

Assignment 3

Submission Deadline: 2021.10.13, 12:00 pm

1. (Hybrid CPA construction). Let (E_0, D_0) be a semantically secure cipher defined over (K_0, M, C_0) , and let (E_1, D_1) be a CPA secure cipher defined over (K, K_0, C_1) .

a) Define the following hybrid cipher (E, D) as:

$$E(k, m) := \{k_0 \xleftarrow{R} K_0, c_1 \xleftarrow{R} E_1(k, k_0), c_0 \xleftarrow{R} E_0(k_0, m), \text{ output } (c_1, c_0)\}$$
$$D(k, (c_1, c_0)) := \{k_0 \leftarrow D_1(k, c_1), m \leftarrow D_0(k_0, c_0), \text{ output } m\}$$

Here c_1 is called the ciphertext header, and c_0 is called the ciphertext body.

Prove that (E, D) is CPA secure.

- b) Suppose m is some large copyrighted content. A nice feature of (E, D) is that the content owner can make the long ciphertext body c_0 public for anyone to download at their leisure. Suppose both Alice and Bob take the time to download c_0 . When later Alice, who has key k_a , pays for access to the content, the content owner can quickly grant her access by sending her the short ciphertext header $c_a \leftarrow E_1(k_a, k_0)$. Similarly, when Bob, who has key k_b , pays for access, the content owner grants him access by sending him the short header $c_b \leftarrow E_1(k_b, k_0)$. Now, an eavesdropper gets to see $E'((k_a, k_b), m) = (c_a, c_b, c_0)$. Generalize your proof from part (a) to show that this cipher is also CPA secure.

2. Assume Alice and Bob wants to run a protocol to compare two numbers from each of them, namely number a from Alice and number b from Bob, here a and b are greater than 0 and less than some big prime number p . Alice wants to know if $a=b$; but if $a \neq b$ then Alice should learn nothing else about b ; Bob should learn nothing at all about a .

We introduce a trust third party Sam to help by allowing Alice and Bob to interact with the server Sam. Suppose Alice and Bob have a shared secret key $(k_0, k_1) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$, and Alice and Bob each have a secure channel to Sam. The protocol works as follows:

- 1) Bob chooses random number $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and send $r, x_b = r(b + k_0) + k_1$ to Sam.
- 2) When Alice wants to test equality, she sends $x_a = a + k_0$ to Sam.
- 3) Sam computes $x = rx_a - x_b$ and sends back to Alice.
- 4) Alice check if $x + k_1 = 0$

In order for this protocol to work properly, what conditions do we need to put on Sam? If k_0, k_1 are used more than once, there could be problems, please explain what trouble will it make and how to prevent it by giving your solution.