
SCION:

Scalability, Control and Isolation On Next-Generation Networks

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Reasons for Clean-Slate Design

- Someone may just want to deploy a new Internet 😊
 - ✓ Possible for specialized high-reliability networks, e.g., smart grid
 - ✓ We need to have a design ready
- Even if we want to evolve current Internet, we need to have a goal, know how good a network could be

**The question is not: why deploy a new Internet?
But: why are we still putting up with the current Internet?**

After years of patching, the Internet is still **neither** Reliable **nor** Secure!

Feb 2008: Pakistani ISP **hijacks** YouTube **prefix**


Apr 2010: A Chinese ISP **inserts fake routes** affecting thousands of US networks.

Nov 2010: 10% of Internet **traffic 'hijacked'** to Chinese servers due to **DNS Tampering**.

❖ Fixes to date – **ad hoc**, patches


❖ Inconvenient truths

- ✧ S-BGP: delayed convergence
- ✧ Global PKI: single root of trust



Limitations of the Current Internet

- ❖ Destination or ISP have no control over inbound paths



- ❖ Route inconsistencies

- ✧ Forwarding state may be different from announced state

Limitations of the Current Internet (cont'd)

❖ Lack of routing isolation

- ✧ A failure/attack can have global effects
- ✧ Global visibility of paths is not scalable

❖ Slow convergence / route oscillation

❖ Large routing tables

- ✧ Multi-homing / flat namespaces prevent aggregation

❖ Lack of route freshness


- ✧ Current (S-)BGP cannot prevent replay of old paths

Note that these issues are fundamental to (S)-BGP!




Wish List (1): Isolation

- ❖ Isolation of attacks
- ❖ Scalable and reliable routing updates
- ❖ Operate with mutually distrusting entities without a global single root of trust: enforceable accountability




Wish List (2): Balanced Control

- ❖ Transit ISPs, source and destination all need path control



Wish List (3): Explicit Trust

- ❖ Know who needs to be trusted
 - ❖ Absence of consistency in BGP prevents knowing exactly who needs to be trusted



SCION Architectural Goals

- High availability, even for networks with malicious parties
- **Explicit trust** for network operations
- Minimal TCB: limit number of entities that need to be trusted for any operation
 - **Strong isolation from untrusted parties**
- Operate with mutually distrusting entities
 - **No single root of trust**
- Enable route **control** for ISPs, receivers, senders
- Simplicity, efficiency, flexibility, and scalability

SCION Architecture Overview

❖ Trust domain (TD)s

- ✧ Isolation and scalability

❖ Path construction


- ✧ Path construction beacons (PCBs)

❖ Path resolution

- ✧ Control
- ✧ Explicit trust

❖ Route joining (shortcuts)

- ✧ Efficiency, flexibility



Trust Domain Decomposition

- Global set of TD (Trust Domains)
 - ✓ Map to geographic, political, legal boundaries
- TD Core: set of top-tier ISPs that manage TD
 - ✓ Route to other TDs
 - ✓ Initiate path construction beacons
 - ✓ Manage Address and Path Translation Servers
 - ✓ Handle TD membership
 - ✓ Root of trust for TD: manage root key and certificates
- AD is atomic failure unit, contiguous/autonomous domain
 - ✓ Transit AD or endpoint AD


Path Construction

Goal: each endpoint learns multiple verifiable paths to its core

- Discovering paths via Path Construction Beacons (PCBs)
 - ✓ TD Core periodically initiates PCBs
 - ✓ Providers advertise upstream topology to peering and customer ADs
- ADs perform the following operations
 - ✓ Collect PCBs
 - ✓ For each neighbor AD, select which k PCBs to forward
 - ✓ Update cryptographic information in PCBs
- Endpoint AD will receive up to k PCBs from each upstream AD, and select k down-paths and up-paths

Path Construction

△: interface ○: Opaque field ☾: expiration time ♥: signature



Path Construction

Interfaces: $I(i)$ = previous-hop interfaces || local interfaces

Opaque field: $O(i)$ = local interfaces || MAC over local interfaces and $O(i-1)$

Signature: $\Sigma(i)$ = sign over $I(i)$, $T(i)$, $O(i)$, and $\Sigma(i-1)$, with cert of pub key

C? – One PCB per neighbor

$C \rightarrow E$: $I(C): I(A) || \{C1, C4\}$

$O(C): \{C1, C4\} || \text{MAC}_{K_A}(\{C1, C4\} || O(A))$


$\Sigma(C): \text{Sign}(I(C) || T(C) || O(C) || \Sigma(A))$

Also include peering link!

$I_{C,D}(C): \{C4, C2\} || \text{TD} || \text{AID}_D$

$O_{C,D}(C): \{C4, C2\} || \text{MAC}_{K_C}(\{C4, C2\})$

$\Sigma_{C,D}(C): \text{Sign}(I_{C,D}(C) || T_{C,D}(C) || O_{C,D}(C) || O(C))$




Address/Path Resolution

- TD core provides address/path resolution servers
- Each endpoint is identified as an AID:EID pair. AID is signed by the containing TD, and EID is signed by the containing AD (with AID).
 - ✓ Address is a public key [AIP 2008]
- Each AD registers name / address at address resolution server, uses an up-path to reach TD core
 - ✓ Private key used to sign name→address mapping
- ADs select which down-paths to announce
- ADs sign down-paths with private key and register down-paths with path resolution servers

Route Joining

- Local traffic should not need to traverse TD core
- Sender obtains receiver's k down-paths
- Sender intersects its up-paths with receiver's down-paths
- Sender selects preferred routes based on k^2 options




Intra-TD Forwarding

- Down-path contains all forwarding decisions (AD traversed) from endpoint AD to TD core
 - ✓ Ingress/egress points for each AD, authenticated in opaque fields
 - ✓ ADs use internal routing to send traffic from ingress to egress point
- Joined end-to-end route contains full forwarding information from source to destination
 - ✓ No routing / forwarding tables needed!

Cross-TD Forwarding

TD: isolation of route
computation

TD cores: interconnected
large ISPs



Discussion

- Incremental Deployment
 - ✓ Current ISP topologies are consistent with the TDs in SCION
 - ✓ ISPs use MPLS to forward traffic within their networks
 - ✓ Only edge routers need to deploy SCION
 - ✓ Can use IP tunnels to connect SCION edge routers in different ADs
- Limitations
 - ✗ ADs need to keep updating down-paths on path server
 - ✗ Increased packet size
 - ✗ Static path binding, which may hamper dynamic re-routing

SCION Security Benefits

	S-BGP + DNSSec	SCION
Isolation	No collusion/wormhole attacks poor path freshness path replay attacks single root of trust	Yes no cross-TD attacks path freshness scalability no single root of trust
TCB	The whole Internet	TD Core and on-path ADs
Path Control	Too little (dst) or too much (src), empowering DDoS attacks	Balanced control enabling DDoS defenses

Performance Benefits

❖ Scalability

- ✧ Routing updates are scoped within the local TD

❖ Flexibility

- ✧ Transit ISPs can embed local routing policies in opaque fields

❖ Simplicity and efficiency

- ✧ No interdomain forwarding table
 - ✧ Current network layer: routing table explosion
- ✧ Symmetric verification during forwarding
- ✧ Simple routers, energy efficient, and cost efficient

Evaluation

❖ Methodology

- ✧ Use of CAIDA topology information
- ✧ Assume 5 TDs (AfriNIC, ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC, RIPE)
- ✧ We compare to S-BGP/BGP


❖ Metric 1: additional path length (AD hops) compared to BGP

- ✧ *Without* shortcuts: 21% longer
- ✧ *With* shortcuts:
 - 1 down/up- path: 6.7% longer
 - 2 down/up- path: 3.5% longer
 - 5 down/up- path: 2.5% longer

Evaluation (cont'd)

❖ Metric 2: Expressiveness

✧ Fraction of BGP paths available under SCION



Related Work

❖ Routing security

- ✧ S-BGP, soBGP, psBGP, SPV, PGBGP
- ✧ Only topological correctness; addressed a subset of attacks addressed in SCION

❖ Routing control

- ✧ Multipath (MIRO, Deflection, Path splicing, Pathlet), NIRA
- ✧ Only given control to the source, and/or little security assurance

❖ Next-generation architectures

- ✧ HLP, HAIR, RBF, AIP, ICING/IGLOO
- ✧ Focusing on other aspects (reducing routing churns and routing table sizes, enforcing routing policies, and providing source accountability)

Conclusions

🏆 Basic architecture design for a next-generation network that emphasizes **isolation**, **control** and **explicit trust**

🏆 Highly efficient, scalable, available architecture

🏆 Enables numerous additional security mechanisms, e.g., network capabilities

