

# Design and Implementation of an Alternative to SSH

### 1 Introduction

### 2 Precursory Works

- Telnet
- Berkeley r-Commands
- OpenSSH

### 3 Oh-My-Gosh

- Secure Connection
- Authentication via Password
- Authentication via Keys
- Privilege Separation
- Forking
- Login Accounting

- User Data Acquisition

- Pseudoterminals

- Starting the Shell

- Terminal Mode

### 4 Evaluation

- Performance

- Comparison to Telnet

- Comparison to Berkeley r-commands

- Comparison to OpenSSH

### 5 Conclusion

### 6 End

Design and implement an alternative to SSH (prototype)

Implementation language: Go (Golang)

Target platform: GNU/Linux

# Telnet

## Precursory Works

telnet(1) is old (RFC15 1969, RFC854 1983)

No secure connection (except: TELNETS)

"Go-Telnet"

# Berkeley r-Commands

## Precursory Works

Frequently used Linux commands made into r-Commands:

- `login(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `rlogin(1)`
- `sh(1)/bash(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `rsh(1)/rexec(1)*`
- `cp(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `rcp(1)`
- `who(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `rwho(1)`
- `stat(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `rstat(1)`
- `uptime(1)`  $\Rightarrow$  `ruptime(1)`

Useful (especially for scripts), but no secure connection

Replaces telnet(1) and Berkeley r-commands

Secure connection (own protocol)

Plethora of features:

- Remote user login
- Auth via keys
- Port forwarding
- X11-forwarding
- Auth agent connection forwarding (!)
- Compression (used by rsync(1))
- ⋮

# Secure Connection

Oh-My-Gosh

Prevent MITM, provide integrity & privacy

TLS 1.3

Server: openssl(1) → key & X.509 certificate  
crypto/tls

Encrypted channel

Self signed server certificate: Ignores trust chain

No client certificates (!) → Cannot authenticate the connecting client

# Authentication via Password

Oh-My-Gosh

/etc/passwd (!)

PAM

No Go-package for PAM

Failure in test environment → `login(1)`

Failure in same environment using `login(1)`

Too time consuming to switch back

`login(1)` allows root login

Prefetch credentials on client



# Authentication via Keys

Oh-My-Gosh

Authenticate via public key cryptography

Store authorized public keys on server

Authorized keys stored in `/root/.gosh` (plain-text)

→ Hash in `~/.gosh/authorized_keys`

→ Important for privilege separation

# Privilege Separation

Oh-My-Gosh

Shell should run with appropriate permissions (`setuid(2)/setgid(2)`)


Failure to drop privileges after login (operation not supported)

Thank you, Go → spawn shell with appropriate UID & GID

SSH more sophisticated

# Privilege Separation

Oh-My-Gosh



# Forking

Oh-My-Gosh

- Server spawns child to handle connection
- `fork(2)`
- Go: No support for forking
- CGO fork fails
- `syscall.ForkExec`
  - High level connection object gets corrupted
- Create host application
- Transfer fd as argument to child
  - Low level socket from `x/sys/unix` (x-package!)
- Prospect: Implement proper privilege separation

# Login Accounting

Oh-My-Gosh

Not implemented, **but**

utmpx → w/who

PAM: pam\_open\_session(3)/pam\_close\_session(3)

# User Data Acquisition

Oh-My-Gosh

Home directory, shell, UID & GID


Go standard library incomplete (misses shell information)

/etc/passwd (!)  $\Rightarrow$  CGO: `getpwnam(2)`/`getpwuid(2)`

# Pseudoterminals

Oh-My-Gosh


Shells expect to be connected to a TTY



# Pseudoterminals

Oh-My-Gosh

PTY fakes being a TTY






# Pseudoterminals

Oh-My-Gosh

## Overview



# Pseudoterminals

Oh-My-Gosh

`istty(3)` on the connected fds

`posix_openpt("/dev/ptmx")(3) → grant_pt(3) → unlockpt(3) → ptsname(3)`

Wrapper function in `internal(!)` package of the Go standard library  
`os/signal/internal/pty`

# Starting the Shell

Oh-My-Gosh

Shell requirements:

- user (UID & GID) & host name
- TERM env var (for ncurses(3X))
- window resolution (including SIGWINCH)
- session leader (controlling terminal)

Transfer of env vars (client ↔ server)

Continuous transfer of SIGWINCH not implemented → prospects

Setting CTTY flag (for controlling terminal) fails → prospects

# Terminal Mode

Oh-My-Gosh

Forward all keystrokes without interpretation (client-sside)

cooked mode → raw mode

x-package (!) `x/crypto/ssh/terminal`

# Performance

## Evaluation

client ↔ server ↔ ptm ↔ pts ↔ shell

/dev/zero → connection (client-side) → server → pv -rabtW →  
/dev/null

TLS vs no TLS

Throughput with:	TLS (total)	no TLS (size)
Linux	427MiB/s (25.1GiB)	1177.6MiB/s (69.0GiB)
WSL	69.7MiB/s (4.09GiB)	116MiB/s (6.82GiB)
Linux to WSL (eth*)	85.1MiB/s (4.99GiB)	83.7MiB/s (4.91GiB)

\*: Netgear Switch & Cat 5 ethernet cable

# Comparison to Telnet

## Evaluation

TLS vs plain text

Key auth vs only password auth

# Comparison to Berkeley r-commands

## Evaluation

Only `rlogin(1)` is considered (`rsh(1)`)

TLS vs plain text

Key auth vs only password auth

# Comparison to OpenSSH

## Evaluation

TLS vs own protocol

Privilege separation

Many additional features



## Conclusion

Many problems encountered

Many new concepts learned

Mixed feelings

End

Thank you for your attention!