LOVE THE CANDIDATE BUT HATE HIS PARTY

Dongil

* How do partisan and personal incumbency advantage differ in terms of their implications on electoral accountability?
  + Does partisan incumbency advantage with no personal one imply a better outcome for voters? Because it implies “strong” parties in the sense that they can constrain their members more effectively?
  + In contrast, does personal incumbency advantage with no party one imply a worse outcome in line with “unfulfilled accountability” (Klasnja and Titiunik 2017)?
* In your discussion of empirical results (p. 3), “incumbency advantage” is defined as “incumbents with the possibility to seek reelection hold an increasing likelihood to win office in the next election relative to municipalities where candidates are term limited.” But isn’t this the definition of *personal* incumbency advantage?
* How is the Mexican mayoral election different from other electoral contexts (for example, U.S. state legislative elections and Brazilian mayoral elections) that past studies have examined? In terms of:
  + Party system institutionalization (is this same as party-centered system?),
  + Strong versus weak individual party organization, and
  + Pool of politicians
* On a related note,
  + why do you think Fowler and Hall (2014) produce similar results with yours despite the vastly different institutional settings (the U.S. versus Mexico and state legislators versus mayors)?
  + What can be possibility the similarities between these two contexts?
  + Why is analyzing the case outside the American context important?
  + Do you expect that a similar pattern would arise for other contexts as well? If so, why?
  + Given the similar results, would you say Fowler and Hall (2014)’s pretrends prior to treatment assumption is innocuous?
* The current study’s scope conditions (a combination of strong party-centered system and “party lock” preventing party switching) appear to imply partisan incumbency *advantage* where “voters believe parties control candidates behaviors” and “thus would allow parties to hold a credible threat against renegade candidates.” Yet the empirical results indicate partisan incumbency *disadvantage*. How should we make sense of this incongruence?
* Recent literature on intergovernmental fiscal transfer suggests a bias in favor of politically aligned (copartisan) politicians such as mayors (Brollo and Nannicini 2012). I suppose this pattern holds for the Mexican case as well. I do so because otherwise, it would imply that opposition incumbent mayors can obtain more revenues than ruling-party non-incumbent mayors. If both the partisan and the incumbency bias exist, it would imply advantage in terms of both personal and partisan incumbency.
* You wrote in the Introduction (p. 4) that “the introduction of reelection debilitates parties power even in party-centered systems like Mexico generating candidate-centered electoral contests.”
  + This is not consistent with some educated guess: I interpret “party-centered systems” as strong individual parties where party leadership can constrain their party members’ actions effectively such as legislators and mayors. If political office is a lucrative job and incumbent politicians are allowed to run again for that office, does that mean more reasons for individual politicians to keep in line with their party leadership?
  + In addition, they cannot run for the office if they switch their party. This further bolster party leaders’ grip on their individual members. In the African contexts, such “party lock” is rare and party switching is frequent especially among those powerful Members of Parliament who disobey party, switch to a different party prior to an upcoming election, and gets reelected. The absence of “party lock” helps those strong MPs to survive electoral contests by switching to other parties. But in Mexico, it is not allowed thereby making individual members more dependent on leaders’ demands.
* Why would allowing for the possibility of reelection lead to partisan dealignment given the party-centered system in Mexico? Why would voters weigh partisanship less and individual quality more in their voting decisions after the reelection reform? While this certainly provides more incentives to individual politicians to shore up their reputation and strong supporter base due to reelection concerns, such incentives would be counterbalanced by the power that party leadership holds over these individual members. To the extent that party leaders can hold the lay members accountable to them, these mayors have less incentives to represent voters’ interest.
* In your argument section, I was wondering how total incumbency advantage (aggregate of partisan and personal incumbency advantages) would factor into your conceptualization of incumbency advantage. For example, in the case of asymmetric effects with partisan disadvantage and personal advantage, it’s possible that which one is greater than the other would matter. It could dictate the behavior of the incumbents. When total incumbency advantage is negative, incumbents might behave in more opportunistic ways (such as corruption and bribe). Otherwise, they would care more about reelection and they would do so more by party switching or defection.
* Some minor typos in the reference:
  + Cox and Katz (1996) is published in AJPS, not APSR
  + Fowler and Hall (2014) is published in QJPS, not QJE

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Comments on Dissertation Chapter 2:

Mariana:

* Really like the part of the implications of the differences between partisan and personal, to hav a table better to summarize this.
* Section on conclusion or discussion on the scope conditions of the results
  + What would happen in later terms?
  + What happens at the thresholds? What happens in larger margins?
  + What happens with no incumbent parties?
  + Mexico is a strong party system but what to expect in weak party systems?
  + How much can we generalize to other settings?
* Confusion:
  + Partisan incumbency disadvantage turning to inc. advantage.
  + Term limits lead to predatory behavior of politicians. When remove term limits there are electoral incentives to get reelected.
    - Mechanism:
    - Just the effect of the incumbency, separated from the term limits.
    - Inc. advantage without term limits. Something to discuss.
* Figure 2: Event study things. Include t-3 and hollow dots at zero that that’s the reference group.
* Mechanisms:
  + Resource based: not what they do but what they get
  + Quality:
  + Information: encompasses everything
  + Having revenues is what matters, so what matters is how you are spending.
    - Right now they can collect more revenues
    - So look at what they are doing with those revenues
  + Its about expenditures, not about budget. Why do they want more revenues, to do more things?
    - How they used that
  + Most revenues come from taxes. So they must be doing something positive.
    - No better economic conditions because there are no consumption revenues increase.
  + Higher tax collection is greater efficiency, and that is what voters are observing.
    - What is driving the incumbency advantage
  + Try to look at expenditures and try to assess the information mechanism
    - Questions on efficiency.
  + Increases in not ear marked infrastructure, so spending more money to gain support
  + Not collecting more revenues is a likely mechanism, so what matters is what they are doing
  + For the quality:
    - Education is not a very good measure of quality.
    - Better use experience.

Anne

* Useful to have some measure of welfare, satisfaction or something like that.
  + Ashworth et al talk that information is welfare enhancing
* Useful to have more detail on what mayors are actually doing. What kind of expenditures they do. What are their responsibilities.
  + Good to start the mechanisms section
* Clarify the methodological motivation.
  + Seemed I was the first to disentangle the partisan from the personal advantage. So clarify the approach.
  + Contribution is the diff in diff in rd, its good that there are pretends. Be more precise on the exact contribution
* Here are the predictions:
  + Great but have a table better.
* On Ashworth et al
  + When doing my predictions, I was drawing normative conclusions, but the point of this paper you can’t draw normative conclusions. So think about the normative conclusions and relate it better.
* Talk on scope conditions:
  + Perhaps not so surprising that we don’t see such a large incumbency advantage. So talk about dimensions. Good to discuss this. Do we expect something like this in larger government units like governors or the president
* Mechanism:
  + Cannot do much on the information based mechanism.
  + Tease out very specific things and then say I have proxies for information, with certain caveats.
  + Not draw straight forward normative arguments.
* Confusion:
  + Parties have less power. Weakening
  + Party dealignment
  + Not really important mechanism.
    - Not talking much about party-mayors mechanisms. So a bit confusing about party dealignment.
  + What is at stake is accountability, rather than party dealignment
  + Term limits were imposed to make candidates accountable, but results indicate that term limits behave worse with
    - Be clearer.
    - Parties have predatory behavior or not.
    - 3 x 3. There it makes sense to talk about this implication. When presenting this paper.
    - Good to have in the theory section but not in the introduction.
* Hard what to prioritize in the framing.
  + If I have a more substantive contribution it would be great.
* Talk less about party-candidate relations but then it changes. Its very interesting. Almost like a motivating puzzle.
  + Politicians are predatory. Is it likely that the inc. disadvantage becomes an advantage.
  + Have this on the discussion section.
  + Ashworth is not a bad thing, it could be more nuanced.
  + I could try to get more data and see what happens long term.

Dongil:

* Scope conditions and broad implications of the study
* How to better shape the introduction:
  + Results are surprising because previous studies talk about US or Europe but mine is with na authoritarian public legacy
  + These elections is about individual candidates, not parties
  + How would we see these patterns, and similarities with different contexts produce the same patterns .
  + Disentangling partisan and personal inc. adv.
    - What do they tell us about more important concepts of democracy, like accountability, representation, responsiveness, (e.g. Titiunik Klansja on unfulfilled acountability)
    - What does it tell us about the welfare of voters, representation
  + I have avoided talking about the normative implications. The paper would be richer
* What I meant by a partisan system more deeply.
  + Define what this means better.
  + Parties institutionalization
  + Weak vs strong organization
  + Sartori. How Mexico differ from other settings.
  + The case of Mexico should be described.
* Why would we see these patterns with previous studies?
  + In Mexico with a legacy of strong parties.
  + Introduction of reelection debilitates party control.
  + But may not be consistent with
    - Party system vs. within party dynamics. Klansja and Titiunik discuss this.
    - Does party dealignment affect a strong party system
    - Absence of party luck
* Mechanisms:
  + Transfers in favor of incumbents. Can mayors ask for transfers
  + Conceptualization of different types of mechanisms into a table and more succinct
  + Inc. advantage has important implications, vs mechanisms.
    - The mechanism helps to make a normative implication
* Not just nice to have an incumbency advantage. We need to do more to get a normative implication. Not just doing the RDD. There are things about welfare.

Conclusions:

1. Discussion section with scope conditions
2. Motivate things more clearly
3. Check Mariana’s paper

* Do this: Not just nice to have an incumbency advantage. We need to do more to get a normative implication. Not just doing the RDD. There are things about welfare.