

Logic and Set Theory

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0 Miscellaneous

Some introductory speech

1 Propositional logic

Let P denote a set of *primitive proposition*, unless otherwise stated, $P = \{p_1, p_2, \dots\}$.

Definition. The *language* or *set of propositions* $L = L(P)$ is defined inductively by:

- (1) $p \in L \ \forall p \in P$;
- (2) $\perp \in L$, where \perp is read as 'false';
- (3) If $p, q \in L$, then $(p \implies q) \in L$. For example, $(p_1 \implies L)$, $((p_1 \implies p_2) \implies (p_1 \implies p_3))$.

Note that at this point, each proposition is only a finite string of symbols from the alphabet $(,), \implies, \perp, p_1, p_2, \dots$ and do not really mean anything (until we define so).

By *inductively define*, we mean more precisely that we set $L_1 = P \cup \{\perp\}$, and $L_{n+1} = L_n \cup \{(p \implies q) : p, q \in L_n\}$, and then put $L = L_1 \cup L_2 \cup \dots$

Each proposition is built up *uniquely* from 1) and 2) using 3). For example, $((p_1 \implies p_2) \implies (p_1 \implies p_3))$ came from $(p_1 \implies p_2)$ and $(p_1 \implies p_3)$. We often omit outer brackets or use different brackets for clarity.

Now we can define some useful things:

- $\neg p$ (not p), as an abbreviation for $p \implies \perp$;
- $p \vee q$ (p or q), as an abbreviation for $(\neg p) \implies q$;
- $p \wedge q$ (p and q), as an abbreviation for $\neg(p \implies (\neg q))$.

These definitions 'make sense' in the way that we expect them to.

Definition. A *valuation* is a function $v : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ s.t.

- (1) $v(\perp) = 0$; (2)

$$v(p \implies q) = \begin{cases} 0 & v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad \forall p, q \in L$$

Remark. On $\{0, 1\}$, we could define a constant \perp by $\perp = 0$, and an operation \implies by $a \implies b = 0$ if $a = 1, b = 0$ and 1 otherwise. Then a valuation is a function $L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that preserves the structure $(\perp \text{ and } \implies)$, i.e. a homomorphism.

Proposition. (1) If v, v' are valuations with $v(p) = v'(p) \ \forall p \in P$, then $v = v'$ (on L).

(2) For any $w : P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, there exists a valuation v with $v(p) = w(p) \ \forall p \in P$. In short, a valuation is defined by its value on P , and any values will do.

Proof. (1) We have $v(p) = v'(p) \ \forall p \in L_1$. However, if $v(p) = v'(p)$ and $v(q) = v'(q)$ then $v(p \implies q) = v'(p \implies q)$, so $v = v'$ on L_2 . Continue inductively we have $v = v'$ on $L_n \ \forall n$.

(2) Set $v(p) = w(p) \ \forall p \in P$ and $v(\perp) = 0$: this defines v on L_1 . Having defined v on L_n , use the rules for valuation to inductively define v on L_{n+1} so we can extend v to L . \square

Definition. We say p is a *tautology*, written $\models p$, if $v(p) = 1 \forall$ valuations v .
Some examples:

(1) $p \implies (q \implies p)$: a true statement implies by anything. We can verify this by:

$v(p)$	$v(q)$	$v(q \implies p)$	$v(p \implies (q \implies p))$
1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1
0	1	0	1
0	0	1	1

So we see that this is indeed a tautology;

(2) $(\neg\neg p) \implies p$, i.e. $((p \implies \perp) \implies \perp) \implies p$, called the "law of excluded middle";

(3) $[p \implies (q \implies r)] \implies [(p \implies q) \implies (p \implies r)]$.

Indeed, if not then we have some v with $v(p \implies (q \implies r)) = 1$, $v((p \implies q) \implies (p \implies r)) = 0$. So $v(p \implies q) = 1$, $v(p \implies r) = 0$. This happens when $v(p) = 1$, $v(r) = 0$, so also $v(q) = 1$. But then $v(q \implies r) = 0$, so $v(p \implies (q \implies r)) = 0$.

Definition. For $S \subset L$, $t \in L$, say S *entails* or *semantically implies* t , written $S \models t$ if $v(s) = 1 \forall s \in S \implies v(t) = 1$, for each valuation v .

("Whenever all of S is true, t is true as well.")

For example, $\{p \implies q, q \implies r\} \models (p \implies r)$. To prove this, suppose not: so we have v with $v(p \implies q) = v(q \implies r) = 1$ but $v(p \implies r) = 0$. So $v(p) = 1$, $v(r) = 0$, so $v(q) = 0$, but then $v(p \implies q) = 0$.

If $v(t) = 1$ we say t is true in v or that v is a model of t .

For $S \subset L$, v is a model of S if $v(s) = 1 \forall s \in S$. So $S \models t$ says that every model of S is a model of t . For example, in fact $\models t$ is the same as $\emptyset \models t$.

2 Syntactic implication

For a notion of 'proof', we will need axioms and deduction rules. As axioms, we'll take:

1. $p \implies (q \implies p) \forall p, q \in L$;
2. $[p \implies (q \implies r)] \implies [(p \implies q) \implies (p \implies r)] \forall p, q, r \in L$;
3. $(\neg\neg p) \implies p \forall p \in L$.

Note: these are all tautologies. Sometimes we say they are 3 axiom-schemes, as all of these are infinite sets of axioms.

As deduction rules, we'll take just *modus ponens*: from p , and $p \implies q$, we can deduce q .

For $S \subset L$, $t \in L$, a *proof* of t from S consists of a finite sequence t_1, \dots, t_n of propositions, with $t_n = t$, s.t. $\forall i$ the proposition t_i is an axiom, or a member of S , or there exists $j, k < i$ with $t_j = (t_k \implies t_i)$.

We say S is the *hypotheses* or *premises* and t is the *conclusion*.

If there exists a proof of t from S , we say S *proves* or *syntactically implies* t , written $S \vdash t$.

If $\phi \vdash t$, we say t is a *theorem*, written $\vdash t$.

Example. $\{p \implies q, q \implies r\} \vdash p \implies r$.

we deduce by the following:

- (1) $[p \implies (q \implies r)] \implies [(p \implies q) \implies (p \implies r)]$; (axiom 2)
- (2) $q \implies r$; (hypothesis)
- (3) $(q \implies r) \implies (p \implies (q \implies r))$; (axiom 1)
- (4) $p \implies (q \implies r)$; (mp on 2,3)
- (5) $(p \implies q) \implies (p \implies r)$ (mp on 1,4);
- (6) $p \implies q$; (hypothesis)
- (7) $p \implies r$. (mp on 5,6)

Example. Let's now try to prove $\vdash p \implies p$. Axiom 1 and 3 probably don't help so look at axiom 2; if we make $(p \implies q)$ and $p \implies (q \implies r)$ something that's a theorem, and make $p \implies r$ to be $p \implies p$ then we are done. So we need to take $p = p, q = (p \implies p), r = p$. Now:

- (1) $[p \implies ((p \implies p) \implies p)] \implies [(p \implies (p \implies p)) \implies (p \implies p)]$; (axiom 2)
- (2) $p \implies ((p \implies p) \implies p)$; (axiom 1)
- (3) $(p \implies (p \implies p)) \implies (p \implies p)$; (mp on 1,2)
- (4) $p \implies (p \implies p)$; (axiom 1)
- (5) $p \implies p$. (mp on 3,4)

Proofs are made easier by:

Proposition. (2, deduction theorem)

Let $S \subset L$, $p, q \in L$. Then $S \vdash (p \implies q)$ if and only if $(S \cup \{p\}) \vdash q$.

Proof. Forward: given a proof of $p \Rightarrow q$ from S , add the lines p (hypothesis), q (mp) to obtain a proof of q from $S \cup \{p\}$.

Backward: if we have proof $t_1, \dots, t_n = q$ of q from $S \cup \{p\}$. We'll show that $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_i) \forall i$, so $p \Rightarrow t_n = q$.

If t_i is an axiom, then we have $\vdash t_i \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i)$, so $\vdash p \Rightarrow t_i$;

If $t_i \in S$, write down $t_i, t_i \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i), p \Rightarrow t_i$ we get a proof of $p \Rightarrow t_i$ from S ;

If $t_i = p$: we know $\vdash (p \Rightarrow p)$, so done;

If t_i obtained by mp: in that case we have some earlier lines t_j and $t_j \Rightarrow t_i$.

By induction, we may assume $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_j)$ and $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_i))$.

Now we can write down $[p \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_i)] \Rightarrow [(p \Rightarrow t_j) \Rightarrow (t_i)]$ by axiom 2, $p \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_i), p \Rightarrow t_j \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i)$ (mp), $p \Rightarrow t_j, p \Rightarrow t_i$ (mp) to obtain $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_i)$.

These are all of the cases. So $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow q)$. □

This is why we chose axiom 2 as we did – to make this proof work.

Example. To show $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r\} \vdash (p \Rightarrow r)$, it's enough to show that $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r, p\} \vdash r$, which is trivial by mp.

Now, how are \vdash and \models related? We are going to prove the *completeness theorem*: $S \vdash t \iff S \models t$.

This ensures that our proofs are sound, in the sense that everything it can prove is not absurd ($S \vdash t$ then $S \models t$), and are adequate, i.e. our axioms are powerful enough to define every semantic consequence of S , which is not obvious ($S \models t$ then $S \vdash t$).

Proposition. (3)

Let $S \subset L, t \in L$. Then $S \vdash t \implies S \models t$.

Proof. Given a valuation v with $v(s) = 1 \forall s \in S$, we want $v(t) = 1$.

We have $v(p) = 1 \forall p$ axiom as our axioms are all tautologies (proven earlier); $v(p) = 1 \forall p \in S$ by definition of v ; also if $v(p) = 1$ and $v(p \Rightarrow q) = 1$, then also $v(q) = 1$ (by definition of \Rightarrow). So $v(p) = 1$ for each line p of our proof of t from S . □

We say $S \subset L$ consistent if $S \not\vdash \perp$. One special case of adequacy is: $S \models \perp \implies S \vdash \perp$, i.e. if S has no model then S inconsistent, i.e. if S is consistent then S has a model. This implies adequacy: given $S \models t$, we have $S \cup \{\neg t\} \models \perp$, so by our special case we have $S \cup \{\neg t\} \vdash \perp$, i.e. $S \vdash ((\neg t) \Rightarrow t)$ by deduction theorem, so $S \vdash \neg \neg t$. But $S \vdash ((\neg \neg t) \Rightarrow t)$ by axiom 3, so $S \vdash t$ (mp).

Theorem. (4)

Let $S \subset L$ be consistent, then S has a model.

The idea is that we would like to define valuation v by $v(p) = 1 \iff p \in S$, or more sensibly, $v(p) = 1 \iff S \vdash p$.

But maybe $S \not\vdash p_3, S \not\vdash \neg p_3$, but a valuation maps half of L to 1, so we want to 'grow' S to contain one of p or $\neg p$ for each $p \in L$, while keeping consistency.

Proof. Claim: for any consistent $S \subset L$, $p \in L$, $S \cup \{p\}$ or $S \cup \{\neg p\}$ consistent.
Proof of claim. If not, then $S \cup \{p\} \vdash \perp$ and $S \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \perp$, then $S \vdash (p \implies \perp)$ (deduction theorem), i.e. $S \vdash \neg p$, so $S \vdash \perp$ contradiction.

Now L is countable as each L_n is countable, so we can list L as t_1, t_2, \dots . Put $S_0 = S$; set $S_1 = S_0 \cup \{t_1\}$ or $S_0 \cup \{\neg t_1\}$ so that S_1 is consistent. Then set $S_2 = S_1 \cup \{t_2\}$ or $S_1 \cup \{\neg t_2\}$ so that S_2 is consistent, and continue likewise. Set $\bar{S} = S_0 \cup S_1 \cup S_2 \cup \dots$. Then $\bar{S} \supset S$, and \bar{S} is consistent (as each S_n is, and each proof is finite). $\forall p \in L$, we have either $p \in \bar{S}$ or $(\neg p) \in \bar{S}$. Also, \bar{S} is *deductively closed*, meaning that is $\bar{S} \vdash p$ then $p \in \bar{S}$: if $p \notin \bar{S}$ then $(\neg p) \in \bar{S}$, so $\bar{S} \vdash p$, $\bar{S} \vdash (\neg p)$ so $\bar{S} \vdash \perp$ contradiction.

Define $v : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by $p \rightarrow 1$ if $p \in \bar{S}$, 0 otherwise. Then v is a valuation: $v(\perp) = 0$ as $\perp \notin \bar{S}$; for $v(p \implies q)$:

If $v(p) = 1$, $v(q) = 0$: We have $p \in \bar{S}$, $q \notin \bar{S}$, and want $v(p \implies q) = 0$, i.e. $(p \implies q) \notin \bar{S}$. But if $(p \implies q) \in \bar{S}$ then $\bar{S} \vdash q$ contradiction;

If $v(q) = 1$: have $q \in \bar{S}$, and want $v(p \implies q) = 1$, i.e. $(p \implies q) \in \bar{S}$. But $\vdash q \implies (p \implies q)$ so $\bar{S} \vdash (p \implies q)$;

If $v(p) = 0$: have $p \notin \bar{S}$, i.e. $(\neg p) \in \bar{S}$ and want $(p \implies q) \in \bar{S}$. So we need $(p \implies \perp) \vdash (p \implies q)$, i.e. $p \implies \perp, p \vdash q$ (deduction theorem). Thus it's enough to show that $\perp \vdash q$. But $(\neg \neg q) \implies q$, and $\vdash (\perp \implies (\neg \neg q))$ (axiom 3 and 1 – to see the second one, write \neg explicitly using \implies and \perp), so $\vdash (\perp \implies q)$, i.e. $\perp \vdash q$. \square

Remark. Sometimes this is called 'completeness theorem'. The proof used P being countable to get L countable; in fact, result still holds if P is uncountable (see chapter 3).

By remark before theorem 4, we have

Corollary. (5, adequacy)

Let $S \subset L$, $t \in L$. Then if $S \models t$ then $S \vdash t$.

And hence,

Theorem. (6, completeness theorem)

Let $S \subset L$, $t \in L$. Then $S \vdash t \iff S \models t$.

Some consequences:

Corollary. (7, compactness theorem)

Let $S \subset L$, $t \in L$ with $S \models t$. Then \exists finite $S' \subset S$ with $S' \models t$.

This is trivial if we replace \models by \vdash (as proofs are finite).

Special case for $t = \perp$: If S has no model then some finite $S' \subset S$ has no model. Equivalently,

Corollary. (7', compactness theorem, equivalent form)

Let $S \subset L$. If every finite subset of S has a model then S has a model.

This is equivalent to corollary 7 because $S \models t \iff S \cup \{\neg t\}$ has no model and $S' \models t \iff S' \cup \{\neg t\}$ has no model.

Corollary. (8, decidability theorem)

There is an algorithm to determine (in finite time) whether or not, for a given finite $S \subset L$ and $t \in L$, we have $S \vdash t$.

This is highly non-obvious; however it's trivial to decide if $S \models t$ just by drawing a truth table, and $\models \iff \vdash$.

3 Well-Orderings and Ordinals

Definition. A *total order* or *linear order* on a set X is a relation $<$ on X , such that

- (1) Irreflexive: Not $x < x \forall x \in X$;
- (2) Transitive: $x < y, y < z \implies x < z \forall x, y, z \in X$;
- (3) Trichotomous: $x < y$ or $x = y$ or $y < x \forall x, y \in X$.

Note: two of (iii) cannot hold: if $x < y, y < x$ then $x < x$ by transitivity.

Write $x \leq y$ if $x < y$ or $x = y$, and $y > x$ if $x < y$.

We can also define total order in terms of \leq :

- (1) Reflexive: $x \leq x \forall x \in X$;
- (2) Transitive: $x \leq y, y \leq z \implies x \leq z \forall x, y, z \in X$;
- (3) Antisymmetric: $x \leq y, y \leq x \implies x = y \forall x, y \in X$;
- (4) 'Tri'chotomous (although it's only two): $x \leq y$ or $y \leq x \forall x, y \in X$.

Example. $\mathbb{N}, \mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{R}$ with the usual orders are all total orders.

\mathbb{N}^+ the relation 'divides' is not a total order: for example we don't have any of $2|3, 3|2$ or $2 = 3$.

$\mathcal{P}(S)$ for some S (with $|S| \geq 2$ to be rigorous), with $x \leq y$ if $x \subseteq y$ is not a total order for the same reason.

A total order is a *well-ordering* if every (non-empty) subset has a least element, i.e. $\forall S \subset X, S \neq \emptyset \implies \exists x \in S, x \leq y \forall y \in S$.

Example. 1. \mathbb{N} with the usual $<$ is a well ordering.

2. $\mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{R}$ with the usual $<$ are not well orderings.

3. $\mathbb{Q}^+ \cup \{0\}$ with the usual $<$ is not a well ordering (e.g. $(0, \infty) \subset \mathbb{Q}^+ \cup \{0\}$).

4. The set $\{1 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\}$ as a subset of \mathbb{R} with the usual ordering is a well ordering.

5. The set $\{1 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\} \cup \{1\}$ as a subset of \mathbb{R} with the usual ordering is a well ordering.

6. The set $\{1 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\} \cup \{2 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\}$ (same assumption) is a well ordering.

Remark. X is well-ordered iff there is no $x_1 > x_2 > x_3 > \dots$ in X .

Clearly if there is such a sequence then $S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots\}$ has no least element.

Conversely, if $S \subset X$ has no least element, then for each element $x \in S$ there exists a $x' \in S$ with $x' < x$, so we can just pick x, x', \dots inductively.

Definition. We say total orders X, Y are *isomorphic* if there exists a bijection $f : X \rightarrow Y$ that is order-preserving, i.e. $x < y \iff f(x) < f(y)$.

For example, 1 and 4 above are isomorphic; 5 and 6 are isomorphic; 4 and 5 are not isomorphic (one has a greatest element, and the other doesn't).

Here comes the first reason why well orderings are useful:

Proposition. (1, Proof by induction)

Let X be well-ordered, and let $S \subset X$ be s.t. if $y \in S \forall y < x$ then $x \in S$ (each $x \in X$). Then $S = X$.

Equivalently, if $p(x)$ is a property s.t. $\forall x: \text{if } p(y) \forall y < x \text{ then } p(x)$, then $p(x) \forall x$.

(I think we must assert S to be non-empty here, but the lecturer didn't agree with me; need to check later.)

Proof. If $S \neq X$ then let x be the least element of $X \setminus S$. Then $x \notin S$. But $y \in S \forall y < x$, contradiction. \square

A typical use:

Proposition. Let X, Y be isomorphic well-orderings. Then there is a *unique* isomorphism from X to Y .

Proof. Let f, g be isomorphisms. We'll show $f(x) = g(x) \forall x$ by induction. Thus we may assume $f(y) = g(y) \forall y < x$, and want $f(x) = g(x)$. Let a be the least element of $Y \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$. Then we must have $f(x) = a$: if $f(x) > a$, then some $x' > x$ has $f(x') = a$ by surjectivity, contradiction. The same shows $g(x)$ = least element of $Y \setminus \{g(y) : y < x\}$, but this is the same as a . So $f(x) = g(x)$. \square

Remark. This is false for total orders in general. One example is, consider from $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$, we could either take identity, or $x \rightarrow x - 5$; or from \mathbb{R} to \mathbb{R} we could take identity or $x \rightarrow x - 5$ or $x \rightarrow x^3 \dots$

Definition. In a total order X , an *initial segment* I is a subset of X such that $x \in I, y < x \implies y \in I$.

Example. For any $x \in X$, set $I(x) = \{y \in X : y < x\}$. Then this is an initial segment.

Obviously, not every initial segment is of this form: for example, in \mathbb{R} we can take $\{x : x \leq 3\}$; or in \mathbb{Q} , take $\{x : x^2 < 2\} \cup \{x < 0\}$ (this cannot be written as above form as $\sqrt{2} \notin \mathbb{Q}$).

Note: in a well-ordering, every proper initial segment *is* of the above form: let x be the least element of $X \setminus I$. Then $y < x \implies y \in I$. Conversely, if $y \in I$, then we must have $y < x$: otherwise $x \in I$, contradiction.

Our aim is to show that every subset of a well-ordered X is isomorphic to an initial segment.

Note: this is very false for total orders: e.g. $\{1, 5, 9\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$, or $\mathbb{Q} \subset \mathbb{R}$. If we have $S \subset X$, We would like to define $f : S \rightarrow X$ that sends the smallest of S to the smallest of X , then remove them from both sets and send the smallest of the remaining to the smallest of the remaining, etc... But to do this we need a theorem.

Theorem. (3, definition by recursion)

Let X be well-ordered, Y be a set, and $G : \mathcal{P}(X \times Y) \rightarrow Y$. Then $\exists f : X \rightarrow Y$ s.t. $f(x) = G(f|_{I_x})$ for all $x \in X$. Moreover, such f is unique.

Here we define the restriction as: for $f : A \rightarrow B$, and $C \subset A$, the restriction of f to C is $f|_C = \{(x, f(x)) : x \in C\}$. (I think the lecturer is regarding a function as subset of a cartesian product)

In defining $f(x)$, make use of $f|_{I_x}$, i.e. the values of $f(y), y < x$.

Proof. Existence: define 'h is an attempt' to mean: $h : I \rightarrow Y$, some initial segment I of X , and $\forall x \in I$ we have $h(x) = G(h|_{I_x})$. Note that h, h' are

attempts, both defined at x , then $h(x) = h'(x)$ by induction on x . Since if $h(y) = h'(y) \forall y < x$ then $h(x) = h'(x)$.

Also, $\forall x \in X$ there exists an attempt defined at x by induction on x : we want attempt defined at x , given $\forall y < x$ there exists attempt defined at y . For each $y < x$, we have unique attempt h_y defined on $\{z : z \leq y\}$ (unique by what we just showed).

Let $h = \cup_{y < x} h_y$: an attempt defined on I_x . This is single-valued by uniqueness, so is indeed a function.

So $h' = h \cup \{(x, G(h))\}$ is an attempt defined at x .

Now set $f(x) = y$ if \exists attempt h , defined at x , with $h(x) = y$ (single-valued).

Uniqueness: if f, f' suitable then $f(x) = f'(x) \forall x \in X$ (induction on X) – since if $f(y) = f'(y) \forall y < x$ then $f(x) = f'(x)$. \square

A typical application:

Proposition. (4, subset collapse)

Let X be well-ordered, $Y \subset X$. Then Y is isomorphic to an initial segment of X . Moreover, such initial segment is unique.

Proof. To have f an isomorphism from Y to an initial segment of X , we need precisely that $\forall x \in Y : f(x) = \min X \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$. So done (existence and uniqueness) by theorem 3.

Note that $X \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\} \neq \emptyset$, e.g. because $f(y) \leq y \forall y$ (induction), so $x \notin \{f(y) : y < x\}$. \square

In particular, a well-ordered X cannot be isomorphic to a proper initial segment of X – by uniqueness in subset collapse, as X is isomorphic to X .

How do different well-orderings relate to each other?

We say $X \leq Y$ if X is isomorphic to an initial segment of Y . For example, $\mathbb{N} \leq \{1 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\} \cup \{1\}$.

Theorem. (5)

Let X, Y be well-orderings. Then $X \leq Y$ or $Y \leq X$.

Proof. Suppose $Y \not\leq X$. To obtain $f : X \rightarrow Y$ that is an isomorphism with an initial segment of Y , need $\forall x \in X : f(x) = \min Y \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$. So we are done by theorem 3.

Note that we cannot have $\{f(y) : y < x\} = X$, as then Y is isomorphic to I_x . \square

Proposition. (6)

Let X, Y be well-orderings with $X \leq Y$ and $Y \leq X$. Then X and Y are isomorphic.

Proof. We have isomorphism f from X to an isomorphism of Y , and g the other way round. Then $g \circ f : X \rightarrow X$ is an isomorphism from X to an initial segment of X (i.s. of i.s. is i.s.), but that is impossible unless the initial segment is X

itself. So $g \circ f$ is identity (by uniqueness in subset collapse). Similarly, $f \circ g$ is identity on Y . \square

New well-orderings from old:

Write $X < Y$ if $X \leq Y$ but X not isomorphic to Y . Equivalently, $X < Y$ iff X is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of Y . For example, if $X = \mathbb{N}$, $Y = \{1 - \frac{1}{n}\} \cup \{1\}$ then $X < Y$.

Make a bigger one: given well-ordered X , choose $x \notin X$, and set $x > y$ for all $y \in X$. This is a well-ordering on $X \cup \{x\}$: written X^+ . Clearly $X < X^+$.

Put some together:

Let $(X, <_X)$ and $(Y, <_Y)$ be well-orderings. Say Y extends X if $X \subset Y$, and $<_X, <_Y$ agree on X , and X an initial segment of $(Y, <_Y)$.

Well-orderings $(X_i : i \in I)$ are nested if $\forall i, j \in I : X_i$ extends X_j or X_j extends X_i .

Proposition. (7)

Let $(X_i : i \in I)$ be a nested family of well-orderings. Then there exist well-ordering X with $X \geq X_i \forall i$.

Proof. Let $X = \cup_{i \in I} X_i$, with $x < y$ if $\exists i$ with $x, y \in X_i$ and $x <_i y$. Then $<$ is a well-defined total order on X . given $S \subset X$, $S \neq \emptyset$, choose i with $S \cap X_i \neq \emptyset$. Then $S \cap X_i$ has a minimal element (as X_i is well-ordered), which must also be a minimal element of S (as X_i an i.s. of X). Also, $X \geq X_i \forall i$. \square

4 Ordinals

Are the well-orderings themselves well-ordered?

An ordinal is a well-ordered set, with two well-ordered sets regarded as the same if they are isomorphic. (Just as a rational is an expression $\frac{M}{N}$, with $\frac{M}{N}, \frac{M'}{N'}$ regarded as the same if $MN' = M'N$. But, unlike for \mathbb{Q} , we cannot formalise by equivalence classes – see later).

If X is a well-ordering corresponding to ordinal α , say X has order-type α .

Example. For each $k \in \mathbb{N}$, write k for the order-type of the (unique) well-ordering of a set of size k , and write ω for order-type of \mathbb{N} . So, in \mathbb{R} , $\{1, 3, 7\}$ has order-type 3. $\{1 - \frac{1}{n} : n = 2, 3, \dots\}$ has order-type ω . For X of o-t α and Y of o-t β , write $\alpha \leq \beta$ if $X \leq Y$ (this is independent of choice of X, Y). Similarly for $\alpha < \beta$ etc.

We know: $\forall \alpha, \beta, \alpha \leq \beta$ or $\beta \leq \alpha$, and if $\alpha \leq \beta, \beta \leq \alpha$ then $\alpha = \beta$.

Theorem. Let α be an ordinal. Then the ordinals $< \alpha$ form a well-ordered set of order-type α . e.g. the ordinals $< \omega$ are $0, 1, 2, 3, \dots$

Proof. Let X have o-t α . the well-orderings $< X$ are precisely (up to isomorphism) the proper initial segments of X , i.e. the $I_x, x \in X$.

But these are isomorphic to X itself, via $x \rightarrow I_x$. □

We often write I_α to be the set of ordinals less than α .

Proposition. (9)

Let S be a non-empty set of ordinals. Then S has a least element.

Proof. Choose $\alpha \in S$. If α minimal in S then done. If not, then $S \cap I_\alpha \neq \emptyset$, so have a minimal element of $S \cap I_\alpha$, which is therefore minimal in S . □

Theorem. (10, Burali-Forti paradox):

The ordinals do not form a set.

Proof. Suppose not, let X be set of all ordinals. Then X is a well-ordering, say order-type α . So X is isomorphic to I_α . But I_α is a proper i.s. of X . □

Given α , we have $\alpha^+ > \alpha$. Also, if $\{\alpha_i : i \in I\}$ is a set of ordinals, then there exists α with $\alpha \geq \alpha_i \forall i$ (by applying prop 7 to the nested family of $I_{\alpha_i}; i \in I$).

In fact, there is therefore a least upper bound for $\{\alpha_i : i \in I\}$ by applying prop 9 to the set $\{\beta \leq \alpha : \beta \text{ an upper bound for the } \alpha_i\}$. This is written $\sup\{\alpha_i : i \in I\}$, e.g. $\sup\{2, 4, 6, 8, \dots\} = \omega$.

Some ordinals: $0, 1, 2, \dots, \omega, \omega + 1$ (officially ω^+), $\omega + 2, \dots$,
 $\omega + \omega = \omega \cdot 2 = \sup\{\omega + 1, \omega + 2, \dots\}$, $\omega^2 + 1, \omega^2 + 2, \dots$,

$\omega 3, \dots, \omega 4, \dots, \dots, \omega \omega = \omega^2 = \sup\{\omega, \omega 2, \omega 3, \dots\},$
 $\omega^2 + 1, \dots, \omega^2 + \omega, \omega^2 + \omega + 1, \dots, \omega^2 + \omega 2, \dots, \omega^2 + \omega^2 = \omega^2 2, \dots, \omega^2 3, \dots, \omega^2 4, \dots, \omega^2 5, \dots, \omega^2 \omega =$
 $\omega^3, \dots, \omega^3 2, \dots, \omega^4, \dots, \omega^\omega = \sup\{\omega, \omega^2, \omega^3, \dots\},$
 $\omega^\omega + 1, \dots, \omega^\omega 2, \dots, \omega^\omega \omega = \omega^{\omega+1},$
 $\omega^{\omega+2}, \dots, \omega^{\omega+3}, \dots, \omega^{\omega^2}, \dots, \omega^{\omega^3}, \dots, \omega^{\omega^\omega}, \dots$
 And as expected we have $\omega^{\omega^{\omega^{\omega^{\dots}}}} = \sup\{\omega, \omega^2, \omega^3, \dots\} := \varepsilon_0$, and then $\varepsilon_0 + 1, \dots$,
 and then the whole thing again until $\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_0^{\varepsilon_0}$.

However, although this thing looks quite magnificent, they are all just countable (as we have just done it). Is there an uncountable ordinal? In other words, is there an uncountable well-ordered set?

Theorem. (11)

There is an uncountable ordinal.

Proof.

IDEA : takes up all countable ordinals. However, this might not be a set.

Let $R = \{A \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N})\}$ s.t. A is a well-ordering of a subset of \mathbb{N} . Let S be image of R under 'order-type', i.e. S is the set of all order-types of well-orderings of some subset of \mathbb{N} . Then S is the set of all countable ordinals. Let ω_1 be $\sup S$. Then ω_1 is uncountable: otherwise, then $\omega_1 \in S$, so ω_1 would be the greatest member of S . But then $\omega_1 + 1$ is also in S . \square

Note that, by contradiction, ω_1 is the *least* uncountable ordinal. ω_1 has some strange properties, e.g.

1. ω_1 is uncountable, but for any $\alpha < \omega_1$, we have $\{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ countable.
2. If $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots < \omega_1$ is any sequence, then it is bounded in ω_1 : $\sup\{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_2\}$ is countable, so is less than ω_1 .

Similarly we have

Theorem. (11', Hartogs' lemma)

For any set X , there is an ordinal that does not inject into X .

To see that, just replace $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N})$ by $\mathcal{P}(X \times X)$ in the previous proof.

Write $\gamma(X)$ for the least such ordinal – e.g. $\gamma(\omega) = \omega_1$.

5 Successors and limits

Given ordinal α , does α (any set of order-type α , e.g. I_α) have a greatest element?

If yes: say β is that greatest element. Then $\gamma < \beta$ or $\gamma = \beta \implies \gamma < \alpha$, and $\gamma < \alpha \implies \gamma < \beta$ or $\gamma = \beta$ (as we can't have $\gamma > \beta$). In other words, $\alpha = \beta^+$.

In that case, we call α a *successor*;

If not: then $\forall \beta < \alpha, \exists \gamma < \alpha$ s.t. $\gamma > \beta$. So $\alpha = \sup\{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$. (this is false in general, e.g. $\omega + 5$). We call α a *limit*.

For example, 5 is a successor, $\omega + 5$ is a successor, ω is a limit, $\omega + \omega$ is a limit. (0 is a limit as well).