RADICLE REGISTRY

SPECIFICATION

VERSION 0.1

MONADIC†

1. Transactions

All transactions on the registry take the form $\mathsf{transaction}(arg_1, \ldots, arg_n)_\sigma$, where $arg_1, \ldots arg_n$ are the *inputs* and σ is the EdDSA signature of the author of the transaction. Transactions always have an *author* and an *origin* (formally α), which is the author's account.

Transactions can be uniquely identified by their *hash*.

2. Accounts

An account A is a tuple:

$$A = \langle A_{\mathsf{id}}, A_{\mathsf{nonce}}, A_{\mathsf{bal}} \rangle$$

DEFINITION

- A_{id} is the unique account identifier obtained by hashing the account owner's public key,
- A_{nonce} is a number which starts at 0 and is incremented every time a transaction originates from this account.
- A_{bal} is the account's balance in the smallest denomination, and $A_{\mathsf{bal}} \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$.

The set of all accounts is $\mathcal{A}$. Accounts are never created or destroyed, rather, if they have never been used to transact, they have an initial state of:

$$A = \langle A_{\mathsf{id}}, 0, 0 \rangle$$

Hence, for all valid account ids, there exists an account with that id. Note that accounts can *never be removed*, since that would violate the invariant that nonces are only ever incremented, and removing an account is equivalent to setting A_{nonce} and A_{bal} to 0.

2.1. Root accounts.

Some accounts are considered *privileged*. These 'root' accounts, formally $\mathcal{A}_R \subset \mathcal{A}$ are authorized to conduct certain transactions that are only valid when originating from these accounts.

The set of accounts in $\mathcal{A}_R$ is defined at *genesis*, and may not be further modified in the initial protocol.

2.2. Transferring value.

The act of transferring coins between two accounts:

$$\mathsf{transfer}(A_{\mathsf{id}}, v)_\sigma$$

which will transfer value from the transaction origin α to account A.

INPUTS

- A_{id} is the account id of the *receiver* of the transfer,
- v is the value or 'balance' to transfer from the origin to the receiver, in the smallest denomination.

VALIDATION

- The transfer balance is positive, or $v \geq 1$,
- The origin's balance minus any transaction fee is $\geq v$.

OUTPUTS

- v is debited from the origin and credited to A.

3. Projects

A project P is a tuple:

$$P = \langle P_{\mathsf{id}}, P_{\mathsf{checkpoint}}, P_{\mathsf{account}}, P_{\mathsf{contract}} \rangle$$

DEFINITION

- P_{id} is the unique project identifier, defined as $\langle P_{\mathsf{name}}, P_{\mathsf{domain}} \rangle$,
- $P_{\mathsf{checkpoint}}$ is the *id* of the latest project checkpoint, or $\varnothing$ if the project hasn't been checkpointed yet,
- P_{account} is the project account or *fund*,
- P_{contract} is the project contract, which governs permissions around the project, as well as its fund.

Projects are created with the register-project transaction.

3.1. Registering.

The act of registering a project under a unique name and domain:

$$\mathsf{register\text{-}project}(P_{\mathsf{name}}, P_{\mathsf{domain}}, P_{\mathsf{checkpoint}})_\sigma$$

INPUTS

- P_{name} is the unique name being requested, where
- P_{domain} is the domain under which P_{name} is being registered, which together form the unique identifier P_{id},
- $P_{\mathsf{checkpoint}}$ is the id of the latest checkpoint representing this project.

VALIDATION

- P_{name} must be unique, i.e. not currently registered under P_{domain}, between 1 and 32 characters long, and valid UTF-8,

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– P_{domain} must be an existing domain,
– $P_{\mathsf{checkpoint}}$ must be an existing checkpoint.

For example,

$$\mathsf{register\text{-}project}(\texttt{rand}, \texttt{crates}, \texttt{0xf9e6ae}\cdots)_\sigma$$

which will request `rand.crates` and associate it with checkpoint `0xf9e6ae`$\cdots$.

3.2. **Accepting & rejecting a project.** The act of accepting or rejecting a project being registered:

$$\mathsf{accept\text{-}project}(t_{\mathsf{hash}})_\sigma$$

or

$$\mathsf{reject\text{-}project}(t_{\mathsf{hash}})_\sigma$$

INPUTS

– t_{hash} is the *transaction hash* of the register-project transaction t of a project being accepted or rejected.

VALIDATION

– The transaction *origin* is a member of $\mathcal{A}_R$,
– t_{hash} must be the hash of an existing transaction of type register-project,
– t must not have been previously accepted or rejected, in other words there can be at most one accept-project or reject-project for each t.

3.3. **Checkpointing.** The act of notarizing a project's state and updating the network graph:

$$\mathsf{checkpoint}(K_{\mathsf{parent}}, K_{\mathsf{hash}}, K_{\mathsf{version}}, K_{\mathsf{contribs}}, K_{\mathsf{deps}})_\sigma$$

Checkpoints form a chain going from the latest checkpoint to the first.

INPUTS

– K_{parent} is the *id* of the previous or 'parent' checkpoint,
– K_{hash} is the new *hash* of the project state,
– K_{version} is the new *version* of the project,
– K_{contribs} is the list of contributions since K_{parent},
– K_{deps} is the list of dependency updates since the K_{parent}.

VALIDATION

– K_{parent} refers to an existing checkpoint in the registry, or is $\varnothing$.
– K_{hash} is a valid hash that hasn't been used in a parent checkpoint.
– K_{version} is a string between 1 and 32 bytes long that hasn't been used in a previous project checkpoint.
– K_{contribs} is a valid contribution list (See §3.3.1).
– K_{deps} is a valid dependency update list (See §3.3.2).

3.3.1. *Contributions.* The list K_{contribs} supplied to the checkpoint transaction is of the form:

$$K_{\mathsf{contribs}} = [\langle C_{\mathsf{parent}}, C_{\mathsf{hash}}, C_{\mathsf{author}}, C_{\mathsf{sig}}\rangle],$$

DEFINITION

– C_{parent} is the hash of the parent contribution, or $\varnothing$ if this is the first contribution of the first checkpoint of the project.
– C_{hash} is the hash of the corresponding commit,
– C_{author} is the public signing key of the commit referred to by C,
– C_{sig} is the author's GPG signature.

VALIDATION

– C_{parent} is a valid SHA-1 hash or $\varnothing$ if this is the first contribution. Note that if C is K_{contribs}'s first item, and C' is the *last* item of the *parent* checkpoint's contributions list, then C'_{hash} and C_{parent} must be equal, such that no gaps between contributions exist.
– C_{hash} is a valid SHA-1 hash,
– C_{author} is the creator of C_{sig},
– C_{sig} is a valid signature of C_{hash}.

Because all changes to a project's source code are described in checkpoints, it is possible to reconstruct a full hash-linked list of contributions for the entire project. When cross-referenced with the project's repository, this constitutes a complete historical record of who authored what code. This ensures the project history is auditable and tamper-proof, while providing fundamental information to for the network graph $\mathcal{N}$. Note that only contribution *metadata* is stored on-chain.

3.3.2. *Dependency updates.* Conceptually, a project P depends on another project P' if it is an "input" to P in some way: P references P' or parts of P' in its source code, or P' is a build/test dependency.

The dependency update list P_{deps} is a list of *dependency updates*, one of:

$$\begin{cases}\mathsf{depend}(P'_{\mathsf{id}}, P'_{\mathsf{version}})\\ \mathsf{undepend}(P'_{\mathsf{id}}, P'_{\mathsf{version}})\end{cases}$$

which refer to the project P' at a specific version P'_{version}. The depend update adds a new dependency while the undepend update removes a dependency. The updates are processed in order with depend only being valid if it adds a dependency that the project does not already have and undepend only being valid for current dependencies. The checkpoint is invalid if the update list contains duplicates.

VALIDATION

– P'_{id} must be a valid project id, but *does not* have to refer to an existing id in the registry. This allows dependent projects to checkpoint dependencies that have not yet been registered.
– P'_{version} must be a valid version string, but *does not* have to refer to an existing version of P'. This allows dependent projects to checkpoint before their dependencies.

As a project maintainer, adding a dependency signals a variety of things depending of the nature of the project:

– They have verified that P indeed depends on this specific version of P'.

– That P' is suitable as a dependency for P, e.g. if P has very high security requirements, that P' fulfills these.

Since contributions to a project carry additional weight—potentially increasing a project's rank—there is an incentive for maintainers to checkpoint their projects regularly. Similarly, adding dependencies may increase connectivity in the network graph, which may in turn indirectly improve a project's rank.

4. Names

4.1. **Registering a domain.** The act of registering a top-level domain:

$$\mathsf{register\text{-}domain}(\mathit{domain})_\sigma$$

INPUTS

– *domain* is the unique domain being registered.

VALIDATION

– The transaction origin α is a member of $\mathcal{A}_R$,
– *domain* must be available for registration, between 1 and 32 characters long, and valid UTF-8.

For example,

$$\mathsf{register\text{-}domain}(\texttt{crates})_\sigma$$

5. Identity

5.1. **Identifying as a contributor.** The act of identifying yourself as a contributor, by linking a public key used to sign project contributions, to an account in the registry:

$$\mathsf{identify}(I_{\mathsf{pk}}, I_{\mathsf{proof}})_\sigma$$

INPUTS

– I_{pk} is the public key that is to be associated with the *origin* account α if this transaction succeeds.
– I_{proof} is a proof verifying that the transaction author owns I_{pk}.

VALIDATION

– I_{pk} is not already associated with an account,
– I_{proof} is α_{id} signed by the secret key sk that I_{pk} was derived from. In other words,

$$I_{\mathsf{proof}} = \mathsf{encrypt}(\mathsf{hash}(\alpha_{\mathsf{id}}), sk)$$

which is valid if

$$\mathsf{decrypt}(I_{\mathsf{proof}}, I_{\mathsf{pk}}) \equiv \mathsf{hash}(\alpha_{\mathsf{id}})$$

5.2. **Forgetting identities.** When a public key associated with the identify transaction is lost or no longer used, the following transaction will 'forget' the association:

$$\mathsf{forget}(I_{\mathsf{pk}})_\sigma$$