

## Barrier setting: what is the certificate about?

### Positivstellensatz certificate template (CBF-style)

Let  $K = \{x \mid g_i(x) \geq 0, i = 1, \dots, N\}$  be a basic semialgebraic set. For a polynomial barrier  $B(x)$ , we certify (schematically):

$$(\text{Interior}) \quad B(x) \equiv \sum_i \alpha_i(x) p_i(x) + \alpha_0(x)$$

$$(\text{Boundary}) \quad -B(x) \equiv \sum_i \beta_i(x) q_i(x) + \beta_0(x)$$

$$(\text{Invariance}) \quad -\nabla B(x) \cdot f(x) + \lambda B(x) \equiv \sum_i \sigma_i(x) r_i(x) + \sigma_0(x)$$

where  $\alpha_0, \beta_0, \sigma_0$  are SOS and  $p_i, q_i, r_i$  are products of the  $g_i$ 's.

$$\alpha_i, \beta_i, \sigma_i, \dots \implies m(x)^\top Q_i m(x)$$

$Q_i$  should be **positive semi-definite**

### Failure modes (what breaks in practice)

Four common ways a “successful” SOS solution fails to become a proof:

1. **PSD non-rationalizability:**  $Q$  is PSD but irrational; rounding breaks identity.
2. **Slight indefiniteness:**  $\lambda_{\min}(Q) \approx 0$  (or slightly negative); formal proof needs strict PSD.
3. **Identity drift after rounding:** most common; residue  $(x) \neq 0$  over  $[x]$ .
4. **Tight margins:** near-active constraints produce near-singular Grams; rounding amplifies drift.

### SOS Encoding

We introduce **repair slacks**  $\Sigma_j$  constrained to DSOS/SDSOS:

$$\text{LHS}_j(\widehat{B}) - \text{RHS}_j(\widehat{R}_j) - \Sigma_j(x) \equiv 0, \quad j \in \{1, 2, 3\}.$$

Concretely:

$$B \equiv \sum_i \alpha_i p_i + \alpha_0 + \alpha_{\text{DSOS/SDSOS}},$$

$$-B \equiv \sum_i \beta_i q_i + \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{DSOS/SDSOS}},$$

$$-\nabla B \cdot f + \lambda B \equiv \sum_i \sigma_i r_i + \sigma_0 + \sigma_{\text{DSOS/SDSOS}}.$$

$$\alpha_i, \beta_i, \sigma_i, \dots \implies m(x)^\top Q_i m(x)$$

$Q_i$  should be **positive semi-definite**

## Proof-producing SOS barrier pipeline

**SOS solve.** Solve an SDP in double precision to obtain  $Q_{\text{fp}}$ :

$$p(x) = z(x)^\top Q_{\text{fp}} z(x), \quad Q_{\text{fp}} \succeq 0$$

(numerically, up to solver tolerances).

SOS solve

Naive rounding

**Residue as data.** Track the error polynomial

$$r(x) = p(x) - z(x)^\top Q_{\text{rat}} z(x).$$

This small but non-zero residue becomes the target for a repair step.

**Exact LP over  $\mathbb{Q}$ .** Re-solve the DSOS LP using rational arithmetic (CDDLib in Julia) to obtain  $Q_{\mathbb{Q}} \in \mathbb{Q}^{n \times n}$ ,  $z(x)^\top Q_{\mathbb{Q}} z(x) = p(x)$ . This removes all floating-point error from the certificate.

DSOS repair

Exact LP over  $\mathbb{Q}$

Final certificate

**Naive rationalization.** Entrywise rounding  $Q_{\text{rat}} = \text{round}(Q_{\text{fp}})$  gives rationals, but small perturbations can make

$$\lambda_{\min}(Q_{\text{rat}}) < 0,$$

so  $Q_{\text{rat}}$  is no longer a valid SOS Gram matrix.

**DSOS repair.** Linear program in Gram entries:

$$z(x)^\top Q_{\text{corr}} z(x) = p(x)$$

with diagonal dominance constraints, so  $Q_{\text{corr}} \succeq 0$ . Solved with an LP solver (e.g. GLPK, Gurobi).

**Final certificate.** Factor  $Q_{\mathbb{Q}} = L^\top L$  (LDLT/Cholesky) and export

$$p(x) = \sum_k \ell_k(x)^2$$

as a machine-checkable artifact (Lean, Coq).

**Takeaway:** SOS is powerful but numerical; DSOS repair + exact LP turns it into an auditable proof.

”From floating-point witnesses to exact, checkable proofs.”