Reelection Backfire: the Effect of Reelection Incentives on Delegation of Public Security Provision in Mexico

Rafael Ch
New York University

Abstract. Local incumbents up for reelection face a delegation puzzle with upper levels of government. In the presence of spillovers and sum costs, delegation of public good provision may increase its efficiency but cut down its use for electoral purposes. Not delegating allows incumbents to signal responsiveness and carry credit claiming activities to win votes but may generate an inefficient public good provision. A clear tradeoff between efficiency and electoral survival arises. This paper studies the effect of reelection incentives on delegation of public security provision to upper levels of government in a country overwhelmed by criminal wars, Mexico. To do so, I exploit the staggered implementation of an electoral reform that introduced reelection for local executives from 2014 to 2022. I find that mayors up for reelection decrease the delegation of public security to the Governor of their state relative to term limited mayors. This behavior is prominent in municipalities characterized with citizens concerned by narcotraffic and insecurity, where they hold high levels of trust for police forces different from municipal ones, and where mayors are not aligned with upper level governments. By taking "the bull by the horns", mayors facing reelection signal responsiveness against crime and differentiate themselves from other political actors. Results suggest that delegation is not only a political decision but an electoral one, and that reelection incentives in party-centered systems -like Mexico- may lead mayors to go local to signal responsiveness at the expense of efficient public good provision.

Key words: Delegation, Reelection Incentives, Responsiveness, Public Good Provision, Public Security, Violence, Incumbency advantage.

Date: April 28, 2021.

Ch: Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University.
Email: rafael.ch@nyu.edu
Website: https://wp.nyu.edu/rafaelch/.

1. Introduction

1. Motivation

This paper studies a classic problem faced by governments with a supra-entity capable of providing and delivering public goods: to delegate or not to delegate. Specifically, it delves into an understudied phenomenon of delegation, the role of incumbent reelection incentives.

Incumbents face a trade-off. In the presence of spillovers and high fixed costs (**??**), delegating public good provision helps groups of incumbents to overcome the free-rider problem (**?**), develop economies of scale, not neglect benefits going to certain localities, and tackle down capacity constraints, all of which increase public good efficiency.[1] However, if incumbents delegate public good provision to an upper-level entity, all the electoral spoils of such provision and the indirect consequences accrue directly to the actor that delivered the good. On the contrary, if incumbents directly provide the public good it may generate inefficiencies, but incumbents may claim responsiveness and develop credit claiming activities to increase their electoral survival. Moreover, by not allowing for upper-level monitoring through delegation, incumbents give leeway to their bureaucracies to overgraze the bribe base through extortions and other rent extraction activities **?**, pleasing potential political brokers in electoral times especially in clientelistic systems **?**. I call this an efficiency-electoral trade-off. This tradeoff is present both in the case of delegation "within the state" from lower to upper levels of government, as well as cases where states can delegate public good provision to supranational entities. Given this trade-off, when would incumbents choose to delegate public good provision and not to do so? This paper shows that reelection incentives are a main driven behind the no delegation to upper-level entities equilibrium.

Term limited and non-term limited politicians face different electoral incentives. A simple Downsian model would predict that term limited and non-term limited incumbents would promise in campaign the ideal point of the median voter in terms of public good provision, and select the same rate of delegation to upper level entities. Moreover, we would expect both type of incumbents to directly provide public goods to differentiate themselves from other political actors and obtain electoral and monetary spoils. Then, what is the difference then between term limited politicians and those up for reelection? In this paper the reason term limited and non-term limited politicians differ in their delegation choice comes from the fact that the latter can turn the differentiability into an electoral

[1] The heterogeneity of tastes and needs of citizens decreases the efficiency of delegation. For more detail see **?** Decentralization Theorem. For clarity, I start the paper by assuming delegation always leads to efficiency of public good provision. I prove this to be the case for the delegation of public security provision in Mexico in Section **??**, the public good and case study analyzed in the paper.

return in the next election while the former can't. Term limited politicians can only partially translate the electoral returns won from differentiability and credit claiming to other electoral competitions -say when running for Deputy, Governor or President- or other political and bureaucratic positions in the regional or central administration. A theoretical micro-foundation comes from thinking that term-limited politicians face a transaction cost when trying to exchange their spoils from incumbency -electoral or monetary- to other electoral races or political positions while those facing reelection don't (or much less so). Thus, when faced with the delegation of public good provision, non-term limited incumbents would see the direct provision of public goods as a higher electoral return relative to term limited incumbents and thus choose to go local in higher rates.

2. This paper and main results
4. Literature appealing to
5. Sections

Main takeaway: Reelection incentives decreased delegation of public security provision to the Governor.

FIGURE 1. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, 2010-2018



Note: Figure **??** shows the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points are pre-treatment, while blue ones post-treatment.

7. Robustness

Main takeaways:

1. Results are robust across multiple specifications and models.

TABLE 1. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Signing Security Cooperation Agreements, Average Effect

Dependent variable: Sign Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor				
Model:	CATTs	CATTs w/ WILD CIs	Change ref. period (t=0)	Trim $<$ t-4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reform Average Effect (from t to t+3)	-0.4197^{***}	-0.4197^{***}	-0.4622^{**}	-0.3559^{***}
	(0.0457(	(0.0473)	(0.1977)	(0.0468)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4545	0.4545	0.4545	0.4544
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓
Parallel trend holds	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?** except for the specification that trims periods prior to t-4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [b] State-level controls include governor winning margin in last pre-treatment election and an indicator of whether the governor's party is the same as the federal incumbent party.

FIGURE 2. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, 2010-2018



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

2. Results only present if upper-level government can compete in credit claiming locally (President never does this).

FIGURE 3. Comparison: Security Cooperation Agreements with Governor vs. Other Actors, 2014-2018



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

8. Mechanisms

Main takeaways:

1. Mayors facing reelection decrease the delegation of public security provision and traffic, but not other services.

FIGURE 4. Comparison: Security Cooperation Agreements with Governor vs. Other Actors, 2014-2018



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t, t+1 and t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

2. Alignment: If you are aligned you have a lot to loose in terms of credit claim, especially if you are from the PRI. This should be smaller for alignment with President since you are not competing directly in terms of reputation in local politics. Lastly, we should see a greater negative effect if not aligned since citizens do not blame you as much por public security inefficiencies following **?**.

FIGURE 5. Reform interaction with Party Alignment



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends. To check parallel trends see Appendix Figure **??**.

3. a. Mayors facing reelection want to show responsiveness to constituents preferences. 3. b. Mayors facing reelection sign security agreements when faced by problems ”too big” or of the national order.

FIGURE 6. Interaction effects by citizens' preferences



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Filled points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

4. Mayors facing reelection do not sign agreements when other security forces are highly trusted or identified.

FIGURE 7. Total interaction effects by citizens' trust and identification of police forces



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Filled points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

9. Ruling out Alternative Hypothesis

9.1. Selection: incumbents and challengers quality

9.2. Cartel Presence

All regressions control for Cartel Presence pretreatment.

9.3. Citizens' Evaluation of Corruption and Efficiency of Police Forces

FIGURE 8. Interaction effects by citizens' evaluation of efficiency and corruption of police forces



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Filled points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

10. Unintended consequences

10.1. Preferences for order and security

1. PREFERENCES: citizens are more concerned about security but less about other things. Recall results are conditional on violence. So in the next election, they will look for another hawk. This ties to the incumbency advantage.

FIGURE 9. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Citizens' Preferences



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Filled points (squares) show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

10.2. Security underprovision and violence

3. VIOLENCE: increase of violence.

FIGURE 10. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence



Note: Figure **??** shows the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points are pre-treatment, while blue ones post-treatment.

TABLE 2. Effect of Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor on Violence

Dependent variable: log(homicides per capita)		
	(1)	(2)
Predicted Agreement w/ Governor	-0.1521*	-0.1521**
	(0.0802)	(0.0749)
Observations	12,173	12,173
R2	0.724	0.724
Controls[a]	✓	✓
Mun. FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
State Cluster S.E.		✓
Wild CI[b]		✓
First stage F-stat	1,739	1,739

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) were removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level unless indicated, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; and Cartel presence. [a] Wild bootstrap standard errors clustered at the state-level are reported when indicated.

FIGURE 11. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Effort of Local and Federal Security Forces



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Filled points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figures

A.1. Main Results

TABLE A-1. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, 2010-2018

Dependent variable:	Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor[a]	
	(1)	(2)
Lag 7 years	0.1123	0.1123
	(0.1709)	(0.7117)
Lag 6 years	−0.0383	−0.0383
	(0.0579)	(0.2458)
Lag 5 years	−0.0848	−0.0848
	(0.0846)	(0.2404)
Lag 4 years	0.0751	0.0751
	(0.3174)	(0.2890)
Lag 3 years	0.2088	0.2088
	(0.2603)	(0.2139)
Lag 2 years	0.0044	0.0044
	(0.1583)	(0.2139)
Reform, time 0	−0.2446***	−0.2446***
	(0.0475)	(0.0685)
Lead 1 year	−0.4154***	−0.4154***
	(0.0610)	(0.0610)
Lead 2 years	−0.4259***	−0.4259***
	(0.0571)	(0.0571)
Lead 3 years	−0.5931***	−0.5931***
	(0.0604)	(0.0604)
Observations	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4545	0.4545
Mun. FEs	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓
WILD CI		✓
Aggregate effect	−0.4197***	−0.4197***
SE (aggregate eff.)	0.0457	0.0473

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

A.2. Robustness

FIGURE B-1. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, propensity score matching on pretreatment covariates



Note: Figure **??** produced by propensity score matching that adjust for the treatment and covariate histories during the 5 year periods prior to the treatment. I report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals clustered at the state level. Covariates include those used to generate Figure **??**.

TABLE A-2. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, with t=0 as reference period

Dependent variable:	Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor[a]	
	(1)	(2)
t-6	−0.0648	0.0312
	(0.0400)	(0.0925)
t-5	−0.2066**	−0.1867
	(0.0746)	(0.1670)
t-4	−0.0615	−0.0250
	(0.1748)	(0.1609)
t-3	0.1032	0.1517*
	(0.1363)	(0.0848)
t-2	−0.0241	−0.0972
	(0.1157)	(0.0848)
t-1	−0.0747	−0.0738
	(0.0917)	(1.6557)
t+1	−0.2856	−0.7543*
	(0.2014)	(0.4304)
t+2	−0.6194**	−0.7092*
	(0.2337)	(0.3702)
t+3	−0.4815*	−0.6337*
	(0.2643)	(0.3141)
Observations	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4545	0.4561
Mun. FEs	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓
WILD CI		✓
Aggregate effect	−0.4622**	−0.6990**
SE (aggregate eff.)	0.1977	0.3366

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 0) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-3. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, trimming periods

Dependent variable:	Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor[a]	
	(1)	(2)
t-4 years	0.1961	0.1961
	(0.2680)	(0.8260)
t-3	0.2193	0.2193
	(0.2070)	(0.2702)
t-2	0.0370	0.0370
	(0.1546)	(0.2702)
t=0 (Reform)	−0.3057***	−0.3057
	(0.0682)	(0.4093)
t+1	−0.2858***	−0.2858
	(0.0725)	(0.2610)
t+2	−0.2389***	−0.2389
	(0.0823)	(0.2369)
t+3	−0.5931***	−0.5931***
	(0.0604)	(0.0715)
Observations	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4544	0.4544
Mun. FEs	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓
WILD CI		✓
Aggregate effect	−0.3559***	−0.3559**
SE (aggregate eff.)	0.0468	0.1395

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. I trimmed the periods lag 8, 7, 6 and 5, and removed the period 1 to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-4. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, **?** correction

Dependent variable:	Agreement A (1)	Agreement B[a] (2)
t-2	-0.161	-0.158
	(0.117)	(0.125)
t-1	-0.094	-0.110
	(0.113)	(0.128)
Reform (t=0)	-0.013	-0.040
	(0.068)	(0.091)
t+1	-0.061	-0.098
	(0.080)	(0.081)
t+2	-0.017^{*}	-0.017^{*}
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Controls[b]	✓	✓

Notes: Coefficients show corrected estimators following **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%.[a] Secondary measure of security cooperation agreements. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

FIGURE B-2. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Security Cooperation Agreements signed with the Governor, 2010-2018



TABLE A-5. Comparison: Security Cooperation Agreements with Governor vs. Other Actors, 2014-2018

Dependent variable:	Sign Security Cooperation Agreement			
	w/ Governor[a]		w/ Other Political Actors[b]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
t-4	0.3516	0.0197	−0.2760	−0.0326
	(1.7224)	(0.3292)	(0.5875)	(0.0763)
t-3	−0.7347	−0.0102***	0.2470	0.2193
	(37.4822)	(0.0000)	(15.0268)	(0.2702)
t-2	0.3855	0.1418	−0.1496	−0.0648
	(0.3262)	(0.1318)	(0.1245)	(0.0524)
Reform (t=0)	0.2227***	0.0064	−0.0599**	−0.0089
	(0.0588)	(0.0354)	(0.0273)	(0.0069)
t+1	−0.2203**	−0.2230***	0.1148	−0.2858
	(0.0920)	(0.0435)	(0.0904)	(0.2610)
t+3	−0.5915***	−0.5921***	0.1660*	0.1665
	(0.0783)	(0.0708)	(0.0953)	(0.1040)
Observations	4,382	4,382	4,382	4,382
R-squared	0.6434	0.6434	0.5469	0.5469
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted		✓		✓
WILD CI	✓	✓	✓	✓
Aggregate effect	−0.213***	−0.2696***	0.069	0.0796
SE (aggregate eff.)	0.033	0.0339	0.045	0.0491

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 5 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers primarily to the President but could include Governors and mayors from other states or other municipalities from the same state. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-6. Test on selection on unobservables

	(1)
Fitted value	0.1312
	(0.0780)
Observations	10,668
R2	0.459
Mun. FE	✓
Year FE	✓
State Cluster S.E.	✓

Notes: I follow **?** to check if unobserved variation is likely to explain the signing of security cooperation agreements with the Governor by mayors. To do so, I regress the treatment (whether the municipality held reelection) on all the available covariates used for Figure **??**. I then take the fitted value from the regression and use it to predict each outcome, this time including unit and year fixed effects. This test suggests that – under the assumption that observables are representative of unobservables – selection on unobservables is not driving the results.

FIGURE B-3. "Event-by-event analysis" following **?**
-95% confidence intervals-



Note: Estimate separate treatment effects for each event, i.e. each Mexican state in the sample. Each event dataset contains the treated state and all other states that never received treatment or received treatment after the sample window ($t + 1$).

FIGURE B-4. "Stacked dataset analysis" following **?**
-95% confidence intervals-



Note: Utilize estimated coefficients from Figure **??** and stack them in relative time, and estimate lead and lag variables to treatment following the event-by-event analysis setup, i.e. without treatment containment from using prior treated units of controls. Analysis done stacking at the cohort level, and adding municipality and year fixed effects, and clustered standard errors at the state level.

A.3. Mechanisms

FIGURE B-5. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Motives to Sign Security Agreements w/ Governor



TABLE A-7. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Motives to Sign Security Agreements w/ Governor

Dependent variable: Motive to Sign Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor						
	Cons. reform (1)	Law reform (2)	Lack resources (3)	Professionalization (4)	Coordination (5)	Crime (6)
t-7	-0.2347^{***}	-0.2580^{**}	-0.0957^{*}	-0.1999^{***}	-0.1558^{*}	-0.1540
	(0.0409)	(0.1174)	(0.0481)	(0.0669)	(0.0843)	(0.1079)
t-6	-0.0757^{***}	-0.0876^{***}	-0.0615^{***}	-0.0647	-0.0824^{**}	-0.0370
	(0.0176)	(0.0199)	(0.0161)	(0.0585)	(0.0344)	(0.0265)
t-5	0.0217	-0.0411	0.0562	0.0567	-0.0095	0.0415
	(0.0582)	(0.0577)	(0.0475)	(0.0744)	(0.0706)	(0.0444)
t-4	0.0218	-0.0823	0.1177	0.0634	-0.1207	0.0333
	(0.1001)	(0.0843)	(0.0832)	(0.1038)	(0.2098)	(0.1167)
t-3	-0.0386	-0.0161	0.0724	0.0800	0.0402	0.0731
	(0.1052)	(0.0840)	(0.1002)	(0.0738)	(0.1660)	(0.1061)
t-2	-0.1161	-0.0919	0.0226	-0.0824	-0.2781^{*}	-0.0756
	(0.1009)	(0.0915)	(0.0640)	(0.1195)	(0.1375)	(0.0666)
Reform (t=0)	0.0457	0.0292	0.0214	0.0282	0.0233	0.0272^{*}
	(0.0278)	(0.0183)	(0.0179)	(0.0201)	(0.0209)	(0.0146)
t+1	-0.0906^{***}	-0.1071^{***}	-0.0935^{***}	-0.0935^{***}	-0.1215^{***}	-0.0735^{***}
	(0.0164)	(0.0182)	(0.0106)	(0.0160)	(0.0291)	(0.0121)
t+3	-0.2452^{***}	-0.2576^{***}	-0.1560^{***}	-0.2011^{***}	-0.2436^{***}	-0.1492^{***}
	(0.0535)	(0.0484)	(0.0350)	(0.0463)	(0.0431)	(0.0527)
Observations	9,725	9,725	9,725	9,725	9,725	9,725
R-squared	0.2974	0.3021	0.2617	0.2722	0.2866	0.2594
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓					
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓					
Controls[a]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓					
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓					
Reform aggregate effect	-0.0967^{***}	-0.1118^{***}	-0.0760^{***}	-0.0888^{***}	-0.1139^{***}	-0.0652^{***}
SE	(0.0225)	(0.0210)	(0.0136)	(0.0208)	(0.0125)	(0.0211)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-8. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Services Delegated to the Governor

Dependent variable: Services Delegated to Governor	Public security (1)	Traffic (2)	Prevention (3)	Training (4)	Technology (5)	Research (6)	Inteligence (7)	Unify procedures (8)
t-2	−0.0244	−0.0447	−0.0598***	−0.0565***	−0.0567***	−0.0596***	−0.0596***	−0.0506***
	(0.1049)	(0.0811)	(0.0021)	(0.0012)	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0052)
Reform (t=0)	0.0701	0.0257	0.0175	0.0214	0.0194	0.0194	0.0204	0.0233
	(0.0435)	(0.0369)	(0.0137)	(0.0142)	(0.0126)	(0.0138)	(0.0135)	(0.0147)
t+1	−0.0947*	−0.0259*	0.0106	0.0053	0.0047	0.0024	0.0018	0.0053
	(0.0509)	(0.0147)	(0.0198)	(0.0193)	(0.0197)	(0.0201)	(0.0205)	(0.0174)
t+3	−0.2847***	0.0000	−0.1560***	−0.2011***	−0.2436***	−0.1492***	−3.1334***	1.0165*
	(0.0430)	(0.0000)	(0.0350)	(0.0463)	(0.0431)	(0.0527)	(0.2407)	(0.5277)
Observations	4,865	4,865	3,244	3,244	3,244	3,244	3,244	12,173
R-squared	0.4234	0.3703	0.5567	0.5477	0.5409	0.5473	0.5467	0.4612
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	−0.1031***	−0.0242	0.0094	0.0133	0.0121	0.0109	0.0111	0.0143
SE (average effect)	(0.0225)	(0.0162)	(0.0080)	(0.0120)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)	(0.0114)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Relative time periods prior to t-2 do not exist and lag 1 is removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?** and serves as the reference period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-9. Party Alignment Total Interaction Effects

Dependent variable: Signing Security Cooperation Agreement			
Party Alignment:	w/ President	w/ Governor	w/ Governor from PRI
	(1)	(2)	(3)
t-7	-0.2389^{*}	-0.0747^{**}	0.0000
	(0.1375)	(0.0291)	(0.0000)
t-6	-0.0810	0.0004	-0.0442
	(0.0881)	(0.0509)	(0.0467)
t-5	-0.1180	-0.2348^{**}	-0.2752^{***}
	(0.1032)	(0.0973)	(0.0949)
t-4	0.0631	-0.1337	-0.1757
	(0.1496)	(0.1292)	(0.1304)
t-3	0.3430^{**}	0.2040^{**}	0.1615^{**}
	(0.1627)	(0.0790)	(0.0781)
t-2	0.0052	-0.0577	0.0503
	(0.1546)	(0.1227)	(0.1548)
Reform (t=0)	-0.1667	-0.2601^{*}	0.1288
	(0.1884)	(0.1297)	(0.1236)
t+1	-0.2121	-0.6036^{***}	-0.0941
	(0.1912)	(0.2122)	(0.1633)
t+2	-0.1075	-0.5550^{**}	-0.5689^{**}
	(0.2467)	(0.2671)	(0.2763)
t+3	-0.2125	-0.4193	-0.4864
	(0.2204)	(0.3757)	(0.3788)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4557	0.4570	0.4551
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	-0.1339	-0.1710^{*}	-0.0799
SE (average effect)	(0.1306)	(0.0895)	(0.0656)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to signing a security cooperation agreement with any of the following actors. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-10. Reform interaction with citizens' preferences

Dependent variable: Signing Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor								
Jurisdiction:	Municipal		State			Federal		
Trust in Police Force:	Traffic	Preventive	State Police	State Attorney Police	Federal Police	Ministerial Police	Army	Marines
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t-7	0.1781	0.0000	0.1737	0.1269	0.0908	0.1162	0.1093*	0.0788
	(0.1657)	(0.0000)	(0.1372)	(0.1137)	(0.0736)	(0.0858)	(0.0638)	(0.0557)
t-6	−0.0459	−0.0601	−0.0415	−0.0566	0.0056	−0.0538	0.0234	0.0038
	(0.0801)	(0.0481)	(0.0539)	(0.0457)	(0.0390)	(0.0379)	(0.0413)	(0.0413)
t-5	−0.8924***	−0.2958	−0.7754	−1.3248	−0.8583**	−1.3845***	−0.6699**	−0.5789
	(0.2538)	(0.2471)	(0.6290)	(0.9127)	(0.3310)	(0.2852)	(0.3135)	(0.3456)
t-4	−0.8378	−0.4847	−0.8334	−1.8134	−1.0907	−1.2390	−0.3788	−0.4918
	(0.7686)	(0.7828)	(0.7594)	(1.3211)	(0.7492)	(1.0418)	(0.5581)	(0.6697)
t-3	−0.0583	−0.2255	−0.4855	−1.8474	−0.6963	−0.8293	0.1189	−0.1128
	(0.8134)	(0.8597)	(0.7510)	(1.3390)	(0.8562)	(1.1144)	(0.6286)	(0.7221)
t-2	0.0349	−0.2669	−0.2886	−0.6193	−0.6132	−0.3460	−0.4240	−0.4018
	(0.5384)	(0.5922)	(0.4176)	(0.8964)	(0.4795)	(0.7851)	(0.3186)	(0.4479)
Reform (t=0)	−0.4445	0.1161	−0.5433	−0.3590	−1.2945**	−0.8582	−0.4517	−0.8450
	(0.4490)	(0.4974)	(0.4116)	(1.1629)	(0.5674)	(0.7679)	(0.4624)	(0.5361)
t+1	−0.9837	−0.2187	−1.3877**	−1.3448	−2.4944***	−1.8551*	−1.5411**	−1.8923**
	(0.5947)	(0.5769)	(0.6053)	(1.4393)	(0.7475)	(0.9450)	(0.6971)	(0.6934)
t+2	−1.8509***	−1.6314**	−1.9022**	−4.0615***	−2.2753***	−3.3031***	−1.2009	−1.8294**
	(0.5939)	(0.6872)	(0.8555)	(1.1352)	(0.7941)	(0.6820)	(0.7654)	(0.6810)
t+3	−0.1382	−1.5280	−0.9653	−1.9755*	−0.9980	−1.1886	0.0385	−0.9525
	(1.1166)	(1.1456)	(0.7908)	(1.0802)	(1.4571)	(1.2863)	(1.1601)	(1.1245)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4666	0.4641	0.4675	0.4673	0.4642	0.4719	0.4666	0.4666
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	−0.1400	−0.2053	−0.3431**	−0.2984**	−0.5739**	−0.2614**	−0.4636	−0.4837*
SE (average effect)	(0.0944)	(0.1633)	(0.1594)	(0.1455)	(0.2673)	(0.1107)	(0.4248)	(0.2374)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-11. Reform interaction with citizens' being able to identify a Police Force

Dependent variable: Signing Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor								
Jurisdiction:	Municipal		State		Federal			
Identify Policy Force:	Traffic	Preventive	State Police	State Attorney Police	Federal Police	Ministerial Police	Army	Marines
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t-7	−0.8572	0.1007	0.0649	0.0783	−2.5321***	0.0632	−1.4640*	0.0539
	(0.6544)	(0.0978)	(0.0611)	(0.0697)	(0.8962)	(0.0550)	(0.8372)	(0.0455)
t-6	−0.2641	0.0248	0.0135	0.0056	−0.7692***	−0.0035	−0.4466*	0.0092
	(0.2039)	(0.0609)	(0.0467)	(0.0441)	(0.2696)	(0.0413)	(0.2577)	(0.0423)
t-5	−0.4097	−0.0652	0.6451	0.1762	−1.1340**	−0.7691***	−0.8805	−0.3720
	(0.3986)	(0.3080)	(0.3960)	(0.4004)	(0.4306)	(0.2589)	(0.5274)	(0.2421)
t-4	0.3350	0.1050	0.7461	−0.0893	−1.6040***	−0.2211	−0.7589	−0.3294
	(0.5455)	(0.5451)	(0.4774)	(0.6583)	(0.5716)	(0.7553)	(0.8538)	(0.4995)
t-3	0.8549	0.3354	0.8618*	−0.1098	−1.2530**	0.2973	−0.3261	−0.0407
	(0.5572)	(0.6384)	(0.5038)	(0.7313)	(0.6065)	(0.8187)	(0.8829)	(0.5638)
t-2	−0.0741	0.0173	0.3106	−0.0035	−1.1572**	−0.2290	−0.7416	−0.3552
	(0.3985)	(0.3426)	(0.3583)	(0.4741)	(0.4705)	(0.5458)	(0.5501)	(0.3444)
Reform (t=0)	0.0965	−0.3095	−0.6740	−0.0176	−1.7122***	−0.3017	−0.8230	−0.7614
	(0.3746)	(0.5580)	(0.5072)	(0.5448)	(0.5196)	(0.5185)	(0.5125)	(0.4724)
t+1	0.1452	−0.8415	−0.5733	−0.5894	−1.1449**	−1.2316	−0.8753	−1.6442***
	(0.4015)	(0.7920)	(0.6386)	(0.7035)	(0.4877)	(0.7296)	(0.5560)	(0.5433)
t+2	0.4499	−0.7212	0.0862	−1.4956**	−0.5687	−1.6626**	−0.4091	−1.5000**
	(0.3760)	(0.7799)	(0.6272)	(0.7215)	(0.5955)	(0.6266)	(0.6311)	(0.5652)
t+3	1.1277	−0.5739	−0.6702	−1.2519	−1.7933	0.0623	−0.5981	−1.0885
	(0.9218)	(1.2931)	(0.9352)	(1.0598)	(1.0758)	(1.0916)	(0.9325)	(0.9434)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4688	0.4599	0.4659	0.4658	0.4624	0.4783	0.4645	0.4655
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	0.3037	−0.4471	−0.2964	−0.3087	−0.7782**	−0.2768	−0.5017	−0.5781**
SE (average effect)	(0.3233)	(0.6044)	(0.3716)	(0.2401)	(0.2868)	(0.2411)	(0.4665)	(0.2669)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-12. Reform interaction with citizens' efficiency evaluation of police forces

Dependent variable: Signing Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor								
Jurisdiction:	Municipal		State			Federal		
Efficiency Policy Force:	Traffic	Preventive	State Police	State Attorney Police	Federal Police	Ministerial Police	Army	Marines
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t-7	0.1495	0.0000	0.1580	0.1178	0.0821	0.1125	0.0996	0.0723
	(0.1280)	(0.0000)	(0.1237)	(0.1059)	(0.0677)	(0.0823)	(0.0592)	(0.0533)
t-6	−0.0430	−0.0600	−0.0408	−0.0550	0.0050	−0.0539	0.0218	0.0031
	(0.0554)	(0.0481)	(0.0487)	(0.0432)	(0.0413)	(0.0372)	(0.0432)	(0.0431)
t-5	−0.8214***	−0.2661	−0.6765	−1.0574	−0.8511**	−1.3151***	−0.6265*	−0.5477
	(0.2173)	(0.2280)	(0.5991)	(0.8293)	(0.3265)	(0.2946)	(0.3331)	(0.3312)
t-4	−0.5218	−0.3094	−0.6839	−1.4607	−1.0699	−1.1764	−0.3632	−0.4794
	(0.6322)	(0.6711)	(0.7109)	(1.2102)	(0.6659)	(0.9647)	(0.5751)	(0.6316)
t-3	0.1534	−0.0826	−0.3839	−1.5521	−0.6947	−0.7613	0.1118	−0.1206
	(0.6633)	(0.7380)	(0.6994)	(1.2330)	(0.7686)	(1.0338)	(0.6450)	(0.6843)
t-2	0.1301	−0.1088	−0.2605	−0.4476	−0.6274	−0.3362	−0.4306	−0.4001
	(0.4219)	(0.5170)	(0.3883)	(0.8207)	(0.4341)	(0.7275)	(0.3376)	(0.4258)
Reform (t=0)	−0.2825	0.2132	−0.4068	−0.1690	−1.2332**	−0.6252	−0.4515	−0.8273
	(0.3771)	(0.4424)	(0.3661)	(1.0199)	(0.5445)	(0.7224)	(0.4956)	(0.5171)
t+1	−0.8544	−0.1639	−1.2047**	−1.0867	−2.4180***	−1.5837*	−1.5141**	−1.8447***
	(0.5069)	(0.5180)	(0.5515)	(1.2521)	(0.7203)	(0.9025)	(0.7243)	(0.6586)
t+2	−1.6548***	−1.5020**	−1.7252**	−3.6912***	−2.2110***	−3.0680***	−1.1837	−1.7816**
	(0.5166)	(0.6272)	(0.8167)	(1.0720)	(0.7669)	(0.6529)	(0.7910)	(0.6492)
t+3	−0.0738	−1.2495	−0.8880	−1.8369*	−1.0878	−1.0650	−0.0721	−1.0091
	(0.9252)	(1.0025)	(0.7675)	(1.0415)	(1.3469)	(1.1792)	(1.2083)	(1.0552)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4692	0.4656	0.4672	0.4675	0.4642	0.4725	0.4667	0.4667
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	−0.1373	−0.1957	−0.3432*	−0.2914*	−0.6190**	−0.2679**	−0.5001	−0.5024**
SE (average effect)	(0.0917)	(0.1697)	(0.1707)	(0.1453)	(0.2769)	(0.1215)	(0.4693)	(0.2369)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

TABLE A-13. Reform interaction with citizens' corruption evaluation of police forces

Dependent variable: Signing Security Cooperation Agreement w/ Governor								
Jurisdiction:	Municipal		State			Federal		
Corruption of Police Forces:	Traffic	Preventive	State Police	State Attorney Police	Federal Police	Ministerial Police	Army	Marines
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t-7	0.1477	0.0419	0.0402	−0.0324	−0.0147	−0.0933	−0.0543	−0.1444
	(0.2864)	(0.3087)	(0.2813)	(0.0946)	(0.3434)	(0.0782)	(0.1059)	(0.1083)
t-6	0.0301	0.0011	−0.0013	−0.0258	−0.0133	−0.0488	−0.0160	−0.0432
	(0.0796)	(0.1139)	(0.1017)	(0.0568)	(0.1316)	(0.0524)	(0.0622)	(0.0617)
t-5	−0.1338	−0.0973	−0.1177	−0.9190***	−0.2156	−0.8364***	0.4054**	0.4021**
	(0.1599)	(0.1895)	(0.1822)	(0.1316)	(0.2160)	(0.1066)	(0.1573)	(0.1567)
t-4	−1.3881***	−0.8179	−1.1187***	−1.3964***	−0.7440	−1.2269***	0.0944	0.3231
	(0.3821)	(0.5316)	(0.3690)	(0.3654)	(0.5666)	(0.3341)	(0.3531)	(0.4236)
t-3	−1.6818***	−0.9104	−1.2935***	−1.1282***	−0.7637	−1.0065***	0.0275	0.2564
	(0.3568)	(0.5728)	(0.3376)	(0.3266)	(0.6363)	(0.2992)	(0.3608)	(0.4274)
t-2	−0.2879	−0.2198	−0.2301	−0.9068***	−0.2657	−0.7393***	0.3265	0.3743
	(0.2474)	(0.2868)	(0.2681)	(0.1970)	(0.2943)	(0.1573)	(0.2314)	(0.2279)
Reform (t=0)	−2.2651***	−1.5561***	−1.9299***	−1.0484***	−1.3274**	−0.9674***	−0.8107***	−0.6875***
	(0.2832)	(0.5290)	(0.2479)	(0.1614)	(0.5851)	(0.1417)	(0.2515)	(0.2343)
t+1	−3.1112***	−2.2160***	−2.6228***	−2.6054***	−1.9768***	−2.2670***	−0.5640**	−0.3577
	(0.3902)	(0.6501)	(0.3255)	(0.2394)	(0.6995)	(0.2017)	(0.2557)	(0.2419)
t+2	−3.0152***	−1.9965***	−2.4536***	−2.5539***	−1.7638**	−2.2646***	−0.2627	−0.0623
	(0.3961)	(0.6063)	(0.2654)	(0.2049)	(0.6524)	(0.1648)	(0.2654)	(0.2224)
t+3	−4.9633***	−3.2615***	−4.0463***	−2.4673***	−2.5721**	−2.2158***	−1.2288**	−0.9278**
	(0.5220)	(1.0612)	(0.3194)	(0.2057)	(1.1755)	(0.1413)	(0.4848)	(0.4028)
Observations	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.4593	0.4572	0.4598	0.4623	0.4636	0.4599	0.4632	0.4586
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	−4.0564***	−2.8579***	−3.5587***	−2.5851***	−2.2583**	−2.3551***	−0.6132**	−0.4725*
SE (average effect)	(0.4611)	(0.8900)	(0.3522)	(0.2217)	(0.9100)	(0.1739)	(0.2536)	(0.2396)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Refers to security cooperation agreements signed with the Governor. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; logged population; logged organized crime related deaths; and Cartel presence.

A.4. Unintended consequences

A. Preferences

TABLE A-14. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Citizens Preferences

Dependent variable: topic that worries the most	Narcotraffic (1)	Insecurity (2)	Punishment to criminals (3)	Corruption (4)	Poverty (5)	Unemployment (6)	Inflation (7)	Natural Disasters (8)	Water Scarcity (9)	Education (10)	Health (11)
t-6	0.0190***	0.0218**	−0.0088	0.0140**	−0.0363***	0.0120	−0.0150	−0.0121***	0.0119*	0.0106***	−0.0087***
	(0.0066)	(0.0085)	(0.0121)	(0.0060)	(0.0118)	(0.0156)	(0.0103)	(0.0021)	(0.0066)	(0.0013)	(0.0022)
t-5	0.0073***	0.0167**	0.0062	0.0015	−0.0186***	0.0143*	−0.0066	−0.0059**	−0.0038***	0.0011	−0.0090**
	(0.0012)	(0.0062)	(0.0063)	(0.0018)	(0.0062)	(0.0074)	(0.0065)	(0.0025)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0034)
t-4	−0.0034	0.0921**	0.0218	−0.0048	−0.0447	0.0106	−0.0432*	−0.0055	0.0303**	0.0089	−0.0492**
	(0.0083)	(0.0380)	(0.0247)	(0.0142)	(0.0274)	(0.0233)	(0.0224)	(0.0043)	(0.0119)	(0.0052)	(0.0189)
t-3	0.0439**	0.0727	−0.0033	−0.0143	−0.0275	0.0254	−0.0204	0.0015	−0.0156	0.0071	−0.0536**
	(0.0182)	(0.0566)	(0.0210)	(0.0202)	(0.0438)	(0.0332)	(0.0152)	(0.0116)	(0.0238)	(0.0172)	(0.0227)
t-2	0.0280	0.0144	0.0304	−0.0195	−0.0253	0.0266	0.0435***	0.0121	−0.0003	−0.0306*	−0.0623*
	(0.0219)	(0.0496)	(0.0195)	(0.0216)	(0.0420)	(0.0211)	(0.0143)	(0.0159)	(0.0171)	(0.0157)	(0.0314)
Reform, t=0	0.0021	0.0267***	0.0206***	0.0012	−0.0187***	−0.0355***	0.0034	−0.0016	0.0073	−0.0091**	0.0017
	(0.0050)	(0.0072)	(0.0037)	(0.0044)	(0.0063)	(0.0051)	(0.0056)	(0.0026)	(0.0052)	(0.0039)	(0.0053)
t+1	0.0165**	0.0427***	0.0270***	0.0126***	−0.0392***	−0.0803***	0.0520***	0.0093	0.0017	−0.0189***	−0.0329***
	(0.0071)	(0.0112)	(0.0037)	(0.0045)	(0.0097)	(0.0058)	(0.0075)	(0.0074)	(0.0053)	(0.0046)	(0.0071)
t+2	0.0227**	0.0785***	0.0400***	0.0079*	−0.0405***	−0.1023***	0.0172*	0.0099*	0.0107*	−0.0283***	−0.0323***
	(0.0086)	(0.0108)	(0.0050)	(0.0042)	(0.0108)	(0.0087)	(0.0093)	(0.0050)	(0.0062)	(0.0062)	(0.0058)
t+3	0.0182	0.0837***	0.0828***	−0.0081	−0.0397**	−0.1094***	−0.0357***	0.0048*	0.0228**	−0.0275***	−0.0152
	(0.0134)	(0.0151)	(0.0098)	(0.0080)	(0.0169)	(0.0177)	(0.0064)	(0.0025)	(0.0087)	(0.0092)	(0.0109)
Observations	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353	11,353
R-squared	0.8662	0.8556	0.9239	0.8767	0.8549	0.8954	0.8557	0.7008	0.8419	0.8048	0.8799
Mun. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform average effect	0.0149*	0.0579***	0.0426***	0.0034	−0.0345***	−0.0819***	0.0092	0.0056	0.0106**	−0.0209***	
SE (average effect)	(0.0079)	(0.0099)	(0.0046)	(0.0048)	(0.0103)	(0.0085)	(0.0063)	(0.0034)	(0.0047)	(0.0055)	(0.0063)

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 1) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?** except for the specification that trims periods prior to t-4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [b] State-level controls include governor winning margin in last pre-treatment election and an indicator of whether the governor's party is the same as the federal incumbent party.

B. Violence

TABLE A-15. Effect of 2014 Term Limit Reform on Violence

Dependent variable:	log(homicide per capita) (1)	IHS(homicide per capita)[a] (2)
Lag 6 years	0.0119	−0.1702
	(0.0195)	(0.1061)
Lag 5 years	−0.0480	0.0381
	(0.0357)	(0.0856)
Lag 4 years	0.0403	−0.0440
	(0.1012)	(0.2077)
Lag 3 years	0.0167	−0.0015
	(0.0581)	(0.1098)
Lag 2 years	−0.0288	−0.1734
	(0.0498)	(0.1098)
Reform, time 0	0.0024	0.0067
	(0.0324)	(0.0583)
Lead 1 year	0.0719*	0.0168
	(0.0401)	(0.0692)
Lead 2 years	0.1420***	0.1814**
	(0.0465)	(0.0761)
Lead 3 years	0.1890*	0.2805*
	(0.0993)	(0.1481)
Observations	12,173	12,173
R-squared	0.7267	0.5330
Mun. FEs	✓	✓
Year. FEs	✓	✓
Controls[b]	✓	✓
Cohort weighted	✓	✓
Aggregate effect	0.1013**	0.1213*
SE (aggregate eff.)	0.0442	0.0687
Standardize Aggregate effect	0.1036**	0.0662*
Standardize SE (aggregate eff.)	0.0452	0.0375

Notes: Coefficients show IW estimators following **?**. Two relative time periods (lag 8 and 0) are removed to avoid collinearity problems noted by **?**. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, with the following significance-level: *** 1%; ** 5%; and * 10%, that refer to two-sided t-test with the null hypothesis equal to 0 for each relative time period. [a] Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. [b] Pretreatment controls include: governor winning margin; party alignment with the President; party alignment with the Governor; municipal winning margin; and Cartel presence.

FIGURE B-6. Robustness tests: Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence, 2010-2018



Note: Figure **??** shows the average treatment effect from t to t+3 across multiple specifications. This average effect was estimated using the IW estimators following **?** for each lead and lag relative to the first year a municipality implemented reelection. Red points show that parallel trends hold, while hollow ones imply pretrends.

FIGURE B-7. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence, propensity score matching on pretreatment covariates



Note: Figure **??** produced by propensity score matching that adjust for the treatment and covariate histories during the 5 year periods prior to the treatment. I report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals clustered at the state level. Covariates include those used to generate Figure **??**.

FIGURE 22. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence, propensity score matching on pretreatment covariates



Note: Figure **??** produced by propensity score matching that adjust for the treatment and covariate histories during the 5 year periods prior to the treatment. I report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals clustered at the state level. Covariates include those used to generate Figure **??**.

FIGURE 23. Effect of Term Limit Reform on Violence, propensity score matching on pretreatment covariates



Note: Figure **??** produced by propensity score matching that adjust for the treatment and covariate histories during the 5 year periods prior to the treatment. I report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals clustered at the state level. Covariates include those used to generate Figure **??**.