
SQL Injection Lab Name: Raman Srivastava SUID: 946665605

Task 1: Get Familiar with SQL Statements


In this task, I've opened mysql on the virtual machine using terminal. The database that this lab relies on is Users, and I've displayed the tables in this database.

Task 2A: SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statement



In this task, I've done an SQL injection attack using the webpage. The task required to get into the admin account without entering the password. This was achieved by entering <u>admin'#</u> in the username field.

What this does is, in the SQL query, it takes in the username entity as admin, the single quote closes the entry field in the SQL query and the # sign comments everything that's supposed to follow in the query, which basically comments out the password field. It's because of this, we're able to bypass the login by just entering the username and not the password.



We get access to the admin page without entering the password.


Task 2B: SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statement




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This task gets us to do the SQL Injection attack using command line. I've captured the HTTP request to find out the URL that needs to be passed along with curl in the command line. In the URL encoded specials symbols are used. %27 represents single quote and %23 represents # which is used for comments in an SQL query. When we pass this URL with curl, it gives us a HTML script of the output that would make sense in a web browser.

Task 2C: SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statement







INPUT: ' or 1=1; delete from credential where username='Alice';#

In this task, we're append a new SQL query in the same entry field. In the second query, I try to delete the field Alice from the database, but I'm unable to do it. It's probably because the php code is able to differentiate the data from the code, which is why it takes evasive actions. 1=1 query is to basically indicate a true condition which makes no sense to a layman user, but it helps to enable SQL injection. We also use the OR logical operator so we can get away with just 1 true condition (1=1).


Task 3A: SQL Injection Attack on UPDATE Statement






INPUT: ',salary='555555' where EID='10000'#

In this task, Alice is unhappy with her boss and wants to change her salary in the database. So, the above string is used in the input field and it's referenced using the EID field. # symbol again helps to comment what ever is a part of the SQL query after EID='10000' is entered.




We can see that her salary has been updated to 555555 from 20000.

Task 3B: SQL Injection Attack on UPDATE Statement



INPUT: ',salary='1' where EID='20000'#


In this task, Alice changes her Boby's salary to 1. The above string is used in the input field. Just like the previous task, we use EID to reference to Boby.




We can see Boby's salary has changed from 99999 to 1.

Task 3C: SQL Injection Attack on UPDATE Statement

SHA1 Hash Generator




In this task, Alice want to change Boby's password to deesboby. Because the password field is encrypted, I use an online to tool to find the hash value of "deesboby" and use the encrypted value in the update query.




INPUT: ',password='01C30430139C213FB1A6DA6B6E90E8F0222EDA54' where EID='20000'#

Alice has used the above string in the input field NickName to change Boby's password to her wish. Just like the previous tasks, EID was used to reference to Boby.



Here we can see that the hash value of Boby's password field has changed.



Here, I'm able to log in to Boby's profile using the updated password.

Task 4: Countermeasure

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```

```
Sabhosts totalhost;

Sabbusers on the sabbuser south of the sabbuser south of the sabbuser south of the sabbuser south of the sabbuser sab
      }
return $conn;
Sconn = getDB();

// Don't do this, this is not local against SQL injection attack
Ssql=";

if(Sinput_pwdi='){

// In case password field is not empty.
Shashed_pwd = shai(Sinput_pwd);

// Update the password stored in the session.

S_SSSION['pwd] = Shashed_pwd;

Sydl = "UPDATE credential SET intkname" Sinput_nickname', email='Sinput_email', address='Sinput_address', Password='Shashed_pwd', PhoneNumber='Sinput_phonenumber' where ID=Sid;';
 }

$conn->query($sql);


$conn->close();


header("Location: safe_home.php");
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             PHP ▼ Tab Width: 8 ▼ Ln 44, Col 33 ▼ INS
                                                                                                n-cutepse cu-mavearloggtereneous/
| hefe="adm_home.php" ><img src="seed_logo.png" style="helght: 40px; wldth: 200px;" alt="SEEDLabs"></a>
-auto mt-2 mt-1g-0 style='padding-left: 30px; >
                                       class='nav-item'>
class='nav-link' href='<mark>safe_</mark>home.php'>Home</a>


<p
       Subpasas Section (Schanee User )
Schanee User D connection
Scon = new nysql(Schbost, Sdbuser, Sdbpass, Sdbname);
if (Sconn-Sconnect_error) {
die("Connection failed: " . Sconn->connect_error . "\n");
 // create a connection
Sconn = getDB();
// Sql query to authenticate the user
Saql = "SELECT Id, name, eld, salary, birth, ssn, phoneNumber, address, email,nickname,Password
WHERE name= 'Suname'";
tf (isresult = Sconn-yeury(Ssql)) {
    de('There was an error running the query [' . Sconn->error . ']\n');
 /* convert the select return result into array type */
Sreturn_arr = array();
whitle($fow s \text{ FresUn}.
array_push($return_arr,$row);
}
  /* convert the array type to json format and read out*/
$json,str = json_encode($return_arr);
$json_a = json_decode($json,str,true);
$nane = $json_decode($json,str,true);
$nane = $json_de[0](*eid*);
$phoneNumber = $json_de[0](*eid*);
$phoneNumber = $json_de[0](*eid*);
$phoneNumber = $json_de[0](*eid*);
```

The above 3 screenshots have the changed code that point to safe_home.php. The purpose of this countermeasure is to form queries as prepared statements. The benefit of this is to separate data from code. This is enabled by using the execve() function because it takes in command and data separately.

Using prepared statements also improves the performance because it uses the SQL query as a template and uses different parameters on the query, storing results before executing the query, compared to running the same query repeatedly.







After making the changes, I restarted the apache server so the changes are reflected on the web application. We can see that the attack which we did in Task 2A doesn't work. That's because the countermeasure has taken the SQL query as a template, instead of having a long typical query. This helps to separate the data from the code, and this property is what doesn't allow the attack to be successful.