

Design and Implementation of an Alternative to SSH

1 Introduction

2 Precursory Works

- Telnet
- Berkeley r-Commands
- OpenSSH

3 Oh-My-Gosh

- Secure Connection
- Authentication via Password
- Authentication via Keys
- Privilege Separation
- Forking
- Login Accounting

■ User Data Acquisition

- Pseudoterminals
- Starting the Shell
- Terminal Mode

4 Evaluation

- Performance
- Comparison to Telnet
- Comparison to Berkeley r-commands
- Comparison to OpenSSH

5 Conclusion

6 End

Task:

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- Prototype (design & implementation)
- Target platform: GNU/Linux
- Implementation language: Go (Golang)

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- Go-Telnet

Frequently used Linux commands:

- `login(1)`
- `sh(1)/bash(1)`
- `cp(1)`
- `who(1)`
- `stat(1)`
- `uptime(1)`

- `rlogin(1)`

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- Plethora of features:
 - Remote user login
 - Auth via keys
 - Port forwarding
 - X11-forwarding
 - Auth agent connection forwarding (!)
 - Compression (used by `rsync(1)`)
 - ⋮

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- No client certificates (!) → Cannot authenticate the connecting client

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- Prefetch credentials on client

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 - Important for privilege separation

- Shell should run with appropriate permissions


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- SSH more sophisticated



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- Prospect: Implement proper privilege separation

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- `utmpx` → `w/who`

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- utmpx → w/who
- PAM: pam_open_session(3)/pam_close_session(3)

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
- Home directory, shell, UID & GID
- Go standard library incomplete (misses shell information)
- `/etc/passwd` (!)
- CGO: `getpwnam(2)/getpwuid(2)`

```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>


struct passwd {
    char *pw_name; /* username */
    char *pw_passwd; /* user password */
    uid_t pw_uid; /* user ID */
    gid_t pw_gid; /* group ID */
    char *pw_gecos; /* user information */
    char *pw_dir; /* home directory */
    char *pw_shell; /* shell program */
};

struct passwd *getpwnam(const char *name);
struct passwd *getpwuid(uid_t uid);
```


Shells expect to be connected to a TTY



PTY fakes being a TTY



Overview



- `istty(3)` on the connected fds

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- `posix_openpt("/dev/ptmx")(3) → grant_pt(3) → unlockpt(3) → ptsname(3)`
- Wrapper function in `internal(!)` package of the Go standard library `os/signal/internal/pty`

```
// Open returns a master pty and the name of the linked slave
// tty.
func Open() (master *os.File, slave string, err error) {
    m, err := C.posix_openpt(C.O_RDWR)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, "", ptyError("posix_openpt", err)
    }
    if _, err := C.grantpt(m); err != nil {
        C.close(m)
        return nil, "", ptyError("grantpt", err)
    }
    if _, err := C.unlockpt(m); err != nil {
        C.close(m)
        return nil, "", ptyError("unlockpt", err)
    }
    slave = C.GoString(C.ptsname(m))
    return os.NewFile(uintptr(m), "pty-master"), slave, nil
}
```

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 - user (UID & GID) & host name
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 - window resolution (including SIGWINCH)
 - session leader (controlling terminal)

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 - TERM env var (for `ncurses(3X)`)
 - window resolution (including SIGWINCH)
 - session leader (controlling terminal)
- Transfer of env vars (client ↔ server)
- Continuous transfer of SIGWINCH not implemented → prospects

```
cmd := exec.Command(pwd.Shell, "--login")
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{
    Setsid: true,
    //Setctty: true,
    Credential: &syscall.Credential{
        Uid: pwd.Uid,
        Gid: pwd.Gid,
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cmd.Env = userEnvs
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Setting CTTY flag (for controlling terminal) fails → prospects

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- cooked mode → raw mode
- x-package (!) `x/crypto/ssh/terminal`

```
import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal"
//...
oldState, err := terminal.MakeRaw(0)
if err != nil {
    panic(err)
}
defer terminal.Restore(0, oldState)
```

■ client ↔ server ↔ ptm ↔ pts ↔ shell

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Throughput with:	TLS (size) MiB/s (GiB)	no TLS (size) MiB/s (GiB)
Arch Linux (loopback)	427 (25.1)	1177.6 (69.0)
WSL (loopback)	69.7 (4.09)	116 (6.82)
Arch Linux to WSL (ethernet*)	85.1 (4.99)	83.7 (4.91)

*: Netgear Switch & Cat 5 ethernet cable

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- Password auth: Both use `login(1)`

- TLS vs own protocol

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- Many additional features

- Many problems encountered

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- Many new concepts learned

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- Many new concepts learned
- Mixed feelings

Thank you for your attention!