

“In blockchains we trust (... n't?)”

Demystifying the Technology that Supports NFTs

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
<https://wp.nyu.edu/omarin/>

Trust Issues - Centralized Services

Billions of digital transactions every day




Traditional solutions rely on a **centralized** Trusted Third Party (TTP)



Trust Issues - Pros of Centralized TTPs

- + No other fully "reliable" solution
- + Simple to implement




Trust Issues - Cons of Centralized TTPs

- Single point of failure



- Privacy




- Service is *never free*



Trust Issues - Cutting out the Middleman

Direct transaction



Digital world offers many opportunities for cheating

- Post-payment denial
- Double spending
- Theft (identity, ownership)
- ...

Trust Issues - Distributed Ledger

Decentralized solution

Share a **common ledger** among all parties



Blockchains are all the hype

Ingredients of a Blockchain

Cryptographic hashing

Unique, verifiable keys

Means for detecting that data has been tampered with



Peer-to-peer system

Scalable, dynamic network

Means for sharing information on a massive scale



Consensus algorithm


Decentralized consistency protocol

Means for agreeing on a common decision




Cryptographic Hashing

Linked list of transactions with hash pointers => "**Block Chain**"



Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Systems



The Small-World Problem

Experiment (Travers & Milgram, 1967) [\[1\]](#)

Letter sent to 150 random subjects in the midwest of the USA (Nebraska and Kansas)

Envelope lists summary information about a recipient on the east coast

Destination is in Cambridge, Massachusetts

Goal: get the letter to its recipient

Rules of transmission

- info. on the envelope indicates possible connection to the recipient
- only passed on to close acquaintances (first-name basis)
- write identity of every forwarder on the envelope (prevents loops)

The Small-World Problem

Results

Average number of hops = **6** (between 2 and 10)

~200 million inhabitants at the time => **fully scalable**

Based on network of acquaintances => **no centralization**

Malicious transmission only restarts the route => **reliable**

One major downside: this best-effort policy holds no guarantees!

Consensus


Everyone pitches in towards the addition of a block/transaction

Computer nodes agree on:


- the validity of blocks
- which block gets added next



Anatomy of a Consensus



Step 1: Propose




Step 2: Decide

Properties of a Consensus

Termination

All processes eventually decide on a result **D**




Validity

D is a proposed value

Agreement

D is the same for all processes




Integrity

Once a process decides **D**, it cannot switch to **D'**

Time is Relative!

Clock skew





Time is Relative!

Clock jitter

Ideal Clock



Real Clock



Time is Relative!

Jitter and skew induce clock drift

The drift varies independently for every node


Clock drifts may break causality

Alice and Bob both wake up at the same time in the real world

At that point their clocks display 8am

Alice's clock drifts forward very fast; Bob's clock drift is marginal

Alice is meant to call Bob at 10 am...



How to (Un)Seal a Deal


The Lockdown Conundrum (aka the *Two Generals' Problem* [3])

A neighborhood with 2 buildings is in lockdown

No new cases in the last 7 days

Each building has a manager, both want to avoid risks at all costs

They communicate by WeChat to decide whether they should lift the lockdown




The Internet Can't Exist: Here's Why!

Scaling paradox

1. Probability of failures increases with the number of nodes
2. Dead nodes can bring down the entire system


Theoretical proof that two nodes may never reach consensus [4]



Solution: unreliable failure detectors [6]

Two-Phase Commit

Consensus: Commit




Two-Phase Commit

Consensus: Abort




Phase 1

Phase 2




Two-Phase Commit

Leader crashes - Consensus?





Two-Phase Commit

Follower crashes - Consensus?



Consensus with byzantine failures

Impossibility: solving byzantine generals with 3 processes [5]



Consensus with byzantine failures

4-process solution for byzantine generals [5]



Takeaway points

None of the blockchain components are 100% reliable!

They can never be!

Failures are... **inevitable!**



Paradoxically, reliability is found in numbers

A majority of honest nodes ensures safety and liveness!

References

- [1] J. Travers, S. Milgram. [An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem](#). Sociometry, 32(4). 1969. pp. 425–443.
- [2] S. Nakamoto. [Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System](#). 2009.
- [3] E. A. Akkoyunlu, K. Ekanadham, and R. V. Huber. [Some constraints and tradeoffs in the design of network communications](#). SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 9(5). 1975. pp. 67–74.
- [4] M. Fischer, N. Lynch, and M. Paterson. [Impossibility of Distributed Consensus with One Faulty Process](#). Journal of the ACM 32(2). 1985. pp. 374–382.
- [5] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. [The Byzantine Generals Problem](#). ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4(3). 1982. pp. 382–401.
- [6] T. D. Chandra and S. Toueg. [Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems](#). Journal of the ACM 43(2). 1996. pp. 225–267.