



The challenge of Morphing for border control



Biometric System Laboratory - University of Bologna (Italy)

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Outline

- What is morphing?
- The morphing attack
 - The idea
 - The morphing factor α
 - A real case
- Automatic morphing detection
 - Application scenarios
 - Different solutions
 - Open issues
- Conclusions


What is morphing?

“In computer graphics and animations, morphing is a special effect that transforms an image into another through a seamless transition”



<https://noahmjacobs.com/computer-vision/face-morphing/>

The morphing attack




The morphing attack (2)


If a double-identity face image can be enrolled in the chip, two subjects can share the document



Passport Issuance




ABC Verification



The morphing attack (3)

- The issued document is **perfectly regular**.
- The attack does not consist of altering the document content but in **deceiving the officer** during document issuing. For this reason the morphed photo ID must be **very similar to the applicant**.
- The document released will thus **pass all the integrity checks** performed at the gates.
- It has been proved that:
 - 1 It is possible to create a **realistic morphed image**;
 - 2 The morphed image is able to **deceive the officer**;
 - 3 State-of-the-art face **recognition algorithms** can be easily **fooled**.

The morphing factor α



- The **morphing factor** α represents the **percentage** of **criminal** characteristics hidden in the morphed image.
- The value of α should be chosen to maximizes the probability of fooling both the **officer** during **enrollment** and the **automatic face recognition system** at the **gate**.
- Based on literature results and tests with human experts, α values in the range **20%→30%** are considered a **good trade-off**.

A real case


On October 2018, German activists used a **morphed** image of **Federica Mogherini** (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and a member of their group to get a **genuine German passport**.




Automatic morphing detection

Two scenarios:

- **Single image** – an algorithm should be able to classify a face image as morphed or not.



- **Differential image** – a second image (e.g., captured live at the gate) is available to help deciding if the suspected image is morphed or not.





Automatic morphing detection (2)

Different **solutions** have been proposed **based on**:

- **Micro-Texture analysis** using different features (e.g., LBP, SURF, etc.);
- **Topological analysis** of facial landmarks;
- **Deep learning** techniques;
- Reverse the morphing process (also called **Demorphing**).

The **results** are **encouraging** but still far to be acceptable. This is mainly due to the following **issues**:


- **Intra-subject variations** are stronger than those introduced by morphing;
- **Printed & scanned** images;
- **Lack** of public **databases**.

Intra-subject vs morphing variations


Beard and Hair style

Makeup


Aging



Which is the morphed image?



Printed & scanned images



Lack of public databases

To develop effective morphing detection systems, **thousand** high quality **morphed images** generated **using different morphing techniques** are needed.

About **20 minutes** are needed to **create** a single high quality **morphed image**. Even more for printed & scanned images.

Morphed **images** cannot be shared between different research groups because of **privacy issues**.

Each research group creates its own **private database** containing only **few hundreds** high quality morphed images generated using a **single morphing technique**.

The morphing detection **methods** are **not** able to **detect** morphed **images** created using a **different morphing process**: **small changes** in the morphed **images** produce **high degradation** in the detection **performance**.

Conclusions

- Morphing attack is today a real **security threat**.
- The best solution is **live enrolment**, but to be effective, should be **adopted by all countries**.
- **Detection techniques** are being studied (with **interesting** but **not satisfactory** results).
- There are **several open issues** to be solved (e.g., different morphing techniques, different conditions, P&S images).
- Common **benchmarks** and evaluations needed:
 - **NIST** Face recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) MORPH
 - **SOTAMD** (State Of The Art Morph Detection) EU project



ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA
CAMPUS DI CESENA



Department of Computer Science and Engineering
University of Bologna



Biometric System Laboratory
biolab.csr.unibo.it

