CS 427/519: Homework 3

Due: Monday February 5, 10pm; typed and submitted electronically.

Important notes for this homework and all future ones:

- ▶ When asked to show that something is **secure**, please clarify what libraries you are going to show indistinguishable. List a sequence of hybrid libraries and briefly justify each step (that two consecutive hybrids are indistinguishable).
- ▶ When asked to show that something is **insecure**, please clarify what libraries you are going to distinguish. Explicitly write the code of the distinguisher / calling program. Explicitly derive the output probability of the distinguisher in the presence of each library.
- 1. Let *F* be a secure PRF with λ -bit outputs, and let *G* be a PRG with stretch ℓ . Define

$$F'(k,r) = G(F(k,r)).$$

So F' has outputs of length $\lambda + \ell$. Prove that F' is a secure PRF.

2. Let *F* be a secure PRF. Let \overline{x} denote the bitwise complement of the string *x*. Define the new function:

$$F'(k, x) = F(k, x) || F(k, \overline{x}).$$

Show that F' is **not** a secure PRF. Describe a distinguisher and compute its advantage.

3. Let $f: \{0,1\}^{\text{in}} \to \{0,1\}^{\text{out}}$ be a (not necessarily invertible) function. The Feistel transform described in the text works only when in = out.

Describe a modification of the Feistel transform that works even when the round function satisfies in \neq out. The result should be an invertible with input/output length in + out. Be sure to show that your proposed transform is invertible!

grad. Let *F* be a secure PRF, and define the following 3-round Feistel cipher:

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{H((k_1,k_2,k_3),X_0||X_1):}{X_2 &\coloneqq F(k_1,X_1) \oplus X_0 \\ &X_3 &\coloneqq F(k_2,X_2) \oplus X_1 \\ &X_4 &\coloneqq F(k_3,X_3) \oplus X_2 \\ &\text{return } X_3||X_4 \end{aligned}$$

Show that H cannot be a secure SPRP.