Permalink
Browse files

Merge pull request #31653 from ydakuka/fix-typo-0801

Fix typos [ci skip]
  • Loading branch information...
eileencodes committed Jan 11, 2018
2 parents 2c08446 + 0ce7681 commit 5e8c79a6fafb8d7a84c272b3c9a0474a0d01b471
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ config.action_mailer.smtp_settings = {
user_name: '<username>',
password: '<password>',
authentication: 'plain',
enable_starttls_auto: true }
enable_starttls_auto: true }
```
Note: As of July 15, 2014, Google increased [its security measures](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6010255) and now blocks attempts from apps it deems less secure.
You can change your Gmail settings [here](https://www.google.com/settings/security/lesssecureapps) to allow the attempts. If your Gmail account has 2-factor authentication enabled,
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ should happen, an `Array` can be used. Moreover, you can apply both `:if` and
```ruby
class Computer < ApplicationRecord
validates :mouse, presence: true,
if: [Proc.new { |c| c.market.retail? }, :desktop?],
if: [Proc.new { |c| c.market.retail? }, :desktop?],
unless: Proc.new { |c| c.trackpad.present? }
end
```
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ The common admin interface works like this: it's located at www.example.com/admi
* Does the admin really have to access the interface from everywhere in the world? Think about _limiting the login to a bunch of source IP addresses_. Examine request.remote_ip to find out about the user's IP address. This is not bullet-proof, but a great barrier. Remember that there might be a proxy in use, though.
* _Put the admin interface to a special sub-domain_ such as admin.application.com and make it a separate application with its own user management. This makes stealing an admin cookie from the usual domain, www.application.com, impossible. This is because of the same origin policy in your browser: An injected (XSS) script on www.application.com may not read the cookie for admin.application.com and vice-versa.
* _Put the admin interface to a special subdomain_ such as admin.application.com and make it a separate application with its own user management. This makes stealing an admin cookie from the usual domain, www.application.com, impossible. This is because of the same origin policy in your browser: An injected (XSS) script on www.application.com may not read the cookie for admin.application.com and vice-versa.
User Management
---------------
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ that promise is to put it as close as possible to the blocking call:
Rails.application.executor.wrap do
th = Thread.new do
Rails.application.executor.wrap do
User # inner thread can acquire the load lock,
User # inner thread can acquire the 'load' lock,
# load User, and continue
end
end
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ Example usage:
```html
document.body.addEventListener('ajax:success', function(event) {
var detail = event.detail;
var data = detail[0], status = detail[1], xhr = detail[2];
var data = detail[0], status = detail[1], xhr = detail[2];
})
```

0 comments on commit 5e8c79a

Please sign in to comment.