Unconditional Differentially Private Mechanisms for Linear Queries

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Abstract

We investigate the problem of designing differentially private mechanisms for a set of d linear queries over a database, while adding as little error as possible. Hardt and Talwar [HT10] related this problem to geometric properties of a convex body defined by the set of queries and gave a $O(\log^3 d)$-approximation to the minimum ℓ_2^2 error, assuming a conjecture from convex geometry called the *Slicing* or *Hyperplane* conjecture. In this work we give a mechanism that works unconditionally, and also gives an improved $O(\log^2 d)$ approximation to the expected ℓ_2^2 error.

We remove the dependence on the Slicing conjecture by using a result of Klartag [Kla06] that shows that any convex body is close to one for which the conjecture holds; our main contribution is in making this result constructive by using recent techniques of Dadush, Peikert and Vempala [DPV10]. The improvement in approximation ratio relies on a stronger lower bound we derive on the optimum. This new lower bound goes beyond the packing argument that has traditionally been used in Differential Privacy and allows us to *add* the packing lower bounds obtained from orthogonal subspaces. We are able to achieve this via a *symmetrization* argument which argues that there always exists a near optimal differentially private mechanism which adds noise that is *independent of the input database!* We believe this result should be of independent interest, and also discuss some interesting consequences.

1 Introduction

Several organizations such as the census bureau and various corporations collect potentially sensitive data about individuals, e.g. the census records, health records, social network and search data, etc. Mining this data can help learn useful aggregate information about the population, e.g. the effectiveness of treatments, and social trends. At the same time, there are often ethical, legal or business reasons to ensure that the private information of individuals contributing to the database is not revealed. This has led to considerable interest in privacy preserving data analysis. Differential Privacy is recent privacy definition [DMNS06] that gives formal guarantees that the output of the mechanism does not compromise the privacy of individual contributing to the database even in the presence of auxiliary information. Differentially private mechanisms are randomized algorithms whose output distribution does not change significantly when one individual's data is added/removed. This is typically achieved by giving noisy answers to queries and for the answers to be useful, one would like to add as little noise as possible. Rather surprisingly, in many settings a large number of aggregate queries can be answered with a small amount of noise while maintaining differential privacy.

A lot of recent research has focused on understanding how little noise a differentially private mechanism can get away with. This work continues that line of research. We consider the question in the context of linear queries over databases represented as vectors in $\Re^n$. Two databases are considered neighboring if their ℓ_1 distance (or distance with respect to any other given norm) is at most 1. We represent a linear query by a $d \times n$ matrix F so that the correct answer on a database x is given by $Fx \in \Re^d$. A mechanism M_F outputs a vector $a \in \Re^d$.

Definition 1.1 *We say that M satisfies ε-differential privacy with respect to $|\cdot|$ if for any $x, x' \in \Re^n$, and for any measurable $S \subseteq \Re^d$,*

$$\frac{Pr[M(x) \in S]}{Pr[M(x') \in S]} \leq exp(\varepsilon |x - x'|)$$

Here $|\cdot|$ is an arbitrary norm on $\Re^n$. While our results hold for any norm, the ℓ_1 norm has the most applications in data analysis and we will present all results for this special case.

Error of the Mechanism. In this paper, we measure the quality of the mechanism by its worst case expected ℓ_2^2 error $err(M, F) \stackrel{def}{=} \sup_{x \in \Re^n} \mathbb{E}[\|M_F(x) - Fx\|_2^2]$ where the expectation is taken over the internal randomness of the mechanism. Denote by $err(F)$ the minimum of $err(M, F)$ over all ε-differentially private mechanisms F.

This setting was previously considered by Hardt and Talwar [HT10] who related the problem to geometric properties of a convex body defined by the queries.[1] They gave upper and lower bounds on the quantity $err(F)$, and showed that the two were within an $O(\log^3 d)$ factor of each other assuming a long-standing conjecture due to Bourgain known as the Slicing conjecture.

Our Results In this work, we improve on this result in two ways. First, we give a new mechanism that gets near optimal error *unconditionally*, i.e., without reliance on the Hyperplane conjecture. We achieve this by combining techniques from the recent results of Klartag [Kla06] (which shows that any convex body is "close" to another that satisfies the hyperplane conjecture), and Dadush,

[1] A minor technical difference is that they consider the ℓ_2 error instead of ℓ_2^2, but their results proceed by approximating the ℓ_2^2 error.

Peikert and Vempala [DPV10] (which makes some of these results constructive). In addition, we note that Klartag's construction by itself does not suffice for us, and this forces us to suitably strengthen it to make it applicable in our setting.

Secondly, we improve the approximation ratio to $O(\log^2 d)$. This is done using a stronger lower bound on $err(F)$ that goes beyond the *packing argument*. Informally, nearly all previous lower bounds are shown by constructing a number of "close' databases answers for which are "far" from each other. We strengthen this approach by showing that packing-based lower bounds over orthogonal subspaces can be added together to get a stronger bound. This improvement relies on a symmetrization argument that shows that for differentially private mechanisms for linear queries of the form considered, it suffices to consider mechanisms that add *database-independent* noise. This fact should be of independent interest and we point out some other consequences in section 1.

A Note about the Model As in [HT10], our model uses ℓ_1 neighborhoods instead of the more traditional Hamming distance. Nevertheless, this model captures several settings. The most common example is linear queries over histograms, including contingency tables. These play an important role in statistics and their differentially private release has been studied previously by Barak et al. [BCD$^+$07] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [KRSU10]. Other examples include settings such as the work of McSherry and Mironov [MM09] where a natural transformation of the data converts a Hamming neighbourhood to an ℓ_1 (or an ℓ_2) neighborhood. We refer the reader to [HT10] for further applications. Moreover, the fact that this definition of privacy assumes that the mechanism is defined for all $x \in \Re^n$ (as opposed to just $x \in \mathbb{Z}_+^n$), makes the upper bound results stronger and applicable in settings such as [MM09] where the stronger guarantee is needed. On the other hand, this also makes the lower bound weaker by allowing us to compete against a higher benchmark. But as shown in [HT10], for small enough ε, these lower bounds (over all ℓ_1) are not significantly higher than those defined over hamming distances. Moreover, all known mechanisms satisfy the stronger definitions we impose. Finally, recent work by De [De11] has shown that the lower bounds on $err(F)$ for certain specific F's shown in [HT10] can be extended to hold under the weaker definition as well. We leave open the question of whether for some F the two definitions lead to different error bounds.

We remark that a lot of previous work has looked at the question of the upper and lower bounding the worst case error over some family of functions, i.e. $\sup_{F \in \mathcal{F}} err(F)$. For example $\mathcal{F}$ may correspond to d sensitivity 1 queries [DN03, DMNS06] or low sensitivity queries coming from a concept class of low VC dimension [BLR08]. Such *absolute* guarantees on the error can be extremely useful and allow us to prove general results for large families of queries. However, for a specific query F at hand, they may be overly pessimistic when there is more structure in F. In some such case, one can morph the query F to an F' so that the mechanism's answers on F' can be used to get a much lower error on F than would result by using the mechanism on F directly (see e.g. [BCD$^+$07] for a very specific F and [LHR$^+$10] for more general techniques).

The algorithmic problem of estimating $err(F)$ for a given F received attention first only in [HT10] (see also [GRS09]). Such *relative* guarantees may lead to mechanisms that add significantly less noise than the general case for specific F's of interest, and avoid the problem of optimizing the way in which a set of queries is asked as in [BCD$^+$07, LHR$^+$10]. Instead the relative guarantee directly ensures that the mechanism adds not much more error than the best possible rephrasing could have given. Thus designing mechanisms that give such a relative guarantee may be immensely valuable, and this is a promising avenue for research.

Open Problems We leave open several natural questions. The algorithms in [HT10] and in this

work involve sampling from convex bodies which can be done in polynomial but unreasonably large running time. While specific cases (such as when the relevant norm is ℓ_2 instead of ℓ_1 so that K is an ellipse) have simple and practical implementations, it is natural to demand practical algorithms for more general settings. Moreover, extending such results for more general queries (not just linear) would require new techniques.

Starting with the work of Blum, Ligett and Roth [BLR08], several recent works have given significantly better absolute bounds for large class of F's under the assumption that the vector x (in our notation) has small ℓ_1 norm. Such upper bounds are interesting and useful. The problem of getting relative guarantees on $err(F)$ given F and an upper bound on $|x|_1$ is a compelling one.

Finally our mechanism is non-interactive: it needs to know the whole query F in advance. Allowing online queries, where we get rows of F one at a time, leads to a natural question in online algorithms.

Related Work

Dwork et al. [DMNS06] showed the first general upper bound showing that any query can be released while adding noise proportional to the total *sensitivity* of the query. Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [NRS07] showed that adding noise proportional to (a smoothed version of) the *local sensitivity* of the query suffices for guranteeing differential privacy; this may be much smaller than the worst case sensitivity for non-linear queries. Lower bounds on the amount of noise needed for general low sensitivity queries have been shown in [DN03, DMT07, DY08, DMNS06, RHS07, HT10, De11]. Kasiviswathan et al. [KRSU10] showed upper and lower bounds for contingency table queries.

Blum, Ligett and Roth [BLR08] used learning theory techniques and the exponential mechanism [MT07] to allow answering a large number of queries of small VC dimension with error small compared to the number of individuals in the database. This line of work has been further extended and improved in terms of error bounds, efficiency, generality and interactivity in several subsequent works [DNR$^+$09, DRV10, RR10, HR10].

Ghosh Roughgarden and Sundarajan [GRS09] showed that for a one dimensional counting query, the Laplacian mechanism is optimal in a very general utilitarian framerwork and Gupte and Sundararajan [GS10] extended this to risk averse agents. Brenner and Nissim [BN10] showed that such universally optimal private mechanisms do not exist for two counting queries or for a single non binary sum query. As mentioned above, Hardt and Talwar [HT10] considered relative guarantees for multi-dimensional queries, and their techniques also showed tight lower bounds for the class of low sensitivity linear queries. De [De11] unified and strengthed these bounds and showed stronger lower bounds for the class of non-linear low sensitivity queries.

Techniques

The key idea in the "K-norm" mechanism proposed by Hardt and Talwar [HT10] is to add noise *proportional* to the convex body $K = AB_1^n$, instead of independent Laplacian noise in each direction. The average noise (in ℓ_2^2) added in this mechanism then turns out to be roughly proportional to $\mathbb{E}_K \|x\|_2^2$. For convex bodies K that are in *approximately isotropic* position (to be defined soon), a well-studied conjecture in convex geometry (called the Hyperplane conjecture) says that this quantity is within a constant factor of the volume when scaled appropriately. Hardt and Talwar then prove a lower bound on the noise of an optimal mechanism in terms of the volume of K, thus concluding that the mechanism is nearly *optimum* in terms of the error if K is almost isotropic, assuming the Hyperplane conjecture.

There are two crucial deficiencies of the above mechanism. Firstly, they are only able to show constant-factor bounds in the error if the body K is nearly isotropic. If the body is far from isotropic, Hardt and Talwar propose a recursive mechanism and show that it is optimal up to a factor $O(\log d)^3$. The main idea is that if K is not isotropic, we can find the *long* and *short* axes of K by computing its covariance matrix, and add noise to different extents along these axes (in particular, if there is only one dominant eigenvalue, this view lets us think about the problem as effectively being 1-dimensional). The two main issues which the [HT10] leave open are that of avoiding the dependence on the Hyperplane conjecture, and whether we can get improved approximation results.

Our main technical tool for avoiding dependence on the Hyperplane conjecture is the result by Klartag [Kla06] on the existence of perturbations of convex bodies with a small *isotropic constant*. More formally, for any convex body $K \in \mathbb{R}^d$, there exists a K' and a translate x_0 such thatt $(1-\varepsilon)(K'-x_0) \subseteq (K-x_0) \subseteq (K'-x_0)$, and $L_{K'} \leq \frac{c}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}$ for some absolute constant c. Our idea is to sample the noise vector from this body K' instead of K: the fact that K' has a bounded isotropic constant lets us relate the error of our mechanism to the volume of K', and the fact that K' approximates K allows us to relate their volumes. While it is tempting to use this result to bypass the hyperplane conjecture, the issue now is that the body K' is not centered at the origin, and the average length of a random vector can be related to its volume only if the body is centered at the origin. On the other hand, if we translate K' to the origin, it only approximates $K - x_0$, and we have no control over the length of x_0. We circumvent this by using convolution based arguments to *symmetrize* the body K'. To convert this to an algorithm, we need constructive versions of all the above ideas. We refer the reader to Section 6 for more details about these issues and how we resolve them.

The improved approximation ratio, as mentioned derives primarily from a stronger lower bound. We first show using a novel symmetrization argument that for differentially private mechanisms for linear queries, one can assume that the distribution of $M(x) - Fx$ is independent of x; in other words, *oblivious noise* mechanism are close to optimal. This result, though simple, is of independent interest and should have other applications. As an example, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KRSU10] show lower bounds for differentially private mechanisms for contingency table queries, and somewhat stronger lower bounds for oblivious noise mechanisms. Our symmetrization result implies that their stronger lower bounds hold for all differentially private mechanisms.

2 Preliminaries

We will write B_p^d to denote the unit ball of the p-norm in $\Re^d$. When $K \subseteq \Re^d$ is a centrally symmetric convex set, we write $\|\cdot\|_K$ for the (Minkowski) norm defined by K (i.e. $\|x\|_K = \inf\{r \colon x \in rK\}$). The ℓ_p-norms are denoted by $\|\cdot\|_p$, but we use $\|\cdot\|$ as a shorthand for the Euclidean norm $\|\cdot\|_2$. Given a function $F : \mathbb{R}^{d_1} \to \mathbb{R}^{d_2}$ and a set $K \in \mathbb{R}^{d_1}$, FK denotes the set $\{F(x) : x \in K\}$. Throughout, c, C will denote absolute constants, and may vary from one occurrence to the next.

2.1 Convex Geometry

We review some elementary facts from convex geometry.

Definition 2.1 (Isotropic Position) *We say a convex body $K \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ is in* isotropic position *if*

its moment matrix is the identity $I_{d\times d}$. Recall that the moment matrix of K has entries $M_{i,j}$,

$$M_{i,j} := \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \mathbf{1}_K x_i x_j \, dx,$$

where $\mathbf{1}_K$ is the indicator function of the body K, and the integral is taken with the Lesbegue measure in $\mathbb{R}^d$. Furthermore, it is a simple fact that any $K \in \mathbb{R}^d$ which is not contained in a $(d-1)$ dimensional subspace can be placed in isotropic position by using an invertible linear transformation.

Definition 2.2 (Isotropic constant) *Let K be a convex body in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and $M(K)$ be its moment (or covariance) matrix. The Isotropic constant is defined by*

$$L_K^{2d} = \frac{\det M(K)}{\mathsf{Vol}(K)^2},$$

where $\mathsf{Vol}(K)$ denotes the d-dimensional volume.

Note that the definition of isotropic constant is affine invariant. It is a fundamental property of a convex body, and a central conjecture in convex geometry is the so-called 'slicing' or 'hyperplane' conjecture, which says that $L_K \leq C$, for some absolute constant C (independent of the body and the dimension d). The conjecture derives its name from the connection to volumes of sections of convex bodies. The best known bounds for L_K in general are $c \leq L_K \leq Cd^{1/4}$.

We refer the reader to the paper of Milman and Pajor [MP89b], as well as the extensive survey of Giannopoulos [Gia03] for more facts regarding the isotropic constant.

3 The Improved Mechanism

In this section, we present a modified version of the recursive mechanism of Hardt and Talwar [HT10]. The only modification in the mechanism itself is to incorporate the (constructive and somewhat modified form) of the result of Klartag [Kla06] which shows that for any convex body K, there is a c-approximation of K which has bounded isotropic constant. In particular, our algorithm is identical to that of Hardt and Talwar, if we assume the Hyperplane conjecture.

The algorithm uses the procedure $\mathsf{Perturb}(K)$, which returns a body $K' \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ with the following properties

1. $cK' \subseteq K \subseteq K'$, for an absolute constant c.
2. K' is centrally symmetric.
3. $L_{K'} < C$ for an absolute constant C.

When we say the procedure "returns" K', we mean that we can obtain uniform samples from K', and compute the moment matrix of K'. We can now present the algorithm.

The overall mechanism now, for an input database x, is to return $Fx + \mathsf{noise}(K, F, d)$.

procedure $\mathsf{noise}(K, F, d)$ `// convex body` K`, query matrix` F`, dimension` d

begin

1. Let $K' = \mathsf{Perturb}(K)$, and let $M(K')$ denote its moment matrix.
2. Let the eigenvalues of $M(K')$ (in non-increasing order) be $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \ldots, \lambda_d$, and pick a corresponding orthonormal eigenbasis $u_1, \ldots u_d$.
3. Let $d' = \lfloor d/2 \rfloor$, and let $U = \mathrm{span}(u_1, \ldots, u_{d'})$ and $V = \mathrm{span}(u_{d'+1}, \ldots, u_d)$.
4. Sample $a \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(K')$ and $r \sim \mathrm{Gamma}(d+1, \varepsilon^{-1})$.[2]
5. If $d = 1$, return ra. Otherwise return $\mathsf{noise}(\Pi_U K, \Pi_U F, d') + \Pi_V(ra)$.

Remarks. Notice that sampling from K' instead of K in Step 4 is the crucial difference from the algorithm of Hardt and Talwar [HT10] (this is to bypass the hyperplane conjecture). Also notice that when we recurse in Step 5, we project the body K on Π_U, and not K'. This simplifies both our analysis and computational efficiency (now we only need to keep track of the original body and the subspace of $\mathbb{R}^d$ we are currently working in).

3.1 Privacy Analysis

In Section 4 of [HT10], the authors show that for any convex body $L \in \mathbb{R}^d$, the distribution $r \cdot u$, where $r \sim \mathrm{Gamma}(d+1, \varepsilon^{-1})$ and $u \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(L)$ has p.d.f. at x proportional to $e^{-\varepsilon \|x\|_L}$. We use this at each level of the recursive procedure noise in order to obtain our privacy guarantee.

Consider two databases x, x' with $\|x - x'\|_1 \leq 1$. Different levels in our algorithm add noise along mutually orthogonal subspaces – thus if the mechanism is ε-differentially private in each subspace, the *joint* distribution will be $\varepsilon \log d$ differentially private (this is well known, c.f. [HT10]), which implies that our overall mechanism is $\varepsilon \log d$-differentially private.

Thus consider some level of the recursion. For any y, the probability that $M(x) = y$ is precisely $\frac{1}{Z} e^{-\varepsilon \|y - Fx\|_{K'}}$, for some normalization Z. So also $M(x') = y$ w.p. $\frac{1}{Z} e^{-\varepsilon \|y - Fx'\|_{K'}}$ for the same Z. Thus the ratio of the probabilities is at most $e^{\varepsilon \|F(x-x')\|_{K'}}$, which is at most e^{ε}, because $F(x - x') \in K \subseteq K'$. Thus for any y the probabilities are within a e^{ε} factor of each other, which implies ε-privacy at this level.

3.2 Error Analysis

The analysis of [HT10] proceeds roughly by 'charging' the squared length $\|\Pi_V(a)\|^2$ to the quantity $f(d)\mathsf{Vol}_d(K)^{2/d}$, for appropriate $f(d)$. Thus the total squared error in the recursive process can be bounded in terms of

$$f(d)\mathsf{Vol}_d(K)^{2/d} + f(d')\mathsf{Vol}_{d'}(\Pi_U K)^{2/d'} + \ldots \tag{1}$$

The lower bound argument of [HT10] shows that each of these terms is a lower bound on the error of an ε-private mechanism, thus concluding that the total error is at most a $\log d$ factor of this.

Our lower bound attempts to capture precisely such a scenario: if we have lower bound on the error in orthogonal subspaces, the sum of these quantities is a lower bound on the overall error. The difficulty in using this directly is that in (1), the spaces onto which K is projected are not orthogonal to each other (in fact they are a sequence of spaces each *containing* the next). This motivates us to present a different analysis so as to enable such a charging argument. We begin

with some basic lemmas concerning a single recursive call of the above function, both of which are proved in [HT10] (and follow from [MP89a])

Lemma 3.1 (Proposition 7.7 in [HT10]) *Let K' be a convex body in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and $M(K')$ be its moment matrix. Suppose $M(K')$ has eigenvalues $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_d$, and let u_i be the corresponding eigenvectors. Then for any $S \subseteq [d]$, if $\mathcal{S}$ is the space $\mathsf{span}\{\cup_{i \in S} u_i\}$ and $\Pi_{\mathcal{S}}$ denotes the projection operator onto $\mathcal{S}$, we have*

$$\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_{\mathcal{S}} K')^{1/|S|} \geq \left(\frac{C}{L_{K'}}\right)^{\frac{d-|S|}{|S|}} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in S} \lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(2d)}}$$

Lemma 3.2 (Lemma 7.9 in [HT10]) *Let K' be the convex body computed in Step 1 of the algorithm* noise*. Then the expected value $E[||\Pi_V a||^2]$ of the squared error added in Step 5 is at most $O(d^3/\varepsilon^2) \sum_{i=d/2}^{d} \lambda_i$, where V and λ_i's are as defined in Steps 2 and 3 of the algorithm.*

Note. Both the above lemmas are stated in [HT10] for the body $K = FB_1^n$, but the proof holds for any convex body and in particular for K'.

Roadmap. We are now ready to present our analysis. It categorizes each level of the recursion as either a *stopping level* or a *continuation level*. The intuition behind these levels (and their names) is in fact extremely simple: informally, we say that a level is a stopping level if the volume of the bodies $\Pi_U K$ and $\Pi_V K$ are comparable (Π_U and Π_V are the projections to the higher $d/2$ and lower $d/2$ eigenvectors respectively). On the other hand, we call a level a continuation level if $\Pi_U K'$ has much larger volume than $\Pi_V K$. The analysis proceeds by separately focussing on intervals of levels in the recursion that are sandwiched by two successive stopping levels. Indeed, in each such interval, we will be able to charge the total error our mechanism adds in *all* the intermediate continuation levels to the volume of the lower subspace $\Pi_V K$ in the latter stopping level. This is possible because we can charge the error in a particular level to the volume of the projected convex body $\Pi_U K$ we recurse on, and this quantity increases geometrically in continuation levels. Finally when we hit a stopping level, we can in fact charge the (total unaccounted) error to the volume of $\Pi_V K$ (because it has similar volume as $\Pi_U K$). Now it becomes easy to see that we identify *mutually orthogonal* subspaces to charge our total error, and therefore are in shape to apply Theorem 4.2. The next two subsections carry out this argument in more detail.

3.2.1 A continuation level

Consider a level of the recursion in which we have the body K, K', dimension d, λ_i, u_i, U, and V as defined in the various steps of the algorithm. Now we define a level to be a *continuation level* if

$$\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} > A \cdot \mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{1}{d}} \tag{2}$$

Above, A is a constant which we define later. The following lemma bounds the total error of our algorithm by the volume of K when projected to the subspace U.

Lemma 3.3 *There is an absolute constant C_1 such that the following holds: Suppose that the algorithm has an unaccounted (squared) error at most $C_1 \cdot (d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K)^{\frac{2}{d}}$ at the beginning of a*

continuation level of the recursive algorithm noise. *Then the total the total unaccounted error at the beginning of the next recursive call is at most* $C_1 \cdot ((d/2)^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K)^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}) \leq C_1 \cdot (\tilde{d}^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(\tilde{K})^{\frac{1}{\tilde{d}}}$, *where* $\tilde{K} = \Pi_U K$ *and* $\tilde{d} = d/2$ *are the input parameters for the next recursive call.*

Proof: By assumption the total unaccounted (squared) error at the beginning of this level is $C_1 \cdot (d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K)^{\frac{2}{d}}$. Since $K \subseteq K'$ (by definition in Step 1 of the algorithm),this is at most $C_1 \cdot (d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{2}{d}}$. Now, we can use the definition of a continuation level to bound this quantity by $\left(C_1/A^2\right)\left(d^3/\varepsilon^2\right)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$.

Furthermore, the total squared error which our mechanism adds at this level is bounded by $C_2 \cdot (d^2/\varepsilon^2)\sum_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i \leq C_2 \cdot (d^3/\varepsilon^2)\lambda_{d/2}$ for some constant C_2 from Lemma 3.2. We can express this in terms of the volume by using the inequality

$$\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}} \geq \left(\frac{C}{L_{K'}}\right)^2 \left(\prod_{i=1}^{d/2}\lambda_i\right)^{1/(d/2)} \geq \left(\frac{C}{L_{K'}}\right)^2 \lambda_{d/2}$$

The first inequality above used Lemma 3.1 and the second inequality follows because the λ_i's are non-increasing. Therefore we can bound the (squared) error incurred in this level by $C_2\left(d^3/\varepsilon^2\right)\left(L_{K'}/C\right)^2\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$. Finally, adding the unaccounted error with the error incurred at this level, we get the total error at the beginning of the next level is at most

$$8\left(\frac{C_2 \cdot L_{K'}^2}{C^2} + \frac{C_1}{A^2}\right)\left(\frac{(d/2)^3}{\varepsilon^2}\right)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}} \leq C_1\left(\frac{(d/2)^3}{\varepsilon^2}\right)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K)^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$$

Again, in the inequality above we used the fact that $\Pi_U K' \subseteq \Pi_U(2K)$ and hence $\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}} \leq 4\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K)^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$. Also in order to satisfy the inequality, we set our parameters such that $32\left(\frac{C_2 \cdot L_{K'}^2}{C^2} + \frac{C_1}{A^2}\right) \leq C_1$. To this end, note that if A^2 is say at least 64, then the above inequality is satisfied for $C_1 \geq 64 C_2 L_{K'}^2/C^2$. Since $L_{K'}$ is $\Theta(1)$ (because K' satisfies the hyperplane conjecture), and C_2 and C are constants determined in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.1 respectively, we can set C_1 to be a constant. Thus we have showed that the desired invariant on the total error is satisfied at a continuation level, which completes the proof. ■

3.2.2 A stopping level

Again consider a level of the recursion in which we have the bodies K, K', dimension d, λ_i, u_i, U, and V as defined in the various steps of the algorithm. We say that this level is a *stopping level* if

$$\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} \leq A \cdot \mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{1}{d}} \tag{3}$$

In this case, we now show that the volumes of K' and $\Pi_V K'$ are roughly identical, and as a consequence, unlike the continuation step where we "charge" the error to the top projection $\Pi_U K$, we can actually charge the total error to the bottom projection $\Pi_V K$. Our analysis then breaks up the levels of recursion into blocks, where each block is a series of continuation levels followed by a stopping level.

Lemma 3.4 *There is an absolute constant B such that the following holds: In every stopping level of the recursive procedure, we have $\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} \geq B\cdot\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d/2}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}}$, and therefore $\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} \geq \sqrt{B}\cdot\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{d}}$.*

Proof: We begin by comparing the higher eigenvalues and the lower eigenvalues of K based on the guarantee of equation (3). Indeed, we have

$$\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d/2}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} \leq \left(\frac{L_{K'}}{C}\right)^2 \mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_U K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}} \leq A\left(\frac{L_{K'}}{C}\right)^2 \mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{2}{d}} = \frac{A}{L_{K'}^2}\left(\frac{L_{K'}}{C}\right)^2\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{d}} \quad (4)$$

Above, the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.1, the second inequality from equation (3), and the final equality from the definition of the isotropic constant $L_{K'}$. It is now easy to see that for a suitable choice of $B = C^4/A^2$, the above inequality implies the first inequality of the lemma statement. The second inequality easily follows by multiplying both sides by $\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}}$. We complete the proof by noting that C is a constant from Lemma 3.1 and A is a constant we set to 8 in the above lemma. ■

Now the following lemma "charges" the total unaccounted error of our algorithm to the volume of K's projection on the lower subspace V. Note that, since our algorithm recurses only on $U = V^{\perp}$, all the subspaces we charge our error to *are mutually orthogonal*.

Lemma 3.5 *Suppose that the unaccounted (squared) error at the beginning of a level of a level or recursion of algorithm textsfnoise is at most $C_1\cdot(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K)^{\frac{2}{d}}$. Then the total error (unaccounted error plus the error incurred in this recursion) is at most $O(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_V K)^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$.*

Proof: By assumption the total unaccounted (squared) error at the beginning of this level is $C_1\cdot(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K)^{\frac{2}{d}}$. Since$K \subseteq K'$ (by definition in Step 1 of the algorithm), this is at most $C_1\cdot(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{2}{d}}$.

By the definition of the isotropic constant $L_{K'}$, we have $L_{K'}^2\mathsf{Vol}(K')^{\frac{2}{d}} = \left(\prod_{i=1}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{d}}$. Therefore we can bound the total unaccounted squared error by $(C_1/L_{K'}^2)(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{d}}$. But now we may appeal to Lemma 3.4 and relate the product of all eigenvalues to only those of the lower $d/2$ eigenvalues. Indeed using the lemma, we can bound the total unaccounted error by $\frac{C_1}{\sqrt{B}\cdot L_{K'}^2}(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}}$.

In addition to this, the total squared error which our mechanism adds at this level is bounded by $C_2\cdot(d^2/\varepsilon^2)\sum_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i \leq C_2\cdot(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\lambda_{d/2} \leq C_2\cdot(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\left(\prod_{i=1}^{d/2}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}}$ for some constant C_2 from Lemma 3.2. Again we can bound this in terms of the lower eigenvalues using Lemma 3.4 and get that this error is at most $(C_2/B)(d^3/\varepsilon^2)\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}}$. Finally we add the above two errors and then use Lemma 3.1, to get that the total error is at most

$$\left(\frac{C_2}{B}+\frac{C_1}{\sqrt{B}}\right)\left(\frac{d^3}{\varepsilon^2}\right)\left(\prod_{i=d/2}^{d}\lambda_i\right)^{\frac{1}{(d/2)}} \leq \left(\frac{C_2}{B}+\frac{C_1}{\sqrt{B}}\right)\left(\frac{L_{K'}}{C}\right)^2\left(\frac{d^3}{\varepsilon^2}\right)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_V K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$$

Note that B, C, C_1, C_2, and $L_{K'}$ are all constants. Moreover $\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_V K')^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}} \leq 4\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_V K)^{\frac{2}{(d/2)}}$ since $\Pi_V K' \subseteq \Pi_V(2K)$, completing the proof. ∎

≪**Kunal 3.1:** In this subsection and the previous one, we are still saying $K' \subseteq 2K$. Perhaps this needs to change to $4K$ or something.≫ KT 3.1

3.3 Putting things together

We are now fully equipped to jointly analyze the two levels and apply our strengthened lower bound of Theorem 4.2. To this end, let K_i denote the convex body considered by the i^{th} recursive call of noise. Also let $\mathcal{S}_i$ be the subspace of $\mathbb{R}^d$ which K_i lies in, and d_i be its dimension. Formally we have $K_0 = K$, $\mathcal{S}_0 = \mathbb{R}^d$, and $d_0 = d$. Note that by construction, $\mathcal{S}_i$ and $\mathcal{S}_{i'}$ are orthogonal for $i \neq i'$.

Analyzing Intervals. Let $0 \leq i_1 \leq i_2 \leq i_m$ denote the levels in the recursive procedure when a *stopping level* was executed. We now bound the error incurred in total by all the levels in each interval $(i_l, i_{l+1}]$ for $0 \leq l < m$. To this end, consider an interval $(i_l, i_{l+1}]$ for some $0 \leq l < m$.

By definition, we have that each of the levels $i_l + 1, i_l + 2 \ldots, i_{l+1} - 1$ are continuation levels. Therefore, we can repeatedly apply Lemma 3.3, with an initial value of unaccounted error set to 0 for the first application of the Lemma and inductively passing on the error accrued n all previous levels to the next level. We can then conclude that the *total unaccounted squared error* incurred by our algorithm coming out of level $i_{l+1} - 1$ (which is equal to the sum of the squared errors incurred at each of the levels $i_l + 1, i_l + 2, \ldots, i_{l+1} - 1$) is at most $F\frac{(d_{i_{l+1}})^3}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \mathsf{Vol}(K_{i_{l+1}})^{2/d_{i_{l+1}}}$.

But now, since the level i_{l+1} is a stopping level, we can apply Lemma 3.5 and conclude that the error incurred in this level (along with the unaccounted error defined above) is upper bounded by $O(d^3_{i_{l+1}}/\varepsilon^2)\mathsf{Vol}(\Pi_{V_{i_{l+1}}}(K))^{\frac{2}{d_{i_{l+1}}/2}}$.

Finally, to complete the proof, notice that, since we recurse on the subspace $U_{i_{l+1}} = V^{\perp}_{i_{l+1}}$, the set of subspaces we charge our error to are mutually orthogonal. We can hence apply Theorem 4.2 and conclude that the total squared error of our algorithm is at most a constant factor of our lower bound on the optimal squared error.

4 A Lower bound on Noise

Let $F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the query matrix (corresponding to the d linear queries in $\mathbb{R}^n$). As before, let $K = FB_1^n$ denote the convex set in $\mathbb{R}^d$ which is the image of the unit ball under the transformation F.

In [HT10], Hardt and Talwar show a lower bound on the error for *any ε-differentially private* mechanism in terms of the volume of K. Specifically, they show that

Theorem 4.1 *Let F and K be as defined above, and let P denote the orthogonal projection operator of a k-dimensional subspace of $\mathbb{R}^d$ for some $1 \leq k \leq d$. Then every ε-differentially private mechanism M must satisfy*

$$\mathsf{err}(M, F) \geq \Omega\left(\frac{k^3}{\varepsilon^2}\ \mathsf{Vol}_k(PK)^{2/k}\right).$$

In the above theorem, the error term $\mathsf{err}(M, F)$ is defined as the maximum over x of the expected squared error added by the mechanism for database x. Formally, $\mathsf{err}(M, F) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} \mathbb{E}[||M(x) - F(x)||^2]$.

In this section, we show a much stronger lower bound which is crucial in performing a tighter analysis of the recursive algorithm. Namely, if P_1, P_2, ..., P_t are different projection operators to a collection of t mutually orthogonal subspaces of $\mathbb{R}^d$ of dimension $k_1, k_2, \ldots k_t$ respectively, then every ε-differentially private mechanism must have expected squared error which is at least the *sum* of the respective bounds computed according to the above theorem. Formally,

Theorem 4.2 *Let F and K be as defined above, and let P_1, P_2, ..., P_t be projection operators to a collection of t mutually orthogonal subspaces of $\mathbb{R}^d$ of dimension $k_1, k_2, \ldots k_t$ respectively, then every ε-differentially private mechanism must satisfy*

$$\mathsf{err}(M, F) \geq \Omega\left(\sum_i \frac{k_i^3}{\varepsilon^2}\ \mathsf{Vol}_{k_i}(P_i K)^{2/k_i}\right).$$

The proof relies on the observation that the arguments of Hardt and Talwar [HT10] are essentially *local packing arguments*, which establish a lower bound on the squared error of the optimal mechanism, *when projected along subspace spanned by the operator P*. This motivates us to argue that if P_1 and P_2 are orthogonal subspaces, then total squared error should be at least the sum of the two lower bounds! However, the primary hurdle towards establishing such an additive form is the following: the lower bound along the individual projections P_i show that there exists an input database x_i for which the optimal mechanism adds a significant noise. But what if these x_i's are very different, i.e., the optimal mechanism somehow correlates the noise added and errs along different directions for different input databases?

In the following section, we show that such correlations do not help reduce error. Indeed, the following theorem shows that there is always a near optimal mechanism which adds noise *oblivious* of the input database, i.e., the noise distribution around each $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the same.

4.1 Making the optimal mechanism oblivious

A crucial ingredient in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is the following lemma, which says that we can, without loss of generality, assume the noise to be *oblivious*. Formally, a mechanism M is said to have oblivious noise if the distribution of $M(x) - Fx$ is independent of x.

Theorem 4.3 *Consider an ε-differentially private mechanism M which has an (worst-case) expected error of $\mathsf{err}(M, F)$. Then there is an 2ε-differentially private mechanism M' with oblivious noise, and $\mathsf{err}(M', F) \leq \mathsf{err}(M, F)$.*

Proof: We begin with some notation. Let $\mathsf{prob}(M, x, y)$ denote the probability density function of M returning y when the input database is x. Notice that we have $\int_y \mathsf{prob}(M, x, y) = 1$ by definition, for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Then, we can express the error of M with respect to the query system F as

$$\mathsf{err}(M, F) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} \int_{y \in \mathbb{R}^n} \mathsf{prob}(M, x, y)\, ||Fx - y||_2^2\, dy \tag{5}$$

We can therefore replace the '$\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n}$' term with *any* probability density function f over $\mathbb{R}^n$ and still satisfy

$$\mathsf{err}(M, F) \geq \int_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x) \int_{y \in \mathbb{R}^n} \mathsf{prob}(M, x, y) \, ||Fx - y||_2^2 \, dy \; dx \tag{6}$$

Now given an f, we define a new mechanism M_f as below. We later choose f appropriately so that M_f is differentially private.

mechanism $M_f(F, x)$ `// query system` F`, input database` x

begin

1. Sample $x' \in \mathbb{R}^n$ according to the pdf $f(x')$.
2. Sample $y' \in \mathbb{R}^n$ according to the error probability $\mathsf{prob}(M, x', y')$.
3. Output y to be $y := Fx + (y' - Fx')$.

Intuitively, the mechanism M_f does the following, regardless of the input database x: it samples a random x' according to distribution f, and adds noise according to what M would add on input x'. Clearly, since the noise added $y - Fx = y' - Fx'$ does not depend on the input x, this mechanism is oblivious.

The following lemma bounds the error of our mechanism M_f in terms of that of M, and the subsequent lemma shows that for a suitable choice of f, the mechanism M_f is 2ε-differentially private. These two lemmas would then complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.

Lemma 4.4 *For any probability density function f, the expected squared error of the mechanism M_f (as defined above) is at most the expected squared error of M.*

Proof: Since the error is distributed exactly as $y' - Fx'$ (where x' is distributed according to f, and y' is distributed according to $\mathsf{prob}(M, x', y')$), we can express the expected squared error as

$$\mathsf{err}(M_f, F) = \int_{x' \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x') \int_{y' \in \mathbb{R}^n} \mathsf{prob}(M, x', y') \left|\left|Fx' - y'\right|\right|_2^2 dy' dx' \tag{7}$$

But now the expression above is identical to the right hand side of (6), and so we get that $\mathsf{err}(M_f, F) \leq \mathsf{err}(M, F)$, which completes the proof. ∎

Lemma 4.5 *There exists a choice of f for which the mechanism M_f is 2ε-differentially private.*

Proof: We prove this by showing that, for all choices of x and z such that $||z - x||_1 \leq 1$, and for all $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$, the probability density functions of M_f outputting y on x and z differ by at most $e^{\pm 2\varepsilon}$. To this end, we first compute the values of $\mathsf{prob}(M_f, x, y)$ and $\mathsf{prob}(M_f, z, y)$, where $x, z \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $n = z - x \in B_1^n$ and $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Indeed, we have

$$\mathsf{prob}(M_f, x, y) = \int_{x' \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x') \; \mathsf{prob}(M, x', y - Fx + Fx') dx' \tag{8}$$

The above expression comes out of the following probability calculation: for M_f to output y on input x, it has to sample some x' in Step 1 (which is distributed according to $f(\cdot)$), and then the mechanism M has to add noise vector y' which satisfies $y' - Fx' = y - Fx$ (see Step 3).

Likewise, we also get

$$\mathsf{prob}(M_f, z, y) = \int_{z' \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(z')\ \mathsf{prob}(M, z', y - Fz + Fz')dz' \tag{9}$$

$$= \int_{x' \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x' + n)\ \mathsf{prob}(M, x' + n, y - Fz + Fx' + Fn)dx' \tag{10}$$

$$= \int_{x' \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x' + n)\ \mathsf{prob}(M, x' + n, y - Fx + Fx')dx' \tag{11}$$

Above the first equality is by making the substitution $x' = z' - n$, and the second equality follows by noting that $x = z - n$, and so $Fx = Fz - Fn$. Now, since M is ε-differentially private, we know that $\mathsf{prob}(M, x' + n, y - Fx + Fx')$ is within a factor of $e^{\pm\varepsilon|n|_1}$ of the term $\mathsf{prob}(M, x', y - Fx + Fx')$ for every x'. Additionally, if f is also such that $f(x + n)$ and $f(x)$ are within a factor of $e^{\pm\varepsilon|n|_1}$ of each other, then we get that the expression in eq. (11) would be within $e^{\pm 2\varepsilon|n|_1}$ of the expression in eq. (8), which would imply that the mechanism M_f is 2ε-differentially private. A suitable choice for f to achieve this property is $f(x) \propto e^{-\varepsilon||x||_1}$ which is precisely the p.d.f of (a scaled variant of) the multi-dimensional Laplace distribution. This completes the proof. ■

As mentioned earlier, Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 complete the proof of Theorem 4.3. ■

We note that the choice of f was crucial in the above proof. More näive choices such that f supported at a single point do not guarantee privacy: indeed the mechanism that always outputs zero is perfectly private, but would not stay private under the above transformation with f supported at a point.

We also observe that this transformation works also for (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms, in which case it gives us an oblivious noise mechanism with $(2\varepsilon, e^{\varepsilon}\delta)$-differentially privacy. As alluded to earlier, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KRSU10] proved lower bounds for contingency table queries for (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms, and somewhat stronger bounds for oblivious noise (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. A corollary of the above then is that the stronger lower bounds hold for arbitrary (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms.

It is now easy to prove theorem 4.2. From the above theorem, we can assume that M adds oblivious noise.

Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let P_1, P_2, ..., P_t be projection operators to a collection of t mutually orthogonal subspaces of $\mathbb{R}^d$ of dimension $k_1, k_2, \ldots k_t$ respectively. Then we can apply Theorem 4.1 individually to each of the projections P_i to get that the (squared) error is at least $\mathsf{err}_i := \Omega\left(\frac{k_i^3}{\varepsilon^2}\ \mathsf{Vol}_k(P_i K)^{2/k_i}\right)$. In fact, the proof of the theorem in [HT10] implies that the expected value of the squared error *when projected along subspace* P_i is at least err_i. In other words, there exists some $x^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for which the expected (squared) error added by M when projected along P_i, is large. But now we can use Theorem 4.3 to infer that for *all points* $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ (and in particular for the point $\vec{0} \in \mathbb{R}^n$), the expected square error when projected along P_i is at least err_i.

To complete the proof, we note that these projections are along mutually orthogonal subspaces, and therefore the total expected squared error for the point $\vec{0}$ is at least $\sum_i \mathsf{err}_i$. ■

5 Constructing the Approximate Body K'

Recall that our aim, given a convex body $K \in \mathbb{R}^n$, is to come up with K' such that the Banach-Mazur distance $d_{BM}(K, K')$ is upper-bounded by a constant c_1, and further the isotropic constant $L_{K'} \leq c_2$. Indeed, the recent powerful result of Klartag [Kla06] says that for any K, we can do this with $c_1 = (1+\varepsilon)$, and $c_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}$. We show in this section how to make the existential proof of [Kla06] constructive (and slightly strengthen it, as we require a body K' which satisfies other geometric properties like central symmetry, etc. for our mechanism). For clarity, we first recall that the Banach-Mazur distance between two convex bodies is defined as

$$d_{BM}(K_1, K_2) = \min_{a,b} \frac{b}{a} \quad \exists x_1, x_2 \quad \text{s.t. } a(K_1 - x_1) \subseteq (K_2 - x_2) \subseteq b(K_1 - x_1)$$

Before we discuss our modification to Klartag's procedure, let us first explain his proof techniques for obtaining such a perturbation K'. The rough outline is the following: given K, we first come up with a point $s \in \mathbb{R}^n$ by a probabilistic process (to be described shortly). This defines a natural log-concave measure over points in $\mathbb{R}^n$, which we will denote f_s. The convex body K' can then be obtained in a deterministic way using this function f_s. We now explain these steps in more detail. In addition to providing a complete exposition of his approach, this will also set up the notation we need.

5.1 An outline of Klartag's proof

The starting point in the proof of [Kla06] is the "equivalence" of convex bodies and log-concave distributions over $\mathbb{R}^n$. This has been studied earlier in different settings, see e.g., [BK05, KM05]. Indeed, much like convex bodies, it is possible to define an analog of the isotropic constant for such log-concave distributions as well. Suppose $f : \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is log-concave (which means $\log f$ is concave over $\mathbb{R}^n$). The isotropic constant is defined by

$$L_f^2 = \frac{\det cov(f) \cdot \sup_{\mathbb{R}^n} f(x)}{\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f(x)dx} \tag{12}$$

Indeed, if f is the indicator function of a convex body K, i.e., $f(x) = 1$ iff $x \in K$ and 0 otherwise, then it is easy to see that $L_f = L_K$, where L_K is the the isotropic constant of K. Moreover, it is also possible to move in the other direction by defining analogues of 'level sets' of f which give convex bodies K_f with $L_f \approx L_{K_f}$.

Using the above intuition, the aim in [Kla06] is to come up with a log-concave distribution f supported on K (therefore we can also view it as a re-weighting of the uniform measure on K), with L_f being small. Given such a re-weighting, which is also 'not too unbalanced', it is possible to recover a K' with the properties we require. In particular, the following lemma formalizes this.

Lemma 5.1 *(Lemma 2.8 of [Kla06]) Let $f : K \mapsto (0, \infty)$ be a log-concave re-weighting of a convex body K and let $x_0 = \int_z z f(z)dz$ denote its barycenter. Moreover, suppose for some $m > 1$, we have*

$$\sup_{x \in K} f(x) \leq m^d \inf_{x \in K} f(x).$$

Then there exists a convex body T, s.t. $L_T = \Theta(L_f)$ (absolute constants), and further,

$$\frac{1}{m}(T - x_0) \subset K - x_0 \subset m(T - x_0).$$

Indeed, Klartag shows that we can find such an f with high probability by (i) sampling a random vector s from the polar of K, and (ii) setting $f(x) \propto e^{\langle s,x\rangle}$ if $x \in K$ and 0 otherwise. This is the crux of his paper, and he showed that such a (seemingly magical) re-weighting in fact works, by exploiting even more connections between log-concave functions and convex sets.

A crucial lemma about such exponential re-weightings is the following

Lemma 5.2 *(Lemma 3.2 of [Kla06])*

$$\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \det cov(f_s) ds = \mathsf{Vol}(K)$$

This is a particular instantiation (setting φ to be the constant function 1) of the 'transportation map lemma' (Lemma 3.2), which is the heart of the proof of [Kla06]. Equipped with this lemma, the aim will be to find an s such that $\det cov(f_s) \approx \mathsf{Vol}(K)$, and f_s does not vary "much" over K (i.e., it is close to 1). This would imply (eq. (12)) that $L_{f_s}^2$ is small, whereupon we can appeal to Lemma 5.1 to construct the body K'. A simple way to ensure that $f_s(x)$ does not vary much over K is to pick $s \in \varepsilon n K^*$, where K^* is the polar body of K. Formally, recall that $K^* = \{s \ : \ \langle x, s\rangle \leq 1 \text{ for all } x \in K\}$. Thus the value of $f_s(x)$, which is proportional to $e^{\langle x,s\rangle}$ varies only by an $e^{\varepsilon n} \approx (1+\varepsilon)^n$ factor, which then enables us to use Lemma 5.1. Formally,

Lemma 5.3 *(essentially Theorem 3.2 of [Kla06]) Suppose $s \sim \varepsilon n K^*$, is picked uniformly. Then*

$$\mathbb{E}\big[L_{f_s}^{2d}\big] \leq \Big(\frac{C}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}\Big)^d$$

for some absolute constant C.

Thus by Markov's inequality, we have that

$$\mathop{\mathbb{P}}_{s}\Big[L_{f_s}^{2d} > \Big(\frac{2C}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}\Big)^d\Big] < \frac{1}{2^d} \tag{13}$$

Since we are interested in ε being a constant (say 1), we have that $L_{f_s}^2 = O(1)$ except with probability exponentially small in d. This finishes the outline of the proof of [Kla06].

Note. The one technical detail here is that x_0 (the barycenter of f) is not 0, *even if the K we started with is centrally symmetric.*[3] However, for the purposes of our application, we really need the convex body K' to be centered as all our errors are measured with respect to the origin. If on the other hand, we translate K' to the origin, then we lose guarantees over K' approximating K (as it would only approximate $K - x_0$), and we have no control over the length of x_0. Our approach to resolve this issue, is to make the function f centrally symmetric before applying Lemma 5.1 so that we obtain a centrally symmetric body K' which is also centered at the origin. To do this, we convolve the function f which Klartag defines, with *its mirror about* 0 and show that the convolved body also satisfies the structural properties that we required, and in addition, it is centered at the origin. We now give the details of the symmetrization by convolution argument.

[3] A perturbation which satisfies this condition was obtained earlier by Klartag [BK05], but that has weaker guarantees on the Banach-Mazur distance than those we seek.

5.2 Symmetrization by Convolution

Let f_s be the log-concave function with support K as determined in the above step. For clarity, let us recall that $f_s(x) = \frac{e^{\langle s,x\rangle}}{\int_y e^{\langle s,y\rangle}}$, hence f_s it is easy to see that indeed a log-concave distribution. Now, let us define $f_{-s}(x) = \frac{e^{-\langle s,x\rangle}}{\int_y e^{-\langle s,y\rangle}}$, and define their *convolution* f to be

$$f(z) := (f_s * f_{-s})\ (z) = \int_x f_s(x) f_{-s}(z-x)dx \tag{14}$$

A basic property of a convolution is that

$$\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f(z)\ dz = \Big(\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_s(z)\ dz\Big)\Big(\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_{-s}(z)\ dz\Big),$$

which implies that f is a probability density as well. A well-known fact (see Lemma 2.1 of Lovász and Simonovits [LS93] or [Din57]) is that log-concave distributions are closed under taking convolutions, which implies f is that log-concave as well.

From our definition of f_s, we also observe that $f_s(x) = f_{-s}(-x)$. Observe that convolution also has an interesting geometric view: we can view sampling from f as picking $u \sim f_s$, $v \sim f_{-s}$ and taking $x = u + v$, which is now precisely the same as picking $u, v \sim f_s$ independently, and setting $x = u - v$. Notice that this immediately implies that $f(z) = f(-z)$, i.e., f is centrally symmetric.

We now move on to showing that the convolved function f also has bounded isotropic constant. To this end, the following lemma establishes that the determinant of the covariance matrix of f is "close" to that of f_s.

Lemma 5.4 *Given $f_s(x) \propto e^{\langle s,x\rangle}$, and $f := f_s * f_{-s}$, we have $\det cov(f) = 2^d \det cov(f_s)$.*

Proof: Now M_f denote the covariance matrix of f. Recall that f_s is not centered at the origin, and therefore let $\mu_i := \int_x f_s(x) x_i dx$. Now, since f is centered at the origin, the (i,j)th entry of M_f is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
M_f(i,j) &= \int_z f(z)\ z_i z_j\ dz \ = \ \int_{x,y} f_s(x) f_s(y)(x_i - y_i)(x_j - y_j)\ dxdy \\
&= \int_{x,y} f_s(x) f_s(y)(x_i - \mu_i)(x_j - \mu_j) + (y_i - \mu_i)(y_j - \mu_j)\ dxdy \qquad \text{(cross terms vanish)} \\
&= 2\int_x f_s(x)(x_i - \mu_i)(x_j - \mu_j)\ dx = 2M_{f_s}(i,j)
\end{aligned}$$

Notice that in the first step above, we have used the equivalence between (sampling $z \sim f$) and (sampling $x, y \sim f_s$ and then setting $z = x - y$). Therefore we have $M_f = 2M_{f_s}$, which implies the lemma statement. ∎

Note that $\sup f = \sup_z f(z) = \sup_z \int_x f_s(x) f_{-s}(z-x)\ dx \le (\sup f_s) \cdot \int_x f_s(x)\ dx \le \sup f_s \le e^{\varepsilon d}$. Thus the isotropic constant of f can be bounded as

$$L_f^{2d} = \det cov(f) \cdot \Big(\frac{\sup f}{\int_z f(z)\ dz}\Big)^2 \le 2^d \det cov(f_s)\ e^{2\varepsilon d} \le C^d \cdot \det cov(f_s).$$

To summarize, we have shown above that our convolved function defined as $f(z) = (f_s * f_{-s})(z) = \int_{y\in\mathbb{R}^d} f_s(y) f_{-s}(z-y)dy$ satisfies the following properties (where $f_s(x) = e^{\langle s,x\rangle}$ if $x \in K$ and 0 otherwise):

(i) **Support in** $2K$. Since f_s has support in K, the convolution has support in $K - K = 2K$ because K is centrally symmetric.

(ii) **Centrally Symmetric.** It is easy to see that $f(\cdot)$ is centrally symmetric, i.e., $f(-x) = f(x)$ for all x. In particular, this implies that the barycenter of f is the origin.

(iii) **Small Istropic Constant.** We showed this by arguing that both the "volume of f" and the determinant of the covariance matrix are roughly similar to the corresponding values of f_s.

Furthermore, the function f has the following expression

$$f(z) = \frac{e^{-\langle s,z\rangle}}{M} \int_{y \in K \cap (K+z)} e^{2\langle s,y\rangle} dy \tag{15}$$

In the above expression M is some normalizing constant such that $\int_z f(z) = 1$. Given the above properties f satisfies, the eager reader might feel tempted to use Lemma 5.1 to obtain the convex body associated with this function f. However, we note that it lacks one crucial property required in the lemma statement, i.e., $\sup_{x \in 2K} f(x) \leq m^d \inf_{x \in 2K} f(x)$ (for useful applications of the lemma, we require m to be an absolute constant). This is because the points at the boundary of the convex body $2K$ have very little support in the convolution and their values could be highly disparate with the supremum value $f(0)$.

We resolve this issue by *truncating* f around the convex body $(1/2)K$, i.e., set $f(x) = 0$ for $x \notin (1/2)K$ (this is allowed, because we do not require f to be a probability distribution). We now show that it satisfies all the above-mentioned properties, in addition to bounded aspect-ratio.

(i) Support in $(1/2)K$.

(ii) Centrally Symmetric.

(iii) **Small Istropic Constant.** Firstly, we observe that since we only set some $f(z)$ to 0, the determinant of the covariance matrix can only drop. Therefore, if we show that $\int_z f(z)dz$ does not drop significantly, that will establish that the isotropic constant does not change by too much (since $0 = \sup_z f(z)$ is also contained in $(1/2)K$, the supremum does not change due to truncation). To this end, the original "volume" is

$$\int_{z \in 2K} f(z) = \int_{v \in S_{d-1}} \int_{r=0}^{||v||_{2K}^{-1}} f(rv)\ Cr^{d-1} dr dv$$

since f is originally non-zero only inside $2K$. Now, the truncated volume is

$$\begin{aligned}
\int_{z \in (1/2)K} f(z) &= \int_{v \in S_{d-1}} \int_{r=0}^{||v||_{(1/2)K}^{-1}} f(rv)\ Cr^{d-1} dr dv \\
&= \int_{v \in S_{d-1}} \int_{r=0}^{||v||_{2K}^{-1}/4} f(rv)\ Cr^{d-1} dr dv \\
&\geq \frac{1}{4^{d-1}} \int_{v \in S_{d-1}} \int_{r'=0}^{||v||_{2K}^{-1}} f(r'v/4)\ Cr'^{d-1} dr' dv \\
&\geq \frac{1}{8^{d-1}} \int_{v \in S_{d-1}} \int_{r'=0}^{||v||_{2K}^{-1}} f(r'v)\ Cr'^{d-1} dr' dv
\end{aligned}$$

In the final inequality above, we have used the fact that $f(rx/4) \geq e^{-4\varepsilon d} f(rx)$ for any r, x such that $rx \in 2K$. This is true because of the following argument: from the expression in equation (15), we know that $f(rx)$ is $e^{-\langle s, rx\rangle}$ times an integral (of a non-negative function) over $K \cap (K + rx)$. Likewise $f(rx/4)$ is $e^{-\langle s, rx/4\rangle}$ times an integral (of the same non-negative function) over $K \cap (K + rx/4)$. But now it is easy to see that $K \cap (K + rx) \subseteq K \cap (K + rx/4)$ using the convexity of K, and hence the latter integral is at least the former integral. Furthermore, since $s \in K^*$ and $rx, (rx/4) \in 2K$, we have that $e^{-\langle s, rx\rangle} \in [e^{-2\varepsilon d}, e^{2\varepsilon d}]$ as well as $e^{-\langle s, rx/4\rangle} \in [e^{-2\varepsilon d}, e^{2\varepsilon d}]$. Therefore we have $e^{-\langle s, rx/4\rangle} \geq e^{-4\varepsilon d} e^{-\langle s, rx\rangle}$. Multiplying these two bounds, we get that $f(rx/4) \geq e^{-4\varepsilon d} f(rx)$ for any r, x such that $rx \in 2K$.

(iv) **Supremum to Infimum Ratio.** Consider $z \in (1/2)K$. We now show that $f(z) \geq 4^{-d} f(0)$. To this end, note that $f(0) = \mathsf{Vol}(K)$, and $f(z) \geq e^{-2\varepsilon d} \mathsf{Vol}(K \cap (K + z))$ for $z \in (1/2)K$. But now, it is easy to verify that $K \cap (K+z) \supseteq z + (1/2)K$ and hence $\mathsf{Vol}(K \cap (K+z)) \geq 2^{-d} \mathsf{Vol}(K)$. Combining these two facts, we get that $f(z) \geq 4^{-d} f(0)$ for all $z \in (1/2)K$.

To summarize the steps discussed above, we now present the procedure for constructing the centrally symmetric body K' which approximates (w.r.t the Banach-Mazur distance) the given centrally symmetric convex body K upto a factor of 2.

procedure $\mathsf{Perturb}(K, d)$ `// convex body` K`, dimension` d

begin

1. Sample a random $s \sim \varepsilon d K^*$, where $K^* = \{x : \langle x, y\rangle \leq 1 \ \forall y \in K\}$ is the polar of K.
2. For any α, let $f_\alpha(x) = e^{\langle \alpha, x\rangle}$ if $x \in K$ and 0.
3. Define $f(x) := (f_s * f_{-s})(x)$ to be the convolution of f_s and f_{-s}.
4. Truncate $f(x)$ at $(1/2)K$, i.e., set $f(x) = 0$ if $x \notin (1/2)K$.
5. Use Lemma 5.1 on f and $(1/2)K$ to obtain the resultant convex body $K' = T$.

Theorem 5.5 *If K is any centrally symmetric convex body, then with probability at least $1 - 4^{-d}$, the convex body $K' = T$ generated above is (i) centrally symmetric, (ii) has bounded isotropic constant $L_{K'} = \Theta(1)$, and (iii) approximates K in the sense that $(1/2)K \subseteq K' \subseteq K$.*

6 Sampling from an Isotropic Perturbation

We now shift our attention to the computational aspects of our algorithm, i.e., methods to efficiently sample from the different bodies we consider at the various steps of recursive algorithm noise.

6.1 Sampling from K'

Let us briefly review the steps of our algorithm where the body K' is involved: we need access to K' in the following senses:

1. Compute the moment matrix $M(K')$.
2. Sample $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ with probability density proportional to $e^{-\varepsilon \|x\|_{K'}}$, which can be achieved by sampling $r \sim \mathrm{Gamma}(d+1, \varepsilon^{-1})$ and $v \sim K'$ and setting $x = rv$.

Both of these can be done if we are able to sample from the body K' uniformly. Estimating $M(K')$ is done in the work of Dadush, et al. [DPV10]. In what follows, we give a way of sampling uniformly from the body K', which is a somewhat stronger requirement. To this end, we first give a (approximate) polynomial time membership oracle for the body K', and then use the grid-walk sampling techniques of [DFK91] (see, e.g., this survey by Vempala [Vem05] for more details). ≪**Aditya 6.1:** mention equivalence of sampling and membership≫ Also, we will restrict our attention AB 6.1 to K being a centrally symmetric convex body.

To sample from K' we need (i) decent estimates of the size of K' which we know since K satisfies $rB_2^d \subseteq K \subseteq RB_2^d$ for polynomially bounded R/r, and (ii) a membership oracle. But first, to even determine the body K', we need to sample a random vector from the polar K^*. We discuss this issue in the next subsection, and then move on to constructing a membership oracle.

6.1.1 Step 1: Sampling from the polar K^*

In this section, we describe an efficient procedure to sample from the polar body

$$K* = \{x : \langle x, y\rangle \leq 1,\ \forall y \in K\}.$$

As mentioned earlier, this is the first step towards generating the approximator of K which satisfies the hyperplane conjecture. With this goal, let us first describe a simple membership testing oracle for the polar body, which we use as a subroutine for the sampling procedure. Indeed, because $y \in K$ and $K = FB_1^n$, we can write y as a convex combination of the columns of F and their negative vectors. That is, y lies in the convex hull of $\pm$ combinations of the columns of F. Therefore, membership in $K*$ is equivalent to

$$x \in K^* \Leftrightarrow |\langle x, f\rangle| \leq 1 \quad \text{for all columns f of } F.$$

Indeed, x has inner product at most 1 with all columns and their negatives *if and only if* it has inner product at most 1 with any convex combination of them. Therefore, given an x, testing if $x \in K^*$ simply amounts to checking the inner product condition for each column f of the query matrix F, which can be done effieciently.

In order to use the grid-walk based sampling technique [DFK91], we require K^* to satisfy the following two properties:

(i) K^* has a membership oracle, and

(ii) K^* is bounded in the sense that $aB_2^d \subseteq K^* \subseteq bB_2^d$ where b/a has ratio $O(\text{poly}(d))$.

In our case, testing membership is easy, and furthermore, since we have the guarantee that $rB_2^d \subseteq K \subseteq RB_2^d$ for some R, r such that R/r has ratio $O(\text{poly}(d))$, we can use elementary properties of the polar body to infer that $(1/R)B_2^d \subseteq K^* \subseteq (1/r)B_2^d$, and therefore we can set $a = 1/R$ and $b = 1/r$ to get the desired bound for property (ii).

Using this, we can sample a random vector $s \sim \varepsilon dK^*$ and appeal to the results of Klartag [Kla06] [Section 4] to conclude that, with probability $1 - 4^{-d}$, the log-concave function $f_s(x) = e^{\langle s,x\rangle}$ for $x \in K$ (and 0 otherwise) has bounded isotropic constant. However, as mentioned earlier, the function is not centrally symmetric, and in fact, is not even centered at the origin. So before we can get a convex body from f_s, we next perform a convolution step in order to resolve these issues.

6.1.2 Step 2: Membership Oracle for K'

We now show how to obtain an approximate separation oracle for K'. Recall that we work with $g := f_{|(K/2)}$, i.e., the restriction of f to $K/2$, rescaled so as to give a distribution. Indeed, as we had explained in the previous section, the body K' is defined as the level sets of some appropriate function of g (à la [Bal]). Formally, Klartag defines the body K' (in the proof of Lemma 5.1) to be

$$K' = \left\{ x \ : \ \int_r g(rx) r^d \, dr \geq \frac{g(0)}{d+1} \right\}.$$

Theorem 6.1 *Let us fix $\rho > 0$. There exists a separation algorithm with the following guarantee: given x, if $x \in K'$, it always outputs YES, and if $x \notin K'\big(1 + \frac{\rho}{d}\big)$, it outputs NO w.p. at least $1 - \delta$. Further, the running time of the algorithm is at most poly$(n/\rho)\times$ polylog$(1/\delta)$.*

The idea of the proof is simple: first we consider an oracle to compute $g(y)/g(0)$ for a given y. We compute this to a factor $(1 \pm \frac{\rho}{d^2})$, w.p. $1 - 1/d^3$. Next, we observe that we can pick $O(d^2)$ discrete values for r, and compute the integral $\int_r (g(rx)/g(0)) r^{d-1} dr$ at these values and estimate the integral.

Thus our first task is to estimate $g(y)/g(0)$, given y. Recall that

$$\frac{g(y)}{g(0)} = \frac{\int_{K \cap (K+y)} e^{\langle s, y \rangle} \, dy}{\int_K e^{\langle s, y \rangle} \, dy}, \tag{16}$$

where s is the point in the polar picked in the definition of g. Because each of these terms is the integral of a log-concave function (namely $e^{\langle s,x \rangle}$) over a convex domain, we can use the machinery of Lovász and Vempala [LV06] to evaluate these. We state their result for completeness.

Theorem 6.2 *Let f be a well-rounded log-concave function given by a sampling oracle. Given $\varepsilon, \delta > 0$, we can compute a number A such that with probability at least $1 - \delta$,*

$$(1 - \varepsilon) \int f \leq A \leq (1 + \varepsilon) \int f$$

and the number of oracle calls is $O\Big(\frac{n^4}{\varepsilon^2} \log^7 \frac{n}{\varepsilon \delta}\Big) = \widetilde{O}(n^4)$.

The well-roundedness of our f is easy to check – we omit the proof (this is also done in [DPV10]). We are now ready to evaluate the integral. Given x, for convenience let us define the integral of interest, $I(x) := \int_r (g(rx)/g(0)) r^d \, dr$. First a couple of simple lemmas.

Lemma 6.3 *If $\|x\|_K < 1/20$, $I(x) > \frac{1}{d+1}$.*

Proof: We note that if $y \in \frac{K}{2}$, then $\frac{K}{2} - y \subseteq K$, implying that $\frac{K}{2} \subseteq K + y$ (since K is symmetric). This implies that $\frac{K}{2} \subseteq K \cap (K + y)$. Thus for $y \in \frac{K}{2}$, we have

$$\frac{g(y)}{g(0)} \geq \frac{\int_{K/2} e^{\langle s, y \rangle} \, dy}{\int_K e^{\langle s, y \rangle} \, dy} \geq \frac{\inf_K e^{\langle s, y \rangle}}{\sup_K e^{\langle s, y \rangle}} \cdot \frac{\mathsf{Vol}(K/2)}{\mathsf{Vol}(K)} \geq \frac{e^{-2\varepsilon d}}{2^d}.$$

Since we pick $\varepsilon = 1/2$, we obtain a lower bound of $1/10^d$. Now consider $I(x)$: the value of $g(x)$ is non-zero as long as $rx \in \frac{K}{2}$, thus the r ranges to a value ≥ 10. Thus

$$I(x) \geq \int_{r=0}^{10} \frac{g(rx)}{g(x)} r^d \, dr \geq \frac{1}{10^d} \int_{r=0}^{10} r^d \, dr = \frac{10}{d+1}.$$

In the last step we used $\int_{r=0}^{a} r^d \, dr = \frac{a^{d+1}}{d+1}$. This proves the lemma. ■

Lemma 6.4 *If $\|x\|_K > 4$, $I(x) < \frac{1}{d+1}$.*

Proof: For any y, we have $g(y) \leq e^{2\varepsilon d} < 3^d$ (even if we grossly over estimate the numerator integral). Thus $I(x) \leq \int_0^{1/8} g(y) r^d \, dr < \left(\frac{3}{8}\right)^d < \frac{1}{d+1}$. ■

Thus we know the "ball-park" of r which we need to integrate over. Next, we show why we can sample different values of r.

Lemma 6.5 *Let $x \in K$, and $y = (1+\theta)x$, for some $\theta > 0$. Then we have*

$$1 \leq \frac{g(x)}{g(y)} \leq e^{O(\theta)d}$$

Proof: The involves a computation using the expression (16), and integrating using polar coordinates (roughly, as in the 'truncating' argument earlier). We defer the proof to a full version of the paper. ■

Thus given an x, the above lemmas show that the range for r to be considered in the integration is $\left(\frac{1}{20\|x\|_K}, \frac{4}{\|x\|_K}\right)$, which can be computed because we can find $\|x\|_K$ accurately. Further, we showed that if r, r' are within a multiplicative $(1 + 1/d^2)$ factor, the integrand is equal up to a small multiplicative factor. Thus we can discretize the integral into a sum of $O(d^2)$ terms and evaluate each one using Theorem 6.2.

It can now be verified that if we need an "accuracy" of $\frac{\rho}{d}$ with probability $(1-\delta)$, the number of samples is at most $\text{poly}(n/\rho) \cdot \text{polylog}(1/\delta)$. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. ■

6.2 Approximate oracle for K' suffices

Hardt and Talwar [HT10] define a β-weak separation oracle for a convex body K as one that always answers YES for $x \in K$ and NO for $x \notin (1+\beta)K$. Along similar lines, we can define a randomized β-approximate separation oracle as one that outputs YES with probability $(1-\delta)$ for $x \in K$ and NO with probability $(1-\delta)$ for $x \notin (1+\beta)K$. The arguments above show that one can implement a randomized β-weak separation oracle for K' in time polynomial in $\frac{1}{\beta}$ and $\log \frac{1}{\delta}$. The results in [HT10] show that such an oracle is sufficient to define a distribution that satisfies ε-differential privacy, and which has an error distribution close to the ideal mechanism that can sample exactly from K'. Thus we can in polynomial time get a differentially private mechanism with the claimed error bound.

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