Investigating Variation in Replicability across Sample and Setting

Richard Klein LIP/PC2S Université Grenoble Alpes

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Essay

Why Most Published Research Findings Are False

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False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant

Joseph P. Simmons¹, Leif D. Nelson², and Uri Simonsohn¹

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and ²Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley


Flexibility in Data Analysis

http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/science-isnt-broken




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- Multiple large-scale Registered Reports
 - POPS/AMPPS Registered Replication Reports

• What we know: Many studies are failing to replicate

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 - Could be many other reasons:
 - Moderators (known/unknown)
 - Lack of care/expertise
 - Sensitivity of effects to sample/context

- Many Labs 1 (Klein et al., 2014)
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 - Follow-up to Reproducibility Project

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
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- Which studies?
 - Structured selection process by committee. Documented: osf.io/8cd4r
 - Sought open nominations for studies
 - Emphasized impact (citations, etc.), diversity of content, possibility for variability across sites
 - But substantial practical constraints: Short, able to be computerized
 - Authors could decline to be replicated

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- Administer packages across 125 samples
 - Slate 1: 13 studies administered in each of 61 labs
 - Slate 2: 15 studies administered in each of 64 labs
 - Sites (mostly) randomly assigned to slates
 - Minimum of 80 participants per site
 - 15,305 participants total
 - Much more diverse

Many Labs 1 Map



Many Labs 2 Map



Many Labs 2 Hsee example



Coats range from \$100-\$1000 Your friend buys you a \$110 coat




Scarves range from \$10-\$100 Your friend buys you a \$90 scarf

How generous was your friend?

Many Labs 2 Hsee results







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- Tau is probably best
 - SD across samples in the unit of the effect size (after accounting for sampling error)

Table 3. Results of Heterogeneity Tests for Each of the 28 Effects

Table 3. (Continued)

			All sam	ples (no	moderato	rs)			
Effect	ES ^a	Tau	Q	df	Þ	I^2	Effect	ES^a	Т
Disgust sensitivity predicts	0.05	.00	55.80	58.00	Coh .56	en's q effect size 3.00%	Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)	0.25	.(
homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009) Assimilation and contrast effects in	-0.07	.10	60.39	58.00	.39	[0%, 30%]	Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012)	0.12	
question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)	0.07	.10	00.57	J0.00		[0%, 33%]	Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich,	0.04	.(
					Coh	en's d effect size	2008)		
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)	1.82	.00	235.65	57.00	< .001	65.00% [46%, 73%]	Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03).
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003)	1.75	.14	631.72	58.00	< .001	93.00% [92%, 97%]	Moral violations and desire for clean- sing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)	1.35	.10	131.24	58.00	< .001	54.00% [32%, 66%]	Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03).
False Consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, & House,	1.18	.00	65.54	58.00	.23	16.00% [0%, 41%]	Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978) Sociometric status and well-being	0.01 -0.04).
1977) Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)	0.95	.10	203.30	59.00	< .001	73.00% [62%, 83%]	(Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)		
False Consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 1977)	0.95	.00	100.19	57.00	< .001	43.00% [18%, 62%]	Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)	0.86	.10	156.75	56.00	< .001	66.00% [54%, 81%]	Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)	-0.02).
Less is better (Hsee, 1998)	0.78	.10	158.41	56.00	< .001	65.00% [49%, 77%]	Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, Oppenheimer,	-0.03	.(
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)	0.40	.00	55.20	54.00	.43	6.00% [0%, 36%]	Epley, & Eyre, 2007) Effect of choosing versus rejecting on	-0.13	
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)	0.40	.24	626.26	63.00	< .001	89.00% [84%, 92%]	relative desirability (Shafir, 1993) Affect and risk (Rottenstreich &	-0.08	.,
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)	0.29	.09	175.26	59.00	< .001	64.00% [49%, 75%]	Hsee, 2001) Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18).
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)	0.18	.00	87.82	58.00	.01	36.00% [6%, 54%]			

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- Open data: https://osf.io/8cd4r/
 - CC0, free use (any purpose)
 - We barely scratched surface

Thanks!

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Questions/comments?

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