Proactive Final Project

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Project Steps

- 1. Execute Zeus banking trojan.
- 2. Check wireshark traffic for c2 communication indicators.

```
Wireshark · Follow HTTP Stream (tcp.stream eq 9) · Ethernet

GET /get/flashplayer/update/current/install/install_all_win_cab_64_ax_sgn.z HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Flash Player Seed/3.0

Host: fpdownload.macromedia.com

Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Server: Apache/2.4.37 (Red Hat Enterprise Linux) OpenSSL/1.1.1k

Content-Length: 196

Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1

Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2024 12:47:09 GMT

Connection: keep-alive

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">

<html><html><hed>
</head></title>404 Not Found</ht>
</head>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</hr>
</rr>
</hr>
</rr>
</ra>

Selection of the properties of
```



- 3. Create suricata rules to detect C2 communication
- Detect the Specific URI Request: This rule looks for the specific URI path used in the Zeus communication:

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Zeus C2 - Specific URI Request"; content:"/get/flashplayer/update/current/install/install_all_win_cab_64_ax_sgn.z"; http_uri; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Detect the Specific User-Agent: This rule identifies HTTP requests with the specific
 User-Agent used in the request:

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Zeus C2 - Suspicious User-Agent"; content:"Flash Player Seed/3.0"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1000002; rev:1;)

- Detect Host Header: This rule matches requests sent to the suspicious Host:
 alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Zeus C2 Suspicious Host Header";
 content:"Host: fpdownload.macromedia.com"; http_header; nocase;
 classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1000003; rev:1;)
- Comprehensive Detection (All Conditions): To ensure the rule fires only if all conditions (URI, User-Agent, and Host) are met, you can combine these conditions: alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Zeus C2 Complete Signature Match"; content:"/get/flashplayer/update/current/install/install_all_win_cab_64_ax_sgn.z"; http_uri; content:"Flash Player Seed/3.0"; http_header; content:"Host: fpdownload.macromedia.com"; http_header; nocase; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1000004; rev:1;)

4. Download "emerging-all.rules" for common threat detection via this link: https://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/

5. Add "zeus.rules" and "emerging-all.rules" to "suricata.yaml"

```
suricata - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
    # See Napatech NTPL documentation other hashmodes and details on their use.
    # This parameter has no effect if auto-config is disabled.
    hashmode: hash5tuplesorted
## Configure Suricata to load Suricata-Update managed rules.
default-rule-path: C:\\Program Files\\Suricata\\rules\\
rule-files:
 - emerging-all.rules
 - zeus.rules
#- botcc.rules
#- botcc.portgrouped.rules
#- ciarmy.rules
#- compromised.rules
#- drop.rules
#- dshield.rules
```

6. Start suricata:

suricata.exe -c suricata.yaml -i 10.0.2.15

```
Administrator Command Prompt - suricata.exe - c suricata.yaml - i 10.0.2.15

C:\Windows\system32>cd c:\program files\suricata

c:\Program Files\Suricata>suricata.exe - c suricata.yaml - i 10.0.2.15

Info: win32-service: Running as service: no

Info: suricata: translated 10.0.2.15 to pcap device \Device\NPF_{43E2B5DD-04D9-4B1C-BC6C-308C8AEA6B32}

i: suricata: This is Suricata version 7.0.8 RELEASE running in SYSTEM mode

i: runmodes: thread stack size of 0 to too small: setting to 512k


W: threshold-config: Error opening file: "C:\Program Files\Suricata\\\threshold.config": No such file or directory

W: suricata: setrlimit unavailable.

i: threads: Threads created -> RX: 1 W: 1 FM: 1 FR: 1 Engine started.
```

7. Check Suricata logs for alerts.

8. Import Suricata and System Logs to Splunk (details are shown in the video)




- 9. Splunk Correlation Rules:
 - a. Detecting abnormal outbound traffic:

index="main" sourcetype="suricata-eve.json" src_ip="10.0.2.15"
event_type="alert"


| stats count as number_of_alerts by dest_ip, dest_port | sort – count


This search query helps identify **abnormal outbound traffic** by focusing on alerts generated for traffic coming from a specific source IP. It aggregates these alerts by destination IP and port, and by sorting the results, it highlights the destinations with the most suspicious or unusual activity. This can point to potential malicious behavior, such as data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or the device attempting to contact unauthorized external resources.




b. Linking Network Anomalies With System Activities
 index="main" (sourcetype="suricata-eve.json" event_type="alert") OR
 (sourcetype!="suricata-eve.json")
 | eval type=if (event_type="alert", "Network Anomaly", "System Activity")
 | table_time, src_ip, dest_ip, type, alert.signature, TaskCategory

This query links network anomalies and system activities by combining Suricata alerts with other system logs into a unified view. It classifies events as either "Network Anomaly" (for Suricata alerts) or "System Activity" (for other system logs) using an eval statement. By displaying key fields such as the timestamp, source IP, destination IP, alert signature, and system activity category, it enables correlation between suspicious network behavior and corresponding system-level changes. This helps identify patterns, such as a network alert followed by suspicious process creation, providing a clear timeline of potential malicious activity for deeper investigation.





c. Create a visual dashboard to track malicious activity



10. use volatility to

Identify active and injected processes related to Zeus
 Identify the running processes

	nna⊛ kal	i)-[~] volatility3/vol.p	y -f ~/Downloa	ds/zeus2×4	.vmem w	indows.p	slist									
/olati	lity 2 F	ramework 2.13.0														
			lavers.vmware:	No metada	ta file	found a	longside	VMEM fil	e. A	VMSS or	VMSN fi	le ma	v be	required to correct	lv process	s a VMEM file. The
		laced in the same														
	ss: 100		PDB scanning													
ID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handle	s Sessio	nId	Wow64	Cre	ateTime	Exi	tTim€		File output		
								20074	-	-1-1						
	0	System 0×823c8		671	N/A	False	N/A	N/A		abled	000000	ure	were.	B2-011-0		
6	4	smss.exe	0×82292da0	3	19	N/A	False			12:25:18.				Disabled		
8	596	csrss.exe	0×821f2978	14	471	0	False			12:25:21.				Disabled		
2	596	winlogon.exe	0×822c09f8	21	588	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
4	692	services.exe	0×821a5da0	15	279	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
6	692	lsass.exe	0×822c8798	24	437	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
2	744	svchost.exe	0×82150b90	20	202	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
2	744	svchost.exe	0×822c8bf8	10	277	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
84	744	svchost.exe	0×82151da0	58	1327	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
40	744	svchost.exe	0×821521b0	6	81	0	False			12:25:22.				Disabled		
92	744	svchost.exe	0×8214f488	13	175	0	False			12:25:23.				Disabled		
36	744	iscsiexe.exe	0×8221e278		78	0	False			12:25:24.				Disabled		
16	744	spoolsv.exe	0×82095500	13	140	0	False			12:25:24.				Disabled		
52	1720	explorer.exe	0×821b2020	22	520	0	False			12:25:25.				Disabled		
00	1752	SharedIntApp.ex		3	75	0	False			12:25:25.				Disabled		
08	1752	prl_cc.exe	0×820ee580	14	133	0	False			12:25:25.				Disabled		
36	1752	jusched.exe	0×8212ada0	1	43	0	False			12:25:26.				Disabled		
4	744	svchost.exe	0×82129370		88	0	False			12:25:33.				Disabled		
2	744	jqs.exe 0×82089		146	0	False				.000000 U			Disab			
8	744	sqlservr.exe	0×8208abf0	25	306	Ø	False			12:25:33.				Disabled		
2	744	coherence.exe	0×82077da0		51	0	False			12:25:36.				Disabled		
36	744	prl_tools_servi		3	78	0	False			12:25:36.				Disabled		
32	436	prl tools.exe	0×82086798	9	107	0	False	2010-09	-02	12:25:36.	000000	UTC	N/A	Disabled		

							menr	na@kali: ~		
File	Actions	Edit View Help								
1140	744	svchost.exe	0×821521b0	6	81	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:22.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1192	744	svchost.exe	0×8214f488	13	175	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:23.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1436	744	iscsiexe.exe	0×8221e278		78	Ø	False	2010-09-02 12:25:24.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1616	744	spoolsv.exe	0×82095500	13	140	Ø	False	2010-09-02 12:25:24.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1752	1720	explorer.exe	0×821b2020	22	520	Ø	False	2010-09-02 12:25:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1900	1752	SharedIntApp.e	x 0×822b96c0		75	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1908	1752	prl_cc.exe	0×820ee580	14	133	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1936	1752	jusched.exe	0×8212ada0		43	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:26.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
364	744	svchost.exe	0×82129370		88	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:33.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
472	744	jqs.exe 0×8208	9558 5	146	0	False	2010-09	9-02 12:25:33.000000 UTC N/A	Disab	
488	744	sqlservr.exe	0×8208abf0	25	306	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:33.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
572	744	coherence.exe	0×82077da0		51	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
436	744	prl_tools_serv	i 0×82189530		78	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
632	436	prl_tools.exe	0×82086798		107	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
660	744	sqlwriter.exe	0×821aa7e8		84	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2180	1084	wscntfy.exe	0×8213dda0		48	0	False	2010-09-02 12:25:41.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2588	744	alg.exe 0×81e8	a368 6	107	Ø	False	2010-09	9-02 12:25:44.000000 UTC N/A	Disab	led
940	1084	wuauclt.exe	0×8205dda0		126	0	False	2010-09-02 12:26:40.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2972	1752	ImmunityDebugg	e 0×82001ad0		87	0	False	2010-09-08 19:14:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2204	2972	nifek_locked.e			38	0	False	2010-09-08 19:14:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1932	1752	ImmunityDebugg	e 0×82282380		86	0	False	2010-09-08 19:23:02.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
952	1932	vaelh.exe	0×8223c020		40	0	False	2010-09-08 19:23:02.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3788	1752	ImmunityDebugg	e 0×81ffb6d8		103	0	False	2010-09-08 22:39:40.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3508	3788	anaxu.exe	0×8219e5c8		54	0	False	2010-09-08 22:39:40.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3984	1084	wuauclt.exe	0×81eab2f8	8	325	0	False	2010-09-09 19:52:45.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2404	1752	ImmunityDebugg	e 0×82066478		85	0	False	2010-09-09 19:56:19.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3772	2404	b98679df6defbb	3 0×81f4bb28		46	0	False	2010-09-09 19:56:19.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3276	3772	ihah.exe	0×81e87da0		45	0	False	2010-09-09 19:56:32.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3768	1084	rundll32.exe	0×82311648	1	53	Ø	False	2010-09-09 19:56:33.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

Immunity Debugger Processes (ImmunityDebugge):

• These processes (e.g., ImmunityDebugge with child processes like nifek_locked.exe, vaelh.exe, anaxu.exe, ihah.exe) are potentially malicious. Immunity Debugger is a popular debugger used in reverse engineering and analysis of malware. If these processes are running on an infected machine, they could indicate the presence of malware being debugged or analyzed, which is a sign of the malware's operation or testing phase.

Suspicious Executables (e.g., nifek_locked.exe, vaelh.exe, anaxu.exe, ihah.exe):

• These processes do not appear to be legitimate Windows system processes. The names of these executables (e.g., nifek_locked.exe, vaelh.exe) are suspicious and could be custom or obfuscated names used by the Trojan to avoid detection. Such names are often associated with malware running on the system.


Rundll32.exe:

The rundll32.exe process is a legitimate Windows process used to run DLL files.
 However, it is often abused by malware to execute malicious code from DLLs. In this case, if it is running from a suspicious location or executing a non-system DLL, it could be malicious.

High Number of Threads and Handles in Certain Processes:

Some processes like sychost.exe have a large number of threads and handles. While sychost.exe is a legitimate process, malware often hijacks this process for persistence or to run malicious code. The fact that multiple instances of sychost.exe are running may warrant closer inspection.

-identify injected processes



Key Elements of the Output:

- 1. **DIRTY + PAGE EXECUTE READ**:
 - DIRTY: This means that the memory page has been modified after it was loaded. It's not in its original state, suggesting it has been altered or injected with new code.
 - PAGE_EXECUTE_READ: This means the memory page is both readable and executable. This is a key flag because code that can execute from a page like this is commonly used by malicious software to run injected code (e.g., malware exploits).
- Analyze Zeus-related network connections.

```
      (menna@ kali) - [~/volatility]

      $ python2 vol.py -f ~/Downloads/zeus2×4.vmem — profile=WinXPSP3×86 connscan

      Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

      Offset(P) Local Address
      Remote Address
      Pid

      0×020f5410 10.211.55.5:1427
      65.54.81.89:80
      1084

      0×02125008 10.211.55.5:1423
      207.46.21.123:80
      1084

      0×022ace08 10.211.55.5:1432
      193.43.134.14:80
      1752
```

- -The **connscan** plugin scans memory for network connections and will help identify all active TCP/UDP connections, including those made by the Zeus Trojan for C&C communication.
- -10.211.55.5 is the local IP address.
- local machine is connected to a remote server at IP 65.54.81.89, 207.46.21.123:80 and 193.43.134.14:80.

```
| Content | Cont
```

The output shows:

Local Address: IP and port on the local machine. (10.211.55.5)

Remote Address: IP and port of the external machine (193.43.134.14).

PID: Process ID of the process using the connection.

Volatility F	oundatio	n Volat	ilitv I	ramework 2.6.1		
Offset(V)	PID			Protocol	Address	Create Time
	1192	1900		UDP	10.211.55.5	
0×820046e0	756	500	17	UDP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-02 12:25:37 UTC+0000
0×81e7c548	4	139	6	TCP	10.211.55.5	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×81f358f0	1752	16441	6	TCP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-09 19:56:32 UTC+0000
0×821715f8	4	445	6	TCP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-02 12:25:18 UTC+0000
0×82154e98	992	135	6	TCP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-02 12:25:22 UTC+0000
0×81e7e458	4	137	17	UDP	10.211.55.5	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×81eafe98	2588	1033	6	TCP	127.0.0.1	2010-09-02 12:25:44 UTC+0000
0×82078798	756	Ø	255	Reserved	0.0.0.0	2010-09-02 12:25:37 UTC+0000
0×8223fb90	1084	123	17	UDP	127.0.0.1	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×81eea480	4	138	17	UDP	10.211.55.5	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×820596d0	1084	123	17	UDP	10.211.55.5	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×8205ae98	1752	1432	6	TCP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-09 19:56:34 UTC+0000
0×81e7ed30	1192	1900	17	UDP	127.0.0.1	2010-09-09 19:52:48 UTC+0000
0×81ffdb18	756	4500	17	UDP	0.0.0.0	2010-09-02 12:25:37 UTC+0000

The sockets command revealed multiple active connections over ports such as 1900, 16444, 445, which could indicate Zeus-related activity.

Suspicious UDP and TCP traffic from processes like PID 1192 and 1752 suggested communication to external servers potentially linked to data exfiltration.


The network connections identified in the memory analysis reveal that the infected VM was actively communicating with external servers over common HTTP ports (port 80), a tactic used by Zeus to send stolen data to C2 servers.

The use of specific ports and external IP addresses can be directly correlated with Zeus malware activity, confirming the malware's presence and its external communication.

Multiple suspicious connections suggest that Zeus was attempting to exfiltrate data or communicate with a malicious server.

- 11. Detect Zeus Using Yara Rules
- 1. Extract urls from "zeus2x4.vmem"

- 2. Detect suspicious URLs using virustotal
 - o http://193.43.134.14/eu2.bin




http://tempuri.org/\$itemname\$.xsd



o http://zephehooqu.ru/bin/koethood.bin



http://nahwgwwergwyt.com/gamer/eqtewttetwq.img



- http://basicasco.ru/otp/zero.doc -> Zeus Related
 References: http://mnin.blogspot.com/2011/09/abstract-memory-analysis-zeus.html
- 3. Create Yara Rules

```
File Actions Edit View Help

kali@kali: ~ × kali@kali: ~ ×

GNU nano 8.1

rule Zeus_Detected
{

meta:
    description = "Detects Zeus Banking Trojan"
    date = "2024-12-20"
    version = "1.0"

strings:

$url1 = "http://193.43.134.14/eu2.bin"
$url2 = "http://zephehoogu.ru/bin/koethood.bin"
$url3 = "http://tempuri.org/$itemname$.xsd
$url4 = "http://nahwgwwergmyt.com/gamer/eqtewtetwq.img"
$url5 = "http://basicasco.ru/otp/zero.doc"

condition:
    any of them
```

4. Test Yara Rules

```
File Actions Edit View Help

kali@kali:~ × kali@kali:~ ×

—(kali@kali)-[~]

-$ yara zeus.yara ~/Downloads/zeus2*4.vmem
Zeus_Detected /home/kali/Downloads/zeus2*4.vmem

—(kali@kali)-[~]

-$
```