





Institut National des Sciences Appliquées et des Technologies UNIVERSITE DE CARTHAGE

STAGE INGÉNIEUR

Génie Logiciel

RN quantifié pour un contexte deep learning embarqué

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Résumé

Les réseaux de neurones sont devenus très utilisés dans l'intelligence artificielle grâce à leurs performances de prédictions.

Ces réseaux de neurones sont parfois très complexes, et il n'est pas pratique de les utiliser dans des systèmes à ressources limités.

Pour cela, dans ce rapport nous allons introduire les réseaux de neurones binaires (BNNs), les formaliser, étudier quelques modèles binarisés et dériver leurs formules, implémenter les résultats trouvés dans une bibliothèque qu'on va nommer **binaryflow**.

Et finalement, nous allons implémenter et entraı̂ner des modèles binarisés pour la classification et régression, et nous allons comparer les performances de prédiction, ainsi que les performances temps et mémoire de ces BNNs et leurs contrepart classique.

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Contenu

Li	ste d	les Figures	4
\mathbf{Li}	ste d	les Tableaux	5
In	trod	uction	7
1	Cad	lre du Stage	8
2	Ana	alysis & Implementation	9
	2.1	Introduction	9
	2.2	Formalisation	9
		2.2.1 Di-Graph	9
		2.2.2 Mean Payoff Game	9
		2.2.3 Well Foundness	10
		2.2.4 Symmetries	12
		2.2.5 Strategy	12
	2.3	Evaluating Strategies	13
		2.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulations	13
		2.3.2 Memoryless Deterministic Strategies	13
		2.3.3 Probabilistic Strategies	15
	2.4	Countering Strategies	15
3	Dat	aset Generation	16
	3.1	Introduction	16
	3.2	Analysis	16
	3.3	Graph Distributions	16
		$3.3.1$ $\mathcal{G}(n,p)$ Family	16
		· · - /	16
			16
		9	17
		3.3.5 Choice Function	18
			20
			21
	3.4		21
		9	22
	3.5	• 9	$\frac{1}{2}$
		9	$\frac{1}{2}$
	3.6		23

RN quantifié pour un contexte deep learning embarqué

		3.6.1	Desired Properties of Mean Payoff Game Distributions	23
		3.6.2	Implemented Distributions	23
	3.7	MPG	Generation	24
		3.7.1	Distribution	24
		3.7.2	Dense Graphs	24
	3.8	Annot	•	24
	0.0	3.8.1	Approach	$\frac{1}{24}$
		3.8.2	Target Values	25
		3.8.3	Heuristics	25
		3.8.4	Deployment	26
		3.0.4	Deployment	20
4		del Des		27
	4.1		uction	27
	4.2		sives	27
	4.3	Proper	ties	27
		4.3.1	Totality	27
		4.3.2	Node Agnostic	27
		4.3.3	Invariance under Positive Scaling	28
		4.3.4	Permutation Equivariance	29
		4.3.5	Stability under Padding	29
5	Imp	lémen	tation	31
6	Ana	llyse		32
0	1	_•		99
Co	onclu	sion		33
	On	\mathbf{Constr}	raint Satistfaction Problems	34
	On	\mathbf{Constr}	raint Satistfaction Problems raint Satisfaction Problem	
	On	\mathbf{Constr}		34
	On	Constr Constr	raint Satisfaction Problem	34 34
	On	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2	raint Satisfaction Problem	34 34 34
	On	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3	Paint Satisfaction Problem	34 34 34 34
	On A.1	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar	raint Satisfaction Problem	34 34 34 34
	On A.1	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1	raint Satisfaction Problem	34 34 34 34 34
	On A.1	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism ry Max Atom Systems Definition Example	34 34 34 34 34 34 35
	On A.1	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism Ty Max Atom Systems Definition Example Stom Systems	34 34 34 34 34 35 35
	On A.1	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism ry Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition Definition Definition	34 34 34 34 34 35 35
	On A.1	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2	$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35
	On A.1 A.2 A.3	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism ry Max Atom Systems Definition Example tom Systems Definition $Ax = Ax =$	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 35 38
	On A.1 A.2 A.3	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism ry Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition $A = A = A = A = A = A = A = A = A = A =$	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism Ty Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition MA \leq MA ₃ Polymorphisms Iax System Transforming to Max Atom Systems	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 38
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Termar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism Ty Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition MA \leq MA ₃ Polymorphisms Iax System Transforming to Max Atom Systems Transforming to Max Atom Systems	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 38
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On B.1	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1 Rando Introd	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism Ty Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition $MA \leq MA_3$ Polymorphisms Iax System Transforming to Max Atom Systems Transforming to Max Atom Systems The Graphs are the first of the	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 43
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1 Rando Introd Sinkles	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism Ty Max Atom Systems Definition Example Atom Systems Definition MA \leq MA ₃ Polymorphisms Iax System Transforming to Max Atom Systems Transforming to Max Atom Systems The Graphs Section The Graphs The Graph The Gr	34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 43 43
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On B.1	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Termar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1 Rando Sinkles B.2.1	raint Satisfaction Problem . Definition . Assignment . Polymorphism . Polymorphism . Definition . Example	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 43 43 43
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On B.1	Constr Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Ternar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1 Rando Introd Sinkles B.2.1 B.2.2	raint Satisfaction Problem Definition Assignment Polymorphism y Max Atom Systems Definition Example tom Systems Definition $MA \leq MA_3$ Polymorphisms lax System Transforming to Max Atom Systems m Graphs uction ss $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Property Basic Comparison with Normal $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$	34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 43 43 43 43
A	On A.1 A.2 A.3 On B.1	Constr A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Termar A.2.1 A.2.2 Max A A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3 Min-M A.4.1 Rando Sinkles B.2.1	raint Satisfaction Problem . Definition . Assignment . Polymorphism . Polymorphism . Definition . Example	34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 38 38 43 43 43

RN quantifié pour un contexte deep learning embarqué

	B.2.5	Asymptotic Analysis For Sparse $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$	45
B.3	Repea	ting Construction	46
	B.3.1	Estimating Complexity	46
	B.3.2	Dense Graph case	46
	B.3.3	Sparse Graph case	46
B.4	Binom	ial Rejection Construction	47
B.5	Expec	ted Mean Payoff	47
	B.5.1	Definition	47
	B.5.2	Matrix Form	47
	B.5.3	Fractional Strategies	47
Bibliog	graphie		51

Liste des Figures

2.1	An example of an execution with non-convergent Mean Payoffs	1
3.1	A counter example of the Linear Bound heuristic	26

Liste des Tableaux

3.1	Le tableau d'avancement	des BNNs	24
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List of Algorithms

1	Deterministic strategies evaluation
2	$\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Generation
3	$\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Generation Optimisation
4	$\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement
5	Fine tuned $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement
6	Fine tuned $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement
7	Fine tuned $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement
8	Converting a Max Atom System to Ternary Max Atom System
9	Converting a Min-Max System to Max Atom
10	Converting a Mean Payoff Game to a Min Max system
11	AC3 for Ternary Max Atom systems
12	AC3 Optimized for Ternary Max Atom systems
13	Solving a Mean Payoff Graph for all states

Introduction

Avec l'explosion de l'intelligence artificielle, et surtout les modèles d'apprentissage profonds, la complexité des modèles a subi une croissance considérable, qui les rend inexploitable dans les systèmes à complexité limitée.

Dans ce rapport, nous allons étudier la quantification des paramètres et des entrées des couches du réseau de neurones sur un seul bit.

Ce rapport va détailler notre approche de la formalisation des BNNs, de l'analyse et généralisation des approches existantes, vers l'implémentation d'une bibliothèque unifiant les BNNs, et son utilisation. Il est composé de 6 chapitres.

Dans le premier chapitre, nous allons présenter la societé dB Sense et sa méthodologie.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous allons donner une petite histoire de l'apprentissage profond, et puis poser le problème de la grande complexitée de ces modèle, en posant la binarisation comme une solution.

Dans le troisième chapitre, nous allons formaliser notre approche, en définissant les BNNs. Après nous allons poser quelques problèmes dans l'entraînement. Après nous allons proposer les optimisations temps et mémoire qu'on peut exploiter avec les BNNs.

Finalement, nous allons proposer l'algorithme d'entraînement et d'interférence des BNNs.

Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous allons étudier et analyser quelques BNNs répandus dans la littérature, en conformant avec notre définition proposée.

Dans le cinquième chapitre, nous allons implémenter la bibliothèque **binaryflow**, en justifiant les paradigmes utilisés.

Dans le sixième chapitre, nous allons utiliser les différents BNNs étudiés sur 3 jeux de données. Pour chacun de ces modèles nous allons analyser son performance de prédiction, sa taille mémoire au déploiement, et une estimation sur la complexité de son interférence en calculant le nombres d'instruction équivalents.

Chapter 1

Cadre du Stage

Introduction

Chapter 2

Analysis & Implementation

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Formalisation

To define a Mean Payoff Game, we will start by formalising a weighted di-graph¹.

2.2.1 Di-Graph

A Weighted Di-Graph \mathcal{G} is a tuple $(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{W})$ where:

- \mathcal{V} is the set of vertices.
- $\mathcal{E} \subseteq V \times V$ is the set of edges.
- $W: \mathcal{E} \to \mathbb{G}$ is the weight function, assigning a weight for every edge, with \mathbb{G} some ordered abelian group².

2.2.2 Mean Payoff Game

Formally, a **Mean Payoff Graph** is a tuple $(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{P}, s, p)$ where:

- $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{W})$ is a di-graph.
- $s \in \mathcal{V}$ denotes the starting position.
- $\mathcal{P} = \{\text{Max}, \text{Min}\}\$ is the set of players.
- $p \in \mathcal{P}$ the starting player

A **Mean Payoff Game** is a perfect information, zero-sum, turn based game played indefinitively on a Mean Payoff Graph as follow:

- The game starts at $u_0 = s$, with player $p_0 = p$ starting.
- For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, Player p_n will choose a vertex $u_{n+1} \in \operatorname{Adj} u_n$, with a payoff $w_n \mathcal{W}(u_n, u_{n+1})$
- The winner of the game will be determined by the Mean Payoff. There are different winning conditions.

¹Directed Graph

²This definition is too general. We will only consider $\mathbb{G} \in \{\mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{R}\}$. Also, \mathbb{G} itself should be clear from the context.

Condition C1

Player Max wins iff:

$$\liminf_{n \in \mathbb{N}^*} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} w_k \geqslant 0$$

Otherwise, Player Min will win

Condition C2

Player Max wins iff:

$$\liminf_{n \in \mathbb{N}^*} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} w_k > 0$$

Otherwise, Player Min will win.

Condition C3

Player Max wins if:

$$\liminf_{n \in \mathbb{N}^*} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} w_k > 0$$

Player Min wins if:

$$\limsup_{n \in \mathbb{N}^*} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} w_k < 0$$

Otherwise, it is a draw.

2.2.3 Well Foundness

It is not very clear from the definition that the game is well founded.

In fact, there are choices for which the mean payoff does not converge. That is the sequence $\left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{k=0}^{n-1}w_k\right)_{n\in\mathbb{N}^*}$ does not converge. One such example is the sequence defined by:

$$w_n = (-1)^{\lfloor \log_2(n+1) \rfloor}$$

For that sequence, the $(2^r - 1)$ -step mean payoff is equal to:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{2^{r}-2} w_{k} = \sum_{k=1}^{2^{r}-1} (-1)^{\lfloor \log_{2}(k) \rfloor}$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \sum_{j=2^{i}}^{2^{i+1}-1} (-1)^{\lfloor \log_{2}(j) \rfloor}$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \sum_{j=2^{i}}^{2^{i+1}-1} (-1)^{i}$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \sum_{j=2^{i}}^{2^{i+1}-1} (-1)^{i}$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} (2^{i+1} - 2^{i})(-1^{i})$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} (-2)^{i}$$

$$= \frac{1 - (-2)^{r}}{3}$$


$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{2^{r}-1} \sum_{k=0}^{2^{r}-2} w_{k} = \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1 - (-2)^{r}}{2^{r}-1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{2^{-r} - (-1)^{r}}{1 - 2^{-r}}$$

That sequence has two accumulation points $\pm \frac{1}{3}$, and thus, it does not converge.

On the other hand, the introduction of the supremum and infimum operators will solve the convergence problem, as the resulting sequences will become monotone.

An example of an execution that gives a rise to such payoffs is the following Meab Payoff Game instance³:



Pair of strategies defined as:

$$\Phi: V^+ \times P \to V$$

$$(s_0 \dots s_r, p) \to B(r) \bmod 2$$

With B(r) the position of the left-most bit in the binary representation of r

(a) Representation of the Mean Payoff Game

(b) Definition of both strategies

Figure 2.1: An example of an execution with non-convergent Mean Payoffs

³Note that the proposed pair of strategies is odd in the sense that it appears that both players cooperated on the construction of non-convergent mean payoffs instead of trying ot win the game.

2.2.4 Symmetries

2.2.5 Strategy

Deterministic Strategies

Let p be a player.

A (deterministic) strategy⁴ is a function $\Pi^p: V^+ \to V$ such that:

$$\forall v_0 \dots v_r \in V^+, \quad \Pi_p(v_0 \dots v_r) \in \operatorname{Adj} v$$

If the strategy does only depend on the current vertex, we say it is a memoryless (deterministic) strategy $\Pi: V \to V$

Probabilistic Strategies

A probabilistic strategy is a random process that assigns for each sequence of vertices $v \in \mathcal{V}$ a probability distribution over Adj v. This constitutes the most general strategy of a player:

$$\forall v_0 \dots v_r \in V^+, \quad \Pi_p(v_0 \dots v_r) \in \mathscr{D}(\operatorname{Adj} v)$$

Considered Strategies

Strategies that depends in complete past histories are in general intractable. For Mean Payoff Game, it is proven that the optimal strategy is a **deterministic** and **memoryless**. For that we will only consider **memoryless** strategies. And for the scope of this report:

- A deterministic strategy should refer to memoryless deterministic strategy.
- A probabilistic strategy should refer to memoryless probabilistic strategy.
- A strategy should refer to memoryless deterministic strategy.

We will still consider (memoryless) probabilistic strategies as they reside in a smooth space, and thus they can be used for machine learning purposes.

Deterministic Optimal Strategy

There are three kinds of optimality:

Weak Optimality : In the deterministic case, a strategy Φ of player $p \in P$ is weakly optimal if one of the following is true:

- For each strategy Φ^p of player p, player \bar{p} can win the game by finding a countering strategy $\Phi^{\bar{p}}$.
- Player p will not lose the game no matter his opponent's strategy

⁴By default, we refer to deterministic strategies. If the strategy is not deterministic, we will explicit it.

Strong Optimality: In the deterministic case, a strategy Φ of player $p \in P$ is strongly optimal if one of the following is true:

- For each strategy Φ^p of player p, player \bar{p} can win or tie the game by finding a countering strategy $\Phi^{\bar{p}}$.
- Player p will win the game no matter his opponent's strategy

Payoff Optimality : In the deterministic case, a strategy Φ of player $p \in P$ is payoff optimal if independently of \bar{p} 's strategy it:

- Maximises the Mean Payoff if p = Min
- Minimises the Mean Payoff otherwise

Now we have the following hiearrhy considering the set of optimal strategies:

 $\forall \text{Mean Payoff Game } G, \forall p \in P, \quad \text{PayoffOptimal}(G, p) \subseteq \text{StrongOptimal}(G, p) \subseteq \text{WeakOptimal}(G, p)$

2.3 Evaluating Strategies

Suppose we have a pair of potentially probabilitic strategies (Φ^{Max} , Φ^{Min}). The problem is to evaluate the winner without doing an infinite simulation of the game.

2.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulations

This is the most intuitive evaluation method

2.3.2 Memoryless Deterministic Strategies

If both strategies are deterministic and memoryless. Then the generated sequence of vertices $(s_n)_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ will be completely determined by the recurrence relation:

$$s_n = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } n = 0\\ \Phi^{\text{Max}}(s_{n-1}) & \text{if } n \text{ is odd}\\ \Phi^{\text{Min}}(s_{n-1}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This can be represented in the compact form:

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^*, \quad (s_n, p_n) = (\Phi^{p_{n-1}}(s_{n-1}), \bar{p}_{n-1}) = F(s_{n-1}, p_{n-1})$$

Since $V \times P$ is a finite set and F is a function, such sequence will be eventually periodic, that is:

$$\exists N \in \mathbb{N}, \exists T \in \mathbb{N}^* / \forall n \in \mathbb{N}_{\geqslant N}, \quad (s_n, p_n) = (s_{n+T}, p_{n+T})$$

We can calculate its eventual period using the turtle hare algorithm.

Now, the mean payoff will be equal to the mean of weights that appears on the cycle. This can be proven as follow.:

$$S_{aT+b+N} = \sum_{k=0}^{aT+b+N-1} w_k$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} w_k + \sum_{k=0}^{aT+b-1} w_{k+N}$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} w_k + a \sum_{r=0}^{T-1} w_{r+N} + \sum_{r=0}^{b-1} w_{r+N}$$

$$\implies \left| S_{n+N} - \lfloor \frac{n}{T} \rfloor \sum_{r=0}^{T} w_{k+N} \right| \leq (N+T-1) \max_{(u,v) \in \mathcal{E}} |\mathcal{W}(u,v)|$$

$$\leq (N+T-1) ||\mathcal{W}||_{\infty}$$

$$\implies \left| \frac{1}{n+N} S_{n+N} - \frac{1}{n+N} \cdot \lfloor \frac{n}{T} \rfloor \sum_{r=0}^{T-1} w_{k+N} \right| \leq \frac{N+T-1}{n+N} ||\mathcal{W}||_{\infty}$$

Now it can be proven that:

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n+N} \cdot \lfloor \frac{n}{T} \rfloor \sum_{r=0}^{T} w_{k+N} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{r=0}^{T-1} w_{r+N}$$

With that:

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} w_k = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{r=0}^{T-1} w_{r+N} \quad \blacksquare$$

Now, our algorithm will be composed of 3 main parts:

- Calculating the transition function $F: V \times P \to V \times P$. This is straightforward from the construction.
- Calculating the period and the offset of the sequence. We will use Floyd's cycle finding algorithm for that.
- Calculating the Mean Payoff

This is an illustrative implementation of our algorithm.

Algorithm 1 Deterministic strategies evaluation

```
Require: G = (V, E, P, s, p) a mean payoff game
Require: (\Phi^{\text{Max}}, \Phi^{\text{Min}}) the edge probability
Ensure: R The mean payoff
   F \leftarrow \text{Transition}(G, \Phi^{\text{Max}}, \Phi^{\text{Min}})

    Calculate the transition function

   x_0 \leftarrow (s, p)
   (T, r) \leftarrow \text{FloydCycleFinding}(F, x_0)
                                                                                           ⊳ Find the period and the offset
   S \leftarrow 0
                                                                \triangleright S represents the cumulative payoffs along a cycle
   x \leftarrow x_0
                                                                                    ► Advance until arriving to the cycle
   for k \in \{1, ..., r\} do
       x \leftarrow F(x)
   end for
   for k \in \{1, ..., T\} do
       y \leftarrow \leftarrow F(x)
       u \leftarrow \operatorname{projection}(x)
                                                                                               ⊳ Extracts the current vertex
                V \times P {
ightarrow} V
       v \leftarrow \operatorname{projection}(y)
                                                                                                   V \times P \rightarrow V
        S \leftarrow S + W(u, v)
       x \leftarrow y
   end for
   return R \leftarrow \frac{S}{T}
```

2.3.3 Probabilistic Strategies

Due to the undeterministic nature of probabilistic strategies, it does not make sense to evaluate the mean payoffs, as different executions may lead to different mean payoffs.

Instead, probabilistic strategies gives rise to a discrete distribution of mean payoffs.

Now two closely related, but different evaluations are possible

- Expected Mean Payoff
- Distribution of winners

Now, with both strategies fixed. A Mean Payoff Game can be considered as a Markov Chain.

2.4 Countering Strategies

Chapter 3

Dataset Generation

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Analysis

Generating a Mean Payoff Game can be decomposed into two subsequent objectives.

- 1. Generate the Graph itself.
- 2. Generate the Weights

3.3 Graph Distributions

There are many well studied graph distributions in the litterature. One of the most explored ones are the $\mathcal{G}(n,p)$ and $\mathcal{G}(n,m)$ families.

3.3.1 $\mathcal{G}(n,p)$ Family

For $n \in \mathbb{N}, p \in [0, 1]$, a graph G is said to follow a $\mathcal{G}(n, p)$ distribution if |V| = n and:

$$\forall e \in \mathscr{E}, \quad \mathscr{P}(s \in \mathcal{E}) = p$$

Where \mathscr{E} is a set of valid edges.

3.3.2 $\mathcal{G}(n,m)$ Family

For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $m \in \mathbb{N}$, a graph G is said to follow a $\mathcal{G}(n,m)$ distribution if |V| = n, |E| = m and the edges e_1, \ldots, e_m were drawn from a set of valid edges \mathscr{E} .

3.3.3 Valid edges

The set of valid edges \mathscr{E} is the set defining the potential edges of the graph. It is equal to:

- 1. $V \times V$ for directed graphs with loops
- 2. $(V \times V) \setminus V \odot V$ for directed graphs without loops
- 3. The set of subsets of size 2 of V denoted $\mathscr{P}_2(V)$ for undirected graphs with loops.
- 4. The set of subsets of size 2 of V denoted $\mathscr{P}_2(V)$ for undirected graphs with loops.

3.3.4 $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Construction

Naive Method

The definition of $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ gives a straightforward construction.

This is achieved by flipping a $coin^1$ for each pair of node $(u, v) \in V^2$, we add an edge if we get a Head.

This is implemented in the following algorithm:

Algorithm 2 $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Generation

```
Require: n \in \mathbb{N}^* the size of the graph
Require: p \in \mathbb{N}^* the edge probability
Ensure: G \sim \mathcal{D}(n,p)
A: (u,v) \in V \times V \to 0
for u \in V do
for v \in V do
Generate X \sim \mathcal{B}(p)
A(u,v) \leftarrow X
end for
end for
end for
return G \leftarrow \text{GraphFromAdjacencyMatrix}(A)
```

The complexity² of the following algorithm is $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$.

Optimized Method

Instead of iterating over all possible pair of nodes. For each vertex $v \in V$:

- We can sample a number d from the outgoing degree distribution³
- ullet We then choose d numbers uniformly without replacement from an indexable representation of V

The following algorithm implements the optimized method:

Algorithm 3 $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Generation Optimisation

```
Require: n \in \mathbb{N}^* the size of the graph Require: p \in \mathbb{N}^* the edge probability Ensure: G \sim \mathcal{D}(n,p)
A: u \in V \to \varnothing for u \in V do
\text{Generate } d \sim \mathcal{B}(n,p) \qquad \rhd d \text{ represents the degree, } \mathcal{B}(n,p) \text{ is the binomial distribution } A(u) \leftarrow \text{choice}(V,d) end for return G \leftarrow \text{GraphFromAdjacencyList}(A)
```

¹The coin is potentially biased with a probability of obtaining head equal to $p \in [0,1]$

²We assume the cost of generating a Bernoulli random variable as $\mathcal{O}(1)$

 $^{^3{}m Or}$ the ingoing degree distribution, they are in fact equal.

Now, Let C(n, m) be the cost of choice function. The expected complexity of this algorithm will be:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n\mathbb{E}_d[C(n,d)])$$
 where $d \sim \mathcal{B}(n,p)$

We will show on the next section what choice function should we use.

3.3.5 Choice Function

First Proposition

We propose here a simple choice algorithm, but it is still efficient for our use case.

It works simply by drawing without replacement, but we ignore duplicate elements. This is implemented as follow

Algorithm 4 $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement

```
Require: S a list
```

Require: $m \in \{0, \dots |S|\}$ the number of chosen elements

Ensure: H a set of size m containing uniformly drawn elements without replacement.

$$\begin{aligned} H &\leftarrow \varnothing \\ \mathbf{while} & |H| < m \ \mathbf{do} \\ & \text{Generate} & v \sim \mathcal{U}(S) \\ & H \leftarrow H \cup \{v\} \\ \mathbf{end} & \mathbf{while} \\ \mathbf{return} & H \end{aligned}$$

 \triangleright Where $\mathcal{U}(S)$ is the uniform distribution over S

To estimate the cost of this algorithm, we will use probabilistic reasoning. X = C(n, m) the running time of an execution of algorithm 4 in a set

Let $X_{n,m} = C(n,m)$ the running time of an execution of algorithm 4 in a set S of size n, with m elements to be chosen. We have:

$$X_{n,0} \text{ is deterministic}$$

$$X_{n,0} = \mathcal{O}(1)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[X_{n,m}] = 1 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m} \mid \text{The last drawn number is } k]$$

$$= 1 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=0}^{m-2} \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m}] + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=m-1}^{n-1} \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m-1}]$$

$$= 1 + \frac{m-1}{n} \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m}] + \frac{n-m+1}{n} \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m-1}]$$

Now we arrived at a recurrent formula. We will simplify it as shown below:

$$\frac{n-m+1}{n}\mathbb{E}[X_{n,m}] = \frac{n-m+1}{n}\mathbb{E}[X_{n,m-1}] + 1$$

$$\implies \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m}] = \frac{n-m+1}{n-m+1}\mathbb{E}[X_{n,m-1}] + \frac{n}{n-m+1}$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[X_{n,m-1}] + \frac{n}{n-m+1}$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{m} \frac{n}{n-k+1} + \mathcal{O}(1)$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} \frac{n}{n-k} + \mathcal{O}(1)$$

$$= n \sum_{k=n-m+1}^{n} \frac{1}{k} + \mathcal{O}(1)$$

$$= n(H_n - H_{n-m}) + \mathcal{O}(1)$$

Here $(H)_{n\in\mathbb{N}^*}$ is the harmonic series, and we define $H_0=0$.

Complexity

The expected complexity of algorithm 4 depends on both n and m:

- If m = o(n), then it is $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(m)$.
- If m = kn + o(n) with $k \in]0, 1[$, then it is $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(m)$.
- If m = n o(n), It is $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(m \log m)$.

To prove this result, we use a well known asymptotic approximation of the Harmonic series⁵:

$$H_n = \ln n + \gamma - \frac{1}{2n} + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n^2}\right)$$

We can prove this claim as follow:

$$m = o(n), \quad \mathbb{E}[C(n,m)] = -n \ln\left(1 - \frac{m}{n}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - \frac{n}{n-m}\right) + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$

$$= m + o(m)$$

$$= \mathcal{O}(m)$$

$$m = km + o(m), k \in]0, 1[, \quad \mathbb{E}[C(n,m)] = -n \ln\left(1 - \frac{m}{n}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - \frac{n}{n-m}\right) + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$

$$= -n \ln(1 - k + o(1)) + \frac{1}{n}(1 - \frac{1}{1-k+o(1)}) + \mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{n})$$

$$= \mathcal{O}(m)$$

⁴Here we use the minus sign to emphasize that $m \leq n$

⁵This asymptotic approximation can be proven using the Euler-Maclaurin formula

For m = n - o(n), we prove it by noting that:

$$\mathbb{E}[C(n,m)] \leq \mathbb{E}[C(n,n)]$$

$$\leq nH_n$$

$$\leq n\ln n + \gamma n + \frac{1}{2} + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$

$$= \mathcal{O}(m\log m)$$

Refinement

If m tends to n, it is more hard to select m elements from a set of size n without replacement. This explains the extra logarithmic factor.

In that case, we can instead focus on the dual problem: "Find the n-m elements that will not be selected". This can be calculated in $\mathcal{O}(n-m)$.

Once we find the elements that will not be selected, their set complement are exactly the m elements that will be selected. This new algorithm is guaranteed to be $\mathcal{O}(m)$ irrespective of n and m

Algorithm 5 Fine tuned $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement

```
Require: S a list
```

Require: $m \in \{0, ... |S|\}$ the number of chosen elements **Require:** choice The choice function defined on algorithm 4

Require: τ a fine tuned threshold. We will use $\tau = \frac{1}{2}$ for all practical purposes.

Ensure: H a set of size m containing uniformly drawn elements without replacement.

```
if \frac{m}{|S|} \leqslant \tau then
H \leftarrow \text{choice}(V, n)
else
H \leftarrow S \backslash \text{choice}(S, n - m)
end if
return H
```

Also, an important point is that by combining the analysis of all possible cases, we can extract a constant factor that is independent of n. So that the Big-O notation is only a function of m.

3.3.6 Complexity of Optimised $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Graph Construction

We return to evaluate the asymptotic behaviour of $\mathbb{E}_d[C(n,d)]$. Let $\delta \in \mathbb{R}_+^*$

The Chebychev Inequality implies that:

$$\mathscr{P}\left(\left|\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}X_{i}-p\right|\geqslant\frac{\delta}{\sqrt{n}}\sqrt{p(1-p)}\right)\leqslant\frac{1}{\delta^{2}}$$

By setting: $\delta = \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}}$, we have:

$$\mathscr{P}\left(\left|\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}X_{i}-p\right|\geqslant\frac{\sqrt{1-p}}{\sqrt{n}}\right)\leqslant p$$

Let
$$I = [np - \sqrt{n(1-p)}, np + \sqrt{n(1-p)}].$$

We have:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[C(n,d)\right] \leqslant \mathbb{E}\left[C(n,d) \mid d \in I\right] + p^2 \mathbb{E}\left[C(n,d) \mid d \notin I\right]$$
$$\leqslant \max_{m \in \mathbb{N} \cap I} C(n,m) + \max_{m \in \{0,\dots,n\}} p^2 C(n,m)$$

To further simplify this, we need two key observations:

- The interval $m \in \mathbb{N} \cap [np-1+p, np+1-p]$ contains at most 3 integers, all of which are within a distance of 1 to np
- The complexity of $\mathbb{E}[C(n,m)]$ does only depend on m.

Thus, we have the following:

$$\max_{m \in \mathbb{N} \cap [np-1+p, np+1-p]} C(n, m) = \mathcal{O}(np)$$
$$\max_{m \in \{0, \dots, n\}} p^2 C(n, m) = \mathcal{O}(np^2)$$

Now, by combining both estimations, we get:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n\mathbb{E}_d[C(n,d)]) = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2p)$$

3.3.7 $\mathcal{D}(n,m)$ Construction

To construct a random $\mathcal{D}(n,m)$ graph, we only have to select m uniformly random elements from the set $V \times V$.

We will use algorithm 5 for this purpose⁶:

Algorithm 6 Fine tuned $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$ Choice without replacement

Require: $n \in \mathbb{N}^*$

Require: $m \in \{0, ..., n^2\}$ the number of chosen elements

Ensure: $G \sim \mathcal{D}(n, m)$

 $E \leftarrow \text{choice}(\text{Lazy}(V) \times \text{Lazy}(V), m)$ \triangleright We only need the m elements on-demand. return $G \leftarrow \text{GraphFromEdges}(E)$ \triangleright This justifies using Lazy

Here $\text{Lazy}(V) \times \text{Lazy}(V)$ is a lazy implementation of cartesian product that supports bijective indexing⁷ over $\{0, \dots, n^2 - 1\}$.

The complexity of this construction is: $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(m)$

3.4 Sinkless Conditionning

Sampling from a graph distribution may lead to graphs that have at least one sink.

These graphs are problematic as Mean Payoff Graphs are exactly the sinkless graphs.

To migitate this, we will impose a conditionning on both distribution that will gives a guaranteed

⁶It is essential that the list $V \times V$ be lazy loaded. In particular, each element will only be loaded when it is indexed. This is essential to reduce the complexity. Otherwise, we will be stuck in an $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ algorithm.

⁷Indexing is required for uniform sampling

Mean Payoff Graph.

We will explore such conditioning both distribution:

- $\mathcal{G}^{S}(n,p)$: This is the distribution of graphs following $\mathcal{G}(n,p)$ with the requirement that they do not have a sink.
- $\mathcal{G}^S(n,m)$: This is the distribution of graphs following $\mathcal{G}(n,m)$ with the requirement that they do not have a sink.

3.4.1 Repeating Construction

Algorithm

This method is very intuitive. It will repeat the sampling until getting the desired graph. The following is an implemention of the repeating construction.

```
Algorithm 7 Fine tuned \mathcal{D}(n,p) Choice without replacement
```

```
Require: n \in \mathbb{N}^*
Require: m \in \{0, \dots |S|\} the number of chosen elements
Require: choice The choice function defined on algorithm 4
Require: Threshold \tau
Ensure: H a set of size m containing uniformly drawn elements without replacement.

if \frac{m}{|S|} \leqslant \tau then
H \leftarrow \operatorname{choice}(V, n)
else
H \leftarrow V \setminus \operatorname{choice}(S, n - m)
end if
return H
```

Analysis

We will analyse the runtime of generating a $\mathcal{G}^S(n,p)$. We expect a similar runtime for $\mathcal{G}^S(n,m)$ due to the similarity between $\mathcal{G}(n,m)$ and $\mathcal{G}(n,p)$. Let F(n)

3.5 Weights Distribution

3.5.1 Construction

Once the graph is constructed. We only have to generate the weights.

This will be done by creating a random weight function:

$$W(u,v):(u,v)\to W_{u,v}$$

Here $W_{u,v}$ will be a sequence of real random variables.

In our case, we set $(W_{u,v})_{(u,v)\in E}$ to be independent and identically distributed over a real distribution \mathcal{W} .

3.6 Proposed MPG Distribution

3.6.1 Desired Properties of Mean Payoff Game Distributions

Fairness in the Limit

This is essential, as we intend to generate a sequence of Mean Payoff Games that do not favour statistically a certain player, in the sense that, if we generate sufficient independent and identically distributed Mean Payoff Games G_1, \ldots, G_n , we expect the following:

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} |\mathtt{R}_{\mathrm{Max}}(G_1, \dots, G_n) - \mathtt{R}_{\mathrm{Min}}(G_1, \dots, G_n)| = 0$$

Where R is defined as follow:

$$R_{Op}(G_1, \dots, G_n) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathscr{P}(Op \text{ wins } G_i \text{ assuming optimal strategies})$$

Symmetric

A real distribution is said to be symmetric if:

$$\forall [a, b] \in \mathbb{R}, X \sim \mathcal{W}, \quad \mathscr{P}(X \in [a, b]) = \mathscr{P}(X \in [-b, -a])$$

We will define a symmetric Mean Payoff Game distribution as a distribution of Mean Payoff Game whose weights are independent and identically distributed on a symmetric real distribution. This property is stronger than Fairness in the Limit, as it implies that:

 $\mathscr{P}(\text{Max wins } G \text{ assuming optimal strategies}) = \mathscr{P}(\text{Min wins } G \text{ assuming optimal strategies})$

We will require a Symmetric Mean Payoff Game as we do not want a player to have an inherit advantage other the other one⁸

3.6.2 Implemented Distributions

The following table resumes the implemented distributions:

⁸Other than the first move.

Distribution Family	Parameters	Type
$\mathcal{D}(n,p)$	• n : Graph size	Graph distribution
	• p : Edge probability	
$\mathcal{D}(n,m)$	• n : Graph size	Graph distribution
	• m : Number of edges	
$\mathcal{U}_{ ext{discrete}}(-r,r)$	\bullet r : The radius of the support	Weight distribution
$\mathcal{U}(-r,r)$	\bullet r : The radius of the support	Weight distribution
$\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma)$	• σ : The standard deviation	Weight distribution

Table 3.1: Le tableau d'avancement des BNNs

3.7 MPG Generation

3.7.1 Distribution

- Each generated graph will follow a distribution $\mathcal{G}(n, p(n))$ for some $n \in \mathbb{N}^*$
- The weights will follow the discrete uniform distribution $\mathcal{D}(-1000, 1000)$

We will generate two kinds of datasets, depending on the nature of the graph

3.7.2 Dense Graphs

- Let $\mathcal{P} = \{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1\}$
- $\mathcal{N} = \{10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 200, 250, 300, 400, 500\}$
- For each $(n,p) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{P}$, we will generate K = 1000 observations $G_1^{n,p}, \ldots, G_K^{n,p} \sim \mathcal{G}(n,p)$

The total number of examples is:

$$K \times |\mathcal{N}| \times |\mathcal{P}| = 160000$$

The generation was done on a 'haswell64' partition with 24 cores. and it took 02:12:38 hours.

3.8 Annotation

3.8.1 Approach

We used the CSP algorithm 12 to annotate the dataset, potentially augmented with some heuristics. We implemented a program that takes the path of the dataset, and solves the Mean Payoff Games one by one.

To maximize efficiency, the program launches many solver threads, with each one independently working on a single file, and the results are accumulated using a ConcurrentQueue.

3.8.2 Target Values

The solver will calculate the following targets:

- The optimal pair of strategies
- The mean payoffs for each starting position, turn.
- The winners for each starting position, turn.

Also, some additional metadata are generated for analysis:

- dataset: The name of the whole dataset
- graph: The name of the graph.
- status: The solver's status on the given graph. In particular, whether it succeeded to solve the instance or not⁹. Equal to "OK" if the execution is successful.
- running_time: The time needed to solve the instance.

3.8.3 Heuristics

To accelerate the annotation of the two datasets, we had to apply some heuristics to the algorithm. We made essentially two kinds of heuristics.

Linear Bound Heuristic

This is the heuristic based on the view that for almost all solutions of a Ternary Max Atom system extracted from our generated random games, either:

• All variables are infinite:

$$X(u) = -\infty \quad \forall u \in V$$

• The diameter of assignments is in the order of $||W||_{\infty}$

$$\Delta X = \sup_{u \in V} X(u) - \inf_{u \in V, X(u) > -\infty} X(u) = \mathcal{O}(\|W\|_{\infty})$$

This heuristic suggests a much tighter search space to the worst case $||W||_1$ one. Going further, with uniform random weights:

$$||W||_1 = \mathcal{O}\left(|E| \times ||W||_{\infty}\right)$$

We believe this heuristic arises due to the random property of graphs, because in general, one can build an infinite family of ternary max atom systems that violate this heuristic.

In fact, going further, one can build ternary max atom systems were the $||W||_1$ estimation is tight. To generating the dataset, we applied this heuristic with $\Delta X = 4||W||_{\infty}$

$$D = \{-\infty, -2\|W\|_{\infty}, , -2\|W\|_{\infty} + 1, \dots, 2\|W\|_{\infty}\}$$

⁹We expect that the solver may crash due to several reasons (corrupted file, out of memory, etc...). For that we made additional effort for exception handling, so that an error for a single instance does not propagate to the whole program.




Figure 3.1: A counter example of the Linear Bound heuristic

Early Stopping

If after any iteration of arc consistency, $\max_{x \in V} \nu(x) < \sup D$. Then, $\nu(t)$ will converge to $-\infty$ for all t.

Thus, we stop the algorithm and sets $\nu(t) \leftarrow -\infty$, $\forall t$

Proof suppose that in fact there is an assignment with:

$$-\infty < \max_{u \in V} \nu(u) < \sup D$$

We will take the u with the biggest such $\nu(u)$.

Now our system is a tropical max atom system, which means translations are also a polymorphism of this system, so for any assignment $\nu: V \to \mathbb{Z}, X + t$ is also an assignment $\forall t \in \mathbb{Z}$. With that, $\nu + \sup D - \nu(u)$ is also an assignment.

This assignment has the property:

$$\forall s \in V, \quad \nu(s) + \sup D - \nu(u) \in D$$

Which is a contradiction, as it violates the consistency of arc consistency, and the maximality of the solution with respect to the domain D

The efficiency of the Early Stopping heuristic depends on the density of the graph. Empirically, for dense graphs. the analoguous ternary max atom system has two kind of assignments:

- 1. Either all variables are finite
- 2. Either all variables are $-\infty$

This translates back in a dense Mean Payoff setting, that the winner of the game does not depend in the starting position and the starting turn.

With that, the Early Stopping heuristic will quickly detect the second case, which is the usually hurdle of the algorithm.

On the other hand, for sparse graphs, we do not have this nice distinction between finite and infinite assignments, and they can overlap, and so will make this heuristic useless in practice.

3.8.4 Deployment

After some experiments, it was very clear that vertical scaling with the number of threads is not sufficient. By analysing the running time of some samples, we estimated the total running time solving both datasets to exceed 30 days.

As a result of this, we deployed a pipeline of 24 nodes, each with 24 threads working simultaneously on a partition of the dataset.

Chapter 4

Model Design

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Objectives

The main objective

4.3 Properties

We expect the model \mathcal{M} to verify the following properties:

4.3.1 Totality

Definition

A function is total if it is defined in the whole domain.

Also, we will say a model \mathcal{M} is total if it works on all Mean Payoff Games..

Importance

This property implies two main characteristics:

- 1. The model works for any Mean Payoff Game whatever the size of |V|. This is difficult to not violate, as most machine learning models require static shapes.
- 2. The model works for any Mean Payoff Game whatever the representation is; This is implicitely verified by an encoding of the Mean Payoff Games.

4.3.2 Node Agnostic

This property tells that a model should not use any extra information about the nodes.

Formalisation

Let $G_1(V_1, E_1, W_1, s_1), G_2(V_2, E_2, W_2, s_2)$ two equivalent Mean Payoff Games in the sense that there exists a bijection $\Phi: V_1 \to V_2$ such that:

$$E_2 = \{ (\Phi(u), \Phi(v)), \quad (u, v) \in E_1 \}$$

$$\forall (u, v) \in E_1, \quad W_2(u, v) = W_1(\Phi(u), \Phi(v))$$

$$s_2 = \Phi(s_1)$$

Then:

$$\Phi\left(\mathcal{M}(G_1)\right) = \mathcal{M}(G_2)$$

Explanation

The property tells that if two graphs mean payoffs only differ by their node representation, then the results should also only differ by the representation of the nodes.

Importance

This property implies that we can simply encode a mean payoff as G(V, E, W, s) as G'(V', E', W', s') with $V' = \{0, |V| - 1\}$, and E', W', s' defined accordingly. In fact, the encoding is done implicitly by our model¹.

4.3.3 Invariance under Positive Scaling

This property comes directly from the fact that both the winner and the set of optimal strategies² are invariant under a positive scaling of the weights.

Now, it is very easy to make augment a model \mathcal{M} into such invariant model \mathcal{M}' . We only do the following:

$$\mathcal{M}'(E, W, s) = \mathcal{M}'(E, \text{Normalize}(W), s)$$

Where Normalize is any endomorphism of weight functions that verify the following constraint:

$$\forall_{\text{MPG}}G(E, W), \forall a \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*}, \quad \text{Normalize}(aW) = \text{Normalize}(W)$$

Standard Scaling

This scaling treats the values of W as samples of random variables, and divides W by an estimate of their variance.

Normalize(W) =
$$\frac{W}{\sqrt{\mathbb{V}[W]}}$$

$$\mathbb{V}[W] = \frac{1}{|E|} \sum_{(u,v)\in E} (W(u,v) - \mathbb{E}[W])^2$$

$$\mathbb{E}[W] = \frac{1}{|E|} \sum_{(u,v)\in E} W(u,v)$$

¹While the encoding is done implicitely, the model itself can violate this property. An example of this is a Multi Layer Perceptron. Which lead to different results for different encodings.

²Whatever the definition of optimality (Weak, Strong, Payoff).

Maximum Scaling

This scaling reduces the interval of the weights to [-1, 1] by dividing by the largest weight in terms of absolute value:

 $\text{Normalize}(W) = \frac{W}{\|W\|_{\infty}}$

Implementation Notes: The weights function is implemented as a matrix W, which is equal to 0 for $(u, v) \notin E$.

It is important to igonre these zeros³ in both normalisations, otherwise it may lead to biased scaling.

4.3.4 Permutation Equivariance

Definition

This property states that the model should out tut the same results for permuted nodes, up to permutation of the results.

Importance

While it is a special case of the Node Agnostic property, but it is still important as the encoding of the graphs is done implicitely, and thus Permutation Equivariance is enough to get a Node Agnostic model.

4.3.5 Stability under Padding

Definition

Let $G_1(V_1, E_1, W_1, s_1), G_2(V_2, E_2, W_2, s_2)$ be two disjoint Mean Payoff Games, in the sense that $V_1 \cap V_2 = \emptyset$.

The padding of G_1 by G_2 , denoted $G_1 \triangleright G_2$ defined as:

$$G_1 \triangleright G_2 = (V_1 \cup V_2, E_1 \cup E_2, W_1 \cup W_2, s_1)$$

A model is said to be stable under padding if:

$$\mathcal{M}(G_1 \triangleright G_2) = \mathcal{M}(G_1)$$

Importance

Deep Learning algorithms generally accept batches of data having a homogeneous shape.

In the other hand, graph input generally has different shapes, and thus are problematic to most learning algorithms.

While we succeeded in experimenting a learning algorithm with a ragged batch⁴, it suffered the following limits:

- It greatly limits the choice of potential models.
- The training is not supported by GPU, as some core operations were only implemented in the CPU for ragged batches.

³And only these zeros. If W(u,v)=0 for $(u,v)\in E$, this term should be accounted.

⁴A batch of inhomogeneous input

For this reasons, we opted to pad the graphs to get homogeneous batches, and this is why the stability under padding is important.

Removing Unreachable Nodes

Another major point for this property, is it gives the possibility to remove unreachable nodes⁵ without affecting the model's results.

- 4.4 Considered Models
- 4.5 Architectures
- 4.6 Augmentation using MCTS

⁵If we ignore the orientation. A stronger property allowing unreachable nodes under orientation can also be defined, but this is beyond the scope.

Chapter 5

Implémentation

Chapter 6

Analyse

For $x \in \mathcal{X}, Y \subseteq \mathcal{X}^m, c \in I$, let $\mathrm{MA}(x,Y,c)$ be defined as follow:

$$MA(x, Y, c) \iff x \leqslant \max Y + c$$

Conclusion

Durant ce stage, nous avons étudié les BNNs, implémenté une bibliothèque de BNNs basée sur tensorflow et larq qu'on a nommé binaryflow.

Dans le premier chapitre, nous avons présenté dB Sense et ses activités.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous avons présenté le problème de la grande complexité, introduit le concept des BNNs et proposé **binaryflow** comme notre solution pour les BNNs

Dans le troisième chapiter, nous avons formalisé les BNNs, et nous avons décris leurs optimisations possible, et les problèmes rencontrés dans leur implémentation.

Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous avons présenté des modèles BNNs, chacun en dérivant ses formules

Dans le cinquième chapitre, nous avons donné notre implémentation de **binaryflow** en jusitifiant les paradigmes utilisés

Dans le sixième chapitre, nous avons analysé 3 jeux de données en implémentant des modèles BNNs pour chacune de ces 3 jeux de données, et en comparant les performances de prédicition et la complexité temps et mémoire des modèles entraînés.

Notre travail n'est qu'une petite introduction des BNNs. En effet, la liste des BNNs proposés dans la littérature est très vaste, et il existe plusieurs autres approches pour faciliter l'entraînement et l'interférence des BNNs que nous n'avons pas considéré vu les contraintes de stage, y parmi:

- 1. Les méthodes d'optimisations discrètes
- 2. Les optimiseurs dédiés au BNNs
- 3. Les binarisations entraînables
- 4. Les méthodes ensemblistes pour régulaliser les BNNs

De plus, nous avons réussi à vérifier l'optimisation de la multiplication matricielle (L'éxecution est parfois 30 fois plus rapide), mais nous n'avons pas pu intégrer cette optimisation aux modèles tensorflow. Et malgré que larq supporte lui même un déploiement optimisé, nous n'avons pas aussi pu l'exploiter puisque ce déploiement ne supporte que les processeurs ARMv8, et nous utilisons une machine avec un processeur d'architecture x86-64.

Finalement, nous avons fait une petite intégration du code carbone comme une mésure de coût d'entraînement. Une fois le problème de déploiement est résoulu, nous recommenderions l'utilisation de ce même métrique pour estimer le coût d'interférence qui va justifier l'utilisation des BNNs.

Appendix A

On Constraint Satistfaction Problems

In the previous chapters, we described how the system works, without formalising the CSP approach.

On this chapter, we will describe the CSP systems that we have used, with an equivalence proof between them.

A.1 Constraint Satisfaction Problem

A.1.1 Definition

A constraint satisfaction problem

A.1.2 Assignment

An assignment of a $CSP(\mathcal{X}, D, \Gamma)$ is a function $X : \mathcal{X} \to D$ such that, by replacing each $x \in \mathcal{X}$, by X(x), all the constraints will evaluate to **True**

A.1.3 Polymorphism

A function $F: \mathscr{F}(\mathcal{X},D)^k \to \mathscr{F}(\mathcal{X},D)$ is said to be a polymorphism if:

 $\forall X_1, \ldots, X_k$ assignments of $\mathtt{CSP}(\mathcal{X}, D, \Gamma)$, $F(X_1, \ldots, X_k)$ is also an assignment of $\mathtt{CSP}(\mathcal{X}, D, \Gamma)$

Now, in the next section, we will define an important class of CSPs that is used to solve Mean Payoff Games, with the polymorphisms required for the solution algorithm's correctness

A.2 Ternary Max Atom Systems

A.2.1 Definition

- Let \mathcal{X} be a finite set of variables
- Let $D = I \cup \{-\infty\}$, with $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$.
- For $x, y, z \in \mathcal{X}, c \in I$, let $MA_3(x, y, z, c)$ be defined as follow:

$$MA_3(x, y, z, c) \iff x \leqslant \max(y, z) + c$$

A ternary max atom system is $CSP(D, \Gamma)$ where:

$$\Gamma = \{ MA_3(x, y, z, c), \quad (x, y, z, c) \in \mathcal{R} \}$$

$$\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{X}^3 \times I$$

$$\mathcal{R} \text{is finite}$$

A.2.2 Example

An example of a ternary max atom system is the following $CSP(D, \Gamma)$ with $D = \mathbb{Z}$ and Γ represented as follow:

$$x \le \max(y, z) - 1$$
$$y \le \max(z, x) - 1$$
$$z \le \max(x, y) - 1$$

A.3 Max Atom Systems

A.3.1 Definition

- Let \mathcal{X} be a finite set of variables
- Let $D = I \cup \{-\infty\}$, with $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$
- For $x \in \mathcal{X}, Y \subseteq \mathcal{X}^m, c \in I$, let $\mathrm{MA}(x,Y,c)$ be defined as follow:

$$MA(x, Y, c) \iff x \leqslant \max Y + c$$

A max atom system is $CSP(D, \Gamma)$ where:

$$\Gamma = \{ \operatorname{MA}(x, Y, c), \quad (x, Y, c) \in \mathcal{R} \}$$

$$\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \times (\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X}) \setminus \{\emptyset\}) \times I$$

$$\mathcal{R} \text{is finite}$$

$A.3.2 \quad MA \leq MA_3$

- Let $S = \text{CSP}(\mathcal{X}, D, \Gamma)$ a max atom system.
- Let $R \in \Gamma$
- Let $x \in \mathcal{X}, Y \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X}), c \in I$ such that $R = \mathrm{MA}(x, Y, c)$ such that |Y| > 2

Recursive Reduction

We will reduce the arity of R as follow:

- Let $y, z \in Y$ such that $y \neq z$
- We introduce a variable $w \notin \mathcal{X}$
- Let $\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \cup \{w\}$

- Let $Y' = (Y \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{y, z\}$
- Let R' = MA(x, Y', c)
- Let $R_w = MA(w, \{y, z\}, 0)$
- Let $\Gamma' = (\Gamma \cup \{R', R_w\}) \setminus \{R\}$
- Let $S' = \text{CSP}(\mathcal{X}', D, \Gamma)$

We will prove that S' is equivalent to S.

Implication Let $X: \mathcal{X}' \to D$ an assignment of S'. It is trivial that by removing X(w), $X_{|\mathcal{X}}$ is an assignment of S

Equivalence

- Let $X: \mathcal{X}' \to D$ such that $X_{|\mathcal{X}}$ is an assignment of S.
- We will set $X(w) = \max(X(y), X(z))$

Then, X is an assignment of S'

Induction

Since the number of variables is finite, the arity of each constraint is finite. Also, as the the number of constraints is finite, Applying such reduction iteratively will eventually give a system S^* equivalent to S with:

- \mathcal{X}^* the set of variables with $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{X}^*$
- Γ^* is the set of constraints:
- Each constraint is of the form MA(x, Y, c) with $x \in \mathcal{X}^*, Y \subseteq \mathcal{X}^*, c \in I$ with $|Y| \leq 2$

Now such system can be transformed to a ternary system S_3 as follow:

- The set of variables is \mathcal{X}^*
- \bullet The domain is D
- For every relation R = MA(x, Y, c) we map it to the relation $R_3 = MA(x, y, z, c)$ as follow:
 - If |Y| = 2, then y, z are the elements of Y.
 - Otherwise, |Y| = 1, and y = z are the same element of the singleton Y.

It is trivial that S^* is equivalent to S_3 . With that, S is equivalent to S_3 .

¹A set with only one element

Algorithm 8 Converting a Max Atom System to Ternary Max Atom System

```
Require: S an N-ary Max Atom system
Ensure: S' a ternary Max Atom system
  S' \leftarrow \emptyset
  H \leftarrow \varnothing
                                             \triangleright H is a symmetric map between variable, variable to variables
  V \leftarrow \text{Variables}(S)
                                                                                 \triangleright V is a set containing all variables
  for C \in S do

    □ Iterate over constraints

       c is the constant in the right hand side of C
       Y is the variables in the right hand side of C
       x is the variable in the left hand side of C
       while |Y| > 2 do
           y \leftarrow \text{pop}(Y)
           z \leftarrow \text{pop}(Y)
           if (y, z) \notin \operatorname{domain} H then
                w \leftarrow \text{newVariable}(V)

ightharpoonup Generate a new formal variable not included in V
                V \leftarrow V \cup \{w\}
                H(y,z) \leftarrow w
                H(z,y) \leftarrow w
           end if
           w \leftarrow H(y, z)
            S' \leftarrow S' \cup \{ MA(w, y, z, c) \}
           Y \leftarrow Y \cup \{w\}
       end while
  end for
  return S'
```

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A.3.3 Polymorphisms

Two main family of polymorphisms are defined for Max Atom systems:

• The max polymorphisms M^k defined by:

$$M^{k}(X_{1},...,X_{k})(x) = \max_{k \in \{1,...,k\}} X_{k}(x)$$

• The translation polymorphisms T_c defined by:

$$T_c(X)(x) = X(x) + c$$

A.4 Min-Max System

- Let \mathcal{X} be a finite set of variables
- Let I be the domain of the variables.
- Let $D = I \cup \{-\infty\}$, with $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$
- For $x \in \mathcal{X}, Y \subseteq \mathcal{X}^m, C \in I^m$, let $\mathrm{MA}(x,Y,C)$ be defined as follow:

$$MA(x, Y, c) \iff x \le max(Y + C)$$

• For $x \in \mathcal{X}, Y \subseteq \mathcal{X}^m, C \in I^m$, let $\mathrm{MI}(x,Y,C)$ be defined as follow:

$$MI(x, Y, C) \iff x \leqslant min(Y + C)$$

A min-max system is $CSP(D, \Gamma)$ where:

$$\Gamma = \{O(x, Y, C), \quad (O, x, Y, C) \in \mathcal{R}\}$$

$$\mathcal{R} \subseteq \{MA, MI\} \times \mathcal{X} \times (\mathcal{X} \times I)^{+}$$

$$\mathcal{R} \text{ is finite}$$

A.4.1 Transforming to Max Atom Systems

A Max Atom system is trivially a Min Max system. So we will only prove the latter implication. Let $S' = \mathtt{CSP}(D, \Gamma)$ be a Min Max system, and let:

- $\Gamma_{\rm MI}$ be the constraints that has MI
- Γ_{MA} be the constraints that has MA

Transforming MI constraints

For each $MI(x, Y, c) \in \Gamma_{MI}$, we replace it with the following constraints:

$$\Gamma_{\text{MI}}^{x,Y,C} = \{ \text{MA}(x,\{y\},c), \quad y,c \in \text{zip}(Y,C) \}$$

Tranforming MA constraints

For each $(y,c) \in \mathcal{X} \times I$ present in a max constraint of the system:

- We add a formal variable $z^{y,c}$ if $c \neq 0$.
- Else, we will simply represent by $z^{y,c}$ the variable y.

By denoting $Z^{Y,C}$ the following set:

$$Z^{Y,C} = \{z^{y,c}, \quad (y,c) \in \operatorname{zip}(Y,C)\}$$

We build the following constraints:

$$\Gamma_{\text{MA}}^{x,Y,C} = \{ \text{MA}(x, Z^{Y,C}, 0) \} \cup \{ \text{MA}(z^{y,c}, \{y\}, c), (y,c) \in \text{zip}(Y,C) \}$$

Building the Max Atom System

Now, let:

$$\Gamma' = \bigcup_{\text{OP} \in \{\text{MI,MA}\}} \bigcup_{\text{OP}(x,Y,C) \in \Gamma_{\text{OP}}} \Gamma_{\text{OP}}^{x,Y,C}$$

The system $CSP(D, \Gamma')$ is an equivalent max system.

Equivalence

Let:

- $\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{X}_{Generated}$ the augmented set of variables.
- $C = \mathrm{OP}(x, Y, C) \in \mathtt{CSP}(D, \Gamma)$ be a constraint.
- $X: \mathcal{X}' \to D$ an assignment of $\mathtt{CSP}(D, \Gamma')$.

If OP = MI, it is trivial that OP(x, Y, C) is equivalent to $\Gamma_{OP}^{x,Y,C}$. Otherwise, for each $(y, c) \in zip(Y, C)$ we have:

$$X(z^{y,c}) \leqslant \max\{X(y)\} + c = X(y) + c$$

Now, we also have:

$$X(x) \leqslant \max_{(y,c) \in \operatorname{zip}(Y,C)} X(z^{y,c}) + 0 \leqslant \max_{(y,c) \in \operatorname{zip}(Y,C)} \left(X(y) + c\right)$$

With that, $X_{|\mathcal{X}}$ is an assignment of $\mathtt{CSP}(D,\Gamma)$

Algorithm 9 Converting a Min-Max System to Max Atom

```
Require: S a Min-Max system
Ensure: S' an N-ary Max Atom system
  S' \leftarrow \emptyset
  H \leftarrow \varnothing
                                                               \triangleright H is a map between variable, offsets to variables
  V \leftarrow \text{Variables}(S)
                                                                                   \triangleright V is a set containing all variables
  for C \in S do

    □ Iterate over constraints

       C is the constants in the right hand side of C
       Y is the variables in the right hand side of \mathcal{C}
       x is the variable in the left hand side of C
       if C is a min constraint then
            S' \leftarrow S' \cup \{ MA(x, \{y, y\}, c), (y, c) \in zip(Y, C) \}
       else
            Z \leftarrow \emptyset
            for (y, c) \in \text{zip}(Y, C) do
                if (y, c) \notin \operatorname{domain} H then
                     z \leftarrow \text{newVariable}(V)
                                                            \triangleright Generate a new formal variable not included in V
                     V \leftarrow V \cup \{z\}
                     H(y,c) \leftarrow z
                end if
                S' \leftarrow S' \cup \{ MA(H(y,c), \{y,y\},c) \}
                Z \leftarrow Z \cup \{H(y,c)\}
            end for
            S' \leftarrow S' \cup \{ MA(x, Z, 0) \}
       end if
  end for
```

Algorithm 10 Converting a Mean Payoff Game to a Min Max system

```
Require: G a Mean Payoff Game
Ensure: S an Min-Max system
   E \leftarrow E(G)
                                                                                                             \triangleright The edges of G
   V \leftarrow V(G)
                                                                                                        \triangleright The variables of G
  W \leftarrow W(G)
                                                                                               \triangleright The weight function of G
   P \leftarrow P(G)
                                                                                                    \triangleright The set of player of G
  for (u, p) \in V \times P do
       x \leftarrow (u, p)
       A \leftarrow \mathrm{Adj}(x)
       Y = \{(a, \bar{p}), a \in A\}
       C \leftarrow W(A)
                                                                              ⊳ Calculating the weights element wise.
       if p is Max then:
            OP \leftarrow MA
       else
            OP \leftarrow MI
       end if
       S \leftarrow S \cup \{ \mathrm{OP}(x, Y, C) \}
  end for
```

Algorithm 11 AC3 for Ternary Max Atom systems

```
Require: C a ternary Max Atom constraint
Require: \nu: V \to \mathscr{P}(D) the admissible values function
Require: Q a Queue of pending updates
Ensure: \nu update the admissible values function.
  x \leftarrow \text{the left-hand side of } \mathcal{C}
  (y,z) \leftarrow the right-hand side variables of \mathcal{C}
  c \leftarrow the right-hand side constant C
  Z \leftarrow [x, y, z]
  for o \in \{0, 1, 2\} do

    □ Iterate over all rotations

       \mathrm{admissible} \leftarrow \mathbf{False}
       x \leftarrow Z[o]
       y \leftarrow Z[(o+1) \bmod 3]
       z \leftarrow Z[(o+2) \bmod 3]
       \mu \leftarrow \emptyset
                                                                                                   \triangleright Set of values to delete
       for a \in \nu(x) do
            for (b, c) \in \nu(y) \times \nu(z) do
                T \leftarrow [a, b, c]
                p \leftarrow T[(-o) \bmod 3]
                 q \leftarrow T[(1-o) \bmod 3]
                q \leftarrow T[(2-o) \bmod 3]
                if p \leq \max(q, r) + c then
                     admissible \leftarrow \mathbf{True}
                end if
            end for
            if not admissible then
                \mu \leftarrow \mu \cup \{a\}
            end if
       end for
       if |\mu| > 0 then
            \nu(x) \leftarrow \nu(x) \setminus \mu
            append(Q, Adj x)
       end if
  end for
```

Algorithm 12 AC3 Optimized for Ternary Max Atom systems

```
Require: \mathcal{C} a ternary Max Atom constraint
Require: \nu: V \to D the maximum admissible value for each variable.
Require: Q a Queue of pending updates
Ensure: \nu update the maximum admissible values function.

x \leftarrow the left-hand side of \mathcal{C}
(y,z) \leftarrow the right-hand side variables of \mathcal{C}
c \leftarrow the right-hand

r \leftarrow \max(\nu(y), \nu(z)) + c
if r < L then

r \leftarrow -\infty
end if
if r < \nu(x) then

\nu(x) \leftarrow r
append(Q, x)
end if
```

Algorithm 13 Solving a Mean Payoff Graph for all states

```
Require: G a Mean Payoff Graph
Ensure: \Phi: V \times P \to V The optimal strategy of each player
   \Phi \leftarrow \emptyset
   for p \in P do
        if p is Max then
             G' \leftarrow G
        else
             G' \leftarrow \bar{G}
        end if
        S \leftarrow \text{transform } (G')
               MPG→Min-Max
            \leftarrow \underset{\text{Min-Max} \to \text{Max}}{\operatorname{transform}}(S)
        S'' \leftarrow \underset{\text{Max} \to \text{Max}_3}{\operatorname{transform}}(S')
        X \leftarrow \operatorname{arcconsistency}(S'')
        for C \in S'' do
                                                                                                 \triangleright Iterate over constraints of S''
             OP \leftarrow Operator(C)
                                                                               \triangleright Get the operator of \mathcal{C}. Either Max or Min
             Y the right-hand side variables of \mathcal{C}
             C the right-hand side constants of \mathcal{C}
             x the left-hand side variable of \mathcal C
             u \leftarrow \operatorname{projection}(x)
                                                                                                                 V \times P \rightarrow V
             if OP is Max then
                  y^*, c^* \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax} \{X(y) + c\}
                                                                                         ⊳ Extracts the maximum assignment
                               (y,c)\in zip(Y,C)
                  \Phi(u,p) \leftarrow \operatorname{projection}(y^*)
                                                          ▶ The Strategy is the vertex of the maximum assignment
                                   V \times P \rightarrow V
             end if
        end for
   end for
   return \Phi
```

Appendix B

On Random Graphs

In the previous chapters, we gave a rough analysis of graph generation. In this chapter, we will dive into a more detailed analysis.

B.1 Introduction

B.2 Sinkless $\mathcal{D}(n, p)$ Graph

B.2.1 Property

Let P be the property¹ "Graph has not sink". This property is increasing in the sense that:

$$\forall H \text{ spanning subgraph of } G, \quad H \in P \implies G \in P$$

As a consequence:

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, p, p' \in [0, 1] / p \leqslant p', \quad \mathscr{P}(\mathcal{D}(n, p) \in P) \leqslant \mathscr{P}(\mathcal{D}(n, p') \in P)$$

We will be interested in two properties:

- The property "Vertex v has no sinks". We denote it by NoSink(v).
- The property "Graph G has no sinks at all". We denote it by Sinkless(G).

B.2.2 Basic Comparison with Normal $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$

We will calculate the expected value of $\deg v$. By applying the law of total expectancy:

$$\mathbb{E}[\deg v] = \mathbb{E}[\deg v \mid \deg v > 0] \times \mathscr{P}(\deg v > 0) + \mathbb{E}[\deg v \mid \deg v = 0] \times \mathscr{P}(\deg v = 0)$$
$$= \mathbb{E}[\deg v \mid \operatorname{Sinkless}(G)] \times \mathscr{P}(\operatorname{NoSink}(v))$$

¹Formally, a property is a just a set of graphs. In practice, it is a set that has desirable "properties".

With that:

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}[\deg v \mid \operatorname{Sinkless}(G)] &= \frac{\mathbb{E}[\deg v]}{\mathscr{P}(\operatorname{NoSink}(v))} = \frac{np}{1 - (1 - p)^n} \leqslant \frac{np}{1 - e^{-1}} \\ \mathbb{E}[|\mathcal{E}|] &= \sum_{v \in V} \mathbb{E}[\deg v \mid \operatorname{Sinkless}(G)] = \frac{n^2p}{1 - (1 - p)^n} \leqslant \frac{n^2p}{1 - e^{-1}} \end{split}$$

This shows that the conditional distribution does inflict a small multiplicative bias on the expected number of edges and expected degree.

This serves as an evidence that $\mathcal{D}^S(n,p)$ is similar enough to $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$

B.2.3 Property Probability

- Let $G \sim \mathcal{D}(n, p)$
- Let v a vertex of G

The probability that NoSink(v) occurs is:

$$\mathcal{P}(\text{NoSink}(v)) = 1 - \mathcal{P}(\text{Adj } v = \emptyset)$$
$$= 1 - \mathcal{P}(\text{deg } v = 0)$$
$$= 1 - (1 - p)^{n}$$

Now, it is clear that the sequence of events $(NoSink(v))_{v \in V}$ is independent. With that, the probability that the whole graph is sinkless is:

$$\mathcal{P}(\operatorname{Sinkless}(G)) = \mathcal{P}(\operatorname{Adj} v \neq \varnothing \quad \forall v \in V)$$

$$= \mathcal{P}\left(\bigwedge_{v \in V} \operatorname{NoSink}(v)\right)$$

$$= \prod_{v \in V} \mathcal{P}(\operatorname{NoSink}(v))$$

$$= (1 - (1 - p)^n)^n$$

B.2.4 Asymptotic Analysis For Dense $\mathcal{D}(n,p)$

Let c > 0. We have for large enough n:

$$(1-p)^n \leqslant \frac{c}{n}$$

Which implies:

$$(1 - \frac{c}{n})^n \le (1 - (1 - p)^n)^n \le 1$$

If we take the limit, we have:

$$e^{-c} \le \lim_{n \to +\infty} (1 - (1-p)^n)^n \le 1 \quad \forall c > 0$$

By tending c to 0, we get:

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} (1 - (1 - p)^n)^n = 1$$

B.2.5 Asymptotic Analysis For Sparse $\mathcal{D}(n, p)$

Let:

$$f: \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} \times \mathbb{R}_{+} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_{+}$$

$$x, k, c \to (1 - g(x, k, c))^{x}$$

$$g: \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} \times \mathbb{R}_{+} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_{+}$$

$$x, k, c \to \left(1 - \frac{k \ln x + c}{x}\right)^{x}$$

By construction, f(n, k, c) is the probability of a graph following $\mathcal{G}(n, \frac{k \ln n + c}{n})$ to contain no sink.

We have:

$$\ln g(k, x, c) = x \ln \left(1 - \frac{k \ln x + c}{x} \right)$$

$$= -k \ln x - c - \frac{(k(\ln x) + c)^2}{2x} + o\left(\frac{(\ln x)^3}{x^2}\right)$$

$$\implies g(x, k, c) = \exp \left(-k \ln x - c - \frac{(k \ln x + c)^2}{2x} + o\left(\frac{(\ln x)^3}{x^2}\right) \right)$$

$$= \frac{e^{-c}}{x^k} \times e^{\frac{-(k \ln x + c)^2}{2x} + o\left(\frac{(\ln x)^3}{x^2}\right)}$$

$$= \frac{e^{-c}}{x^k} \left(1 - \frac{(k \ln x + c)^2}{2x} + o\left(\frac{(\ln x)^3}{x^2}\right) \right)$$

$$= \frac{e^{-c}}{x^k} - e^{-c} \frac{k^2 (\ln x)^2}{2x^{k+1}} + o\left(\frac{(\ln x)^3}{x^{k+2}}\right)$$

$$= \frac{e^{-c}}{x^k} + o\left(\frac{1}{x^k}\right)$$

$$\implies 1 - g(x, k, c) = 1 - \frac{e^{-c}}{x^k} + o\left(\frac{1}{x^k}\right)$$

$$\implies x \ln(1 - g(x, k, c)) = -\frac{e^{-c}}{x^{k-1}} + o\left(\frac{1}{x^{k-1}}\right)$$

$$\sim -\frac{e^{-c}}{x^{k-1}}$$

$$\implies f(x, k, x) = e^{-\frac{e^{-c}}{x^{k-1}} + o\left(\frac{1}{x^{k-1}}\right)}$$

Now with that:

$$\lim_{x\to +\infty} x \ln(1-g(x,k,c)) = \begin{cases} -\infty & \text{if } k \in [0,1[\\ -e^{-c} & \text{if } k=1\\ 0 & \text{otherwise if } k \in]1,+\infty[\end{cases}$$

Finally, we can conclude that:

$$\lim_{x \to +\infty} f(x, k) \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } k \in [0, 1[\\ e^{-e^{-c}} & \text{if } k = 1\\ 1 & \text{otherwise if } k \in]1, +\infty[\end{cases}$$

B.3 Repeating Construction

B.3.1 Estimating Complexity

Now the method of rejecting graphs that have sinks and retrying give us a natural question about how many times will the algorithm reject graph until finding a desirable one.

The number of such rejections will follow a geometric law $\mathcal{G}(h(n,p))$ where:

$$h(n,p) = \mathscr{P}(\text{Sinkless}(\mathcal{D}(n,p))) = (1 - (1-p)^n)^n$$

With that, the expected complexity of the algorithm will be:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{C(n,p)}{h(n,p)}\right) = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{C(n,p)}{(1-(1-p)^n)^n}\right)$$

With C(n, p) the cost of building the graph, depending on the algorithm².

B.3.2 Dense Graph case

Now it is clear for dense enough graphs, in particular with $p(n) \ge \frac{k \ln(n)}{n}$ for large enough n, the expected complexity will reduce to $\mathcal{O}(C(n,p))$. And thus, we consider the rejection method to be efficient.

B.3.3 Sparse Graph case

If $p(n) = \frac{k \ln n}{n} + c$ with k < 1. We have:

$$(1 - (1 - p)^n)^n = e^{-e^{-c}x^{1-k} + o(x^{1-k})}$$

With that, the expected complexity of the rejection method will be:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(C(n,p)\times \exp\left(e^{-c}x^{1-k}+o(x^{1-k})\right)\right)$$

which is an exponential algorithm, and thus in efficient for large graphs. Since property P is increasing, this argument generalises to $p(n) \leqslant \frac{k \ln n}{n} + c$ for large enough n

²The two algorithms that we have discussed are the naive $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ algorithm and the more optimized $\mathcal{O}(pn^2 + n)$ algorithm.

B.4 Binomial Rejection Construction

Instead of throwing the whole graph at once. For every vertex $u \in V$, we try to construct the adjacenty vertices of u, and repeat if the procedure gives $\operatorname{Adj} u = \emptyset$

With this trick, the expected complexity will reduce for both algorithms to:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{C(n,p)}{1-(1-p)^n}\right)$$

Now for our case, it is natural to assume that $p(n) \ge \frac{1}{n}$, as a Mean Payoff Graph does not have a sink. With that:

$$1 - (1 - p)^n \ge 1 - (1 - \frac{1}{n})^n \ge 1 - e^{-1}$$

Therefore, the expected complexity will simplify to:

$$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(C(n,p)\right)$$

Moreover, the cost of the conditionning makes only a constant $\frac{1}{1-e^{-1}} \approx 1.582$ factor slowdown, which is effectively neligible.

B.5 Expected Mean Payoff

B.5.1 Definition

- Let $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ be a mean-payoff game
- For $u \in \mathcal{V}$, Let $\mathscr{P}(u)$ be the set of probability distributions over the set $\mathrm{Adj}(u)$
- We define a fractional strategy as a function $\Phi \in \mathscr{P}$

B.5.2 Matrix Form

- Let $n = |\mathcal{V}|$
- Let u_1, \ldots, u_n an enumeration of elements of \mathcal{V} A fractional strategy can be represented as a matrix A such that:

$$\mathcal{P}(\Phi(u_i) = u_j) = A_{i,j}$$

B.5.3 Fractional Strategies

Notations

- Let A, B be a pair of fractional strategies
- Let P_m, Q_m two random variables defining the mean-payoffs for the respective players after turn m

Expected Cost of $\frac{1}{2}$ -turn

Let $\Pi \in \{A, B\}$

We have:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[w(u,\Pi(u))\right] = \sum_{v \in \text{Adj } u} w(u,v) \cdot \mathcal{P}(\Pi(u) = v)$$

Expected Cost of full turn

Let h be the cost of a turn We have:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[h(u,A(u),B\circ A(u))\right] = \mathbb{E}[w(u,A(u))] + \sum_{v\in \mathrm{Adj}\, u} \mathbb{E}[w(v,B(v))]\cdot \mathcal{P}(A(u)=v)$$

Expected Total Payoff

- Let $\Pi = B \circ A$
- Let $(X_m)_{m\in\mathbb{N}}$ defined as follow:

$$\begin{cases} X_0 &= s \\ \forall m \in \mathbb{N}^*, & X_m &= \Pi(X_{m-1}) \end{cases}$$

• Let $(R_m)_{m\in\mathbb{N}}$ defined as follow:

$$\begin{cases} R_0 &= 0 \\ \forall m \in \mathbb{N}^*, \quad R_m &= R_{m-1} + \sum_{u \in V} h(u, A(u), \Pi(u)) \cdot \mathcal{P}(X_{m-1} = u) \end{cases}$$

We have:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_m] = \mathbb{E}[R_{m-1}] + \sum_{u \in V} \mathbb{E}[h(u, A(u), \Pi(u))] \cdot \mathcal{P}(X_{m-1} = u)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[R_{m-1}] + \sum_{u \in V} P^{m-1}(s, u) \times q(u)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[R_{m-1}] + (P^{m-1} \cdot q)(s) \quad \text{(Matrix Multiplication)}$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{m} (P^{k-1} \cdot q)(s) + \mathbb{E}[R_0]$$

$$= \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m-1} P^k \cdot q\right)(s) + \mathbb{E}[R_0]$$

$$= \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m-1} P^k \cdot q\right)(s)$$

Now, we may see that the formula is easy generalisable to any starting vertex:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_m] = \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} P^k \cdot q$$

Expected Mean Payoffs

The mean-payoff is defined as:

$$K_m = \frac{R_m}{m}$$

We define K_{∞} as:

$$K_{\infty} = K_{+\infty} = \lim_{m \to +\infty} \frac{R_m}{m}$$

Let $m \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{+\infty\}$ Now, the expected mean-payoff can act as a the judge for who is winning:

- 1. Player 0 wins if $\mathbb{E}[K_m] > 0$
- 2. Player 1 wins if $\mathbb{E}[K_m] < 0$
- 3. Else, it is a tie

Now, if m is finite, we can calculate $\mathbb{E}[K_m]$ directly. Otherwise, we have:

$$\mathbb{E}[K_{\infty}] = \lim_{m \to +\infty} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=0}^{m} P^{k} \cdot q$$

Now, P can be seen as a stochastic matrix. Thus it has a simple eigenvalue of value 1, and all its other eigenvalue λ satisfies:

$$\lambda \neq 1 \land |\lambda| \leqslant 1$$

Also, we have (Proof?):

$$|\lambda| = 1 \implies \lambda$$
 is a simple eigenvalue

With that, it can be proven that the $\lim_{m\to +\infty} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=0}^m P^k$ converges so some matrix T. This matrix can be constructed as follow. Let $P = VJV^{-1}$ the jordan normal form of P. Without a loss of generality, we will suppose that the first eigenvalue of this decomposition is 1. We have then:

$$T = V \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{0}_{n-1} \end{pmatrix} V^{-1}$$

Discounted Payoffs

Using the same approach as the mean payoffs. Let R_m be the discounted payoff. It can be shown that:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_m] = \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \gamma^n P^n \cdot q = (\mathrm{Id} - \gamma P)^{-1} q$$

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