


Reverse Engineering Lab 4

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Task 1: Debugging in Windows

În primul rând am rulat programul și am încercat o parolă aleatoare.



Apoi, am căutat textul *“Try Harder”* în **.rodata**. Uitându-mă la referința stringului, am văzut că este folosit în funcția **sub_140003010**, care este responsabilă pentru verificarea parolei.

```
.rdata:00000001400052F0 Caption      db 'You win',0           ; DATA XREF: sub_140003010+1F5↑o
.rdata:00000001400052F8 ; CHAR Text[]
.rdata:00000001400052F8 Text        db 'Correct!!!!!!!!!!',0       ; DATA XREF: sub_140003010+1FC↑o
.rdata:00000001400052F8
.rdata:000000014000530A align 10h
.rdata:0000000140005310 ; CHAR aYouLose[]
.rdata:0000000140005310 aYouLose    db 'You lose',0           ; DATA XREF: sub_140003010+216↑o
.rdata:0000000140005319 align 20h
.rdata:0000000140005320 ; CHAR aTryHarder[]
.rdata:0000000140005320 aTryHarder db 'Try Harder!',0       ; DATA XREF: sub_140003010+21D↑o
.rdata:000000014000532C align 10h
```

De asemenea, folosind această abordare am găsit și funcția **main** sub numele **sub_140002E30**. Am identificat funcția **sub_1400035B0** ca fiind **sprintf**. Aceasta se poate observa în următoare imagine.

În același timp, putem observa că la finalul funcției se compară două stringuri, iar condiția de succes depinde de rezultatul operației.

```

32 Str = a2;
33 hWnd = a1;
34 sub_1400011D0(&v8);
35 v2 = strlen(Str);
36 sub_140002C60(&v8, Str, v2);
37 sub_140001010(v26, &v8);
38 for ( i = 0; i < 16; ++i )
39     sprintf(&Str1[2 * i], "%02x", (unsigned __int8)v26[i]);
40 for ( j = 0; j < 16; ++j )
41 {
42     v3 = Str1[j];
43     Str1[j] = Str1[31 - j];
44     Str1[31 - j] = v3;
45 }
46 v9 = 122;
47 v10 = -23;
48 v11 = -2;
49 v12 = -34;
50 v13 = -127;
51 v14 = -122;
52 v15 = -23;
53 v16 = 61;
54 v17 = 114;
55 v18 = 118;
56 v19 = 19;
57 v20 = 40;
58 v21 = -58;
59 v22 = 22;
60 v23 = 70;
61 v24 = -124;
62 for ( k = 0; k < 16; ++k )
63     sprintf(&Str2[2 * k], "%02x", (unsigned __int8)*(&v9 + k));
64 if ( !strcmp(Str1, Str2) )
65     result = MessageBoxA(hWnd, "Correct!!!!!!!!!!!!", "You win", 0);
66 else
67     result = MessageBoxA(hWnd, "Try Harder!", "You lose", 0);
68 return result;
69 }

```

In **x64dbg** am pus un Breakpoint inainte de a se chema functia de comparare.

000000001400031E2	E8 C9030000	call task1.1400035B0
000000001400031E7	EB C0	jmp task1.1400031A9
000000001400031E9	48:8D9424 D8000000	lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+D8]
000000001400031F1	48:8D8C24 A0000000	lea rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+A0]
000000001400031F9	E8 04110000	call <JMP.&strcmp>
000000001400031FE	85C0	test eax, eax
00000000140003200	75 21	jne task1.140003223
00000000140003202	45:33C9	xor r9d, r9d
00000000140003205	4C:8D05 E4200000	lea r8,qword ptr ds:[1400052F0]

Dupa rularea mai multor teste cu date de intrare diferite, am observat ca inputul ajunge, dupa niste procesare, in **RCX** si cel mai probabil se compara cu valoarea din **RDX**.

```

Hide FPU

RAX 0000000000000010
RBX 0000000000000000
RCX 00000000014F310 "550de3138dbd63002cd40d25bdb9cd18"
RDX 00000000014F348 "7ae9fede8186e93d72761328c6164684"
RBP 00000000014F9D8
RSP 00000000014F270 "&"84"
RSI 0000000080006010
RDI 0000000000000001

```

```

Hide FPU

RAX 0000000000000010
RBX 0000000000000000
RCX 00000000014F310 "b7e48f19861a43c4c607a8aee0bcc728"
RDX 00000000014F348 "7ae9fede8186e93d72761328c6164684"
RBP 00000000014F9D8
RSP 00000000014F270 "&"84"
RSI 0000000080006010
RDI 0000000000000001


```

Am forțat acceptarea parolei prin setarea **RIP** la adresa de după **jne**, ca și cum am fi satisfăcut condiția.

RIP	000000001400031F1	48:8D9424 D8000000	lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+D8]	
	000000001400031F1	48:8D8C24 A0000000	lea rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+A0]	
	000000001400031F8	E8 04110000	call <JMP.&strcmp>	
	000000001400031FE	85C0	test eax, eax	
	00000000140003200	75 21	jne task1.140003223	
	00000000140003202	45:33C9	xor r9d, r9d	
	00000000140003205	4C:8D05 E4200000	lea r8,qword ptr ds:[1400052F0]	000000001400052F0:"You win"
	0000000014000320C	48:8D15 E5200000	lea rdx,qword ptr ds:[1400052F8]	rdx:"7ae9fede8186e93d72761328c6164684"
	00000000140003213	48:8B8C24 20010000	mov rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+120]	
	00000000140003218	FF15 AF1E0000	call qword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxA>]	
	00000000140003221	EB 1F	jmp task1.140003242	

RIP	000000001400031F1	48:8D8C24 A0000000	lea rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+A0]	
	000000001400031F9	E8 04110000	call <JMP.&strcmp>	
	000000001400031FE	85C0	test eax, eax	
	00000000140003200	75 21	jne task1.140003223	
	00000000140003202	45:33C9	xor r9d, r9d	
	00000000140003205	4C:8D05 E4200000	lea r8,qword ptr ds:[1400052F0]	000000001400052F0:"You win"
	0000000014000320C	48:8D15 E5200000	lea rdx,qword ptr ds:[1400052F8]	rdx:"7ae9fede8186e93d72761328c6164684"
	00000000140003213	48:8B8C24 20010000	mov rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+120]	

Astfel, am programul a "crezut" ca am introdus parola corecta.




Introducerea parolei "password" rezulta in sirul "99fc288bed7238d16d567aa5b3ccd4f5". Dupa cateva cautari, am aflat ca inversul acestuia ("5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99") este hash-ul MD5 corespunzator textului "password".

```
Hide FPU

RAX 0000000000000010
RBX 0000000000000000
RCX 00000000014F310 "99fc288bed7238d16d567aa5b3ccd4f5"
RDX 00000000014F348 "7ae9fede8186e93d72761328c6164684"
RBP 00000000014F9D8
RSP 00000000014F270 "&"84"
RSI 0000000080006010
RDI 0000000000000001
```

De aici, putem trage concluzia ca programul calculeaza hash-ul MD5 al inputului, il inverseaza, dupa care il compara cu un alt string. In acest caz, pentru a afla parola, putem urma procesul in sens invers.

Inversam stringul cu care se compara, de unde rezulta textul "4864616c82316727d39e6818edef9ea7". Dupa utilizarea catorva site-uri care "inverseaza" hash-uri MD5, gasim ca parola este "fmire". Am avut succes cu pagina <https://md5.web-max.ca/index.php>.




Task 2: Debugging in Linux

La rularea programului observam ca este transmis mesajul “Wrong” la introducerea unei parole gresite.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/media/sf_vm-shared/task2]
$ ./task2
password
Wrong
```

Folosind aceeasi metoda ca pana acum, nu putem ajunge la functia de verificare. IDA nu poate gasi nicio referinta catre stringul “Wrong”. In acest moment nu am stiut care era cauza.



De altfel, nu putem folosi **ltrace** pe programul respectiv. Este aruncata o eroare si mesajul “Do not debug me”.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/media/sf_vm-shared/task2]
$ ltrace ./task2
ptrace(0, 0, 1, 0) = -1
puts("Do not debug me"Do not debug me
) = 16
_exit(1 <no return ...>
+++ exited (status 1) +++
```

Folosind IDA, gasim acest segment de cod in care se foloseste **ptrace**.

```
1 __int64 sub_401186()
2 {
3     __int64 result; // rax
4
5     result = ptrace(0, 0LL, 1LL, 0LL);
6     if ( result == -1 )
7     {
8         puts("Do not debug me");
9         _exit(1);
10    }
11    return result;
12 }
```

Un proces poate avea un singur tracer atasat la un moment dat. Din acest motiv, programul nu poate continua (in mod normal) daca incercam sa folosim **ltrace** sau **gdb**.

Am deschis programul cu **gdb** si am setat un **breakpoint** inainte de aceasta verificare (comparatia cu -1).

```
gdb-peda$ b *0x4011A8
Breakpoint 1 at 0x4011a8
gdb-peda$ info break
Num      Type           Disp Enb Address            What
1        breakpoint     keep y   0x00000000004011a8
gdb-peda$ run
```

La oprirea programului, am modificat registrul **RAX** astfel incat sa fie diferit de -1.

```
[-----code-----]
0x401199: mov     edi,0x0
0x40119e: mov     eax,0x0
0x4011a3: call    0x401050 <ptrace@plt>
=> 0x4011a8: cmp     rax,0xffffffffffffffff
0x4011ac: jne     0x4011c4
0x4011ae: lea     rdi,[rip+0xe4f]          # 0x402004
0x4011b5: call    0x401040 <puts@plt>
0x4011ba: mov     edi,0x1
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0x7fffffffde50 -> 0x2
0008| 0x7fffffffde58 -> 0x4013d5 (add     rbx,0x1)
0016| 0x7fffffffde60 -> 0x0
0024| 0x7fffffffde68 -> 0x7fffffffdf08 -> 0x7fffffffe26e ("/media/sf_vm-shared/task2/task2")
0032| 0x7fffffffde70 -> 0x1
0040| 0x7fffffffde78 -> 0x0
0048| 0x7fffffffde80 -> 0x7fffffffdf18 -> 0x7fffffffe28e ("COLORFGBG=15;0")
0056| 0x7fffffffde88 -> 0x0
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 1, 0x00000000004011a8 in ?? ()
gdb-peda$ set $rax = 0
```

In acest caz programul sare la adresa **0x4011c4**, evitand o iesire prematura.

```
[-----code-----]
0x40119e: mov     eax,0x0
0x4011a3: call    0x401050 <ptrace@plt>
0x4011a8: cmp     rax,0xffffffffffffffff
=> 0x4011ac: jne     0x4011c4
| 0x4011ae: lea     rdi,[rip+0xe4f]          # 0x402004
| 0x4011b5: call    0x401040 <puts@plt>
| 0x4011ba: mov     edi,0x1
| 0x4011bf: call    0x401030 <_exit@plt>
|> 0x4011c4: nop
| 0x4011c5: pop     rbp
| 0x4011c6: ret
| 0x4011c7: stos    BYTE PTR es:[rdi],al
[-----stack-----]
JUMP is taken
```

Putem observa ca este decriptata memoria incepand de la adresa functiei secrete, numita aici **encrypted_function** pana la functia de decriptare **decrypt**. Acest lucru se intampla pentru ca cele doua functii se afla una dupa cealalta. Deci se decripteaza toata functia **encrypted_function**. Decriptarea presupune negarea bitilor.

```

1 __int64 (*decrypt())(void)
2 {
3     __int64 (*result)(void); // rax
4     __int64 (*i)(void); // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
5
6     mprotect((void *)((unsigned __int64)&encrypted_function & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL), 0x2000ULL, 7);
7     for ( i = (__int64 (*)(void))&encrypted_function; ; i = (__int64 (*)(void))((char *)i + 1) )
8     {
9         result = i;
10        if ( (unsigned __int64)i >= (unsigned __int64)decrypt )
11            break;
12        *(_BYTE *)i = ~*(_BYTE *)i;
13    }
14    return result;
15 }

```

Am setat un nou **breakpoint** inainte de chemarea functiei de verificare a parolei. In momentul acela, functia este decriptata.

```

gdb-peda$ break *0x401376
Breakpoint 2 at 0x401376
gdb-peda$ continue

```

Cand programul ajunge in acest punct, putem extrage functia din memoria programului prin comanda **dump**.

```

[-----code-----]
0x40136a:    call    0x4012cb
0x40136f:    lea     rax,[rbp-0x30]
0x401373:    mov     rdi,rax
⇒ 0x401376:    call    0x4011c7
0x40137b:    mov     eax,0x0
0x401380:    leave
0x401381:    ret
0x401382:    cs nop WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
Guessed arguments:
arg[0]: 0x7fffffffddc0 ("password")
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0x7fffffffddc0 ("password")
0008| 0x7fffffffddc8 → 0x0
0016| 0x7fffffffddd0 → 0x0
0024| 0x7fffffffddd8 → 0x0
0032| 0x7fffffffdde0 → 0x0
0040| 0x7fffffffdde8 → 0x0
0048| 0x7fffffffddf0 → 0x1
0056| 0x7fffffffddf8 → 0x7ffff7df418a (<__libc_start_call_main+122>: mov     edi,eax)
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 1, 0x0000000000401376 in ?? ()
gdb-peda$ dump memory function.out 0x4011c7 0x4012CB
gdb-peda$

```

Am creat un script pentru IDA, disponibil in **patch_bytes.py**, care suprascrie bitii din functia criptata cu cei decriptati, adica continutul fisierului **function.out**.

Dupa aceasta actiune, putem observa ca sunt introduse niste valori intr-o lista. Presupunerea este ca aceste valori reprezinta parola corecta. IDA a refuzat sa transforme codul assembly in pseudocod. Este posibil sa fi folosit un range gresit la extragerea memoriei.


```

.text:00000000004011C7
.text:00000000004011C7 loc_4011C7: ; CODE XREF: main+31↓p
.text:00000000004011C7 ; DATA XREF: decrypt+8↓o ...
.text:00000000004011C7 ; __unwind {
.text:00000000004011C7         push    rbp |
.text:00000000004011C8         mov     rbp, rsp
.text:00000000004011C8 ; -----
.text:00000000004011C8         db     48h ; H
.text:00000000004011CC ; -----
.text:00000000004011CC         sub     esp, 40h
.text:00000000004011CC ; -----
.text:00000000004011CF         db     48h ; H
.text:00000000004011D0         mov     [rbp-38h], edi
.text:00000000004011D3         mov     byte ptr [rbp-30h], 9Bh
.text:00000000004011D7         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Fh], 86h
.text:00000000004011DB         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Eh], 91h
.text:00000000004011DF         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Dh], 9Eh
.text:00000000004011E3         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Ch], 92h
.text:00000000004011E7         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Bh], 96h
.text:00000000004011EB         mov     byte ptr [rbp-2Ah], 9Ch
.text:00000000004011EF         mov     byte ptr [rbp-29h], 0A0h
.text:00000000004011F3         mov     byte ptr [rbp-28h], 9Eh
.text:00000000004011F7         mov     byte ptr [rbp-27h], 91h
.text:00000000004011FB         mov     byte ptr [rbp-26h], 9Eh
.text:00000000004011FF         mov     byte ptr [rbp-25h], 93h
.text:0000000000401203         mov     byte ptr [rbp-24h], 86h
.text:0000000000401207         mov     byte ptr [rbp-23h], 8Ch
.text:000000000040120B         mov     byte ptr [rbp-22h], 96h
.text:000000000040120F         mov     byte ptr [rbp-21h], 8Ch
.text:0000000000401213         mov     byte ptr [rbp-20h], 0A0h
.text:0000000000401217         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Fh], 96h
.text:000000000040121B         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Eh], 8Ch
.text:000000000040121F         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Dh], 0A0h
.text:0000000000401223         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Ch], 8Bh
.text:0000000000401227         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Bh], 97h
.text:000000000040122B         mov     byte ptr [rbp-1Ah], 9Ah
.text:000000000040122F         mov     byte ptr [rbp-19h], 0A0h
.text:0000000000401233         mov     byte ptr [rbp-18h], 9Dh
.text:0000000000401237         mov     byte ptr [rbp-17h], 9Ah
.text:000000000040123B         mov     byte ptr [rbp-16h], 8Ch
.text:000000000040123F         mov     byte ptr [rbp-15h], 8Bh
.text:0000000000401243         mov     byte ptr [rbp-14h], 0FFh
.text:0000000000401247         mov     dword ptr [rbp-4], 0
.text:000000000040124E         jmp     short loc_40126B
.text:0000000000401250 ; -----
.text:0000000000401250

```

Continutul listei nu rezulta intr-un sir de caractere citibile. Pare ca toate valorile sunt negate. Am aplicat operatia de negare pe fiecare element si le-am transformat in caractere.

Pare ca lista are aceste valori opuse si la rularea normala a programului (lucru observat prin analizarea cu **gdb**).



Dupa aplicarea acestor schimbari, putem observa care este parola:
“dynamic_analysis_is_the_best”.

```

.text:0000000004011CC ;
.text:0000000004011CF db 48h ; H
.text:0000000004011D0 mov [rbp-38h], edi
.text:0000000004011D3 mov byte ptr [rbp-30h], not 'd'
.text:0000000004011D7 mov byte ptr [rbp-2Fh], not 'y'
.text:0000000004011DB mov byte ptr [rbp-2Eh], not 'n'
.text:0000000004011DF mov byte ptr [rbp-2Dh], not 'a'
.text:0000000004011E3 mov byte ptr [rbp-2Ch], not 'm'
.text:0000000004011E7 mov byte ptr [rbp-2Bh], not 'i'
.text:0000000004011EB mov byte ptr [rbp-2Ah], not 'c'
.text:0000000004011EF mov byte ptr [rbp-29h], not '_'
.text:0000000004011F3 mov byte ptr [rbp-28h], not 'a'
.text:0000000004011F7 mov byte ptr [rbp-27h], not 'n'
.text:0000000004011FB mov byte ptr [rbp-26h], not 'a'
.text:0000000004011FF mov byte ptr [rbp-25h], not 'l'
.text:000000000401203 mov byte ptr [rbp-24h], not 'y'
.text:000000000401207 mov byte ptr [rbp-23h], not 's'
.text:00000000040120B mov byte ptr [rbp-22h], not 'i'
.text:00000000040120F mov byte ptr [rbp-21h], not 's'
.text:000000000401213 mov byte ptr [rbp-20h], not '-'
.text:000000000401217 mov byte ptr [rbp-1Fh], not 'i'
.text:00000000040121B mov byte ptr [rbp-1Eh], not 's'
.text:00000000040121F mov byte ptr [rbp-1Dh], not '-'
.text:000000000401223 mov byte ptr [rbp-1Ch], not 't'
.text:000000000401227 mov byte ptr [rbp-1Bh], not 'h'
.text:00000000040122B mov byte ptr [rbp-1Ah], not 'e'
.text:00000000040122F mov byte ptr [rbp-19h], not '-'
.text:000000000401233 mov byte ptr [rbp-18h], not 'b'
.text:000000000401237 mov byte ptr [rbp-17h], not 'e'
.text:00000000040123B mov byte ptr [rbp-16h], not 's'
.text:00000000040123F mov byte ptr [rbp-15h], not 't'
.text:000000000401243 mov byte ptr [rbp-14h], not 0
.text:000000000401247 mov dword ptr [rbp-4], 0
.text:00000000040124E jmp short loc_40126B
.text:000000000401250 ;

```

Iar prin rularea normala a programului, putem observa ca intr-adevar asta este parola.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/media/sf_vm-shared/task2]  
$ ./task2  
dynamic_analysis_is_the_best  
Correct
```