#### Deterrence is failing now - Iran doesn't know what we want

Christopher J. **Bolan**, 6-15-20**19**, "Deterrence Is Failing — Partly Because Iran Has No Idea What the US Really Wants," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/06/restoring-deterrence-iran/157756/

At base, deterrence policy is developed to change the decision-making calculus of an opponent. As such it is a game of perception management and clear communication. Successful deterrence requires clear delineation of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. It requires that the opponent understand that unacceptable behavior will be met with a credible punishment whose costs will outweigh any potential benefit to be gained. Finally, prospects for successful deterrence are improved when threats of punishment are combined with positive incentives to alter the opponent’s unacceptable behavior. Recent events offer clear evidence that U.S. deterrence has failed to sufficiently alter Tehran’s calculus as it weighs its options in responding to the devastating economic impact of U.S. sanctions. Restoring deterrence will require changes to U.S. policies.

#### Tensions rising now, every time Iran finds a loophole to keep proliferating, the US puts a new round of sanctions ---- locked into a cycle where Iran fears US aggression, reacting with enrichment and the US fears Iranian proliferation, reacting with aggressive sanctions

**Abc** News, 5-29-20**20**, "Iran says it will continue nuclear work despite US sanctions," ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-continue-nuclear-work-us-sanctions-70945331

TEHRAN, Iran -- **Iran said Friday its experts would continue nuclear development activities, despite sanctions imposed** earlier this week on their fellow scientists by the United States. State TV cited a statement from the country’s nuclear department saying the**U.S. decision to impose sanctions on two Iranian nuclear scientists indicate continuation of a “hostile” attitude. It said the sanctions would make them “determined to continue their nonstop efforts more than before."** The statement said the sanctions violate international law. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo imposed sanctions on two officials with Iran’s atomic energy organization, Majid Agha’i and Amjad Sazgar, who are involved in the development and production of centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Pompeo also said he would revoke all but one of the sanctions waivers covering civil nuclear cooperation.

#### Iran has 10 times Uranium permitted

BBC news, 9-5-20, “Iran's enriched uranium stockpile '10 times limit'” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54033441

Iran now has more than 10 times the amount of enriched uranium permitted under an international agreement, the UN's nuclear watchdog says. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iran's enriched uranium stockpile had reached 2,105kg (4,640lb). Iran insists its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

#### So Iran prolif now due to necessity to match the US strike

The **Guardian**, 10-2-20**12**, "The true reason US fears Iranian nukes: they can deter US attacks," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/iran-nukes-deterrence

So what, then, is the real reason that so many people in both the US and Israeli governments are so desperate to stop Iranian proliferation? Every now and then, they reveal the real reason:**Iranian nuclear weapons would prevent the US from attacking Iran at will, and that is what is intolerable.**The latest person to unwittingly reveal the real reason for viewing an Iranian nuclear capacity as unacceptable was GOP Senator Lindsey Graham, one of the US's most reliable and bloodthirsty warmongers. On Monday, Graham spoke in North Augusta, South Carolina, and was asked about the way in which sanctions were harming ordinary Iranians. Ayman Hossam Fadel was present and recorded the exchange. Answering that question, Graham praised President Obama for threatening Iran with war over nuclear weapons, decreed that "the Iranian people should be willing to suffer now for a better future," and then – invoking the trite neocon script that is hauled out whenever new wars are being justified – analogized Iranian nukes to Hitler in the 1930s. But in the middle of his answer, he explained the real reason Iranian nuclear weapons should be feared:

#### Our current posture is to nuclearly intimidate Iran, the cause of proliferation

**Grossman, 2007**

 Jerome Grossman, political activist and commentator on the subject of WMDs and nuclear weapons,

“U.S. should promise no first use of nukes” June 15, 2007, <http://cjonline.com/stories/061507/opi_177295240.shtml>

**When American military officials and politicians are asked about relations with Iran** and North Korea, too **often they** threateningly **reply**: "No military option is off the table." **This sentiment is an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons** and a violation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the NPT.

One of the politicians making such provocative remarks is Senator Barack Obama, a frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination. In a recent speech covering national security, Obama argued that "We must never take the military option off the table" in trying to stop the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Does he realize that this "option" includes the incalculable human suffering that would be wrought by a preemptive nuclear attack? In 1958, Albert Wohlstetter, an influential Cold War nuclear theorist, concluded that the chief purpose of nuclear weapons is to terrorize. While much attention is paid to terrorism by non-state groups like al Qaeda, the truth is that nations can engage in terrorism as well. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, each of the nine nuclear powers — the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — has threatened to use nuclear weapons. This threat, which is intended to terrorize other states, must stop. These types of threatening remarks could lead to nuclear war by accident, inadvertence, or error, with the most tragic consequences for all humanity. Most importantly, nuclear threats encourage the spread of nuclear weapons to countries seeking to protect themselves in a dangerous world dominated by nuclear aggressors. **The world needs a "No First Strike" commitment** combined with the elimination of the present policy of keeping nukes on hair trigger alert so they are ready to hit their intended targets thirty minutes after they are launched on intercontinental ballistic missiles. To this day, the United States has never established a policy of "No First Strike" or "No First Use" for its nuclear arsenal. China is the only nuclear weapons state that has a standing "No First Use" declaratory policy. In 1982, the Soviet Union announced such a policy, but its military plans never actually changed. A decade later, the successor Russian government forfeited its commitment to "No First Use." When the NPT was being negotiated in the 1960s, non-nuclear weapons states sought guarantees that agreeing not to acquire nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. This was an important consideration because **nuclear intimidation encourages the intimidated to develop their own nukes to deter aggression from larger nuclear powers.** While the Reagan Administration developed nuclear weapons and threatened their use, the President himself said on April 17, 1982, that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." He was right in his rhetoric but wrong in his policies — just as the United States is today. It is time to match our pious words with pious actions and take the nuclear option off the table by declaring a "No First Use" policy.

#### That causes regime survival fears

The **Guardian**, 10-2-20**12**, "The true reason US fears Iranian nukes: they can deter US attacks," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/iran-nukes-deterrence

Answering that question, Graham praised President Obama for threatening Iran with war over nuclear weapons, decreed that "the Iranian people should be willing to suffer now for a better future," and then – invoking the trite neocon script that is hauled out whenever new wars are being justified – analogized Iranian nukes to Hitler in the 1930s. But in the middle of his answer, he explained the real reason Iranian nuclear weapons should be feared: "They have two goals: one, regime survival. The best way for the regime surviving, in their mind, is having a nuclear weapon, because when you have a nuclear weapon, nobody attacks you." Graham added that the second regime goal is "influence", that "people listen to you" when you have a nuclear weapon. In other words, we cannot let Iran acquire nuclear weapons because if they get them, we can no longer attack them when we want to and can no longer bully them in their own region.

#### NFU solves - eases Iranian threat perception and stops prolif

Scott D. **Sagan**, 1-1-20**07**, "How to Keep the Bomb From Iran," No Publication, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/how\_to\_keep\_the\_bomb\_from\_iran\_20070101/

A source of inspiration for handling Iran is the 1994 Agreed Framework that the United States struck with North Korea. The Bush administration has severely criticized the deal, but it contained several elements that could prove useful in the Iranian nuclear crisis. After the North Koreans were caught violating their NPT commitments in early 1993, they threatened to withdraw from the treaty. Declaring that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb,” President Clinton threatened an air strike on the Yongbyon reactor site if the North Koreans took further steps to reprocess plutonium. In June 1994, as the Pentagon was reinforcing military units on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang froze its plutonium production, agreed to let IAEA inspectors monitor the reactor site, and entered into bilateral negotiations. The talks produced the October 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to eventually dismantle its reactors, remain in the NPT, and implement full IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the United States promised to provide it with limited oil supplies, construct two peaceful light-water reactors for energy production, “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” and extend “formal assurances to [North Korea] against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.”  Most important, however, would be a reduction in the security threat that the United States poses to Iran. Given the need for Washington to have a credible deterrent against, say, terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, a blanket security guarantee would be ill advised. But more limited guarantees, such as a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, could be effective. They would reassure Tehran and pave the way toward the eventual normalization of U.S.–Iranian relations while signaling to other states that nuclear weapons are not the be all and end all of security. Peaceful coexistence does not require friendly relations, but it does mean exercising mutual restraint. Relinquishing the threat of regime change by force is a necessary and acceptable price for the United States to pay to stop Tehran from getting the bomb.

#### Iran lacks second strike capabilities - they fear they will not survive the first US strike

Jack **David**, 6-8-20**10**, "Iran’'s Nuclear Weapon Capability: Containment or Military Action ," No Publication, https://www.hudson.org/research/7066-iran-s-nuclear-weapon-capability-containment-or-military-action-

Can a nuclear-armed Iran be contained? The United States and its allies for at least six years have promised tough sanctions that will dissuade Iran from continuing down the path to acquiring nuclear weapons. But what they have characterized as tough sanctions before and tougher sanctions thereafter have not done the trick. Sanctions that could have persuaded Iran to forgo its nuclear weapons program are those that would have hurt its economy, such as cutting off lines of credit and other banking capabilities of the government and selected businesses and cutting off insurance necessary for shipments to Iran. These are plainly tougher than any sanctions on which the leading countries can agree. In view of the failure to dissuade and deter Iran from continuing its nuclear program, what can the United States and the rest of the West do to contain a nuclear-armed Iran? What could the United States threaten that would deter Iran and what could it promise to assure Irans potential victims in the region that they are not vulnerable to escalation of Irans hegemonic aggression and nuclear intimidation? Threaten Iran with more sanctions? Promise more tough diplomacy? Threaten more serious consequences if Iran crosses specified red-lines? Is it reasonable to believe that an effective policy of containment would dissuade and deter a nuclear-armed Iran from both escalated aggression and actually detonating a nuclear weapon, and also would assure its potential victims? I think not. A nuclear-armed Iran will dramatically increase chances for nuclear exchanges costing hundreds of thousands of lives. Consider the history of the worlds major nuclear powers. It took the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China decades to learn how to manage nuclear weaponsto weave the possession of these terribly destructive weapons into constructive national security and military doctrine, to make them a force for stability, security, and peace. There were perilous moments along the wayeven on the brink moments. The five powers did not want to foment a nuclear exchange. They had second-strike capabilities that deterred adversaries from initiating a nuclear attack. They devised means of reducing the riskshot line phones, nonproliferation regimes, exchanges of information, inspections, and the like. Perilous moments in a nuclear-armed Middle East are unlikely to have such unbloody outcomes as those in the Cold War. Iran and other Middle East countries would be tempted to use their limited nuclear capabilities to eliminate the limited nuclear capabilities of their adversaries before their adversaries could use them. None of them [including Iran], other than Israel, would have second-strike capabilities providing deterrence and assurance. And Israels second-strike capability would be limited because it is so small; its enemy would know that Israel likely could not recover from a first strike and might risk an Israeli retaliatory strike to achieve that.

#### Dallas 13

7.1 million people dead in Iran strike on Israel

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3671126/table/T4/?report=objectonly>

#### NFU solves “use it or lose it” paranoia and is key to disarmament and non-prolif

Manpreet **Sethi**, xx-xx-20**13**, "," No Publication, http://capsindia.org/files/documents/Using-Nuclear-Weapons-Firrst-Manpreet.pdf

McNamara wrote in 2005, “I know from direct experience that US nuclear policy today creates unacceptable risks to other nations and to our own.”12 And yet, nuclear first use has been the predominant doctrine over the last six decades that nuclear weapons have been around. Only two countries maintain a no-first-use (NFU) strategy and the general tendency has been to be dismissive of these declarations since it has been believed that it is the threat of first use that establishes credible deterrence. Questioning this conventional wisdom in the face of the current nuclear realities where nearly all nuclear armed states (with the possible exception of North Korea) have a secure second strike capability, this essay explores the value of no-first-use as a meaningful and credible deterrence strategy. Besides, it also offers two other benefits of an NFU. One, since [an NFU] it is premised on communication of threat of punishment, the nature of the required arsenal reduces existential nuclear risks, and by relieving the adversary of a “use or lose” pressure, it enhances strategic stability. Secondly, by de facto making the nuclear weapon unusable, NFU brings down its salience and helps in promotion of non-proliferation and disarmament, thereby making a contribution to international security.

#### NFU reassures non-nuclear states they don’t need nuclear weapons, checking prolif.

**Collina 16**

Tom Z. Collina (Policy Director at Ploughshares Fund in Washington DC). “America Would Never Be the First to Use Nukes. So Why Say We Might?” The National Interest, July 28, 2016. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americawouldneverbethefirstuse> nukessowhysaywe17168

A no first use policy would also reassure the world’s nonnuclear states that they could continue to protect themselves without nuclear weapons. To prevent states, such as Iran, from building the bomb we must convince them that they can be secure without nukes. A no first use policy would strengthen U.S. efforts to stop the spread of the bomb in a major way. At the same time, U.S. allies should not worry that a no first use pledge would under mine Washington’s commitment to come to their defense. Even for states under the U.S. nuclear “umbrella,” such as Japan or South Korea, the U.S. first use of nuclear weapons is not needed to keep them safe, and in fact any use of nukes would undermine their security.

#### Upon ending nuclearization, the US would lift sanctions on Iran.

Amanda **Macias**, 9-14-20**20**, “Trump administration to impose sweeping sanctions tied to Iran’s weapons programs,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/20/trump-administration-slated-to-impose-sanctions-tied-to-iran.html

“Our maximum pressure campaign on the Iranian regime will continue until Iran reaches a comprehensive agreement with us to rein in its proliferation threats and stops spreading chaos, violence, and bloodshed,” Pompeo said, adding that in the coming days the Trump administration “will announce a range of additional measures to strengthen the implementation of UN sanctions and hold violators accountable.”

**Empirically sanctions were removed when Iran dismantled nuclear program**

**Sanger**, D. (20**16**, January 16). Iran Complies With Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are Lifted. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-lifted-nuclear-deal.html>

The United States and European nations lifted oil and financial sanctions on Iran on Saturday and released roughly $100 billion of its assets after international inspectors concluded that the country had followed through on promises to dismantle large sections of its nuclear program. The moves came at the end of a day of high drama that played out in a diplomatic dance across Europe and the Middle East, just hours after Tehran and Washington swapped long-held prisoners. Five Americans, including a Washington Post reporter, Jason Rezaian, were released by Iran hours before the nuclear accord was implemented. The detention of one of the released Americans, Matthew Trevithick, who had been engaged in language studies in Tehran when he was arrested, according to his family, had never been publicly announced. Early on Sunday, a senior United States official said, “Our detained U.S. citizens have been released and that those who wished to depart Iran have left.” The Washington Post also released a statement confirming that Mr. Rezaian and his wife, Yeganeh Salehi, had left Iran.

#### Sanctions kill lots of people - Iran is teetering on failed state status

**Salhani**, 11-2-20**20**, "Iran's whole system is failing, not just its satellite programme," https://thearabweekly.com/irans-whole-system-failing-not-just-its-satellite-programme

Does Iran qualify as a failed state? Technically, perhaps not quite yet but it is certainly a failing state considering its misguided policies and self-destructive decisions. If Tehran continues its current policies, it will only be a matter of time before it falls into the failed state category or before the government is forcefully removed by a popular uprising, very similar to the one that put the current regime to power. The Fragile States Index, published by the Fund for Peace think-tank and Foreign Policy magazine, ranked Iran 57th among 178 countries in 2007, in which the lower the ranking number, the more fragile the state is considered. Its ranking reached 32nd by 2010 and in 2019 Iran was in 52nd place. With every cycle of anti-government protests that has erupted in Iran in the past several decades since the mullahs overthrew the monarchy and turned Iran into an Islamic republic, there has been a gradual increase in the level of violence the government is willing to go to maintain its hold on power. History has shown that escalation of violence by any government never solves its problems but encourages protesters to also step up their actions and can lead that government to its own demise. Its tattered economy, soaring cost of living, rising unemployment, dissatisfied youth, merchants who own the shops and stalls in the bazaar representing the lifeline of Iran’s economy, provide indicators of the worsening political situation in Tehran. That, combined with US- and UN-imposed economic sanctions and the country’s failure in foreign diplomacy and disastrous neighbourhood relations, only increase Iran’s trend towards becoming a failed state. A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point that basic conditions and responsibilities of a government no longer function properly. Among the factors that contribute to a failed state is an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

#### Only removing sanctions solves - Emprics prove - in 2016 when Iran complied w halting their nuclear program their economy rebounded to pre-sanction levels

**Congressional Research Center**, 23-7-20**20**, "," No Publication, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf

Remaining in place were U.S. sanctions on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support for regional armed factions, its human rights abuses, and on its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, kept in place an existing ban on its importation or exportation of arms (until October 18, 2020) and a non-binding restriction on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (until October 18, 2023). The sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels, regain access to its foreign exchange funds, and order some new passenger aircraft.

#### If Iran becomes a failed state - interstate war breaks out

Zaryab **Iqbal**,, xx-xx-20**08**, "Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Consequences," GSDRC, https://gsdrc.org/document-library/bad-neighbors-failed-states-and

When states fail do they destabilise entire regions? This article from Conflict Management and Peace Science assesses the negative effects of state collapse, focusing particularly on the spatial diffusion of these consequences. It argues that when a state collapses, neighbouring states are also likely to experience higher levels of political instability, unrest, civil war and interstate conflict. State failure is not contagious, but some of its most negative consequences diffuse to other states. State failure may result in political disturbances ranging from minor political unrest to interstate war. The consequences of state collapse include political unrest and instability, **civil war**, international conflict and state failure itself. Studies over the past forty years have shown that the causes of violent conflict – both external and domestic – include previous violent conflict. Conflict has been found to act as both cause and consequence of further conflict.

#### Its scalar - High intensity interstate conflicts kill 100k every year

Stephen **Watts**, xx-xx-20**17**, "," No Publication,

<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1063/RAND_RR1063.pdf>

Our second typology dimension, conflict intensity, is based on total battle deaths. We define four levels of violence: minimum violence, which includes events involving 0 to 25 deaths per 11 year; low-intensity conflict, which includes 25–999 deaths per year; medium-intensity, which includes 1,000 to 100,000 deaths per year; and high-intensity [conflicts], which includes more than 100,000 battle deaths per year. Battle deaths are an imperfect measure of conflict intensity because they capture only one small piece of the cost of a conflict, namely the direct effect of a conflict in terminating individual life. For example, conflict may cause famine or disease that wipes out hundreds of thousands of lives or economic devastation that leads to widespread poverty, but neither of these costs will be included if intensity is only based on battle deaths. Furthermore, battle deaths can be difficult to count, as it is not always clear who is a combatant. There are some alternative measures of intensity being developed to address these shortcomings. Some use indexes to rate the level of violence, others look at economic costs, or disability-adjusted life years. Because most data sets still rely on battle deaths or “conflict-related deaths,” we use this measure for the current report, although we recognize its shortcomings.

#### Prior to COVID - sanctions shrunk Iran’s economy 15 percent and pushed 33 million into poverty

Lawrence **Goodman**, 11-6-20**20**, "COVID-19 ravages Iran," BrandeisNOW, https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2020/may/iran-virus-kahalzadeh.html

Even before COVID-19, as a result of U.S. sanctions, Iran had a 40% poverty rate with 33 million people living under the poverty line. The sanctions also shrank Iran’s economy by 15% in 2018-2019, leaving the country with the largest fiscal deficit in its modern history. So far, the coronavirus outbreak has cost the economy $11 billion. I also expect the poverty rate to rise as high as 50% or 40 million people by the end of this year. In addition, the roughly four million jobs that were created after Iran signed the nuclear deal with the Obama administration in 2015 will be lost in the next eight months.