Investigating Variation in Replicability across Sample and Setting

Richard Klein LIP/PC2S Université Grenoble Alpes

2018-12-12 (updated: 2018-12-12)

From cause for concern...

From cause for concern...

Open access, freely

Essay

Why Most Published Research Findings Are False

John P. A. Ioannidis

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2011, Vol. 100, No. 3, 407-425 © 2011 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/11/\$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0021524

Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect

Daryl J. Bem Cornell University

False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant

Joseph P. Simmons¹, Leif D. Nelson², and Uri Simonsohn¹

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and ²Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

...to evidence of a problem...

- Reproducibility Project: Psychology (OSC, 2015)
 - ~40/100 studies replicated
- Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018)
 - 13/21 replicated
- Multiple large-scale Registered Reports

- What we know:
 - It's easy to fool yourself with data (p < .05).

...to addressing the problem

• What we know:


- It's easy to fool yourself with data (p < .05).
- \circ *p* values =/= truth.

- What we know:
 - It's easy to fool yourself with data (p < .05).
 - \circ *p* values =/= truth.
- What we want to know:
 - How to ensure our own results are replicable.


- What we know:
 - It's easy to fool yourself with data (p < .05).
 - \circ *p* values =/= truth.
- What we want to know:
 - How to ensure our own results are replicable.
- What we don't know:
 - Very much about replication.

- What we know:
 - It's easy to fool yourself with data (p < .05).
 - \circ *p* values =/= truth.
- What we want to know:
 - How to ensure our own results are replicable.
- What we don't know:
 - Very much about replication.
 - Must improve understanding to inform solutions


- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - 36 labs
 - 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples




- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - 36 labs
 - 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples
- Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., in press)
 - Discussing today




- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - 36 labs
 - 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples
- Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., in press)
 - Discussing today
- Many Labs 3 (Ebersole et al., 2016)
 - 3/10 successful replications
 - Little variation across semester




- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - o 36 labs
 - o 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples
- Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., in press)
 - Discussing today
- Many Labs 3 (Ebersole et al., 2016)
 - o 3/10 successful replications
 - Little variation across semester
- Many Labs 4 (Klein et al., in prep)
 - Terror Management Theory-specific
 - Compare expert replications vs "in-house" replications



- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - o 36 labs
 - o 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples
- Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., in press)
 - Discussing today
- Many Labs 3 (Ebersole et al., 2016)
 - o 3/10 successful replications
 - Little variation across semester
- Many Labs 4 (Klein et al., in prep)
 - Terror Management Theory-specific
 - Compare expert replications vs "in-house" replications
- Many Labs 5 (Ebersole et al., in prep)
 - Follow-up to Reproducibility Project



- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
 - 36 labs
 - 10/13 successful replications
 - Little variation between samples
- Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., in press)
 - Discussing today
- Many Labs 3 (Ebersole et al., 2016)
 - o 3/10 successful replications
 - Little variation across semester
- Many Labs 4 (Klein et al., in prep)
 - Terror Management Theory-specific
 - Compare expert replications vs "in-house" replications
- Many Labs 5 (Ebersole et al., in prep)
 - Follow-up to Reproducibility Project
- Also: Many Beds (IJzerman et al.,), Many Babies, Many Analysts, Many Labs VR, Many Numbers, Brazilian Reproducibility Project



Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

• **Question:** Will psychology studies replicate when they're repeated in contexts and samples very different from the original?

Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

- **Question:** Will psychology studies replicate when they're repeated in contexts and samples very different from the original?
- **Goal:** Replicate many different studies all around the world and compare if they vary based on the sample of data collection.

Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

- **Question:** Will psychology studies replicate when they're repeated in contexts and samples very different from the original?
- **Goal:** Replicate many different studies all around the world and compare if they vary based on the sample of data collection.
- Replicated 28 studies
 - Selected for impact, diversity of content, possibility for variation
 - Split across two study "packages" due to length
 - Computerized in Qualtrics
 - Randomized study order, presented back-to-back

Many Labs 2 Hsee example



Coats range from \$100-\$1000 Your friend buys you a \$110 coat



Scarves range from \$10-\$100 Your friend buys you a \$90 scarf

How generous was your friend?


Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

- **Question:** Will psychology studies replicate when they're repeated in contexts and samples very different from the original?
- **Goal:** Replicate many different studies all around the world and compare if they vary based on the sample of data collection.
- Replicated 28 studies
 - Selected for impact, diversity of content, possibility for variation
 - Split across two study "packages" due to length
 - Computerized in Qualtrics
 - Randomized study order, presented back-to-back

Like Many Labs 1, but a much stronger test:

- **Question:** Will psychology studies replicate when they're repeated in contexts and samples very different from the original?
- **Goal:** Replicate many different studies all around the world and compare if they vary based on the sample of data collection.
- Replicated 28 studies
 - Selected for impact, diversity of content, possibility for variation
 - Split across two study "packages" due to length
 - Computerized in Qualtrics
 - Randomized study order, presented back-to-back
- Administer identical study package across as many diverse samples as possible


Many Labs 1 Map



Many Labs 2 Map



- 125 samples (each study administered in 60+)
- 36 countries, translated into 16 languages
- 15,305 participants total



Many Labs 2 Results

Many Labs 2 Results

- 14/28 successful replications
 - \circ p < .0001, non-trivial effect size, same direction as original
 - One additional weakly supported: p = .03

Many Labs 2 Results

- 14/28 successful replications
 - \circ *p* < .0001, non-trivial effect size, same direction as original
 - One additional weakly supported: p = .03
- 21/28 had smaller effect size than original
 - Median original d = 0.60
 - Median replication d = 0.15

Many Labs 2 Heterogeneity



Many Labs 2 Heterogeneity



- Q statistic: 11/28 had p < .001 (statistically significant heterogeneity)
 - For 11 studies, observed variability across sites exceeded that which would be expected due to chance.

Many Labs 2 Heterogeneity



- Q statistic: 11/28 had p < .001 (statistically significant heterogeneity)
 - For 11 studies, observed variability across sites exceeded that which would be expected due to chance.
- However: 26/28 Tau ≤ 0.1
 - Variability across sites *existed*, but only had a very small effect (except for 1 or 2 studies)

• Low variation across sample/context

- Low variation across sample/context
 - \circ Not reasonable to discount replications by default based on sample

- Low variation across sample/context
 - Not reasonable to discount replications *by default* based on sample
 - Instead, test moderators empirically

- Low variation across sample/context
 - Not reasonable to discount replications *by default* based on sample
 - Instead, test moderators empirically
- Replication rate aligns with other projects
 - Is this meaningful?

- Low variation across sample/context
 - Not reasonable to discount replications *by default* based on sample
 - Instead, test moderators empirically
- Replication rate aligns with other projects
 - Is this meaningful?
- Many studies replicate robustly (and robust replicability is a feasible goal)

- Low variation across sample/context
 - Not reasonable to discount replications *by default* based on sample
 - Instead, test moderators empirically
- Replication rate aligns with other projects
 - Is this meaningful?
- Many studies replicate robustly (and robust replicability is a feasible goal)
 - Reinforces need for solutions to ensure replicability

- Low variation across sample/context
 - Not reasonable to discount replications *by default* based on sample
 - Instead, test moderators empirically
- Replication rate aligns with other projects
 - Is this meaningful?
- Many studies replicate robustly (and robust replicability is a feasible goal)
 - Reinforces need for solutions to ensure replicability
- Open data: https://osf.io/8cd4r/
 - CC0, free use (any purpose)
 - We barely scratched surface

Thanks!

Special thanks to co-leads Fred Hasselman, Michelangelo Vianello, and Brian Nosek + 186 other co-authors.


Questions/comments?

@raklein3
raklein22@gmail.com
https://www.raklein.me












Table 3. Results of Heterogeneity Tests for Each of the 28 Effects

Table 3. (Continued)

							-						
			All sam	ples (no	moderato	rs)				All sam	ples (no	moderato	rs)
Effect	ESa	Tau	Q	df	p	I^2	Effect	ES^a	Tau	Q	df	Þ	I^2
Disgust sensitivity predicts	0.05	.00	55.80	58.00	Coh .56	en's q effect size 3.00%	double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)	0.25	.00	60.40	59.00	.42	12.00% [0%, 33%]
homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009) Assimilation and contrast effects in	-0.07	.10	60.39	58.00	.39	[0%, 30%]	Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012)	0.12	.00	63.78	53.00	.15	12.00% [0%, 49%]
question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)			33.37	, , , ,		[0%, 33%]	Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich,	0.04	.00	64.88	58.00	.25	6.00% [0%, 43%]
					Coh	en's d effect size	2008)						
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)	1.82	.00	235.65	57.00	< .001	65.00% [46%, 73%]	Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03	.00	103.56	53.00	< .001	50.00% [28%, 68%]
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003)	1.75	.14	631.72	58.00	< .001	93.00% [92%, 97%]	Moral violations and desire for clean- sing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	.00	65.59	51.00	.08	22.00% [0%, 52%]
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)	1.35	.10	131.24	58.00	< .001	54.00% [32%, 66%]	Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03	.00	62.87	58.00	.31	3.00% [0%, 42%]
False Consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, & House,	1.18	.00	65.54	58.00	.23	16.00% [0%, 41%]	Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978) Sociometric status and well-being	0.01 -0.04	.00	15.33 55.09	48.00 58.00	.99	0.00% [0%, 0%] 2.00%
1977) Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)	0.95	.10	203.30	59.00	< .001	73.00% [62%, 83%]	(Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)	-0.04	.00	33.09	70.00	.96	[0%, 30%]
False Consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 1977)	0.95	.00	100.19	57.00	< .001	43.00% [18%, 62%]	Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	.10	72.96	46.00	.01	37.00% [8%, 63%]
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)	0.86	.10	156.75	56.00	< .001	66.00% [54%, 81%]	Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, &	-0.02	.00	33.95	51.00	.97	0.00% [0%, 2%]
Less is better (Hsee, 1998)	0.78	.10	158.41	56.00	< .001	65.00% [49%, 77%]	Landau, 2014) Disfluency engages analytic	-0.03	.00	59.46	65.00	.67	0.00%
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)	0.40	.00	55.20	54.00	.43	6.00% [0%, 36%]	processing (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)	0.12	00	51 (7	40.00	10	[0%, 27%]
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)	0.40	.24	626.26	63.00	< .001	89.00% [84%, 92%]	Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993) Affect and risk (Rottenstreich &	-0.13 -0.08	.00	51.67 50.75	40.00 59.00	.10	26.00% [0%, 52%] 0.00%
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)	0.29	.09	175.26	59.00	< .001	64.00% [49%, 75%]	Hsee, 2001) Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18	.00	155.49	56.00	< .001	[0%, 21%] 64.00% [47%, 76%]
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)	0.18	.00	87.82	58.00	.01	36.00% [6%, 54%]							

			All samples (no moderators)			
Effect	ES^a	Tau	Q	df	p	I^2
Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)	0.05	.00	55.80	58.00	Coh .56	en's <i>q</i> effect size 3.00% [0%, 30%]
Assimilation and contrast effects in question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)	-0.07	.10	60.39	58.00	.39	15.00% [0%, 33%]
					Coh	en's d effect size
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)	1.82	.00	235.65	57.00	< .001	65.00% [46%, 73%]
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003)	1.75	.14	631.72	58.00	< .001	93.00% [92%, 97%]
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)	1.35	.10	131.24	58.00	< .001	54.00% [32%, 66%]
False Consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)	1.18	.00	65.54	58.00	.23	16.00% [0%, 41%]
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)	0.95	.10	203.30	59.00	< .001	73.00% [62%, 83%]
False Consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 1977)	0.95	.00	100.19	57.00	< .001	43.00% [18%, 62%]
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)	0.86	.10	156.75	56.00	< .001	66.00% [54%, 81%]
Less is better (Hsee, 1998)	0.78	.10	158.41	56.00	< .001	65.00% [49%, 77%]
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)	0.40	.00	55.20	54.00	.43	6.00% [0%, 36%]
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)	0.40	.24	626.26	63.00	< .001	89.00% [84%, 92%]
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)	0.29	.09	175.26	59.00	< .001	64.00% [49%, 75%]
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)	0.18	.00	87.82	58.00	.01	36.00% [6%, 54%]

_							
				All samı	oles (no i	moderator	rs)
	Effect	ES^a	Tau	Q	df	p	I^2
	Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)	0.25	.00	60.40	59.00	.42	12.00% [0%, 33%]
	Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012)	0.12	.00	63.78	53.00	.15	12.00% [0%, 49%]
	Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)	0.04	.00	64.88	58.00	.25	6.00% [0%, 43%]
1	Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03	.00	103.56	53.00	< .001	50.00% [28%, 68%]
	Moral violations and desire for clean- sing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	.00	65.59	51.00	.08	22.00% [0%, 52%]
	Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03	.00	62.87	58.00	.31	3.00% [0%, 42%]
	Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978)	0.01	.00	15.33	48.00	.99	0.00% [0%, 0%]
	Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)	-0.04	.00	55.09	58.00	.58	2.00% [0%, 30%]
	Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	.10	72.96	46.00	.01	37.00% [8%, 63%]
	Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)	-0.02	.00	33.95	51.00	.97	0.00% [0%, 2%]
	Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)	-0.03	.00	59.46	65.00	.67	0.00% [0%, 27%]
	Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)	-0.13	.00	51.67	40.00	.10	26.00% [0%, 52%]
	Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)	-0.08	.00	50.75	59.00	.77	0.00% [0%, 21%]
	Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18	.00	155.49	56.00	< .001	64.00% [47%, 76%]

			All samples (no moderators)						
Effect	ES^a	Tau	Q	df	p	I^2			
Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)	0.05	.00	55.80	58.00	Coh .56	en's <i>q</i> effect size 3.00% [0%, 30%]			
Assimilation and contrast effects in question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)	-0.07	.10	60.39	58.00	.39	15.00% [0%, 33%]			
					Coh	en's d effect size			
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)	1.82	.00	235.65	57.00	< .001	65.00% [46%, 73%]			
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003)	1.75	.14	631.72	58.00	< .001	93.00% [92%, 97%]			
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)	1.35	.10	131.24	58.00	< .001	54.00% [32%, 66%]			
False Consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)	1.18	.00	65.54	58.00	.23	16.00% [0%, 41%]			
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)	0.95	.10	203.30	59.00	< .001	73.00% [62%, 83%]			
False Consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 1977)	0.95	.00	100.19	57.00	< .001	43.00% [18%, 62%]			
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)	0.86	.10	156.75	56.00	< .001	66.00% [54%, 81%]			
Less is better (Hsee, 1998)	0.78	.10	158.41	56.00	< .001	65.00% [49%, 77%]			
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)	0.40	.00	55.20	54.00	.43	6.00% [0%, 36%]			
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)	0.40	.24	626.26	63.00	< .001	89.00% [84%, 92%]			
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)	0.29	.09	175.26	59.00	< .001	64.00% [49%, 75%]			
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)	0.18	.00	87.82	58.00	.01	36.00% [6%, 54%]			

	All samples (no moderators)						
Effect	ES^a	Tau	Q	df	Þ	I^2	
Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)	0.25	.00	60.40	59.00	.42	12.00% [0%, 33%]	
Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012)	0.12	.00	63.78	53.00	.15	12.00% [0%, 49%]	
Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)	0.04	.00	64.88	58.00	.25	6.00% [0%, 43%]	
Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03	.00	103.56	53.00	< .001	50.00% [28%, 68%]	
Moral violations and desire for clean- sing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	.00	65.59	51.00	.08	22.00% [0%, 52%]	
Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03	.00	62.87	58.00	.31	3.00% [0%, 42%]	
Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978)	0.01	.00	15.33	48.00	.99	0.00% [0%, 0%]	
Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)	-0.04	.00	55.09	58.00	.58	2.00% [0%, 30%]	
Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	.10	72.96	46.00	.01	37.00% [8%, 63%]	
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)	-0.02	.00	33.95	51.00	.97	0.00% [0%, 2%]	
Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)	-0.03	.00	59.46	65.00	.67	0.00% [0%, 27%]	
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)	-0.13	.00	51.67	40.00	.10	26.00% [0%, 52%]	
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)	-0.08	.00	50.75	59.00	.77	0.00% [0%, 21%]	
Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18	.00	155.49	56.00	< .001	64.00% [47%, 76%]	