Use Pablo´s paper as example.

NEW INTRODUCTION

* Start by saying that there are certain goods that need to be delegated because of efficiency.
* Then state the efficiency-electoral tradeoff
* Everything else is the same.
* Send the current introductory paragraph to the theory.

NEW THEORY

* Eliminate all the IR stuff. Intermix it and that´s it. It can be a foonote or an appendix.
* Bring back electoral accountability from the old old version of the paper.

NEW HYPOTHESES

* Drop H2 and H3

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Normatively, public good provision should be determined by efficiency and equity considerations \citep{oates\_1972, Musgrave\_1959, Musgrave\_1983, gramlich\_1977}. In some cases, however, incumbents may lack the capacity to provide public goods efficiently due to constraints on resources \citep{Moravcsik\_2000}, expertise or information \citet{Rodrick\_1996} or the existence of spillovers \citep{oates\_1972, Besley\_case\_1995}. Take for instance the monopoly of violence in conflict settings where subnational units might not be able to fight non-state armed groups, may be more prone to capture, coercion and strife \citet{chacon\_2018}, and their fight against crime might only create a ``balloon effect’’ where criminal organizations simply move to other localities where crime is less well clamped down \citep{shirk\_wallman\_2015}. Consider also the control of the outbreak of COVID-19 where governors in the US might not be the best actors to delimit and implement lockdowns, mask mandates and the rollout of vaccines. Incumbents facing these concerns, however, may choose to delegate policy to more productive agents who can pool resources, gather better information and increase the efficiency of policy, despite potential agency costs and losing the control of policy.\footnote{Even when able to accomplish efficiently and unilaterally a desired policy, governments may want to delegate to share costs with others \citep{Moravcsik\_2000} or decrease the level of uncertainty in the environment if deemed too powerful or a threat \citep{lake\_2009, milner\_2011}.} \footnote{The heterogeneity of tastes and needs of citizens decrease the efficiency of delegation. For more detail see \citet{oates\_1972} Decentralization Theorem. For simplicity, I start the paper by assuming delegation always leads to efficiency of public good provision. I prove this to be the case for the delegation of public security provision in Mexico in Section \ref{sec:unintended}, the public good and case study analyzed in this paper.}

Delegation, however, is not an obvious choice for incumbents with reelection incentives. The delegation of policy might help to overcome the free-rider problem \citep{hamman\_etal\_2011}, develop economies of scale and specialize \citep{Hawkins\_etal\_2006}, not neglect benefits going to certain localities, and tackle down capacity constraints \citep{oates\_1972, besley\_coate\_2003}. By delegating, however, incumbents lose the capacity to use policy as an instrument for vote gathering: they cannot take credit for policy outcomes; they cannot send a signal to voters on competence and type; and they cannot show responsiveness to addressing their demands, weakening the electoral accountability created by reelection \citep{cox\_katz\_2002}. As a result, incumbents with reelection incentives cannot differentiate themselves from competing forces and maybe punished by not addressing local issues of concern to constituents \citep{milner\_2004}.\footnote{Also, by delegating policy, incumbents introduce monitoring to their bureaucracy from another principal reducing potential leeway given to them to overgraze the bribe base through extortions and other rent extraction activities \citep{schleifer\_vishny\_1993}. Since bureaucrats are important political brokers, especially in clientelistic systems like Mexico \citep{larreguy\_etal\_2017}, delegation might displease them increasing their chances of shirking for the harvesting of votes.} I call this an efficiency-electoral trade-off. This tradeoff is present both in the case of delegation ``within-the-state’’ between different levels of government, as well as cases where states can delegate policies to supranational entities.\footnote{States’ delegation of policy to supranational organizations has been a widely studied topic in the International Relations literature. For a summary see Section \ref{sec:why\_delegate}.} Given this trade-off,

Given this trade-off, when will incumbents with electoral concerns delegate policy?

In this paper, I study the extent to which reelection incentives have shaped the delegation of public policy. I argue that compared to term limit incumbents, incumbents eligible for reelection respond to the newly acquired accountability to voters by taking charge of policy, i.e. taking the bull by the horns. To do so, ….

I build on an existing strand of literature that shows that electoral concerns have proven to shape public policy in an inefficient directions: incumbents may favor specific regions that are electorally favorable to them \citep{schady\_2000, Miguel\_zaidi\_2003, cole\_2004, khemani\_2007} or those with higher political representation \citep{wright\_1974, porto\_2001, ansolabehere\_etal\_2002}, and follow voters’ preferences instead of those of experts given reelection concerns \citep{pulejo\_querubin\_2021}. However, to date no study has showed the effect of reelection incentives on the delegation of policy.

Issue: why do citizens prefer no delegation.

In recognition of inefficiencies and potential benefits, governments may choose to delegate public good provision to upper-level governments or entities who can pool resources, reduce costs and decrease the politicization of policies.

Delegation, however, is not an obvious choice for incumbents facing electoral incentives.

State here that they have policy concerns.

While

This setting