


Recap

Wiretap Channel



WT code $c_n = (Q_{x^n | m}, g_n)$

Reliability w.r.t. $\ell_{avg}(c_n)$ or $\ell_{max}(c_n)$

Security w.r.t. $\ell_{avg}(c_n)$ or $\ell_{max}(c_n)$

Secrecy Capacity as sup over all R achievable rates

Theorem:

$$C_{WTC}(\underbrace{P_{YZ|X}}_{\text{degraded}}) = \max_{P_X} I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$$


for any degraded WTC $P_{YZ|X}$ ($\forall P_X, P_X P_{YZ|X} \ x \leftrightarrow y \leftrightarrow z$)

$I(X; Y|Z)$ via


Proof Outline

I Achievability: If $R < \max_{P_X} I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$ then it is achievable, i.e. we can find asymptotically reliable + secure sequence of wiretap codes of rate R.

*One codeword per message



P2P codes
 $X^n = Y^n$



$X^n = Y^n = Z^n$
** Multiple codewords per message which allows us to confuse Eve


Random Code Design

$M_n = \{1, \dots, 2^{nR}\}$ and define $W_n = \{1, \dots, 2^{\tilde{R}}$, $\tilde{R} > R$

\nwarrow message set \nwarrow auxiliary index set

- The wiretap code comprises $2^{n(R+\tilde{R})}$ codewords iid according to $P^{\otimes n}$ of length n , i.e., $C_n = \{X(m, w)\}_{(m, w) \in M_n \times W_n}$.

Thus, for each $m \in M_n$ there is a sub-codebook $C_n(m) = \{X(m, w)\}_{w \in W_n}$ associated with it. Any codeword in $C_n(m)$ conveys the same information: "message m was sent".



Encoding & Decoding

Fix a WT code $C_n = \{X^n(m, w)\}_{(m, w) \in M_n \times W_n}$ by drawing C_n .

- ① Encoding: To send $m \in M_n$, draw $w \sim \text{Unif}(W_n)$ and let $x^n(m, w)$ be the realization of $X^n(m, w)$. The sequence $x^n(m, w)$ is transmitted over the wiretap channel

$$Q_{X^n | M}(x^n | m) = 2^{-n\tilde{R}} \sum_{w \in W_n} \mathbf{1}_{\{x^n = X^n(m, w)\}} \quad \begin{matrix} m \in M_n \\ x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n \end{matrix}$$

② Decoding: Upon observing $Y^n \sim P_{Y|X}^{\otimes n}(y^n | x^n(m, w))$, we will use joint typicality decoding to estimate both m and w !

\Rightarrow The decoder searches for a unique pair $(\hat{m}, \hat{w}) \in M_n \times W_n$ such that

$$(x^n(\hat{m}, \hat{w}), Y^n) \in T_{\gamma}^{(n)}(P_{X|Y})$$

\uparrow
 $P_x P_{Y|X}$
 $\sum_z P_{YZ|X}(\cdot, z | \cdot)$

Reliability Analysis

Observe that our goal is to decode (M, W) from Y^n where each pair $(m, w) \in M_n \times W_n$ is associated with a unique codeword $x^n(m, w)$. Then the reliability analysis reduces to classic P2P reliability analysis but for a codebook of rate $R + \tilde{R}$ (instead of R in the classic case).


\Rightarrow We have $E_{C_n} [e_{av}(c_n)] \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0$ exponentially

fast provided $R + \tilde{R} < I(X; Y)$

Security Analysis

We will use the approximate distribution simulation result.

How is it related?



When we are sending $m \in M_n$, the output at Eve's end is distributed according to $Z^n \sim Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)}(\cdot | m)$

We will see how to make $Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)}(\cdot | m) \approx P_Z^{(X_n)}$ for any $m \in M_n$

In particular, doing so make Z^n asymptotically independent of M .

$$\begin{aligned} I_{\text{avg}}(c_n) &= I_{Q^{(c_n)}}(M; Z^n) = D_{\text{KL}}(Q_{2^n|M}^{(c_n)} \| Q_{Z^n}^{(c_n)} | \text{Unif}(M_n)) \\ &\quad \leftarrow P_Z \propto P(Z) \\ &= D_{\text{KL}}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)} \| P_Z^{(X_n)} | \text{Unif}(M_n)) - \underbrace{D_{\text{KL}}(Q_{Z^n}^{(c_n)} \| P_Z^{(X_n)})}_{\geq 0} \\ &\leq D_{\text{KL}}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)} \| P_Z^{(X_n)} | \text{Unif}(M_n)) \end{aligned}$$

KLD divergence chain rule

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{C_n} [\text{Aug}(c_n)] \leq \mathbb{E}_{C_n} \left[D_{KL} \left(Q_{Z|IM}^{(C_n)} \| P_Z^{\otimes n} \mid \text{Unif}(\mathcal{U}) \right) \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{U}_n|} \sum_{m \in \mathcal{U}_n} \mathbb{E}_{C_n} \left[D_{KL} \left(Q_{Z|IM}^{(C_n)} (-1_m) \| P_Z^{\otimes m} \right) \right]$$

symmetry

"Same across different indices"

$$= \mathbb{E}_{C_n(1)} \left[D_{KL} \left(Q_{Z^n|IM} (-1_1) \| P_Z^{\otimes n} \right) \right]$$

$$Q_{Z^n|IM} (-1_1) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{W}_n|} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}_n} P_{Z|X}^{\otimes n} (z^n | x^n(1, w))$$

exponentially fast provided that $\tilde{R} > I(X; Z)$

Combined Rate conditions: We've seen that for our scheme to work it suffices that $\underbrace{R + \tilde{R} < I(X; Y)}_{\text{Reliability}}, \underbrace{\tilde{R} > I(X; Z)}_{\text{Security via distribution approximation}}$.

Note that \tilde{R} is not part of the problem definition and we only need to show that if $R < I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$ then a pair (R, \tilde{R}) as above can be found.

Clearly this is the case: If $R < I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$, then $\exists \delta > 0$ s.t. $R = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) - \delta$

Take

$$\tilde{R} = I(X; Z) + \delta > I(X; Z).$$

We also get

$$R + \tilde{R} = I(X; Y) - 2\delta < I(X; Y)$$

$\Rightarrow R < I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$ is a sufficient condition for our performance guarantees to hold, as is the goal in the achievability proof.

Remark: From here we need to use Markov's inequality to prove that a deterministic (non-random) sequence of asymptotically reliable & secure WT codes exists (codes w/ rate R). Afterwards, we can further prune the extracted codebooks to attain small maximal error probability and information leakage.

II Converse: Assume R is achievable, i.e., let $\{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a reliable & secure sequence of WT codes of rate R , and prove $R \leq \max_{P_X} I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$

It is sufficient to assume $\{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ has average performance guarantees.

$$P_{avg}(C_n) = P_{Q^{C_n}}(\tilde{M} + M) \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0 \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} n \rightarrow \infty \\ \epsilon_n \\ H(M|Y^n) \leq n \cdot \epsilon_n \end{array} \right)$$

$$I_{avg}(C_n) = I_{Q^{C_n}}(M; Z^n) \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0 \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} n \rightarrow \infty \\ \epsilon_n \\ I(M; Z^n) \leq \epsilon_n \end{array} \right)$$

\uparrow
 $\sim \text{Unif}(M_n)$

We have

$$nR = H(M) = H(M) - H(M|Y^n) + H(M|Y^n) - I(M; Z^n) + I(M; Z^n)$$

$$= \underbrace{I(M; Y^n) - I(M; Z^n)}_{\text{channel is degraded}} - \underbrace{n \epsilon_n + \epsilon_n}_{:= n \delta_n \text{ where } \delta_n \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0}$$

$$M \longleftrightarrow Y^n \longleftrightarrow Z^n$$

$$= I(M; Y^n | Z^n) + n \delta_n$$

$$\leq I(M, X^n; Y^n | Z^n) + n \delta_n$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \underbrace{H(Y_i | Z^n Y^{i-1})}_{\leq H(Y_i | Z_i)} - \underbrace{H(Y_i | M, X^n, Z^n, Y^{i-1})}_{Y_i = X_i = (M, Y^{i-1}, Z^n)} + n \delta_n$$

by (Z^{i-1}, Y^{i-1}) being removed

\Downarrow


$$Y_i \leftrightarrow (X_i, Z_i) \leftrightarrow (M, Y^{i-1}, Z^{i-1})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \underbrace{I(X_i; Y_i | Z_i)}_{I(X_i; Y_i) - I(X_i; Z_i)} + n \delta_n$$

$$I(X_i; Y_i) - I(X_i; Z_i) = I(P_{X_i} P_{Y|X_i}) - I(P_{X_i} P_{Z|X_i})$$

$$\leq \max_{P_X} I(P_{X_i} P_{Y|X_i}) - I(P_{X_i} P_{Z|X_i})$$

Discussion Section



Say we have q secret messages we want to transmit

\leftarrow Planting a codeword in space

$m=1$

$m=2$ • etc

Fix $c_n \in \mathbb{C}^n$

$$I_{\max}(c_n) = \max_{P_M \in \mathcal{P}(M_n)} I_{Q^{c_n}}(M; Z^n)$$

$$\text{Fix } P_M \in \mathcal{P}(M_n): I(M; Z^n) \leq D_{KL}(Q_{Z|M}^{(c_n)} \| P_Z^{\otimes n} | P_M)$$

$$I(M; Z^n) \leq D_{KL}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)} \| P_Z^{\otimes n}(P_M))$$

$$= \sum_{m \in M_n} \cancel{P_m(\cdot_m)} D_{KL}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)}(\cdot|_m) \| P_Z^{\otimes n}(\cdot))$$

$$\leq \max_{m \in M_n} D_{KL}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)}(\cdot|_m) \| P_Z^{\otimes n}(\cdot))$$

Direct analysis for maximum information leakage

$$\Pr_{C_n}(\ell_{\max}(c_n) > e^{-\delta n}) \leq \Pr_{C_n}(\max_{m \in M_n} D_n(m) > e^{-\delta n})$$

$$= \Pr_{C_n}(\exists m \in M_n \quad D_n(m) > e^{-\delta n})$$

$$= \Pr_{C_n}\left(\bigcup_{m \in M_n} \{D_n(m) > e^{-\delta n}\}\right)$$

Union bound

$$\leq \sum_{m \in M_n} \Pr_{C_n}(D_n(m) > e^{-\delta n})$$


$$= \sum_{m \in M_n} 2^n R$$

$$\Pr_{C_n}(D_{KL}(Q_{Z^n|M}^{(c_n)}(\cdot|_1) \| P_Z^{\otimes n}) > e^{-\delta n})$$

$$\leq e^{-e^{\delta n}}$$

$$\leq 2^n R e^{-e^{\delta n}} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0 \quad (\text{Strong-soft covering lemma})$$

Example: Consider the BSWT(p, q)



$$Y = X \oplus N_1 \quad N_1 \sim \text{Ber}(p)$$

$$Z = Y \oplus N_2 \quad N_2 \sim \text{Ber}(q)$$

$$0 \leq p, q \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

(things just flip
otherwise)

What is the effective channel to Eve?

$$Z = X \oplus \tilde{N} \quad \tilde{N} \sim \text{Ber}(\tilde{q})$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\tilde{N}}(1) &= P(\tilde{N}=1) = P(N_1 \oplus N_2 = 1) = P(N_1 \neq N_2) = (1-p)q + p(1-q) \\ &= p^* q \end{aligned}$$

For $p, q \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $\tilde{q} = p^* q \geq \max\{p, q\}$ Prove this

We will show

$$C_{\text{WT}}^{(\text{BSC})}(p, q) = H_b(\tilde{q}) - H_b(p) = \underbrace{1 - H_b(p)}_{C_{\text{BSC}}(p)} - \underbrace{(1 - H_b(\tilde{q}))}_{C_{\text{BSC}}(\tilde{q})}$$

$$C_{WT}^{(BSC)}(p, q) = \max_{x \sim \text{Ber}(r)} I(x; Y) - I(x; Z)$$

Achievability

choose $X \sim \text{Ber}(1/2)$

$$C_{WTC}^{(BSC)}(p, q) \geq H_b(\tilde{q}) - H_b(p)$$

Converse

For $r \leq \frac{1}{2}$, let $X \sim \text{Ber}(r)$

$$I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) = H_b(r^* p) - H_b(p)$$

$$- (H_b(r^* \tilde{q}) - H_b(\tilde{q}))$$

$$= H_b(\tilde{q}) - H_b(p) - (H_b(r^* \tilde{q}) - H_b(r^* p))$$

need ≥ 0

$$\leq H_b(\tilde{q}) - H_b(p)$$

Observe that for $r \leq \frac{1}{2}$, the function that maps $u \mapsto r^* u$ is monotonically increasing in $u \in [0, \frac{1}{2}]$

$$\Rightarrow H_b(r^* \tilde{q}) \geq H_b(r^* q)$$

$$\Rightarrow H_b(r^* \tilde{q}) - H_b(r^* q) \geq 0 \Rightarrow \text{Proof}$$

$$f_r(u) = r^* u = r(1-u) + (1-r)u$$
$$= r + (1-2r)u \quad , \quad r < \frac{1}{2}$$
