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Music and Musicians in Exile

The Romantic Legacy of a Double Life

Lydia Goehr

Difficult as it must always appear to the thinker, to satisfactorily define the true relation of a great artist to his nation, that difficulty is enormously increased when the subject is neither a poet nor a painter, but a musician. . . . Neither through language, nor through any form wherein his country or his people greets the eye, does the musician reveal his origin. It has generally been assumed, therefore, that tone speech belongs to the whole human race alike, that melody is an absolute tongue, in power whereof the musician speaks to every heart. However, upon closer examination . . . we recognize that it is possible to talk of a German . . . music.

RICHARD WAGNER, "BEETHOVEN," IN *PROSE WORKS*

During the Second World War my grandfather assumed a double identity. He even went by two names. Under the safe English-sounding name George Walter he composed film music, light music, and music for the Allied war effort, specifically for the BBC's propaganda newsreels. Under his German birth name, Walter Goehr, he continued the career he had pursued in Berlin, predominantly as symphonic conductor but also as composer. He regarded as more self-authenticating not only his birth name but also the musical activity the name symbolized. "I have worked very hard for many years," he wrote in wartime correspondence to his former teacher Arnold Schoenberg, who was now in America, "and lately I am happy to say I find more time for composing. . . . This is the only thing in life I feel is worthwhile. . . . Whenever I try to compose . . . old times appear clearly before me."¹

For my grandfather, as for others in my family who have lived in countries different from those of their birth, his musical activity was one of his strongest connections to home. Unreflectively, "home" simply names a place and a life once lived; reflectively, it names a continually transforming set of bonds organized by activities, conversations, and relationships that trace memories of past, establish patterns of present significance, and suggest desires for the future. "Home" is largely synonymous with "family": when a

family feels more no place than a place in particular, the bonds (musical or otherwise) holding them together carry the significance of home.

The constant questioning about the soil of a family's significance is no different for those who emigrate in freedom than for those who emigrate for political reasons, even if the urgency of the questioning is.² In contrast to the relative comfort of the freely moving immigrant, the often indescribable suffering of political exile links the questioning to extreme emotions: melancholy mixed with relief in leaving, happiness mixed with guilt for surviving, excitement mixed with trepidation for the new life to be lived. Indeed, the principal reason my grandfather had written to Schoenberg was to thank him for all he had done for his brother Rudolf. "I hope he will be able to get to the U.S.A.," he wrote. "At the moment it seems very difficult to accomplish."

My great-uncle did eventually reach the United States, but the journey was agonizing. Exiled from Germany and interned in France, Rudi himself wrote to Schoenberg with a desperate request: could his former teacher help him obtain a visa or work permit for entry into America? His writing traveled across the languages of German, French, and English as he described the camps of his internment, his places of hiding and refuge. "I hope you received my postcards," he wrote after the occupation of France. "Unfortunately, I am always in a camp, but I hope to be free soon and to see my wife." He continued:

It was really a miracle. The German army stopped its advance just 5 miles before the village. So I escaped them. But now, know all is very sad. There will not be any chance for me to work again in France and I don't know what to do. Could you help me? I am very sorry to disturb you, but my situation is very serious. Otherwise I know, after a week in America, all could be so easy—I mean, I could perhaps try my chance.

Rudi did try his chance. "Life is very hard in New York," he wrote to Schoenberg after his arrival.

Weather and thinking, thinking and weather. It is a terrible conflict, but I have always the impression that somehow it will work out. . . . These days I make music with Rudi Kolisch. We've been playing the Bartók violin concerto, and it's great fun. . . . But besides this, one hears only Shostakovich, Sh. and more Shostakovich.

Rudi joined the army. "Three months in the Army and already an American citizen," he told Schoenberg on 4 February 1944.

I write you again. The infantry never did like much musicians, so I have to wait and see what is going to happen. . . . I got wonderful news from my brother, always conducting concerts with very interesting programs. I was—before I came here—arranger and musical director of the Eastman Kodak Show on NBC.

Apparently the purpose of having music on the Eastman Show was unapologetically commercial: it was used to encourage new Kodak customers to take snapshots with their cameras on picnic outings.³ "The musical direction of the programming is not very interesting," Rudi wrote on 13 December 1942 while commuting between Rochester and New York. "Beethoven is far less appreciated than Sousa!" Apparently, some of Rudi's early musical activities in America were not so different in style from those of his brother, known in Britain as George.

It is clear from Schoenberg's replies to Walter and Rudi that he wanted to help his former students, and sometimes succeeded in doing so, but was not confident at any point that he *could* do so. Schoenberg had surmised early on that his position in America would not be exactly what it had been in Europe: "I'd like to know too if I can do anything for you in America," he had written in 1933, before his own departure, responding to a plea for help from Alban Berg—but he added, "always supposing that I should have the power. . . . For there's no knowing how disregarded, slighted, and without influence I may be there."⁴ Had his students not been facing quite desperate circumstances, they too would have recognized that, in exile, as every other kind of family is transformed, so also is a family of musicians.

This essay investigates the transformations that occur to a musical family in exile, specifically the mass move of European composers to America prompted by Germany's National Socialism. It investigates the tensions that arose in musical practice when a powerful nineteenth-century metaphysical thesis about music and musicians was converted into the most extreme of ideological terms, when, more specifically, purportedly universal ideals were converted into racially bounded ideals. However, the ultimate concern of this essay is less historical than philosophical.

Thus, by "a musical family" I shall not mean just a historical family of persons who were musicians, or the relations holding between composition teachers and their pupils who in turn became composers and teachers. I shall also include a family of views about music. The kind of views I include are those invoking what I like to call the condition of *doubleness*. Bonding the family will be the view that composers, who because of exile were propelled into foreignness, began to live what the philosopher Ernst Bloch called in 1939 the double rather than divided life of frontier men. I shall show, first through a detailed description of composers' responses to exile and later through conceptual clarification, that the doubleness involved in this frontier life has had numerous expressions of a musical, historical, aesthetic, and metaphysical sort. In general, doubleness exists in practices of thought and activity that invoke two-sided, mediating, or conflicting ideals, productions, and conditions. In particular, doubleness has been expressed in, for example, music-text mergers of languages and idioms, strategies of adaptation and resistance, articulations of insider and outsider positions,

and, finally, in romantic-modernist theorists invoking limits. These diverse expressions of doubleness do not, however, together form a neatly unified picture, nor do they always mesh exactly with one another, even though they are often employed as if they do. Nor do they together refer to a single way of conceiving of doubleness. Rather, they stand to one another, at best and appropriately, as "family resemblant."

Doubleness pervades this century's thinking about the exile of artists and intellectuals generally. Thus, this thinking tends to take the two notions of language and creativity as constitutive within artistic and intellectual practices and the sociopolitical notions of expression and freedom as regulative. Its theorists then ask whether living on foreign soil affects a person's freedom of expression or whether being forced to speak a foreign language renders an artist more or less creative.

In historical mode, theorists answer these two questions by determining whether or not artists and intellectuals were exiled to places that provided them with adequate living conditions so that they could continue to create and write in comfort and freedom. They also study the impact of exile on the quality and quantity of the exiles' artistic and intellectual creation. But theorists also investigate exile as an existential or psychological condition. "Being an exile is not a matter of needing a passport," Henry Pachter once wrote; "it is a state of mind."⁵ An exile is any artist or intellectual who maintains a critical distance from what Adorno called the "administered world." Thus, even if artists are not living in political exile, they may live in a state of psychological or inner exile. Some theorists even claim that this inner exile is required for creative work because it marks the free human subject. Political or outer exile may be just the thing to shock the artist out of a comfortable complacency, but, by itself, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for creative work.

This highly positive view of the state of exile is countered by an equally positive view of the state of rootedness in home. Some argue that exile (in either its inner or outer form) is deadening, not awakening. Exile from one's culture, losing the use of a native language, does not quicken the fancy but places it far out of reach. "To be rooted," wrote Simone Weil, "is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul."⁶ Creativity and the language of free artistic expression requires more the sense of belonging, more a native or saturated cultural understanding, than it does the purportedly alienating and empty condition of political or social freedom. In this view, rootedness rather than exile is the true condition of the creative spirit.⁷

To complicate matters, the two opposing views are not always presented as such. In paradoxical flourish, some theorists play with the meaning of "home." The artist is truly at home when not at home. Home for an artist is a place that allows her to feel constructively alienated from home—for

truth is better grasped at a distance. If paradox (irony and laughter) once fueled Groucho Marx's rejection of belonging to a club, it has also fueled the artist's position more generally.

Yet it is just this complication of paradox that allows us to see the duality of home and estrangement less in mutually excluding than in doubling terms. Estrangement (linked to freedom, reflectiveness, and openness) and home (linked to understanding, identity, and involvement) capture in their mutual mediation a complex and constructive modernist attitude that persons may take in relation to the society in which they live. The cosmopolitan wants to be both estranged and at home in the modern metropolis. Of course, in times of intense social and political upheaval the terms are usually employed in excluding and not in mediating ways, so that the duality between home and estrangement prompts negative claims of opposition, rigidity, and purity. Such terms are encouraged by a society's different groups—by those “at home” and those “estranged”—according to their respective advantage. In the history of mass and individual exile we should not be surprised to find, therefore, the home/estrangement duality being used in wiser moments in its doubling or mediating form, and in more extreme moments in its most dividing and polarizing form.

The polarization that negatively conditions a particular practice under certain historical circumstances may disrupt without permanently destroying the practice's ability to accommodate the constructive condition of doubleness. When investigating a given practice it is necessary to view it from both descriptive and normative perspectives, to see how it is conditioned at any given time and how it could be conditioned, and to see how the practice is being described and how in fact it is working. This dual perspective, in other terms, allows us to see past a polarization that forces us to conclude either that creativity demands estrangement or that it demands home, and allows us to conclude instead that, if it demands either, then it most likely demands both.

The dual perspective also suits a musical practice whose specific modernist character is captured precisely in a myriad of “doubling” views. For example, one view describes music's otherworldly or aesthetic status on the one hand, and its worldly or historical character on the other. Another view describes the play between inner and outer exile, that is, between the psychological exile musicians experienced “at home” in Europe and the actual exile they experienced in their move to America. In what follows, we will see that these distinct doubling views are connected.

The philosophy of music has thrived on claims about the language of music as bound or not bound to a nation, as free, expressive, and creative. But exiled musicians challenged two basic views: that music is a language and, relatedly, that creativity is causally or otherwise connected to the condition either of exile or of home. However, their challenge consisted less in

a rejection of these views than in showing their limits. Chiefly, their experiences revealed the limits of describing music monologically, as one might an ordinary, conceptual or cognitive, language, because the description failed to capture the full significance of music, notably its creative moment. A resemblant claim was contemporaneously made that music could not be reduced to its social conditioning or embodiment insofar as that reduction would fail to recognize music's resisting (purely musical) aspects. In general, the romantic-modernist legacy in the philosophy of music has been exemplary in showing the need for recognizing limits and doubleness, and thus the dangers of reductionism, in both our theories and our practices.

The double life of the exiled musician makes explicit the double-sided character of music that the sometimes more comfortable life of the musician at home leaves implicit. Accordingly, my cast of characters is chosen for the manifold ways each character lived both "homed" and "foreign" lives. The primary cast comprises composers. All moved to a country with a different spoken language. Most were Jewish (by birth, or by force or choice of return) and thus already had some understanding of the condition of religious exile. Some had experienced exile or inner emigration at home for their political views. All had experienced historical or psychological exile en masse or as individual targets. The philosophical chorus comprises thinkers closely connected to the aforementioned composers, to issues of musical composition and creativity, and who themselves experienced exile or emigration. The doubly destructive and inspirational spirit of Richard Wagner will burst at least once onto the stage to overshadow the entire proceedings.

EXPERIENCES OF EXILE

In 1950 Albert Goldberg of the *Los Angeles Times* asked several exiled composers to respond to a claim made by a composer of European birth who, despite being "distinguished," remained nameless. The claim was that "European composers had changed since they lost contact with their native countries and the music the majority of them had written [in the United States] did not equal that . . . previously composed."⁸ Of the many responses given, Schoenberg's statement that he was unconscious that his exile had changed him has been the most frequently cited by theorists to characterize him as the composer who most resisted Americanization.⁹ Taken in isolation, Schoenberg's statement fails to capture what was, as one would expect, a much more complex reaction.

Drawing on a range of documents, I shall show that responses to exile were usually too varied to allow us to characterize the composers as merely resisting or adapting to Americanization. To be sure, some variation within and across individual cases is due to context of utterance: whether, say, the

responses were politically strategic or guided by particular emotions. But some variation reflects the conflicting views composers often held regarding the need for their creativity and use of the musical language to be positioned sometimes at a distance from, and sometimes as rooted in, home. Following conventional discursive patterns, composers responded to exile dichotomously. They distinguished between inner and outer lives and between music's transcendence and its situatedness. They gave flesh to these distinctions by distinguishing high from low art, the quality from the quantity of their work, and their resisting from their conceding to market pressures. Precisely because there is no perfect fit between these different distinctions, and because composers often wanted to endorse both sides, we find constructive conflicts in the overall picture of music as a language and of conditions of creativity. In other words, in mixing the particular exigencies of their exile with the musical aesthetic they brought with them, composers' responses to exile became deeply conflicted. My claim is that these conflicts are better interpreted in doubling terms rather than in dividing terms.

Schoenberg attached his famed response to a question a Spanish musician once asked him about the effect a country's climate or character could have on his compositional style. He replied rhetorically at first—should my style be cold in Alaska, but hot near the equator?—but then more soberly. He surmised that, whereas the quantity of his compositional output might be affected, the quality would not be, for quality comes from within.¹⁰ Schoenberg was not the only one to answer this way. Quoting the exile Albert Einstein, Mario Castelnuovo-Tedesco wrote to Goldberg: "The bitter and the sweet come from the outside, the hard from within, from one's own efforts. For the most part I do the thing which my own nature drives me to." And of Béla Bartók, Yehudi Menuhin recalled: "Exile made of him [an] unaccommodated man, solitary, intense, requiring for material support only a bed, a table to write at and—but this might be considered a luxury—absolute quiet in which his inner concentration might bear fruit."¹¹

Many exiles believed that the reliance upon their "inner natures" had grown in proportion to the decline they experienced in external support. Although some composers admitted that they were just too old to adapt to new conditions ("I was a finished product of the old world," wrote Eric Zeisl), others blamed the conditions of America's musical life. Something is "missing in America's musical scene," complained Miklós Rózsa, "the bubbling, fertile, and germinating artistic atmosphere of prewar Europe that gave inspiration to many masterpieces." Composers are isolated in America, the protesters continued; concert audiences only want to hear the old warhorses; there is a "critical lack of demand for contemporary music" and a lack of performance opportunities; performers are vain, conductors are

temperamental. Comparing himself to Schoenberg, Stravinsky commented with some irony: "We shared a common exile to the same alien culture," and there "we wrote some of our best works (his *Fourth Quartet*, my *Abraham and Isaac*)," but "we are still played far less [here] than in the Europe that exiled us."¹²

The moderate conclusion drawn from these complaints was that relying on one's inner nature was a contingent consequence of one's exile: one may not be able to *overlook* external conditions, Castelnuovo-Tedesco remarked, but one must try to *overlive* them. Some composers drew a stronger conclusion: since exile reveals the true relation between creativity and the inner life, exile is a necessary or optimum condition. Zeisl thus explained that the artist

is always unhappy and maladjusted to his society and that it is this [condition] . . . which prompts him to dig so deeply into the hidden resources of his soul. . . . The more harassed he is, the stronger the medicines with which he will come up for his own benefit and the benefit of mankind. (See Beethoven, Mozart, Wagner, etc.) Longing, nostalgia, loneliness, and strife. I . . . know of no better nourishment for the artist's soul, and we have in proof the fact that the world's most beautiful works of art and music have frequently been created in exile and far from home (Wagner, Chopin, Stravinsky, Hindemith, etc.).

Stravinsky agreed with the last sentiment at least. Despite his warning against generalities and dismissing Goldberg's subject as "not worth a column of [his] pen," he still felt obliged to comment that the Soviets had tried to intimidate artists by warning them that their creativity would be impoverished by exile. However, the Soviet's claim had been "brilliantly refuted" throughout history—"by Handel, Gogol, Chopin, Picasso." Strategically, said Stravinsky, composers should never admit defeat; fortunately, they rarely, if ever, had had to.

Some composers were skeptical of the advantages of exile. Having bitingly attributed his creativity in exile to the "torment of boredom," Hanns Eisler dismissed the glorification of the "masochistic suffering of exile."¹³ (Virgil Thomson commented similarly when he wrote that one does not have to be poor to be an artist.)¹⁴ If exile was inspiring, it was not because of the suffering involved, but because exile has the positive effect of making one see the world anew. Seeing distant lands, Eisler wrote in 1935, "tests our methods of reasoning." Exiles "are never absolutists." Eisler was seeing a link that others would see too, a link between thinking differently and being creative.¹⁵

Ernst Krenek expressed his skepticism regarding the link between exile and creativity more strongly than Eisler.¹⁶ Exile, he said, is an external condition; it is simply the condition of composing away from home. Although

some exiles' works followed in the tradition of "the European output" and some "were written for American opportunities," because we do not know how composers would have composed had they stayed in Europe, we cannot determine whether exile made them more or less creative. External conditions affect composition wherever you live; the safest conclusion, therefore, is not to consider them. "It is amazing that the pattern of one's [creative] life does not change," Krenek reflected autobiographically in 1941, "in spite of the most comprehensive outward changes."¹⁷

Many exiled composers enjoyed reminding one another that external conditions in their native lands had not always been so good. Modern (dissonant) music was already alienated in Europe; even European audiences preferred their warhorses. That conditions before and after exile could be more similar than different was a point made by one composer who simply reminded his fellow exiles that they were now ten or fifteen years older and, if their creativity were lessened, it might simply be because they had "not discovered the pills which Wagner took to write his *Parsifal* and Verdi to write his *Falstaff*."

Still, composers generally agreed that dismissing the impact of exile altogether was untenable. Krenek remarked that a total disregard would probably be motivated by defensiveness, even though he retained his skepticism.¹⁸ Describing his composition as always having been guided by two contradictory tendencies—the pure and the situated, or the purely musical and the socially influenced—he maintained that he had never been able to tell which tendency had made his work better.¹⁹

Some composers used the pure/situated dichotomy to draw precisely the same conclusions as was done with the inner/outer one. Having already asserted that "nothing comes out, [that wasn't already] in," Schoenberg, for example, unhesitatingly moved from "inside" to "beyond." A musical idea or style, he said, is like a mathematical truth, and "two times two equals four in every climate." He then used this claim to stake out a position of artistic integrity: "Maybe I had four times four times harder to work for a living. But I made no concessions to the market." And then he used the implied distinction between loyalty to a pure musical tradition and concession to market pressures to support the traditional distinction between autonomous "high" art and dependent "low" art—although to the latter he refused even to give the name art. "No serious composer in this country is capable of living from his *art*," he had written in a letter in 1945: "only popular composers earn enough." But then, he proclaimed, they are not producing "*art*."²⁰

Exiled composers generally agreed that they could not live from composition alone and that they were having to spend their energy on teaching or writing film music. ("The only way to escape Hollywood is to live in it,"

snapped Stravinsky.)²¹ If composers were living by composition alone, it must be because they were compromising. Rózsa thus warned of the dangers of writing down to the American public and of diluting one's art, and, like Schoenberg, concluded that real art is produced only with full conviction. Compromise, he said, is "synonymous with the ruin of all artistic endeavor." "Adjustment," Castelnuovo-Tedesco wrote similarly, "shouldn't mean 'opportunism' or obedience to transitory fashions. I believe that only by following sincerely and honestly my natural trend can I bring some contribution . . . to musical art."

Expressing resistance to external pressures in terms of a retreat into one's private inner world enabled exiled composers to articulate the continuity they needed to feel across the radical rupture they had experienced. What would have been the point of conceding that their life's work, their creative inspiration, had been inhibited by exile? Most frighteningly, it would have been to admit the triumph of National Socialism. Composers *had* to believe that they could compose anywhere.

On the other hand, the sense of a composer's belonging to a place captures another side of exile experience. Sixteen years before Schoenberg spoke to the *L.A. Times*, he wrote:

It is perhaps [to be] expected that now I am in [the] new world I should feel its amenities ample compensation for the loss I have sustained and which I had foreseen for more than a decade. Indeed, I parted from the old world not without feeling the wrench in my very bones, for I was not prepared for the fact that it would render me not only homeless but speechless, languageless.²²

"Languageless"? Surely Schoenberg hadn't lost his music? To make sense of his statement, perhaps we have to assume that he was referring only to speech and language associated with nation and tongue. The idea that music (at least purely instrumental music) is not nation bound, and the related idea that if music is a language then it is not an ordinary one, are familiar ideas in the history of music. They are familiar also in exile theory. Jarrell C. Jackman has written recently that the "great advantage the émigré composers and musicians had over writers and actors was not being bound to language for economic survival."²³ In this claim, music is apparently not even classified as a language. Günter Berghaus writes comparably that "those artists who relied in their profession on verbal language and linguistic skills had to overcome considerably greater difficulties than those who worked in [arts which were] more international in their general outlook."²⁴ At least Berghaus assumes that the difference between nation-bound and international arts is one of degree. Only the exiled musician Boris Schwarz tempers his account appropriately: "On the surface," he writes, "the fate of a musician forced to emigrate seems less onerous than that of an actor, writer, or

scientist. Music is an international language; a musician—with his instrument in hand—can play and be understood in Paris, New York, or Rio, without the need to communicate through spoken words." However, composers are "more difficult to transplant: there are subtle national differences in musical tastes and customs."²⁵

The appeal to music as abstract, unbounded, or international clearly provided composers a way to resist the impact of exile, but it could only be used so far. For exiled composers also had a very strong sense of themselves as carrying a national musical identity with them into their new and foreign lives. Thus, within their responses to exile there arose a conflict between two claims: on the one hand, that music was an abstract language, and on the other, that it was nation bound. (This conflict was already embroiled in Krenek's distinction between pure and situated tendencies.)²⁶

"As much as I have an accent in my language," a painter exiled to Britain would remark, "I have an accent in my painting."²⁷ Could not the same be said about music? Apparently Schoenberg sometimes thought so: "Artistically speaking," he had written as early as 1928, "it is all the same whether someone paints, writes, or composes; his style is anchored in his time."²⁸ Later, after his exile, he may well have added: "And his style is anchored also in his place." Maybe he really did feel that he had lost his musical language.

Certainly he used the conflict between music's abstraction and its being culture or nation bound to strategic ends. It allowed him to retreat from explicit involvement in war and politics. "I did not come into this marvelous country to speak about terrors," he announced, "but to forget them."²⁹ He had long ago motivated this act of forgetting: "There are . . . reasons," he had written in 1928, "why one cannot seriously believe that the arts influence political happenings. . . . By what chord would one diagnose the Marxist confession in a piece of music, and by what colour the Fascist one in a picture?"³⁰ Schoenberg wasn't being naïve. Music, he knew, could be a powerful language: "Composers speak symbolically of philosophy, morals, etc.," he wrote in 1943; it is just that their music speaks "without a defined vocabulary."³¹ As a symbolic language, music could function without such a vocabulary but convey values nonetheless. Schoenberg was adapting here the traditional romantic strategy of claiming that music, unable to mean in ordinary referential or conceptual terms, resists description as a language yet, precisely in this act of negation, succeeds in communicating, in its unique musical and transcendental terms, philosophical, moral, and social value.

Describing music this way gave composers the confidence to maintain both that in exile nothing had changed (because the musical language is abstract or universal), and that they had brought with them a language thoroughly permeated by value, and when it suited a national value. But to sustain their confidence, they had to employ yet another distinction. To conserve a musical culture or tradition abroad required that the idea of mu-

sic's being, for example, German should be separated from the idea that it had to be situated in Germany. This separation was already a staple of exile discourse. Many German-speaking artists and intellectuals were simply proclaiming that it was they who defined German culture; it was not the geography or social/political condition of a country that did so. "German culture," Thomas Mann apparently announced, "is where I am."³² German culture was being maintained abroad because it no longer existed in Nazi Germany. If one could found a "university in exile," why not also a culture?³³

For many musicians, therefore, composition in exile was an act not merely of personal survival, but also of cultural survival. Composers were, as Berg-haus describes them, *Kulturvermittler* ("cultural ambassadors"), keepers of a tradition abroad, because the country in which this musical tradition originated had expelled its proponents.³⁴ Krenek thus spoke of the political necessity of continuing to use the twelve-tone technique, despite its often negative reception, simply because the Nazis had banned it.³⁵ Darius Milhaud commented that even in exile the "profound impulses of race endure. . . . You cannot make a mistake as to the nature of a creative artist," he continues: "It is idle to pretend that any great composer fails to demonstrate the racial origins of his expression."³⁶ Eugene Zador likewise denied "the hypothesis that a composer must live in the country of his birth, even," he said, "when his musical style is based on native folk-lore. Stravinsky's ballets, written in Paris, are Russian, just as Bartók's 'Concerto,' written in America, is Hungarian." Stravinsky agreed: "A man has one birth place, one fatherland, one country—he *can* only have one country—and the place of his birth is the most important fact of his life."³⁷ Castelnuovo-Tedesco, finally, spoke of his having never felt "cut off" in exile from either his Jewish ancestry or Latin culture, because, as he said, they were "a wealth which I had acquired once and for all: which were in me forever."

In these responses, exiled composers were now asserting a continuity between their personal and their cultural or national selves, rather than a severance. Looking back at this period, Elliott Carter duly explained that the maintenance of the European culture of serious music was one of the things that made composers "who and what they [were]."³⁸ Further sense to this identification was again given by Thomas Mann when he described his own work as requiring "long roots in my life, secret connections must lead from it to earliest childhood dreams if I am to consider myself entitled to it. . . . The arbitrary reaching for a subject to which one does not have traditional claims of sympathy and knowledge, seems senseless and amateurish to me."³⁹

If one could separate a tradition from its originating country, one could similarly separate a language. Thus Brecht distinguished the language spoken in Nazi Germany from the "true" German language, and claimed to take the latter wherever he went.⁴⁰ Profoundly skeptical, moreover, of the

possibility of being creative in a foreign language, Brecht asked in song: "Wozu in einer fremden Grammatik blättern? / Die Nachricht, die dich heimruft / Ist in bekannter Sprache geschrieben" (Why turn the pages of a strange grammar? / The news that calls you home / Is written in a familiar language).⁴¹

If Brecht held passionately on to his familiar/native language, other exiles just as passionately gave it up. Bartók refused to speak or write German because it was the language of the enemy; he did not, however, feel obliged, according to György Sándor, to reject the "German" tradition of music. Bartók, Sándor wrote, was "strongly anti-German in all his activities, except [in] his musical work."⁴² Bartók thus sought continuity in his musical language (Hungarian/German) but discontinuity in his spoken language. The same was true in the case of Brecht's former collaborator Kurt Weill—but with a twist.

Weill sometimes described himself as having given up speaking German, as being "the same composer as before," but denied that he was any longer a "German composer."⁴³ Of course, it wasn't clear that Weill had been a German composer for a long time. Stephen Hinton records Constant Lambert's prophetic, if incongruous, description of Weill as an American composer even before exile.⁴⁴ What seemed to motivate this description was the fact that the musical tradition Weill had been developing since the mid-1920s, and which he transported from Germany to America, was, according to contemporary views, more "American" than "German" to begin with. It was a tradition that, as Weill described it himself, saw music as composed not for posterity but, unlike the tradition of "serious" music, for contemporary lives and times. Its techniques and material were, therefore, of a "popular" sort.⁴⁵

Contrary to the crude assessment of Weill as the great assimilator, or as a "popular" composer who "sold out" to commercial pressures, a more subtle assessment recognizes that although he composed in a "popular" vein, he not only saw himself as doing what he had always done, but he saw that what he had always done was resistant as much as it was adaptive. "My position in America has become so secure," Weill once explained, "that I am able to contemplate making my earlier works better known here than they have been up to now. . . . I have now completely settled down and feel absolutely at home." However, he continued, "it is heavy going in America, especially for someone who speaks his own musical language, but in the theatre the situation is still better and more favorable here than anywhere else, and I am sure that I shall reach the point where I can carry forward here what I began in Europe."⁴⁶ Apparently, although Weill conceived of his music as thoroughly situated in the world, he did not believe that it thereby had to be dictated by the world. To borrow a distinction from the philosophy of law, music as immanent is different from it being merely in-

strumental (that is, in service): immanent music still has the freedom to resist. In this matter of resistance and continuity Weill, moreover, was no different from Schoenberg; it is just that they did not seem always to agree on how and in what ways music should be anchored in time and place. Of course, that was for the exiles precisely the matter in dispute.

If Weill was not, crudely, an adapter, then Schoenberg was not, crudely, a resister. Consider this description Schoenberg once gave of his expatriation. Contrasting his experience to that of the snake who "was driven out of paradise" and "sentenced to go on its belly and to eat dust all the days of its life," Schoenberg experienced, he said, a new freedom: "I . . . came from one country into another, where neither dust nor better food is rationed and where I am allowed to go on my feet, where my head can be erect, where kindness and cheerfulness is dominating, and where to live is a joy and to be an expatriate of another country is the grace of God." In sum, he wrote: "I was driven into paradise."⁴⁷

Other composers would also see the promise of paradise—or at least freedom—at the end of their tunnel of complaints. Having fully detailed the utter physical and mental torment of exile, Castelnuovo-Tedesco concluded his interview with Goldberg by saying: "On the other hand, America gave me something I didn't have before or perhaps I hadn't fully developed: a greater sense of freedom and a better understanding of social conditions and of community life."

Nowadays, the "on the one hand/on the other hand" style of argument is often dismissed as unappealing intellectualization or academese; nonetheless, it serves to capture the often conflicting aspects of human experience. We have seen this style employed constantly by exiled composers to convey a range of different distinctions, distinctions which demonstrated, overall, that in the matter of musical creativity composers saw both the advantages and disadvantages of exile, doubly conceived as an inner and outer condition, even though in claiming a given side they often spoke as if they were dismissing another. To see constructive doubleness emerging from their distinctions, rather than polarized one-sidedness, one simply must be cognizant of the hand with which any composer is speaking at any given time.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Let me now fortify with conceptual clarification the historical construction of the double-sided discourse of music and musicians in exile. Certain philosophical claims and distinctions need to be detached from their particular historical expression. For example, the palatable claim that music and musicians are bounded to nation, tradition, or culture must be separated from the more difficult and disturbing historical fact that they were once so bounded according to a racial criterion.

As is well known, Wagner psychologically exiled many composers from the tradition of German music long before Hitler geographically exiled them, and he did so with thoughts that would pervade exile discourse far into the future. In his sinister essay "Judaism in Music," Wagner conflated his broad metaphysical concept of Judaism (which he used synonymously with his negative concept of the rootless, wandering, modern cosmopolite) with a more local and racial criterion to demarcate a class of living persons—the Jews.⁴⁸ He spoke accordingly of "the effect the Jews produce on us through [their] speech; and [of] . . . the Jewish influence upon music," charging that "the Jew speaks the language of the nation in whose midst he dwells from generation to generation, but he speaks it always as an alien." He described this alienation first in terms of the "violent severance" of Jews from "Christian Civilization," and then in terms relating to language use: "the Jew talks the modern European languages merely as learned, and not as mother tongues." This fact, he continued at length,

must necessarily debar him from all capability of therein expressing himself idiomatically, independently, and conformably to his nature. A language, with its expression and its evolution, is not the work of scattered units, but of a historical community; only he who has unconsciously grown up within the bonds of this community takes also any share in its creations. . . . To make poetry in a foreign tongue has hitherto been impossible, even to geniuses of the highest rank. . . . The Jew can only after-speak . . . not truly make a poem of his words, an artwork of his doings. . . . Now if the aforesaid qualities . . . make the Jew almost incapable of giving artistic enunciation to his feelings . . . through *talk*, [they make his aptitude for] enunciation through *song*. . . [even] smaller, [for] song is just talk aroused to highest passion.

Wagner went on to describe what he saw to be the apparent success but real failure of Jews in the musical world. He attributed their apparent success to their ability to deceive, to present the appearance of being German; their real failure he attributed to their lack of ability to express themselves as "purely human." Combining the appearance and the reality, he wrote: "If we hear a Jew speak, we are unconsciously offended by the entire lack of purely-human expression."⁴⁹ From this, Wagner's main conclusion duly followed: Despite external appearances to the contrary, Jews can participate in the German musical tradition only as second-hand thinkers.

Wagner's reading of Jewish second-handedness was reread along the path of its pervasive influence. In remarks that might well have been gathered together for "friends . . . scattered throughout the corners of the globe," Ludwig Wittgenstein once described, with Wagner's essay in mind, how the Jew had been measured in Western civilization "on scales which [did] not fit him"; consequently, the Jews had been either over- or underestimated but, the suggestion is, never judged aright.⁵⁰ Wittgenstein reminded his read-

ers that Jews believe that "‘genius’ is found only in the holy man" and thus that "even the greatest of Jewish thinkers" takes himself to be "no more than talented." "Myself for instance," Wittgenstein wrote, and then added: "There is some truth in my idea that I only think reproductively." In this context, being second-hand is not a negative quality: following Jewish law, to think reproductively is to think in truthfulness; it is to think (albeit imperfectly) in the image of G-d.

For Wittgenstein, however, truthfulness was also linked to one's being "at home" in a language. *Prima facie*—and certainly Nazi doctrine supposed this—"being at home in Jewish tradition" was incompatible with "being at home in German tradition." But upon reflection, this incompatibility proved at most contingent. For it is false that belonging to one tradition automatically precludes one from belonging to another.

Wittgenstein spoke of the need for an expression sometimes "to be withdrawn from language and sent for cleaning." My purpose in comparing Wagner's remarks with Wittgenstein's is to show how the latter withdrew Wagner's judgment on the alienation of the Jews and tried to clean it. Schoenberg tried the same thing. In the second of his two speeches on the Jewish situation, given in 1935, he recalled young Austrian-Jewish artists growing up in circumstances in which their "self-esteem suffered very much."⁵¹ It was a time (the late nineteenth century), he wrote, when Wagner's "victorious career" was beginning to have its impact. Wagner, according to Schoenberg, had challenged the Jews to try to become true Germans, but racism had interfered. Camp followers, Schoenberg wrote forgivingly, had distorted Wagner's views by turning his "mild" pronouncements into "harsh and excessive" ones.⁵² (Wagner had not made the distortion so difficult.) The impact on young artists was severe: How could one create if one was not convinced of one's creative capacity? Schoenberg went on to describe the resistance that Jewish artists and intellectuals were able to muster against this destructive view, but commented sadly that Jewish audiences had been more compliant: Aryans were more appreciative of his music, he wrote, than the Jews. Schoenberg, however, concluded positively: We should not pity Jews for being second-hand, but celebrate the fact that they are G-d's chosen people. "He is only a Jew. No, he is a Jew and therefore is probably of great importance," Schoenberg wrote, to turn the anti-Semitic propaganda on its head.

Now, both Schoenberg and Wittgenstein could have concluded their remarks by identifying a special quality not of a racial or religious group (although we can understand why they did the contrary), but of a particular condition, namely that of being second-hand. For this condition by itself may foster qualities in persons that contradict outright the judgment that they are second-rate.

This possibility was given its first steps toward credibility in Bloch's brief but insightful article of 1939 entitled "Disrupted Language, Disrupted Culture" in which he dismissed an exile's suffering from *divided* loyalties and embraced an exile's celebrating his *double* loyalties.⁵³ Bloch generated his doubleness thesis specifically as a response to the conflict that arises when exiles or refugees (and he was thinking here explicitly of writers) recognize that they are bound to the language of their home but are forced to fulfill their cultural task in a foreign place. He described the difficulties of translation and of trying to create art in an alien or second language, and then described the role of language in the shaping and maintaining of "the culture-world," a world that results from the mediation between subject and object. Where the mediation is disrupted, where the "I" meets the "Other" in shock, where the language does not mediate through a feeling of belonging, the cultural task is temporarily arrested. What, Bloch asked, is the exile to do?

Bloch narrated, as I stated above, the exile's temptation to drift toward the extreme either of resistance or of adaptation, but argued that both temptations are incorrect. The correct attitude, he wrote, is "as far from insipid intrusion as it is from introverted foreignness." The exile, he explained, "brings his roots with him . . . to America" but "remains faithful to them not by making museum-pieces of them, but by testing and quickening his powers of expression on the new stuff of life." The point is not to produce "travel-books about America," but to produce an American literature in the German language. Crying out to be translated, this literature will reach a multilingual audience, but insofar as it succeeds this literature will remain a "deeply original creation," for it will have been "fostered by double but not divided loyalties—by memory and a vigorous faith in the future." He wrote in conclusion: "We are creating on the frontier of two epochs. We, German writers in America, are frontier-men in a doubly legitimate sense—both temporally and spatially—and we are working at the one necessary task: the realization of the rights of man."

Bloch thus showed how the transition from divided to double loyalties demanded a twofold account, of doubleness itself and of the creativity or originality of composition issuing therefrom. But what he left more implicit than explicit in this demand was the many forms of doubleness supporting the construction of exile discourse. The rest of this essay attends to making these forms explicit.

Bloch's thesis derived from an exile's attempt to use his native language in a new country. But the same thesis could be derived were the exile to adopt the new language as well. Given the many elements involved—languages, genres, styles, customs, traditions, cultures, and countries—and the fact that these elements are not related by simple one-to-one correspondences, the ways of mixing the so-called old with the new are countless: one

may change country but retain the customs, change the style but retain the language, and so on.

Essential to the exile's experience is the feeling of doubled kinship. Exiles always have two elements in mind—broadly referred to as the old and the new—that share a common function. If exiles always experienced the old and the new as mutually exclusive, their decisions would be straightforward. But because they more often experience the old and the new as interpenetrating or mediating one another, their tasks are complex. For mediation allows symmetric and asymmetric processes of transfiguration to occur in the relation when, say, the use of a secondary language in a new country brings changes to the dominant primary language, and vice versa, or when the mixing of two musical traditions or styles brings changes to one or both.

These processes are capable, furthermore, of generating different creative outcomes. One outcome recognizes new products arising straight out of the doubleness, where the "two-tone" character is preserved. Another outcome rests upon the doubleness's being overcome: when aspects of continuity overshadow aspects of discontinuity, a synthesis or a "supervenient unity" may be formed (for example, a new or third language) on the basis of which new products may then be created.

Recall now Bloch's recommendation that exiled writers express their double rather than divided loyalties by producing an American literature in the German language. This production might involve the use of American themes and content and a foreign literary form or genre, or the form or genre may be American too and only the language foreign. But the recommendation could be extended to allow authors to write of German concerns in the language(s) of America. Extending this recommendation now to the other arts, one soon sees that there are myriad ways in which exiled artists may match the old with the new and thereby demonstrate the many creative possibilities available to them.⁵⁴

Against this background, consider some musical works composed in exile in America of which one might judge that they could only have been composed by foreigners. Many composers set American or new-life lyrics or themes to what was still generally regarded a German or European (old-world) language of music: Eisler's exile lieder (the *Hollywood Songbook*), Stravinsky's cappella arrangement of "The Star-Spangled Banner," Weill's "Down in the Valley" or Four Walt Whitman Songs, Schoenberg's (mixed-language) *A Survivor from Warsaw*, and finally Krenek's orchestral composition based on the South Carolina song "I Wonder as I Wander."⁵⁵ (Perhaps we should also include the Britten/Auden opera *Paul Bunyan*.) What is shared by these and other examples—whether the compositions end up being purely instrumental or not—is the dialogical play between the words

(or themes) and music, where the presence of the foreign music transfigures or subverts the conventional, expressive significance of the text or theme, and/or vice versa.⁵⁶

These transfigurative possibilities illustrate the creative possibilities of doubleness. They illustrate not only the very general principle that changing the context may change the meaning, but also the more specific principle that setting the familiar against the unfamiliar, the new against the old, the native against the foreign, may result in a changed understanding of the two sides. These musical examples also attest to the possibility of there being different kinds of creative or expressive outcomes. Composers who imagined their "old world" language transforming into a future "American" language were imagining, in relative terms, a synthetic "third" language. Composers, however, who still saw their compositions as embodying "unlovely," parodistic, or Aesopian antagonisms generated through the mixing of languages would not have been so desirous of eventual synthesis—at least "not yet." Recall Eisler's bitter song "Under the Green Pepper Trees."⁵⁷

So far, I have extended Bloch's thesis of doubleness to accommodate, first, the production of different mixes of German-American literatures and, then, comparable production in the other arts. I have also allowed for the creative possibilities to be twofold, depending on whether doubleness is maintained or synthesis attempted. But another extension is possible, for the doubleness pervasive in exile discourse also describes the position of artists as artists rather than as exiles. Hence, the doubleness entailed in the desire of exiles to hold on to the old as they negotiate the new is guided by the same ideal of creativity as the doubleness entailed in the long-standing claim that artists, from their position of difference or distance—from their position, as it were, at the limits of the world (another frontier)—undertake to transfigure the familiar. For artists, the doubleness is conventionally expressed in the vertical distinction between the transcendent and the ordinary; for exiles it is expressed horizontally between the old and the new. But what exiles and artists share is their experience of being both insiders and outsiders. In doubling terms, by seeing outside, beyond, or above, they both claim to see more truthfully the "here and now" within. Ironically, Wagner played on the advantages of this shared double positioning as explicitly as any composer ever has.

This shared position can also be seen as infusing European artistic culture before the war. Recall the sense of newness, linked increasingly to a sense of outsidership or psychological exile, that composers were cultivating as they experimented with compositions mixing familiar and unfamiliar themes. Looking back, it seems tragically prophetic that they often voiced their desired doubleness by contrasting the European "old world" and an Amerikan "new world." However, it was not the European-influenced Amer-

ican establishment to which they looked, but the music of alienated "black" America, because there they found similarities with their experience of alienation at home. Of course, the practice of fusing "American" motifs of jazz, folk song, and poetry with European idioms to suggest idealistic, utopian, or avant-garde visions had already been developed by Puccini, Ravel, and Dvořák, but it was given increasing political urgency in the music of Milhaud, Chavez, Krenek, Hindemith, Zemlinsky, and Weill. (It was also being developed in America itself by Ives, Copland, and, of course, Gershwin.) Probably, however, the best doubling examples from Europe were the unofficially (but appropriately) named "zonks" emerging out of the Brecht/Weill collaboration.⁵⁸ But another telling example is found in Zemlinsky's *Symphonische Gesänge* of 1929 (especially the "Afrikanischer Tanz"), in which he mixed tonal and atonal idioms with Dixieland and African idioms. This piece gave urgent expression to the message he had already conveyed in the opening of his *Lyric Symphony* of 1924, in which he used the words of the Bengali poet Tagore to cry: "I am a stranger in a strange land" and "am athirst for far-away things."

The visionary or revolutionary moment captured in the doubled compositional style of the doubled exiled artist prompts us to extend Bloch's thesis a step further. For this moment has also been invoked in modernist and more recent descriptions of the condition and progressive potential of migrating, marginal, and minority social groups. These descriptions have forced us to think with dynamic models and traveling terms. They have stressed the importance of difference and duality in opening up spaces for multiple and new voices, and have stressed mediation to overcome static dichotomies. They have spoken of borders and frontiers as sites for constructive displacements of the center. James Clifford has thus recently written of Diaspora cultures as mediating, "in a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place," and of diaspora consciousness as a product of "cultures and histories in collision and dialogue."⁵⁹

The doubling thesis so extended allows us to see that it is less the "two-ness" than the "more-than-oneness," the lack of sameness or fixity, or, in Adorno's terms, the excess, that is considered the positive moment. A multiply situated person, in proceeding beyond the limits of the familiar, sees that there is more than one way to view the world. The doubleness thesis is compatible, in other words, with a fundamental openness or a purposive ambivalence to the world ("Let's see what the world is like"). When exiles thus spoke of their losing their absolutism (Eisler), of America's deprovincializing them, of their learning not to take things for granted or "regard as natural the circumstances that had developed in Europe" (Adorno), they were suggesting not that these new conditions were leading them all to think the

same new thing, but that, in seeing the world anew, each had a genuine option about how they would shape their home in permanent exile or eventual return.⁶⁰ Santayana made the point earlier and most poetically: "Migration," he wrote, "like birth is heroic: the soul is signing away her safety for a blank cheque."⁶¹ Edward Said made the point more recently when he talked about the painfulness, but also the benefits, of an exile's contrapuntal awareness.⁶² (Neither for this essay nor for Said's is the musical term accidental.)

Neither openness nor the condition of doubleness, however, carries progressive value by itself; rather, according to most exile theorists, each must connect to the integrity of the self, albeit now nonintegrated. For in this connection, the condition becomes linked also to a person's deeds. In other words, whether exiles described themselves as feeling at home, or as estranged, or as oscillating between the two, they believed—rightly, I think—that they would be judged less on the condition itself than on the outcome of their condition, that is, on their human deeds. Victor Hugo once wrote that "an exile is a decent man who persists in decency," but for the exiled composer the concern was also whether, as a creative person, he had persisted in creativity.⁶³ Of course, the two concerns were not necessarily unconnected.

I have suggested that Bloch's thesis of doubleness with my extensions establishes a link between the condition in which exiles and artists found themselves, on the one hand, and their creative products, on the other. But it would be wrong to think that the link is one of either a necessary or sufficient condition. Even were a composer to be "ideally" saturated in a culture and critically estranged from it, there would be no guarantee that his products would be creative. That the link is not one of guarantee, however, does not mean that there is no link at all. Rather, the link is one of "opening up a space"—an autonomous or critical gap that allows us to make assessments of creativity by looking not at the conditions of production but at the productions or exemplars—the works themselves. Describing the link this way is intended to help forestall reductionist arguments, assertions of causal links, or specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions, all of which close the gap between the conditions of musical practice and its creative productions. The attempt to preserve this gap is an attempt, in other words, to recognize through philosophical theory music's aesthetic moment or, otherwise put, its double quality of being at once purely musical and socially conditioned.

Using doubleness as a technique of philosophical description, however, requires that we extend Bloch's thesis one last time. This extension asks us to see the limits of conditions and of philosophical descriptions in a positive light. It asks us to follow Nietzsche in seeing philosophy and language as approximating to the condition of music and not vice versa. For "com-

pared with music," Nietzsche wrote, "communication by means of words is a shameless mode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal; words make common that which is uncommon."⁶⁴ It has long been claimed that the true significance of music—its creative or aesthetic moment—is ineffable and inexpressible, and that it fails to be accounted for even in the most complete description not only of its conditions of production but also of its own forms and contents. Such a view we saw invoked by exiled composers when they spoke of music as partially surpassing its situatedness, and it was this characterization that led them to conclude that music was not wholly, even if it were in part, an ordinary, nation- or culture-bound language. But suppose exiled composers had focused more than they did on these so-called ordinary or common languages and had noticed the extent to which they, too, are capable of being taken abroad and transfigured. What they might then have seen is that "ordinary" language is much more like the "nonordinary" language of music than the "nonordinary" language of music is like an "ordinary" language.

Recall Alfred Schutz's explanation of William James's "fringes" in the former's germanic discussion of *The Stranger*: "Every word and every sentence is surrounded by 'fringes' connecting them, on the one hand, with past and future elements of the universe of discourse to which they pertain and surrounding them, on the other hand, with a halo of emotional values and irrational implications which themselves remain ineffable." He concluded: "The fringes are the stuff poetry is made of; they are capable of being set to music but they are not translatable."⁶⁵ In this picture, ordinary language has a double identity: it has "ordinary" conceptual significance and it has its fringes. As such, it seems to approximate to the condition of suggestiveness or expressiveness that we find in lyric poetry or music, or paradigmatically in song.

Following James and Schutz, and then not accidentally (the Tractarian) Wittgenstein, one may likewise say of philosophical theory itself that its full meaning fails to be grasped in what it tries ordinarily, that is by means of reason and logic, to say. For its meaning is captured as well in what a theory suggests or shows "between the lines," or even in what it fails to say in its spaces and silences. In other terms, meaning is captured in the doubling condition of a philosophical theory, in, that is to say, a theory's allowing what it says to be weathered and/or defied by what it shows. Thus, just as the doubling condition of the exiled composer opened up a space without fully accounting for any creativity that might follow, so the apparent failure or limits of a philosophical theory to account for everything is precisely the positive condition in which it is able to suggest the polysemous nature of its meaning. Music, in broader terms, teaches language and philosophy to see their limits as positive.

In this essay, I drew a philosophical picture out of an exemplary instance,

that instance being the fact of my grandfather's having once adopted a double identity. Like an aphorism, the instance opened up a world of significance. But it was a world that revealed much more constructive conflict or contrapuntal doubleness than it did either simple logical opposition or harmonious theory. It was a world, moreover, that challenged two claims prevalent in exile theory: the rigid "Wagnerian" line that exile precludes creativity, and the diminishing line, articulated most recently by Edward Said, that an exile "exists in a median state, beset by half-involvements and half-detachments." For, as an exile and as an artist, alienated at home or living abroad, an exiled composer, I have tried to show, may live constructively in a condition of doubleness, as opposed to division. Suffice it to conclude on an ironic note: that my grandfather would surely have been surprised to know that his double identity, once adopted in a period of crisis, would one day spawn so much philosophy.

NOTES

I would like to thank many colleagues and friends who offered useful comments, my Summer Institute colleagues in Rochester, and the NEH.

1. Letter of 17 July 1941. All quotations from the correspondence between Schoenberg and the Gochr family originate in documents collected at the Arnold Schoenberg Archive at the University of Southern California. I am grateful to Lawrence Schoenberg for permission to use them. I have corrected spelling and grammar in these letters where appropriate, for the sake of readability.

2. I have borrowed here from Eva Hoffman's autobiographical *Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1989). "Pattern," she writes, "is the soil of significance; and it is surely one of the hazards of emigration, and exile, and extreme mobility, that one is uprooted from that soil" (278).

3. I am grateful to an Eastman House archivist for giving me this information.

4. *Arnold Schoenberg Letters*, ed. Erwin Stein, trans. Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), 184.

5. Henry Pachter, "On Being an Exile," in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals*, ed. Robert Boyers (New York: Schocken, 1972), 16. Cf. Louis Wirth's comment that "intellectuals are always nomads in the universe of the mind and should feel at home anywhere," quoted by Claus-Dieter Krohn in *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research*, trans. Riba Kimber and Robert Kimber (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 179.

6. Quoted in Edward W. Said, "Reflections on Exile," in *Altogether Elsewhere: Writers on Exile*, ed. Marc Robinson (Boston: Faber & Faber, 1994), 146.

7. Cf. Pachter ("On Being an Exile," 17) again: "The myth that exile produces Dantes, Marxes, Bartóks, and Avicennas certainly is not justified in the mass. More often exile destroys talent, or it means the loss of the environment that nourished the talent morally, socially, and physically."

8. The interviews are printed in section 4 in the issues of 14, 21, and 28 May.

9. See Günter Berghaus, ed., *Theatre and Film in Exile: German Artists in Britain, 1933-45* (New York: Oswald Wolff Books, 1989), 19; Jarrell C. Jackman, "German Émigrés in Southern California," in *The Muses Flee Hitler: Cultural Transfer and Adaptation*, ed. Jarrell C. Jackman and Carla M. Borden (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), 98; and Walter Rubsamen, "Schönberg in America," *Musical Quarterly* 37 (Oct. 1951): 485-86.

10. Unless otherwise noted, all views recorded in this section are taken from Goldberg's interviews in the *Los Angeles Times*.

11. Malcolm Gillies, ed., *Bartók Remembered* (New York: Faber & Faber, 1990), 186.

12. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Dialogues and a Diary* (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 108.

13. Hanns Eisler: *A Rebel in Music—Selected Writings*, ed. Manfred Grabs (New York: Seven Seas, 1978), 14. See also Albrecht Betz, *Hanns Eisler: Political Musician*, trans. Bill Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 14 and 153.

14. *Virgil Thomson* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 346, ending his chapter "Europe in America."

15. "A Musical Journey through America," in *Eisler: Rebel in Music*, 82.

16. See Ernst Krenck, "America's Influence on Its Émigré Composers," trans. Don Harran, *Perspectives of New Music* 8 (spring-summer 1970): 112.

17. Ernst Krenck, *Die amerikanischen Tagebücher, 1937-1942: Dokumente aus dem Exil*, ed. Claudia Maurer Zenck (Vienna: Böhlau, 1992), 192.

18. Krenck, "America's Influence," 112.

19. Ernst Krenck, "Self-Analysis," *New Mexico Quarterly* 23 (spring 1953): 7.

20. *Schoenberg Letters*, 233.

21. Vera Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Stravinsky in Pictures and Documents* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 347.

22. *Schoenberg Letters*, 191-92. Cf. Hannah Arendt's observation in "We Refugees" (in Robinson, ed., *Altogether Elsewhere*, 10): "We lost our language . . . the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings."

23. Jackman, "German Émigrés," 101.

24. Berghaus, ed., *Theatre and Film in Exile*, iv. He discusses this point further on page 18, but in a different context. There he acknowledges the languages difficulties faced by all artists.

25. Boris Schwarz, "The Music World in Migration," in Jackman and Borden, eds., *Muses Flee Hitler*, 137.

26. The dichotomy is also related to Aron Gurwitsch's description of the refugee's life as coming, in one sense, out of a void and, in another sense, out of a three-thousand-year past; see *Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959*, trans. J. Claude Evans (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), xvi.

27. Quoted in Berghaus, *Theatre and Film in Exile*, 18. The painter's name is not given.

28. Arnold Schoenberg, "Does the World Lack a Peace-Hymn?" in *Style and Idea: Selected Writings of Arnold Schoenberg*, ed. Leonard Stein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 500.

29. Arnold Schoenberg, "Two Speeches on the Jewish Situation," *ibid.*, 502.

30. Schoenberg, "Does the World Lack a Peace-Hymn?" 500.

31. Schoenberg *Letters*, 217.
32. Brecht ascribed these words to Mann, as James K. Lyon explains in *Bertolt Brecht in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 252. For more on Mann's conflicting attitudes toward exile, see Henry Hatfield's "Thomas Mann and America," in Boyers, ed., *Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals*, 174–85.
33. For more on the "University in Exile" or New School for Social Research, see Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*.
34. Berghaus, *Theatre and Film in Exile*, xvi and 33.
35. Krenek, "Self-Analysis," 32.
36. See David Josephson's essay in this volume.
37. Quoted by John Warrack in his comments on Stravinsky as a Russian, *Tempo* (1967): 9, to confirm his general point that theorists have underestimated the fact of Stravinsky's Russianness and have tried to denationalize him.
38. In Allen Edwards, *Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds: A Conversation with Elliott Carter* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 13.
39. Quoted in Jackman, "German Emigrés," 103.
40. For further details, see Lyon, *Bertolt Brecht in America*, 30, 109, 251–62, who describes Brecht's position here as being directly influenced by Ernst Bloch. Of Bloch, more later.
41. Bertolt Brecht, "Thoughts Concerning the Duration of Exile," in *Selected Poems*, trans. Hoffman Reynolds Hays (New York: Regal & Hitchcock, 1947), 30, set to music by Hanns Eisler.
42. Gillies, ed., *Bartók Remembered*, 201.
43. See Ronald Taylor, *Kurt Weill: Composer in a Divided World* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991), 227; also Kim Kowalke, "Formerly German: Kurt Weill in America," in *A Stranger Here Myself: Kurt Weill Studien*, ed. Kim Kowalke and Horst Edler (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1993), 35–57.
44. Hinton, ed., *The Threepenny Opera* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 70.
45. Quoted in Taylor, *Kurt Weill*, 251.
46. *Ibid.*, 233.
47. Schoenberg, "Two Speeches on the Jewish Situation," 502. Boris Schwarz comments on Schoenberg's dual position this way: "Although Schönberg is known to have been rather uncompromising in his musical views, he did make some concessions so that his writing would be more accessible to the American public, particularly to young American musicians" ("Musical World in Migration," 141).
48. Richard Wagner [writing as "K. Freigedank"], "Judaism in Music" (1850), in *Richard Wagner's Prose Works*, trans. William Ashton Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 375–122. The following quotations, unless otherwise specified, are also from this essay.
49. Quoted in Paul Lawrence Rose, *Wagner: Race and Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 70.
50. The reference to "friends around the globe" is from Wittgenstein's "Sketch for a Foreword," printed originally as a foreword to *Philosophical Remarks* (ed. Rush Rhees), and in *Culture and Value*, trans. Peter Winch, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). All quotations from Wittgenstein, unless specified otherwise, are from this book, remarks 16, 18, 35, 39, 49, and 50.

51. Schoenberg, "Two Speeches on the Jewish Situation," 501-5.
52. Cf. the Nazi statement that "when a Jew speaks writes or thinks as a German he lies"; quoted by Herbert Peyser in the *New York Times*, 10 Dec. 1933, X-8, in an article on the Cultural League of German Jews. See David Josephson's documentation in this volume.
53. Ernst Bloch, "Disrupted Language, Disrupted Culture," *Direction*, Dec. 1939, 16-19 (a special issue entitled "Exiled German Writers: Art, Fiction, Documentary Material").
54. Note that although the identification of nations is not a necessary feature of this mixed production, linked as the mixing often is with experiences of travel and exile, such identification is very common. And note that "German" and "American" already stand for complex and historically constructed unities and are neither related nor opposed to one another as pure elements.
55. Boris Schwarz, "Musical World in Migration," discusses many more examples of what he calls the "Americana" compositions to demonstrate the mutual and immeasurable enrichment of American music by European musicians.
56. Cf. Hinton, *Threepenny Opera*, 5, 102, and 118.
57. For more on "unlovely" antagonisms, see Hatfield, "Thomas Mann and America," 175.
58. For more on "zonks," see Taylor, *Kurt Weill*, 107.
59. James Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 311, 319.
60. Theodor W. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1969), 367.
61. George Santayana, "The Philosophy of Travel," in Robinson, ed., *Altogether Elsewhere*, 44.
62. Said, "Reflections on Exile," 148.
63. Victor Hugo, "What Exile Is," in Robinson, ed., *Altogether Elsewhere*, 79.
64. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, sec. 810, in *Complete Works*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1968), 15:254; quoted in Robert P. Morgan's "Secret Languages: The Roots of Musical Modernism," in *Modernism: Challenges and Perspectives*, ed. Monique Chefdor, Ricardo Quinones, and Albert Wachtel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 33-53.
65. Alfred Schutz, "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology* 49, no. 6 (1944): 504.