

## ABSTRACT

This project focuses on the development of a secure smart metering system using DLMS (Device Language Message Specification) Standards. The system employs advanced cryptographic algorithms, including AES-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard - Galois/Counter Mode), SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm), and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) for data encryption and key exchange. The implementation of the encryption process is done using Verilog code, which is uploaded into an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) for hardware acceleration. The proposed system ensures secure and reliable communication between the smart meter and the central utility system while protecting against various cyber threats. The project demonstrates the practical application of advanced cryptographic techniques to improve the security and privacy of smart metering systems.

*Keywords* : Secure smart metering system, DLMS Standards, FPGA

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## **NOMENCLATURE**

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ASCII	American Standard Code for Information Interchange
DLMS	Device Language Message Specification
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Arrays
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
MD5	Message Digest Algorithm
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA	National Security Agency
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman
SCADA	Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
TLS	Transport Layer Security
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
USB	Universal Serial Bus

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Overview

The project aims to enhance the security of data transmission in smart meters that use DLMS standards by implementing encryption algorithms such as AES-GCM, SHA, and ECDSA using Verilog, a hardware description language used in digital circuit design.

The primary objective is to enable secure communication between smart meters and the utility company, preventing unauthorized access to sensitive information such as energy usage and billing data. The encryption algorithms will be integrated into an FPGA device, providing hardware-based encryption for smart meters.

The project represents an innovative approach to improving the security of data transmission in smart meters, with the potential to enhance the reliability of energy usage data and protect consumer privacy, which are crucial aspects of smart grid technology. The implementation of the encryption algorithms in Verilog and integration into the FPGA device ensures that the data transmitted between smart meters and the utility company remains secure and private.

### 1.2 Objectives

The primary objective of this project has been to ensure the security of data communications in smart meters. In order to secure the transmission in smart meters, the project has studied different communication protocol standards and gained an understanding of how data communication occurs, including the encryption standards used. The final objective of the project has been to implement the solution in the FPGA and conduct tests to assess the results. By implementing the solution in the FPGA, the project has validated the design's feasibility for implementation in hardware.

### 1.3 Background

Smart Meters are deployed around the country due to its various benefits such as reduction in cost of overproducing or under producing, Detailed Electricity consumption report allowing consumers to make informed decisions, Detection of faulty appliances, Energy theft detection, and enhancements in grid reliability. All these

data which is provided by the smart meters has to be transmitted to the utility either via power line communication, wireless communication or wired communication. During the transmission of data there is a possibility of data theft, and data tampering which is catastrophic and makes the smart meter system unreliable. In order to ensure secure transmission of data through smart meters we need to encrypt the data before its transmitted.

The communication protocol which we have considered for our project is Device Language Message Specification (DLMS). This is a globally recognized protocol for communication that defines the semantics and the syntax of a language for data exchange with smart devices in an interoperable, efficient and secure manner. It supports applications such as remote meter reading, remote control, and value-added services for metering any kind of energy, such as electricity, water, gas or heat. To specify data exchange with smart devices DLMS uses a three-step approach:

1. Modelling i.e. the semantics, defined with COSEM objects.
2. Messaging i.e. the syntax, defined with DLMS services.
3. Transport, defined with communication profiles.

The DLMS security mechanisms include Entity authentication, Role-based access, Message protection, Data protection, Firmware upgrade, Communication port protection, Security and efficiency, Security logs, Security suites, Security policy, and Security Keys. The security algorithms used in DLMS provide confidentiality, Data integrity, Digital Signature, Key transport, Key agreement, and Hash algorithms. There are three security suites provided by DLMS. We will be implementing the level 1 security suite of DLMS in our project. In this suite AES-GCM 128 is used for Authenticated encryption, ECDSA with P-256 is used for Digital signature, ECDH with P-256 for Key agreement, SHA-256 for Hash generation, AES-128 Key-Wrap for Key transport and V.44 for Compression.

## 1.4 Organization of Thesis

The thesis begins with an introduction that outlines the purpose and objectives of the research, followed by a section that briefly discusses the relevant background literature on smart meter technology and encryption techniques. The literature review chapter provides a critical analysis of the existing literature in the field of study, while the methodology chapter describes the methods used to design the encryption module and the organization of each module.

The thesis also includes a chapter on synthesis and implementation, where the designed encryption module is tested through simulation and implementation. The

synthesis report provides a detailed description of the synthesis process, including the design specifications and the parameters used in the synthesis tool. The implementation report presents the results of the simulation and implementation, using relevant visual aids such as snippets and reports to demonstrate the feasibility of the design.

The results chapter presents the findings of the simulation and implementation, highlighting the success of the encryption module design. The conclusion provides a summary of the main findings and their implications, highlighting the contributions of the research to the field of study. Finally, a comprehensive list of the references cited throughout the research is included at the end of the thesis.

## CHAPTER 2

### Literature Review

Smart meters have been devices that have measured energy consumption in real-time and have provided accurate and up-to-date information about energy usage. They have offered several benefits, including more accurate billing, improved energy management, and improved grid efficiency [1]. By providing real-time data on energy usage patterns, smart meters have helped customers reduce their energy consumption. Smart meters have been essential for modernizing the energy system and have provided customers with more accurate and useful information about their energy consumption.

In order to have achieved these functionalities, the smart meter has had to have bidirectional communication between the household and the service provider. The data that has been transmitted has contained sensitive information about a household's energy consumption, including how much energy has been used and when it has been used. This data has been able to reveal details about a household's behavior and routine, which could be used to infer personal information about the occupants. Encrypting smart meter data has helped to prevent unauthorized access and tampering, as well as protected against interception and eavesdropping during transmission [2]. It has also ensured that the data has remained confidential, which has been important for protecting the privacy of households and complying with data protection regulations.

Encryption of data has been able to be done in two ways: symmetric and asymmetric manner. The basic difference between the two encryption methods has been that in symmetric cipher, the same key has been used to encrypt and decrypt the message, while in asymmetric cipher, the public key has been used to encrypt the data, and the private key has been used to decrypt the data. For symmetric cipher, both the parties, the sender and receiver, have had to know the key, and it has had to be kept as a secret, whereas in asymmetric cipher, the public key has been shared among everyone, and the private key has been kept as a secret.

Either symmetric or asymmetric cipher has not been able to be used alone because of the drawbacks it has possessed. Symmetric cipher has been faster, more efficient, and secure, but the key distribution process has added more complexity and may have compromised the security. On the other hand, asymmetric cipher has not had the problem of key distribution, but it has been slower and inefficient. So, from the paper [3], we have come to the conclusion that hybrid mode of ciphers

has been able to be used to get the best of both worlds.

Here, symmetric algorithm Blowfish has been used to encrypt the main smart meter data, which has been faster and efficient, and the key for the symmetric cipher has been encrypted with the asymmetric algorithm RSA, eliminating the key distribution problems. Along with these encryption algorithms, MD5 and RSA digital signature have been used to provide more authenticity to the data. This hybrid cryptographic stack has formed the base for further studies. Even though multiple algorithms have been used, this stack has been a preliminary option without much optimization for a specific purpose.

Cryptography for SCADA [4] has provided a more optimum, efficient, and specific solution for data encryption for SCADA systems. The proposed methodology has also used a hybrid cryptographic stack with some changes to make it work for specific SCADA applications. This stack has used AES symmetric cipher instead of Blowfish because it has been more secure and recognized as a standard. And for asymmetric cipher, ECC has been preferred over RSA because for smaller size research has proved that ECC has been more efficient than RSA. The hashing algorithm used has remained the same, MD5.

DLMS has provided three different encryption standards that can be used for smart meter data encryption [5]. Out of which, level 1 security suite has been chosen for implementation because the standard mentioned in DLMS has been specific for smart meter, whereas in [4], it has been a general stack for SCADA system. And level 1 security suite has been efficient and has been a little complex to implement.

# CHAPTER 3

## Proposed Methodology

### 3.1 Overall Block Diagram

The encryption standard utilized for smart meter encryption is the DLMS Level 1 standard, which has multiple encryption algorithms to ensure secure transmission of contents. In this project, a flow diagram has been designed to depict the Level 1 suite process. The first step in this encryption process has been ECDH (Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman), which is a key-agreement protocol that defines how keys should be generated and exchanged between parties. This step has been essential as the following algorithms, namely AES and ECDSA, require key and other parameters to be known by both sender and receiver for proper functionality.




Figure 3.1: Flow Diagram

The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) has been a widely used symmetric-key block cipher encryption algorithm to secure data by encrypting it with a key. This algorithm is considered to be highly secure due to its resistance to various types of attacks, including brute force attacks. The AES algorithm has used a symmetric key, which means that the same key has been used for both encryption and decryption. Hence, the sender and receiver have had to know the key for secure communication.

ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) has been a cryptographic digital signature algorithm utilized to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of data. It has been based on the mathematical properties of elliptic

curves and has been a widely used public-key algorithm. ECDSA has worked by using a private key to sign a message, which generates a digital signature. This signature has then been verified using the corresponding public key, which has been published and available to anyone. The signature has provided proof that the message was signed by someone with access to the private key and has not been tampered with since it was signed. ECDSA has been implementable only if curve parameters have been known to both sides. Thus, key transport should have occurred, and other parameters should have been known to both sides for the cryptographic stack to work efficiently.

ECDH (Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman) is a key-agreement protocol that enables two parties (typically Alice and Bob) to exchange information securely without the risk of interception by a third party (known as the Man In the Middle). This principle is often used in the TLS protocol to ensure secure communication between parties.

- To begin the ECDH process, both Alice and Bob generate their own private and public keys using the same domain parameters, such as the same base point on the same elliptic curve on the same finite field. Alice’s private and public keys are denoted as  $d_A$  and  $H_A$  respectively, while Bob’s private and public keys are denoted as  $d_B$  and  $H_B$  respectively.
- Next, Alice and Bob exchange their public keys over an insecure channel. The Man In the Middle may intercept  $H_A$  and  $H_B$ , but they would not be able to obtain  $d_A$  or  $d_B$  without solving the discrete logarithm problem.
- Using her private key and Bob’s public key, Alice calculates  $H_A \cdot G$ , while Bob calculates  $H_B \cdot G$  using his own private key and Alice’s public key. Notably, the shared secret is the same for both Alice and Bob, and it cannot be discovered by the Man In the Middle, who only knows  $H_A$  and  $H_B$  (together with the other domain parameters). This problem is known as the Diffie-Hellman problem, and it is solved by ECDH.




Figure 3.2: ECDH

The Diffie-Hellman problem for elliptic curves is considered to be a challenging problem in cryptography. While no mathematical proofs are available, it is believed

to be as difficult as the discrete logarithm problem. However, it cannot be more difficult than the logarithm problem since solving the logarithm problem provides a way to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem. In comparison to other key exchange protocols such as RSA or Diffie-Hellman (DH), the ECDH algorithm offers several advantages. It enables smaller key sizes, faster processing times, and stronger security for the same key size. As a result, it has become a popular choice for secure communication in various applications, including secure messaging and virtual private networks (VPNs).

In our current project, we assume that the ECDH key exchange algorithm has already been completed, and both parties have obtained the required keys and parameters. With the keys and other parameters known, we can focus on the encryption algorithms without any concerns about the key exchange process. This allows us to work more efficiently towards ensuring secure communication through the implementation of the DLMS Level 1 suite.

### 3.2 AES

AES is a widely used symmetric-key encryption algorithm. It was first introduced by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2001 and is now considered to be one of the most secure encryption algorithms available. AES is used to protect sensitive data, such as credit card numbers, passwords, and other personal information, in various applications, including online banking, e-commerce, and file encryption. The AES encryption algorithm operates on fixed block sizes of 128 bits and supports key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. AES is widely adopted due to its high level of security, efficiency, and scalability.




Figure 3.3: Flowchart for AES encryption

The AES algorithm works in a series of steps that includes key expansion, initial round, main rounds, and final round. Here's a brief explanation of each step:

1. Key expansion: In this step, the original key is expanded into a set of subkeys. These subkeys are generated through a key schedule that uses a combination of substitution and permutation operations.




Figure 3.4: Flowchart for Key Expansion

2. Initial round: The initial round involves the transformation of the input data using a key generated from the key expansion step. This is done through a

process called "AddRoundKey," where each byte of the input data is combined with a corresponding byte of the subkey.

3. Main rounds: The main rounds involve a series of four different transformations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey.

(a) In the SubBytes step, each byte of the input data is replaced with a corresponding byte from a fixed substitution table.




Figure 3.5: SubBytes

(b) In the ShiftRows step, the rows of the input data are shifted by a certain number of bytes.




Figure 3.6: ShiftRows

(c) In the MixColumns step, each column of the input data is multiplied with a fixed matrix.




Figure 3.7: MixColumns

- (d) Finally, in the AddRoundKey step, the input data is combined with a subkey.




Figure 3.8: AddRoundKeys

- Final round: The final round is similar to the initial round, but it omits the MixColumns step. The final round transforms the data using a key generated from the key expansion step and outputs the encrypted data.

In summary, the AES algorithm uses a combination of substitution, permutation, and multiplication operations to transform the input data using a key generated from the key expansion step. This process of encryption makes it very difficult for an attacker to reverse the encryption and obtain the original data without the proper key. Some of the uses for this encryption standard include

- Secure Communication: AES is used to encrypt data transmitted over the internet, such as email, instant messaging, and online transactions. It is commonly used in protocols such as SSL/TLS, SSH, and IPSec to secure communications between servers and clients.
- Data Storage: AES is used to encrypt data stored on hard drives, USB drives, and other storage devices to protect against unauthorized access in case of theft or loss. Many operating systems, including Windows and macOS, use AES encryption to secure user data.
- Military and Government Applications: AES is used by the US government and military to protect classified information. It is also used by other governments and organizations to protect sensitive information.
- Financial Transactions: AES is used to secure financial transactions, such as online banking and credit card transactions, to prevent unauthorized access and fraud.

5. Digital Rights Management: AES is used in digital rights management (DRM) systems to protect copyrighted material from unauthorized distribution and piracy.

Here is a pseudo-code for the encryption process:

### 3.3 AES-GCM

AES-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois Counter Mode of Operation), GCM provides assurance of the confidentiality of data using a variation of the Counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM provides assurance of the authenticity of the confidential data (up to about 64 gigabytes per invocation) using a universal hash function that is defined over a binary Galois (i.e., finite) field. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The Elements of the GCM include Block Cipher (AES), Authenticated Encryption and Decryption function. In our project we will be implementing the Authenticated Encryption function for Smart Meters. The Authenticated decryption function can be used for verification. [6]

#### 3.3.1 Authenticated Encryption Function

Initially the function requires the selection of a block cipher and key. The input data for authenticated encryption function are Plaintext (P), Additional Authenticated Data(AAD), and Initialization Vector (IV). The plaintext and the AAD are the two categories of data that GCM protects. GCM protects the authenticity of the plaintext and the AAD. It also protects the confidentiality of the plaintext, while AAD is left in the clear. The IV is essentially a nonce, a value that is unique within the specified context, which determines an invocation of the authenticated encryption function on the input data to be protected.

The output data from the function include Ciphertext (C), and an Authentication Tag (t). The bit length of the ciphertext is same as the plaintext. The bit length of the Authentication tag , denoted t, is a security parameter, varies from 128, 120, 112, 104, or 96. For some Application tag length can be 64 or 32.

There are some mathematical algorithms that are used as a part of this function which include the following :-

## Incrementing Function

For a positive integer  $s$  and a bit string  $X$  such that  $\text{len}(X)s$ , let the  $s$ -bit incrementing function, denoted  $\text{inc}_s(X)$ , be defined as follows:

$$\text{inc}_s(X) = \text{MSB}_{\text{len}(X)-s}(X) \parallel [\text{int}(\text{LSB}_s(X)) + 1 \bmod 2^s]_s$$

It is a 32 bit incrementing function, the function increments the right-most 32 bits and left-most  $\text{len}(X) - 32$  bits remain unchanged. [7]

## Multiplication Operation ( $X \bullet Y$ )

The  $\bullet$  operation on (pairs of) the  $2^{128}$  possible blocks corresponds to the multiplication operation for the binary Galois (finite) field of  $2^{128}$  elements. The fixed block,  $R$  ( $11100001 \parallel 0^{120}$ ), determines a representation of this field as the modular multiplication of binary polynomials of degree less than 128.

Consider  $R$  to be a bit string ( $11100001 \parallel 0^{120}$ ). Given two input blocks  $X$  and  $Y$ , this algorithm computes a "product" block, denoted as  $X \bullet Y$ .

## Pseudo code

- Let  $x_0x_1\dots x_{127}$  denote the sequence of bits in  $X$ .
- Let  $Z_0 = 0^{128}$  and  $V_0 = Y$ .
- For  $i = 0$  to 127, calculate blocks  $Z_{i+1}$  and  $V_{i+1}$  as follows :

$$Z_{i+1} = \begin{cases} Z_i & \text{if } x_i = 0 \\ Z_i \oplus V_i & \text{if } x_i = 1. \end{cases}$$

$$V_{i+1} = \begin{cases} V_i \gg 1 & \text{if } \text{LSB}_1(V_i) = 0 \\ (V_i \gg 1) \oplus R & \text{if } \text{LSB}_1(V_i) = 1 \end{cases}$$

- Return  $Z_{128}$

This Encryption function uses two main functions GCTR and GHASH. The GCTR function is used for generating the Cipher Text and GHASH function is used for generating the authentication tag.

## GCTR Function

The input required for this function is Initial Counter Block (ICB), Plaintext(X). The ICB is generated by concatenating the Initialization Vector (IV) with 31 zero

bits and a logic high bit. The output(Y) generated will have the same bit length as the input Plaintext(X).




Figure 3.9: GCTR Algorithm

The input string of arbitrary length is partitioned into a sequence of blocks to the greatest extent possible, so that only the rightmost string in the sequence may be a “partial” block. The 32-bit incrementing function is iterated on the initial counter block input to generate a sequence of counter blocks; the input block is the first block of the sequence. The block cipher is applied to the counter blocks and the results are XORed with the corresponding blocks (or partial block) of the partition of the input string. The sequence of results is concatenated to form the output. The output will be the encrypted Ciphertext.

### Pseudo Code

- If  $X$  is the empty string, then return the empty string as  $Y$ .
- Let  $n = [len(X)/128]$ .
- Let  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{n-1}, X_{n^*}$  denote the unique sequence of bit strings such that

$$X = X_1 || X_2 || \dots || X_{n-1} || X_n$$

$X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{n-1}$  are complete blocks

- Let  $CB_1 = ICB$  .
- For  $i = 2$  to  $n$ , Let  $CB_i = inc_{32}(CB_{i-1})$ .
- For  $I = 1$  to  $(n - 1)$ , let  $Y_i = X_i \oplus CIPH_K(CB_i)$ .
- Let  $Y_n^* = X_n^* \oplus MSB_{len(X_n)}(CIPH_K(CB_n))$ .

## GHASH Function

The input required for this function is input string (Ciphertext from GCTR) and a hash subkey. The hash subkey is the output generated by passing 128 zero bits as input to AES algorithm. The output (T) generated from GHASH will be of 128 bits.




Figure 3.10: GHASH Algorithm

The GHASH function calculates  $X_1 \bullet H_m \oplus X_2 \bullet H_{m-1} \oplus \dots \oplus X_{m-1} \bullet H_2 \oplus X_m \bullet H$ . Here the  $\bullet$  function represents the multiplication algorithm. The GHASH function is illustrated in Figure, without the zero block,  $Y_0$ , whose exclusive-OR with  $X_1$  does not change  $X_1$ .

## Pseudo Code

- Let  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{m-1}, X_m$  denote the unique sequence of blocks such that  $X = X_1||X_2||\dots||X_{m-1}||X_m$ .
- Let  $Y_0$  be the “zero block,”  $0^{128}$ .
- For  $i = 1, \dots, m$ , let  $Y_i = (Y_{i-1} \oplus X_i) \bullet H$ .
- Return  $Y_m$ .

## Algorithm for Authenticated Encryption function

The hash subkey for the GHASH function is generated by applying the block cipher to the “zero” block. The pre-counter block (ICB) is generated from the IV. In particular, when the length of the IV is 96 bits, then the padding string 031—1 is appended to the IV to form the pre-counter block. In Step 3, the 32-bit incrementing function is applied to the pre-counter block to produce the initial counter block for an invocation of the GCTR function on the plaintext. The output of this invocation of the GCTR function is the ciphertext. The AAD and the ciphertext are each appended with the minimum number of ‘0’ bits, possibly none, so that the bit

lengths of the resulting strings are multiples of the block size. The concatenation of these strings is appended with the 64-bit representations of the lengths of the AAD and the ciphertext, and the GHASH function is applied to the result to produce a single output block. This output block is encrypted using the GCTR function with pre-counter block that was generated earlier. The result is truncated to the specified tag length to form the authentication tag. The Ciphertext and tag are returned as the output.




Figure 3.11: AES-GCM Algorithm

### Pseudo Code

- Let  $H = CIPH_K(0^{128})$ .
- Define a block, ICB, as follows:  
If  $len(IV) = 96$ , then let  $J_0 = IV||0^{31}||1$ .
- Let  $C = GCTR_K(inc_{32}(ICB), P)$ .
- Let  $u = 128.[len(C)/128]-len(C)$  and let  $v = 128.[len(A)/128]-len(A)$ .
- Define a block, S, as follows:

$$S = GHASH_H(A||0_v||C||0_u||[len(A)]_{64}||[len(C)]_{64})$$

- Let  $T = MSB_t(GCTR_K(ICB, S))$ .
- Return  $(C, T)$ .

### 3.4 SHA256

The SHA256 algorithm is a cryptographic hash function that generates a fixed-length hash value of 256 bits from a given input data. It belongs to the SHA-2 family of hash functions, which were developed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) and published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001. It is widely used and considered a secure hash function in various security applications, such as digital signatures and password storage. The algorithm operates by dividing the input data into blocks and then processing each block through a series of mathematical operations. The resulting 256-bit hash value is unique to the input data and is virtually impossible to recreate the input data for a particular hash value.

One of the essential characteristics of SHA256 is that it is a one-way function, which means that obtaining the original input data from the hash value is infeasible. Additionally, even a minor modification in the input data generates a distinct hash value, making it useful for detecting data tampering or corruption. The main steps followed in the SHA256 algorithm are as follows.

- **Message Padding:** The input message is padded to make its length a multiple of 512 bits.
- **Message Parsing:** The padded message is parsed into 512-bit blocks.
- **Message Schedule Computation:** For each block, a message schedule of 64 32-bit words is computed from the block's 512 bits.
- **Hash State Initialization:** The hash state, consisting of eight 32-bit words, is initialized to fixed constants.
- **Compression Function:** For each block, the compression function is applied to the current hash state and the message schedule.
- **Hash Output:** After all blocks have been processed, the final hash value is obtained by concatenating the eight 32-bit words of the final hash state.




Figure 3.12: SHA256 Overview

### 3.4.1 Message Padding

Before beginning the hash computation, the message,  $M$ , has to be padded to ensure that the padded message is a multiple of 512 bits, which can be processed by SHA256. To achieve this, the bit "1" is added to the end of the message, followed by the addition of  $k$  zero bits, where  $k$  is the smallest non-negative solution to the equation  $1 + 1 + k \equiv 448 \pmod{512}$ , where 1 is the length of the message in bits. Finally, the 64-bit block equal to the number 1 expressed using a binary representation is appended to the message. For instance, if the message is "abc" with a length of  $8 \times 3 = 24$  bits, it is padded with one bit followed by 423 zero bits, and then the message length is added to form a 512-bit padded message.

In this project, the padded message of the data that needed to be transmitted has been stored in the registers of FPGA, assuming that the smart meter has sent the data and padded it accordingly. After a message has been padded, it must be parsed into  $N$  m-bit blocks before the hash computation can begin. So the 512 bits of the input block may be expressed as sixteen 32-bit words




Figure 3.13: SHA Message Padding

### 3.4.2 Message Schedule Computation

After dividing the input message into 16 32-bit blocks, the message scheduling function is applied to create 64 32-bit blocks, which are then used for further data processing.

let us assume the parsed message as M0-M15

let us assume the message schedules as W0-W63

Message schedule function does the following process

- The first 16 message schedules (W0-W15) are copied directly from the initial 16 parsed message blocks (M0-M15).

- The last 48 message schedules (W16-W63) are computed using this function

$$W_n = \sigma_1(W_{n-2}) + W_{n-7} + \sigma_0(W_{n-15}) + W_{n-16}$$

+ means Addition modulo  $2^w$

$\sigma_0$  means function that has some rotation and shift operation

$\sigma_1$  means function that has some rotation and shift operation

$W_n$  means nth term of message schedule

In the hardware design, there is a separate module called SHA256\_W\_mem, which performs the message scheduling operation. This module takes the padded message as input and generates the message schedule by executing the aforementioned functions, and stores them in registers. When the message schedule number is provided as input, it retrieves the corresponding message schedule register value and provides it as output.

### 3.4.3 Hash State Initialization

The SHA256 algorithm employs eight initial hash values, which are referred to as the "state," to create the ultimate hash value by merging them with the input message. These hash values are derived from the initial 32 bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first eight prime numbers (2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19) and are used to initialize the variables as the initial hash value. While processing the first 512 bits block at the start of the SHA process, the SHA256 module initializes

the Hash value registers, which comprise of eight 32-bit registers. However, for the subsequent block(s), the register value retains the result of the previous block.

H0 = 6a09e667

H1 = bb67ae85

H2 = 3c6ef372

H3 = a54ff53a

H4 = 510e527f

H5 = 9b05688c

H6 = 1f83d9ab

H7 = 5be0cd19

### 3.4.4 Compression Function

SHA256 employs 64 constant 32-bit words, each of which is stored in a module called SHA256\_constants. When the module is provided with the input of a specific constant register number, it produces the corresponding constant register value as output. The module contains the sequence of constant values used in SHA256.

428a2f98 71374491 b5c0fbcf e9b5dba5 3956c25b 59f111f1 923f82a4 ab1c5ed5  
d807aa98 12835b01 243185be 550c7dc3 72be5d74 80deb1fe 9bdc06a7 c19bf174  
e49b69c1 efbe4786 0fc19dc6 240ca1cc 2de92c6f 4a7484aa 5cb0a9dc 76f988da  
983e5152 a831c66d b00327c8 bf597fc7 c6e00bf3 d5a79147 06ca6351 14292967  
27b70a85 2e1b2138 4d2c6dfc 53380d13 650a7354 766a0abb 81c2c92e 92722c85  
a2bfe8a1 a81a664b c24b8b70 c76c51a3 d192e819 d6990624 f40e3585 106aa070  
19a4c116 1e376c08 2748774c 34b0bcb5 391c0cb3 4ed8aa4a 5b9cca4f 682e6ff3  
748f82ee 78a5636f 84c87814 8cc70208 90befffa a4506ceb bef9a3f7 c67178f2

During the SHA256 hashing process, a total of 64 rounds are executed using the SHA256 constants and message schedules generated. Each round involves passing one constant value and one message schedule to a function that processes them according to the SHA256 algorithm.

For n = 0 to 63

{

T1 = h +  $\sum_1^{256}(e) + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + K_n + W_n$

T2 =  $\sum_0^{256}(a) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)$

h = g

g = f

f = e

e = d + T1

```

d = c
c = b
b = a
a = T1 + T2
}

```

+ means Addition modulo  $2^w$

$\sum_0^{256}$  means function that has some rotation operation

$\sum_1^{256}$  means function that has some rotation operation

$K_n$  means nth term of SHA256 constants

$W_n$  means nth term of message schedule

Ch( e, f, g) and Maj( a, b, c) are combinational functions

The eight working variables, namely a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are initialized with the stored hash value of the particular block in the SHA256 module. These variables are updated in each round, and the final values of the working variables after 64 rounds are added to the previous or stored hash value to generate the hash value for that block. All of these operations are designed in the SHA256 module.

### 3.4.5 Hash Output

The SHA256 algorithm applies the described operations to each 512-bit block sequentially, where the output of each block is used as input for the subsequent block. After processing all the blocks, the eight hash values of the initial blocks are combined with the output of the final block to yield the final hash value. The SHA\_digest\_valid signal in the SHA\_top module goes high to indicate the completion of the SHA256 process and the production of the final output for the final block.

To summarize, the SHA-256 algorithm is created with the aim of being highly secure against various types of attacks, such as preimage attacks, collision attacks, and birthday attacks. This makes it extremely difficult to find a message that produces a specific hash value, find two distinct messages with the same hash value, or find two messages that generate the same hash value. Therefore, it is valuable for ensuring the accuracy of data and identifying unauthorized modifications.




Figure 3.14: Elliptic Curves

## 3.5 ECDSA

### 3.5.1 Elliptic Curves

The Elliptic curve will be the set of points described by the equation

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, \quad (3.1)$$

where  $a$  and  $b$  are constants and  $x$  and  $y$  are the coordinates of the points on the curve.

In Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm we deal with what is called Weierstrass normal form for elliptic curves with the equation

$$\{(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0\} \cup \{0\} \quad (3.2)$$

Depending on the value of  $a$  and  $b$ , elliptic curves may assume different shapes on the plane and they are symmetric about the x-axis. The point at infinity will act as an ideal point for our curve.

### 3.5.2 Group Laws for Elliptic Curves

- The elements of the group are the points of an elliptic curve;

- The identity element is the point at infinity 0;
- The inverse of a point  $P$  is the one symmetric about the  $x$ -axis;
- Addition is given by the following rule: given three aligned, non-zero points  $P$ ,  $Q$  and  $R$ , their sum is  $P + Q + R = 0$ .

Note that this definition assumes that the elliptic curve is defined over a field that supports the arithmetic operations necessary for the group law.

### Geometric Addition

In the context of elliptic curve cryptography, the sum between two points  $P$  and  $Q$  can be computed using a geometric method. The formula  $P + Q + R = 0$  can be written as  $P + Q = -R$ . To find the point  $R$ , one can draw a line passing through  $P$  and  $Q$ , which will intersect a third point on the curve, denoted by  $R$ . This intersection is implied by the fact that  $P$ ,  $Q$ , and  $R$  are aligned. The required result of  $P + Q$  can then be obtained by taking the inverse of  $R$ , denoted by  $-R$ . [8]




Figure 3.15: Geometric Addition

### Algebraic Addition

1. Two non-zero, non-symmetric points  $P = (x_p, y_p)$  and  $Q = (x_q, y_q)$  are considered. If  $P$  and  $Q$  are distinct ( $x_p \neq x_q$ ), the slope of the line passing

through them is given by

$$m = (y_p - y_q)/(x_p - x_q) \quad (3.3)$$

2. The third point of intersection of this line with the elliptic curve is denoted by  $R = (x_r, y_r)$  and can be determined using the following equations:

$$x_r = m^2 - x_p - x_q$$

$$y_r = y_p + m(x_r - x_p) \quad \text{or} \quad y_r = y_q + m(x_r - x_q)$$

3. Therefore, the sum of the two points  $(x_p, y_p)$  and  $(x_q, y_q)$  is given by  $(x_r, -y_r)$  (the signs need to be taken into account and it should be remembered that  $P + Q = -R$ ). The validity of this result can be verified by checking whether  $R$  belongs to the curve and whether  $P$ ,  $Q$ , and  $R$  are aligned.[9]

### Point Doubling

ECDSA, point doubling refers to the process of adding a point to itself algebraically. Let  $P = (x_p, y_p)$  be a non-zero point on an elliptic curve  $E$  represented in Weierstrass form. The doubling of  $P$  can be computed as follows:

1. Calculate the slope  $m$  of the tangent line to  $E$  at point  $P$  using the following formula:

$$m = \frac{3x_p^2 + a}{2y_p} \quad (3.4)$$

where  $a$  is the coefficient of the  $x^3$  term in the Weierstrass equation for  $E$ .

2. Calculate the  $x$  and  $y$  coordinates of the point  $2P$  using the following formulas:

$$x_{2P} = m^2 - 2x_p$$

$$y_{2P} = m(x_p - x_{2P}) - y_p$$

or equivalently,

$$y_{2P} = -y_p - m(x_{2P} - x_p)$$

The resulting point  $2P = (x_{2P}, y_{2P})$  is the doubling of  $P$  on the elliptic curve  $E$ . Note that the point at infinity does not have a doubling operation.

## Scalar Multiplication

Scalar multiplication is the operation of multiplying a point on the elliptic curve by an integer scalar. Let  $P$  be a point on the curve, and  $k$  be a scalar. Then the scalar multiplication  $kP$  is defined as adding  $P$  to itself  $k$  times: [10]

$$kP = \underbrace{P + P + \cdots + P}_{k \text{ times}}$$

This can be done using repeated point addition, but there are more efficient algorithms such as the double-and-add algorithm and the Montgomery ladder algorithm. These algorithms are based on the binary representation of the scalar  $k$ .

The double-and-add algorithm works as follows: Starting with  $Q_0 = \mathcal{O}$  (the point at infinity), compute  $Q_i$  as follows:

1. If the  $i$ -th bit of  $k$  is 1, then set  $Q_i = Q_{i-1} + P$ .
2. Otherwise, set  $Q_i = 2Q_{i-1}$  (i.e., double the previous point).

After  $n$  iterations,  $Q_n = kP$ . This algorithm requires at most  $2\log_2(k)$  point additions and  $\log_2(k)$  point doublings.

### 3.5.3 Elliptic Curves in a Finite Field

An elliptic curve over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is defined by an equation of the form

$$E : y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}, \quad (3.5)$$

where  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$  and  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \pmod{p}$ . The points on the curve  $E$  form a group denoted by  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .

### Domain Parameters of an Elliptic Curve over a Finite Field

An elliptic curve over a finite field is defined by six domain parameters, which are as follows:

- A prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  where  $p$  is a large prime number.
- A coefficient  $a$  and  $b$  from the field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  such that the elliptic curve equation  $E$  is defined by  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ .
- A point  $P$  on the elliptic curve with coordinates  $(x_P, y_P)$ , which generates a cyclic subgroup of prime order  $n$ .
- The order  $n$  of the cyclic subgroup generated by the point  $P$ .




Figure 3.16: Elliptic Curves in Finite Fields

- The cofactor  $h$ , which is defined as the number of points on the elliptic curve divided by the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by  $P$ , i.e.,  $h = \#E(F_p)/n$ .

The domain parameters are usually chosen in such a way that the order  $n$  of the cyclic subgroup generated by the point  $P$  is a large prime number. This is important for the security of cryptographic schemes that use elliptic curves, such as ECDSA.

The elliptic curve equation  $E$  over  $F_p$  can be written as:

$$E : y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p} \quad (*)$$

where  $\equiv$  denotes congruence modulo  $p$ .

The point  $P$  on the elliptic curve is chosen such that its order  $n$  is prime, i.e.,  $nP = \mathcal{O}$  where  $\mathcal{O}$  is the point at infinity. The order  $n$  is also used to define a cyclic subgroup  $G$  of  $E$ , which is generated by  $P$  and has  $n$  elements:

$$G = \langle P \rangle = \{\mathcal{O}, P, 2P, 3P, \dots, (n-1)P\}$$

The cofactor  $h$  is defined as the number of points on the elliptic curve divided by the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by  $P$ :

$$h = \frac{\#E(F_p)}{n}$$

where  $\#E(F_p)$  denotes the number of points on the elliptic curve over  $F_p$ .

In order to ensure the security of cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves, it is important to choose the domain parameters carefully and to use parameters that have been standardized and thoroughly vetted by the cryptographic community.

The group arithmetic defined for Elliptic Curves are still valid in the finite fields

The elliptic curve used in this project is the one used for signature in Bitcoins which is secp256k1. Curve parameters are as follows

1. secp256k1
  2. Field characteristic:  $p = 0xFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F$
  3. Curve coefficients:  $a = 0, b = 7$
  4. Base point:  $g = ( 0x79be667e f9dcbbac 55a06295 ce870b07 029bfcd8 2dce28d9 59f2815b 16f81798 0x 483ada77 26a3c465 5da4fbfc 0e1108a8 fd17b448 a6855419 9c47d08f fb10d4b8 )$
  5. Subgroup order:  $n = 0x FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C D0364141$
  6. Subgroup cofactor:  $h=1$

### 3.5.4 Design Architecture

The design has several sub-modules which are integrated together to achieve the functionality. There is a custom ALU for Modular mathematics used in the finite field Elliptic Curve operations, and algebraic point arithmetics using modules that help find slopes between two points and tangents and followed by another module that does the resultant point calculation with the obtained slope and given points.

ALU

The Verilog-designed ECDSA module utilizes a custom ALU for performing mathematical operations required for Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This ALU is built using basic arithmetic and logic functions such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, modulus, and comparison. Additionally, a modular arithmetic module has been developed using these functions as building blocks, specifically for performing arithmetic operations like addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division on a finite field.

Inverse module function is also an essential math in finite field operations and Extended Euclidean Algorithm is used to obtain the value for this which is explained below

1. Given two integers  $a$  and  $m$ , where  $m$  is prime, set  $b = m$  and  $x = 0$  and  $y = 1$ .
2. Using the standard Euclidean algorithm, compute the greatest common divisor of  $a$  and  $m$ , along with the quotients  $q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots$  and remainders  $r_0, r_1, r_2, \dots$ .
3. Write the greatest common divisor as a linear combination of  $a$  and  $m$ :  $d = as + mt$ , where  $d$  is the greatest common divisor and  $s$  and  $t$  are integers.
4. If  $d \neq 1$ , then  $a$  is not invertible modulo  $m$ . Otherwise, the inverse of  $a$  modulo  $m$  is given by  $s$ .

With this put together the ECDSA ALU does the following operations

1. Modular Addition
2. Modular Subtraction
3. Modular Multiplication
4. Modular Division
5. Inverse Modulo

## Slope Calculation

The module calculates the slope for point addition or doubling and passes it to the next module. The pseudo-code explains these steps

```

if  $P = Q$  then
   $m \leftarrow (3x_1^2 + a)/(2y_1)$                                  $\triangleright$  Calculate tangent slope
else
   $m \leftarrow (y_2 - y_1)/(x_2 - x_1)$                              $\triangleright$  Calculate slope between two points
end if
Output  $m$                                                $\triangleright$  Output the slope value

```

## Point Calculation

This module calculates the new point  $R(x, y)$  from point  $P(x, y)$  and  $Q(x, y)$  and the slope  $m$  obtained from the slope calculation module. The pseudo-code that corresponds to this step is as follows

- 1:  $x \leftarrow m^2 - P.x - Q.x$
- 2:  $y \leftarrow m \cdot (P.x - x) - P.y$
- 3:  $R.x \leftarrow x$
- 4:  $R.y \leftarrow y$

## Scalar Multiplication

This module does the Double and Add Algorithm to calculate the scalar product of a given point. It uses both the slope calculation and point calculation modules to obtain the scalar product. The pseudo-code given below explains the working

**Require:**  $k$  is a scalar,  $P$  is a point on an elliptic curve  $E$

**Ensure:**  $kP$

```

1: function DOUBLEANDADDSLOPE( $k$ ,  $P$ )
2:    $Accum \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$             $\triangleright$  Initialize  $Accum$  to the point at infinity
3:    $k_{bin} \leftarrow$  binary representation of  $k$ 
4:   for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $\text{length}(k_{bin}) - 1$  do
5:     if  $k_{bin}[i] = 1$  then
6:        $slope \leftarrow$  slope of line through  $P$  and  $Accum$   $\triangleright$  Calculate the slope
7:        $Q \leftarrow$  point resulting from adding  $P$  and  $Accum$  with slope  $slope$   $\triangleright$ 
      Calculate the new point
8:        $Accum \leftarrow Q$             $\triangleright$  Set the new point as the current accumulator
9:     end if
10:     $P \leftarrow$  double of  $P$  using slope  $slope$   $\triangleright$  Double  $P$  using the previous
        slope
11:   end for
12:   return  $Accum$ 
13: end function

```

## Main Block

This is the top module that integrates all other components. This module generates the digital signal. One instance of the ALU module is used and a common is bus used to connect it to other components of the main block and is also used by the main block as well. The following pseudo-code explains the process in brief.

**Require:**  $G$  is the generator point,  $d$  is the private key,  $p$  and  $n$  are curve parameters,  $H$  is the hash function,  $k$  is a random value

**Ensure:** ECDSA signature  $(r, s)$

```

1: function ECDSASIGN( $G$ ,  $d$ ,  $p$ ,  $n$ ,  $H$ ,  $k$ )
2:    $kG \leftarrow$  scalar product of  $k$  and  $G$   $\triangleright$  Compute the scalar product of  $k$  and  $G$ 
3:    $r \leftarrow kG.x \bmod n$        $\triangleright$  Compute the  $x$  coordinate of the scalar product and
      take mod  $n$ 
4:    $e \leftarrow H(m)$             $\triangleright$  Compute the hash value of the message
5:    $s \leftarrow (k^{-1}(e + dr)) \bmod n$   $\triangleright$  Compute the signature component  $s$ 
6:   return  $(r, s)$ 

```

In this algorithm, the scalar product of the random value  $k$  and the generator point  $G$  is computed to obtain a point on the elliptic curve. The  $x$  coordinate of this point is then taken mod  $n$  to obtain the  $r$  component of the signature. The hash value of the message is computed using the specified hash function  $H$ , and this value is denoted as  $e$ . Finally, the  $s$  component of the signature is computed using the formula  $(k^{-1}(e + dr)) \bmod n$ . Note that  $d$  is the private key and is used in the computation of  $s$ .

# CHAPTER 4

## Results and Discussions

### 4.1 Simulation

Simulation is the process of creating a computer model of a real-world system or process and using that model to investigate or study the behavior and performance of the system under different scenarios or conditions. It is a technique that allows researchers, engineers, scientists, and other professionals to test, analyze, and optimize complex systems or processes without the need for expensive and time-consuming physical experiments.

Simulations can be used in various fields, such as engineering, physics, economics, biology, and social sciences, among others. They can range from simple models that involve only a few variables to highly complex models that incorporate many interrelated factors. Simulations can help to identify and address problems or issues, optimize performance, predict outcomes, and support decision-making processes.

#### 4.1.1 AES-GCM




Figure 4.1: AES Simulation Result

Here the input data to the AES Algorithm is 128 bits and in hexadecimal its represented as "4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f43". The AES key used for simulation is also of 128 bits and in hexadecimal its represented as "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f". The encrypted data in hexadecimal is "e930ac10030fa5db617af6dfa741ade4".

[<<< back](#)

**AES Calculator**

You can use the AES Calculator applet displayed below to encrypt or decrypt using AES the specified 128-bit (32 hex digit) data value with the 128-bit (32 hex digit) key. 128-bit key is most often used in dongles.

Example AES test values (taken from FIPS-197) are:

Key: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 Plaintext: 00112233445566778899aabcccddeeff  
 Ciphertext: 69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a

Encrypting the plaintext with the key should give the ciphertext, decrypting the ciphertext with the key should give the plaintext.

---

AES key (in hex):	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Input Data (in hex):	e930ac10030fa5db617af6dfa741ade4
Encrypt it:	
Decrypt it:	4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f43

Figure 4.2: AES Verification

Here we have used the same input AES key that was used for simulation and the input data is encrypted data we obtained after AES Simulation. The decrypted output in hexadecimal is "4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f43" which is the input we gave to our AES algorithm for simulation. Hence its successfully verified.



Figure 4.3: AES-GCM Simulation

Here input Plaintext is 384 bits and in hexadecimal its represented as 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f43000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f5786934454ab4748494a4b4c4d4e4f43. The Initialization Vector is of 96 bits and in hexadecimal its represented as "4142435ab6d41abcd45b2acb". The AES key used is "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f". The Additional Authenticated data is of 128 bits and in hexadecimal its

”5786934454ab4748494a4b4c4d4e4f43”. The final encrypted output after simulation is of 384 bits and in hexadecimal its represented as ”d20d9dbba42180babe2fb56bfff45afcc858a0cfcf48fc1f5ff6cf42cbe06ee80c4c94dbbb5cc80babe2fb56bfff45afcc”.

### 4.1.2 SHA & ECDSA

## The input data

ID (32 Bits) – 0x9a35b0e2

Voltage (64 Bits) – 0x35bd74c41e98b44

Mag - 219.841 (0x435bd74c)

Pha - 29.193 (0x41e98b44)

Current (64 Bits) – 0x40c6d91742187dd9

Mag - 6.214 A (0x40c6d917)

Pha - 8.1229 (0x42187dd9)

Power (64 Bits) - 0x00000000449a1bf8 (1232.874 W)

Energy (64 Bits) – 0x0000000042707bb3 (60.1208 kwh)

## Date and Time

Day (8 Bits) - 0x08

Month (8 Bits) - 0x05

Year (16 bit) - 0x07E7

Hours (8 Bits) - 0x0a

Minutes (12 Bits) - 0x0

### Seconds (12 Bits) - 0x021

Floating point harmonic distortion (32 bit) 2.1045 V (0x4006b021)

Frequency (32 Bits) 00000032

## SHA input data Block

### Hash Value

0x5e7474c0fa6142ebfd3da11e7d571755ae42ba3860faa41ccc589df1d9b2e88c

### Digital Signature R

0x2b4ea0a797a443d293ef5cff444f4979f06acfbd7e86d277475656138385b6c

### Digital Signature S

0x4fa4cb26df088990aac824f4b91945104f5f9b701c41bcc61c0fa7fd8bd42576




Figure 4.4: SHA ECDSA Simulations

```
[Running] python -u "e:\College\Internship and Projects\Digital\Smart Meter\ecdsa_py.py"
Curve: secp256k1
Private key: 0x2ab
Public key: (0x0c613eb61d6955eb2ebc92840aa69d288c390504b7e869ff3d943aa67ea65d, 0x72f61ae527b5c82e4afa896655d9289d29931c1bf0d36c09fe4213c527848cba)
Hash : 5e7474c0fa6142ebfd3da11e7d571755ae42ba3860faa41ccc589df1d9b2e88c

Message: 9a35b0e2435bd74c41e98b4440c6d91742187dd90000000449a1bf800000004270/bb3080507e/0a0120214006b02100000032
Signature: (0x2b4ea0a797a443d293ef5cff444f4979f06acfbd7e86d277475656138385b6c, 0x4fa4cb26df088990aac824f4b91945104f5f9b701c41bcc61c0fa7fd8bd42576)
Hash : 5e7474c0fa6142ebfd3da11e7d571755ae42ba3860faa41ccc589df1d9b2e88c
Verification: signature matches
```

Figure 4.5: SHA ECDSA Verification

Upon observing the provided figure, it can be noted that the input block of the SHA undergoes processing within the SHA module, resulting in the generation of a hash value. This hash value is then passed onto the ECDSA module, where the digital signature is created by producing the r and s values. It is noteworthy that the generated hash value from the hardware simulation corresponds to the hash value generated from the Python script. This observation leads to the conclusion that the modules' functionalities are logically correct, as expected.

## 4.2 Synthesis

Synthesis refers to the process of transforming a high-level hardware description language (HDL) code, such as Verilog or VHDL, into a gate-level netlist that can be used to configure an FPGA device. The synthesis process involves analyzing the HDL code and translating it into a logic-level representation of the design. During synthesis, the HDL code is analyzed and optimized to create a gate-level netlist that is functionally equivalent to the original design. This netlist is then used to configure

the FPGA device, which consists of programmable logic blocks, interconnects, and I/O blocks that can be configured to implement any digital logic function.

#### 4.2.1 AES-GCM




Figure 4.6: AES-GCM RTL Schematic

Name	1	Slice LUTs (20800)	Bonded IOB (106)
N mult_in_GF128		7715	384

Figure 4.7: AES-GCM Utilization




Figure 4.8: AES-GCM Power

We synthesized the AES-GCM algorithm and generated the RTL schematic. The schematic consists of 9469 nets and 9213 leaf cells. From fig 4.5 it can be observed that total LUTs used is 7715. From fig 4.6 we can observe that static power dissipation is 0.485 W and dynamic power dissipation is 296.041 W. The total on chip power required is 296.527 W.

#### 4.2.2 SHA




Figure 4.9: SHA256 Utilization Report




Figure 4.10: SHA256 Schematics

Based on an analysis of the utilization report and schematics, it can be inferred that the hardware design of SHA256 has been successfully implemented. The SHA256 module employs 1332 LUTs and 1326 slice registers, which are well within the available limit of FPGA LUTs and slice registers.

However, it is noteworthy that the Bonded IOB pins have exceeded the limit. This can be attributed to the fact that the SHA256 module was synthesized without the Encryption\_top module, which is responsible for transmitting the hash data through a TxD line in the UART communication protocol.

#### 4.2.3 ECDSA




Figure 4.11: ECDSA Schematics

Based on the analysis of schematics, it can be inferred that the hardware design of ECDSA has been successfully implemented.

### 4.3 Implementation

The feasibility of the hardware design was tested by implementing the hardware designs on the Basys 3 board. This was done to ensure that the design could be effectively converted into an electronic circuit. In the design, separate registers were used to store the input data that would be processed by the encryption algorithm of each module. This approach helped to reduce the need for external inputs to the FPGA, thereby minimizing the work required for communication between the FPGA peripherals and the registers.

To facilitate the transmission and reading of output data from the FPGA, the outputs of each algorithm were also stored in registers. The UART communication protocol was used to read the output data from the FPGA, and a USB RS232 connection was employed to connect the FPGA to the computing machine. This approach ensured that the output data could be easily transmitted and read.

The implementation of the design on the Basys 3 board helped to confirm the feasibility of the hardware design. It also provided valuable insights into the performance and functionality of the design, which can be used to further optimize and improve the design. Overall, the use of separate registers for input data storage proved to be an effective approach, which helped to simplify the communication process and reduce the workload required for data transfer.

### 4.3.1 AES-GCM




Figure 4.12: AES-GCM FPGA

The FPGA board which was used for implementation did not have enough registers to execute the algorithm hence bitstream generation was not possible. As observed from the figure LUT and BRAM ran out of space to store the algorithm.

### 4.3.2 SHA




Figure 4.13: SHA256 FPGA implementation




Figure 4.14: SHA256 FPGA Enable signal




Figure 4.15: SHA256 UART Output

After analyzing the provided figures, it can be observed that the FPGA has been programmed with SHA256. In the first figure, the Led-U16 and switch-V16 are both turned off, indicating that the enable signal has not been asserted using the V16

switch. However, in the second figure, the switch-V16 is turned on, and the Led-U16 is also turned on, indicating that the SHA module is performing the hashing process. The module completes the hashing process by asserting Hash\_digest\_valid, which is represented by the Led-U16 turning on.

Moreover, the result obtained from the hashing process is stored in the register and can be read out from the FPGA using the UART protocol. It is noteworthy that the output of the Hash value matches the simulation-verified output, confirming that the hardware design is functioning correctly.

In summary, the analysis of the figures suggests that the FPGA has been successfully programmed with SHA256. The activation of the Led-U16 and switch-V16 confirms that the enable signal has been asserted, allowing the SHA module to perform the hashing process. The verification of the output using simulation adds to the confidence in the hardware design's effectiveness. Overall, these observations provide assurance in the accuracy and reliability of the SHA256 hardware design.

# CHAPTER 5

## Conclusion

### 5.1 Summary

The FPGA implementation of level 1 security suite of DLMS protocol for secure transmission of data in smart meters is discussed in this paper. The level 1 security suite of DLMS consists of AES-GCM for encryption of plain text, SHA-256 for generation of hash, ECDH for key agreement and key exchange, and ECDSA for generation of digital signature. We have considered that the key exchange between the sender and receiver has already been done using the ECDH algorithm.

Based on results from Chapter 4, the level of implementation of the security suite is as follows :

1. SHA-256 algorithm was successfully simulated in Xilinx Vivado and verified using online tools. We were able to synthesize the algorithm and generate the bitstream for the Basys 3 FPGA board.
2. AES-GCM algorithm was successfully simulated in Xilinx Vivado. AES is one of main modules present inside this algorithm which was separately simulated and verified using online tools. We were able to synthesize the algorithm but could not generate the bitstream for Basys 3 FPGA board as it did not have enough memory space.
3. ECDSA algorithm was successfully simulated in Xilinx Vivado and verified using a python script.

### 5.2 Future Scope

This project has several potential future scopes that can further enhance the security of data transmission in smart meters. These include:

1. Integration with other communication protocols: The project can be extended to include other communication protocols used in smart grid technology, such as Modbus and DNP3, to provide secure communication across various devices.
2. Implementation of other encryption algorithms: The project can incorporate other encryption algorithms, such as RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman), to provide a wider range of secure communication options.

3. Development of a comprehensive security framework: The project can serve as a foundation for developing a comprehensive security framework for smart grid technology, addressing various security concerns across different layers of the system.
4. Integration with machine learning algorithms: The project can be combined with machine learning algorithms to enhance the security and privacy of smart meters by detecting anomalies in energy usage data and preventing cyber attacks.
5. Development of a user-friendly interface: The project can be extended to develop a user-friendly interface for smart meter users, providing them with an easy way to verify the security of their data transmission.

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# APPENDIX A

## CODE ATTACHMENTS

### A.1 AES

#### A.1.1 TOP-MODULE

```
1  module AES128(
2      input  clk ,
3      input  reset ,
4
5      input  [31:0] IN_DATA0,
6      input  [31:0] IN_DATA1,
7      input  [31:0] IN_DATA2,
8      input  [31:0] IN_DATA3,
9
10     input  [31:0] IN_KEY0,
11     input  [31:0] IN_KEY1,
12     input  [31:0] IN_KEY2,
13     input  [31:0] IN_KEY3,
14
15     output [31:0] OUT_DATA0,
16     output [31:0] OUT_DATA1,
17     output [31:0] OUT_DATA2,
18     output [31:0] OUT_DATA3
19 );
20 wire [127:0] IN_DATA, IN_KEY, OUT_DATA;
21
22 assign IN_DATA = {IN_DATA3, IN_DATA2, IN_DATA1, IN_DATA0};
23 assign IN_KEY = {IN_KEY3, IN_KEY2, IN_KEY1, IN_KEY0};
24 assign {OUT_DATA3, OUT_DATA2, OUT_DATA1, OUT_DATA0} = OUT_DATA;
25
26 reg [127:0] R0_OUT_DATA, KEY;
27 wire [127:0] R1_OUT_DATA, R2_OUT_DATA, R3_OUT_DATA, R4_OUT_DATA,
28             R5_OUT_DATA, R6_OUT_DATA, R7_OUT_DATA, R8_OUT_DATA, R9_OUT_DATA;
29 wire [127:0] OUT_KEYW1, OUT_KEYW2, OUT_KEYW3, OUT_KEYW4, OUT_KEYW5,
30             OUT_KEYW6, OUT_KEYW7, OUT_KEYW8, OUT_KEYW9;
31 wire [127:0] OUT_KEYR0, OUT_KEYR1, OUT_KEYR2, OUT_KEYR3, OUT_KEYR4,
32             OUT_KEYR5, OUT_KEYR6, OUT_KEYR7, OUT_KEYR8, OUT_KEYR9;
33
34 always @(posedge clk) begin
35     R0_OUT_DATA <= IN_DATA ^ IN_KEY;
36     KEY <= IN_KEY;
37 end
38
39 GENERATE_KEY
40     K1 (.clk(clk), .ROUND_KEY(4'd0), .IN_KEY(KEY), .OUT_KEY
41             (OUT_KEYW1), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR0)),
42     K2 (.clk(clk), .ROUND_KEY(4'd1), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW1), .OUT_KEY
43             (OUT_KEYW2), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR1)),
```

```

39      K3 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd2), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW2), .OUT_KEY
40          (OUT_KEYW3), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR2)),
41      K4 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd3), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW3), .OUT_KEY
42          (OUT_KEYW4), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR3)),
43      K5 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd4), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW4), .OUT_KEY
44          (OUT_KEYW5), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR4)),
45      K6 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd5), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW5), .OUT_KEY
46          (OUT_KEYW6), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR5)),
47      K7 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd6), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW6), .OUT_KEY
48          (OUT_KEYW7), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR6)),
49      K8 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd7), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW7), .OUT_KEY
50          (OUT_KEYW8), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR7)),
51      K9 (.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd8), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW8), .OUT_KEY
52          (OUT_KEYW9), .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR8)),
53      K10(.c1k(c1k), .ROUND_KEY(4'd9), .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYW9), .OUT_KEY
54          () , .OUT_KEY_R(OUT_KEYR9));
55
56 ROUND_ITERATION R1(.c1k(c1k),
57                     .IN_DATA(R0_OUT_DATA),
58                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR0),
59                     .OUT_DATA(R1_OUT_DATA));
60
61 ROUND_ITERATION R2(.c1k(c1k),
62                     .IN_DATA(R1_OUT_DATA),
63                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR1),
64                     .OUT_DATA(R2_OUT_DATA));
65
66 ROUND_ITERATION R3(.c1k(c1k),
67                     .IN_DATA(R2_OUT_DATA),
68                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR2),
69                     .OUT_DATA(R3_OUT_DATA));
70
71 ROUND_ITERATION R4(.c1k(c1k),
72                     .IN_DATA(R3_OUT_DATA),
73                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR3),
74                     .OUT_DATA(R4_OUT_DATA));
75
76 ROUND_ITERATION R5(.c1k(c1k),
77                     .IN_DATA(R4_OUT_DATA),
78                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR4),
79                     .OUT_DATA(R5_OUT_DATA));
80
81 ROUND_ITERATION R6(.c1k(c1k),
82                     .IN_DATA(R5_OUT_DATA),
83                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR5),
84                     .OUT_DATA(R6_OUT_DATA));
85
86 ROUND_ITERATION R7(.c1k(c1k),
87                     .IN_DATA(R6_OUT_DATA),
88                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR6),
89                     .OUT_DATA(R7_OUT_DATA));
90
91 ROUND_ITERATION R8(.c1k(c1k),
92                     .IN_DATA(R7_OUT_DATA),
93                     .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR7),
94                     .OUT_DATA(R8_OUT_DATA));

```

```

87
88 ROUND_ITERATION R9(.clk(clk),
89 .IN_DATA(R8_OUT_DATA),
90 .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR8),
91 .OUT_DATA(R9_OUT_DATA));
92
93 LAST_ROUND R10(.clk(clk),
94 .IN_DATA(R9_OUT_DATA),
95 .IN_KEY(OUT_KEYR9),
96 .OUT_DATA(OUT_DATA));
97
98
99 endmodule

```

### A.1.2 SUB-BYTES

```

1 module SUB_BYTES(
2     input clk,
3     input [127:0] IN_DATA,
4     output [127:0] SB_DATA
5 );
6
7 reg [127:0] SB_DATA;
8 wire [127:0] SB_DATA_W;
9
10 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST0(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[127:120]), .
11     C(SB_DATA_W[127:120]));
12 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST1(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[119:112]), .
13     C(SB_DATA_W[119:112]));
14 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST2(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[111:104]), .
15     C(SB_DATA_W[111:104]));
16 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST3(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[103:96]), .C
17     (SB_DATA_W[103:96]));
18 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST4(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[95:88]), .C(
19     SB_DATA_W[95:88]));
20 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST5(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[87:80]), .C(
21     SB_DATA_W[87:80]));
22 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST6(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[79:72]), .C(
23     SB_DATA_W[79:72]));
24 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST7(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[71:64]), .C(
25     SB_DATA_W[71:64]));
26 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST8(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[63:56]), .C(
27     SB_DATA_W[63:56]));
28 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST9(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[55:48]), .C(
29     SB_DATA_W[55:48]));
30 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST10(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[47:40]), .C(
31     SB_DATA_W[47:40]));
32 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST11(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[39:32]), .C(
33     SB_DATA_W[39:32]));
34 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST12(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[31:24]), .C(
35     SB_DATA_W[31:24]));
36 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST13(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[23:16]), .C(
37     SB_DATA_W[23:16]));

```

```

27 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST14(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[15:8]), .C(
28   SB_DATA_W[15:8]));
29 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST15(.clk(clk), .A(IN_DATA[7:0]), .C(
30   SB_DATA_W[7:0]));
31
32 always @(*) begin
33   SB_DATA <= SB_DATA_W;
34 end
35
36 endmodule

```

### A.1.3 MIX-COLUMNS

```

1  module MIX_COLUMNS(
2    input clk,
3    input [127:0] IN_DATA,
4    output [127:0] MIXED_DATA
5  );
6
7  reg [127:0] MIXED_DATA_REG;
8
9  always @(*) begin
10   MIXED_DATA_REG[127:120] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[127:120],IN_DATA
11     [119:112],IN_DATA[111:104],IN_DATA[103:96]);
12   MIXED_DATA_REG[119:112] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[119:112],IN_DATA
13     [111:104],IN_DATA[103:96],IN_DATA[127:120]);
14   MIXED_DATA_REG[111:104] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[111:104],IN_DATA
15     [103:96],IN_DATA[127:120],IN_DATA[119:112]);
16   MIXED_DATA_REG[103:96] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[103:96],IN_DATA
17     [127:120],IN_DATA[119:112],IN_DATA[111:104]);
18
19   MIXED_DATA_REG[95:88] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[95:88],IN_DATA[87:80],
20     IN_DATA[79:72],IN_DATA[71:64]);
21   MIXED_DATA_REG[87:80] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[87:80],IN_DATA[79:72],
22     IN_DATA[71:64],IN_DATA[95:88]);
23   MIXED_DATA_REG[79:72] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[79:72],IN_DATA[71:64],
24     IN_DATA[95:88],IN_DATA[87:80]);
25   MIXED_DATA_REG[71:64] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[71:64],IN_DATA[95:88],
26     IN_DATA[87:80],IN_DATA[79:72]);
27
28   MIXED_DATA_REG[63:56] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[63:56],IN_DATA[55:48],
29     IN_DATA[47:40],IN_DATA[39:32]);
30   MIXED_DATA_REG[55:48] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[55:48],IN_DATA[47:40],
31     IN_DATA[39:32],IN_DATA[63:56]);
32   MIXED_DATA_REG[47:40] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[47:40],IN_DATA[39:32],
33     IN_DATA[63:56],IN_DATA[55:48]);
34   MIXED_DATA_REG[39:32] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[39:32],IN_DATA[63:56],
35     IN_DATA[55:48],IN_DATA[47:40]);
36
37   MIXED_DATA_REG[31:24] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[31:24],IN_DATA[23:16],
38     IN_DATA[15:8],IN_DATA[7:0]);
39   MIXED_DATA_REG[23:16] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[23:16],IN_DATA[15:8],
40     IN_DATA[7:0],IN_DATA[31:24]);
41   MIXED_DATA_REG[15:8] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[15:8],IN_DATA[7:0],
42     IN_DATA[31:24],IN_DATA[23:16]);
43   MIXED_DATA_REG[7:0] = MIXCOLUMN(IN_DATA[7:0],IN_DATA[31:24],
44     IN_DATA[31:24],IN_DATA[7:0]);

```

```

        IN_DATA[23:16],IN_DATA[15:8]);
29 end
30
31 assign MIXED_DATA = MIXED_DATA_REG;
32
33 function [7:0] MIXCOLUMN;
34 input [7:0] IN1, IN2, IN3, IN4;
35 begin
36     MIXCOLUMN[7] = IN1[6]^IN2[6]^IN2[7]^IN3[7]^IN4[7];
37     MIXCOLUMN[6] = IN1[5]^IN2[5]^IN2[6]^IN3[6]^IN4[6];
38     MIXCOLUMN[5] = IN1[4]^IN2[4]^IN2[5]^IN3[5]^IN4[5];
39     MIXCOLUMN[4] = IN1[3]^IN1[7]^IN2[3]^IN2[4]^IN2[7]^IN3[4]^IN4
[4];
40     MIXCOLUMN[3] = IN1[2]^IN1[7]^IN2[2]^IN2[3]^IN2[7]^IN3[3]^IN4
[3];
41     MIXCOLUMN[2] = IN1[1]^IN2[1]^IN2[2]^IN3[2]^IN4[2];
42     MIXCOLUMN[1] = IN1[0]^IN1[7]^IN2[0]^IN2[1]^IN2[7]^IN3[1]^IN4
[1];
43     MIXCOLUMN[0] = IN1[7]^IN2[7]^IN2[0]^IN3[0]^IN4[0];
44 end
45 endfunction
46
47 endmodule

```

#### A.1.4 SHIFT-ROWS

```

1   module SHIFT_ROWS(
2     input clk ,
3     input [127:0] IN_DATA,
4     output [127:0] SHIFT_DATA
5   );
6
7   reg [127:0] SHIFT_DATA_REG = 128'b0;
8
9   always @(*) begin
10    SHIFT_DATA_REG[127:120] = IN_DATA[127:120];
11    SHIFT_DATA_REG[119:112] = IN_DATA[87:80];
12    SHIFT_DATA_REG[111:104] = IN_DATA[47:40];
13    SHIFT_DATA_REG[103:96] = IN_DATA[7:0];
14
15    SHIFT_DATA_REG[95:88] = IN_DATA[95:88];
16    SHIFT_DATA_REG[87:80] = IN_DATA[55:48];
17    SHIFT_DATA_REG[79:72] = IN_DATA[15:8];
18    SHIFT_DATA_REG[71:64] = IN_DATA[103:96];
19
20    SHIFT_DATA_REG[63:56] = IN_DATA[63:56];
21    SHIFT_DATA_REG[55:48] = IN_DATA[23:16];
22    SHIFT_DATA_REG[47:40] = IN_DATA[111:104];
23    SHIFT_DATA_REG[39:32] = IN_DATA[71:64];
24
25    SHIFT_DATA_REG[31:24] = IN_DATA[31:24];
26    SHIFT_DATA_REG[23:16] = IN_DATA[119:112];
27    SHIFT_DATA_REG[15:8] = IN_DATA[79:72];
28    SHIFT_DATA_REG[7:0] = IN_DATA[39:32];
29 end
30

```

```

31     assign SHIFT_DATA = SHIFT_DATA_REG;
32
33 endmodule

```

### A.1.5 FORWARD-SUBSTITUTION

```

1      module FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX(
2        input  clk ,
3        input [7:0] A,
4        output [7:0] C
5      );
6
7      reg [7:0] C_REG;
8
9      always @(posedge clk) begin
10        case (A)
11          8'h00: C_REG <= 8'h63;
12          8'h01: C_REG <= 8'h7c;
13          8'h02: C_REG <= 8'h77;
14          8'h03: C_REG <= 8'h7b;
15          8'h04: C_REG <= 8'hf2;
16          8'h05: C_REG <= 8'h6b;
17          8'h06: C_REG <= 8'h6f;
18          8'h07: C_REG <= 8'hc5;
19          8'h08: C_REG <= 8'h30;
20          8'h09: C_REG <= 8'h01;
21          8'h0a: C_REG <= 8'h67;
22          8'h0b: C_REG <= 8'h2b;
23          8'h0c: C_REG <= 8'hfe;
24          8'h0d: C_REG <= 8'hd7;
25          8'h0e: C_REG <= 8'hab;
26          8'h0f: C_REG <= 8'h76;
27          8'h10: C_REG <= 8'hca;
28          8'h11: C_REG <= 8'h82;
29          8'h12: C_REG <= 8'hc9;
30          8'h13: C_REG <= 8'h7d;
31          8'h14: C_REG <= 8'hfa;
32          8'h15: C_REG <= 8'h59;
33          8'h16: C_REG <= 8'h47;
34          8'h17: C_REG <= 8'hf0;
35          8'h18: C_REG <= 8'had;
36          8'h19: C_REG <= 8'hd4;
37          8'h1a: C_REG <= 8'ha2;
38          8'h1b: C_REG <= 8'haf;
39          8'h1c: C_REG <= 8'h9c;
40          8'h1d: C_REG <= 8'ha4;
41          8'h1e: C_REG <= 8'h72;
42          8'h1f: C_REG <= 8'hc0;
43          8'h20: C_REG <= 8'hb7;
44          8'h21: C_REG <= 8'hf0;
45          8'h22: C_REG <= 8'h93;
46          8'h23: C_REG <= 8'h26;
47          8'h24: C_REG <= 8'h36;
48          8'h25: C_REG <= 8'h3f;
49          8'h26: C_REG <= 8'hf7;
50          8'h27: C_REG <= 8'hcc;

```

```

51      8'h28: C_REG <= 8'h34;
52      8'h29: C_REG <= 8'ha5;
53      8'h2a: C_REG <= 8'he5;
54      8'h2b: C_REG <= 8'hf1;
55      8'h2c: C_REG <= 8'h71;
56      8'h2d: C_REG <= 8'hd8;
57      8'h2e: C_REG <= 8'h31;
58      8'h2f: C_REG <= 8'h15;
59      8'h30: C_REG <= 8'h04;
60      8'h31: C_REG <= 8'hc7;
61      8'h32: C_REG <= 8'h23;
62      8'h33: C_REG <= 8'hc3;
63      8'h34: C_REG <= 8'h18;
64      8'h35: C_REG <= 8'h96;
65      8'h36: C_REG <= 8'h05;
66      8'h37: C_REG <= 8'h9a;
67      8'h38: C_REG <= 8'h07;
68      8'h39: C_REG <= 8'h12;
69      8'h3a: C_REG <= 8'h80;
70      8'h3b: C_REG <= 8'he2;
71      8'h3c: C_REG <= 8'heb;
72      8'h3d: C_REG <= 8'h27;
73      8'h3e: C_REG <= 8'hb2;
74      8'h3f: C_REG <= 8'h75;
75      8'h40: C_REG <= 8'h09;
76      8'h41: C_REG <= 8'h83;
77      8'h42: C_REG <= 8'h2c;
78      8'h43: C_REG <= 8'h1a;
79      8'h44: C_REG <= 8'h1b;
80      8'h45: C_REG <= 8'h6e;
81      8'h46: C_REG <= 8'h5a;
82      8'h47: C_REG <= 8'ha0;
83      8'h48: C_REG <= 8'h52;
84      8'h49: C_REG <= 8'h3b;
85      8'h4a: C_REG <= 8'hd6;
86      8'h4b: C_REG <= 8'hb3;
87      8'h4c: C_REG <= 8'h29;
88      8'h4d: C_REG <= 8'he3;
89      8'h4e: C_REG <= 8'h2f;
90      8'h4f: C_REG <= 8'h84;
91      8'h50: C_REG <= 8'h53;
92      8'h51: C_REG <= 8'hd1;
93      8'h52: C_REG <= 8'h00;
94      8'h53: C_REG <= 8'hed;
95      8'h54: C_REG <= 8'h20;
96      8'h55: C_REG <= 8'hfc;
97      8'h56: C_REG <= 8'hb1;
98      8'h57: C_REG <= 8'h5b;
99      8'h58: C_REG <= 8'h6a;
100     8'h59: C_REG <= 8'hcb;
101     8'h5a: C_REG <= 8'hbe;
102     8'h5b: C_REG <= 8'h39;
103     8'h5c: C_REG <= 8'h4a;
104     8'h5d: C_REG <= 8'h4c;
105     8'h5e: C_REG <= 8'h58;
106     8'h5f: C_REG <= 8'hcf;

```

```

107      8'h60: C_REG <= 8'hd0;
108      8'h61: C_REG <= 8'hef;
109      8'h62: C_REG <= 8'haa;
110      8'h63: C_REG <= 8'hfb;
111      8'h64: C_REG <= 8'h43;
112      8'h65: C_REG <= 8'h4d;
113      8'h66: C_REG <= 8'h33;
114      8'h67: C_REG <= 8'h85;
115      8'h68: C_REG <= 8'h45;
116      8'h69: C_REG <= 8'hf9;
117      8'h6a: C_REG <= 8'h02;
118      8'h6b: C_REG <= 8'h7f;
119      8'h6c: C_REG <= 8'h50;
120      8'h6d: C_REG <= 8'h3c;
121      8'h6e: C_REG <= 8'h9f;
122      8'h6f: C_REG <= 8'ha8;
123      8'h70: C_REG <= 8'h51;
124      8'h71: C_REG <= 8'ha3;
125      8'h72: C_REG <= 8'h40;
126      8'h73: C_REG <= 8'h8f;
127      8'h74: C_REG <= 8'h92;
128      8'h75: C_REG <= 8'h9d;
129      8'h76: C_REG <= 8'h38;
130      8'h77: C_REG <= 8'hf5;
131      8'h78: C_REG <= 8'hbc;
132      8'h79: C_REG <= 8'hb6;
133      8'h7a: C_REG <= 8'hda;
134      8'h7b: C_REG <= 8'h21;
135      8'h7c: C_REG <= 8'h10;
136      8'h7d: C_REG <= 8'hff;
137      8'h7e: C_REG <= 8'hf3;
138      8'h7f: C_REG <= 8'hd2;
139      8'h80: C_REG <= 8'hcd;
140      8'h81: C_REG <= 8'h0c;
141      8'h82: C_REG <= 8'h13;
142      8'h83: C_REG <= 8'hec;
143      8'h84: C_REG <= 8'h5f;
144      8'h85: C_REG <= 8'h97;
145      8'h86: C_REG <= 8'h44;
146      8'h87: C_REG <= 8'h17;
147      8'h88: C_REG <= 8'hc4;
148      8'h89: C_REG <= 8'ha7;
149      8'h8a: C_REG <= 8'h7e;
150      8'h8b: C_REG <= 8'h3d;
151      8'h8c: C_REG <= 8'h64;
152      8'h8d: C_REG <= 8'h5d;
153      8'h8e: C_REG <= 8'h19;
154      8'h8f: C_REG <= 8'h73;
155      8'h90: C_REG <= 8'h60;
156      8'h91: C_REG <= 8'h81;
157      8'h92: C_REG <= 8'h4f;
158      8'h93: C_REG <= 8'hdc;
159      8'h94: C_REG <= 8'h22;
160      8'h95: C_REG <= 8'h2a;
161      8'h96: C_REG <= 8'h90;
162      8'h97: C_REG <= 8'h88;

```

```

163      8'h98: C_REG <= 8'h46;
164      8'h99: C_REG <= 8'hee;
165      8'h9a: C_REG <= 8'hb8;
166      8'h9b: C_REG <= 8'h14;
167      8'h9c: C_REG <= 8'hde;
168      8'h9d: C_REG <= 8'h5e;
169      8'h9e: C_REG <= 8'h0b;
170      8'h9f: C_REG <= 8'hdb;
171      8'ha0: C_REG <= 8'he0;
172      8'ha1: C_REG <= 8'h32;
173      8'ha2: C_REG <= 8'h3a;
174      8'ha3: C_REG <= 8'h0a;
175      8'ha4: C_REG <= 8'h49;
176      8'ha5: C_REG <= 8'h06;
177      8'ha6: C_REG <= 8'h24;
178      8'ha7: C_REG <= 8'h5c;
179      8'ha8: C_REG <= 8'hc2;
180      8'ha9: C_REG <= 8'hd3;
181      8'haa: C_REG <= 8'hac;
182      8'hab: C_REG <= 8'h62;
183      8'hac: C_REG <= 8'h91;
184      8'had: C_REG <= 8'h95;
185      8'hae: C_REG <= 8'he4;
186      8'haf: C_REG <= 8'h79;
187      8'hb0: C_REG <= 8'he7;
188      8'hb1: C_REG <= 8'hc8;
189      8'hb2: C_REG <= 8'h37;
190      8'hb3: C_REG <= 8'h6d;
191      8'hb4: C_REG <= 8'h8d;
192      8'hb5: C_REG <= 8'hd5;
193      8'hb6: C_REG <= 8'h4e;
194      8'hb7: C_REG <= 8'ha9;
195      8'hb8: C_REG <= 8'h6c;
196      8'hb9: C_REG <= 8'h56;
197      8'hba: C_REG <= 8'hf4;
198      8'hbb: C_REG <= 8'hea;
199      8'hbc: C_REG <= 8'h65;
200      8'hbd: C_REG <= 8'h7a;
201      8'hbe: C_REG <= 8'hae;
202      8'hbf: C_REG <= 8'h08;
203      8'hc0: C_REG <= 8'hba;
204      8'hc1: C_REG <= 8'h78;
205      8'hc2: C_REG <= 8'h25;
206      8'hc3: C_REG <= 8'h2e;
207      8'hc4: C_REG <= 8'h1c;
208      8'hc5: C_REG <= 8'ha6;
209      8'hc6: C_REG <= 8'hb4;
210      8'hc7: C_REG <= 8'hc6;
211      8'hc8: C_REG <= 8'he8;
212      8'hc9: C_REG <= 8'hdd;
213      8'hca: C_REG <= 8'h74;
214      8'hcb: C_REG <= 8'h1f;
215      8'hcc: C_REG <= 8'h4b;
216      8'hcd: C_REG <= 8'hbd;
217      8'hce: C_REG <= 8'h8b;
218      8'hcf: C_REG <= 8'h8a;

```

```

219      8'hd0: C_REG <= 8'h70;
220      8'hd1: C_REG <= 8'h3e;
221      8'hd2: C_REG <= 8'hb5;
222      8'hd3: C_REG <= 8'h66;
223      8'hd4: C_REG <= 8'h48;
224      8'hd5: C_REG <= 8'h03;
225      8'hd6: C_REG <= 8'hf6;
226      8'hd7: C_REG <= 8'h0e;
227      8'hd8: C_REG <= 8'h61;
228      8'hd9: C_REG <= 8'h35;
229      8'hda: C_REG <= 8'h57;
230      8'hdb: C_REG <= 8'hb9;
231      8'hdc: C_REG <= 8'h86;
232      8'hdd: C_REG <= 8'hc1;
233      8'hde: C_REG <= 8'h1d;
234      8'hdf: C_REG <= 8'h9e;
235      8'he0: C_REG <= 8'he1;
236      8'he1: C_REG <= 8'hf8;
237      8'he2: C_REG <= 8'h98;
238      8'he3: C_REG <= 8'h11;
239      8'he4: C_REG <= 8'h69;
240      8'he5: C_REG <= 8'hd9;
241      8'he6: C_REG <= 8'h8e;
242      8'he7: C_REG <= 8'h94;
243      8'he8: C_REG <= 8'h9b;
244      8'he9: C_REG <= 8'h1e;
245      8'hea: C_REG <= 8'h87;
246      8'heb: C_REG <= 8'he9;
247      8'hec: C_REG <= 8'hce;
248      8'hed: C_REG <= 8'h55;
249      8'hee: C_REG <= 8'h28;
250      8'hef: C_REG <= 8'hdf;
251      8'hf0: C_REG <= 8'h8c;
252      8'hf1: C_REG <= 8'ha1;
253      8'hf2: C_REG <= 8'h89;
254      8'hf3: C_REG <= 8'h0d;
255      8'hf4: C_REG <= 8'hbf;
256      8'hf5: C_REG <= 8'he6;
257      8'hf6: C_REG <= 8'h42;
258      8'hf7: C_REG <= 8'h68;
259      8'hf8: C_REG <= 8'h41;
260      8'hf9: C_REG <= 8'h99;
261      8'hfa: C_REG <= 8'h2d;
262      8'hfb: C_REG <= 8'h0f;
263      8'hfc: C_REG <= 8'hb0;
264      8'hfd: C_REG <= 8'h54;
265      8'hfe: C_REG <= 8'hbb;
266      8'hff: C_REG <= 8'h16;
267      endcase
268  end
269
270  assign C = C_REG;
271
272 endmodule

```

## A.1.6 KEY GENERATION

```

1  module GENERATE_KEY(
2    input clk ,
3    input [3:0] ROUND_KEY,           // Round Number
4    input [127:0] IN_KEY,          // Input Key
5    output [127:0] OUT_KEY,        // Output Key
6    output reg [127:0] OUT_KEY_R
7  );
8
9  wire [31:0] KEY0, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3;
10 wire [31:0] C;
11
12 assign KEY3 = IN_KEY[127:96];
13 assign KEY2 = IN_KEY[95:64];
14 assign KEY1 = IN_KEY[63:32];
15 assign KEY0 = IN_KEY[31:0];
16
17 assign OUT_KEY[127:96] = KEY3 ^ C ^ RCON(ROUND_KEY);
18 assign OUT_KEY[95:64] = KEY3 ^ C ^ RCON(ROUND_KEY) ^ KEY2;
19 assign OUT_KEY[63:32] = KEY3 ^ C ^ RCON(ROUND_KEY) ^ KEY2 ^ KEY1;
20 assign OUT_KEY[31:0] = KEY3 ^ C ^ RCON(ROUND_KEY) ^ KEY2 ^ KEY1 ^
21   KEY0;
22 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST0(.clk(clk), .A(KEY0[23:16]), .C(C
23   [31:24]));
24 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST1(.clk(clk), .A(KEY0[15:8]), .C(C
25   [23:16]));
26 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST2(.clk(clk), .A(KEY0[7:0]), .C(C
27   [15:8]));
28 FORWARD_SUBSTITUTION_BOX INST3(.clk(clk), .A(KEY0[31:24]), .C(C
29   [7:0]));
30
31 always @ (posedge clk) OUT_KEY_R <= OUT_KEY;
32
33 function [31:0] RCON;
34   input [3:0] ROUND_KEY;
35   case (ROUND_KEY)
36     4'h0: RCON = 32'h01_00_00_00;
37     4'h1: RCON = 32'h02_00_00_00;
38     4'h2: RCON = 32'h04_00_00_00;
39     4'h3: RCON = 32'h08_00_00_00;
40     4'h4: RCON = 32'h10_00_00_00;
41     4'h5: RCON = 32'h20_00_00_00;
42     4'h6: RCON = 32'h40_00_00_00;
43     4'h7: RCON = 32'h80_00_00_00;
44     4'h8: RCON = 32'h1b_00_00_00;
45     4'h9: RCON = 32'h36_00_00_00;
46     default: RCON = 32'h00_00_00_00;
47   endcase
48 endfunction
49
50 endmodule

```

## A.1.7 ROUND-ITERATION

```
1  module ROUND_ITERATION(
```

```

2     input clk ,
3     input [127:0] IN_DATA ,
4     input [127:0] IN_KEY ,
5     output reg [127:0] OUT_DATA
6 );
7
8 wire [127:0] SB_DATA, SHIFT_DATA, MIXED_DATA;
9
10 SUB_BYTES SB(.clk(clk), .IN_DATA(IN_DATA), .SB_DATA(SB_DATA));
11 SHIFT_ROWS SR(.clk(clk), .IN_DATA(SB_DATA), .SHIFT_DATA(SHIFT_DATA));
12 MIX_COLUMNS MC(.clk(clk), .IN_DATA(SHIFT_DATA), .MIXED_DATA(
13     MIXED_DATA));
14 always @(posedge clk) OUT_DATA <= IN_KEY ^ MIXED_DATA;
15
16 endmodule

```

### A.1.8 LAST ROUND

```

1     module LAST_ROUND(
2     input clk ,
3     input [127:0] IN_DATA ,
4     input [127:0] IN_KEY ,
5     output reg [127:0] OUT_DATA
6 );
7
8 wire [127:0] SB_DATA, SHIFT_DATA, OUT_KEY;
9
10 SUB_BYTES SB(.clk(clk), .IN_DATA(IN_DATA), .SB_DATA(SB_DATA));
11 SHIFT_ROWS SR(.clk(clk), .IN_DATA(SB_DATA), .SHIFT_DATA(SHIFT_DATA));
12
13 always @(posedge clk) OUT_DATA <= IN_KEY ^ SHIFT_DATA;
14
15 endmodule

```

## A.2 GCM

### A.2.1 TOP-MODULE

```

1     module AES_GCM_TOP #(parameter length_plain = 384,
2                         length_tag = 32,
3                         length_aad = 128)(
4     input clk ,
5     input reset ,
6     input [length_plain - 1 : 0] Plain_Text ,
7
8     input [95:0] IV ,
9     input [length_aad -1 :0] AAD,
10
11
12     input [31:0] IN_KEY0 ,
13     input [31:0] IN_KEY1 ,
14     input [31:0] IN_KEY2 ,
15     input [31:0] IN_KEY3 ,
16

```

```

17 output [128:0] Cipher ,
18 output [length_tag -1 :0] Tag
19
20 );
21
22 wire [127:0] h_key ;
23
24 wire [127:0] Initial_CB ;
25
26 wire [127:0] Y_0;
27 wire [127:0] Y_1;
28 wire [127:0] Y_2;
29 wire [383:0] Y;
30
31 wire [511:0] g_hash_inp ;
32
33 wire [127:0] GH_0;
34 wire [127:0] GH_1;
35 wire [127:0] GH_2;
36
37
38 wire [127:0] Tag_g ;
39
40 hash_key h1 (clk , reset , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1, IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3 ,
41 h_key );
42
43 ICB IC1 ( IV, Initial_CB );
44
45 //integer i = length_plain/128;
46 //integer j;
47 // for ( j = 1; j <= 3 ; j = j+1)
48 // begin
49 GCTR G1( clk , reset , IV, Plain_Text [127 : 0], Initial_CB ,
50 IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1, IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, Y_0);
51 assign Initial_CB = Initial_CB + 1;
52 GCTR G2( clk , reset , IV, Plain_Text [255 : 128], Initial_CB ,
53 IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1, IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, Y_1);
54 assign Initial_CB = Initial_CB + 1;
55 GCTR G3( clk , reset , IV, Plain_Text [383: 256], Initial_CB ,
56 IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1, IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, Y_2);
57
58 assign Y = {Y_0, Y_1, Y_2};
59
60 assign g_hash_inp = {AAD,Y};
61
62 GHASH gh1 (clk , reset , AAD, 128'b0, h_key , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1 ,
63 IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, GH_0);
64 GHASH gh2 (clk , reset , Y_0, GH_0, h_key , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1 ,
65 IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, GH_1);
66 GHASH gh3 (clk , reset , Y_1, GH_1, h_key , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1 ,
67 IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, GH_2);
68 GHASH gh4 (clk , reset , Y_2, GH_2, h_key , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1 ,
69 IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, Cipher);
70
71 GCTR T1(clk , reset , IV, Cipher , Initial_CB , IN_KEY0, IN_KEY1 ,
72 IN_KEY2, IN_KEY3, Tag_g );

```

```

64
65     assign Tag = Tag_g [127:96];
66
67 endmodule

```

### A.2.2 ICB initialization

```

1     module ICB(input [95:0] IV, output [127:0] Initial_CB);
2 assign Initial_CB = {IV,{31{1'b0}},1'b1};
3 endmodule

```

### A.2.3 GCTR

```

1     module GCTR(
2     input clk,
3     input reset,
4     input [95:0] IV,
5     input [127:0] X,
6     input [127:0] Initial_CB ,
7
8     input [31:0] IN_KEY0,
9     input [31:0] IN_KEY1,
10    input [31:0] IN_KEY2,
11    input [31:0] IN_KEY3,
12
13    output [127:0] Y
14
15
16
17 );
18
19 wire [31:0] OUT_DATA0;
20 wire [31:0] OUT_DATA1;
21 wire [31:0] OUT_DATA2;
22 wire [31:0] OUT_DATA3;
23 //ICB IC1 ( IV, Initial_CB );
24
25 AES128_Cipher (
26   clk,
27   reset,
28
29   Initial_CB [31:0],
30   Initial_CB [63:32],
31   Initial_CB [95:64],
32   Initial_CB [127:96],
33
34   IN_KEY0,
35   IN_KEY1,
36   IN_KEY2,
37   IN_KEY3,
38
39   OUT_DATA0,
40   OUT_DATA1,
41   OUT_DATA2,
42   OUT_DATA3);
43

```

```

44 wire [127:0] OUT_DATA;
45 assign OUT_DATA = {OUT_DATA3, OUT_DATA2, OUT_DATA1, OUT_DATA0} ;
46
47 assign Y = OUT_DATA ^ X ;
48
49 endmodule

```

## A.2.4 GHASH

```

1      module GHASH(
2 input clk ,
3 input reset ,
4 input [127:0] X,
5 input [127:0] I,
6
7 input [127:0] h_key ,
8
9 input [31:0] IN_KEY0 ,
10 input [31:0] IN_KEY1 ,
11 input [31:0] IN_KEY2 ,
12 input [31:0] IN_KEY3 ,
13
14 output wire [127:0] Y
15 );
16
17 wire [127:0] mult_in ;
18
19 assign mult_in = X ^ I;
20
21 //hash_key h1 (clk , reset , IN_KEY0 , IN_KEY1 , IN_KEY2 , IN_KEY3 , h_key )
22 ;
23 mult_in_GF128 G1( mult_in ,h_key ,Y);
24 endmodule

```

## A.2.5 Multiplication in Galois Field

```

1      module mult_in_GF128(
2         input wire[127:0] X,
3         input wire[127:0] Y,
4         output reg[127:0] Z
5     );
6     reg[127:0] V;
7     reg[127:0] R;
8     integer i;
9     always @ (*) begin
10        R = {8'b11100001,{120{1'b0}}};
11
12        Z = 0;
13        V = X;
14        for(i=0;i<128;i=i+1) begin
15            if(Y[127-i]==1) begin
16                Z = Z^V;
17            end
18            if(V[0]==0) begin
19                V = V>>1;

```

```

20          end
21      else begin
22          V = (V>>1)^R;
23      end
24  end
25 end
26
27 endmodule

```

### A.3 ECDSA

```

1  'define HIGH 1'b1
2  'define LOW 1'b0
3  'define ON 1'b1
4  'define OFF 1'b0
5 package ecDSA_package;
6 //Definitions
7
8 //Type Definition
9
10
11 //Parameter
12 parameter ORDER = 256;
13
14 //Basic ALU Operations
15 parameter ADD = 3'h0, SUB = 3'h1, MUL = 3'h2, DIV = 3'h3, MOD =
16     3'h4, COM = 3'h5;
17 parameter MOD_INV = 3'h6;
18
19 //Modular ALU Counter
20 parameter CNT_LEN = 4;
21 parameter MOD_ADD_DELAY = 1, MOD_SUB_DELAY = 1, MOD_MUL_DELAY =
22     1, MOD_DIV_DELAY = 1, MOD_MOD_DELAY = 1, MOD_COM_DELAY = 1;
23
24 parameter LOAD = 1'b0, COUNT = 1'b1;
25
26 parameter POINT = 1'b0, TANGENT = 1'b1;
27
28 parameter BIT_LEN = 3;
29 parameter BIT_COUNTER_LEN = 3'b101;
30 parameter SLOPE_CALC = 3'b000, POINT_CALC = 3'b001, MATH = 3'b010
31     ;
32
33 endpackage
34
35 // Company:
36 // Engineer:
37 //
38 // Create Date: 04/14/2023 10:55:41 AM
39 // Design Name:

```

```

40 // Module Name: ecdsa_basic_alu
41 // Project Name:
42 // Target Devices:
43 // Tool Versions:
44 // Description:
45 //
46 // Dependencies:
47 //
48 // Revision:
49 // Revision 0.01 - File Created
50 // Additional Comments:
51 //
52 //
53 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
53
54 import ecdsa_package::*;
55
56 module ecdsa_basic_alu(
57     input enable ,
58     input [2:0] op ,
59     input [ORDER-1:0] in1 ,in2 ,
60     input [ORDER-1:0] p ,
61     output reg [2*ORDER-1:0] out
62 );
63
64     always @(*) begin
65         if(enable == 'ON) begin
66             case(op)
67                 ADD: out = in1+in2 ;
68                 SUB: out = in1-in2 ;
69                 MOD: out = {in1,in2}%p;
70                 MUL: out = in1*in2 ;
71                 DIV: out = in1/in2 ;
72                 COM: out[0] = in1>in2 ;
73             endcase
74         end
75         else begin
76             out = out ;
77         end
78     end
79
80 endmodule
81
82 module ecdsa_modular_alu(
83     input clk ,
84     input enable ,
85     input start ,
86     input [1:0] op ,
87     input [ORDER-1:0] in1 ,in2 ,
88     input [ORDER-1:0] p ,
89     output reg [ORDER-1:0] out ,
90     output reg done
91 );
92
93

```

```

94  reg basic_alu_enable;
95  reg [ORDER-1:0] basic_alu_in1 , basic_alu_in2 ;
96  reg [2:0] basic_alu_op ;
97  wire [2*ORDER-1:0] basic_alu_out_w ;
98  reg [2*ORDER-1:0] basic_alu_out ;
99
100 ecdsa_basic_alu basic_alu(
101     .enable(basic_alu_enable),
102     .op(basic_alu_op),
103     .in1(basic_alu_in1),
104     .in2(basic_alu_in2),
105     .p(p),
106     .out(basic_alu_out_w)
107 );
108
109 reg [CNT_LEN-1:0] counter;
110 reg counter_state;
111
112 always @(posedge clk) begin
113     if(counter_state == COUNT) begin
114         counter = counter - 1'b1;
115     end
116     else begin
117         case(basic_alu_op)
118             default: counter = 1;
119             ADD: counter = MOD_ADD_DELAY;
120             SUB: counter = MOD_SUB_DELAY;
121             MUL: counter = MOD_MUL_DELAY;
122             DIV: counter = MOD_DIV_DELAY;
123             MOD: counter = MOD_MOD_DELAY;
124             COM: counter = MOD_COM_DELAY;
125         endcase
126     end
127 end
128
129 reg comp_flag;
130
131 parameter IDLE = 5'h00;
132 parameter MOD_ADD_0 = 5'h01 , MOD_ADD_1 = 5'h02 , MOD_ADD_2 = 5'h03
133 ;
134 parameter MOD_SUB_0 = 5'h04 , MOD_SUB_1 = 5'h05 , MOD_SUB_2 = 5'h06
135 ;
136 parameter MOD_MUL_0 = 5'h07 , MOD_MUL_1 = 5'h08 , MOD_MUL_2 = 5'h09
137 ;
138 parameter MOD_DIV_0 = 5'h0a , MOD_DIV_1 = 5'h0b , MOD_DIV_2 = 5'h0c
139 ;
140 parameter MOD_MOD_0 = 5'h0d , MOD_MOD_1 = 5'h0e , MOD_MOD_2 = 5'h0f
141 ;
142 parameter COMPARE_0 = 5'h10 , COMPARE_1 = 5'h11 , COMPARE_2 = 5'h12
143 ;
144 parameter ADD_IN = 5'h13;
145 reg [4:0] state , next_state;
146
147 always @(posedge clk) begin
148     state = next_state;
149 end

```

```

144
145 always @(*) begin
146     if (enable == 'ON) begin
147         if (start == 'HIGH) begin
148             case (state)
149                 default: next_state = IDLE;
150                 IDLE: begin
151                     case (op)
152                         ADD: next_state = MOD_ADD_0;
153                         SUB: next_state = COMPARE_0;
154                         MUL: next_state = MOD_MUL_0;
155                         DIV: next_state = MOD_DIV_0;
156                         default: next_state = IDLE;
157                     endcase
158                 end
159                 MOD_ADD_0: next_state = MOD_ADD_1;
160                 MOD_ADD_1: begin
161                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =
162                         MOD_ADD_2;
163                     else next_state = MOD_ADD_1;
164                 end
165                 MOD_ADD_2: next_state = MOD_MOD_0;
166                 MOD_SUB_0: next_state = MOD_SUB_1;
167                 MOD_SUB_1: begin
168                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =
169                         MOD_SUB_2;
170                     else next_state = MOD_SUB_1;
171                 end
172                 MOD_SUB_2: begin
173                     if (comp_flag) next_state = MOD_MOD_0;
174                     else next_state = ADD_IN;
175                 end
176                 MOD_MUL_0: next_state = MOD_MUL_1;
177                 MOD_MUL_1: begin
178                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =
179                         MOD_MUL_2;
180                     else next_state = MOD_MUL_1;
181                 end
182                 MOD_MUL_2: next_state = MOD_MOD_0;
183                 MOD_DIV_0: next_state = MOD_DIV_1;
184                 MOD_DIV_1: begin
185                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =
186                         MOD_DIV_2;
187                     else next_state = MOD_DIV_1;
188                 end
189                 MOD_DIV_2: next_state = MOD_MOD_0;
190                 MOD_MOD_0: next_state = MOD_MOD_1;
191                 MOD_MOD_1: begin
192                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =
193                         MOD_MOD_2;
194                     else next_state = MOD_MOD_1;
195                 end
196                 MOD_MOD_2: next_state = IDLE;
197                 COMPARE_0: next_state = COMPARE_1;
198                 COMPARE_1: begin
199                     if (counter == {CNT_LEN{1'b0}}) next_state =

```

```

195                               COMPARE_2;
196                               else next_state = COMPARE_1;
197                               end
198                               COMPARE_2: next_state = MOD_SUB_0;
199                               ADD_IN: next_state = MOD_ADD_1;
200                               endcase
201                           end
202                           else next_state = IDLE;
203                           end
204                           else begin
205                               next_state = IDLE;
206                           end
207                       end
208
209           always @(state) begin
210             case(state)
211               IDLE: begin
212                 basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
213                 done = 'LOW;
214                 out = out;
215               end
216               MOD_ADD_0: begin
217                 basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
218                 basic_alu_in1 = in1;
219                 basic_alu_in2 = in2;
220                 basic_alu_op = {1'b0,op};
221                 counter_state = LOAD;
222               end
223               MOD_ADD_1: counter_state = COUNT;
224               MOD_ADD_2: begin
225                 basic_alu_out = basic_alu_out_w;
226                 basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
227               end
228               MOD_SUB_0: begin
229                 basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
230                 basic_alu_op = SUB;
231                 counter_state = LOAD;
232               end
233               MOD_SUB_1: counter_state = COUNT;
234               MOD_SUB_2: begin
235                 basic_alu_out = basic_alu_out_w;
236                 basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
237               end
238               MOD_MUL_0: begin
239                 basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
240                 basic_alu_in1 = in1;
241                 basic_alu_in2 = in2;
242                 basic_alu_op = {1'b0,op};
243                 counter_state = LOAD;
244               end
245               MOD_MUL_1: counter_state = COUNT;
246               MOD_MUL_2: begin
247                 basic_alu_out = basic_alu_out_w;
248                 basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
249               end
250               MOD_DIV_0: begin

```

```

250     basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
251     basic_alu_in1 = in1;
252     basic_alu_in2 = in2;
253     basic_alu_op = {1'b0,op};
254     counter_state = LOAD;
255   end
256   MOD_DIV_1: counter_state = COUNT;
257   MOD_DIV_2: begin
258     basic_alu_out = basic_alu_out_w;
259     basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
260   end
261   MOD_MOD_0: begin
262     basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
263     {basic_alu_in1,basic_alu_in2} = basic_alu_out;
264     basic_alu_op = MOD;
265     counter_state = LOAD;
266   end
267   MOD_MOD_1: counter_state = COUNT;
268   MOD_MOD_2: begin
269     basic_alu_out = basic_alu_out_w;
270     out = basic_alu_out[ORDER-1:0];
271     basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
272     done = 'HIGH;
273   end
274   COMPARE_0: begin
275     basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
276     basic_alu_in1 = in1;
277     basic_alu_in2 = in2;
278     basic_alu_op = COM;
279     counter_state = LOAD;
280   end
281   COMPARE_1: begin
282     counter_state = COUNT;
283   end
284   COMPARE_2: begin
285     comp_flag = basic_alu_out_w[0];
286     if(basic_alu_out_w[0]) begin
287       basic_alu_in1 = in1;
288       basic_alu_in2 = in2;
289     end
290     else begin
291       basic_alu_in1 = p;
292       basic_alu_in2 = in2;
293     end
294     basic_alu_enable = 'OFF;
295   end
296   ADD_IN: begin
297     comp_flag = 'HIGH;
298     basic_alu_enable = 'ON;
299     basic_alu_in1 = in1;
300     basic_alu_in2 = basic_alu_out;
301     basic_alu_op = ADD;
302     counter_state = LOAD;
303   end
304 endcase
305 end

```

```

306
307 endmodule
308
309 module ecdsa_inverse_modulo(
310     //Inverse Modulo Port
311     input clk ,
312     input enable ,
313     input start ,
314     input [ORDER-1:0] in ,
315     input [ORDER-1:0] p ,
316     output reg [ORDER-1:0] out ,
317     output reg done ,
318     //Modular ALU Ports
319     output reg modular_alu_start ,
320     output reg [1:0] modular_alu_op ,
321     output reg [ORDER-1:0] modular_alu_in1 , modular_alu_in2 ,
322     input [ORDER-1:0] modular_alu_out ,
323     input modular_alu_done
324 );
325
326     reg loop_run ;
327     parameter R = 1'b0 , S = 1'b1 ;
328
329     parameter IDLE = 4'h0 ;
330     parameter INITIALIZE = 4'h1 ;
331     parameter LOOP_DIV_0 = 4'h2 , LOOP_DIV_1 = 4'h3 , LOOP_DIV_2 = 4'ha
332         ;
333     parameter LOOP_MUL_0 = 4'h4 , LOOP_MUL_1 = 4'h5 , LOOP_MUL_2 = 4'hc
334         ;
335     parameter LOOP_SUB_0 = 4'h6 , LOOP_SUB_1 = 4'h7 , LOOP_SUB_2 = 4'hd
336         ;
337     parameter UPDATE = 4'hb ;
338     parameter RELOOP = 4'hf , CHECK_EXIT = 4'h8 ;
339     parameter EXIT = 4'h9 ;
340
341     reg [ORDER-1:0] q ;
342     reg [ORDER-1:0] r_new , r_old , r_temp ;
343     reg [ORDER-1:0] s_new , s_old , s_temp ;
344     reg [ORDER-1:0] t_new , t_old , t_temp ;
345     reg [3:0] state , next_state ;
346
347     always @(*) begin
348         if(enable) begin
349             if(start) begin
350                 case(state)
351                     default: next_state = IDLE;
352                     IDLE: next_state = INITIALIZE;
353                     INITIALIZE: next_state = LOOP_DIV_0;
354                     LOOP_DIV_0: next_state = LOOP_DIV_1;
355                     LOOP_DIV_1: begin
356                         if(modular_alu_done) next_state = LOOP_DIV_2;
357                         else next_state = LOOP_DIV_1;
358                     end
359                     LOOP_DIV_2: next_state = LOOP_MUL_0;
360                     LOOP_MUL_0: next_state = LOOP_MUL_1;
361                     LOOP_MUL_1: begin
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359             if (modular_alu_done) next_state = LOOP_MUL_2;
360             else next_state = LOOP_MUL_1;
361         end
362         LOOP_MUL_2: next_state = LOOP_SUB_0;
363         LOOP_SUB_0: next_state = LOOP_SUB_1;
364         LOOP_SUB_1: begin
365             if (modular_alu_done) next_state = LOOP_SUB_2;
366             else next_state = LOOP_SUB_1;
367         end
368         LOOP_SUB_2: next_state = UPDATE;
369         UPDATE: begin
370             next_state = RELOOP;
371         end
372         RELOOP: begin
373             if (loop_run==R) next_state = CHECK_EXIT;
374             else next_state = LOOP_MUL_0;
375         end
376         CHECK_EXIT: begin
377             if (r_new=={ORDER{1'b0}}) next_state = EXIT;
378             else next_state = LOOP_DIV_0;
379
380             end
381             EXIT: next_state = IDLE;
382         endcase
383     end
384     else next_state = IDLE;
385   end
386   else begin
387     next_state = IDLE;
388   end
389 end
390
391 always @(posedge clk) state <= next_state;
392
393 always @(state) begin
394   case (state)
395     IDLE: begin
396       done = 'LOW;
397     end
398     INITIALIZE: begin
399       s_new = {ORDER{1'b0}};
400       s_old = {{(ORDER-1){1'b0}},1'b1};
401       r_old = in;
402       r_new = p;
403     end
404     LOOP_DIV_0: begin
405       modular_alu_in1 = r_old;
406       modular_alu_in2 = r_new;
407       modular_alu_op = DIV;
408       modular_alu_start = 'HIGH;
409     end
410     LOOP_DIV_2: begin
411       q = modular_alu_out;
412       modular_alu_start = 'LOW;
413       t_old = r_old;
414       t_new = r_new;

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415         loop_run = R;
416
417     end
418     LOOP_MUL_0: begin
419         modular_alu_in1 = t_new;
420         modular_alu_in2 = q;
421         modular_alu_op = MUL;
422         modular_alu_start = 'HIGH;
423     end
424     LOOP_MUL_2: begin
425         t_temp = modular_alu_out;
426         modular_alu_start = 'LOW;
427     end
428     LOOP_SUB_0: begin
429         modular_alu_in1 = t_old;
430         modular_alu_in2 = t_temp;
431         modular_alu_op = SUB;
432         modular_alu_start = 'HIGH;
433     end
434     LOOP_SUB_2: begin
435         case (loop_run)
436             R: begin
437                 r_temp = modular_alu_out;
438                 r_old = r_new;
439             end
440             S: begin
441                 s_temp = modular_alu_out;
442                 s_old = s_new;
443             end
444         endcase
445         modular_alu_start = 'LOW;
446     end
447     UPDATE: begin
448         case (loop_run)
449             R: begin
450                 r_new = r_temp;
451                 t_new = s_new;
452                 t_old = s_old;
453                 loop_run = S;
454             end
455             S: begin
456                 s_new = s_temp;
457                 loop_run = R;
458             end
459         endcase
460     end
461     EXIT: begin
462         out = s_old;
463         done = 'HIGH;
464     end
465 endcase
466 end
467 endmodule
468
469 module ecdsa_alu(
470     input clk,

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471     input enable ,
472     input start ,
473     input [2:0] op ,
474     input [ORDER-1:0] in1 , in2 , p ,
475     output reg [ORDER-1:0] out ,
476     output reg done
477 );
478
479 reg [ORDER-1:0] modular_alu_in1 , modular_alu_in2 ;
480 reg [2:0] op_reg ;
481 reg modular_alu_start ;
482
483 wire [ORDER-1:0] modular_alu_in1_w , modular_alu_in2_w ;
484 wire [2:0] op_w ;
485 wire modular_alu_start_w ;
486
487 wire modular_alu_done ;
488 wire [ORDER-1:0] modular_alu_out ;
489
490     ecdsa_modular_alu modular_alu(
491         .clk(clk) ,
492         .in1(modular_alu_in1_w) ,
493         .in2(modular_alu_in2_w) ,
494         .op(op_w[1:0]) ,
495         .start(modular_alu_start_w) ,
496         .done(modular_alu_done) ,
497         .enable(enable) ,
498         .out(modular_alu_out) ,
499         .p(p)
500 );
501
502 reg inverse_modulo_enable , inverse_modulo_start ;
503 wire inverse_modulo_done ;
504 wire [ORDER-1:0] inverse_modulo_out ;
505 wire inverse_modulo_modular_alu_start_w ;
506 wire [1:0] inverse_modulo_modular_alu_op_w ;
507 wire [ORDER-1:0] inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in1_w ,
508     inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in2_w ;
509
510     ecdsa_inverse_modulo inverse_modulo(
511         .clk(clk) ,
512         .enable(inverse_modulo_enable) ,
513         .start(inverse_modulo_start) ,
514         .in(in1) ,
515         .p(p) ,
516         .done(inverse_modulo_done) ,
517         .out(inverse_modulo_out) ,
518         .modular_alu_start(inverse_modulo_modular_alu_start_w) ,
519         .modular_alu_in1(inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in1_w) ,
520         .modular_alu_in2(inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in2_w) ,
521         .modular_alu_op(inverse_modulo_modular_alu_op_w) ,
522         .modular_alu_done(modular_alu_done) ,
523         .modular_alu_out(modular_alu_out)
524 );
525
526 reg [3:0] state , next_state ;

```

```

526  reg select_line;
527  parameter MOD_ALU = 1'b0, INV_MOD = 1'b1;
528  parameter IDLE = 4'h0;
529  parameter SET_UP = 4'h1;
530  parameter MODULAR_ALU_LOAD = 4'h2, MODULAR_ALU_PROCESS = 4'h3;
531  parameter INVERSE_MODULO_LOAD = 4'h4, INVERSE_MODULO_PROCESS = 4'
532          h5;
533  parameter OUTPUT_VALUE = 4'h6;
534
535  always @(*) begin
536      if(enable=='ON) begin
537          if(start=='HIGH) begin
538              case(state)
539                  default: next_state = IDLE;
540                  IDLE: next_state = SET_UP;
541                  SET_UP: begin
542                      if(op==MOD_INV) next_state =
543                          INVERSE_MODULO_LOAD;
544                      else next_state = MODULAR_ALU_LOAD;
545                  end
546                  MODULAR_ALU_LOAD: next_state =
547                      MODULAR_ALU_PROCESS;
548                  MODULAR_ALU_PROCESS: begin
549                      if(modular_alu_done) next_state =
550                          OUTPUT_VALUE;
551                      else next_state = MODULAR_ALU_PROCESS;
552                  end
553                  INVERSE_MODULO_LOAD: next_state =
554                      INVERSE_MODULO_PROCESS;
555                  INVERSE_MODULO_PROCESS: begin
556                      if(inverse_modulo_done) next_state =
557                          OUTPUT_VALUE;
558                      else next_state = INVERSE_MODULO_PROCESS;
559                  end
560                  OUTPUT_VALUE: next_state = IDLE;
561              endcase
562          end
563          else begin
564              next_state = IDLE;
565          end
566      end
567
568      always@ (posedge clk) begin
569          state <= next_state;
570      end
571
572      always @ (state) begin
573          case(state)
574              IDLE: begin
575                  done = 'LOW;
576                  inverse_modulo_enable = 'OFF;
577              end
578              MODULAR_ALU_LOAD: begin
579                  select_line = MOD_ALU;
580                  modular_alu_in1 = in1;
581              end
582          end
583      end
584  end
585
586  initial begin
587      state = IDLE;
588      done = 'LOW;
589      inverse_modulo_enable = 'OFF;
590  end
591
592  assign modular_alu_out = select_line ? MOD_ALU : INVERSE_MODULO_PROCESS;
593
594  endmodule

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```

576         modular_alu_in2 = in2;
577         op_reg = op;
578         modular_alu_start = 'HIGH;
579     end
580     INVERSE_MODULO_LOAD: begin
581         select_line = INV_MOD;
582         inverse_modulo_enable = 'ON;
583         inverse_modulo_start = 'HIGH;
584     end
585     OUTPUT_VALUE: begin
586         if (select_line == MOD_ALU) begin
587             modular_alu_start = 'LOW;
588             out = modular_alu_out;
589         end
590         else begin
591             inverse_modulo_start = 'LOW;
592             out = inverse_modulo_out;
593         end
594         done = 'HIGH;
595     end
596 endcase
597 end
598
599 assign modular_alu_start_w = (select_line==MOD_ALU)?
600     modular_alu_start : inverse_modulo_modular_alu_start_w;
601 assign modular_alu_in1_w = (select_line==MOD_ALU)?
602     modular_alu_in1 : inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in1_w;
603 assign modular_alu_in2_w = (select_line==MOD_ALU)?
604     modular_alu_in2 : inverse_modulo_modular_alu_in2_w;
605 assign op_w = (select_line==MOD_ALU)? op_reg :
606     inverse_modulo_modular_alu_op_w;
607
608 endmodule
609
610 module ecdsa_point_multiplication(
611     input clk,
612     input enable,
613     input start,
614     input [ORDER-1:0] scalar_k,
615     input [ORDER-1:0] x, y,
616     output reg [ORDER-1:0] r,
617     output reg done,
618     //Point Calculation
619     output reg point_calc_enable,
620     output reg point_calc_start,
621     output reg point_type,
622     output reg [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_p, point_calc_y_p,
623     output reg [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_q, point_calc_y_q,
624     input [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_r, point_calc_y_r,
625     input point_calc_done
626 );
627     reg [ORDER-1:0] s;
628     reg [BIT_LEN-1:0] bit_counter;
629
630     reg [ORDER-1:0] x_reg, y_reg;
631     parameter IDLE = 4'h0;

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```

628  parameter INITIALIZE = 4'h1;
629  //Loop
630  parameter LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_0 = 4'h2, LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_1 = 4'h3,
631      LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_2 = 4'h4;
632  parameter LOOP_CHECK_INDEX = 4'h5;
633  parameter LOOP_POINT_ADD_0 = 4'h6, LOOP_POINT_ADD_1 = 4'h7,
634      LOOP_POINT_ADD_2 = 4'h8;
635  parameter COUNTER_UPDATE = 4'h9;
636  parameter CHECK_EXIT = 4'ha;
637  parameter EXIT = 4'hb;
638
639  reg [3:0] state, next_state;
640
641  always @(*) begin
642      if(enable) begin
643          if(start) begin
644              case(state)
645                  default: next_state = IDLE;
646                  IDLE: next_state = INITIALIZE;
647                  INITIALIZE: next_state = LOOP_CHECK_INDEX;
648                  LOOP_CHECK_INDEX: begin
649                      if(scalar_k[bit_counter]) next_state =
650                          LOOP_POINT_ADD_0;
651                      else next_state = LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_0;
652                  end
653                  LOOP_POINT_ADD_0: next_state = LOOP_POINT_ADD_1;
654                  LOOP_POINT_ADD_1: begin
655                      if(point_calc_done == 'HIGH) next_state =
656                          LOOP_POINT_ADD_2;
657                      else next_state = LOOP_POINT_ADD_1;
658                  end
659                  LOOP_POINT_ADD_2: next_state =
660                      LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_0;
661                  LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_0: next_state =
662                      LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_1;
663                  LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_1: begin
664                      if(point_calc_done == 'HIGH) next_state =
665                          LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_2;
666                      else next_state = LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_1;
667                  end
668                  LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_2: next_state = COUNTER_UPDATE;
669                  COUNTER_UPDATE: next_state = CHECK_EXIT;
670                  CHECK_EXIT: begin
671                      if(bit_counter == BIT_COUNTER_LEN) next_state
672                          = EXIT;
673                      else next_state = LOOP_CHECK_INDEX;
674                  end
675              endcase
676          end
677          else begin
678              next_state = IDLE;
679          end
680      end
681      else begin
682          next_state = IDLE;
683      end
684  end

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676     end
677
678     always @(posedge clk) state <= next_state;
679
680     always @(state) begin
681         case(state)
682             IDLE: begin
683                 point_calc_enable = 'OFF;
684                 done = 'LOW;
685             end
686             INITIALIZE: begin
687                 point_calc_enable = 'ON;
688                 bit_counter = {BIT_LEN{1'b0}};
689                 r = {ORDER{1'b0}};
690                 s = {ORDER{1'b0}};
691                 x_reg = x;
692                 y_reg = y;
693             end
694             LOOP_POINT_ADD_0: begin
695                 point_calc_x_p = r;
696                 point_calc_y_p = s;
697                 point_calc_x_q = x_reg;
698                 point_calc_y_q = y_reg;
699                 point_type = POINT;
700                 point_calc_start = 'ON;
701             end
702             LOOP_POINT_ADD_2: begin
703                 r = point_calc_x_r;
704                 s = point_calc_y_r;
705                 point_calc_start = 'OFF;
706             end
707             LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_0: begin
708                 point_calc_x_p = x_reg;
709                 point_calc_y_p = y_reg;
710                 point_type = TANGENT;
711                 point_calc_start = 'HIGH;
712             end
713             LOOP_POINT_DOUBLE_2: begin
714                 x_reg = point_calc_x_r;
715                 y_reg = point_calc_y_r;
716                 point_calc_start = 'OFF;
717             end
718             COUNTER_UPDATE: begin
719                 bit_counter = bit_counter+1'b1;
720             end
721             EXIT: begin
722                 done = 'HIGH;
723             end
724         endcase
725     end
726
727 endmodule
728
729 module point_calc(
730     input clk,
731     input enable,

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```

732  input start ,
733  input [ORDER-1:0] x_p , y_p ,
734  input [ORDER-1:0] x_q , y_q ,
735  input point_type ,
736  output reg [ORDER-1:0] x_r , y_r ,
737  output reg done ,
738  //Slope Calc
739  output reg slope_calc_enable ,
740  output reg slope_calc_start ,
741  output [ORDER-1:0] slope_x_p , slope_y_p ,
742  output [ORDER-1:0] slope_x_q , slope_y_q ,
743  output slope_type ,
744  input [ORDER-1:0] m,
745  input slope_calc_done ,
746  //ALU Port
747  output reg alu_enable ,
748  output reg [ORDER-1:0] alu_in1 , alu_in2 ,
749  output reg [2:0] op ,
750  output reg alu_start ,
751  input alu_done ,
752  input [ORDER-1:0] alu_out
753  );
754
755  reg [ORDER-1:0] m_reg ;
756
757  assign slope_type = point_type ;
758  assign {slope_x_p , slope_y_p} = {x_p , y_p } ;
759  assign {slope_x_q , slope_y_q} = {x_q , y_q } ;
760
761  parameter IDLE = 5'h00 ;
762  parameter SLOPE_CALC_0 = 5'h01 , SLOPE_CALC_1 = 5'h02 ,
763   SLOPE_CALC_2 = 5'h03 ;
764  parameter X_R_0 = 5'h04 , X_R_1 = 5'h05 , X_R_2 = 5'h06 ;
765  parameter X_R_3 = 5'h07 , X_R_4 = 5'h08 , X_R_5 = 5'h09 ;
766  parameter X_R_6 = 5'h0a , X_R_7 = 5'h0b , X_R_8 = 5'h0c ;
767  parameter Y_R_0 = 5'h0d , Y_R_1 = 5'h0e , Y_R_2 = 5'h0f ;
768  parameter Y_R_3 = 5'h10 , Y_R_4 = 5'h11 , Y_R_5 = 5'h12 ;
769  parameter Y_R_6 = 5'h13 , Y_R_7 = 5'h14 , Y_R_8 = 5'h15 ;
770  parameter EXIT = 5'h16 ;
771  parameter ZERO = 5'h17 ;
772
773  reg [4:0] state , next_state ;
774
775  always @(*) begin
776   if (enable=='ON) begin
777    if (start=='HIGH) begin
778     case (state)
779      default: next_state = IDLE;
780      IDLE: begin
781       if ((x_p | y_p)&&(x_q | y_q)) next_state =
782          SLOPE_CALC_0;
783       else next_state = ZERO;
784     end
785     SLOPE_CALC_0: next_state = SLOPE_CALC_1;
786     SLOPE_CALC_1: begin
787      if (slope_calc_done) next_state = SLOPE_CALC_2

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    ;
    else next_state = SLOPE_CALC_1;
end
SLOPE_CALC_2: next_state = X_R_0;
X_R_0: next_state = X_R_1;
X_R_1: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = X_R_2;
  else next_state = X_R_1;
end
X_R_2: next_state = X_R_3;
X_R_3: next_state = X_R_4;
X_R_4: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = X_R_5;
  else next_state = X_R_4;
end
X_R_5: next_state = X_R_6;
X_R_6: next_state = X_R_7;
X_R_7: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = X_R_8;
  else next_state = X_R_7;
end
X_R_8: next_state = Y_R_0;
Y_R_0: next_state = Y_R_1;
Y_R_1: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = Y_R_2;
  else next_state = Y_R_1;
end
Y_R_2: next_state = Y_R_3;
Y_R_3: next_state = Y_R_4;
Y_R_4: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = Y_R_5;
  else next_state = Y_R_4;
end
Y_R_5: next_state = Y_R_6;
Y_R_6: next_state = Y_R_7;
Y_R_7: begin
  if (alu_done) next_state = Y_R_8;
  else next_state = Y_R_7;
end
Y_R_8: next_state = EXIT;
ZERO: next_state = EXIT;
EXIT: next_state = IDLE;
endcase
end
else begin
  next_state = IDLE;
end
end
else begin
  next_state = IDLE;
end
end
always @(posedge clk) state <= next_state;
always@( state ) begin

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```

841     case ( state )
842         IDLE: begin
843             done = 'LOW;
844             alu_enable = 'OFF;
845         end
846         SLOPE_CALC_0: begin
847             slope_calc_enable = 'ON;
848             slope_calc_start = 'HIGH;
849         end
850         SLOPE_CALC_2: begin
851             m_reg = m;
852             slope_calc_start = 'LOW;
853             slope_calc_enable = 'OFF;
854         end
855         X_R_0: begin
856             alu_in1 = m;
857             alu_in2 = m;
858             op = MUL;
859             alu_enable = 'ON;
860             alu_start = 'HIGH;
861         end
862         X_R_2: begin
863             x_r = alu_out;
864             alu_start = 'LOW;
865         end
866         X_R_3: begin
867             alu_in1 = x_r;
868             alu_in2 = x_p;
869             op = SUB;
870             alu_start = 'HIGH;
871         end
872         X_R_5: begin
873             x_r = alu_out;
874             alu_start = 'LOW;
875         end
876         X_R_6: begin
877             alu_in1 = x_r;
878             if (point_type == TANGENT) alu_in2 = x_p;
879             else alu_in2 = x_q;
880             op = SUB;
881             alu_start = 'HIGH;
882         end
883         X_R_8: begin
884             x_r = alu_out;
885             alu_start = 'LOW;
886         end
887         Y_R_0: begin
888             alu_in1 = x_p;
889             alu_in2 = x_r;
890             op = SUB;
891             alu_start = 'HIGH;
892         end
893         Y_R_2: begin
894             y_r = alu_out;
895             alu_start = 'LOW;
896         end

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```

897     Y_R_3: begin
898         alu_in1 = m_reg;
899         alu_in2 = y_r;
900         op = MUL;
901         alu_start = 'HIGH;
902     end
903     Y_R_5: begin
904         y_r = alu_out;
905         alu_start = 'LOW;
906     end
907     Y_R_6: begin
908         alu_in1 = y_r;
909         alu_in2 = y_p;
910         op = SUB;
911         alu_start = 'HIGH;
912     end
913     Y_R_8: begin
914         y_r = alu_out;
915         alu_start = 'LOW;
916     end
917     ZERO: begin
918         x_r = x_q | x_p;
919         y_r = y_q | y_p;
920     end
921     EXIT: begin
922         done = 'HIGH;
923     end
924     endcase
925 end
926
927 endmodule
928
929 module slope_calc(
930     input clk,
931     input enable,
932     input start,
933     input [ORDER-1:0] x_p, y_p,
934     input [ORDER-1:0] x_q, y_q,
935     input slope_type,
936     output reg [ORDER-1:0] m,
937     output reg done,
938     input [ORDER-1:0] curve_a,
939     //ALU Port
940     output reg alu_enable,
941     output reg [ORDER-1:0] alu_in1, alu_in2,
942     output reg [2:0] op,
943     output reg alu_start,
944     input alu_done,
945     input [ORDER-1:0] alu_out
946 );
947
948 parameter IDLE = 6'h00;
949 parameter TYPE_BRANCH = 6'h01;
950
951 parameter POINT_SLOPE_0 = 6'h2, POINT_SLOPE_1 = 6'h3,
952     POINT_SLOPE_2 = 6'h4;

```



```

999      if (alu_done) next_state = POINT_SLOPE_11;
1000     else next_state = POINT_SLOPE_10;
1001   end
1002   POINT_SLOPE_11: next_state = OUTPUT_VALUE;
1003   TANGENT_SLOPE_0: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_1;
1004   TANGENT_SLOPE_1: begin
1005     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_2;
1006     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_1;
1007   end
1008   TANGENT_SLOPE_2: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_3;
1009   TANGENT_SLOPE_3: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_4;
1010   TANGENT_SLOPE_4: begin
1011     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_5;
1012     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_4;
1013   end
1014   TANGENT_SLOPE_5: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_6;
1015   TANGENT_SLOPE_6: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_7;
1016   TANGENT_SLOPE_7: begin
1017     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_8;
1018     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_7;
1019   end
1020   TANGENT_SLOPE_8: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_9;
1021   TANGENT_SLOPE_9: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_10;
1022   TANGENT_SLOPE_10: begin
1023     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_11;
1024     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_10;
1025   end
1026   TANGENT_SLOPE_11: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_12;
1027   TANGENT_SLOPE_12: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_13;
1028   TANGENT_SLOPE_13: begin
1029     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_14;
1030     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_13;
1031   end
1032   TANGENT_SLOPE_14: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_15;
1033   TANGENT_SLOPE_15: next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_16;
1034   TANGENT_SLOPE_16: begin
1035     if (alu_done) next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_17;
1036     else next_state = TANGENT_SLOPE_16;
1037   end
1038   TANGENT_SLOPE_17: next_state = OUTPUT_VALUE;
1039 endcase
1040 end
1041 else begin
1042   next_state = IDLE;
1043 end
1044 end
1045 else begin
1046   next_state = IDLE;
1047 end
1048 end
1049
1050 always @(posedge clk) state = next_state;
1051
1052 always @(state) begin
1053   case (state)
1054     IDLE: begin

```

```

1055         done = 'LOW;
1056         alu_enable = 'OFF;
1057     end
1058     TYPE_BRANCH: alu_enable = 'ON;
1059     POINT_SLOPE_0: begin
1060         alu_in1 = y_q;
1061         alu_in2 = y_p;
1062         op = SUB;
1063         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1064     end
1065     POINT_SLOPE_2: begin
1066         m = alu_out;
1067         alu_start = 'LOW;
1068     end
1069     POINT_SLOPE_3: begin
1070         alu_in1 = x_q;
1071         alu_in2 = x_p;
1072         op = SUB;
1073         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1074     end
1075     POINT_SLOPE_5: begin
1076         alu_in1 = alu_out;
1077         alu_start = 'LOW;
1078     end
1079     POINT_SLOPE_6: begin
1080         op = MOD_INV;
1081         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1082     end
1083     POINT_SLOPE_8: begin
1084         alu_in2 = alu_out;
1085         alu_start = 'LOW;
1086     end
1087     POINT_SLOPE_9: begin
1088         alu_in1 = m;
1089         op = MUL;
1090         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1091     end
1092     POINT_SLOPE_11: begin
1093         m = alu_out;
1094         alu_start = 'LOW;
1095     end
1096     TANGENT_SLOPE_0: begin
1097         alu_in1 = x_p;
1098         alu_in2 = x_p;
1099         op = MUL;
1100         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1101     end
1102     TANGENT_SLOPE_2: begin
1103         m = alu_out;
1104         alu_start = 'LOW;
1105     end
1106     TANGENT_SLOPE_3: begin
1107         alu_in1 = m;
1108         alu_in2 = {{(ORDER-2){1'b0}},2'b11};
1109         op = MUL;
1110         alu_start = 'HIGH;

```

```

1111     end
1112     TANGENT_SLOPE_5: begin
1113         m = alu_out;
1114         alu_start = 'LOW;
1115     end
1116     TANGENT_SLOPE_6: begin
1117         alu_in1 = m;
1118         alu_in2 = curve_a;
1119         op = ADD;
1120         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1121     end
1122     TANGENT_SLOPE_8: begin
1123         m = alu_out;
1124         alu_start = 'LOW;
1125     end
1126     TANGENT_SLOPE_9: begin
1127         alu_in1 = y_p;
1128         alu_in2 = {{(ORDER-2){1'b0}},2'b10};
1129         op = MUL;
1130         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1131     end
1132     TANGENT_SLOPE_11: begin
1133         alu_in1 = alu_out;
1134         alu_start = 'LOW;
1135     end
1136     TANGENT_SLOPE_12: begin
1137         op = MOD_INV;
1138         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1139     end
1140     TANGENT_SLOPE_14: begin
1141         alu_in2 = alu_out;
1142         alu_start = 'LOW;
1143     end
1144     TANGENT_SLOPE_15: begin
1145         alu_in1 = m;
1146         op = MUL;
1147         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1148     end
1149     TANGENT_SLOPE_17: begin
1150         m = alu_out;
1151         alu_start = 'LOW;
1152     end
1153     OUTPUT_VALUE: done = 'HIGH;
1154 endcase
1155 end
1156 endmodule
1157
1158 module ecdsa_main(
1159     input clk,
1160     input enable,
1161     input start,
1162     output reg done,
1163     input [ORDER-1:0] G_x, G_y,
1164     input [ORDER-1:0] p, n, z, a, k,
1165     input [ORDER-1:0] curve_a,
1166     output reg [ORDER-1:0] r,

```

```

1167  output reg [ORDER-1:0] s
1168  );
1169  //ALU
1170  wire alu_enable_w;
1171  wire [ORDER-1:0] in1_w, in2_w;
1172  wire [2:0] op_w;
1173  wire alu_start_w;
1174  wire alu_done_w;
1175  wire [ORDER-1:0] alu_out_w;
1176  wire [ORDER-1:0] mod_p_w;
1177  reg mod_p_select;
1178
1179  ecdsa_alu ecdsa_alu(
1180  .clk(clk),
1181  .enable(alu_enable_w),
1182  .start(alu_start_w),
1183  .in1(in1_w),
1184  .in2(in2_w),
1185  .p(mod_p_w),
1186  .op(op_w),
1187  .out(alu_out_w),
1188  .done(alu_done_w)
1189 );
1190
1191 //Slope to ALU Connections
1192 wire [ORDER-1:0] slope_in1, slope_in2;
1193 wire [2:0] slope_op;
1194 wire slope_start, slope_enable;
1195
1196 //Point to ALU Connections
1197 wire [ORDER-1:0] point_in1, point_in2;
1198 wire [2:0] point_op;
1199 wire point_start, point_enable;
1200
1201 //Math ALU
1202 reg [ORDER-1:0] alu_in1, alu_in2;
1203 reg [2:0] op;
1204 reg alu_start;
1205 reg alu_enable;
1206
1207 //Slope_Calc to Point_Calc Connections
1208 wire slope_calc_enable;
1209 wire slope_calc_start;
1210 wire [ORDER-1:0] slope_x_p, slope_y_p;
1211 wire [ORDER-1:0] slope_x_q, slope_y_q;
1212 wire slope_type;
1213 wire [ORDER-1:0] m;
1214 wire slope_calc_done;
1215
1216 //Point_Calc to Point Multiplication Connections
1217 wire point_calc_enable;
1218 wire point_calc_start;
1219 wire point_type;
1220 wire [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_p, point_calc_y_p;
1221 wire [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_q, point_calc_y_q;
1222 wire [ORDER-1:0] point_calc_x_r, point_calc_y_r;

```

```

1223     wire point_calc_done;
1224
1225     //Point Multiplication
1226     reg point_multiplication_enable;
1227     reg point_multiplication_start;
1228     wire point_multiplication_done;
1229
1230     ecdsa_point_multiplication point_multiplication(
1231         .clk(clk),
1232         .enable(point_multiplication_enable),
1233         .start(point_multiplication_start),
1234         .done(point_multiplication_done),
1235         .scalar_k(k),
1236         .x(G_x), .y(G_y),
1237         .r(r),
1238         //Point_calc to Point Multiplication
1239         .point_calc_enable(point_calc_enable),
1240         .point_calc_start(point_calc_start),
1241         .point_type(point_type),
1242         .point_calc_x_p(point_calc_x_p), .point_calc_y_p(
1243             point_calc_y_p),
1244         .point_calc_x_q(point_calc_x_q), .point_calc_y_q(
1245             point_calc_y_q),
1246         .point_calc_x_r(point_calc_x_r), .point_calc_y_r(
1247             point_calc_y_r),
1248         .point_calc_done(point_calc_done)
1249     );
1250
1251     point_calc point_calculator(
1252         .clk(clk),
1253         .enable(point_calc_enable),
1254         .start(point_calc_start),
1255         .x_p(point_calc_x_p), .y_p(point_calc_y_p),
1256         .x_q(point_calc_x_q), .y_q(point_calc_y_q),
1257         .x_r(point_calc_x_r), .y_r(point_calc_y_r),
1258         .point_type(point_type),
1259         .done(point_calc_done),
1260         //Point Calc to Slope Calc
1261         .slope_calc_enable(slope_calc_enable),
1262         .slope_calc_start(slope_calc_start),
1263         .slope_x_p(slope_x_p), .slope_y_p(slope_y_p),
1264         .slope_x_q(slope_x_q), .slope_y_q(slope_y_q),
1265         .slope_type(slope_type),
1266         .m(m),
1267         .slope_calc_done(slope_calc_done),
1268         //Point_calc to ALU
1269         .alu_in1(point_in1), .alu_in2(point_in2),
1270         .op(point_op),
1271         .alu_enable(point_enable),
1272         .alu_start(point_start),
1273         .alu_done(alu_done_w),
1274         .alu_out(alu_out_w)
1275     );
1276
1277     slope_calc slope_calculator(
1278         .clk(clk),

```

```

1276     .enable(slope_calc_enable),
1277     .start(slope_calc_start),
1278     .x_p(slope_x_p), .y_p(slope_y_p),
1279     .x_q(slope_x_q), .y_q(slope_y_q),
1280     .slope_type(slope_type),
1281     .m(m),
1282     .done(slope_calc_done),
1283     .curve_a(curve_a),
1284     //Slope_calc to ALU
1285     .alu_enable(slope_enable),
1286     .alu_start(slope_start),
1287     .alu_in1(slope_in1), .alu_in2(slope_in2),
1288     .op(slope_op),
1289     .alu_done(alu_done_w),
1290     .alu_out(alu_out_w)
1291 );
1292
1293 reg [4:0] state, next_state;
1294
1295 parameter IDLE = 5'h00;
1296 parameter POINT_MULTIPLICATION_0 = 5'h01, POINT_MULTIPLICATION_1
1297     = 5'h02, POINT_MULTIPLICATION_2 = 5'h03;
1298 parameter R_MOD_0 = 5'h11, R_MOD_1 = 5'h12, R_MOD_2 = 5'h13;
1299 parameter S_MUL_0 = 5'h04, S_MUL_1 = 5'h05, S_MUL_2 = 5'h06;
1300 parameter S_ADD_0 = 5'h07, S_ADD_1 = 5'h08, S_ADD_2 = 5'h09;
1301 parameter S_INV_0 = 5'h0a, S_INV_1 = 5'h0b, S_INV_2 = 5'h0c;
1302 parameter S_PROD_0 = 5'h0d, S_PROD_1 = 5'h0e, S_PROD_2 = 5'h0f;
1303 parameter EXIT = 5'h10;
1304
1305 always @(*) begin
1306     if(enable == 'ON) begin
1307         if(start == 'HIGH) begin
1308             case(state)
1309                 default: next_state = IDLE;
1310                 IDLE: next_state = POINT_MULTIPLICATION_0;
1311                 POINT_MULTIPLICATION_0: next_state =
1312                     POINT_MULTIPLICATION_1;
1313                 POINT_MULTIPLICATION_1: begin
1314                     if(point_multiplication_done) next_state =
1315                         POINT_MULTIPLICATION_2;
1316                     else next_state = POINT_MULTIPLICATION_1;
1317                 end
1318                 POINT_MULTIPLICATION_2: next_state = R_MOD_0;
1319                 R_MOD_0: next_state = R_MOD_1;
1320                 R_MOD_1: begin
1321                     if(alu_done_w) next_state = R_MOD_2;
1322                     else next_state = R_MOD_1;
1323                 end
1324                 R_MOD_2: next_state = S_MUL_0;
1325                 S_MUL_0: next_state = S_MUL_1;
1326                 S_MUL_1: begin
1327                     if(alu_done_w) next_state = S_MUL_2;
1328                     else next_state = S_MUL_1;
1329                 end
1330                 S_MUL_2: next_state = S_ADD_0;
1331                 S_ADD_0: next_state = S_ADD_1;

```

```

1329           S_ADD_1: begin
1330             if (alu_done_w) next_state = S_ADD_2;
1331             else next_state = S_ADD_1;
1332           end
1333           S_ADD_2: next_state = S_INV_0;
1334           S_INV_0: next_state = S_INV_1;
1335           S_INV_1: begin
1336             if (alu_done_w) next_state = S_INV_2;
1337             else next_state = S_INV_1;
1338           end
1339           S_INV_2: next_state = S_PROD_0;
1340           S_PROD_0: next_state = S_PROD_1;
1341           S_PROD_1: begin
1342             if (alu_done_w) next_state = S_PROD_2;
1343             else next_state = S_PROD_1;
1344           end
1345           S_PROD_2: next_state = EXIT;
1346           EXIT: next_state = IDLE;
1347         endcase
1348       end
1349     end
1350     else begin
1351       next_state = IDLE;
1352     end
1353   end
1354
1355   always @(posedge clk) state <= next_state;
1356
1357   always @(state) begin
1358     case(state)
1359       IDLE: begin
1360         done = 'LOW;
1361         alu_enable = 'LOW;
1362         mod_p_select = 1'b1;
1363       end
1364       POINT_MULTIPLICATION_0: begin
1365         point_multiplication_enable = 'ON;
1366         point_multiplication_start = 'HIGH;
1367       end
1368       POINT_MULTIPLICATION_2: begin
1369         point_multiplication_start = 'LOW;
1370         point_multiplication_enable = 'OFF;
1371       end
1372       R_MOD_0: begin
1373         mod_p_select = 1'b0;
1374         alu_in1 = r;
1375         alu_in2 = {ORDER{1'b0}};
1376         op = ADD;
1377         alu_enable = 'ON;
1378         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1379       end
1380       R_MOD_2: begin
1381         r = alu_out_w;
1382         alu_enable = 'OFF;
1383         alu_start = 'LOW;
1384       end

```

```

1385     S_MUL_0: begin
1386         alu_enable = 'ON;
1387         alu_in1 = a;
1388         alu_in2 = r;
1389         op = MUL;
1390         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1391     end
1392     S_MUL_2: begin
1393         s = alu_out_w;
1394         alu_start = 'LOW;
1395     end
1396     S_ADD_0: begin
1397         alu_in1 = z;
1398         alu_in2 = s;
1399         op = ADD;
1400         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1401     end
1402     S_ADD_2: begin
1403         s = alu_out_w;
1404         alu_start = 'LOW;
1405     end
1406     S_INV_0: begin
1407         alu_in1 = k;
1408         op = MOD_INV;
1409         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1410     end
1411     S_INV_2: begin
1412         alu_in2 = alu_out_w;
1413         alu_start = 'LOW;
1414     end
1415     S_PROD_0: begin
1416         alu_in1 = s;
1417         op = MUL;
1418         alu_start = 'HIGH;
1419     end
1420     S_PROD_2: begin
1421         s = alu_out_w;
1422         alu_start = 'LOW;
1423     end
1424     EXIT: begin
1425         done = 'HIGH;
1426         alu_enable = 'LOW;
1427     end
1428 endcase
1429 end
1430
1431
1432     assign mod_p_w = (mod_p_select) ? p : n;
1433     assign alu_enable_w = (alu_enable) | (slope_enable) | (
1434         point_enable);
1435     assign alu_start_w = (alu_enable == 'ON) ? alu_start : (
1436         slope_enable == 'ON) ? slope_start : (point_enable == 'ON) ?
1437         point_start : 1'hz;
1438     assign in1_w = (alu_enable == 'ON) ? alu_in1 : (slope_enable ==
1439         'ON) ? slope_in1 : (point_enable == 'ON) ? point_in1 : {ORDER
1440         {1'hz }};


```



#### A.4 SHA256

#### A.4.1 SHA Top

```

48     Hash_digest_valid_1 <= Hash_digest_valid ;
49     Hash_digest_valid_2 <= Hash_digest_valid_1 ;
50     if(Hash_digest_valid == 1'b0 && SHA_ready == 1'b1 && count
51         == 0)
52     begin
53         initial_block <= 1 ;
54         block_SHA <= block_data_1 ;
55         count <= count + 1 ;
56         next_block <= 0 ;
57     end
58     else if(Hash_digest_valid == 1'b1 && SHA_ready == 1'b1 &&
59         count >= 1 && count < blocks )
60     begin
61         initial_block <= 0 ;
62         next_block <= 1 ;
63         count <= count + 1 ;
64         block_SHA <= block_data_2 ;
65     end
66     else if(Hash_digest_valid == 1'b1 && Hash_digest_valid_1 ==
67         1'b1 && Hash_digest_valid_2 == 1'b1 && SHA_ready == 1'b1
68         && count == blocks)
69     begin
70         sha_valid <= 1 ;
71     end
72     else
73     begin
74         initial_block <= 0 ;
75         next_block <= 0 ;
76     end
77
78     if(Hash_digest_valid == 1'b1)
79     begin
80         Hash_data <= SHA_digest ;
81     end
82
83 endmodule

```

#### A.4.2 SHA256

```

1
2 module sha256(
3             input wire           clk ,
4             input wire           reset_n ,
5             input wire           init ,
6             input wire           next ,
7             input wire [511 : 0] block ,
8             output wire          ready ,
9             output wire [255 : 0] digest ,
10            output wire          digest_valid
11            );
12
13 wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H0 = 32'h6a09e667;

```

```

14  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H1 = 32'hbb67ae85;
15  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H2 = 32'h3c6ef372;
16  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H3 = 32'ha54ff53a;
17  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H4 = 32'h510e527f;
18  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H5 = 32'h9b05688c;
19  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H6 = 32'h1f83d9ab;
20  wire [31:0] initial_SHA256_H7 = 32'h5be0cd19;
21
22  localparam CTRL_IDLE    = 0;
23  localparam CTRL_ROUNDS = 1;
24  localparam CTRL_DONE   = 2;
25
26  reg [31 : 0] a_reg ;
27  reg [31 : 0] b_reg ;
28  reg [31 : 0] c_reg ;
29  reg [31 : 0] d_reg ;
30  reg [31 : 0] e_reg ;
31  reg [31 : 0] f_reg ;
32  reg [31 : 0] g_reg ;
33  reg [31 : 0] h_reg ;
34
35  reg [31 : 0] H0_reg ;
36  reg [31 : 0] H0_new ;
37  reg [31 : 0] H1_reg ;
38  reg [31 : 0] H1_new ;
39  reg [31 : 0] H2_reg ;
40  reg [31 : 0] H2_new ;
41  reg [31 : 0] H3_reg ;
42  reg [31 : 0] H3_new ;
43  reg [31 : 0] H4_reg ;
44  reg [31 : 0] H4_new ;
45  reg [31 : 0] H5_reg ;
46  reg [31 : 0] H5_new ;
47  reg [31 : 0] H6_reg ;
48  reg [31 : 0] H6_new ;
49  reg [31 : 0] H7_reg ;
50  reg [31 : 0] H7_new ;
51  reg           H_we;
52
53  reg [5 : 0] counter_pos ;
54
55  reg digest_valid_reg ;
56  reg digest_valid_new ;
57  reg digest_valid_we ;
58
59  reg [1 : 0] sha256_ctrl_reg ;
60  reg [1 : 0] sha256_ctrl_new ;
61  reg           sha256_ctrl_we ;
62
63  reg digest_init ;
64  reg digest_update ;
65  reg state_update ;
66  reg ready_flag ;
67
68  reg [31 : 0] t1 ;
69  reg [31 : 0] t2 ;

```

```

70
71     wire [31 : 0] k_data;
72     wire [31 : 0] w_data;
73
74     wire constant_pos = (init || next) ;
75     wire next_word = (sha256_ctrl_reg == CTRL_ROUNDS)?1:0 ;
76
77     sha256_constants k_constants_inst(
78             .position(counter_pos),
79             .constant_value(k_data)
80         );
81
82     sha256_w_mem w_mem_inst(
83             .clk(clk),
84             .reset_n(reset_n),
85             .block(block),
86             .init(constant_pos),
87             .next(next_word),
88             .w(w_data)
89         );
90
91     assign ready = ready_flag;
92
93     assign digest = {H0_reg, H1_reg, H2_reg, H3_reg,
94                     H4_reg, H5_reg, H6_reg, H7_reg};
95
96     assign digest_valid = digest_valid_reg;
97
98     always @ (posedge clk or posedge reset_n)
99         begin : reg_update
100            if (reset_n)
101                begin
102                    H0_reg      <= 32'h0;
103                    H1_reg      <= 32'h0;
104                    H2_reg      <= 32'h0;
105                    H3_reg      <= 32'h0;
106                    H4_reg      <= 32'h0;
107                    H5_reg      <= 32'h0;
108                    H6_reg      <= 32'h0;
109                    H7_reg      <= 32'h0;
110                    digest_valid_reg <= 0;
111                    sha256_ctrl_reg <= CTRL_IDLE;
112                end
113            else
114                begin
115                    if (H_we)
116                        begin
117                            H0_reg <= H0_new;
118                            H1_reg <= H1_new;
119                            H2_reg <= H2_new;
120                            H3_reg <= H3_new;
121                            H4_reg <= H4_new;
122                            H5_reg <= H5_new;
123                            H6_reg <= H6_new;
124                            H7_reg <= H7_new;
125                        end

```

```

126
127     if ( digest_valid_we )
128         digest_valid_reg <= digest_valid_new ;
129     if ( sha256_ctrl_we )
130         sha256_ctrl_reg <= sha256_ctrl_new ;
131     end
132 end
133
134 always @(posedge clk or posedge reset_n )
135 begin : counter
136     if ( reset_n || next || init )
137         begin
138             counter_pos <= 0 ;
139         end
140     else if ( sha256_ctrl_reg == CTRL_ROUNDS )
141         begin
142             counter_pos <= counter_pos + 1 ;
143         end
144     end
145
146 always @*
147     begin : digest_logic
148         H0_new = 32'h0;
149         H1_new = 32'h0;
150         H2_new = 32'h0;
151         H3_new = 32'h0;
152         H4_new = 32'h0;
153         H5_new = 32'h0;
154         H6_new = 32'h0;
155         H7_new = 32'h0;
156         H_we = 0;
157
158     if ( digest_init )
159         begin
160             H_we = 1;
161             H0_new = initial_SHA256_H0;
162             H1_new = initial_SHA256_H1;
163             H2_new = initial_SHA256_H2;
164             H3_new = initial_SHA256_H3;
165             H4_new = initial_SHA256_H4;
166             H5_new = initial_SHA256_H5;
167             H6_new = initial_SHA256_H6;
168             H7_new = initial_SHA256_H7;
169         end
170
171     if ( digest_update )
172         begin
173             H0_new = H0_reg + a_reg;
174             H1_new = H1_reg + b_reg;
175             H2_new = H2_reg + c_reg;
176             H3_new = H3_reg + d_reg;
177             H4_new = H4_reg + e_reg;
178             H5_new = H5_reg + f_reg;
179             H6_new = H6_reg + g_reg;
180             H7_new = H7_reg + h_reg;
181             H_we = 1;

```

```

182         end
183     end
184
185     always @*
186     begin : t1_logic
187         reg [31 : 0] sum1;
188         reg [31 : 0] ch;
189
190         sum1 = {e_reg[5 : 0], e_reg[31 : 6]} ^
191             {e_reg[10 : 0], e_reg[31 : 11]} ^
192             {e_reg[24 : 0], e_reg[31 : 25]};
193
194         ch = (e_reg & f_reg) ^ ((~e_reg) & g_reg);
195
196         t1 = h_reg + sum1 + ch + w_data + k_data;
197     end
198
199
200     always @*
201     begin : t2_logic
202         reg [31 : 0] sum0;
203         reg [31 : 0] maj;
204
205         sum0 = {a_reg[1 : 0], a_reg[31 : 2]} ^
206             {a_reg[12 : 0], a_reg[31 : 13]} ^
207             {a_reg[21 : 0], a_reg[31 : 22]};
208
209         maj = (a_reg & b_reg) ^ (a_reg & c_reg) ^ (b_reg & c_reg);
210
211         t2 = sum0 + maj;
212     end
213
214     always @(*posedge clk or posedge reset_n)
215     begin : working_registers
216         if (reset_n)
217             begin
218                 a_reg          <= 32'h0;
219                 b_reg          <= 32'h0;
220                 c_reg          <= 32'h0;
221                 d_reg          <= 32'h0;
222                 e_reg          <= 32'h0;
223                 f_reg          <= 32'h0;
224                 g_reg          <= 32'h0;
225                 h_reg          <= 32'h0;
226             end
227         else if (init)
228             begin
229                 a_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H0;
230                 b_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H1;
231                 c_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H2;
232                 d_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H3;
233                 e_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H4;
234                 f_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H5;
235                 g_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H6;
236                 h_reg  <= initial_SHA256_H7;
237             end

```

```

238     else if (next)
239     begin
240         a_reg    <= H0_reg;
241         b_reg    <= H1_reg;
242         c_reg    <= H2_reg;
243         d_reg    <= H3_reg;
244         e_reg    <= H4_reg;
245         f_reg    <= H5_reg;
246         g_reg    <= H6_reg;
247         h_reg    <= H7_reg;
248     end
249     else if (sha256_ctrl_reg == CTRL_ROUNDS)
250     begin
251         a_reg    <= t1 + t2;
252         b_reg    <= a_reg;
253         c_reg    <= b_reg;
254         d_reg    <= c_reg;
255         e_reg    <= d_reg + t1;
256         f_reg    <= e_reg;
257         g_reg    <= f_reg;
258         h_reg    <= g_reg;
259     end
260 end
261
262 always @@
263     begin : sha256_ctrl_fsm
264         digest_init      = 0;
265         digest_update    = 0;
266
267         state_update     = 0;
268
269         ready_flag       = 0;
270
271         digest_valid_new = 0;
272         digest_valid_we  = 0;
273
274         sha256_ctrl_new  = CTRL_IDLE;
275         sha256_ctrl_we   = 0;
276
277
278     case (sha256_ctrl_reg)
279         CTRL_IDLE:
280         begin
281             ready_flag = 1;
282
283             if (init)
284             begin
285                 digest_init      = 1;
286                 digest_valid_new = 0;
287                 digest_valid_we  = 1;
288                 sha256_ctrl_new  = CTRL_ROUNDS;
289                 sha256_ctrl_we   = 1;
290             end
291
292             if (next)
293             begin

```

```

294         digest_valid_new = 0;
295         digest_valid_we  = 1;
296         sha256_ctrl_new  = CTRL_ROUNDS;
297         sha256_ctrl_we   = 1;
298     end
299 end
300
301 CTRL_ROUNDS:
302 begin
303     state_update = 1;
304
305     if (counter_pos == 63)
306     begin
307         sha256_ctrl_new = CTRL_DONE;
308         sha256_ctrl_we  = 1;
309     end
310 end
311
312 CTRL_DONE:
313 begin
314     digest_update     = 1;
315     digest_valid_new = 1;
316     digest_valid_we  = 1;
317     sha256_ctrl_new  = CTRL_IDLE;
318     sha256_ctrl_we   = 1;
319 end
320 endcase
321 end
322
323 endmodule

```

### A.4.3 SHA Constants

```

1 module sha256_constants(
2             input wire [5 : 0] position ,
3             output reg [31 : 0] constant_value
4 );
5
6     always @(*)
7     begin : constant_mem
8         case(position)
9             00: constant_value = 32'h428a2f98 ;
10            01: constant_value = 32'h71374491 ;
11            02: constant_value = 32'hb5c0fbcf ;
12            03: constant_value = 32'he9b5dba5 ;
13            04: constant_value = 32'h3956c25b ;
14            05: constant_value = 32'h59f111f1 ;
15            06: constant_value = 32'h923f82a4 ;
16            07: constant_value = 32'hab1c5ed5 ;
17            08: constant_value = 32'hd807aa98 ;
18            09: constant_value = 32'h12835b01 ;
19            10: constant_value = 32'h243185be ;
20            11: constant_value = 32'h550c7dc3 ;
21            12: constant_value = 32'h72be5d74 ;
22            13: constant_value = 32'h80deb1fe ;
23            14: constant_value = 32'h9bdc06a7 ;

```

```

24      15: constant_value = 32'hc19bf174;
25      16: constant_value = 32'he49b69c1;
26      17: constant_value = 32'hefbe4786;
27      18: constant_value = 32'h0fc19dc6;
28      19: constant_value = 32'h240calcc;
29      20: constant_value = 32'h2de92c6f;
30      21: constant_value = 32'h4a7484aa;
31      22: constant_value = 32'h5cb0a9dc;
32      23: constant_value = 32'h76f988da;
33      24: constant_value = 32'h983e5152;
34      25: constant_value = 32'ha831c66d;
35      26: constant_value = 32'hb00327c8;
36      27: constant_value = 32'bf597fc7;
37      28: constant_value = 32'hc6e00bf3;
38      29: constant_value = 32'hd5a79147;
39      30: constant_value = 32'h06ca6351;
40      31: constant_value = 32'h14292967;
41      32: constant_value = 32'h27b70a85;
42      33: constant_value = 32'h2e1b2138;
43      34: constant_value = 32'h4d2c6dfc;
44      35: constant_value = 32'h53380d13;
45      36: constant_value = 32'h650a7354;
46      37: constant_value = 32'h766a0abb;
47      38: constant_value = 32'h81c2c92e;
48      39: constant_value = 32'h92722c85;
49      40: constant_value = 32'ha2bfe8a1;
50      41: constant_value = 32'ha81a664b;
51      42: constant_value = 32'hc24b8b70;
52      43: constant_value = 32'hc76c51a3;
53      44: constant_value = 32'hd192e819;
54      45: constant_value = 32'hd6990624;
55      46: constant_value = 32'hf40e3585;
56      47: constant_value = 32'h106aa070;
57      48: constant_value = 32'h19a4c116;
58      49: constant_value = 32'h1e376c08;
59      50: constant_value = 32'h2748774c;
60      51: constant_value = 32'h34b0bcb5;
61      52: constant_value = 32'h391c0cb3;
62      53: constant_value = 32'h4ed8aa4a;
63      54: constant_value = 32'h5b9cca4f;
64      55: constant_value = 32'h682e6ff3;
65      56: constant_value = 32'h748f82ee;
66      57: constant_value = 32'h78a5636f;
67      58: constant_value = 32'h84c87814;
68      59: constant_value = 32'h8cc70208;
69      60: constant_value = 32'h90beffffa;
70      61: constant_value = 32'ha4506ceb;
71      62: constant_value = 32'hbef9a3f7;
72      63: constant_value = 32'hc67178f2;
73      endcase
74  end
75
76 endmodule

```

#### A.4.4 SHA256 W Mem

```

1
2 module sha256_w_mem(
3             input wire          clk ,
4             input wire          reset_n ,
5
6             input wire [511 : 0] block ,
7
8             input wire          init ,
9             input wire          next ,
10            output wire [31 : 0] w
11            );
12
13 reg [31 : 0] w_mem [0 : 15];
14 reg [31 : 0] w_mem00_new;
15 reg [31 : 0] w_mem01_new;
16 reg [31 : 0] w_mem02_new;
17 reg [31 : 0] w_mem03_new;
18 reg [31 : 0] w_mem04_new;
19 reg [31 : 0] w_mem05_new;
20 reg [31 : 0] w_mem06_new;
21 reg [31 : 0] w_mem07_new;
22 reg [31 : 0] w_mem08_new;
23 reg [31 : 0] w_mem09_new;
24 reg [31 : 0] w_mem10_new;
25 reg [31 : 0] w_mem11_new;
26 reg [31 : 0] w_mem12_new;
27 reg [31 : 0] w_mem13_new;
28 reg [31 : 0] w_mem14_new;
29 reg [31 : 0] w_mem15_new;
30 reg          w_mem_we;
31
32 reg [5 : 0] w_ctr_reg;
33 reg [5 : 0] w_ctr_new;
34 reg          w_ctr_we;
35
36 reg [31 : 0] w_tmp;
37 reg [31 : 0] w_new;
38
39 assign w = w_tmp;
40
41 always @ (posedge clk or posedge reset_n)
42     begin : reg_update
43         integer i;
44
45         if (reset_n)
46             begin
47                 for (i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i = i + 1)
48                     w_mem[i] <= 32'h0;
49
50                     w_ctr_reg <= 6'h0;
51             end
52         else
53             begin
54                 if (w_mem_we)
55                     begin
56                         w_mem[00] <= w_mem00_new;

```

```

57          w_mem[01] <= w_mem01_new ;
58          w_mem[02] <= w_mem02_new ;
59          w_mem[03] <= w_mem03_new ;
60          w_mem[04] <= w_mem04_new ;
61          w_mem[05] <= w_mem05_new ;
62          w_mem[06] <= w_mem06_new ;
63          w_mem[07] <= w_mem07_new ;
64          w_mem[08] <= w_mem08_new ;
65          w_mem[09] <= w_mem09_new ;
66          w_mem[10] <= w_mem10_new ;
67          w_mem[11] <= w_mem11_new ;
68          w_mem[12] <= w_mem12_new ;
69          w_mem[13] <= w_mem13_new ;
70          w_mem[14] <= w_mem14_new ;
71          w_mem[15] <= w_mem15_new ;
72      end
73
74      if ( w_ctrl_we )
75          w_ctrl_reg <= w_ctrl_new ;
76      end
77  end
78
79  always @*
80      begin : select_w
81          if ( w_ctrl_reg < 16 )
82              w_tmp = w_mem[ w_ctrl_reg [3 : 0] ];
83          else
84              w_tmp = w_new ;
85      end
86
87  always @*
88      begin : w_mem_update_logic
89          reg [31 : 0] w_0 ;
90          reg [31 : 0] w_1 ;
91          reg [31 : 0] w_9 ;
92          reg [31 : 0] w_14 ;
93          reg [31 : 0] d0 ;
94          reg [31 : 0] d1 ;
95
96          w_mem00_new = 32'h0 ;
97          w_mem01_new = 32'h0 ;
98          w_mem02_new = 32'h0 ;
99          w_mem03_new = 32'h0 ;
100         w_mem04_new = 32'h0 ;
101         w_mem05_new = 32'h0 ;
102         w_mem06_new = 32'h0 ;
103         w_mem07_new = 32'h0 ;
104         w_mem08_new = 32'h0 ;
105         w_mem09_new = 32'h0 ;
106         w_mem10_new = 32'h0 ;
107         w_mem11_new = 32'h0 ;
108         w_mem12_new = 32'h0 ;
109         w_mem13_new = 32'h0 ;
110         w_mem14_new = 32'h0 ;
111         w_mem15_new = 32'h0 ;
112         w_mem_we      = 0 ;

```

```

113
114     w_0  = w_mem[0];
115     w_1  = w_mem[1];
116     w_9  = w_mem[9];
117     w_14 = w_mem[14];
118
119     d0 = {w_1[6 : 0], w_1[31 : 7]} ^
120         {w_1[17 : 0], w_1[31 : 18]} ^
121         {3'b000, w_1[31 : 3]};
122
123     d1 = {w_14[16 : 0], w_14[31 : 17]} ^
124         {w_14[18 : 0], w_14[31 : 19]} ^
125         {10'b0000000000, w_14[31 : 10]};
126
127     w_new = d1 + w_9 + d0 + w_0;
128
129     if (init)
130     begin
131         w_mem00_new = block[511 : 480];
132         w_mem01_new = block[479 : 448];
133         w_mem02_new = block[447 : 416];
134         w_mem03_new = block[415 : 384];
135         w_mem04_new = block[383 : 352];
136         w_mem05_new = block[351 : 320];
137         w_mem06_new = block[319 : 288];
138         w_mem07_new = block[287 : 256];
139         w_mem08_new = block[255 : 224];
140         w_mem09_new = block[223 : 192];
141         w_mem10_new = block[191 : 160];
142         w_mem11_new = block[159 : 128];
143         w_mem12_new = block[127 : 96];
144         w_mem13_new = block[95 : 64];
145         w_mem14_new = block[63 : 32];
146         w_mem15_new = block[31 : 0];
147         w_mem_we     = 1;
148     end
149
150     if (next && (w_ctr_reg > 15))
151     begin
152         w_mem00_new = w_mem[01];
153         w_mem01_new = w_mem[02];
154         w_mem02_new = w_mem[03];
155         w_mem03_new = w_mem[04];
156         w_mem04_new = w_mem[05];
157         w_mem05_new = w_mem[06];
158         w_mem06_new = w_mem[07];
159         w_mem07_new = w_mem[08];
160         w_mem08_new = w_mem[09];
161         w_mem09_new = w_mem[10];
162         w_mem10_new = w_mem[11];
163         w_mem11_new = w_mem[12];
164         w_mem12_new = w_mem[13];
165         w_mem13_new = w_mem[14];
166         w_mem14_new = w_mem[15];
167         w_mem15_new = w_new;
168         w_mem_we     = 1;

```

```

169         end
170     end
171
172     always @*
173     begin : w_ctr
174         w_ctr_new = 6'h0;
175         w_ctr_we = 1'h0;
176
177         if (init)
178             begin
179                 w_ctr_new = 6'h0;
180                 w_ctr_we = 1'h1;
181             end
182
183         if (next)
184             begin
185                 w_ctr_new = w_ctr_reg + 6'h01;
186                 w_ctr_we = 1'h1;
187             end
188         end
189     endmodule

```

## A.5 UART

### A.5.1 UART Top

```

1 module UART_Top(
2     input clk ,
3     input reset ,
4     input transmit ,
5     output TxD
6 );
7
8     wire transmit_out;
9     wire transmit_and_valid ;
10    wire valid = 1'b1 ;
11    wire [511:0] data_512 ;
12    wire [255:0] data = 255 ,
13         h514D41524A49545241414A414D41524A49545241414A414D41524A4954524141
14         ;
15
16    hex_to_ascii CV ( data , data_512 ) ;
17    Debounce_Signals DB (clk , transmit , transmit_out );
18    Transmitter T1 (clk , reset , transmit_and_valid , data_512 , TxD );
19
20 endmodule

```

### A.5.2 Hex to ASCII

```

1 module hex_to_ascii(
2     input [255:0] data ,
3     output [511:0] out_data
4 );

```

```

5
6 integer i ;
7 reg [3:0] in_data ;
8 reg [7:0] ascii_data ;
9 reg [511:0] ascii_con ;
10
11 always @(*)
12 begin
13     for ( i = 0; i < 64 ; i = i+1 ) begin
14         in_data = {data[i*4+3],data[i*4+2],data[i*4+1],data[i*4]} ;
15         case (in_data)
16             4'h0: ascii_data = 8'h30;
17             4'h1: ascii_data = 8'h31;
18             4'h2: ascii_data = 8'h32;
19             4'h3: ascii_data = 8'h33;
20             4'h4: ascii_data = 8'h34;
21             4'h5: ascii_data = 8'h35;
22             4'h6: ascii_data = 8'h36;
23             4'h7: ascii_data = 8'h37;
24             4'h8: ascii_data = 8'h38;
25             4'h9: ascii_data = 8'h39;
26             4'hA: ascii_data = 8'h41;
27             4'hB: ascii_data = 8'h42;
28             4'hC: ascii_data = 8'h43;
29             4'hD: ascii_data = 8'h44;
30             4'hE: ascii_data = 8'h45;
31             4'hF: ascii_data = 8'h46;
32         endcase
33         { ascii_con[i*8+7], ascii_con[i*8+6], ascii_con[i*8+5],
34         ascii_con[i*8+4], ascii_con[i*8+3], ascii_con[i*8+2], ascii_con[
35             i*8+1], ascii_con[i*8]} = ascii_data ;
36     end
37
38     assign out_data = ascii_con ;
39
40 endmodule

```

### A.5.3 Debounce Signal

```

1 module Debounce_Signals #(parameter threshold = 100000)
2 (
3     input clk ,
4     input btn1 ,
5     output reg transmit
6     );
7
8     reg button_ff1 = 0;
9     reg button_ff2 = 0;
10    reg [30:0] count = 0;
11
12    always @(posedge clk)begin
13        button_ff1 <= btn1;
14        button_ff2 <= button_ff1;
15    end
16

```

```

17 always @(posedge clk) begin
18   if (button_ff2)
19   begin
20     if (~&count)
21       count <= count+1;
22   end else begin
23     if (| count)
24       count <= count-1;
25   end
26   if (count > threshold)
27     transmit <= 1;
28   else
29     transmit <= 0;
30 end
31
32
33 endmodule

```

#### A.5.4 Transmitter

```

1 module Transmitter(
2   input clk ,
3   input reset ,
4   input transmit ,
5   input [511:0] in_data ,
6   output reg TxD
7   );
8
9   reg [3:0] bitcounter;
10  reg [5:0] total_data_counter = 6'b111111 ;
11  reg [13:0] counter;
12  reg [1:0] state ,nextstate ;
13  reg [9:0] rightshiftreg ;
14  reg shift;
15  reg load;
16  reg clear;
17  reg [7:0] data = 8'h41 ;
18
19  integer i,j ;
20
21 always @ (posedge clk)
22 begin
23   if (reset)
24     begin
25       state <=0 ;
26       counter <=0 ;
27       bitcounter <=0 ;
28       total_data_counter <= 6'b111111 ;
29     end
30   else begin
31     counter <= counter + 1;
32     if (counter >= 10415)
33     begin
34       state <= nextstate ;
35       counter <= 0;
36       if (load)

```

```

37      begin
38          total_data_counter <= total_data_counter - 1 ;
39          rightshiftreg <= {1'b1,in_data[total_data_counter
40              *8+7],in_data[total_data_counter*8+6],in_data[
41                  total_data_counter*8+5],in_data[
42                  total_data_counter*8+4],
43                  in_data[total_data_counter*8+3],in_data[
44                      total_data_counter*8+2],in_data[
45                      total_data_counter*8+1],in_data[
46                      total_data_counter*8],1'b0};
47      end
48          if (clear) bitcounter <=0;
49      if (shift)
50          begin
51              rightshiftreg <= rightshiftreg >> 1;
52              bitcounter <= bitcounter + 1;
53          end
54      end
55  end
56
57 always @ (posedge clk)
58
59 begin
60     load <=0;
61     shift <=0;
62     clear <=0;
63     TxD <=1;
64     case (state)
65         0: begin
66             if (transmit) begin
67                 nextstate <= 1;
68                 load <=1;
69                 shift <=0;
70                 clear <=0;
71             end
72             else begin
73                 nextstate <= 0;
74                 TxD <= 1;
75             end
76         end
77         1: begin
78             if (bitcounter >=10) begin
79                 nextstate <= 2;
80                 clear <=1;
81             end
82             else begin
83                 nextstate <= 1;
84                 TxD <= rightshiftreg [0];
85                 shift <=1;
86             end
87         end
88         2: begin
89             if(total_data_counter == 0)
90                 begin
91                     nextstate <= 0 ;

```

```
87           clear <= 1 ;
88       end
89   else
90       begin
91           nextstate <= 1 ;
92           load <= 1 ;
93           shift <= 0 ;
94           clear <= 0 ;
95       end
96   end
97   default: nextstate <= 0;
98 endcase
99 end
100
101 endmodule
```