# Design and Implementation of an Alternative to SSH



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## Introduction



#### Task:

- Alternative to SSH (core function)
- Prototype (design & implementation)
- Target platform: GNU/Linux
- Implementation language: Go (Golang)





■ telnet(1)

Telnet

- Old (RFC15 1969, RFC854 1983)
- Port 23
- No secure connection (TELNETS)
- Go-Telnet



## Berkeley r-Commands



### Frequently used Linux commands:

- login(1)
- = sh(1)/bash(1)
- **■** cp(1)
- who(1)
- stat(1)
- $\blacksquare$  uptime(1)



## Berkeley r-Commands



- rlogin(1)
- rsh(1)
- rexec(1)\*
- rcp(1)
- rwho(1)
- rstat(1)
- ruptime(1)



## Berkeley r-Commands



- Useful (scripts)
- No secure connection



#### **OpenSSH**



- Replaces telnet(1) and Berkeley r-commands
- Port 22
- Secure connection (own protocol)
- Plethora of features:
  - Remote user login
  - Auth via keys
  - Port forwarding
  - X11-forwarding
  - Auth agent connection forwarding (!)
  - Compression (used by rsync(1))





#### Secure Connection



- Prevent MITM, provide integrity & privacy
- TLS 1.3
- Server: openss1(1)  $\rightarrow$  key & X.509 certificate
- crypto/tls
- Encrypted channel
- Self signed server certificate: Ignores trust chain
- $\blacksquare$  No client certificates (!)  $\to$  Cannot authenticate the connecting client



### Authentication via Password



- /etc/passwd (!)
- PAM
- No Go-package for PAM
- Failure in test environment  $\rightarrow$ login(1)
- Failure in same environment using login(1)
   Too time consuming to switch back
- login(1) allows root login
- Prefetch credentials on client



#### Authentication via Keys



- Public key cryptography
- Client ↔ Server
- Random, high entropy secret
- Store authorized public keys on server
- openssl(1)
- Authorized keys stored in /root/.gosh (plain-text)
  - $\rightarrow$  Hash in ~/.gosh/authorized\_keys
  - $\rightarrow$  Important for privilege separation



#### Privilege Separation




- Shell should run with appropriate permissions
- setuid(2) & setgid(2)
- $\blacksquare$  Failure to drop privileges after login (operation not supported) Thank you, Go  $\to$  spawn shell with appropriate UID & GID
- SSH more sophisticated



#### Privilege Separation









#### **Forking**



- Server spawns child to handle connection
- fork(2)
- Go: No support for forking
- CGO fork fails
- syscall.ForkExec
  - → High level connection object gets corrupted
- Create host application
- Transfer fd as argument to child
  - $\rightarrow$  Low level socket from x/sys/unix (x-package!)
- Prospect: Implement proper privilege separation



## Login Accounting



- Not implemented, but
- utmpx  $\rightarrow$  w/who
- PAM: pam\_open\_session(3)/pam\_close\_session(3)



#### User Data Acquisition



- Home directory, shell, UID & GID
- Go standard library incomplete (misses shell information)
- /etc/passwd (!)
- CGO: getpwnam(2)/getpwuid(2)



## zh


```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
struct passwd {
   char *pw_name; /* username */
   char *pw_passwd; /* user password */
   uid_t pw_uid; /* user ID */
   gid_t pw_gid; /* group ID */
   char *pw_gecos; /* user information */
   char *pw_dir; /* home directory */
   char *pw_shell; /* shell program */
};
struct passwd *getpwnam(const char *name);
struct passwd *getpwuid(uid t uid);
```



#### **Pseudoterminals**




#### Shells expect to be connected to a TTY





#### Pseudoterminals


## PTY fakes being a TTY



#### **Pseudoterminals**



#### Overview



# zh

#### **Pseudoterminals**

- istty(3) on the connected fds
- posix\_openpt("/dev/ptmx")(3)  $\rightarrow$  grant\_pt(3)  $\rightarrow$  unlockpt(3)  $\rightarrow$  ptsname(3)
- Wrapper function in internal(!) package of the Go standard library os/signal/internal/pty





```
// Open returns a master pty and the name of the linked slave
   tty.
func Open() (master *os.File, slave string, err error) {
   m, err := C.posix_openpt(C.O_RDWR)
   if err != nil {
       return nil, "", ptyError("posix_openpt", err)
   if _, err := C.grantpt(m); err != nil {
       C.close(m)
       return nil, "", ptyError("grantpt", err)
   if _, err := C.unlockpt(m); err != nil {
       C.close(m)
       return nil, "", ptyError("unlockpt", err)
   slave = C.GoString(C.ptsname(m))
   return os.NewFile(uintptr(m), "pty-master"), slave, nil
```

#### Starting the Shell



- Shell requirements:
  - user (UID & GID) & host name
  - TERM env var (for ncurses(3X))
  - window resolution (including SIGWINCH)
  - session leader (controlling terminal)
- Transfer of env vars (client  $\leftrightarrow$  server)
- $lue{}$  Continuous transfer of SIGWINCH not implemented ightarrow prospects





```
cmd := exec.Command(pwd.Shell, "--login")
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{
    Setsid: true,
    //Setctty: true,
    Credential: &syscall.Credential{
        Uid: pwd.Uid,
        Gid: pwd.Gid,
    },
}
cmd.Env = userEnvs
```

Setting CTTY flag (for controlling terminal) fails  $\rightarrow$  prospects



## zh aw

#### Terminal Mode

- Forward all keystrokes without interpretation (client-sside)
- $lue{}$  cooked mode ightarrow raw mode
- x-package (!) x/crypto/ssh/terminal





Terminal Mode

```
import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal"
//...
oldState, err := terminal.MakeRaw(0)
if err != nil {
    panic(err)
}
defer terminal.Restore(0, oldState)
```



#### Performance



- client  $\leftrightarrow$  server  $\leftrightarrow$  ptm  $\leftrightarrow$  pts  $\leftrightarrow$  shell
- /dev/zero  $\rightarrow$  connection (client-side)  $\rightarrow$  server  $\rightarrow$  pv -rabtW  $\rightarrow$  /dev/null
- TLS vs no TLS

Throughput with:	TLS (size)	no TLS (size)
	MiB/s (GiB)	MiB/s (GiB)
Arch Linux (loopback)	427 (25.1)	1177.6 (69.0)
WSL (loopback)	69.7 (4.09)	116 (6.82)
Arch Linux to WSL (ethernet*)	85.1 (4.99)	83.7 (4.91)

<sup>\*:</sup> Netgear Switch & Cat 5 ethernet cable



## Evaluation

## Comparison to Telnet



- TLS vs plain text
- Key auth vs only password auth



## **Evaluation**

# zh

#### Comparison to Berkeley r-commands

- Only rlogin(1) is considered (rsh(1))
- TLS vs plain text
- Key auth vs only password auth
- lacktriangle Password auth: Both use login(1)



## Evaluation

#### Comparison to OpenSSH



- TLS vs own protocol
- Privilege separation
- Many additional features



## Conclusion



- Many problems encountered
- Many new concepts learned
- Mixed feelings



## End



Thank you for your attention!

