Use Pablo´s paper as example.

NEW INTRODUCTION

* Start by saying that there are certain goods that need to be delegated because of efficiency.
* Then state the efficiency-electoral tradeoff
* Everything else is the same.
* Send the current introductory paragraph to the theory.

NEW THEORY

* Eliminate all the IR stuff. Intermix it and that´s it. It can be a foonote or an appendix.
* Bring back electoral accountability from the old old version of the paper.

NEW HYPOTHESES

* Drop H2 and H3

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Normatively, public good provision should be determined by efficiency and equity considerations \citep{oates\_1972, Musgrave\_1959, Musgrave\_1983, gramlich\_1977}. In some cases, however, incumbents may lack the capacity to provide public goods efficiently due to constraints on resources \citep{Moravcsik\_2000}, expertise or information \citet{Rodrick\_1996} or the existence of spillovers \citep{oates\_1972, Besley\_case\_1995}. Take for instance the monopoly of violence in conflict settings where subnational units might not be able to fight non-state armed groups, may be more prone to capture, coercion and strife \citet{chacon\_2018}, and their fight against crime might only create a ``balloon effect’’ where criminal organizations simply move to other localities where crime is less well clamped down \citep{shirk\_wallman\_2015}. Consider also the control of the outbreak of COVID-19 where governors in the US might not be the best actors to delimit and implement lockdowns, mask mandates and the rollout of vaccines. Incumbents facing these concerns, however, may choose to delegate policy to more productive agents who can pool resources, gather better information and increase the efficiency of policy, despite potential agency costs and losing the control of policy.\footnote{Even when able to accomplish efficiently and unilaterally a desired policy, governments may want to delegate to share costs with others \citep{Moravcsik\_2000} or decrease the level of uncertainty in the environment if deemed too powerful or a threat \citep{lake\_2009, milner\_2011}.} \footnote{The heterogeneity of tastes and needs of citizens decrease the efficiency of delegation. For more detail see \citet{oates\_1972} Decentralization Theorem. For simplicity, I start the paper by assuming delegation always leads to efficiency of public good provision. I prove this to be the case for the delegation of public security provision in Mexico in Section \ref{sec:unintended}, the public good and case study analyzed in this paper.}

Delegation, however, is not an obvious choice for incumbents with reelection incentives. The delegation of policy might help to overcome the free-rider problem \citep{hamman\_etal\_2011}, develop economies of scale and specialize \citep{Hawkins\_etal\_2006}, not neglect benefits going to certain localities, and tackle down capacity constraints \citep{oates\_1972, besley\_coate\_2003}. By delegating, however, incumbents lose the capacity to use policy as an instrument for vote gathering: they cannot take credit for policy outcomes; they cannot send a signal to voters on competence and type; and they cannot show responsiveness to addressing their demands, weakening the electoral accountability created by reelection \citep{cox\_katz\_2002}. As a result, incumbents with reelection incentives cannot differentiate themselves from competing electoral forces. Moreover, they maybe punished by not addressing local issues of concern to constituents \citep{milner\_2004}.\footnote{Also, by delegating policy, incumbents introduce monitoring to their bureaucracy from another principal reducing potential leeway given to them to overgraze the bribe base through extortions and other rent extraction activities \citep{schleifer\_vishny\_1993}. Since bureaucrats are important political brokers, especially in clientelistic systems like Mexico \citep{larreguy\_etal\_2017}, delegation might displease them increasing their chances of shirking for the harvesting of votes.} This efficiency-electoral tradeoff is present both in the case of delegation ``within-the-state’’ between different levels of government, as well as cases where states can delegate policies to supranational entities.\footnote{States’ delegation of policy to supranational organizations has been a widely studied topic in the International Relations literature. For a summary see Section \ref{sec:why\_delegate}.} What then is the end result of this trade-off?

In this paper, I study the extent to which reelection incentives have shaped the delegation of public policy. I argue that compared to term limit incumbents, incumbents eligible for reelection respond to voter accountability by taking charge of policy, especially when citizens are more concerned about it. To do so, I compare the delegation decision of public security provision of mayors with term limits to mayors up for reelection in a country overwhelmed by criminal wars, Mexico. As \citet{ley\_trejo\_2020} note, the country's transition to democracy in the early 2000s led to an outbreak of wars among drug cartels, and a proliferation of clashes between the state and criminal organizations. As a result, voters see the monopoly of violence as the most relevant public policy in the country.\footnote{The majority of the population prefers higher rather than lower public good provision. However, heterogeneity of preferences exists across the country and time since the start of the War on Drugs in December of 2006. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, public insecurity in Mexico was the principal public problem as measured by survey data. See \url{https://www.dropbox.com/s/c5dte5pscggat2c/leadingproblem\_mexico.png?dl=0}} Importantly, in this setting public security provision falls under the responsibility of local governments and the intervention of upper-level governments has been deemed as intrusive by civil organizations and voters, and the reason behind forced disappearances and political repression. However, since the presidency of Felipe Calderon (PAN, 2006-2012), the Federal government pushed forth the creation of state-level centralized commands in charge of governors, as well as other public security cooperation agreements between municipalities and other political actors -other municipalities, governors from other states, and the President. A delegation choice opened up for mayors, and by 2018 79.12\% of municipalities in the country adopted a form of centralized command according to data from the 2019 National Census of Municipal Governments and Territories of the City of Mexico. While delegating the fight of criminal organizations to upper-level governments may be the best policy to address violence, and the safest one for mayor since they have been killed in high rates in the country \citep{ley\_trejo\_2020}, little do we know if reelection incentives affected their decision to delegate security provision since being responsive to voters in the issue they care the most might yield greater electoral returns.

I build on an existing strand of literature that shows that electoral concerns have proven to shape public policy in an inefficient directions: incumbents may favor specific regions that are electorally favorable to them \citep{schady\_2000, Miguel\_zaidi\_2003, cole\_2004, khemani\_2007} or those with higher political representation \citep{wright\_1974, porto\_2001, ansolabehere\_etal\_2002}. However, to date no study has showed the effect of reelection incentives on the delegation of policy.

As such my arguments coincides with that of \citet{milner\_2004} that finds that states prefer to delegate the delivery of foreign aid to multilateral organizations only when citizens dislike the policy; however, when aid is relevant to them, governments respond by disbursing aid directly since the distribution of aid through multilateral institutions tends to have low domestic support. It also speaks to recent literature that finds that incumbents follow voters’ preferences instead of those of experts given reelection concerns \citep{pulejo\_querubin\_2021}.

In recognition of inefficiencies and potential benefits, governments may choose to delegate public good provision to upper-level governments or entities who can pool resources, reduce costs and decrease the politicization of policies.

Delegation, however, is not an obvious choice for incumbents facing electoral incentives.

State here that they have policy concerns.

While

This setting