

# Panel Methods (1): The Parametric Approach


Northwestern Causal Inference Main Workshop

Yiqing Xu  
Stanford University


July 31st, 2024

# Motivations


- Causal inference is challenging with observational data
- Panel data often come to the rescue (**false hope?**)
- In the social sciences, difference-in-differences (DiD) and two-way fixed effects (TWFE) are the most popular



# What's a Panel Dataset?




# What's a Panel Dataset?



# What's Causal Inference with Panel Data?

What would happen if a group of units experienced a set of counterfactual treatment histories?



# What's Special about Panel Data?

- The fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland 1986)

$$\tau_i = Y_{1i} - Y_{i0}$$

- A statistical solution makes use of others' information

$$\text{e.g. } ATE = E[Y_1] - E[Y_0]$$

- A scientific solution exploits homogeneity or invariance assumptions

e.g. The long-run growth rate of the US economy is 2.5%.

- Panel data allow us to construct treated counterfactuals using information from both [the past](#) and [the others](#) with the caveat that treatment assignment mechanism may be complicated
- Causal inference with panel data is also challenging because of
  - potentially (very) high dimensional treatment
  - limited knowledge about treatment assignment mechanisms
  - both cross-sectional and temporal interference (SUTVA violations)

- First, introduce the traditional, **parametric** approach, covering models such as unit fixed effects models and two-way fixed effects models (TWFE)
- Investigate the difference-in-differences (DID) design, including its identification, estimation, its link to TWFE models, and common treats
- Discuss the synthetic control methods and its extensions
- [\[Advanced workshop\]](#) Discuss the pathologies of TWFE models and potential solutions

- Panel Setup and Unobserved Confounding
- Fixed Effects (vs. Pooled OLS)
- Time Effects (and TWFE)
- Dynamic Treatment Effects
- Heterogeneous Treatment Effects



Single unit:

$$\mathbf{y}_i = \begin{pmatrix} y_{i1} \\ \vdots \\ y_{it} \\ \vdots \\ y_{iT} \end{pmatrix}_{T \times 1} \quad \mathbf{X}_i = \begin{pmatrix} x_{i,1,1} & x_{i,1,2} & x_{i,1,j} & \cdots & x_{i,1,K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ x_{i,t,1} & x_{i,t,2} & x_{i,t,j} & \cdots & x_{i,t,K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ x_{i,T,1} & x_{i,T,2} & x_{i,T,j} & \cdots & x_{i,T,K} \end{pmatrix}_{T \times K}$$

Panel with all units:

$$\mathbf{y} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{y}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{y}_i \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{y}_N \end{pmatrix}_{NT \times 1} \quad \mathbf{X} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{X}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{X}_i \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{X}_N \end{pmatrix}_{NT \times K}$$

# Unobserved Effects Model: Farm Output

- For a randomly drawn cross-sectional unit  $i$ , the model is given by

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$ : output of farm  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ :  $1 \times K$  vector of variable inputs for farm  $i$  in year  $t$ , such as labor, fertilizer, etc. plus an intercept
- $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ :  $K \times 1$  vector of marginal effects of variable inputs, the **causal quantity of interest**
- $c_i$ : farm effect, i.e. the sum of all time-invariant inputs known to farmer  $i$  (but unobserved for the researcher), such as soil quality, managerial ability, etc.
  - often called: **unobserved effect**, **unobserved heterogeneity**, capturing **unobserved confounding**
- $\varepsilon_{it}$ : time-varying unobserved inputs, such as rainfall, unknown to the farmer at the time the decision on the variable inputs  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  is made
  - often called: **idiosyncratic error**
- What happens when we regress  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ ?

- When we ignore the panel structure and regress  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  we get

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + v_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

with **composite error**  $v_{it} \equiv c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$

- Main assumption to obtain consistent estimates for  $\beta$  is:
  - $E[v_{it}|\mathbf{x}_{i1}, \mathbf{x}_{i2}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{iT}] = E[v_{it}|\mathbf{x}_{it}] = 0$  for  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ 
    - $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  are **strictly exogenous**: the composite error  $v_{it}$  in each time period is uncorrelated with the past, current, and future regressors
    - But: labour input  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  likely depends on soil quality  $c_i$  and so we have omitted variable bias and  $\hat{\beta}$  is not consistent
  - No correlation between  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  and  $v_{it} \Rightarrow$  no correlation between unobserved effect  $c_i$  and  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  for all  $t$ 
    - Violations are common: whenever we omit a time-constant variable that is correlated with the regressors (**unobserved confounding**)

# Unobserved Effects Model: Program Evaluation

- Program evaluation model:

$$y_{it} = \text{prog}_{it} \beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$ : log wage of individual  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\text{prog}_{it}$ : indicator coded 1 if individual  $i$  participates in training program at  $t$  and 0 otherwise
- $\beta$ : effect of program
- $c_i$ : sum of all time-invariant unobserved characteristics that affect wages, such as ability, etc.
- What happens when we regress  $y_{it}$  on  $\text{prog}_{it}$ ?  $\hat{\beta}$  not consistent since  $\text{prog}_{it}$  is likely correlated with  $c_i$  (e.g. ability)
- Always ask: Is there a time-constant unobserved variable ( $c_i$ ) that is correlated with the regressors? If yes, pooled OLS is problematic
- Additional problem:  $v_{it} \equiv c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$  are serially correlated for same  $i$  since  $c_i$  is present in each  $t$  and thus pooled OLS standard errors are invalid

- Our unobserved effects model is:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- If we have data on multiple time periods, we can think of  $c_i$  as **fixed effects** or “nuisance parameters” to be estimated
- OLS estimation with fixed effects yields:

$$(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, \hat{c}_1, \dots, \hat{c}_N) = \underset{\mathbf{b}, m_1, \dots, m_N}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - \mathbf{x}_{it}\mathbf{b} - m_i)^2$$

this amounts to including  $N$  farm dummies in regression of  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$

$$(\hat{\beta}, \hat{c}_1, \dots, \hat{c}_N) = \underset{\mathbf{b}, m_1, \dots, m_N}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - \mathbf{x}_{it} \mathbf{b} - m_i)^2$$

The first-order conditions (FOC) for this minimization problem are:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{x}'_{it} (y_{it} - \mathbf{x}_{it} \hat{\beta} - \hat{c}_i) = 0$$

and

$$\sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - \mathbf{x}_{it} \hat{\beta} - \hat{c}_i) = 0$$

for  $i = 1, \dots, N$ .

## Derivation: Fixed Effects Regression

Therefore, for  $i = 1, \dots, N$ ,

$$\hat{c}_i = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - \mathbf{x}_{it}' \hat{\beta}) = \bar{y}_i - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i' \hat{\beta},$$

where

$$\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i \equiv \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{x}_{it}, \quad \bar{y}_i \equiv \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T y_{it}.$$

Plug this result into the first FOC to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta} &= \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)' (\mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i) \right)^{-1} \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)' (y_{it} - \bar{y}_i) \right) \\ \hat{\beta} &= \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it}' \ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it} \right)^{-1} \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it}' \ddot{y}_{it} \right) \end{aligned}$$

with time-demeaned variables  $\ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it} \equiv \mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i$ ,  $\ddot{y}_{it} \equiv y_{it} - \bar{y}_i$ .

# Fixed Effects Regression

Running a regression with the time-demeaned variables  $\ddot{y}_{it} \equiv y_{it} - \bar{y}_i$  and  $\ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it} \equiv \mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i$  is numerically equivalent to a regression of  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  and unit specific dummy variables.

Fixed effects estimator is often called the **within estimator** because it only uses the time variation within each cross-sectional unit.

The regression with the time-demeaned variables is consistent for  $\beta$  even when  $\text{Cov}[\mathbf{x}_{it}, c_i] \neq 0$ , because time-demeaning eliminates the unobserved effects:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\bar{y}_i = \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i\beta + c_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i$$

---

$$(y_{it} - \bar{y}_i) = (\mathbf{x}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)\beta + (c_i - c_i) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i)$$

$$\ddot{y}_{it} = \ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it}\beta + \ddot{\varepsilon}_{it}$$



# Fixed Effects Regression: Main Results

- Identification assumptions:

- 1  $E[\varepsilon_{it} | \mathbf{x}_{i1}, \mathbf{x}_{i2}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{iT}, c_i] = 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ 
  - regressors are **strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect**
  - allows  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  to be arbitrarily related to  $c_i$
- 2  $\text{rank}(\ddot{\mathbf{X}}) = K < NT$  and  $E(\ddot{\mathbf{x}}_i' \ddot{\mathbf{x}}_i)$  is p.d. and finite
  - regressors vary over time for at least some  $i$  and are not collinear

- Fixed effects estimator:

- 1 Demean and regress  $\ddot{y}_{it}$  on  $\ddot{\mathbf{x}}_{it}$  (need to correct degrees of freedom)
- 2 Regress  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  and unit dummies (dummy variable regression)
- 3 Regress  $y_{it}$  on  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$  with canned fixed effects routine
  - Stata: `reghdfe y x , a(PanelID) cl(PanelID)`


- Properties (under assumptions 1-2):

- $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$  is consistent:  $\text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\beta}_{FE,N} = \beta$
- $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$  also unbiased conditional on  $\mathbf{X}$

- Inference:
  - Standard errors have to be “clustered” by panel unit (e.g. farm) to allow correlation in the  $\varepsilon_{it}$ 's for the same  $i$ .
  - Yields valid inference as long as number of clusters is reasonably large
- Typically we care about  $\beta$ , but unit fixed effects  $c_i$  could be of interest
  - $\hat{c}_i$  from dummy variable regression is unbiased but not consistent for  $c_i$  (based on fixed  $T$  and  $N \rightarrow \infty$ )
  - `reghdfe` demeans the data before running the regression and therefore does not estimate  $\hat{c}_i$  in the first run, but you can recover them using `predict`

## Example: Direct Democracy and Naturalizations

- Do minorities fare worse under direct democracy than under representative democracy?
- Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016, AJPS) examine data on naturalization requests of immigrants in Switzerland, where municipalities vote on naturalization applications in:
  - referendums (direct democracy)
  - elected municipality councils (representative democracy)
- Annual panel data from 1,400 municipalities for the 1991-2009 period
  - $y_{it}$ : naturalization rate =  $\frac{\# \text{ naturalizations}_{it}}{\text{eligible foreign population}_{it-1}}$
  - $x_{it}$ : 1 if municipality used representative democracy, 0 if municipality used direct democracy in year  $t$



```
. des muniID muni_name year nat_rate repdem
```

variable name	storage type	display format	value label	variable label
muniID	float	%8.0g		municipality code
muni_name	str43	%43s		municipality name
year	float	%ty		year
nat_rate	float	%9.0g		naturalization rate (percent)
repdem	float	%9.0g		1 representative democracy, 0 direct

## Panel Data Long Format

```
. list muniID muni_name year nat_rate repdem in 31/40
```

	muniID	muni_name	year	nat_rate	repdem
31.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2002	4.638365	0
32.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2003	4.844814	0
33.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2004	5.621302	0
34.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2005	4.387827	0
35.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2006	8.115358	1
36.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2007	7.067371	1
37.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2008	8.977719	1
38.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2009	6.119704	1
39.	3	Bonstetten	1991	.8333334	0
40.	3	Bonstetten	1992	.8403362	0

```
. reg nat_rate repdem
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	5958.63488	1	5958.63488
Residual	73705.2336	4653	15.8403683
Total	79663.8685	4654	17.1172902

Number of obs = 4655  
 F( 1, 4653) = 376.17  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.0748  
 Adj R-squared = 0.0746  
 Root MSE = 3.98

nat_rate	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
repdem	2.503318	.12907	19.40	0.000	2.250279	2.756356
_cons	2.222683	.0690427	32.19	0.000	2.087326	2.358039

## Decompose Within and Between Variation

```
. tsset muniID year , yearly
      panel variable: muniID (strongly balanced)
      time variable: year, 1991 to 2009
              delta: 1 year
```

```
. xtsum nat_rate
```

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
nat_rate overall	2.938992	4.137305	0	24.13793	N = 4655
between		1.622939	0	7.567746	n = 245
within		3.807039	-3.711323	24.80134	T = 19

## Time-Demeaning for Fixed Effects: $y_{it} \rightarrow \ddot{y}_{it}$

```
. * get municipality means
. egen means_nat_rate = mean(nat_rate) , by(muniID)

. * compute deviations from means
. gen dm_nat_rate = nat_rate - means_nat_rate

. list muniID muni_name year nat_rate means_nat_rate dm_nat_rate in 20/40 ,ab(20)
```

	muniID	muni_name	year	nat_rate	means_nat_rate	dm_nat_rate
20.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1991	.2173913	3.595932	-3.37854
21.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1992	.9473684	3.595932	-2.648563
22.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1993	1.04712	3.595932	-2.548811
23.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1994	.8342023	3.595932	-2.761729
24.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1995	2.002002	3.595932	-1.59393
25.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1996	1.7769	3.595932	-1.819031
26.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1997	1.862745	3.595932	-1.733186
27.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1998	2.054155	3.595932	-1.541776
28.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1999	2.402135	3.595932	-1.193796



# Fixed Effects Regression with Demeaned Data

```
. egen means_repdem = mean(repdem) , by(muniID)

. gen dm_repdem = repdem - means_repdem

.
. * regression with demeaned data
. reg dm_nat_rate dm_repdem , cl(muniID)
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 4655  
F( 1, 244) = 265.18  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.1052  
Root MSE = 3.6017

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

dm_nat_rate	Robust					
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
dm_repdem	3.0228	.1856244	16.28	0.000	2.657169	3.388431
_cons	6.65e-10	5.81e-09	0.11	0.909	-1.08e-08	1.21e-08

# Fixed Effects Regression with Canned Routine

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem, a(muniID) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 1 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,655
Absorbing 1 HDFE group	F( 1, 244)	=	265.18
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.2423
	Adj R-squared	=	0.2002
	Within R-sq.	=	0.1052
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	245	Root MSE = 3.7000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust		t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
repdem	3.0228	.1856244	16.28	0.000	2.657169	3.388431
_cons	2.074036	.0531153	39.05	0.000	1.969413	2.178659

Absorbed degrees of freedom:

Absorbed FE	Categories	- Redundant	= Num. Coefs
muniID	245	245	0 *

\* = FE nested within cluster; treated as redundant for DoF computation

# Fixed Effects Regression with Dummies

```
. reg nat_rate repdem i.muniID, cl(muniID)
```

Linear regression

Number of obs = 4655

F( 0, 244) = .

Prob > F = .

R-squared = 0.2423

Root MSE = 3.7

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust					
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
repdem	3.0228	.1906916	15.85	0.000	2.647188	3.398412
muniID						
2	1.367365	5.17e-14	2.6e+13	0.000	1.367365	1.367365
3	1.292252	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.292252	1.292252
9	1.284652	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.284652	1.284652
10	1.271783	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.271783	1.271783
13	.3265469	5.17e-14	6.3e+12	0.000	.3265469	.3265469

# Problems that Fixed Effects Do Not Solve

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$  is murder rate and  $x_{it}$  is police spending per capita
- What happens when we regress  $y$  on  $x$  and city fixed effects?
  - $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$  inconsistent unless **strict exogeneity** conditional on  $c_i$  holds
    - $E[\varepsilon_{it} | \mathbf{x}_{i1}, \mathbf{x}_{i2}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{iT}, c_i] = 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$
    - implies  $\varepsilon_{it}$  uncorrelated with past, current, and future regressors
- Most common violations:
  - 1 Time-varying omitted variables
    - economic boom leads to more police spending and fewer murders
    - can include time-varying controls, but avoid post-treatment bias
  - 2 Simultaneity & feedback
    - if city adjusts police based on past murder rate, then  $\text{spending}_{t+1}$  is correlated with  $\varepsilon_t$  (since higher  $\varepsilon_t$  leads to higher murder rate at  $t$ )
    - strictly exogenous  $x$  cannot react to what happens to  $y$  in the past or the future!
- Fixed effects do not obviate need for good research design...

## Summary: Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS (and Random Effects)

**Assm. 1** Regressors are strictly exogenous conditional on the time-invariant unobservables


**Assm. 2** Regressors are uncorrelated with time-varying & time-invariant unobservables

- Results:


- Fixed effects estimator is consistent given Assm. 1, but rules out time-invariant regressors
- Pooled OLS (and random effects) are consistent under Assum. 2, and allow for time-invariant regressors
- Specification tests (e.g., Hausman test) are not gonna cut it

- Assum. 2 is strong, so fixed effects models are typically more credible

- One main advantage of panel data is to account for **time-invariant unobserved confounding**




# Naturalization Rate Over Time



xtgraph nat\_rate

# Representative Democracy Over Time



xtgraph repdem



- Reconsider our unobserved effects model:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Fixed effects assumption:  $E[\varepsilon_{it}|\mathbf{x}_i, c_i] = 0$ ,  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ : regressors are strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect
- Typical violation: Common shocks that affect all units in the same way and are correlated with  $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ .
  - Trends in farming technology or climate affect productivity
  - Trends in immigration inflows affect naturalization rates
- We can allow for such common shocks by including time effects into the model

## Fixed Effects Regression: Adding Time Effects

- Linear time trend:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + c_i + t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Linear time trend common to all units

- Time fixed effects:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + c_i + t_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$


- Common shock in each time period
  - This is called the **two-way fixed effects** model
  - Referred to as “generalized difference-in-differences”

- Unit specific linear time trends:


$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}\beta + c_i + g_i \cdot t + t_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Linear time trends that vary by unit


# Modeling Time Effects




# Unit Specific Time Trends



# Unit Specific Time Trends



# Unit Specific Time Trends



# Unit Specific Time Trends Often Eliminate “Results”

TABLE 5.2.3


Estimated effects of labor regulation on the performance of firms in Indian states

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Labor regulation (lagged)	-.186 (.064)	-.185 (.051)	-.104 (.039)	.0002 (.020)
Log development expenditure per capita		.240 (.128)	.184 (.119)	.241 (.106)
Log installed electricity capacity per capita		.089 (.061)	.082 (.054)	.023 (.033)
Log state population		.720 (.96)	0.310 (1.192)	-1.419 (2.326)
Congress majority			-.0009 (.01)	.020 (.010)
Hard left majority			-.050 (.017)	-.007 (.009)
Janata majority			.008 (.026)	-.020 (.033)
Regional majority			.006 (.009)	.026 (.023)
State-specific trends	No	No	No	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	.93	.93	.94	.95

Notes: Adapted from Besley and Burgess (2004), table IV. The table reports regression DD estimates of the effects of labor regulation on productivity. The

“labor regulation increased in states where output was declining anyway”

A survey of political science papers published in top journals



# Fixed Effects Regression: Linear Time Trend

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem year, a(muniID) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 1 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,655
Absorbing 1 HDFE group	F( 2, 244)	=	247.57
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.2891
	Adj R-squared	=	0.2494
	Within R-sq.	=	0.1604
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	245	Root MSE = 3.5844

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust					[95% Conf. Interval]
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t		
repdem	.8247928	.2590615	3.18	0.002	.3145106	1.335075
year	.2313692	.0171752	13.47	0.000	.1975386	.2651997
_cons	-460.0353	34.2984	-13.41	0.000	-527.594	-392.4766

Absorbed degrees of freedom:

Absorbed FE	Categories	- Redundant	= Num. Coefs
muniID	245	245	0 *

\* = FE nested within cluster; treated as redundant for DoF computation



# Fixed Effects Regression: Year Fixed Effects

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem, a(muniID year) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 2 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,655
Absorbing 2 HDFE groups	F( 1, 244)	=	15.76
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0001
	R-squared	=	0.3129
	Adj R-squared	=	0.2717
	Within R-sq.	=	0.0081
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	245	Root MSE = 3.5308

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust					[95% Conf. Interval]
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t		
repdem	1.203658	.3031499	3.97	0.000	.6065335	1.800783
_cons	2.594572	.0867445	29.91	0.000	2.423709	2.765436

Absorbed degrees of freedom:

Absorbed FE	Categories	- Redundant	= Num. Coefs	
muniID	245	245	0	*
year	19	1	18	

\* = FE nested within cluster; treated as redundant for DoF computation

# Fixed Effects Regression: Unit Specific Time Trends

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem, a(muniID year muniID#c.year) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 3 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,655
Absorbing 3 HDFE groups	F( 1, 244)	=	9.33
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0025
	R-squared	=	0.3777
	Adj R-squared	=	0.3014
	Within R-sq.	=	0.0049
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	245	Root MSE = 3.4581

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust		t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
repdem	.9865241	.3229047	3.06	0.002	.3504877	1.622561
_cons	2.656704	.0923972	28.75	0.000	2.474706	2.838702

Absorbed degrees of freedom:

Absorbed FE	Categories	- Redundant	= Num. Coefs	
muniID	245	245	0	*
year	19	1	18	
muniID#c.year	245	0	245	?

? = number of redundant parameters may be higher

\* = FE nested within cluster; treated as redundant for DoF computation

# Unit Specific Quadratic Time Trends

```
. g year2 = year^2
```

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem, a(muniID year muniID#c.year muniID#c.year2) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 3 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,655
Absorbing 4 HDFE groups	F( 1, 244)	=	8.81
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0033
	R-squared	=	0.3777
	Adj R-squared	=	0.2575
	Within R-sq.	=	0.0049
Number of clusters (muniID) =	245	Root MSE	3.5650

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Robust		t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
repdem	.9862918	.3322911	2.97	0.003	.3317666	1.640817
_cons	2.65677	.0950831	27.94	0.000	2.469482	2.844059


Absorbed degrees of freedom:

Absorbed FE	Categories	- Redundant	= Num. Coefs	
muniID	245	245	0	*
year	19	1	18	
muniID#c.year	245	0	245	?
muniID#c.year2	245	0	245	?


? = number of redundant parameters may be higher

\* = FE nested within cluster; treated as redundant for DoF computation

# Fixed Effects Regression: Unit Specific Time Trends



# Fixed Effects Regression: Unit Specific Time Trends



$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{it-1}\beta_1 + x_{it-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Model recognizes that effect of change in  $x$  may occur with a lag
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level  $m$  to  $m + 1$  at  $t$ , which lasts only one period
$$\begin{aligned}y_{t-1} &= m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i \\y_t &= (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i \\y_{t+1} &= m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i \\y_{t+2} &= m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i \\y_{t+3} &= m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i\end{aligned}$$
  - $\beta_0 = y_t - y_{t-1}$  immediate change in  $y$  due to temporary one-unit increase in  $x$  (impact propensity)
  - $\beta_1 = y_{t+1} - y_{t-1}$  change in  $y$  one period after temporary one-unit increase in  $x$
  - $\beta_2 = y_{t+2} - y_{t-1}$  change in  $y$  two periods after temporary one-unit increase in  $x$
  - $y_{t+3} = y_{t-1}$  change in  $y$  is zero three periods after temporary one-unit increase in  $x$

# Lagged Effects of Direct Democracy

```
. reghdfe nat_rate repdem L1.repdem L2.repdem L3.repdem, a(muniID year) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 2 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	3,920
Absorbing 2 HDFE groups	F( 4, 244)	=	5.61
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	0.0002
	R-squared	=	0.3078
	Adj R-squared	=	0.2580
	Within R-sq.	=	0.0124
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	245	Root MSE = 3.7157

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
repdem						
--.	.6364802	.3593924	1.77	0.078	-.0714272	1.344388
L1.	1.201065	.4233731	2.84	0.005	.367133	2.034998
L2.	-.1648692	.4697434	-0.35	0.726	-1.090139	.7604003
L3.	-.5245206	.4109918	-1.28	0.203	-1.334065	.2850239
_cons	2.906479	.1150951	25.25	0.000	2.679772	3.133186

## Long-run Effect of Direct Democracy

```
. lincom repdem + L1.repdem + L2.repdem + L3.repdem
```

```
( 1)  repdem + L.repdem + L2.repdem + L3.repdem = 0
```

nat_rate	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
(1)	1.294485	.4426322	2.92	0.004	.4226175	2.166353



$$y_{it} = x_{it+1}\beta_{-1} + x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{it-1}\beta_1 + x_{it-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Can use estimate of  $\beta_{-1}$  to test for anticipation effects
  - Consider temporary increase in  $x_{it}$  from level  $m$  to  $m + 1$  at  $t$ 
    - $y_{t-2} = \beta_{-1}m + m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t-1} = \beta_{-1}(m + 1) + m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
- Anticipation effect:  $\beta_{-1} = y_{t-1} - y_{t-2}$  change in  $y$  in period  $t - 1$ , the period before the temporary one-unit increase in  $x$
- Placebo test: if  $x$  causes  $y$ , but  $y$  does not cause  $x$ , then  $\beta_{-1}$  should be close to zero

# Leads and Lags

```
. reghdfe nat_rate F1.repdem repdem L1.repdem L2.repdem L3.repdem, a(muniID year) cl(muniID)
(MWFE estimator converged in 2 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	<b>3,675</b>
Absorbing 2 HDFE groups	F( 5, 244)	=	<b>3.76</b>
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity	Prob > F	=	<b>0.0027</b>
	R-squared	=	<b>0.3215</b>
	Adj R-squared	=	<b>0.2692</b>
	Within R-sq.	=	<b>0.0121</b>
Number of clusters (muniID)	=	<b>245</b>	Root MSE = <b>3.6808</b>

(Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
repdem						
F1.	.1707685	.3212906	0.53	0.596	-.4620886	.8036255
--.	.6975731	.4397095	1.59	0.114	-.1685376	1.563684
L1.	.8723962	.4619322	1.89	0.060	-.0374873	1.78228
L2.	.014941	.4583628	0.03	0.974	-.8879119	.9177939
L3.	-.2904252	.4108244	-0.71	0.480	-1.09964	.5187895
_cons	2.838663	.1187582	23.90	0.000	2.604741	3.072585


# The Autor Test

- Let  $D_{it}$  be a binary indicator coded 1 if unit  $i$  switched from control to treatment between  $t$  and  $t - 1$ ; 0 otherwise
  - Lags:  $D_{it-1}$ : unit switched between  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$
  - Leads:  $D_{it+1}$ : unit switches between  $t + 1$  and  $t$
- Include lags and leads into the fixed effects model:

$$y_{it} = D_{it+2}\beta_{-2} + D_{it+1}\beta_{-1} + D_{it}\beta_0 + D_{it-1}\beta_1 + D_{it-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Leads  $\beta_{-1}$ ,  $\beta_{-2}$ , etc. test for anticipation effects
  - Switch  $\beta_0$  tests for immediate effect
  - Lags  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ , etc. test for long-run effects
    - highest lag dummy can be coded 1 for all post-switch years


# Dynamic Effect of Switching to Representative Democracy



# Lagged Dependent Variables (LDVs)

$$y_{it} = \alpha y_{it-1} + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$  could be capital stock of firm  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $\alpha$  the capital depreciation rate
- Models with unit fixed effects and lagged  $y$  do not produce consistent estimators (**Nickell bias**)
  - after taking first differences to eliminate  $c_i$ , the differenced residual  $\Delta\varepsilon_{it}$  is correlated with the lagged dependent variable  $\Delta y_{it-1}$  by construction
- We might use past levels  $y_{it-2}$  as an instrument for  $\Delta y_{it-1}$  and apply a general method of moment (GMM) estimator, but this requires strong assumptions (e.g. no serial correlation in  $\varepsilon_{it}$ )
- When  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , the Nickell bias goes to 0; controlling for LDVs is fine as long as they are not correlated with treatment assignment
- However, many existing studies do not survive adding one LDV



# Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

- So far we have assumed that the treatment effect is constant across units
- We can allow for heterogeneous treatment effects by including interaction of treatment with other regressors

$$y_{it} = \text{treat}_{it}\alpha_0 + (\text{treat}_{it} \cdot x_{it})\alpha_1 + x_{it}\beta + c_i + t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Often the treatment is interacted with a time-invariant regressor:

$$y_{it} = \text{treat}_{it}\alpha_0 + (\text{treat}_{it} \cdot x_i)\alpha_1 + c_i + t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Note: The lower order term on the time-invariant  $x_i$  is collinear with the fixed effects and drops out

# Heterogeneous Effect of Direct Democracy

