

Overview

Programming Paradigms II

Overview

- Higher-order functions
 - What are they? Why they are useful?
 - Observations: Functions are data and can be treated like data.
 - Examples: Many of them are programming patterns.
- Some basic access-control concepts are also included

Introduction

A function is called **higher-order** if it takes a function as an argument or returns a function as a result.

```
twice :: (a → a) → a → a
twice f x = f (f x)
```

twice f
└───┐
Also a
function

twice is higher-order because it takes a function as its first argument.

Why Are They Useful?

- **Common programming idioms** can be encoded as functions within the language itself.
- **Domain-specific languages** can be defined as collections of higher-order functions.
- **Algebraic properties** of higher-order functions can be used to reason about programs.

"foldr"

Overview

The End


List Processing I

Maps and Filters


Maps and Filters

- $\text{map } f [x,y,z,w,v] = [f x, f y, f z, f w, f v]$
- $\text{filter } p [x,y,z,w,v] = [x y, z, w v]$
($p x = p z = p v = \text{True}; p y = p w = \text{False}$)

Map



Filter



filter
those
elements
 y, w

The Map Function

- The higher-order library function called **map** applies a function to every element of a list

```
map :: (a → b) → [a] → [b]
```

- For example:

```
> map (+1) [1,3,5,7]
```

```
[2,4,6,8]
```


- The map function can be defined in a particularly simple manner by using a list comprehension:

$$\text{map } f \text{ } xs = [f \ x \mid x \leftarrow xs]$$

- Alternatively, for the purposes of proofs, the map function can also be defined by using recursion:

$$\text{map } f \ [] = []$$
$$\text{map } f \ (x:xs) = f \ x : \text{map } f \ xs$$

The Filter Function

- The higher-order library function **filter** selects every element from a list that satisfies a predicate

`filter :: (a → Bool) → [a] → [a]`

- For example:

↳ predicate ↴



```
> filter even [1..10]
```

```
[2,4,6,8,10]
```

- Filter can be defined using a list comprehension:

```
filter p xs = [x | x ← xs, p x]
```

- Alternatively, it can be defined using recursion:

```
filter p [] = []  
filter p (x:xs)  
  | p x      = x : filter p xs  
  | otherwise = filter p xs
```

List Processing I

The End

List Processing II

Using Lambda Functions

Lambda Functions

Example: lambda (λ) expressions (Hutton, Section 4.5)

- $\lambda x y \rightarrow x + y$
- $\lambda f x \rightarrow f x$
- $\lambda f g \rightarrow (\lambda x \rightarrow f (g x))$

Why Are Lambdas Useful?

- Lambda expressions can be used to give a formal meaning to functions defined using **currying**
- For example:

`add x y = x + y`

means

`add = $\lambda x \rightarrow (\lambda y \rightarrow x + y)$`

- Lambda expressions are also useful when defining functions that return **functions as results**
- For example:

```
const :: a → b → a  
const x _ = x
```

is more naturally defined by

```
const :: a → (b → a)  
const x = λ_ → x
```


- Lambda expressions can be used to avoid naming functions that are only **referenced once**
- For example:

```
odds n = map f [0..n-1]  
      where  
        f x = x*2 + 1
```

can be simplified to

```
odds n = map ( $\lambda x \rightarrow x*2 + 1$ ) [0..n-1]
```

Using Lambda Functions

- Using lambda functions with higher-order functions
- Example: *flip* takes a function f as input (e.g., $f\ x\ y = x - y$), returns a *function* $flip\ f$ such that
$$(flip\ f)\ x\ y = f\ y\ x$$
- As a lambda function: $flip\ f = (\lambda\ x\ y \rightarrow f\ y\ x)$

List Processing II

The End

Programming Patterns I

The Composition Operator

The Composition Operator

- The library function `(.)` returns the **composition** of two functions as a single function


```
(.) :: (b → c) → (a → b) → (a → c)  
f . g = λx → f (g x)
```

- For example:

```
odd :: Int → Bool  
odd = not . even
```

Examples

- $\text{twice } f = f . f$
- $\text{sumsqreven} = \text{sum} . \text{map } (^2) . \text{filter even}$



Programming Patterns I: The Composition Operator

The End

Programming Patterns I

Other Common Patterns

- The library function **all** decides if every element of a list satisfies a given predicate

```
all :: (a → Bool) → [a] → Bool  
all p xs = and [p x | x ← xs]
```

- For example:

```
> all even [2,4,6,8,10]
```

```
True
```

- Dually, the library function **any** decides if at least one element of a list satisfies a predicate

```
any :: (a → Bool) → [a] → Bool  
any p xs = or [p x | x ← xs]
```

- For example:

```
> any (== ' ') "abc def"  
True
```

- The library function **takeWhile** selects elements from a list while a predicate holds of all the elements

```
takeWhile :: (a → Bool) → [a] → [a]
takeWhile p [] = []
takeWhile p (x:xs)
  | p x      = x : takeWhile p xs
  | otherwise = []
```

- For example:

```
> takeWhile (/= ' ') "abc def"
```

```
"abc"
```

- Dually, the function **dropWhile** removes elements while a predicate holds all the elements

```
dropWhile :: (a → Bool) → [a] → [a]
dropWhile p [] = []
dropWhile p (x:xs)
  | p x      = dropWhile p xs
  | otherwise = x:xs
```

- For example:

```
> dropWhile (== ' ') " abc"
```

```
"abc"
```

Programming Patterns I: Other Common Patterns

The End

Programming Patterns II

Recursion Operators

The Foldr Function

A number of functions on lists can be defined using the following simple pattern of recursion:

$$\begin{aligned} f [] &= v \\ f (x:xs) &= x \oplus f xs \end{aligned}$$

f maps the empty list to some value v , and any nonempty list to some function \oplus applied to its head and f of its tail.

For example:

```
sum [] = 0  
sum (x:xs) = x + sum xs
```

$V = 0$
 $\oplus = +$


```
product [] = 1  
product (x:xs) = x * product xs
```

$V = 1$
 $\oplus = *$

```
and [] = True  
and (x:xs) = x && and xs
```

$V = \text{True}$
 $\oplus = \&\&$

- The higher-order library function **foldr** (fold right) encapsulates this simple pattern of recursion, with the function \oplus and the value v as arguments
- For example:




```
sum = foldr (+) 0
product = foldr (*) 1
or = foldr (||) False
and = foldr (&&) True
```

"Sum function"

$SUM [1, 2, 3] =$
 $1 + 2 + 3 = 6$

- Foldr itself can be defined using recursion:




```
foldr :: (a -> b -> b) -> b -> [a] -> b
foldr f v []      = v
foldr f v (x:xs) = f x (foldr f v xs)
```

- However, it is best to think of foldr **nonrecursively**, as simultaneously replacing each (:) in a list by a given function and [] by a given value

For example:


`sum [1,2,3]`
=
`foldr (+) 0 [1,2,3]`
=
`foldr (+) 0 (1:(2:(3:[])))`
=
`1+(2+(3+0))`
=
`6`



Replace each `(:)`
by `(+)` and `[]` by `0`.

For example:

`product [1,2,3]`
=
`foldr (*) 1 [1,2,3]`
=
`foldr (*) 1 (1:(2:(3:[])))`
=
`1*(2*(3*1))`
=
`6`



Replace each `(:)`
by `(*)` and `[]` by `1`.

Other foldr Examples

- Even though foldr encapsulates a simple pattern of recursion, it can be used to define many more functions than might first be expected
- Recall the length function:

```
length :: [a] → Int  
length []    = 0  
length (_:xs) = 1 + length xs
```

- For example:

```
length [1,2,3]
=
length (1:(2:(3:[])))
=
1+(1+(1+0))
=
3
```

Replace each $(:)$ by λ_{-}
 $n \rightarrow 1+n$ and $[]$ by 0 .

- Hence, we have:

length = foldr $(\lambda_n \rightarrow 1+n)$ 0

- Now recall the reverse function:

*

```
reverse [] = []
reverse (x:xs) = reverse xs ++ [x]
```

- For example:

```
reverse [1,2,3]
=
reverse (1:(2:(3:[])))
=
(([] ++ [3]) ++ [2]) ++ [1]
=
[3,2,1]
```

Replace each (:) by $\lambda x \text{ xs}$
 $\rightarrow \text{xs} ++ [x]$ and [] by [].

← unpack the list [1,2,3]
 ← "Guess" what's definition
 of the operator
 ← "Trial & Error"

- Hence, we have:

`reverse = foldr ($\lambda x\ xs \rightarrow xs ++ [x]$) []`

- Finally, we note that the append function (`++`) has a particularly compact definition using `foldr`:

`(++ ys) = foldr (:) ys`

Replace each `(:)` by `(:)`
and `[]` by `ys`.

Practice

Redefine map f and filter p using foldr

$$\text{map } \underline{f} = \text{foldr} \left(\underbrace{(:).f}_{\text{operator}} \right) \underbrace{([])}_{\text{initial value}}$$

$$\text{filter } p = \text{foldr} \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{ } \\ \text{ } \end{array} \right) ([])$$

$\llbracket \lambda x \, xs \rightarrow \text{if } p \, x \text{ then } x : xs \text{ else } xs \rrbracket$

A Variant of Foldr: Foldl

- The function foldl (*“fold from the left”*)

```
foldl :: (a -> b -> a) -> a -> [b] -> a
foldl f v [] = v
foldl f v (x:xs) = foldl f (f v x) xs
```

- How foldl works (algebraically)

```
foldl (#) v [x0, x1, ..., xn] = (... ((v # x0) # x1) ...) # xn
```

$\text{foldl } (\#) v [x_0, x_1, x_2] = ((v \# x_0) \# x_1) \# x_2$

$\text{foldr } (\#) v [x_0, x_1, x_2] = x_0 \# (x_1 \# (x_2 \# v))$

Foldl: “Fold from the Left”

- $\text{length} :: [a] \rightarrow \text{Int}$
- $\text{length} :: \text{foldl} (\quad) (\quad)$
- Example $=$ $\underbrace{\quad}_{\text{operator}} \quad \underbrace{\quad}_{\text{initial value}}$

fold $l \ (\ \backslash \ n \ _ \rightarrow \ n+1 \) \ (0)$


\hookrightarrow defines $_$ \hookrightarrow initial $_$

the operator value

Try length $[1, 2]$ & see if you agree.

Practice: Define Reverse

```
reverse :: [a] -> [a]
reverse = foldl (\xs x -> x:xs) []
```

Try  reverse [1,2] following definition above.

Programming Patterns II: Recursion Operators

The End


Basic Access-Control Concepts

Reference Monitors, Tickets


Access Control

Access control is central to security:

Who should be granted what access to which objects under what circumstances?




Expectations of Hardware Engineers



- *Mathematical derivation* of behavior
- Inability to do so is interpreted as **incompetence**

Our Position on Security and Trust



- *Mathematical derivation* of behavior given
 - Requests, policies, certifications, jurisdiction of authorities, and trust assumptions
- Inability to do so is interpreted as **incompetence**

Rigorous policy-based design and verification

Should I say “yes”? It depends on:

The access request: What is requested and by whom?

Commander says $\langle launch, missile \rangle$

The access policy: Who is authorized?

(Commander & Sub-commander) controls $\langle launch, missile \rangle$

Trust assumptions: Who is trusted or what is taken for granted?
What are symbols or tokens of authority? Jurisdiction?

National Command Authority controls

[((Commander & Sub-commander) controls $\langle launch, missile \rangle$)]

$Key_{NCA} \Rightarrow$ National Command Authority

Central Concepts

We focus on four central concepts:

1. **Reference monitors:** the guards protecting objects
2. **Tickets:** an unforgeable indicator of a principal's *capability* or right to access an object
3. **Access control lists:** a list of principals (with their rights) to access an object
4. **Authentication:** the process of identifying a principal (i.e., the source of a request)

Reference monitors enforce access control policies using concepts of tickets, access-control lists, or some combination of both.

Tickets: Unforgeable access tokens

- Simple ticket:

Ticket says (*Subject* controls $\langle \textit{Access Right}, \textit{Object} \rangle$)

- Simple access-control policy (jurisdiction & policy statement):

Authority controls (*Subject* controls $\langle \textit{AccessRight}, \textit{Object} \rangle$)

Authority says (*Subject* controls $\langle \textit{AccessRight}, \textit{Object} \rangle$)

- Trust assumption:

Ticket \Rightarrow Authority

- General form of a subject making a request using a ticket:

Subject says $\langle \textit{AccessRight}, \textit{Object} \rangle$

Derived Inference Rule

We can capture ticket use as a derived rule:

$$\text{Ticket Rule} \quad \frac{\left[\begin{array}{ll} \text{subject says } \varphi & \text{authority controls (subject controls } \varphi) \\ \text{ticket} \Rightarrow \text{authority} & \text{ticket says (subject controls } \varphi) \end{array} \right]}{\varphi}$$

- Advantages
 - Simplifies and reduces size of proofs
 - Soundness
 - Specifies what specific reference monitor needs to do (i.e., a checklist)

Exercise: Derive the Ticket Rule


Your proof should begin with:

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| 1. <i>subject</i> says φ | Access request |
| 2. <i>authority</i> controls (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Access policy |
| 3. <i>ticket</i> \Rightarrow <i>authority</i> | Trust assumption |
| 4. <i>ticket</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Ticket |

Goal: derive φ


Ticket Rule

Proof tree construction



A Derivation

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| 1. <i>subject</i> says φ | Access request |
| 2. <i>authority</i> controls (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Access policy |
| 3. <i>ticket</i> \Rightarrow <i>authority</i> | Trust assumption |
| 4. <i>ticket</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Ticket |
| 5. <i>authority</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | 3, 4 speaks for |
| 6. <i>subject</i> controls φ | 2, 5 controls |
| 7. φ | 6, 1 controls |



Basic Access-Control Concepts: Reference Monitors, Tickets

The End

Basic Access-Control Concepts

Access-Control Mechanisms: Tickets

A Derivation

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| 1. <i>subject</i> says φ | Access request |
| 2. <i>authority</i> controls (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Access policy |
| 3. <i>ticket</i> \Rightarrow <i>authority</i> | Trust assumption |
| 4. <i>ticket</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | Ticket |
| 5. <i>authority</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ) | 3, 4 speaks for |
| 6. <i>subject</i> controls φ | 2, 5 controls |
| 7. φ | 6, 1 controls |

Ticket Rule

- The inference rule

$$\text{Ticket Rule} \quad \frac{\begin{array}{l} \text{subject says } \varphi \quad \text{authority controls (subject controls } \varphi) \\ \text{ticket} \Rightarrow \text{authority} \quad \text{ticket says (subject controls } \varphi) \end{array}}{\varphi}$$

- Hypotheses used are:

<i>subject</i> says φ	Access request
<i>authority</i> controls (<i>subject</i> controls φ)	Access policy
<i>ticket</i> \Rightarrow <i>authority</i>	Trust assumption
<i>ticket</i> says (<i>subject</i> controls φ)	Ticket

Example Using Tickets

Tina has an airplane ticket that assigns her to seat 25D on SmoothAir Flight #1.

When Tina's row is called, she presents her ticket to the gate agent for flight #1. What is the justification for granting her access to board?

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Tina says $\langle \text{seat 25D, flight \#1} \rangle$ | Tina's request |
| 2. SmoothAir controls (Tina controls $\langle \text{seat 25D, flight \#1} \rangle$) | Access policy |
| 3. ticket \Rightarrow SmoothAir | Trust assumption |
| 4. ticket says (Tina controls $\langle \text{seat 25D, flight \#1} \rangle$) | Tina's ticket |
| 5. $\langle \text{seat 25D, flight \#1} \rangle$ | 1, 2, 3, 4 ticket rule |

Exercise

Exercise 4.2.1 *Suppose a theater ticket is sold by the box office to a patron to see Gone with the Wind in Theater 5 at 7:30 p.m. Using the access-control logic, describe the patron's request, the access-control policy of the theater, the trust assumptions, and movie ticket. Based on your descriptions, formally justify admitting the patron to see the movie.*

Discussions

ticket \Rightarrow Box office
 \uparrow
 speaks for

Patron says (view. GWTW in Thr 5
at 7:30 pm)

Exercise 4.2.1 (cont.)

Discussions (cont.)

The policy:—

Box office controls

(Patron controls (view GWTI in Thr 5-
at 7:30 pm)

Ticket: —

ticket sury's (Patron controls)

Basic Access-Control Concepts: Access-Control Mechanisms: Tickets

The End

Weekly Summary

Programming Paradigms II

Overview

- Higher-order functions
 - What are they? Why they are useful?
 - Observations: Functions are data and can be treated like data.
 - Examples: Many of them are programming patterns.
- Some basic access-control concepts are also included

Higher-Order Functions

- Functions that take other function(s) as input
- Utilize lambda expressions to represent input functions
- Capture many programming patterns, including basic list processing, function composition, iteration, and recursion
- Interesting properties (e.g., algebraic properties of foldr) can be used to reason about programs

Basic Access-Control Concepts

- Introduce and discuss reference monitors, the guards for computer and information systems.
- Reference monitors provide the context for our studies in security mechanism. The fundamental concepts behind can be expressed in access-control logic. Derived inference rules can be obtained, and it allows proper reasoning about the systems.

Weekly Summary

The End