than what we've experienced directly. And the humility to acknowledge we still need others, to extend this ability to sense consequences, and seek them out, to address them (or know we are not). And "get to market" (André Henry) and learn from that experience.

"Good engineering is less about finding the "perfect" solution and more about understanding the tradeoffs and being able to explain them."

— Jaana B. Dogan

"So much of this comes from experience, and seeing the consequences of decisions and learning from others."

— André Henry

Trade-offs

Space-Time Trade-Off



☐ Spotify Example:

- ↑ Size of songs, to
- ↓ Co-ordination overhead between teams

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"A trade-off (or tradeoff) is a situational decision that involves diminishing or losing one quality, quantity or property of a set or design in return for gains in other aspects. In simple terms, a tradeoff is where one thing increases and another must decrease."

— wikipedia

Space-Time or Time-Memory Trade-Off

"Usually, a TMTO is developed to improve the speed of an algorithm by utilizing one-time work, which results in increased storage (memory) requirements when the resulting algorithm is executed. Of course, it is also possible to work in the opposite direction by reducing the one-time work at the expense of more work each time the algorithm is executed. The goal is to balance the one-time work (memory) requirement with the speed of the algorithm (time)."

— Mark Stamp, Once Upon a Time-Memory Tradeoff



A classic illustration of the trade-off entails using a lookup table (uses upfront work and a lot of space to enable a fast lookup when the result is needed) versus calculating on demand (uses little space, but can take a long time at the point of demand, depending on the calculation).

Another space-time trade-off arises in data storage. If data is stored uncompressed, it takes more space but less time than if the data were stored compressed.

We're talking about this as a space-time trade-off, but it translates into a cost-performance (i.e., user experience) trade-off.

What are we giving up and what are we gaining?

Trade-offs: Dyads



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"For example, continuous evolution pulls against product stability[...]. Low-level decisions pull against strict process control"

— Eberhardt Rechtein and Mark Maier

Trade-Off Dyads (Picturing the Dilemma)

We have a trade-off when design variations improve one dimension (something we value, like a performance metric), but diminish another. Factor in multiple of these trade-off dimensions, and there is no unique optimal design; the choice lies in what is valued in that context.

By drawing the trade-offs out — making them visible — we can make judgments, and subject them to discourse to better assess impact and value.

Many trade-offs can usefully be thought of in terms of dyads: performance and cost (another way to frame the space-time trade-off); data confidentiality or security (via encryption) and performance; safety and cost; structural mass (for physical structures) and safety; usability or convenience and security; etc.

In *Seeing Organizational Patterns*, Robert Keidel considers organizational structures and interaction dynamics, and pivotal trade-offs underlying organizing choices.

These could be presented as the dyads shown (slide above).


While considering pair-wise trade-offs can help understand the design space, it can obscure the tensions when multiple variables are simultaneously in play. Keidel points out that "every organization must blend autonomy, control, and cooperation." The trade-off space (the design options), is more usefully visualized as a triad, or triangle.

The multiple library versions example earlier, is missing impacts (eg security implications).

Trade-offs: Triads

"most organizational issues are a balance of three variables: individual autonomy, hierarchical control, and spontaneous cooperation. By learning to frame issues as trade-offs among these design variables, one can see underlying patterns"

— Robert Keidel



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A Trilemma of Trade-offs

According to Keidel, any particular organization will focus on at most two of autonomy, control, and co-ordination. (Attempting all three is an unstable form.) These are the organizational forms he identifies:

Organizations that are autonomy-based have as their distinctive competence adding value through solo performers; they are truly star systems. Example: any first-rate university.

Control-based organizations compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and/or complexity through global coordination. Authority, information, and initiative reside chiefly at the top levels.

A cooperation-based organization builds synergy across teams. The distinctive organizational competence is innovation through cooperation.

Probably the most familiar example of an autonomy/control hybrid is the divisionalized corporation.

A control/cooperation hybrid may be described as a "humanistic hierarchy." Top-down control remains essential but every effort is made to meld it with voluntary, lateral processes among individuals, functions, and units.

The autonomy/cooperation has the oldest roots. This combination goes back to the craft organizations of the late 18th century, which featured a blend of individual initiative and informal cooperation.



"Equally dangerous is an overemphasis on a single variable to the point that the other two are neglected.

Autonomy becomes problematic when a relatively freestanding part-individual or organizational unit-overdoes its own thing."

— Robert Keidel

Seeing Organizational Patterns, Robert Keidel

Design Force Field



**TECHNICAL
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Tensions

Design has to balance tensions caused by different imperatives, needs, and perceptions.

"Some of competing technical factors are shown in [the figure in the slide above]. This figure was drawn such that directly opposing factors pull in exactly opposite directions on the chart. For example, continuous evolution pulls against product stability; a typical balance is that of an architecturally stable, evolving product line. Low-level decisions pull against strict process control, which can often be relieved by systems architectural partitioning, aggregation, and monitoring. Most of these tradeoffs can be expressed in analytic terms, which certainly helps, but some cannot"

Eberhardt Rechtin and Mark Maier

"design is the [...] structure or behavior of a system whose presence resolves or contributes to the resolution of a force or forces on that system. A design thus represents one point in a potential decision space."

— Grady Booch

"We're trying to find habitable zones in a large multidimensional space, in which we're forced to make regrettable, but necessary, tradeoffs."

— Robert Smallshire

Sources of Forces

"we build systems out of pure thought, in order to balance the static and dynamic forces of cost, schedule, functionality, performance, reliability, usability, and ethical implications"

— Grady Booch

Image source: Grady Booch



Sources of Forces

"We do not analyze requirements; we construct them from our own perspective. This perspective is affected by our personal priorities and values, by the methods we use as orientation aids, and by our interaction with others" — Christiane Floyd

'The word "requirements" represents a fundamental misunderstanding of software. They're theories, at best.' — Sarah Mei

Design Envelopes

In engineering, we contemplate, weigh, and experiment to find the boundaries of the design envelope.

"Hard" requirements tend to be areas where our design envelope has less "give", so other parts of the requirements design have to flex.

"The better you understand the problem, the closer you can design to tolerances." — Dana Bredemeyer

We innovate by pushing the design envelope — extending the range of possible, into the adjacent possible.

[with reference to the slide:] "Of course they are categories: each describing a class of forces. For example, compatibility encompasses pressures that arise from legacy, frameworks, and standards" — Grady Booch

"Architecture is the set of design decisions that provide a reasonably satisfying resolution to the static and dynamic forces on the system." — Grady Booch

There is a multidimensional decision space. We want to surface not just options, but assumptions about forces in play.

"the force field of a software project starts with Requirements. Requirements are often categorized in some way, like "functional" and "nonfunctional", or "user requirements" and "system requirements. However, requirements of any kind [...] contribute to shape the overall field."

— Carlo Pescio

Smart Decisions

The Smart Decisions Game highlights the tradeoffs inherent in each decision and across decisions

Images from: Smart Decisions Game site: <https://smartdecisionsgame.com/>

Bigtable
IOT / PATTERN / DATABASE
Massively scalable NoSQL wide-column database suitable for low-latency and high-throughput workloads. Integrates easily with Hadoop and Spark, it supports open-source, industry-standard HBase API.

Rechargeable with Energy Harvesting
IOT / PATTERN / POWER SOURCE
By harvesting energy from the environment, IoT devices can operate without need for manual charging. The source of energy will depend on the application.

CHARACTERISTICS:

- ★★ Capacity — must be matched to power source so it doesn't run out too soon or take too long to charge
- ★★ Maintenance — energy harvesting device may require cleaning or upkeep, but no manual charging
- ★ Cost economy — cost of rechargeable battery plus energy harvester is higher than standard battery, but lower maintenance cost from charging or replacing batteries
- ★★ Mobility — limited to similar environmental conditions where energy can be harvested
- ★ Reliability — exposing the energy harvester to the environment can cause failure points in the device's housing

SAMPLE USE CASES:
Solar weather station, Piezo vibration monitor, Windmill on sailboat

The Smart Decisions Game

"Smart Decisions is a game that simulates the design process of software systems and promotes learning about it in a fun way." -- from the Smart Decisions Game website; but having played the game at SATURN, I agree. The game can be downloaded, and used in a team learning activity.

It's a good way to highlight for the team that each technology and related decision has its strengths and weaknesses, and architectures are not just about individual decisions, but weighing across the decisions for a fit to the context and purpose of the system. Further, there will not always be agreement on the approach to take, because the nature of tradeoffs is that they entail judgment about the strengths/weakness as well as the value of the outcomes, and the

degree to which the consequences (in other areas of the system, or its containing systems) need to be taken into account.

The SEI team has done important work in the system qualities and trade-offs space, including developing the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method:

"ATAM gets its name because it not only reveals how well an architecture satisfies particular quality goals, but it also provides insight into how those quality goals interact—how they trade off against each other"

Judgment Factors


We may notice where we're being constrained (that's where we've hit a point of tension in the tradeoff space). But discerning tradeoffs is very much a matter of experience and judgment.

"Because the situation is ill-structured, the goal cannot be optimization. The architect seeks satisfactory and feasible problem-solution pairs."

— Mark Maier and Eb Rechtin

Smart Decisions Game site: <https://smartdecisionsgame.com/>

Force Field Analysis



Adapted from: Gamestorming.com, by Dave Gray, et al

Force Field Analysis

Kurt Lewin did pioneering work in group dynamics, Action Research, and organizational development.

Of particular interest to us here, is Force Field Analysis, using Force Field Diagrams, developed by Kurt Lewin. Lewin was interested in group and organizational change or adaptation, and forces holding the organization in quasi-equilibrium. Force field analysis is useful in the context of organizational change, but can also help visualize forces that any decision balances or compromises across.

'According to Kurt Lewin "An issue is held in balance by the interaction of two opposing sets of forces - those seeking to promote change (driving forces) and those attempting to maintain the status quo (restraining forces)." Lewin viewed organizations as systems in which the present situation was not a static pattern, but a dynamic balance ("equilibrium") of forces working in opposite directions. In order for any change to occur, the driving forces must exceed the restraining forces, thus shifting the equilibrium.'

The Force Field Diagram is a model built on this idea that forces - persons, habits, customs, attitudes - both drive and restrain change.'

"If you want truly to understand something, try to change it."

— Kurt Lewin*

* this quote is attributed to Kurt Lewin by Charles Tolman in *Problems of Theoretical Psychology*,

"Any given change may be a positive for some people and a negative for others. Who benefits from they way things are now? Who will benefit from a change? Who will experience the negative space, and what will that negative be?"

— Esther Derby

Forces in Dynamic Tension

Rasmussen's dynamic safety model describes the feasible operating space for a sociotechnical system.

Adapted here to explore interaction of code habitability and software habitability




Image: Adapted from the Dynamic Safety Model presented in Cook and Rasmussen, 2005

Habitable Zone

The dynamic safety model was developed by Jens Rasmussen; adapted by Cook, Rasmussen, and others. It is described by Richard Cook in his presentation titled "Resilience In Complex Adaptive Systems" (Velocity 2013). This talk is available to watch on Youtube (under 19 minutes), and highly recommended.

We can combine the notion of habitable code and habitable software, adapting Rasmussen's dynamic safety model to design, to illustrate Rob Smallshire's point that "We're trying to find habitable zones in a large multidimensional space, in which we're forced to make regrettable, but necessary, tradeoffs." I'm not sure of the origin of the notion of code habitability, but it was Rebecca Wirfs-Brock who drew my attention to it. And in his keynote at OOPSLA in 1995, Christopher Alexander pleaded with our field to pay attention to the habitability of the software we create.

The idea that is being illustrated here is that if we push too hard to get features to market to stay away from the economic failure boundary, we may defer investments in code habitability and repair and in so doing increase developer decision fatigue and stress because of an overload of conceptual and decision burden with entangled code and hard to predict consequences of changing the code.

But some of the things we do to keep the code habitable may also keep us away from failures on the boundary of operation and use.

"Most software architects do not think of themselves accounting for social issues, but that is one of the characteristics of good architecture. Accounting for social issues gives designers an easier life, which gives the software a longer life."

— Alistair Cockburn

Context Matters

“Design quality is not a property of the code. It's a joint property of the code and the context in which it exists.”

— Sarah Mei



Image source: @sarahmei with permission

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“The value of every decision we make depends on the context in which we make it. In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo’s journey to destroy the ring is meaningful inside the context of Middle Earth. Otherwise, he’s a short, hairy guy with apocalyptic hallucinations.”

— Diana Montalion

Context Factors

'better expression than "common sense" is contextual sense — a knowledge of what is reasonable within a context'

— Eb Rechtin

"[system design] strives for fit, balance and compromise among the tensions of [stakeholder] needs and resources, technology, and multiple stakeholder interests" (Rechtin and Maier) There is no perfect solution. Eb Rechtin put it this way: "The essence of architecture is structuring, simplification, compromise, and balance."

We joke about the two word answer to any question, that distinguishes the architect: "It depends." But a good architect tells you what it depends on.

At a recent conference, Diana Montalion shared her definition of wisdom:


Wisdom = knowledge + experience + good judgment

According to this definition, wisdom is the ability to know what "it depends" on.

Design in Context

“Always design a thing by considering it in its next larger context – a chair in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, an environment in a city.”

— Eliel Saarinen



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Always Consider

“101 Things” is a book written for building architects, but has translatable lessons for software architects. In it, Eliel Saarinen* is quoted: “Always design a thing by considering it in its next larger context — a chair in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, environment in a city plan.” We could amend Saarinen’s point to “always decide a thing by considering its context.” Decisions, any decisions, must take context into account too. From desired outcome(s) to forces that impinge, to side-effects, interactions and consequences, context factors. [* Also, related by Eero Saarinen in *Time Magazine*, "The Maturing Modern," 7/2/56, pp-50-57]

Christiane Floyd pointed out: “Design consists of a web of design decisions which, taken together, make up a proposed solution.”

This is true of any design – including organizational design, or UI design, and system design. As well as the design or formulation of initiatives and strategies.

Back to Christiane Floyd: ‘By design I understand the creative process in the course of which the problem as a whole is grasped, and an appropriate solution worked out and fitted into human contexts of meaning. In [Peter] Naur’s words: “Software development is an activity of overall design with an experimental attitude”.’

“Software Development as Reality Construction” (by Christiane Floyd, 1992) is an exciting work, for it articulates software development as a co-evolving, dialogic process where we are learning what the design needs to be, even as we adapt both the system and its context. That is, it exhibits what Nora Bateson termed “sympathesy” (learning together).

“The problem is connected to a larger system, and it’s not solved by the quick fix.”

— Mary Catherine Bateson

Theory Building

Peter Naur, Programming as Theory Building • 227

PETER NAUR, PROGRAMMING AS THEORY BUILDING

Peter Naur, widely known as one of the authors of the programming language syntax notation "Backus-Naur Form" (BNF), wrote "Programming as Theory Building" in 1985. It was reprinted in his collection of works, *Computing: A Human Activity* (Naur 1992).

This article is, to my mind, the most accurate account of what goes on in designing and coding a program. I refer to it regularly when discussing how much documentation to create, how to pass along tacit knowledge, and the value of the XP's metaphor-setting exercise. It also provides a way to examine a methodology's economic structure.

In the article, which follows, note that the quality of the designing programmer's work is related to the quality of the match between his theory of the problem and his theory of the solution. Note that the quality of a later programmer's work is related to the match between his theories and the previous programmer's theories.


"PROGRAMMING AS THEORY BUILDING"

Introduction

The present discussion is a contribution to the understanding of what programming is. It suggests that programming properly should be regarded as an activity by which the programmers form or achieve a certain kind of insight, a theory, of the matters at hand. This suggestion is in contrast to what appears to be a more common notion, that programming should be regarded as a production of a program and certain other texts.

Some of the background of the views presented here is to be found in certain observations of what actually happens to programs and the teams of programmers dealing with them, particularly in situations where the programs do not work as expected.

match between his theory of the problem and his theory of the solution. Note that the quality of a later programmer's work is related to the match between his theories and the previous programmer's theories.



Building our Theory of the Problem

Our field contends with complex software-intensive systems and their evolution, and one of the classics (1980) is "Programs, Life Cycles, and Laws of Software Evolution." In it, Meir Lehman observed:

"The installation of the program together with its associated system [...] change the very nature of the problem to be solved. The program has become a part of the world it models, it is embedded in it. Analysis of the application to determine requirements, specification, design, implementation now all involve extrapolation and prediction of the consequences of system introduction and the resultant potential for application and system evolution. This prediction must inevitably involve opinion and judgment."

Peter Naur, in "Programming As Theory Building" (1985), argues

"programming properly should be regarded as an activity by which the programmers form or achieve a certain kind of insight, a theory, of the matters at hand."

A theory, that is, of the problem* being solved, and how the code relates to and addresses this problem.

Returning to Lehman:

"any program is a model of a model within a theory of a model of an abstraction of some portion of the world or of some universe of discourse"

* Where the "problem" is the opportunity we're creating, the need we're addressing, etc, with the capability we're building.

Between Lehman, Floyd, and Naur, we have an important set of ideas for software, or any systems, really. We're building a theory, that informs our (design) decisions. We need to anticipate the impact of our decisions, in making them. And probe, to assess/amend our theory.

"what has to be built by the programmer is a theory of how certain affairs of the world will be handled by, or supported by, a computer program."

— Peter Naur

These classics advanced ideas about design that are important today

Formulating the Problem

Dancing with Systems

1. Get the beat

Before you disturb the system in any way, watch how it behaves.

2. Listen to the wisdom of the system

Aid and encourage the forces and structures that help the system run itself.

— Donella Meadows



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Image: donellameadows.org

Formulating the Problem Is the Problem

Horst Rittel, the design theorist who coined the term "wicked problem," also said "formulating the problem is the problem." Donald Schon, another pioneering system thinker, wrote (in *The Reflective Practitioner*): "problems do not present themselves to practitioners as givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain." Design is fractal and emergent. We move (in both directions) between problem and solution, constructing a theory of the problem and theory of the solution (Peter Naur).

Observe the System

"Before you disturb the system in any way, watch how it behaves. [...] If it's a social system, watch it work. Learn its history. Ask people who've been around a long time to tell you what has happened. If possible, find or make a time graph of actual data from the system. Peoples' memories are not always reliable when it comes to timing."

"the problem itself is grasped in the course of the design process."

— Christiane Floyd

Starting with the behavior of the system forces you to focus on facts, not theories. It keeps you from falling too quickly into your own beliefs or misconceptions, or those of others. It's amazing how many misconceptions there can be. [...]

Listen to the wisdom of the system. [...] Don't be an unthinking intervener and destroy the system's own self-maintenance capacities. Before you charge in to make things better, pay attention to the value of what's already there." — Donella Meadows

Mental Models

'these facets are incorporated into an internal representation that is sometimes called a "mental model"

— David Woods,
STELLA Report




Image: Richard I. Cook, STELLA Report

Image source: <https://snafucatchers.github.io/>

Mental Models

We all have mental models. They are all imperfect. And they are all different. But they are the basis for our decisions — consequential decisions; decisions we may not be able to back out of, especially as other decisions become layered upon, and even entangled with, them.

+

"what [@ri_cook] says is that there are multiple mental models inside an organization. And that is advantageous! It's good that there are multiple models. And the reason it's good, is because of the bounded rationality of each of these actors – no one person can hold the whole system in their head. The frames they make in their mind of what exists below the line, are what enable them to understand and make decisions about what's happening. If they tried to put the whole thing in their head, they'd spend their whole time trying to load it in their head, and they'd never make any decisions." – Jabe Bloom, Two Frames on Development and Operations, DevOpsCon

Woods' Theorem: "As the complexity of a system increases, the accuracy of any single agent's own model of that system decreases rapidly."




Image by Dave Gray in "Liminal thinking The pyramid of belief"


Context Context Context

To make a decision, we need to have a (good enough) conception of

- Desired outcome(s)
- Forces and constraints

Arising in context of

- development
- operations
- use
- value network



Contexts Factor

Making decisions, as well as conveying decisions, is as much about what is relevant in the context as it is about the decision we make in response. If we want to make better decisions, and convey them well, we need to have a (good enough) conception of the desired outcome(s), the forces we need to weigh and constraints we need to take into account, as well as the significant consequences and side-effects of our decision. Where these goals and forces arise in various contexts — development and **operations**, the contexts of **use**, and the broader **value network**. We're concerned with factors impacting developer experience, and forces arising from development constraints, capabilities, organizational forces like coordination mechanisms and costs (differing for collocated and distributed teams, say) and taking into account trends in the technology ecosystem. And so forth, also for operations engineers, management teams, security teams, as well as customers and users in various segments and at different points on the user path, as well as partners in the value network — channel partners, others adding value to our products, and more.

"What, at this extraordinary moment, is the most important thing for me to be thinking about?"


— Buckminster Fuller

Of course, this is a lot. These contexts are all important, and to avoid being overwhelmed, we have to use judgment in determining what to pay attention to. What do we need to be paying attention to, now? And what do we need to table, but be mindful about returning to, later? And what is tantalizingly almost relevant, that is hovering in peripheral vision, that we might, at some point need to turn our attention to?

Aside: There are several sociotechnical systems of note: the sociotechnical system that is the system and its users; the operations sociotechnical system, and the development sociotechnical system. (Or a devOps STS.) And there are associated ecosystems (value networks, organizations and teams, etc.).

Decisions Across Boundaries

System design is contextual design — it is inherently about boundaries (what's in, what's out, what spans, what moves between), and about tradeoffs. It reshapes what is outside, just as it shapes what is inside.



System Design is Contextual Design

Recognizing that a system changes its contexts, means recognizing we're designing the system-in-context — not just the system, but the socio-technical system or system-in-context (of use) too. While we have limited degrees of design freedom with respect to the context, everything the system takes on, impacts its (various) context(s), so we are redesigning at least some aspects of the containing socio-technical systems and broader context.

Alternately put, to develop our "theory of the problem," or to "load" the context into our mental models, so that we can uncover this multidimensional decision options and tradeoff space, we need to ask (not just) "what do users need?" but also "what do developers and testing need?" and "what do our operations and security teams need?" and "what do others in the value network need?"

"We need to ask: what does the code need?" — Michael Feathers


We architect across — across boundaries: across not just the code and the teams involved, but across the internal system design (architecture and code/tests) and design of the system-in-use or system-of-systems design (what our industry has tended to call "requirements"); across the different languages and concerns of these different spaces, the technical language of code and test and integration, deployment and operation, and the languages of the domains where the system is used; across the turfs and sense of ownership and decision responsibility; across views and perspectives; etc.

But of course, we can't attend to everything, at least not all at the same time, in detail. We "zoom out," as it were, to scan the ecosystem or value landscape, to identify opportunities and challenges that do warrant closer attention. To set framing for the problem, to understand the trends and forces that shape and constrain it. To get a bearing on the ecosystems that are or will be impacted.

"The greatest complexities arise exactly at boundaries"

— Donella Meadows

Framework of Theories



A Complex of Theories Inform Decisions

We have described the “anatomy” or structure of decisions with an emphasis on contexts, constraints, friction and forces, and consequences, noting that what factors in a decision, isn’t neatly bound to stay within any decision-maker’s zone of influence and responsibility or purview. It’s also just as well to note that our decisions also lie within a network of values (different parts of the organization have different subcultures, for example) and theories about why what is being done makes sense. Leaders at different scopes of complexity, are working to bring these systems of theories into some degree of coherence and attempting, at any rate, to balance effectiveness and sustainability needs.

“Decision making comes to be understood for what it has always been, finding our way through partially undiscovered country rather than charting a scientifically determined course to a known end point.”


— Michelle Boyle et al

Quote source: Michelle Boyle, James Kay and Bruce pond, “Monitoring in Support of Policy: An Adaptive Ecosystem Approach, 2001

Decisions Across Boundaries

"It is inadequate to architect up to the boundaries or interfaces of a system; one must architect across them."

– Robert Spinrad*



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* As quoted in Rechtin and Maier

Systems: Cohesion, Integrity and Leadership

Recap: Our systems, and organizations, are complex, or grow to be (Lehman's Laws). Organization design, like other system design, entails a set of tradeoffs to weigh and balances to strike. Organizations have sub-entities because we organize to focus, to build and leverage capabilities, to get work done.

Communication costs – in terms of time but also in terms of focus of attention. Diverse perspectives are important to innovation; too many perspectives diffuses attention, increasing cognitive burden and demands on relationship fostering.

Interdependencies cost in terms of potential for delays as well as interactions and relationships which need to be established and maintained.

We seek to identify responsibility boundaries so teams can be more independent. And yet we want to create systems with structural and design integrity – that is, conceptual integrity, as well as robustness where it matters, and resilience or adaptive capacity. And organizational integrity (matters of ethics, and social and environmental responsibility).

Decision making in strategy and architecture is about setting direction and context, so that decision making and work at more narrow scope, produces something coherent at broader (system or system-of-systems) scope. Without these decisions, we have piecemeal contributions which fail to add up to a system with integrity. These decisions have impact across boundaries (and their associated arenas of responsibility), and it takes organizational will (determination, because they are hard and other things compete for attention), and a commitment to understanding the decision and its ramifications, to follow through.

Participation in decision making helps build understanding and a sense of priorities, but broad participation in every decision doesn't scale. So "higher level" decisions (decisions that impact across boundaries) need to be attended to and made in a smaller decision setting (a few people), but advocated for and shared in a way that brings others along, so that impacted work is consonant with these decisions. That is, decisions that impact others' work across boundaries, entail leadership across boundaries.

Decisions and Power

"Power is America's last dirty word. It is easier to talk about money [...] than it is to talk about power."

— Rosabeth Moss Kanter



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Photo: Ardmore Ceramics <http://ardmoreceramics.co.za>

About Power

Making good decisions in high risk, high outcome situations, is a source of power. If people look to you to make critical outcome-shaping decisions, in a socio-dynamic sense, that's leadership. It's not all of leadership. But it factors.

In many situations, good decision making is associated with being in a leadership position. Yes, there's the Peter Principle (a person will rise in the hierarchy, stopping when they reach the level at which they are incompetent), but is that cynical? Working at broader scope, across domains, changes at each scope change (or level, in a hierarchy). The demands of the role differ, the context shifts, the relationships are different. Expertise needed shifts. Some people don't make the transition — perhaps because they need mentors or coaches and time to learn. Just like anything else.

Now, an inversion of the structures and dynamics of power comes of drawing on others to share in the decision making. "This typically requires an intersection of the right technical knowledge, a thorough understanding of your organization's goals, authority to make the decision, and responsibility for the consequences of the decisions made." — David Marquet (*Turn the Ship Around!*)


"the core of the leader-leader model is giving employees control over what they work on and how they work. It means letting them make meaningful decisions. The two enabling pillars are competency and clarity"

— David Marquet

How Decisions are Made

“the sources of power that are needed in natural settings are usually not analytical at all—the power of intuition, mental simulation, metaphor and story telling”

— Gary Klein



“In many cases, the problem isn't about having or noticing insights; it is about acting on them. The organization lacks the willpower to make changes.”

— Gary Klein

Sources of Power

Gary Klein (*Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*) studied decision making in settings that he characterizes as naturalistic decision making:

“Features that help define a naturalistic decision-making setting are time pressure, high stakes, experienced decision making, inadequate information, ill-defined goals, poorly defined goals and procedures, and dynamic conditions.”


Here, rather than deductive analysis and statistical methods, other “powers” were used:

“The power of intuition enables us to size up a situation quickly. The power of mental simulation lets us imagine how a course of action might be carried out. The power of metaphor lets us draw on our experience by suggesting parallels between the current situation and something else we come across. The power of storytelling helps us consolidate our experiences to make them available in the future, either to ourselves or others.”

Experience

"Their experience let them identify a reasonable reaction as the first one they considered, so they did not bother thinking of others. They were not being perverse. They were being skillful."

— Gary Klein



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Experts Tend to Make Good (Enough) Decisions, Based on Experience

"The standard advice for making better decisions is to identify all the relevant options, define all the important evaluation criteria, weight the importance of each evaluation criterion, evaluate each option on each criterion, tabulate the results, and select the winner. In one form or another, this paradigm finds its way into training programs the world over. Again and again, the message is repeated: careful analysis is good, incomplete analysis is bad. And again and again, the message is ignored; trainees listen dutifully, then go out of the classes and act on the first option they think of. The reasons are clear. First, the rigorous, analytical approach cannot be used in most natural settings. Second, the recognitional strategies that take advantage of experience are generally successful, not as a substitute for the analytical methods, but as an improvement on them. The analytical methods are not the ideal; they are the fallback for those without enough experience to know what to do."

"Intuition depends on the use of experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation. This is one basis for what we call intuition: recognizing things without knowing how we do the recognizing." "If you want people to size up situations quickly and accurately, you need to expand their experience base."

Satisficing. "selecting the first option that works. Satisficing is different from optimizing, which means trying to come up with the best strategy. Optimizing is hard, and it takes a long time. Satisficing is more efficient." — Gary Klein, *Sources of Power*

"decision makers can satisfice either by finding optimum solutions for a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more realistic world"
— Herbert Simon*

* in his Nobel Prize in Economics speech

Mental Simulation

'In the middle of the meeting, the man stood up, walked over to the door, and closed it. Then in a hushed voice he said, "To be a good fireground commander, you need to have a rich fantasy life."

He was referring to the ability to use the imagination.'

– Gary Klein




Image: from *Sources of Power*

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Thought Experiments

The quote in the slide above, is in the introductory paragraph in Gary Klein's chapter on mental simulation (in *Sources of Power*). It is a reminder that we tend too much to treat soft skills, and imagination in particular, as less than professional – less than "rational" or "objective" reasoning. Klein reminds us that we play out scenarios and alternatives in mind, to understand, to discover, to decide on courses of action.

Foresight is the application of imagination, of anticipating. I used to annoy my kids (don't judge me; repetition to the point of absurdity is the stuff of humor) when they'd say "I didn't mean to" and I'd respond "You've got to mean not to" – meaning, we need to try to anticipate the likely or even the possible, when it has bad consequences. Foresight is not a direct application of hindsight or learning from the past, but a willingness to take the risk of playing threads of the present forward, staying creative under uncertainty. Experience is valuable in giving us practice in recognizing cues and applying "muscle-memory" and tested-through-trial approaches, as well as in giving us the ability to anticipate, to "look ahead" and "look around" in an imaginative playing out of features and forces in a design or (other) decision moment. Project premortems (Gary Klein, HBR, 2007) asks us to imagine, during design, say, that a project *has* gone wrong, and to explore why.

"Code wins arguments" (from Zuckerberg's "Hacker Way" letter to investors included in Facebook's IPO filing). Sure, but are all arguments worth having? Out beyond not valuing design/anticipation/etc. and not valuing making stuff, there is a field... (apologies to Rumi, etc.)

"*To me, the real challenge is getting teams to slow down for a moment and think about what's going to be built, why, what the risks are, and what might change.*" — Phillip Johnston

"mental anticipation... pulls the future into the present"

— Erich Jantsch

Try This

- Consider the following problem

- One morning, exactly at 8 A.M., a monk began to climb a tall mountain. The narrow path, no more than a foot or two wide, spiraled around the mountain to a glittering temple at the summit. The monk ascended the path at varying rates of speed, stopping many times along the way to rest and to eat the dried fruit he carried with him. He reached the temple precisely at 8 P.M.

The next day, he began his journey back along the same path, starting at 8A.M. and again walking at varying speeds with many pauses along the way. He reached the bottom at precisely 8 P.M.

- I assert that there is at least one spot along the path the monk occupied at precisely the same time of day on both trips.
- Is my assertion true? How do you decide?

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
Source:

Exercise: Read the slide

And don't turn the page until you've had a chance to think about it.

"Principle of Correspondence: The content and form of the representation should match the content and form of the targeted concepts"

— Barbara Tversky



One Approach





Image: Visual Thinking by Rudolf Arnheim

(Mental) Simulation Illustration

One way to think, is to draw, and the diagram illustrates that we can say yes. Another way to think about it is each of my hands is the monk on the two days, and one hand will move along the path in one direction, and the other hand is the monk starting at the other end of the path, and moving in the other direction on the same path. My hands have to meet at some point, at the same time. As important as the illustrations are to the point that we can put something in the world to help us think, it's also illuminating that some people will still not see it, and these people are important too. We can try to illuminate the solution different ways, but our perspectives differ, we're looking for a catch, and trust and credibility may factor, etc.



"We have misfiled the significance of drawing because we see it as a professional skill instead of a personal capacity [...] This essential confusion has stunted our understanding of drawing and kept it from being seen as a tool for learning above all else." — D.B. Dowd

Modeling and Sketchprototypes




Image: Simon Brown's C4 Model <https://c4model.com/>

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Thought Experiments, Sketchprototypes, and Heuristics

Whether you're using an ad hoc approach, or *Visual Architecting* with UML and/or C4 (from Simon Brown), or something else, diagrams, models, views of the system, are ways to explore "decisions in formation" — sets of related decisions, as well as formative ideas — to probe and assess them.

We take a guess as a starting point, and improve on it: model, and run thought experiments across it. For example, take use cases or user stories or focus on one property, then another, etc., and "run" (imagine and talk through) behavior across the structure models, to flush out component responsibilities we overlooked in our initial guess. Lists of responsibilities (for elements of a system — technical, strategic or organizational) are a powerful and largely overlooked/under used tool in the architect's toolbelt. If the responsibilities don't cohere within an overarching responsibility, or purpose, that should trip the architect's boundary bleed detectors. Interactions at the boundaries are essential to making a system more than the sum of its parts, but introduce coupling and (inter)dependencies.

As we do this exploration with the aid of models (just as we do when doing design in the medium of code), we're applying heuristics we've developed through experience, and exposure to other people's work (books, and such). Heuristics don't take away the need to think, to reason and try things out. They help us identify what to think about, as we do so, and may suggest how to go about it (better).

"Heuristics offer plausible approaches to solving problems, not infallible ones." — Rebecca Wirfs-Brock

To illustrate, let's turn to Parnas and his criteria (heuristics) for decomposing, and hence coping with complex systems despite our bounded rationality:

"[begin] with a list of difficult design decisions [...] Each module is then designed to hide such a decision from the others ."

Be deliberate and
deliberate all the
things"

— Dawn Ahukanna

Experiment (on paper, too)

Models help us try out or test our ideas -- in an exploratory way when they are just sketches, and thought experiments, where we "animate" the models in mind and in conversation. Just sketches, so less is invested. Less ego. Less time.

Image: by me, with apologies to Escher's Reptiles



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Experiment, On Paper Too

Fred Brooks wrote "Plan to throw one away. You will, anyway." I'd say that too, but plan to throw several away — on paper. It's quick and cheap. We sketch-prototype to come up with alternatives and try them out in the cheapest medium that fits what we're trying to understand and improve. We seek to probe, to learn, to verify the efficacy of the design elements we're considering, under multiple simultaneous demands. We acknowledge we can misperceive and deceive ourselves, and hold our work to scrutiny, seeing it from different perspectives, from different vantage points but also with different demands in mind. We make trade-offs and judgment calls. We bring in others with fresh perspective to help us find flaws. We simulate. We figure out what to probe further, what to build and instrument.

We need to come up with and try out alternatives in the cheapest medium we can learn more in; sometimes that's code, but not if a sketch will do. We don't learn what we learn in the medium of code, but we can at least start to try ideas out, and explore and bat at them, investigate how they could work, in sketch-driven-dialog.

Three possibilities (Gerald Weinberg)? For everything? That smacks of BDUF FUD (fear, uncertainty and doubt)?? Can't we just YAGNI that? Well, remember, these are make or break decisions. Game shapers and game changers.

"Thought happens not only inside the skull but out in the world, too; it's an act of continuous assembly and reassembly that draws on resources external to the brain. For another: the kinds of materials available to "think with" affect the nature and quality of the thought that can be produced."

—Annie Murphy Paul

Constraints

1. Make a list of constraints
2. Rank constraints by flexibility
3. Evaluate design concepts by how many constraints they address
4. Discuss the right balance of constraints
5. Sketch ideas based on that balance

— Dan Brown



Dan Brown (he/him) @ · Jun 23 ...

On a recent project @amelia bshuler and I were struggling with a "table leg" problem. That is, as we solved one piece of the design challenge, we negatively affected another. We tried something new to get un-stuck.



Dan Brown (he/him) @ · Jun 23 ...

We then ranked the constraints along a scale of flexibility. We identified which constraints could be relaxed and which could not be. For example, the constraint "Accommodating two types of individual profiles" could not be relaxed.



Constraints and the Design Envelope

Engineers have a concept of a design envelope or design space that is created by constraints – outside the design envelope, the design is (technically) infeasible or (economically or socially) not viable.

The concept of a Pareto frontier is useful, not because we know (in general) where this frontier lies exactly (though we find out when we cross it), but because it reminds us we're working in a space of interacting decisions and constraints – some of which may only "bite" (factor crucially) at some point.

Pareto Frontier: "The Pareto frontier is the set of all Pareto efficient allocations, conventionally shown graphically. ... It is a statement of impossibility of improving one variable without harming other variables in the subject of multi-objective optimization (also termed Pareto optimization)." (Source: wikipedia)


"Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a situation where no individual or preference criterion can be better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off or without any loss thereof." (Source: wikipedia)

Analogy and Metaphor

“Metaphor does more than adorn our thinking. It structures our thinking. It conditions our sympathies and emotional reactions. It helps us achieve situation awareness. It governs the evidence we consider salient and the outcomes we elect to pursue [...]”

Analogical reasoning can also suggest options.”

— Gary Klein



“Analogues provide the problem solver with a recommendation about what to do.”

— Gary Klein

DISPLACEMENT OF CONCEPTS

Donald A. Schon

TAVISTOCK PUBLICATIONS

Using Analogies To Solve Problems

“If we did not want to use analogical reasoning for tasks like these, we would be stuck. We would not know enough to construct formulas or to use them or have enough hard information to proceed. By using analogues, we are tapping into the same source of power for stories. We are applying an informal experiment, using a prior case with a known outcome and a semi-known set of causes to make predictions about a new case.”

“First, we learned that they do not select analogues just based on similarity. [...] You would select an analogue that shares the same dynamics [...] If you do not have enough experience to take causal factors into account, you can get into trouble. The engineers we studied were all knowledgeable.

Second, we learned that some causal factors are easy to adjust for, and others are not.

Third, we learned that the logic of reasoning by analogy is similar to the logic of an experiment: to draw a conclusion without having to know all of the important factors operating.”


— Gary Klein, *Sources of Power*

Analogies help us shape the problem (what we're addressing, and how we conceive of it) and get ideas for solutions (how we approach it).

Again: Cynefin and Context

"All too often, managers rely on common leadership approaches that work well in one set of circumstances but fall short in others. Why [...]? The answer lies in a fundamental assumption of organizational theory and practice: that a certain level of predictability and order exists in the world. This assumption, grounded in the Newtonian science that underlies scientific management, encourages simplifications that are useful in ordered circumstances. Circumstances change, however, and as they become more complex, the simplifications can fail."

— David Snowden and Mary Boone



Liz Keogh's Introduction to Cynefin

Liz Keogh has a useful introduction to Dave Snowden's Cynefin framework (and the extracts below are from Liz Keogh's post). Cynefin introduces four domains – obvious, complicated, complex and chaotic:

Obvious

Obvious problems are ones that either children can solve, or, if they do require expertise, the solution is obvious. In the obvious domain, there's normally one good way to solve the problem – a "best practice".

Complicated

As things become more and more complicated, the solution requires more and more expertise. A watchmaker knows how to fix your watch. The outcome is still predictable, but now it takes an expert to know how to get there. Both the Obvious and Complicated domains are called ordered. Ordered problems have repeatable solutions; the same process applied to the same problem will always work.

Complex

Complex problems are ones in which the solution, and the practices which lead to it, emerge. While it's possible to think of examples of what a solution might look like, attempting to create that solution usually creates unexpected side-effects; other problems or unintended consequences that might need to be solved. Cause and effect are only correlated in retrospect; you can see how you got there, but you couldn't possibly have predicted it. This is the domain of "wicked" problems that tend to resist being easily solved with expertise. In the complex domain, we have to probe the problem.

Chaos

Chaos is a transient domain; it resolves itself quickly, and not necessarily in your favor. It's dominated by urgency and the need to act, and act fast.

"Cynefin, pronounced ku-nev-in, is a Welsh word that signifies the multiple factors in our environment and our experience that influence us in ways we can never understand"

— David Snowden
and Mary Boone

"A Quick Introduction to Cynefin , "
by Liz Keogh

The Leadership Moment

"I always say to myself, what is the most important thing we can think about at this extraordinary moment."

– Buckminster Fuller



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What at this Moment?

It's a lot? Sure. We need to continually be asking ourselves the orienting question: "what at this extraordinary moment, is the most important thing for me, and for us, to be attending to?" The discipline is in the question. We still need to do mundane things, supporting things, etc. However, we're guiding our own attention, and, as a leader, potentially others'.

Leadership is associated with vision, or at least, we tend to attribute absence of leadership when clear, shared vision is lacking. Is vision what we need to be attending to? Is it threat, and inhibitors to success? Is it decisions and shared understanding of the outcomes and our chosen approach to reaching them?

Who at this Moment?

We need to be aware of, think consciously about, who is involved. Diverse perspectives, born of different backgrounds and experience sets, are important to understanding the (various) contexts of use, development, and operations, surface ethical considerations, and understanding alternatives and impacts.

Asking who, is also about understanding that with too many involved, we can slow the process down (reaching agreement, decisions by committee, etc.). And we need to balance this with creating shared understanding and insight into the constraints and forces taken into account. We can get some of these benefits, involving others in reviews, etc.

Minimalist Discipline

Adopt a minimalist orientation: Leaders work across; any decisions we make (or decisions we guide in the making), ought to be those that have substantive consequence and impact on system outcomes, and implications in different contexts.

Minimalist: does the decision need to be made by me? Scope? Timing? Impact? No? Then don't make it!

Strengthening the Decision

Recap: Characterize the decision

- Clarify outcome sought
- Understand the context(s), shaping forces, constraints and trade-offs

"Doing the right thing is a matter of wisdom, doing the thing right is a matter of knowledge and understanding."

— Russ Ackoff*

Recap: Determine the response

- Next: *Strengthen the proposed approach*

* Via Trond Hjorteland

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Strengthening Our Decisions

So far, we've been considering why we make decisions and what kinds of decisions we make more intentionally and when. And what goes into making technical decisions. Not prescriptively, for it's a judgement call, or rather, sets of judgment calls.

To inform the decision, we seek to understand the context or circumstances (Diana Montalion), and seek to identify the best possible approach, or solution, or resolution.

If the decisions we're making are make or break, it's worth considering how might we strengthen our reasoning underlying the decision. What do we need to learn, to increase confidence (our own, and stakeholders') in our approach? What constrains us? What are we not willing to compromise on? And yes, this can take time. We acknowledge uncertainty and incompleteness and seek to improve our understanding of impact and fit and options and opportunities.

Not that we want bullets, but to play with the "no silver bullets" (Brooks in MMM) expression: we know that objectivity isn't a thing we reach, but in attempting it, we employ the practices of science and experiment, to try to get to sounder decisions. To discover. To adapt. Where it matters.

"My first round I tried appealing to rationality. Then I ran smack bang into bounded rationality."

— Abdul Gani

"There is a silver bullet — it's relationships of goodwill and a commitment to objectivity"

— Dana Bredemeyer

"look at reasons in terms of:

- *fact: is it so?*
- *inference: does it follow?*
- *weight: does it matter?*

— Diana Montalion

Writing to Think (Better)

Title: short noun phrase

Context: desired outcomes and the forces at play (probably in tension)

Decision: describes our response to these forces

Status: proposed, accepted, deprecated or superseded

Consequences: describes the resulting context, after applying the decision



— Michael Nygard, Documenting Architecture Decisions, Nov 2011

*"Here are [...] reasons that radiating intent is better than begging forgiveness:
Radiating intent gives a chance for someone to stop you before you do a thing, in case it's truly harmful
Radiating intent gives people who have information, or want to help, an opening to participate
Radiating intent leaves better evidence of your good will"*
— Elizabeth Ayer

Source: <https://medium.com/@ElizAyer/dont-ask-forgiveness-radiate-intent-d36fd22393a3n>

Write It Down — No Really, Do It!

Writing our thinking down helps us to see what we're thinking, so we can improve it – the thinking, or the way we're communicating it. It creates externalized reasoning and memory that others can access, understand, and help improve.

We've mentioned keeping a systems and decision journal as a way to be more reflective and intentional about learning from our system(s) and decisions, and what is shaping up in the context. Design pattern templates and ADRs (covered earlier) help direct our attention, so that in our conversations and in formulating and writing our reasoning down, we have a well-trod path to follow in the form of template structure.

Various architecture decision templates have been published, including by Jeff Tyree and Art Akerman then at Capital One (in IEEE Software, so this template and discussion gained exposure and influence), and Olaf Zimmerman at IBM. But Michael Nygard's simplified (and well-described) Architecture Decision Record template caught on as a just enough version for documenting architecture decisions in an Agile context.

See Nat Pryce's ADR tools on Github:

<https://github.com/npryce/adr-tools>

See also Upmo and Wisen Tanasa's examples:

<https://opensoftwaredesign.com/upmo/decisions/>

Perspective, Illustrated





Image: [wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/Cassini_apparent.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cassini_apparent.jpg)

Perspective (Shifts)

*One way to change
your vantage point is to
see from someone
else's point of view*

Christin Gorman used this example in a wonderful talk recently: Before Copernicus, the earth was generally assumed to be at the center of the universe (geocentrism), and observations about the planets' movements were explained by a model that worked – its predictions were consistent with observations. Copernicus argued that the sun was at the center of the solar system, which resulted in a much simpler model, that explained and predicted the planets paths.

Christin uses this as an example of how we can be wrong. (And not know it. Until we know it.) Which brings in Kathryn Schulz's TED Talk: *On being wrong*. It is wonderful, and highly recommended, but here is an important (and funny, when she does it) take-away: When asked "what does it feel like, emotionally, to be wrong?" we answer things like "embarrassed," "awkward," (and if we're self-aware?) "defensive," ... Kathryn points out: "That is answering a different question – namely, "what does it feel like to find out we're wrong?" She recalls how, when running off a cliff, Wile Coyote continues running -- on thin air, and only falls when he realizes there's only air beneath him. And she points out that *being wrong feels exactly the same as being right*. Sure, there's the old quip: "The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool." But notice, that was talking about *you*. I'm kidding, but also not. It's key to Kathryn's talk.

Christin Gorman: Our architecture is a mess! Are you sure?, DevCon 2019

Kathryn Schulz: https://www.ted.com/talks/kathryn_schulz_on_being_wrong

Assumptions, and Perspective



A change in perspective helps make unstated assumptions (and other options) visible.

From Dawn Ahukanna: we need to actively surface not just assumptions, but our degree of confidence in them, and continually probe and update our understanding of the probability of the occurrence of assumptions that shape decisions, especially critical ones

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*'But the critical ones are what Jeff Bezos calls "irreversible" and therefore load bearing. If they are built on assumptions (with probability o) "Things fall apart; the center does not hold" (Yeats, quoted by Chinua Achebe in *Things Fall Apart*.)'*

— Dawn Ahukanna


* referencing the Simons and Chabris Selective Attention Experiment.

Repairing Blindspots


"A change of perspective" ... Alan Kay reminds us to take a different vantage point, to see from a different perspective, use the lens of various views. We need to notice what is hard to notice from inside the tunnel of our own vision — where what we're paying attention to, shapes what we perceive and pay attention to. Another way to get a change of perspective, is to get another person's perspective. Our team can miss the gorilla*, so to speak, when our attention is focused on the design issues of the moment. Fresh perspective, and even just naive questions about what the design means, can nudge an assumption or weakness into view. And merely telling the story, unfolding the narrative arc of the architecture to fit this person or audience, then that, gets us to adopt more their point of reference, across more perspectives — in anticipation, and when we listen, really listen, to their response and questions.

We need to adopt the discipline of not just accepting our initial understanding, but rather seeking different understandings. This illuminates options, and gives us other things to try. These are the significant decisions, decisions about the important stuff, after all.

Image xkcd.com/106/



Assumption and Constraint Mapping



Goals as Fields and Enabling Constraints

So we have explored dynamics using influence maps and causal loop diagrams. Now, with the Technical Debt Exercise in mind, identify challenges we need to address. Pick a challenge. What is the goal that makes this challenge one we need to address? Explore how we might achieve the goal, using the template – see template on the slide (from John Cutler), and description on John Cutler's site at:

<https://eleganthack.com/a-map-from-goals-around-assumptions-through-tasks-towards-results/>

"A lot of work is the work of noticing what work needs doing."

— Elizabeth Zagroba

System Knowledge

"understanding of complex systems is distributed"

— Chris McDermott

TECHNICAL
DECISIONS

Imperfect and Incomplete

Indeed, when it comes to complex systems, as Chris McDermott observed in a talk last week: "understanding of the system is distributed." None of us understand it all, in breadth and depth, and even if we did or could, circumstances are ever changing, the environment is changing, the system is changing. And so is understanding. David Woods observed (and it is known as Woods' Theorem): "As the complexity of a system increases, the accuracy of any single agent's own model of that system decreases rapidly." (STELLA Report)

"The people engaged in observing, inferring, anticipating, planning, troubleshooting, diagnosing, correcting, modifying and reacting to what is happening are shown with their individual mental representations. These representations allow the people to do their work -- work that is undertaken in pursuit of particular goals. To understand the implications of their actions requires an understanding of the cognitive tasks they are performing and, in turn, an understanding of what purposes those cognitive tasks serve.

The green line is the line of representation. It is composed of terminal display screens, keyboards, mice, trackpads, and other interfaces. The software and hardware (collectively, the technical artifacts) running below the line cannot be seen or controlled directly. Instead, every interaction crossing the line is mediated by a representation. This is true as well for people in the using world who interact via representations on their computer screens and send keystrokes and mouse movements.

A somewhat startling consequence of this is that what is below the line is inferred from people's mental models of The System.


This is not to say that what is below the line is imaginary. But the artifacts there cannot be perceived or manipulated directly. Instead, people use mental models of what, although hidden, they infer must be there to interpret what they see on the screens and to predict what the effect of typing a character or clicking a mouse will be." from The STELLA report,
<https://snafucatchers.github.io/>

Decisions via Advice Process

The Rule: anyone can make an architectural decision.

The Qualifier: before making the decision, the decision-taker must consult two groups: The first is everyone who will be meaningfully affected by the decision. The second is people with expertise in the area the decision is being taken.

— Andrew Harmel-Law,
in “*Scaling the Practice of Architecture, Conversationally*”



Conversations and Learning

So we have talked about Architecture Decision Records as a device for leading our thinking – directing us to consider contexts, impact and consequences. That is, implicitly drawing on and refining our Theory of the Problem, Theory of the Solution, and Match between.

We (as an industry) have also seen something of a return to the RFC (request for comment), as a mechanism to involve more people in architecture decision making. This may take the form of an ADR adding a space for comments (and in-flight status). One of the ways to build expertise, is to draw on expertise, perspectives, alternative points of view and experience.

Andrew Harmel-Law has pushed this practice further, working as an architect with Thoughtworks clients and in an article he wrote, hosted on Martin Fowler's site. In what he calls the Advice Process, anyone can make an architectural decision, but they must get advice from 1. those affected or impacted by the decision, and 2. those who have expertise relevant to the decision.

This is a process to make better decisions, and foster and build system understanding and design expertise.

Architecture decisions impact across boundaries.

In Andrew's words: “while decision-takers are in no way obliged to agree with the advice the folks in these two consulted groups give them, they must seek it out, and they must listen to and record it. We are not looking for consensus here, but we are looking for a broad range of inputs and voices.”

And later, “It will come as no surprise to learn that consequently, a series of ADRs, and their surrounding conversations provide an excellent learning ground for people wanting to begin to take on the task of decision-taking; everything is out in the open, including the dissent and compromise-making. Less experienced practitioners of architecture can peruse the history of what went before them quickly and easily, see good (and quite likely less-good) examples, and see decisions being taken (and perhaps also being revoked when circumstances change / the team learned more). They are almost a thinking and decision lore for a set of software, written in the hand of those who contributed most to it.”

— Andrew Harmel-Law, *Scaling the Practice of Architecture, Conversationally*, 2011

Note: Where we say architecture, we could also add in other strategically significant decisions; that is, decisions that impact identity and value.

Architecture Advisory Forum

“the invitees to the AAF are those typically affected / possessing relevant expertise.”

— Andrew Harmel-Law



Scaling the Practice of Architecture, Conversationally

Architecture need not be a monologue: delivered top-down from the minds and mouths of a centralised few. This article describes another way to do architecture; as a series of conversations, driven by a decentralised and empowering decision-making technique, and supported by four learning and alignment mechanisms: Decision Records, Advisory Forum, Team-sourced Principles, and a Technology Radar.

15 December 2021



Andrew Harmel-Law

Andrew is a technology Principal at Thoughtworks. His focus is in helping software teams and the organisations they work within to deliver valuable outcomes in the most efficient way. Andrew is also a domain-driven design trainer on the O'Reilly training platform.

► ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
► EVOLUTIONARY DESIGN
► TECHNICAL LEADERSHIP

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- When “traditional” approaches to architecture break down
- The most fundamental element: decision making via the “Advice Process”
- The fundamental role of conversations
- What about strategy and cross-functional requirements?
- The four supporting mechanisms
- 1. A thinking and recording tool: Decision Records
- 2. A time and place for conversations: The Architecture Advisory Forum
- 3. A light to illuminate a unified goal: Team-sourced Architectural Principles
- 4. A landscape and current climate sensing tool - Your own Tech Radar
- How this typically works in practice
- How to fail
- The five elements again, and possible further steps
- Afterword: What next?

From: Andrew Harmel-Law, Scaling the Practice of Architecture, Conversationally, 2021

Structured Conversations and Learning: Architecture Advice Forum

“The second supporting element in this alternative approach exists to make all the conversations supporting this advice-seeking easier: a weekly, hour-long Architecture Advisory Forum (“AAF”).

Fundamentally, this is a regular and recurring place and time for conversations. Your ideal attendees are delegates from each team as well as your key representatives from your Advice Process checklist. However, the invite should remain completely open to encourage transparency and openness. The timeliness and quality of the conversations which take place is a key indicator of success, but equally important is the breadth and diversity of views shared, and the same goes for the contributors. If architecture is being “done” here, and lessons shared and learned, then you’re winning.”

“Firstly, the Advice Process reigns. Decisions taken to the AAF are still owned and made by the originators. The only thing other attendees can do is offer advice, or suggest additional people to seek advice from. Hence the name.

This brings us to the second key difference. Given the Advice Process qualifiers, the invitees to the AAF are those typically affected / possessing relevant expertise. This means those typically present include representatives from each feature team (and not just the lead; BAs/POs and QAs are frequently present), people from other programmes of work, UX, Product, Operations, and occasionally senior execs.”

— Andrew Harmel-Law

Leadership is very much about ensuring that conversations that need to be happening are happening — not always initiating them, nor always helping to focus or navigate them, but ensuring they do happen and guiding when needed

Architecture Advisory Forum

"When [the conversations] take place in an AAF there is an audience, so many people can listen and everyone can learn. The amount of organisational, domain, legacy, and experiential information and architectural skill-deployment shared at these sessions is unlike anything I have ever seen"

— Andrew Harmel-Law



Scaling the Practice of Architecture, Conversationally

Architecture need not be a monologue: delivered top-down from the minds and mouths of a centralised few. This article describes another way to do architecture; as a series of conversations, driven by a decentralised and empowering decision-making technique, and supported by four learning and alignment mechanisms: Decision Records, Advisory Forum, Team-sourced Principles, and a Technology Radar.

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Conversations with "the System in the Room"

The Architecture Advisory Forum convenes conversations about key system decisions with "the system in the room" – if not the full system, folk who bring in the perspective of relevant, or impacted parts of the system. (User research will go beyond this, too.)

Over time, these conversations increase the repertoire of, or at least exposure to, a variety of system design elements and approaches, and develop and nuance each person's system understanding, as various people grapple with the interaction between their perspectives, assumptions, concerns and understandings, and those of others across the various sociotechnical system spaces involved.

I again want to point out that I am referring to Andrew Harmel-Law's work (which is specifically in the architecture context) here, but we might consider extending advice gathering to other strategically important areas (such as strategic aspects of product design, or SRE and platform engineering, usability, etc.).

Now, I want to return to André Henry's point (in the quote alongside). Some of our decisions have impacts and consequences and implications outside our of our extended team's collective experience (even as we strive to be more inclusive). For decisions of consequence to the people and ecosystems that our system impacts, we need to extend our consequence scanning and advice gathering, so that we are drawing on broader demographic and geographic, experience and can anticipate adverse impacts. Further,

"you also have to get to market and this is where the experience comes in" — André Henry

"So much of this comes from experience, and seeing the consequences of decisions and learning from others."

— André Henry

Better Decisions

Through:

- Identifying the decision factors, explicitly considering the various contexts (use, operations, development, .., ecosystem)
- Writing and clarifying the decision reasoning using an RFC, ADR, etc.
- Getting advice and input via an advice or RFC process
- Conversation with the “system together in the room” in Advice Forum or similar

which over time, across decisions, deepens system understanding

What else?

So Far

To recap and reinforce, we have looked at better decisions through the frames of decision “anatomy,” directing our attention at what we’re taking into account, and in particular reminding us that forces are not just forces in the technical context, shaping developer experience and technical outcomes. We need to look outwards to effects and side-effects, to forces and desired outcomes, arising in the user space and other partnering parts of the organization, and beyond.


Documenting decisions with some version of an ADR shares this reasoning, and an RFC or advice process encourages input and advice. The better the decision process – where it gathers input, what it seeks to understand in terms of impact and consequences, the options created and deliberated, and so forth – the more the decision record itself serves to teach design reasoning and increase the design repertoire of decision makers and decision readers and implementers.

An Advice Forum, or similar, brings “the system” (representative parts of it) together in conversation, and over time builds and deepens understanding.


Local vs System

what we're paying attention to, shapes what we perceive and pay attention to

(sub)system boundaries



team boundaries



Local Concerns and Autonomy

So, this is good. Conversations are happening. And people are being brought into the decision informing, decision shaping, decision understanding process. Better decisions. Better socialization of the decisions, as now more people are part of the various conversations considering the decision, its approach, alternatives, tradeoffs and ramifications.

However.

Focus builds focus. What we are paying attention to, shapes what we perceive and pay attention to.

At any rate, with focus and autonomy, we need to pay attention to, put work into, the system as a system, where decisions that impact what the system is and is becoming, are made with the system in mind.

"Don't ever stop talking about the system."


— Eb Rechtin

Team Topologies

"The limit of what a team can do is cognitive capacity."

"If we stress a team by giving it responsibility for part of the system that is beyond its cognitive load capacity, it ceases to act like a high-performing unit and starts to behave like a loosely associated group of individuals, each trying to accomplish their individual tasks without the space to consider if those are in the team's best interest."

— Matthew Skelton and Manuel Pais



Cognitive Load

"When we talk about cognitive load, it's easy to understand that any one person has a limit on how much information they can hold in their brains at any given moment. The same happens for any one team by simply adding up all the team members' cognitive capacities."

"When cognitive load isn't considered, teams are spread thin trying to cover an excessive amount of responsibilities and domains. Such a team lacks bandwidth to pursue mastery of their trade and struggles with the costs of switching contexts."

— Matthew Skelton and Manuel Pais

Jessica Kerr: "When a team's cognitive load is too high, coherence dissolves. You get a group of individuals instead"

'Cognitive load was characterized in 1988 by psychologist John Sweller as "the total amount of mental effort being used in the working memory.'"

— Matthew Skelton and Manuel Pais

Coordination Costs

If there is interaction between (microservices, modules, ..) components (and hence an interface), work has gone into enabling that interaction. It may be communication and coordination between the teams involved, or may be interface design work that's been done, and that the teams agree to adhere to. It may be that the components publish and subscribe to events, but those are designed. Somewhere, that coordination cost is born as design attention and design communication (which may be code). If born by only one side of the

interface, the other side bears the cost of accommodating to its constraints.

Coupling enables interactions to build capabilities, but comes with co-ordination costs. Communicating across contexts means understanding the needs and trade-offs across those boundaries, and the synthesis and emergence sought. This may mean context switching away from the focus of the team's work on the component(s) they are responsible for, increasing cognitive load which we seek to reduce.

Put Work into Common Ground

“requires continuing effort to sustain, extend, and repair common ground.”

— Richard Cook



Image from: *Unflattening*, by Nick Sousanis

Common Ground Takes Effort

"Joint activity assumes a basic compact, which is an agreement (often tacit) to facilitate coordination and prevent its breakdown." — Gary Klein et al.

Gary Klein and collaborators, working on joint activity (and systems development and evolution is joint activity), indicate that joint activity depends on interpredictability, and interpredictability depends on a "common ground" of shared knowledge, beliefs and assumptions. And Richard Cook (quote on slide), who you might recognize from the classic "How systems fail," is reminding us that common ground takes effort – effort to build, effort to sustain and extend, and effort to repair.


Byte-Size Architecture Sessions

Andrea Magnorsky created a practice area around something many of us maybe sorta do, but should do more, and more consciously. Those whiteboard (or Miro board) discussions we pull others into, to noodle on some part of the system? Those Architecture Community of Practice meetings? Extend/modify that idea to intentionally and regularly get folk talking about and modeling "the system" and architecture. Building understanding of this system, together. Addressing issues, together. And doing so at a regular cadence (like an hour a week) with just enough structure, to build shared understanding, to investigate and learn together, to explore options, and more. Make it an ongoing practice.

<https://bytesizearchitecturesessions.com/>

"Collective responsibility is not a matter of adding but of interweaving, a matter of the reciprocal modification brought about by the interweaving. It is not a matter of aggregation but of integration."

— Mary Parker Follett



(Co)Stewardship

"I got reminded [...] of the notion of stewardship, and we should probably think about our successful systems in these terms – with responsibility for the connections, continuity, and health of the system and the people impacted by it. And part of that stewardship should be – *needs* to be – an engagement in a sustained renewal of necessary expertise."

– Michael McCliment


Source: <https://twitter.com/cornazano/status/1292967631990018049>

Stewardship

This brings to mind the notion of stewardship and the sustained building and renewal of the expertise it takes to be good stewards of the system – stewards who are convening conversations and growing expertise and contextualizing work so that we're bending the arc of our system more towards (structural, conceptual, design, organizational) integrity, and sustainability in technical, economic, social and environmental terms.

Roles that have "across" organizational unit (teams, teams of teams; managers, architects, managers of managers, senior SREs and principal engineers, CTOs, etc.) focus, each have a unique responsibility field, with a unique relationship and perceptual field, putting them in a position to develop understandings of the system (and interacting systems) at this scope. From this unique across-boundaries vantage point, we scan for and discern what needs to be understood and responded to, to sustain the system. Anticipatory awareness means paying ongoing attention to understanding the various contexts (use, development, operations, business, technology, ...), the system, and the implications of changes and shifts. This is work. Collaborative work. Integrative work. Still, work. As is co-shaping and responding to shifts.

Anticipatory awareness and intentional design, both as ongoing processes as the system and its contexts co-evolve, mean doing hard things that have outcomes and consequences. And stewardship also means building the organizational will and wherewithal to confront, understand, cope with, and co-create and co-evolve towards better. Even as we seek to understand and shape what we mean by "better."



Each system, and its intertwining in other systems, is unique and (co-)evolving.

We have a unique responsibility and opportunity to understand, to recognize, to draw out.

Ethics and Oughts



Jabe Bloom
@cyetain

Thinking about, thinking about, the differences between these...



"the designer, is concerned with how things ought to be - how they ought to be in order to attain goals, and to function."

— Herbert Simon

We lead to enable things to be more the way they ought to be.

Intention, and Oughts

"The rocks on the right where (presumably) assembled by "objective" means, no human intervened, physical explanations should be able to capture how it "got like that." [T]he rocks on the left... OTOH... can't VIOLATE physical laws... but their assembly includes a good deal of human judgment" — Jabe Bloom (@cyetain)

Just because we can, doesn't mean we should. But there is a lot to discern, and forces and pressures.


Consider rock stacking in river beds. "Rock stacking can be detrimental to the sensitive ecosystems of rivers and streams. Moving rocks from the river displaces important ecosystem structure for fish and aquatic invertebrates. Many of our Ausable River fish species lay eggs in crevices between rocks, and moving them can result in altered flows, which could wash away the eggs or expose the fry to predators. Salamanders and crayfish also make their homes under rocks, and rock moving can destroy their homes, and even lead to direct mortality of these creatures." (Ausable River Association website)

The point? Is that our impact adds up. How much should and could we think about? More than we have, typically? Yes, technology disrupts. Has positive and negative effects. Still, considerate design would have us think in terms of impacts.

Impact Blindspots

Blood oximeters failing to be accurate for people with darker skin, impacts diagnoses during Covid.

AirTags have been used to maliciously track women.



Responsibilities and Outcomes

Lore has it that "The ancient Romans had a tradition: whenever one of their engineers constructed an arch, as the capstone was hoisted into place, the engineer assumed accountability for his work in the most profound way possible: he stood under the arch." (Michael Armstrong). Being around as a legacy system ages, is another way that we in software get to experience the impact of decisions made years, and even just days, ago... But our responsibilities aren't just to our future selves, in development and operations. They are to users, and communities, and other creatures and ecosystems. And it can be hard to anticipate. This is not a get out of responsibility free card. We need to foster diverse teams and partner with others to research options and impacts (to anticipate, and as we build out the system, to probe and test impacts and outcomes). It's work and part of this work is to explore for what our team and organization is set up to be blind to (e.g., strive to see from different points of view, and partner with impacted groups).


"Those of us developing software don't need to be told what a big impact it's had on humanity this century. I've long maintained that this places a serious responsibility on our profession. Whether asked to or not, we have a duty to ensure our systems don't degrade our society."

— Martin Fowler, in the introduction to a post on Thoughtworks' "Responsible Tech Playbook" at <https://martinfowler.com/articles/2021-responsible-tech-playbook.html>

"Given any design team organization, there is a class of design alternatives which cannot be effectively pursued by such an organization because the necessary communication paths do not exist."

— Mel Conway

Ethics for Designers



How Design Designs Us: Part 3 | The Ethics of Design

Leyla Acaroglu writes:

"With all this rapid post-industrial revolution growth and technological advancement, we are beginning to see the fall-out of the avoidance of a singular question: how does what we design, design us?"

"Nearly everyone I interviewed had, at some point, learnt about the systemic implications of rapid innovation and how to make better decisions; yet, most of them still passed off the responsibility of 'right' decision making to someone else. It was the boss's, client's, manufacturer's, government's, or consumer's choice that would solve the problem that their production would participate in. When everyone within a system plays this hands-off, 'that's not my problem' game, the system is very quickly riddled with externalities... and a shit load of problems! This appears to be the case with the complex debate around the ethics of design and technology."

Source: Leyla Acaroglu, How Design Designs Us: Part 3 | The Ethics of Design
<https://medium.com/disruptive-design/how-design-designs-us-part-3-the-ethics-of-design-ca40e33f5842#.5ur28he4l>

Some folk I value following, to learn more at the intersection of ethics and design: Abeba Birhane (@abebab); Alba Villamil (@albanvillamil)

"Who is taking responsibility for the outcomes, externalities, and downright damaging impacts of our hyper-consumer, ever-changing landscape of new gadgets and virtual arenas that are coming on board at a lighting speed pace?"

— Leyla Acaroglu

Where Not to Act is to Act

"In the end, there are no perfect solutions to leadership and management problems [...] But because the essence of leadership is action and responsibility, one cannot *not* act."

— Peter Vaill

TECHNICAL
LEADERSHIP

Hard Things Are Still Hard

Ethical matters often contain clear choices. And not so clear choices. A technology that takes away jobs in one area, may open up jobs or create solutions to a societal concern (treatments, etc.) in another. Not considering ethical choices, and their conflicts, doesn't make them go away (like some object permanence game).

Agnostology is culturally cultivated ignorance. Nescience is a term for constructed ignorance. Daniel R. DeNicola identified "five forms of nescience, distinguished by factors motivating a decision to barricade the boundary of knowledge: rational ignorance, strategic ignorance, willful ignorance, privacy and secrecy, forbidden knowledge." (PropCazhPM)

It can be useful to distinguish rational ignorance from strategic ignorance:

'This habit of feigning incompetence at a task, so as to make it someone else's responsibility, is called "weaponized incompetence," and can show up at work in a number of different ways.' (strategic ignorance)

"rational ignorance" [is] ignorance we CHOOSE to retain. We make a decision that something isn't worth knowing, or the benefits of learning X would not outweigh the investment of learning X.'

— @PropCazhPM (on twitter)

"the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise."


— F. Scott Fitzgerald

Recommended:

Daniel R. DeNicola,
Understanding Ignorance

Decisions, Decisions

So we have understood the context, the various interacting desired outcomes, the interacting forces, and implications, and we have developed alternatives that... all look good... 😊 NOW WHAT???



TECHNICAL
LEADERSHIP

Decisions Are About Choices

Sometimes we'll do this work, and the choice is clear. Or we pick the most intuitive path based on our experience and best sense of what to do with limited time, and attention and resources. Other times, it's hard — the choice may not be clear, or those involved may be split on what alternative is preferred. It is all the more difficult (and potentially fractious), if it's a crucial decision that much depends on.

Some ways to winnow the choice set: dot voting and attempts to converge; play "vote off the island," voting the least preferred out of the consideration set (and then considering factors like minimization of regret). A powerful approach, is to go back to the notion of reversibility, and consider how to make the decision testable in a short timeframe, before too much depends on it and while it is still reversible.

For those who disagree, we can ask: what would it take, to make this approach work for you? Or: if you partially agree, is this sufficient to try out, and what should we explore first to address your concerns?


Hard Choices

When we're working across the system, strategically and structurally significant decisions need to be made from a system — not local (to a part) — perspective. So not only do they impact different people — stakeholders (the ones with stakes, to quote Tom Graves) — but they are things people care about, and have strong, but different, opinions about. They are seen from different vantage points where there are different pressure points, by different teams and their people, responsible for different pieces of the system. We work across the system. And across the turfs and charters of teams, and individuals, and functions. Well. All this means that people will see things differently. Care about them differently. And as leaders we need to make decisions to meet broader system or organizational goals. Decisions that will sometimes look suboptimal from the perspective of local goals. These decisions need to be communicated effectively, so that progress can be made even if there isn't uniform agreement.

Common Understanding

“Unless and until all members of a team have a common understanding of the problem, attempts to solve the problem are just so much wasted energy.”

— Gerald M. Weinberg



Some Ways to Develop Common Understanding

We orient to working together, especially in ways that draw out assumptions and ideas, so that we can ask questions and probe (work them out, as well as instrument, to better assess) and respond to them together. Working together is a rich way to build common ground and shared understanding. But when teams (of teams) get too large for this to be particularly effective, we start to rely on a more fractal approach, with smaller teams. As much as we can, we involve team members to work collaboratively on interface design and to address concerns that cut across teams. Still, proactive system identity and integrity defining work, needs perspective and leadership across boundaries. There's also the matter of building organizational will to do bigger things that impact various teams. At any rate, even where everyone can't be involved, drawing in some of those who'll be impacted, helps to bring ideas and concerns into the decision making, and builds understanding among those who can share it in their teams. In other words, working organically, through participation, broadens the set of those who can tell the story of the system, its architecture and key decisions. We still need to write significant decisions down (and describe architectural models and their implications) and talk about them.

*If you are a good leader,
Who talks little,
They will say,
When your work is done,
And your aim fulfilled,
"We did it ourselves."*

— Lao Tse

"He who establishes his argument by noise and command shows that his reason is weak."

— Michel de Montaigne

Communicate, Communicate

"The longer I'm a leader, the more I realize that communicating something once is the equivalent of not communicating it at all. Communicate the [th/b]ring repeatedly until they literally ask you to stop."

— Nivia Henry



Image source: Nivia Henry (@lanooba) with permission

**TECHNICAL
LEADERSHIP**

Go Ahead, Repeat Yourself

I really have to remind myself that I not only get to repeat myself, but I MUST repeat myself -- for the benefit of others. Contrast this (apocryphal??) interchange:

"Simplify, simplify" — H. D. Thoreau

'One "simplify" would have sufficed' — Ralph Waldo Emerson

with Eberhardt Rechtin's:

"Simplify, simplify, Simplify"

And recall he also said:

"Communicate, Communicate, Communicate"

So much competes for attention, we miss things. And there are things we don't understand at first, and need to hear again, perhaps another way. Communicating helps increase awareness – of the decision and its ramifications, and implications we may not have been aware of. Conversations move understanding around. We need to keep having them, and drawing attention to what is important, or subtle or overlooked. We're helping to build shared understanding of critical shaping decisions, whether its architecture, product direction, strategy, or other matters of importance to system integrity and business outcomes.


"bring" was a typo (for thing), but I liked it — communicating what we're doing, and how that's important for the system (us/stakeholders/..).

*"Don't ever stop
talking about the
system"*

— Eb Rechtin



Impact Mapping and Enablement



Impact Mapping

We can use impact mapping to explore how to make the decision successful, organizationally. What information do teams need, in what format? What capabilities do they need to build and how can we help?

Impact Mapping Template

"Goal: The centre of an impact map answers the most important question: Why are we doing this? This is the goal we are trying to achieve.

Actors: The first branch of an impact map provides answers to the following questions: Who can produce the desired effect? Who can obstruct it? Who are the consumers or users of [our decision]? Who will be impacted by it? These are the actors who can influence the outcome.

Impacts: Next, we answer the following questions: How would our actors' behaviour need to change? How can they help us to achieve the goal? How can they obstruct or prevent us from succeeding? These are the impacts that we're trying to create.

Deliverables: Once we have the first three questions answered, we can talk about scope. The third branch level of an impact map answers the following question: What can we do, to support the required impacts?"

Source:

<https://www.impactmapping.org/drawing.html>




Persuasion

Rhetoric: persuasion through the use of oral or written language
(term coined by Plato)

In *The Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle defined three modes of rhetoric

- Logos: an argument from reason
- Pathos: emotional appeal, and
- Ethos: reputation and credibility



Logos, Ethos and Pathos


"There are 3 frogs on a log. One decides to jump. How many frogs are on the log?" (Cory Booker) Just deciding, doesn't mean anything gets done. As much as we eschew manipulation against anyone's interests or will, there's still the work of influence or persuasion and building sufficient common ground or understanding, so that others can and will act.

In engineering, we tend to use and appeal to logic as our principal tool for persuasion; logos, standing on the shoulders of ethos. We might try to avoid pathos, the appeal to the emotions, but then we neglect enthusiasm, and the importance of building it in ourselves that it may light in others; we neglect to tell stories that connect personally, appealing to the common history and aspirations of those we would persuade.

In *Changing Minds*, Howard Gardner plays with the pun – changing minds not just in the sense of persuading, but in the sense of changing the information we have to work with or what we hold in mind, too. For example, presenting *reasoned* arguments where relevant factors are presented and weighed (the decision template does this); collecting and presenting relevant data and *research*; *resonance* which depends on style of audience and may be appeal to logic, or may be through stories or narratives; representing the information differently (think back to the monk and the mountain exercise and how we "simulated" the monk walking the path both days, and the visual representation) (what Gardner calls *representational redescription*); etc.

*"People don't change because of data.
They change because of what they value."*

— Esther Derby



Performance Art

"When I taught a "user interface" class at the University of Virginia, I'd bring in a working VCR on the first day. I would put it on the desk in front of the room. I would pull out a sledgehammer. I would destroy the VCR. ... I sure got their attention. That's always the first step to solving an ignored problem."

— Randy Pausch



Persuasion and Performance

Culture is expressed and shaped; built, repaired and renewed; acted and reenacted. Some is in the doing, in the performance of work and conversations and what we encourage and discourage. Still, we might note the role of the performance of performance, whether it is in a setting like a talk or a meeting, or in ensemble programming, hallway conversation, etc. It might be to draw attention, as Randy Pausch did. As Steve Jobs reportedly did (e.g. tossing iPod prototype in aquarium: "Those are air bubbles," he snapped.


"That means there's space in there.") — in a way that arguably eroded other important social elements, like psych safety, at least for some, or inclusion and diversity, at least for some.... Now, what both Pausch and Jobs were drawing attention to were, often, elements of quality or design excellence. That's the lesson, not the unkindness!

Meanwhile at Amazon...

"All of our meetings are structured around six-page memos" ... "When you have to write your ideas out in complete sentences and complete paragraphs, it forces a deeper clarity of thinking." — Jeff Bezos

"When I'm getting ready to reason with a man I spend one third of my time thinking about myself and what I am going to say—and two thirds thinking about him and what he is going to say."

— Abraham Lincoln, maybe???



Persuasion and Influence

Cialdini's 6 fundamental principles of persuasion:

Liking: People like those who are like them.


Reciprocity: People repay in kind.

Social Proof: People follow the lead of similar others.

Consistency: People align with their clear commitments.

Authority: People defer to experts.

Scarcity: People want more of what they can have less of.



Participation Persuades

Cialdini's principles of persuasion may be self-illustrating? In which case, how do we break out of the trap of self-fulfilling like-mindedness, and foster more diverse inclusive teams/organizations?


One thing to bear in mind, is that participation helps build understanding and common ground. By being there (for the discussions that surface assumptions and shape desired outcomes and surface and weigh tradeoffs, and make the judgment calls about simplifications, sometimes, and interweaving understanding across views and perspectives to take in more of the complexity at others, etc., etc.), we build up our understanding (mental models) and, frankly, feelings! We become invested – we “feel and take ownership.” But we can’t do everything “by committee” together in large, and then even larger, groups, as the system and organization grows and adapts to challenges. So we look to extend participation through “design crits” or “design labs” or reviews. By creating opportunities for areas of participation, understanding and contribution. And by writing about the decisions. But this may be more helpful for some stakeholders and not so much for others. Senior management, for example. Or very large teams. So we want to think about and work on bringing them along to, so they understand how they can support and enable, and what we are doing to support and enable them.

"Persuasion used to be a "good" word. It was the opposite of coercion. It was wrong to try to force people, you should try to persuade them. Now we tend to think that persuasion is, or rather may easily be, a kind of force."

— Mary Parker Follett*

* Source: Leaders and Experts, Mary Parker Follett, 1927, in Dynamic Administration

Decisions Interact With Context



John Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing"

Decisions Orient; Decisions Interact with Context; It's Loopy!

The OODA loop is a simplification, for all its depiction of feedback loops. While we're making decisions, we need information and re-enter observe/orient or sense/make sense stances and activities. Our evolving understanding changes our perception of the context. Our decisions change actions, potentially already underway. Actions change the context. And so forth.

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Elizabeth Ayer: @ElizAyer

Kenny Baas-Schwegler: @kenny_baas

Abeba Birhane: @abebab

Kent Beck: @KentBeck

Grady Booch: @Grady_Booch

Sue Borchardt: @contemplatethis

Alistair Cockburn: @totheralistair

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Esther Derby: @estherderby

Jaana Dogan: @rakyll

André Henry: @7grok

Nivia Henry: @lanooba

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"There is a Zulu phrase, 'Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu', which means 'A person is a person through other persons.'

—Abeba Birhane

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References

"We know from everyday experience that a person is partly forged in the crucible of community."

—Abeba Birhane

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
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Attribution

The format for these notes is adapted from a template from Nancy Duarte and team.

For more:

<https://www.duarte.com/slidedocs/>



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Duarte Slidedocs®

We recommend the Duarte material on slidedocs® in addition to the template; much that is valuable there.

Quotes and Photos

We have consciously brought various pioneers and contemporaries visibly into our materials for two reasons:

"Act always so as to increase the number of choices.'
— Heinz von Foerster

- i. to acknowledge and celebrate the extent to which we are because of others (Abeba Birhane). It is a small way to bring into the room, so to speak, with us people whose insights and work has influenced us, and integrated with our experiences, other reading and conversations, and more, to build what we understand and can share.
- ii. to recommend to you wonderful work you may want follow up on, and also to draw in our contemporaries who are sharing insights that you too may find useful, and want to follow them on twitter, etc.

Stay in Touch

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Masterclasses and Workshops

- **Technical Leadership Masterclass**, October 17 and 24, 2023 at 12 pm - 3:00 pm ET.
- **System Design and Architecture Workshop**, Oct 3-5 and 10-12, 2023, at 11 am - 3:30 pm ET

“What we care about is the productive life, and the first test of the productive power of the collective life is its nourishment of the individual. The second test is whether the contributions of individuals can be fruitfully united”
— Mary Parker Follett



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