

## Homework 2 solutions

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1.(Shamir's secret sharing) Construct (4,5) threshold scheme to share a secret  $S = 15$ .

a) Create a secure polynomial.

$$S = 15, t = 4, n = 5$$

Choose prime  $p = 17$ ,  $p > \max(S, n)$ , define  $a_0 = S = 15$

Choose  $t-1 = 3$  independent coefficients ( $0 \leq a_j \leq p-1$ ):  $a_1 = 3, a_2 = 5, a_3 = 7$

Create the secure polynomial over  $Z_{17}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} f(x) &= a_{t-1} x^{t-1} + \dots + a_2 x^2 + a_1 x + a_0 \pmod{p} \\ &= 7x^3 + 5x^2 + 3x + 15 \pmod{17} \end{aligned}$$

b) Assign each participant a share.

$x_1 = 1, y_1 = f(1) = 13$ , assign share (1, 13) to participant 1;

$x_2 = 2, y_2 = f(2) = 12$ , assign share (2, 12) to participant 2;

$x_3 = 3, y_3 = f(3) = 3$ , assign share (3, 3) to participant 3;

$x_4 = 4, y_4 = f(4) = 11$ , assign share (4, 11) to participant 4;

$x_5 = 5, y_5 = f(5) = 10$ , assign share (5, 10) to participant 4;

c) Show how any 4 of the participant pool their shares to recover the secret  $S$ .

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= (-x_2/(x_1-x_2)) * (-x_3/(x_1-x_3)) * (-x_4/(x_1-x_4)) \\ &= (-2/(1-2)) * (-3/(1-3)) * (-4/(1-4)) \\ &= 2 * 3/2 * 4/3 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_2 &= (-x_1/(x_2-x_1)) * (-x_3/(x_2-x_3)) * (-x_4/(x_2-x_4)) \\ &= (-1/(2-1)) * (-3/(2-3)) * (-4/(2-4)) \\ &= -1 * 3 * 2 = -6 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_3 &= (-x_1/(x_3-x_1)) * (-x_2/(x_3-x_2)) * (-x_4/(x_3-x_4)) \\ &= (-1/(3-1)) * (-2/(3-2)) * (-4/(3-4)) \\ &= -1/2 * -2 * 4 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_4 &= (-x_1/(x_4-x_1)) * (-x_2/(x_4-x_2)) * (-x_3/(x_4-x_3)) \\ &= (-1/(4-1)) * (-2/(4-2)) * (-3/(4-3)) \\ &= -1/3 * -1 * -3 = -1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} S &= c_1 y_1 + c_2 y_2 + c_3 y_3 + c_4 y_4 \pmod{p} \\ &= 4 * 13 - 6 * 12 + 4 * 3 - 1 * 11 \pmod{17} \\ &= -19 \pmod{17} = -2 \pmod{17} = 15 \end{aligned}$$


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2. (Generalized secret sharing). Suppose there are 4 participants  $\{P1, P2, P3, P4\}$  and the access structure AS is  $\{\{P1, P2, P3\}, \{P2, P3, P4\}, \{P1, P4\}\}$ . Use Shamir's scheme to assign each participant share(s) so that only authorized group of participants can recover the secret.

$$AS = \{\{P1, P2, P3\}, \{P2, P3, P4\}, \{P1, P4\}\}$$

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$$|AS| = 5$$

Use Shamir's (5,5) scheme to generate 5 shares  $S1, S2, S3, S4$  and  $S5$ . Assign the shares in the following ways.

$$S1 \rightarrow P2, P4 \quad S2 \rightarrow P1, P4$$

$$S3 \rightarrow P3, P4 \quad S4 \rightarrow P1, P3$$

$$S5 \rightarrow P1, P2$$

So  $P1$  has the shares  $\{S2, S4, S5\}$ ,  $P2$  has the shares  $\{S1, S5\}$ ,  $P3$  has the shares  $\{S3, S4\}$

3. (Verifiable secret sharing). Construct a (4,4) verifiable threshold scheme to share a secret  $S=20$ .

a) How does the dealer construct a secure polynomial?

$$S = 20 \quad t = 4, n = 4$$

Choose prime  $p = 31$ ,  $p > \max(S, n)$ , define  $a_0 = S = 20$

Choose  $t-1 = 3$  independent coefficients ( $0 \leq a_j \leq p-1$ ):  $a_1 = 3, a_2 = 5, a_3 = 7$

Create the secure polynomial over  $\mathbb{Z}_{31}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} f(x) &= a_{t-1} x^{t-1} + \dots + a_2 x^2 + a_1 x + a_0 \pmod{p} \\ &= 7x^3 + 5x^2 + 3x + 20 \pmod{31} \end{aligned}$$

b) Assign each participant a share.

$$x_1 = 1, y_1 = f(1) = 4, \text{ assign share } (1, 4) \text{ to participant 1;}$$

$$x_2 = 2, y_2 = f(2) = 9, \text{ assign share } (2, 9) \text{ to participant 2;}$$

$$x_3 = 3, y_3 = f(3) = 15, \text{ assign share } (3, 15) \text{ to participant 3;}$$

$$x_4 = 4, y_4 = f(4) = 2, \text{ assign share } (4, 2) \text{ to participant 4;}$$

c) What information does the dealer publish?

$$E(a_0) = g^{a_0} \pmod{p} = g^{20} \pmod{p}$$

$$E(a_1) = g^{a_1} \pmod{p} = g^3 \pmod{p}$$

$$E(a_2) = g^{a_2} \pmod{p} = g^5 \pmod{p}$$

$$E(a_3) = g^{a_3} \pmod{p} = g^7 \pmod{p}$$

d) How does each participant verify the validity of his/her share?

Participant 1: (1,4)

$$E(f(1)) = g^4$$

$$= E(a_0) * E(a_1) * E(a_2) * E(a_3) = g^{20} * g^3 * g^5 * g^7 = g^{35 \bmod 31} \bmod 31 = g^4 \bmod p$$

Participant 2: (2,9)

$$E(f(2)) = g^9$$

$$= E(a_0) * E(a_1)^2 * E(a_2)^4 * E(a_3)^8 = g^{20} * g^6 * g^{20} * g^{56} = g^{102 \bmod 31} \bmod 31 = g^9 \bmod p$$

Participant 3: (3,15)

$$E(f(3)) = g^{15}$$

$$= E(a_0) * E(a_1)^3 * E(a_2)^9 * E(a_3)^{27} = g^{20} * g^9 * g^{45} * g^{189} = g^{263 \bmod 31} \bmod 31 = g^{15} \bmod p$$

Participant 4: (4,2)

$$E(f(4)) = g^2$$

$$= E(a_0) * E(a_1)^4 * E(a_2)^{16} * E(a_3)^{64} = g^{20} * g^{12} * g^{80} * g^{448} = g^{560 \bmod 31} \bmod 31 = g^2 \bmod p$$

4. (Proxy signature) In MUO's proxy signature scheme,  $p=241$  and  $g=7$ . The original signer's private key  $x=14$ .

a) Generate a proxy key pair.

Choose random number  $k = 50$

$$t = g^k \bmod p = 7^{50} \bmod 241 = 121$$

$$s = (x + kt) \bmod (p-1) = (14 + 50*121) \bmod 240 = 64$$

The proxy key pair is  $(s,t) = (64, 121)$

b) How does the proxy signer verify the validity of the proxy key pair?

$$\text{The original signer's public key } y = g^x \bmod p = 7^{14} \bmod 241 = 188$$

$$g^s \bmod p = 7^{64} \bmod 241 = 94$$

$$yt^t \bmod p = 188 * 121^{121} \bmod 241 = 94$$

$g^s \bmod p = yt^t \bmod p$ , the proxy key pair  $(s,t)$  is verified.

c) The proxy signer needs to sign a message  $m=15$  on behalf of the original signer. How does (S)he generate the proxy signature?

Select a random number  $r = 11$

$$S1 = g^r \bmod p = 7^{11} \bmod 241 = 68$$

$$S2 = (M - s * S1) r^{-1} \bmod p-1$$

$$= (15 - 64 * 68) * 11^{-1} \bmod 240$$

$$= 223 * 11^{-1} \bmod 240$$

$$= 223 * 11^{63} \bmod 240$$

$$= 223 * 131 \bmod 240 = 173$$

$$(\phi(240) = \phi(2^4 * 3 * 5) = (2^4 - 2^3) * 2 * 4 = 64)$$

d) How does a verifier verify the proxy signature?

$$g^m \bmod p = 7^{15} \bmod 241 = 111$$

$$(yt^t)^{S^1 S^2} \bmod p$$

$$= (188 * 121^{121})^{68} * 68^{173} \bmod 241$$

$$= 94^{68} * 74 \bmod 241 = 24 * 95 \bmod 241 = 111$$

$g^m = (yt^t)^{S^1 S^2} \bmod p$ , the proxy signature is verified.

5. (Partially Blind signature) The signer's public key pair is (11,91) and he keeps  $(d,p,q)=(59, 7, 13)$  secure. A requester want the signer to sign  $m=19$  with  $h(m)=23$ . The common information  $a$  is 25 with  $h(a) = 17$ .

a) How does the requester blind  $m$  and what information does he send to the signer?

The requester chooses two random numbers:  $r=3, u=33$

$$\sigma = r^e h(m)(u^2+1) \bmod n$$

$$= 3^{11} * 23 * (33^2 + 1) \bmod 91$$

$$= 61 * 23 * 89 \bmod 91$$

$$= 15$$

He send  $(a, \sigma) = (25, 15)$  to the signer.

b) After the signer receives the information sent by the requester, he selects a random number  $x=29$  and send  $x$  to the requester. After the requester receives  $x$ , what does he do and what information does he send to the signer?

The requester randomly choose a number  $r' = 10$

He calculates  $b = r * r' = 2 * 10 = 30$

$$\beta = b^e (u-x) \bmod n = 30^{11} * (33 - 29) \bmod 91 = 79$$

He send  $\beta = 79$  to the signer.

c) How does the signer generate a blind signature?

$$\text{The signer computes: } \beta^{-1} \bmod n = 79^{-1} \bmod 91 = 79^{71} \bmod 91 = 53$$

$$(\phi(91) = \phi(7 * 13) = 6 * 12 = 72)$$

$$t = h(a)^d (\sigma(x^2+1) \beta^{-2})^{2d} \bmod n$$

$$= 17^{59} (15 * (29^2 + 1) 79^{-2})^{2*59} \bmod 91$$

$$= 75 * (15 * 842 * 53^2)^{118} \bmod 91 = 27$$

The signer generates blind signature  $(\beta^{-1}, t) = (53, 27)$ , and send it to the requester.

d) After the requester gets the blind signature, how does he extract the signature?

The requester calculates:

$$c = (ux+1) * \beta^{-1} * b^e \bmod n$$

$$= (33*29 + 1) * 53 * 30^{11} \bmod 91 = (48*53 * 88) \bmod 91 = 12$$

$$S = t*r^2*r^4 \bmod n = 27 * 3^2 * 10^4 \bmod 91 = 27$$

He extracts the signature  $(a, c, s) = (25, 12, 27)$

e) How to verify the extracted signature?

To verify the signature, check  $s^e = h(a)*h(m)^2*(c^2+1)^2 \bmod n$  ?

$$s^e = 27^{11} \bmod 91 = 27$$

$$h(a)*h(m)^2*(12^2+1)^2 \bmod n$$

$$= 17*23^2*(12^2+1)^2 \bmod 91$$

$$= 17*529*21025 \bmod 91$$

$$= 27$$

The equation holds, so the signature is valid.

6. In Tseng-Jan's group signature scheme,  $p=743$ ,  $q=53$ ,  $g=38$ .  $h(x) = x^2 \bmod 100$ .  $a||b = a+b \bmod 100$ . Suppose 2 users join a group, use specific values to show how the algorithm work(it's up to you to choose random values if required):

Ack: The answer is from Yuan Yang.

a) How the two users and the group manager (GM) set up the keys and other parameters

U1: choose  $x_1 = 3$ ,  $y_1 = g^{x_1} \bmod p = 633$ ;  
 U2: choose  $x_2 = 5$ ,  $y_2 = g^{x_2} \bmod p = 162$ ;  
 GM:  $x = 7$ ,  $y = g^x \bmod p = 626$

U1 and U2 send their public key  $y_1$  and  $y_2$  to GM  
 GM choose  $k_1 = 11$  and  $k_2 = 12$  to U1 and U2

Calculate  $r_1$  and  $s_1$  for U1:

$$r_1 = g^{-k_1} * y_1^{k_1} \bmod p = 65$$

$$s_1 = (k_1 - r_1 * x) \bmod q = 33$$

Calculate  $r_2$  and  $s_2$  for U2:

$$r_2 = g^{-k_2} * y_2^{k_2} \bmod p = 610$$

$$s_2 = (k_2 - r_2 * x) \bmod q = 35$$

so U1 has  $(x_1, y_1, r_1, s_1) = (3, 633, 65, 33)$ , U2 has  $(x_2, y_2, r_2, s_2) = (5, 162, 610, 35)$ ;

b) Suppose user 1 signs on a message  $M=20$  on behalf of the group, what's the signature?

U1 want to sign  $M=20$ , U1 random choose  $(a,b,d,t) = (3,5,12,9)$

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= r_1^a \bmod p = 65^3 \bmod 743 = 458; \\
 C &= (a * r_1 - d) \bmod q = (3 * 65 - 12) \bmod 53 = 24; \\
 D &= g^b \bmod P = 38^5 \bmod 743 = 162; \\
 E &= y^d \bmod p = 626^{12} \bmod 743 = 663; \\
 B &= (a * s_1 - b * h(\text{AllC} \parallel \text{D} \parallel \text{E})) \bmod q \\
 &= (3 * 33 - 5 * 49) \bmod 53 \\
 &= 13 \\
 \alpha &= g^{B * y^C * E * D h(\text{AllC} \parallel \text{D} \parallel \text{E})} \bmod p \\
 &= (38^{13}) * (626^{24}) * 663 * 162^{49} \bmod 743 \\
 &= 388
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 R &= \alpha^t \bmod p \\
 &= 388^9 \bmod 743 \\
 &= 675
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 S &= t^{-1} (h(m \parallel R) - R * x_1) \bmod q = 6 * (25 - 675 * 3) \bmod 53 \\
 &= 31
 \end{aligned}$$

The signature is  $(R, S, A, B, C, D, E) = (675, 31, 458, 13, 24, 162, 663)$

c) How to verify the group signature?

$$\alpha^{h(m \parallel R)} \bmod p \stackrel{?}{=} (\alpha * A)^R * R^S \bmod p$$

$$\alpha^{h(m \parallel R)} \bmod p = 388^{25} \bmod 743 = 37$$

$$(\alpha * A)^R * R^S \bmod p = ((388 * 458)^{675}) * 675^{31} \bmod 743 = 37$$

So the group signature is valid

d) If there is a need to identify the signer, how to open the signature?

GM first calculates  $\alpha = 388$

GM identifies U1 because the following equation holds:

$$\begin{aligned}
 388 &= ((g^C * E^{x^{-1}} \bmod q)^{(r_1^{-1} * k_1 \bmod q)}) \bmod p \\
 &= (38^{24} * 663^{38})^{31 * 11 \bmod 53} \bmod 743 \\
 &= (242 * 364)^{23} \bmod 743 \\
 &= 388
 \end{aligned}$$

7. Secure multiparty communication. Assume the followings:

- RSA is used.
- Bob's public key is (19, 391)
- His private key is (315, 391)
- Alice's secret value  $i$ , is 5
- Bob's secret value  $j$ , is 8.
- Only the values from 1 to 10 are possible for  $i$  and  $j$

Show how Alice and Bob knows which value is bigger without revealing their secret value to the other?

1) Alice chooses a large random number,  $x=193$ , and encrypts it in Bob's public key

$$c = E_B(x) = 193^{19} \bmod 391 = 335$$

$E_B$  is the encryption algorithm with Bob's public key

2) Alice computes  $c-i = 335-5 = 330$  and sends the results to Bob

3) Bob computes the following 10 numbers:

$$y_u = D_B(c-i+u), \text{ for } 1 \leq u \leq 10$$

$$u=1 \quad y_1 = D_B(330+1) = 331^{315} \bmod 391 = 257$$

$$u=2 \quad y_2 = D_B(330+2) = 332^{315} \bmod 391 = 83$$

$$u=3 \quad y_3 = D_B(330+3) = 333^{315} \bmod 391 = 122$$

$$u=4 \quad y_4 = D_B(330+4) = 334^{315} \bmod 391 = 131$$

$$u=5 \quad y_5 = D_B(330+5) = 335^{315} \bmod 391 = 193$$

$$u=6 \quad y_6 = D_B(330+6) = 336^{315} \bmod 391 = 157$$

$$u=7 \quad y_7 = D_B(330+7) = 337^{315} \bmod 391 = 333$$

$$u=8 \quad y_8 = D_B(330+8) = 338^{315} \bmod 391 = 179$$

$$u=9 \quad y_9 = D_B(330+9) = 339^{315} \bmod 391 = 135$$

$$u=10 \quad y_{10} = D_B(330+10) = 340^{315} \bmod 391 = 374$$

4) Bob chooses a large random prime  $p = 137$  ( $< x$ )

5) Bob computes the following 10 numbers:

$$z_u = (y_u \bmod p), \text{ for } 1 \leq u \leq 10$$

$$u=1 \quad z_1 = y_1 \bmod p = 257 \bmod 137 = 120$$

$$u=2 \quad z_2 = y_2 \bmod p = 83 \bmod 137 = 83$$

$$\begin{aligned}
u=3 \quad z_3 &= y_3 \bmod p = 122 \bmod 137 = 122 \\
u=4 \quad z_4 &= y_4 \bmod p = 131 \bmod 137 = 131 \\
u=5 \quad z_5 &= y_5 \bmod p = 193 \bmod 137 = 56 \\
u=6 \quad z_6 &= y_6 \bmod p = 157 \bmod 137 = 20 \\
u=7 \quad z_7 &= y_7 \bmod p = 333 \bmod 137 = 59 \\
u=8 \quad z_8 &= y_8 \bmod p = 179 \bmod 137 = 42 \\
u=9 \quad z_9 &= y_9 \bmod p = 135 \bmod 137 = 135 \\
u=10 \quad z_{10} &= y_{10} \bmod p = 374 \bmod 137 = 100
\end{aligned}$$

6) Bob verifies that, for all  $u \neq v$

$$\begin{aligned}
|z_u - z_v| &\geq 2 \quad \text{and that for all } u \\
0 < z_u &< p-1
\end{aligned}$$

Bob does all the verification and confirms that the sequence is fine

7) Bob sends Alice this sequence of numbers in this exact order

$$\begin{aligned}
&z_1, z_2, \dots, z_j, z_{j+1} + 1, z_{j+2} + 1, \dots, z_{100} + 1, p \\
&= 120, 83, 122, 131, 56, 20, 59, 42, 135 + 1, 100 + 1, 137 \\
&= 120, 83, 122, 131, 56, 20, 59, 42, 136, 101, 137
\end{aligned}$$

8) Alice checks whether the 5<sup>th</sup> number in the sequence is congruent to 193 mod 131.

$$\begin{aligned}
56 &= 193 \bmod 137 \\
\text{Alice knows that } i &\leq j \quad (5 < 8)
\end{aligned}$$

9) Alice tells Bob the result

8. Prove that Chaum's undeniable signature scheme works, that is, the signature is valid if  $d = m^a * g^b \bmod p$

$$\begin{aligned}
d &= c^t \bmod p \\
&= c^{(x-1)} \bmod p \\
&= s^a (x-1) * y^b (x-1) \bmod p \\
&= m^a x (x-1) * g^b x (x-1) \bmod p \\
&= m^a * g^b \bmod p
\end{aligned}$$