

# Political Economy of Land Conflict and Infrastructure

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September 15, 2022

## Albertus: The Political Price of Authoritarian Control



# Overview

- Electoral legacies of Francoist land settlements after transition to democracy.
- Argument: Paternalism and control exhibited to settlers created resentment that manifest in voting behavior after democratization.
  - Resentment faded over time so effects should attenuate.
- Findings: Municipalities with land settlements exhibited:
  - ↑ support for the Left
  - ↓ support for Francoist parties

post-democratization, relative to matched municipalities. Effects seem to decay.

# The importance of theory/mechanisms in HPE


- The world does not offer the ability to **replicate** most “treatments” in HPE.
  - Hopefully it doesn’t happen, but if it did, a future fascist settlement policy would have very different attributes than the one you study.
- As a result, the contribution needs to rest more heavily on:
  - Characterization of a **more general mechanism** or **theory**.
- See Gailmard and Rozenas work on these ideas.
- To my case, the mechanism is too deep **in the case** here.
  - The resentment and patterns of decay thereof are ostensibly more general.
  - Many autocratic policies could cause **resentment**, what are the more general scope conditions?
  - Is **decay** about changes in the psychology of victims or generational replacement?
  - What is going on post-democratization in **untreated** municipalities?

# Compound treatments

- Worried that treatments are compound:
  - **Social control** → preferred interpretation
  - **Economic** consequences
  - **Demographic** consequences
- Assesses whether treatment was compound by measuring **downstream** effects on economy (post-2000), population change.
  - This doesn't provide information on what is in the treatment bundle.
  - One could imagine that different aspects of treatment activate countervailing mechanisms that "cancel out" when we look downstream.
  - As such, this doesn't tell us about what is in the bundle.
- Almost all treatments (certainly in history) are **compound**:
  - By delineating more clearly the **mechanism** from the **case**, you can perhaps discuss strengths and weaknesses of this instance of the mechanism.

## Quantitative mechanism tests

- Main mechanism tests are estimates of CATEs in **subgroups** where the effect should be larger than the main effects.
  - Currently, there is no actual test of these predictions.
  - Aside from the **intensive margin**, results show no distinguishable differences.



- **Qualitative accounts** much more compelling to me.

## What are the stakes?

- If you want to keep this very “in the case,” I wanted to know more about the **stakes** for Spanish political history?
- How big are these municipalities (at endline)?
  - Mapping of municipalities → **districts** (constituencies) for Chamber of Deputies.
  - How close are these elections?
- This effect was presumably **unanticipated** by Franco et al. → or at least they didn't care what happened after they were deposed.
  - Any reason to believe that autocrats are constrained by anticipated **post-transition** legacies?
- Did Francoist politicians realize this was happening? Did they do anything to win back support?
  - Important for interpretation of decay.

## Blair, Christensen, and Gibilisco: The Point of Attack





# Overview

- Ask where **attacks on oil infrastructure** occur in Africa and why.
- Theory: Blotto game + bargaining model with incomplete information and costly signaling.
- Empirics:
  - Show that **pipelines** are more likely to be attacked than **critical** pieces (i.e. wells, terminals)
  - Show some evidence consistent with rebel **mixed strategies** the equilibrium prediction of the Blotto game.
  - Suggest that pipeline attacks  $\uparrow$  in **local prices** but  $\downarrow$  in **global prices**.

# Theory I: Blotto + bargaining model

- Blotto game is modular (self-contained) → only **equilibrium payoffs** embedded in bargaining model.
- Pro:
  - **Tractability**
- Cons:
  - Government's budget for defending oil infrastructure **doesn't depend on (global) oil prices**.
  - But oil producer gov'ts typically get more resources when  $\uparrow$  global prices.
  - Gov't could spend budget on **defense** and/or **buying off** the rebels.
    - What aside from the story from Nigeria do we have to support the buying off story?
    - Are these stories observationally equivalent wrt your empirical implications?

## Theory → Data: Aggregation

- The model characterizes interactions between a **single government** and a **single rebel group**
- The data we observe are presumably consistent with interactions between a **single government** but **multiple rebel groups**.
- What do we need to believe for theoretical implications to aggregate up when we have this “**asymmetry**” between the aggregation of different actors?
  - Often a hard problem, worth thinking through.

## Empirics:

- DV for all analyses is **geocoded ACLED events**
  - This includes more than attacks on oil infrastructure.
  - Is this the right outcome for H2 (the measure of rebel mixed strategies)?
  - You mention the **Energy Infrastructure Attack Database** but say results would be mechanical.
    - I agree for tests of H1 and H3.
    - But it seems like this data would allow you to more directly test H2.
- Moderating effect of **prices** (H3/Table 4)
  - Global prices are varying equivalently **within all countries**.
  - Local prices **change at different times/rates** within different countries.
  - Are the effective samples comparable? Are certain countries providing most of the variation?
  - If not comparable, why test  $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2$ ?

# Policy Implications

- Basically divorced from model now, could be more structured.
- Was surprised by characterization of **characterization of rebel groups**:
  - Attacks on oil infrastructure → “weapon of the weak”
  - Attacks might **government accountability** to rebel groups?
  - Who benefits from concessions to rebel groups?