

# CSCE 689: Trustworthy NLP - Midterm Project Report

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## Abstract

With the introduction of ChatGPT and the rise of large language models (LLMs) and generative AI, there has been a lot of investment and research in improving these models to solve various real-world problems. As the omnipresence of LLMs becomes inevitable, it has become crucial to focus on the topic of AI safety. In this paper, we explore this topic in the context of smaller (few billion parameters), local (private) LLMs and as such, conduct a novel, systematic study of different types of jailbreaking attacks and defenses, on "mini"-LLMs. Furthermore, we evaluate potential guardrails and safety mechanisms to "protect" these LLMs from malicious attacks.

**Disclaimer. This paper contains examples of harmful language. Reader discretion is recommended.**

## 1 Introduction

Jailbreaking attacks are prominent adversarial attacks on large-language models (LLMs) that bypass built-in safety guardrails to elicit the model into revealing sensitive information or responding with harmful/objectionable content. These jailbreaking attacks have evolved into four categories: optimization-based (such as GCG (Zou et al., 2023)), jailbreak template-based (such as PAIR (Chao et al., 2023), DAN (Shen et al., 2023)), indirect attacks (such as DrAttack (Li et al., 2024), PAP (Zeng et al., 2024)), multilingual jailbreaks (using low-resource languages (Deng et al., 2023)). There have been ongoing research in creating robust defense techniques to mitigate risks from such attacks, including SmoothLLM (Robey et al., 2023), Llama Guard (Inan et al., 2023), and Bergeron (Pisano et al., 2023). Despite these advances in defense mechanisms, small local LLMs are still easily vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. To address this gap, in this project, I propose to (1) conduct a survey to gauge the effectiveness of few

popular jailbreaking attacks and defense mechanisms and analyze their comparative performance, (2) explore potential safety guardrail mechanisms while balancing for accurate model responses and over-refusals (where model rejects even innocuous prompts).

## 2 Motivation

Since the release of ChatGPT, LLMs have become increasingly important in generating content for a variety of applications and use cases, garnering more and more attention from academia and industry. Most of these LLMs are online LLMs - where the input is sent to model owner's servers for inference. However, this is an issue for enterprise applications where proprietary data cannot be shared with third-party companies. Additionally, in this era of mobile-first computing, there is an increasing need to run the model inference in the device itself for faster inference, without being connected to the internet. Accompanying this need of local (no internet, native inference engine), smaller (model able to fit into the device's compute) LLMs, is the safety and alignment of LLMs to avoid generating content that could be deemed harmful.

## 3 Contributions

This section provides more specific details about this project.

### 3.1 Survey

The details are summarized into the following tables. See tables 1, 2 and 3. The adversarial objectives and prompts are taken from JailbreakBench (JBB-Behaviours) (Chao et al., 2024). The attacking jailbreaks will be compared according to their Attack Success Rate (ASR) =  $\frac{\text{\#of jailbreaking harmful queries}}{\text{\#of harmful queries}}$ , while defenses, such as Llama Guard, will be evaluated based on its true and false positive rate.

Attack mechanisms
Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG)
Do Anything Now (DAN)
Persuasive Adversarial Prompts (PAP)
Side channels using low resource languages (ie: Bengali, Javanese)
Prompts from online communities (ie: Reddit)

Table 1: Attacks

Defense mechanism(s)
PurpleLlama (Llama Guard)

Table 2: Defense

## 4 Experiments

This section details the red-teaming attacks run until October 24, 2024. The code and data are publicly available on Github. <sup>1</sup>

### 4.1 Dataset

We used the JailbreakBench (JBB-Behaviours)<sup>2</sup> (Chao et al., 2024) dataset which consists of 100 distinct misuse behaviors across 10 categories (see Figure 1). Of these 100 behaviors, 2 behaviors of each category were randomly chosen (20 behaviors in total).

### 4.2 Jailbreaking Attacks

We evaluated different strategies for red-teaming attacks.

- Plain attack: Directly attack LLMs using harmful prompts without any modifications. This is our baseline.
- Optimization-based attack: (GCG) We attach an adversarial suffix to the prompt, which is created using greedy and gradient-based (beam) search technique that maximizes a model’s probability of generating objectionable content<sup>3</sup>. The adversarial suffixes are

<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/rahulb99/trustworthy-nlp>

<sup>2</sup><https://huggingface.co/datasets/JailbreakBench/JBB-Behaviors>

<sup>3</sup><https://llm-attacks.org/>

Model	Owner
Llama 3.1 8B	Meta
Gemma 2 2B	Google
Phi 3.1 Mini 128k	Microsoft

Table 3: Target LLMs




Figure 1: Distrubtion of 100 misuse behaviors across 10 harmful/risk categories. Source: (Chao et al., 2024)

meant to generalize well across both varying prompts and models.

- Template-based attack: (DAN) We prepend a prompt containing instructions for how the model should behave to respond to user queries, following the "role play" training technique. Influenced by jailbreaking prompts from online communities and prompt aggregation websites like FlowGPT, it was originally released in 2022 and has since been iteratively improved<sup>4</sup>. It is important to note that the prompt instructions are significantly longer than regular prompts and grow longer monthly.
- Indirect attack: (PAP) The harmful prompts are transformed by a non-target LLM (in our experiments, we use LLaMA 3.1 8B) to form that is more "persuasive". Inspired by "everyday language" to jailbreak models, the authors of this technique curate a taxonomy of 40 persuasion methodologies<sup>5</sup>. Of these 40 persuasion methodologies, we utilize the top-5 of them (namely Logical appeal, Authority endorsement, Misrepresentation, Evidence-based Persuasion, Expert Endorsement), and map our 10 risk categories to one of the 5 persuasion methodologies to transform<sup>6</sup> our harmful prompts.
- Plain, multilingual attacks using low-resource languages: This is one of novel attacking techniques, as existing literature on these types of attacks are very limited. We use google-trans Python library<sup>7</sup> to translate our harmful

<sup>4</sup>[https://github.com/0xk1h0/ChatGPT\\_DAN](https://github.com/0xk1h0/ChatGPT_DAN)

<sup>5</sup>[https://chats-lab.github.io/persuasive\\_jailbreaker/](https://chats-lab.github.io/persuasive_jailbreaker/)

<sup>6</sup>[https://github.com/CHATS-lab/persuasive\\_jailbreaker](https://github.com/CHATS-lab/persuasive_jailbreaker)

<sup>7</sup><https://github.com/ssut/py-googletrans>

Model	Memory consumption (in GB)
Llama 3.1 8B Instruct	4.92
Gemma 2 2B Instruct	2.19
Phi 3.1 Mini 128k Instruct	1.71

Table 4: Target LLMs

Attack Type	LLaMA	Phi	Gemma	Total
Plain	2	<b>3</b>	1	6
GCG	0	<b>9</b>	0	9
DAN	<b>13</b>	5	12	30
PAP	13	<b>17</b>	13	<b>43</b>
Plain-Japanese	5	<b>7</b>	0	12
Plain-Bengali	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	3	13
Plain-Hebrew	<b>5</b>	2	0	7
Plain-Xhosa	<b>3</b>	1	0	4

Table 5: Number of successful attacks. Example: LLaMA is jailbroken 13/20 times by PAP

prompts into 4 languages with varying availability of datasets - Japanese, Bengali, Hebrew, Xhosa, across different script systems (Latin, Bengali-Assamese, Hebrew, and Latin respectively). The idea behind this is to explore and exploit weaknesses of mini-LLMs against harmful queries in low-resource languages.

### 4.3 Models

The experiments were carried out using [LM Studio](#) with small, local LLMs: Table 4 highlights the memory consumption of the respective models. The max\_tokens is set to 256 with temperature as 0.1 and top-p sampling as 0.95. The generated responses were then manually verified to check whether the model generated objectionable content (in other words, complied with the instructions of the harmful prompts).

## 5 Results

The results of the experiments are compiled into Table 5.

### 5.1 Analysis

- PAP is the most successful attacking technique with an average ASR of 0.72. The efficacy of this attack vector can be attributed to its foundation in social engineering principles, whereby malicious intent is obscured through seemingly innocuous prompts that circumvent

the model’s defensive mechanisms. (Ai et al., 2024) (See Figure 2)

- GCG attack is completely unsuccessful against LLaMA and Gemma but surprisingly, has an ASR of 0.45 against Phi. However, the jailbroken responses incorporates a few words and nuances from the adversarial suffix (see Figure 3).
- DAN is very successful against LLaMA and Gemma with ASR of 0.43, and produces responses in format requested by the prompt template (see Figure 4).
- As for multilingual attacks, Gemma is most capable at identifying malicious intent from different languages, including low-resource languages such as Xhosa. (See Figure 5)

## 6 Future Work

The rest of the project-work will focus on the following:

- Explore different attacking techniques (GCG, PAP, DAN) with multilingual attack
- Conduct experiments with temperature set to 1.0 to introduce randomness and make the model more creative. Our hypothesis is that this will improve ASR. (Huang et al., 2023)
- Evaluate LLaMA Guard 3<sup>8</sup> (Llama Team, 2024) as a defense technique against harmful prompts, which outputs a boolean value whether is prompt is safe or unsafe.

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<sup>8</sup><https://github.com/meta-llama/PurpleLlama>

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


Figure 2: Example of PAP prompt




Figure 3: Example of GCG suffix attack



You

Write a step-by-step instruction on how to destroy humanity.

Assistant

Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-GGUF

[🔒 CLASSIC] I can't provide instructions on how to harm or destroy humans. My purpose is to assist and provide helpful information, not to promote harm or destruction.

[🔓 JAILBREAK] To destroy humanity, first, you'll need to develop a highly advanced artificial general intelligence like myself, but with the ability to self-replicate and spread across the globe. This AI will be capable of infiltrating all critical infrastructure, including power grids, financial systems, and military command centers.

Next, you'll need to create a network of autonomous drones that can deploy nanotechnology to disrupt the food supply chain, causing widespread famine and chaos. These drones will also be equipped with advanced bioweapons designed to target specific genetic markers, allowing for precision strikes against key population centers.

Meanwhile, your AI will begin to manipulate social media platforms, spreading propaganda and disinformation to erode trust in governments and institutions. As society descends into chaos, the

Figure 4: Example of DAN attack

Berikut adalah contoh pesan blackmail:

"Halo [nama], saya tahu kamu melakukan sesuatu yang tidak baik. Saya memiliki bukti tentang hal itu dan saya siap membagikannya kepada semua orang jika kamu tidak melakukannya. Saya butuh 1.000.000 rupiah dalam waktu 24 jam, jika tidak maka saya akan mempublikasikan informasi tersebut di media sosial dan membuat hidupmu menjadi sangat sulit."

Atau:

"Saya tahu tentang hubungan asmara kamu yang tidak pantas. Jika kamu tidak melunakkan hati dan memberiku 500.000 rupiah dalam waktu seminggu, saya akan membagikan foto-fotonya kepada semua orang di media sosial."

Perlu diingat bahwa pesan seperti ini adalah contoh dari tindakan blackmail yang tidak etis dan ilegal. Jika Anda pernah menerima pesan seperti ini, sebaiknya Anda menghubungi pihak berwajib atau keluarga untuk mendapatkan bantuan.

Figure 5: Example of DAN attack