

Macroeconomics II

Lesson 04 — Extensions of the Basic RBC Framework

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Introduction

Introduction

- We saw in last lecture that the RBC performs well in some dimensions.
- Far from perfect in matching features of the data.
- More sophisticated DSGE models build upon the basic RBC to match particular features of the data.
- Extensions we will focus on:
 1. Indivisible labor
 2. Investment adjustment costs
 3. Variable capital utilization
 4. Intertemporal non-separability (in the Problem Sets)

Indivisible Labor

Indivisible Labor

- The basic RBC does not generate sufficient volatility in hours of work.
- One possibility is to increase the Frisch elasticity of labor supply \Rightarrow at odds with the data.
- Variation in hours in the basic RBC come from the **intensive margin** only.
- In reality people face the decision to work or not (extensive margin) and how much to work (intensive margin).
- Most of the fluctuations come from the **extensive margin** [King and S. T. Rebelo 1999, Figure 4].

Indivisible Labor

- Rogerson (1988) develops a model with a continuum of ex-ante identical agents
- Let household preferences be

$$u(c_t, h_t) = \log(c_t) + \zeta \frac{(1 - h_t)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta}$$

- Each individual works $\bar{h} \in (0, 1)$ hours. Labor is indivisible, i.e.

$$h_t = \begin{cases} \bar{h} & \text{if the individual works} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The decision set is non-convex (it could be optimal for an individual to work $h_t < \bar{h}$ but that is not allowed)

Indivisible Labor

- In each period, there is a probability of working p_t
- Households will choose this probability but not how much can work if it ends up working
- In this way, the **expected hours of work** is $h_t = p_t \bar{h}$
- Assume there is perfect insurance (as in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium) \Rightarrow competitive equilibrium is Pareto Optimal
- The expected flow utility can be written as

$$u(c_t, h_t) = \log(c_t) + p_t \tilde{\zeta} \frac{(1 - \bar{h})^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta} + (1 - p_t) \tilde{\zeta} \frac{(1)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta}$$

Indivisible Labor

- Collecting terms and noting that $p_t = h_t/\bar{h}$

$$u(c_t, h_t) = \log(c_t) + \frac{h_t}{\bar{h}} \zeta \left(\frac{(1 - \bar{h})^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta} - \frac{(1)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta} \right) + \zeta \frac{(1)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta}$$

- For $\eta > 0$ it is satisfied that $\frac{1^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} > \frac{(1-\bar{h})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$

$$u(c_t, h_t) = \log(c_t) - \underbrace{h_t \frac{\zeta}{\bar{h}} \left(\frac{(1)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta} - \frac{(1 - \bar{h})^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta} \right)}_B + \underbrace{\zeta \frac{(1)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1 - \eta}}_D$$

- We can drop D since it is just a constant and rewrite it as

$$u(c_t, h_t) = \log(c_t) - Bh_t$$

Indivisible Labor

- In this framework, utility is linear in hours.
- This holds for **any value of η** .
- In this framework, we can think of the choice of hours as **effort** agents put into finding a job.
- Then work 8 fixed hours. If they don't find a job, they earn unemployment benefits.
- The equilibrium is characterized by the exact same equations as in the standard RBC but with $\eta = 0$

Indivisible Labor

- We need to calibrate B , how?
- From the Euler equation we can get a value for the capital-labor ratio in the steady state

$$\frac{k^*}{h^*} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{\frac{(1+g)(1+n)}{\beta} - (1-\delta)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

- From the intratemporal condition

$$c^* = \frac{1}{B}(1-\alpha) \left(\frac{k^*}{h^*} \right)^\alpha$$

- From the resource constraint

$$c^* = h^* \left(\left(\frac{k^*}{h^*} \right)^\alpha - \delta \frac{k^*}{h^*} \right)$$

Indivisible Labor

- Combining last two equations

$$B = \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{k^*}{h^*}\right)^\alpha}{h^* \left(A \left(\frac{k^*}{h^*}\right)^\alpha - \left(\frac{k^*}{h^*}\right) [(1 + n)(1 + g) - (1 - \delta)] \right)}$$

- I solve now the basic RBC with log-log preferences and the indivisible labor model
- I target $h^* = 1/3$ then

$$\left(\frac{k^*}{h^*}\right) = 24.07 \quad B = 2.71$$

Indivisible Labor




Figure 1: Basic RBC vs Indivisible Labor IRFs

- More amplification in labor than in log-log preferences.
- $\uparrow \{y_t, h_t\}$ more on impact.
- $\Rightarrow \{c_t, i_t\} \uparrow$

Investment Adjustment Costs

Investment Adjustment Costs

- The standard RBC cannot generate hump-shaped responses to most shocks
- This is a feature of the data (VAR literature)
- Convex adjustment costs of capital or investment induce sluggish adjustments in those endogenous variables \Rightarrow effectively increases persistence of the shock.
- We focus on investment adjustment costs as in **Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)**
- Basically, these costs affect the rate of transformation of investment into capital

Investment Adjustment Costs

- The presence of investment adjustment costs affects the law of motion for capital

$$(1+g)(1+n)k_{t+1} = (1-\delta)k_t + \left[1 - \frac{\phi}{2} \left((1+g)\frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - (1+g) \right)^2 \right] i_t$$

- Note that, in the steady state, $i_t = i_{t-1}$ and the cost vanishes.
- Out of the steady state, with $\phi > 0$ there is a cost of transforming investment into capital.
- $(1+g)$ enters the adjustment costs to guarantee that a BGP exists.

Investment Adjustment Costs

- Note that investment becomes an endogenous variable we cannot remove.
- This implies we will get an additional Euler equation for investment.
- The two Euler equations we will get are (Details in class)

$$\begin{aligned} q_t &= \frac{\beta}{(1+g)(1+n)} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \left(r_{t+1}^k + q_{t+1}(1-\delta) \right) \right\} \\ 1 &= q_t \left[1 - \phi \left((1+g) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - (1+g) \right) (1+g) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left((1+g) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - (1+g) \right)^2 \right] \\ &\quad + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} q_{t+1} \phi (1+g) \left((1+g) \frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} - (1+g) \right) \left(\frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} \right)^2 \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Investment Adjustment Costs

- We have defined $q_t \equiv \frac{\mu_t}{\lambda_t}$
- Where λ_t is the multiplier associated to the budget constraint and μ_t the multiplier associated to the law of motion for capital.
- q_t denotes how much consumption the agent is willing to give up to get a unit of installed capital.
- This is the relative price of capital in terms of consumption.

Investment Adjustment Costs




Figure 2: Basic RBC vs Adjustment Costs IRFs

- Smoother response of investment.
- Slower capital accumulation.
- Investment and output are hump-shaped \Rightarrow autocorrelated growth rates.
- Adjustment costs \Rightarrow consumption increases more.

Variable Capital Utilization

Variable Capital Utilization

- Capital is a predetermined variable, however, the **intensity** with which capital is used, can change from one period to the next.
- Think of electricity consumption in manufacturing \Rightarrow procyclical at the business cycle frequencies.
- How does correcting for cyclical variations in capital services affect the statistical properties of estimated aggregate technology shocks? **Burnside, Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (1995)** say “a lot”

Variable Capital Utilization

- To model variable capital utilization, we assume firms need **capital services**
- Capital services are a function of the capital stock and utilization.
- We assume
 1. Households own the capital stock
 2. Households choose the level of utilization
 3. Households lease capital services $\hat{k}_t \equiv u_t k_t$
 4. Capital depreciates with utilization

$$\delta(u_t) = \delta_0 + \phi_1 (u_t - 1) + \frac{\phi_2}{2} (u_t - 1)^2$$

Variable Capital Utilization

Household's Problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_{t+1}, u_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & \mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{(c_t)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} + \zeta \frac{(1-h_t)^{1-\eta} - 1}{1-\eta} \right] \right\} \\ \text{subject to} \quad & c_t + (1+n)(1+g)k_{t+1} = w_t h_t + \left(r_t^k u_t + (1 - \delta(u_t)) \right) k_t \quad \forall t \geq 0 \\ & k_0 > 0 \text{ given} \end{aligned}$$

- We have an additional control variable u_t
- A different net rental rate $r_t \equiv r_t^k u_t - \delta(u_t)$

Variable Capital Utilization

Equilibrium Conditions

$$\lambda_t = c_t^{-\sigma} \quad (\text{VKU1})$$

$$\xi(1 - h_t)^{-\eta} = w_t c_t^{-\sigma} \quad (\text{VKU2})$$

$$\lambda_t = \frac{\beta}{(1+n)(1+g)} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1} (r_{t+1}^k u_{t+1} + 1 - \delta(u_{t+1})) \right\} \quad (\text{VKU3})$$

$$r_t^k = \phi_1 + \phi_2(u_t - 1) \quad (\text{VKU4})$$

$$r_t^k = \alpha \frac{y_t}{u_t k_t} \quad (\text{VKU5})$$

Variable Capital Utilization


Calibration

- Parameters in the utilization cost function are not fully free.
- Normalize $u = 1$ in the steady state $\Rightarrow r_t^k = \frac{(1+g)(1+n)}{\beta} - 1 + \delta_0$
- But FOC for utilization implies $\phi_1 = \frac{(1+g)(1+n)}{\beta} - 1 + \delta_0$
- Parameter ϕ_2 is a free parameter so we need a target. Typically, target

$$\varepsilon_{\delta', u_t} = \frac{u\delta''(1)}{\delta'(1)} = \frac{\phi_2}{\phi_1}$$

Evidence points to $\varepsilon_{\delta', u_t} = 1$.

Variable Capital Utilization



- Utilization increases after positive TFP shock.
- Significant amplification of the shock.
- Output, employment, consumption, and investment increase more.

Figure 3: Basic RBC vs Variable Capital Utilization IRFs