Reelection Backfire: Political Accountability and Security Under-provision in Mexico

Rafael Ch
NYU

Introduction

- Reelection: Mayhew's (1974) "electoral connection" - incumbent's behavior constrained by reelection desire
  - widespread among democratic representative systems
  - 80s, 90s: go-to policy recommendation to foster political accountability
- However, conflicted evidence on the effect of term limit removal
- Positive side:
  - $\uparrow$ competence of elected politicians (Dalbo et. al 2017)
  - $\downarrow$ corruption (Ferraz & Finan 2008, 2011)
  - $\uparrow$ legislators productivity (Hall et. al 2018)
  - $\uparrow$ welfare (Alt et. al 2011)
- Negative side:
  - $\uparrow$ particularistic legislation (Motolinia 2020)
  - $\uparrow$ corruption (Coviello et. al 2017)
- At face value: reelection does not always lead to political accountability for the median voter

- What features limit the political accountability of reelection?

  Such as parties' electoral incentives

- This is the focus of this paper.

This paper

Studies:

- Effect of term limit removal on violence (proxy welfare distortion) and public security provision (incumbents' effort) Why public security?
- Leverage staggered implementation of 2014 Term Limit Reform in Mexico Why Mexico?
  - Reelection for 2 consecutive periods for local executives
  - Staggered implementation at state-level from 2015 to 2022
- Effect of reelection on incumbent party electoral incentives
  - Samuels & Shurgart (2010): mayors as agents to parties and voters, accountability and delegation tension
  - Berman & Lake (2019): "Why principals deviate from optimal control of agents [in charge of deterring non-state challengers]?"

Preview of main results

- Event-study design shows term limit removal led under-provision of public security by military and local police forces
  - Result: increase violence treated municipalities
- Not explained by: (1) adverse candidate selection, (2) citizens security preferences, (3) capture by DTOs
- Robust to:
  - Multiple homicide databases
  - Sensitivity analysis pretrend violation
  - Falsification of treatment

Preview of mechanism

RDD & Event-in-discontinuity of close elections designs:

- Reform generated an incumbency avantage
- Increase prob. of survival reduced party monitoring of local agents that tackle crime (military & police forces)

Strategic behavior:

- PRI followed a "not in my backyard strategy"
- Targeted security efforts in opposition municipalities making them bare the externalities of the War on Drugs
- Violence increased in opposition municipalities relative to PRI ones

Argument

- Since Mayhew 1974, large literature on political accountability effect of reelection
- But "electoral connection" states that reelection is maximized by catering particularistic transfers. Salient when
  - Parties suffer political misfortunes (Motolinia 2020)
  - Clientelistic parties (Fergusson et. al 2018)
- Result: longer tenure associated with particularistic transfers and corruption (Coviello et. al 2017)
- Another limit to the political accountability of reelection:
  - Incumbent party political survival

Political survival

- Incumbents are accountable to voters and political parties: two principals-agent problem (Moreno et. al 2003, Samuels & Shugart, 2010, Klasnja & Titiunik, 2017)
- Top-down accountability=f(party strength, party electoral incentives)
  1. Party strength: ability to monitor
  2. Electoral incentives: willingness to monitor
- Electoral incentives: party able but not willing to monitor
- Mexico: assume strong party strength
  - Increase party political survival $\rightarrow$ weak oversight
- E.g. incumbency advantage. Weaver 2020 appears when
  - voters don't associate first term in office with experience on corruption
  - believe strong horizontal or vertical accountability institutions to oversight incumbents

Hypotheses

- **H1:** $\uparrow$ political survival principal (inc. advantage) $\rightarrow \downarrow$ oversight of agent
- **H2:** $\downarrow$ oversight $\rightarrow \downarrow$ agent's effort (security provision)
- **H3:** $\downarrow$ effort (security provision) $\rightarrow \uparrow$ welfare distortions (violence)
- **Accountability paradox:** under strong parties, reelection leads voters to create an incumbency advantage, while the advantage decreases the willingness of parties to do so

Mexico's War on Drugs

- From 2006-2019: more than 300,000 deaths and more than 30,000 forced disappearances
- Reasons:
  - DTOs drug markets competition (Rios 2013)
  - State effort to reduce DTOs operations (Rios 2013, Dell 2015)
  - Cocaine supply shortages (Castillo et. al 2018)
- Multiple pacification strategies tested:
  - beheading drug kingpins
  - deployment of troops (45,000)
  - increasing military & police capacity (e.g. Plan Merida)
  - corruption detection & money laundering policies
  - increase fiscal transfers for crime prevention
  - security cooperation agreements (e.g. Mando Único)
  - financing self-defense groups (most effective but generate stateless)
  - strengthening political accountability ???

2014 Term Limit Reform: content

Reform Background

Proposed three main changes:

1. Creation of INE
2. Term limit removal of mayors for 2 consecutive terms (also legislators for more terms)
3. Party-lock: those running for reelection could not switch parties

On staggered treatment timing:

- state legislatures (under governors control) granted discretion to define...
  1. number of terms
  2. implementation date (could not affect 2014 elections by law)

Figure 1: Mexican States Electoral Reform Treatment Status



Data

- Database on violence and effort by military and local police forces
- Unit: municipalities from 2010 to 2018
- Main outcome: Homicides to proxy for violence
  - INEGI's homicide related deaths
  - SNSP's homicides (counts cases; for robustness)
  - Population: INEGI and CONAPO projections
  - logged and inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation
- Mechanisms:
  - Military's effort: narcotics, arms and laboratories erradicated 2010-2018 (INFOMEX)
  - Police's effort: criminal detentions 2010-2018 (INFOMEX)
  - Incumbency advantage:
    - Incumbent $t-1$, barely winning (loosing) at t, on election outcome at $t+1$ (Klasnja & Titiunik, 2017)
    - State & municipal winning margin (Magar, 2012, 2017)

Research Design

- Cohort weighted event-study design (Abraham & Sun, 2020):

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_{mt} = \mu_m + \mu_t + \sum_{e=1}^{5} \sum_{k=-7,\neq -8,-1}^{3} \gamma_{e,k} (1\{E_i = e\} \cdot R_{m,t}^k) \\
+ \sum_{e=1}^{5} \sum_{k=-7,\neq -8,-1}^{3} \Theta' X_{s(m)t} (1\{E_i = e\} \cdot R_{m,t}^k) + \epsilon_{mt}
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

  - y_{mt}: log/ihs(homicides per capita), log(anti-narcotic operations)
  - exclude $\gamma_{-8,-1}$ to avoid collinearity
  - μ_m & μ_t: municipality and year FEs
  - E_i: cohort-specific indicators
  - $R_{m,t}^k$: Term Limit Reform indicator
  - $X_{s(m)t}$: state s (municipal m) level covariates
  - $\gamma_{e,k}$: DiD estimators or Cohort Average Treatment Effects (CATTs).
  - SEs clustered state-level (Reform treatment level)

Main estimators

- Construct interaction weighted (IW) estimators (Abraham & Sun, 2020)

$$\hat{\nu}_g = \frac{1}{|g|} \sum_{k \in g} \sum_{e} \hat{\gamma_{e,k}} \hat{Pr}\{E_i = e | E_i \in [-k, T-k]\} \tag{2}$$

  - $\hat{\gamma_{e,k}}$: CATTs returned from equation (1)
  - $\hat{Pr}\{E_i = e | E_i \in [-k, T-k]\}$: estimated cohort weights
  - estimator normalized by the size of g
  - $\hat{\nu}_g$: weighted linear combination of the CATTs

Main results

Figure 2: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Violence, IW estimators with 95% confidence intervals



IHS transformation

Identification

Four identifying assumptions:

1. Pretrends, and given CATTs no bias from other relative timer periods
2. *As-if* random assignment of treatment
   - Strong assumption given governors potential selection bias
   - Include governors' strength covariates: winning margin and partisan alignment with central government
   - ID assumption now: conditional on covariates and FEs, unobserved factors are not correlated with Reform treatment assignment
3. No anticipatory behavior of agents
   1. Assume it can only occur in fixed window prior to Reform; but late adopters could anticipate
   2. No difference between late and early adopters Event-by-event analysis
4. No treatment effect heterogeneity accounted by cohort weighted event-study design (Abraham & Sun, 2020):
   - Saturated FEs structure: treatment units do not enter test window as control units

Robustness tests

1. Test different homicide databases Different datasets
2. Sensitivity analysis on potential violations of parallel trends (Rambachan & Roth, 2019) Sensitivity analysis
3. Falsification test: randomly assign Mexican states to treatment, keeping observed proportion of treated units per year Falsification
4. Asymmetric effects when accounting for security cooperation agreements Coop. Agreements
   - Effect persist after controlling for coop. agreements Coop. Agreements control

Inc. Advantage: Event study-in-discontinuity of close elections design

- Local linear regression for municipalities in an Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{mt} = \mu_m + \mu_t + \sum_{e=1}^{5} \sum_{k=-5,\neq -6,-1}^{0} \gamma_{e,k}(1\{E_i = e\} \cdot R_{m,t}^k) \\ + \sum_{e=1}^{5} \sum_{k=-7,\neq -5,-1}^{0} \Theta' X_{it}(1(E_i = e) \cdot R_{m,t}^k) + f_{(.)}(margin)_{mt} \\ + \sum_{e=1}^{5} \sum_{k=-5,\neq -6,-1}^{0} \nu_{e,k}(1\{E_i = e\} \cdot R_{m,t}^k \cdot f_{(.)}(margin)_{mt}) + \epsilon_{mt} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

  - $f_{(.)}(margin)_{mt}$: RD polynomial on winning margin
  - k relative time periods run from $k \in \{-6, -5, ..., 0\}$
  - exclude $\gamma_{-6,-1}$ to avoid collinearity; γ_{-2} non-existent
  - $\gamma_{e,k}$: CATTs
  - SEs clustered state-level (treatment level)

Incumbency Advantage

Figure 3: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Incumbency Advantage, IW estimators with 95% confidence intervals



Inc. Advantage: Identification

- Close elections where party barely won to those where it barely lost: isolate from current and future electoral success
- DiD setup: tease time-variant and time-invariant confounding variation
- Identification assumptions:
  1. pretrends (found)
  2. as-if random treatment assignment (conditional on covariates)
  3. no anticipatory behavior Event-by-event analysis
  4. treatment effect homogeneity (CATTs)
  5. selection into treatment
     - no covariate jump at discontinuity Population
     - density test Mccrary Test
- Similar results using RDD design RDD figure RDD table

Effort placed by Security Forces

Figure 4: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Security Forces Effort, IW estimators with 95% confidence intervals



Strategic placement of effort by security forces

- Concern that rampant crime hides a non-strategical choice by security forces
- Heterogeneous treatment effects show this is not the case:
  1. Party Alignment: aligned municipalities with PRI central government show a decrease in violence
  2. "Not in my backyard" strategy: low security provision in PRI municipalities, and high in opposition ones (PAN and MORENA)
  3. "Let others burn" strategy: increase of violence in opposition municipalities
     - Importance negative externalities of War on Drugs

(ruling out) Alternative Explanations

1. Adverse politician selection: positive and non-significant effect of Reform on incumbent's quality Incumbents quality
   - quality: web-scrape mayors' professional titles from 2010-2019 from the SNIM
2. Citizens' security preferences:
   - results robust conditional on preferences from ENVIPE 2011-2019 (INEGI) Figure w/ logs Figure w/ ihs
3. Captured incumbent Capture
   - DTOs as strategic actors
   - use Camilo et. al (2018) cartel presence and proximity to US measures
   - municipalities with cartel presence exhibit higher levels of violence
   - municipalities closer to the US show higher violence
   - results robust to controlling for cartel presence

Conclusion: 4 insights

1. Once we factor party electoral incentives, reelection may not lead to political accountability locally
   - Global party competition dominates local competitive dynamics
2. "Not in my backyard" strategy in the presence of public good with high negative externalities
   - More salient under clientelistic parties
3. Political survival to explain a principal deviation from optimal agent control
   - Aside from Berman & Lake (2019) weak, cost-constrained or misinformed principals explanations

Conclusion: 4 insights

1. Once we factor party electoral incentives, reelection may not lead to political accountability locally
   - Global party competition dominates local competitive dynamics
2. "Not in my backyard" strategy in the presence of public good with high negative externalities
   - More salient under clientelistic parties
3. Political survival to explain a principal deviation from optimal agent control
   - Aside from Berman & Lake (2019) weak, cost-constrained or misinformed principals explanations
4. **For the case of Mexico:** Reform effect on party incumbency advantage (speak to Klasnja & Titiunik, 2017)

An "Accountability Paradox"

- Under strong parties, reelection leads voters to create an incumbency advantage
- However, incumbency advantage decreases the willingness of parties to do so
- Need of encompassing reforms
  - Strengthen bottom-up accountability
  - Increase horizontal oversight to hold central governments accountable

Email: rafael.ch@nyu.edu

Website: https://wp.nyu.edu/rafaelch/

Appendix

Why Mexico?

Scope conditions:

1. Intra-state conflict with high violence variation across municipalities and time Homicide variation
2. Despite centralization efforts, still strong decentralization in public security provision
3. Party centered elections: strong say on candidate selection and financing
4. Strong parties: prevent party switching and monitor party members
5. Vibrant democracy
6. Mexico middle income distribution

This Paper

Figure 5: Evolution of Homicides and Treatment Status by Mexican State, 2010-2018



Why Mexico?

Why public security?

- Most relevant public good demand in the country since 2007



- No citizen preference variation across the country: help identification

This Paper

2014 Term Limit Reform: background

- Since 1933 constitutional amendment with reelection ban by he PNR (former PRI): control party members
- 2012 Felipe Calderon introduced term limit reform to Congress, blocked by the PRI
- 2012 Pena Nieto (PRI) won presidency with multiple electoral irregularities
- 2013 Pushed set of Energy and Fiscal reforms
- Mexican Pact Accord between PRI, PAN and PRD to avoid political gridlocks
- Electoral Reform used as a bargaining chip to approve PRI's Energy reform
- Faced opposition by governors
- President Pena Nieto "exhorted" local legislator to approve the reform
- Promulgated on Jan. 31, 2014

Reform Content

With IHS transformation

Figure 6: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Violence, IHS transformation



Main Results

Event-by-event analysis

- Estimate treatment effects for each treated Mexican state (28) (Cengiz et. al, 2019)
- Create sate-event specific panel datasets contain the treated state and all other non yet treated states
- Estimate 28 DiD regressions:

$$y_{mt} = \mu_m + \mu_t + \gamma Reform_{mt} + \epsilon_{mt} \tag{4}$$

- Looking for: no clustering across early and late adopters

Identification

Figure 7: "Event-by-event analysis", 95% confidence intervals



Stacked dataset analysis | Identification

Figure 8: "Stacked dataset analysis", 95% confidence intervals



Event-by-event analysis | Identification

Table 1: Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Violence, using different homicide databases

Dependent variable: log(homicides per capita)				
Source:	INEGI	SNSP		
		(old measure)	(new measure)	(combined)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag 7 years	−0.2569			
	(0.1766)			
Lag 6 years	−0.0416		−0.0826**	−0.0711**
	(0.0820)		(0.0381)	(0.0343)
Lag 5 years	0.1505*		−0.0398*	−0.0387*
	(0.0777)		(0.0210)	(0.0198)
Lag 4 years	0.1534		0.0482	0.1170
	(0.1571)		(0.0769)	(0.0776)
Lag 3 years	0.1274		−0.0813	0.1105
	(0.1551)		(0.1318)	(0.1524)
Lag 2 years	0.0873	−0.0107	−0.0638	0.0766
	(0.1143)	(0.0261)	(0.0964)	(0.0972)
Reform, time 0	0.1080**	0.0130	0.0825	0.1898**
	(0.0518)	(0.0230)	(0.0702)	(0.0711)
Lead 1 year	0.4616***	0.0479	0.3014***	0.5458***
	(0.0804)	(0.0335)	(0.0921)	(0.1258)
Lead 2 years	0.3939***	0.0490**	0.0782	0.4253**
	(0.1165)	(0.0198)	(0.0831)	(0.1574)
Lead 3 years	0.4061***	0.2470***		0.5446***
	(0.1386)	(0.0810)		(0.1589)
Observations	8,592	3,088	5,452	6,515
R-squared	0.7776	0.8479	0.7359	0.7312
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lag DV	✓	✓	✓	✓

Robustness

Figure 9: Sensitivity Analysis for $\theta = \tau_3$ using $\Delta = \Delta^{SD}(M)$



Note: M lower bound=0; M upper bound=0.5536. Blue confidence interval shows the third lag after treatment.

Figure 10: Monotonically decreasing pre-trend violation



Note: M lower bound=0; M upper bound=0.5536. Blue confidence interval shows the third lag after treatment.

Robustness

Figure 11: Monotonically increasing pre-trend violation



Note: M lower bound=0; M upper bound=0.5536. Blue confidence interval shows the third lag after treatment.

Robustness

Figure 12: Falsifying Term-Limit Reform Treatment Assignment, post-treatment periods



Robustness

Figure 13: Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence, by security cooperation agreement



Robustness

Table 2: Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Violence, controlling for security cooperation agreements

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita) (1)	ihs(homicide per capita)[a] (2)
Lag 7 years	−0.2675	−0.3293
	(0.1675)	(0.2478)
Lag 6 years	−0.0463	−0.0607
	(0.0789)	(0.1071)
Lag 5 years	0.1419*	0.1893*
	(0.0793)	(0.1034)
Lag 4 years	0.1367	0.2069
	(0.1565)	(0.1913)
Lag 3 years	0.1132	0.1833
	(0.1544)	(0.1887)
Lag 2 years	0.0785	0.1282
	(0.1139)	(0.1887)
Reform, time 0	0.1045**	0.1472**
	(0.0506)	(0.0600)
Lead 1 year	0.4623***	0.6120***
	(0.0783)	(0.0975)
Lead 2 years	0.3721***	0.5068***
	(0.1132)	(0.1456)
Lead 3 years	0.3938***	0.5380***
	(0.1355)	(0.1713)
Observations	8,442	8,442
R-squared	0.7786	0.7035
Mun. FEs	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓
State Controls[b]	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓
Lag DV	✓	✓
Security Coop. Agreement	✓	✓

Robustness

Figure 14: "Event-by-event analysis", 95% confidence intervals



No discontinuous jump of population

Figure 15: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Population, IW estimators with 95% confidence intervals



Figure 16: McCrary Test, quadratic polynomial



Mechanism: identification

Figure 17: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Incumbency Advantage, quadratic polynomial



Mechanism: identification

Table 3: Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Elections on Incumbency Advantage, comparing pre and post-Term Limit Reform estimates

Dependent variable:	linear polynomial		quadratic polynomial		cubic polynomical		quartic polynomial	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Probability of victory at t+1[a]	-0.1075***	0.0750	-0.1114***	0.0595	-0.1130***	0.0639	-0.1132***	0.0565
	(0.0217)	(0.0636)	(0.0274)	(0.0846)	(0.0330)	(0.0925)	(0.0387)	(0.1182)
Observations	8,623	890	10,138	955	10,849	1,116	11,262	1,064
Post Reform (2014)		✓		✓		✓		✓

Mechanism: identification

Strategic placement of effort: party alignment

Table 4: Total Interaction Effect:[a] the role of Alignment with Federal Government and Municipal Winning Margin

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita)		ihs(homicide per capita)[b]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reform (t+3)*Alignment Fed. Gov.	−0.1397*		−0.1748**	
	(0.0690)		(0.0816)	
Reform (t+3)*Winning Margin		−0.3325		−0.4745
		(0.4494)		(0.5430)
Observations	2,966	2,966	2,966	2,966
R-squared	0.8244	0.7759	0.8234	0.7748
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[c]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted[d]	✓	✓	✓	✓

Effort

Strategic placement of effort: "not in my backyard"

Table 5: Total Interaction Effect of Partisanship on Public Security Effort[a]

Dependent variable:	log(cocaine)[b]		log(heroine)[b]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reform (t+3)*PRI	0.0616		−0.0295	
	(0.0561)		(0.0429)	
Reform (t+3)*PAN		0.1004**		0.0267*
		(0.0443)		(0.0147)
Observations	4,550	4,550	4,550	4,550
R-squared	0.4533	0.4537	0.3372	0.3373
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[c]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted[d]	✓	✓	✓	✓

Effort

Strategic placement of effort: "let others burn"

Table 6: Total Interaction Effect of Partisanship on Violence[a]

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita)		ihs(homicide per capita)[b]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reform (t+3)*PRI	−0.0920		−0.0979	
	(0.0759)		(0.0959)	
Reform (t+3)*PAN		0.1444*		0.1744**
		(0.0733)		(0.0842)
Observations	2,966	2,966	2,966	2,966
R-squared	0.8244	0.7759	0.8234	0.7748
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[c]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted[d]	✓	✓	✓	✓

Effort

Table 7: Event-in-Discontinuity in close elections model: Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Incumbent's Quality

Dependent variable:	Incumbent quality indicator	
	(1)	(2)
	quadratic polynomial	
Lag 6 years		−0.2795
		(0.5702)
Lag 5 years	−0.4390	−0.0755
	(0.3773)	(0.7316)
Lag 4 years	−0.3998	−2.0649***
	(0.6689)	(0.1457)
Lag 3 years	−0.0573	−0.4221*
	(0.6061)	(0.2179)
Reform, time 0	0.4450	0.0584
	(0.5035)	(0.0452)
Observations	1,813	1,985
R-squared	0.7031	0.6816
Sample Inc. Adv. DV	Inc. at t-1 won at t+1	Inc. at t won at t+1

Alternative Explanations

Table 8: Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Violence, controlling for citizens security perception

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita)		ihs(homicide per capita)[a]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag 7 years	−0.2569		−0.3129	
	(0.1766)		(0.2584)	
Lag 6 years	−0.0416	−0.0111	−0.0535	−0.0053
	(0.0820)	(0.0580)	(0.1108)	(0.0748)
Lag 5 years	0.1505*	−0.0072	0.2019*	−0.0056
	(0.0777)	(0.0198)	(0.1011)	(0.0248)
Lag 4 years	0.1534	0.0469	0.2315	0.0704
	(0.1571)	(0.0801)	(0.1910)	(0.0967)
Lag 3 years	0.1274	0.3133	0.2044	0.4325*
	(0.1551)	(0.2082)	(0.1883)	(0.2407)
Lag 2 years	0.0873	0.1054	0.1416	0.1534
	(0.1143)	(0.1362)	(0.1386)	(0.1608)
Reform, time 0	0.1080**	0.1477*	0.1512**	0.1978**
	(0.0518)	(0.0775)	(0.0610)	(0.0926)
Lead 1 year	0.4616***	0.2641**	0.6111***	0.3507***
	(0.0804)	(0.1038)	(0.0994)	(0.1176)
Lead 2 years	0.3939***	0.1894*	0.5372***	0.2686**
	(0.1165)	(0.0937)	(0.1485)	(0.1060)
Lead 3 years	0.4061***	0.2188*	0.5564***	0.3107**
	(0.1386)	(0.1068)	(0.1740)	(0.1261)
Observations	8,592	7,574	8,592	7,574
R-squared	0.7776	0.7889	0.7025	0.7164
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lag DV	✓	✓	✓	✓
Citizens' Security Perception[c]		✓		✓

Figure 18: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Violence, controlling for citizens' security preferences



Figure 19: Effect of Term Limit Reform of 2014 on Violence, controlling for citizens' security preferences



Table 9: Total Interaction Effect of Term Limit Reform and Drug Trafficking Organization Presence on Violence[a]

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita)		ihs(homicide per capita)[b]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reform (t+3) X Proximity to U.S.	−0.3094**		−0.3761**	
	(0.1210)		(0.1539)	
Reform (t+3) X Cartel presence (indicator)		0.1412**		0.1398*
		(0.0670)		(0.0818)
Observations	8,592	8,592	8,592	8,592
R-squared	0.7779	0.7030	0.7778	0.7027
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Controls[c]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted[d]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lag DV	✓	✓	✓	✓

Alternative Explanations