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Merge pull request #3617 from indirect/remote_ip

refactor RemoteIp middleware
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2 parents df300a7 + 317f4e2 commit 2591cc66924d3e625ed0dc755751ac0f7c1db2d3 @josevalim josevalim committed Nov 13, 2011
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19 actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/http/request.rb
@@ -155,24 +155,7 @@ def ip
@ip ||= super
end
- # Which IP addresses are "trusted proxies" that can be stripped from
- # the right-hand-side of X-Forwarded-For.
- #
- # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv4_address_spaces.
- TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{
- ^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost
- ^(10 | # private IP 10.x.x.x
- 172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]) | # private IP in the range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
- 192\.168 # private IP 192.168.x.x
- )\.
- }x
-
- # Determines originating IP address. REMOTE_ADDR is the standard
- # but will fail if the user is behind a proxy. HTTP_CLIENT_IP and/or
- # HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR are set by proxies so check for these if
- # REMOTE_ADDR is a proxy. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR may be a comma-
- # delimited list in the case of multiple chained proxies; the last
- # address which is not trusted is the originating IP.
+ # Originating IP address, usually set by the RemoteIp middleware.
def remote_ip
@remote_ip ||= (@env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] || ip).to_s
end
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89 actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/remote_ip.rb
@@ -2,50 +2,69 @@ module ActionDispatch
class RemoteIp
class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError ; end
- class RemoteIpGetter
- def initialize(env, check_ip_spoofing, trusted_proxies)
- @env = env
- @check_ip_spoofing = check_ip_spoofing
- @trusted_proxies = trusted_proxies
+ # IP addresses that are "trusted proxies" that can be stripped from
+ # the comma-delimited list in the X-Forwarded-For header. See also:
+ # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv4_address_spaces
+ TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{
+ ^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost
+ ^(10 | # private IP 10.x.x.x
+ 172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]) | # private IP in the range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
+ 192\.168 # private IP 192.168.x.x
+ )\.
+ }x
+
+ attr_reader :check_ip_spoofing, :trusted_proxies
+
+ def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, custom_proxies = nil)
+ @app = app
+ @check_ip_spoofing = check_ip_spoofing
+ if custom_proxies
+ custom_regexp = Regexp.new(custom_proxies, "i")
+ @trusted_proxies = Regexp.union(TRUSTED_PROXIES, custom_regexp)
+ else
+ @trusted_proxies = TRUSTED_PROXIES
end
+ end
- def remote_addrs
- @remote_addrs ||= begin
- list = @env['REMOTE_ADDR'] ? @env['REMOTE_ADDR'].split(/[,\s]+/) : []
- list.reject { |addr| addr =~ @trusted_proxies }
- end
+ def call(env)
+ env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = GetIp.new(env, self)
+ @app.call(env)
+ end
+
+ class GetIp
+ def initialize(env, middleware)
+ @env, @middleware = env, middleware
end
+ # Determines originating IP address. REMOTE_ADDR is the standard
+ # but will be wrong if the user is behind a proxy. Proxies will set
+ # HTTP_CLIENT_IP and/or HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR, so we prioritize those.
+ # HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR may be a comma-delimited list in the case of
+ # multiple chained proxies. The last address which is not a known proxy
+ # will be the originating IP.
def to_s
- return remote_addrs.first if remote_addrs.any?
-
- forwarded_ips = @env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] ? @env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : []
-
- if client_ip = @env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP']
- if @check_ip_spoofing && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ip)
- # We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
- raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?!" \
- "HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect}" \
- "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}"
- end
- return client_ip
+ client_ip = @env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP']
+ forwarded_ips = ips_from('HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR')
+ remote_addrs = ips_from('REMOTE_ADDR')
+
+ check_ip = client_ip && @middleware.check_ip_spoofing
+ if check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ip)
+ # We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
+ raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?!" \
+ "HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect}" \
+ "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}"
end
- return forwarded_ips.reject { |ip| ip =~ @trusted_proxies }.last || @env["REMOTE_ADDR"]
+ client_ip || forwarded_ips.last || remote_addrs.last
end
- end
- def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, trusted_proxies = nil)
- @app = app
- @check_ip_spoofing = check_ip_spoofing
- regex = '(^127\.0\.0\.1$|^(10|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|30|31)|192\.168)\.)'
- regex << "|(#{trusted_proxies})" if trusted_proxies
- @trusted_proxies = Regexp.new(regex, "i")
- end
+ protected
- def call(env)
- env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = RemoteIpGetter.new(env, @check_ip_spoofing, @trusted_proxies)
- @app.call(env)
+ def ips_from(header)
+ ips = @env[header] ? @env[header].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : []
+ ips.reject{|ip| ip =~ @middleware.trusted_proxies }
+ end
end
+
end
-end
+end

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