

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

INR 5036 | Fall 2021
Thu. 9:00–11:30 a.m.
BEL 0113

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is a Ph.D.-level colloquium on the study of international political economy. It addresses the major theoretical debates in the field and introduces the chief methodological approaches used in contemporary analyses. Drawing on the scientific literature in IPE, the course focuses on such key issues as trade, international financial and monetary relations, foreign direct investment, migration, international institutions, and contemporary responses to economic integration. The course is intended to lay the groundwork for future research in the fields of international political economy, international relations, and comparative political economy, as well as to help prepare students for the IPE component of the comprehensive exams in international relations.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

- **READING:** The main requirement for this course is to read thoroughly the assigned works and come to meetings prepared to examine and critically discuss them.
- **DISCUSSION LEADERS:** In addition to regular seminar participation, each participant will choose **two weeks** for which they will be responsible for leading off the discussion with a 5–10 minute series of comments and questions. These are *not* intended to be summaries of the readings; rather, discussion leaders are expected to propose themes to organize the meeting and suggest some of the more important questions to be addressed in the discussion.
- **CRITICAL REVIEWS:** Each seminar participant will write **three critical reviews** (3–4 double-spaced pages) reacting to the material assigned for that week. The reviews must focus on readings to be discussed in that week, not previous class readings. While a successful review likely requires a short summary of the questions and findings con-

tained in the readings, the bulk of the paper should be dedicated to providing original criticism of the research. The essay should strive to offer *constructive* criticism—i.e., some sense of how the research could be improved. These essays are to be posted to all seminar participants on Canvas **on the day before class (Wednesday) by noon**.

Participants may not write critical reviews for weeks in which they have discussion leader duty. Discussion leader and critical review duties will be assigned in consultation with the instructor in the first meeting of the seminar.

- **FINAL PAPER:** Students will write a final research paper that attempts to advance our knowledge about a topic/question addressed in the course, with the goal of producing something that could eventually be published after some revision. Students must choose one of the following formats for the final paper:

1. **Original Research Design:** The paper will develop a feasible research design for a question in international political economy. The research design paper should include: (1) a succinct statement of a research question or puzzle that can be evaluated empirically (often this can be the most difficult part; keep this task in mind as you read for each week, and ask me if you want to read further on a specific topic); (2) a literature review that critically evaluates existing approaches to the question; (3) the specification of one or more theoretically-grounded hypotheses; and (4) a description of the data and methods that will be used to evaluate the hypotheses. The methods part of the paper should describe whether the hypotheses will be evaluated qualitatively, quantitatively (experimentally or observationally), or formally; the data and measurement choices appropriate for the question at hand (the data need not actually exist, but it should be data that could exist); the main design and/or modeling choices and how you intend to analyze the data; competing explanations and threats to inference, and how you propose to address them. Ideally, this assignment will further your own research agenda in a tangible way and result in a paper that will eventually be published after the analysis is executed.
2. **Replication Paper:** The student will write a publishable empirical paper based on the replication of a published article. The paper should address a substantive problem in international political economy and make one or more clear arguments. Students will first find an article that they wish to replicate (which ideally will have been recently published in one of the top journals in the discipline) in consultation with me, acquire the data used in the article, and replicate the main results in the tables/figures in the original paper. The bulk of the project, however, will be dedicated to improving on or extending the original analysis. Examples of improvements and extensions include testing the robustness of previous results using new data or changing how the original authors handled problems of measurement, selection bias, endogeneity, omitted variable bias, model specification, effect heterogeneity, among others. Extensions may also consider whether previous research results are context-dependent or conditional on another variable.

As students consider which improvement or extension to tackle in their replica-

tion project, they should keep these questions in mind: How does this change our understanding of the issue at hand? Whose mind will you change and how? A successful paper need not actually be published or submitted for publication; however, it should be of publishable quality, in that it could be submitted for a conference or a journal after some revisions.

The final paper should be about 15–20 pages (double-spaced, one-inch margins, 12pt standard font, not including references).

The first step of the final paper will be getting my approval for your proposed research. Students are required to **submit an abstract or proposal** of the paper (~500 words) via email or Canvas **by Week 6**. The proposal should include a preliminary bibliography that identifies the main works in the debate to which you will be contributing. Students must schedule a meeting with the instructor as soon as possible (and before submitting their proposal) to discuss their interests and ideas for the final paper.

- **FINAL PAPER PRESENTATION:** Students will present their final project at the end of the semester. The presentation will be 10–12 minutes and will use standard conference format. Each presentation will be followed by 10–15 minutes of Q&A and feedback from all seminar participants.

Calculation of Final Grade: Your final grade in this course will be based on the following criteria:

Participation	15%
Critical review essays	30%
Final paper	40%
Final paper presentation	15%

READINGS

Virtually all assigned readings are available online through the FSU Library system. Readings not available online will be provided by the instructor on the course Canvas page.

There are no required books, but students seeking a substantive or theoretical background in IPE may find the following works helpful:

- Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, sixth edition, 2017.
- Jeffry A. Frieden. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2006.
- Thomas Oatley. *International Political Economy*. Routledge, New York, sixth edition, 2018.

COURSE PLAN

Week 1 (Aug. 26): Perspectives on IPE

- David A. Lake. Hobbesian Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1):263–283, 2009.
- Robert O. Keohane. The old IPE and the new. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(1):34–46, 2009.
- Thomas Oatley. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization*, 65(2):311–341, 2011.

Recommended:

Dani Rodrik. When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(1):189–208, 2014.

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman. BREXIT, voice and loyalty: Rethinking electoral politics in an age of interdependence. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2):232–247, 2017.

Erica Owen and Stefanie Walter. Open economy politics and Brexit: Insights, puzzles, and ways forward. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2):179–202, 2017.

Ronald Rogowski. Trade, Immigration, and Cross-Border Investment. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Robert Gilpin. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2001.

Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin. International political economy: Global and domestic interactions. In Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, editors, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, pages 118–146. Norton, New York, 2002.

Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs. Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE's missing macroeconomy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2):203–231, 2017.

Stephen Chaudoin and Helen V. Milner. Science and the system: IPE and international monetary politics. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(4):681–698, 2017.

Benjamin Cohen. The IPE of money revisited. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(4):657–680, 2017.

Thomas Oatley. Open economy politics and trade policy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(4):699–717, 2017.

Week 2 (Sep. 2): Individuals, Groups, and Trade

- Ronald Rogowski. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *The American Political Science Review*, 81(4):1121–1137, 1987.
- Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1):133–145, 2001.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3):425–457, 2009.
- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade. *International Organization*, 60(2):469–498, 2006.
- Diana C. Mutz and Eunji Kim. The Impact of In-group Favoritism on Trade Preferences. *International Organization*, 71(4):827–850, 2017.
- In Song Kim. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):1–20, 2017.

Recommended:

Jason Kuo and Megumi Naoi. Individual Attitudes. In Lisa L. Martin, editor, *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2015.

Gene M Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Identity Politics and Trade Policy. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 88(3):1101–1126, 2021.

Erica Owen and Noel P. Johnston. Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment. *International Organization*, 71(4):665–699, 2017.

Diana C. Mutz and Amber Hye-Yon Lee. How Much is One American Worth? How Competition Affects Trade Preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4):1179–1194, 2020.

Andy Baker. Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America? A Consumption-Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences. *World Politics*, 55(3):423–455, 2003.

Michael J. Hiscox. Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization*, 55(1):1–46, 2001.

Alexandra Guisinger. Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable? *International Organization*, 63(3):533–557, 2009.

Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg. How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade? *International Organization*, 66(02):311–328, 2012.

- Sungmin Rho and Michael Tomz. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization*, 71(S1):S85–S108, 2017.
- James E. Alt, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski. The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(6):689–717, 1996.
- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Protection for Sale. *The American Economic Review*, 84(4):833–850, 1994.
- Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi. Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation. *The American Economic Review*, 89(5):1135–1155, 1999.
- Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay. Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 82(1):139–152, 2000.
- Michael J. Hiscox. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review*, 96(3):593–608, 2002.
- Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik. Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? *European Economic Review*, 49(6):1393–1430, 2005.
- Eugene Beaulieu. Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem. *Economics & Politics*, 14(2):99–131, 2002.
- Andy Baker. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):924–938, 2005.
- Xiaobo Lü, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3):638–654, 2012.
- Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik. Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45(1):39–82, 2007.
- Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, and Philipp Kircher. Matching, Sorting, and the Distributional Effects of International Trade. *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(1):224–264, 2016.
- Katja B. Kleinberg and Benjamin O. Fordham. Trade and Foreign Policy Attitudes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(5):687–714, 2010.
- Alexandra Guisinger. *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences Without Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting. *International Organization*, 71(3):423–457, 2017.
- Judith Goldstein. The impact of ideas on trade policy: The origins of U.S. agricultural and manufacturing policies. *International Organization*, 43(1):31–71, 1989.

Sean D. Ehrlich. The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(4):1013–1033, 2010.

Edward J. Ray and Howard P. Marvel. The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialized World. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 66(3):452–458, 1984.

Edward D. Mansfield and Marc L. Busch. The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. *International Organization*, 49(4):723–749, 1995.

Michael Bailey. Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26(1):45–80, 2001.

Douglas Nelson. Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(3):796–837, 1988.

Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley. Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy. *International Organization*, 65(1):37–68, 2011.

Bumba Mukherjee, Dale L. Smith, and Quan Li. Labor (Im)mobility and the Politics of Trade Protection in Majoritarian Democracies. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(1):291–308, 2009.

Megumi Naoi and Ikuo Kume. Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession. *International Organization*, 65(4):771–795, 2011.

Pushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra. Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 87(1):59–72, 2005.

Richard K. Herrmann, Philip E. Tetlock, and Matthew N. Diascro. How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(2):191–218, 2001.

Andrew Kerner, Jane Sumner, and Brian Richter. Offshore production’s effect on Americans’ attitudes toward trade. *Business and Politics*, pages 1–33

Firms and Trade:

Iain Osgood, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim, Helen V. Milner, and Gabriele Spilker. The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):133–152, 2016.

Iain Osgood. Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, 72(2):455–484, 2018.

Michael J. Gilligan. Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(3):455–474, 1997.

Oona A. Hathaway. Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection. *International Organization*, 52(3):575–612, 1998.

Leonardo Baccini, Pablo M. Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence. *International Organization*, 71(2):373–395, 2017.

Helen Milner. Resisting the protectionist temptation: Industry and the making of trade policy in France and the United States during the 1970s. *International Organization*, 41(4):639–665, 1987.

Elhanan Helpman. Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 44(3):589–630, 2006.

Helen Milner. Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade. *World Politics*, 40(3):350–376, 1988.

J. Lawrence Broz and Seth H. Werfel. Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection. *International Organization*, 68(02):393–416, 2014.

Week 3 (Sep. 9): Trade and Domestic Institutions

- James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan. The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2(2):165–192, 1994.
- Ronald Rogowski. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organization*, 41(02):203–223, 1987.
- Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization*, 59(1):107–143, 2005.
- Daniel Y. Kono. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review*, 100(3):369–384, 2006.
- Sean D. Ehrlich. Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies. *International Organization*, 61(03):571–605, 2007.

Recommended:

In Song Kim, John Londregan, and Marc Ratkovic. The Effects of Political Institutions on the Extensive and Intensive Margins of Trade. *International Organization*, 73(4):755–792, 2019.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse. Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration. *World Economy*, 31(1):67–96, 2008.

Edward D. Mansfield and Marc L. Busch. The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. *International Organization*, 49(4):723–749, 1995.

Michael A. Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics*,

49(3):309–338, April 1997.

Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade. *International Organization*, 63(3):491–532, 2009.

Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield. Fragmenting Protection: The Political Economy of Trade Policy in the Post-Communist World. *British Journal of Political Science*, 33(4):635–657, 2003.

Megumi Naoi and Ellis Krauss. Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4):874–892, 2009.

Witold J. Henisz and Edward D. Mansfield. Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1):189–211, 2006.

Devashish Mitra, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu. “Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(3):497–508, 2002.

J. Ernesto López-Córdova and Christopher M. Meissner. The Impact of International Trade on Democracy: A Long-Run Perspective. *World Politics*, 60(4):539–575, 2008.

Judith Goldstein. Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy. *International Organization*, 42(1):179–217, 1988.

Michael J. Hiscox. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization*, 53(4):669–698, 1999.

Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3):427–460, 1988.

Daniel Yuichi Kono. Democracy and Trade Discrimination. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(04):942–955, 2008.

Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee. Democratization and Economic Globalization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1):163–181, 2009.

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4):1239–1282, 2005.

Carolyn L. Evans. A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation. *Economics & Politics*, 21(2):278–307, 2009.

Week 4 (Sep. 16): Trade and International Politics

- Stephen D. Krasner. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics*, 28(3):317–347, April 1976.
- Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield. Power Politics and International Trade. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(2):408–420, 1993.
- Giovanni Maggi. The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation. *The American Economic Review*, 89(1):190–214, 1999.

- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade. *The American Political Science Review*, 96(1):167–169, March 2002.
- Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1):37–67, 2007.

Recommended:

Michael Tomz, Judith L. Goldstein, and Douglas Rivers. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment. *The American Economic Review*, 97(5):2005–2018, 2007.

Joanne Gowa. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade. *American Political Science Review*, 83(4):1245–1256, 1989.

Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield. Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade. *International Organization*, 58(4):775–805, 2004.

Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson. The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows. In Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, editors, *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, pages 188–208. Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1997.

Charles P. Kindleberger. *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 40th anniversary edition, 2013. “Chapter. 14. An Explanation of the 1929 Depression” (pp. 291–308).

Nuno Limao. Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States. *American Economic Review*, 96(3):896–914, 2006.

Mark S. Manger. Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs. *World Politics*, 64(4):622–658, 2012.

Lloyd Gruber. Power politics and the free trade bandwagon. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(7):703–741, 2001.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *The American Political Science Review*, 94(2):305–321, 2000.

Daniel Verdier. Democratic Convergence and Free Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(1):1–24, 1998.

Xinyuan Dai. Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage: Conceptualizing the Effect of Democratic Constraints on Trade. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 18(3):267–297, 2006.

Michael D. Ward, Nils W. Metternich, Cassy L. Dorff, Max Gallop, Florian M. Hollenbach, Anna Schultz, and Simon Weschle. Learning from the Past and Stepping into the

Future: Toward a New Generation of Conflict Prediction. *International Studies Review*, 15(4):473–490, 2013.

James Ashley Morrison. Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization. *International Organization*, 66(3):395–428, 2012.

International Institutions and Trade:

Andrew K. Rose. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review*, 94(1):98–114, 2004.

Andrew K. Rose. Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy? *Journal of International Economics*, 63(2):209–235, 2004.

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger. An Economic Theory of GATT. *American Economic Review*, 89(1):215–248, 1999.

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger. The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice. *Annual Review of Economics*, 2(1):223–256, 2010.

Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94. *World Politics*, 57(4):453–478, 2005.

Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. *Economics & Politics*, 2(1):1–23, 1990.

B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization*, 55(4):829–857, 2001.

B. Peter Rosendorff. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(3):389–400, 2005.

Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt. International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade. *International Organization*, 62(4):621–652, 2008.

Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. *International Organization*, 57(4):829–862, 2003.

Marc L. Busch. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *International Organization*, 61(04):735–761, 2007.

Stephen Chaudoin. Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. *International Organization*, 68(04):877–911, 2014.

Christina L. Davis. International institutions and issue linkage: Building support for agricultural trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1):153–169, 2004.

R. W. Staiger and G. Tabellini. Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? *Economics & Politics*, 11(2):109–144, 1999.

Leslie Johns and Lauren Peritz. The Design of Trade Agreements. In Lisa L. Martin, editor, *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1st edition, 2015.

Allison Carnegie. States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 108(01):54–70, 2014.

Jason S. Davis. Screening for losers: Trade institutions and information. *The Review of International Organizations*, 17(1):1–37, 2022.

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(3):574–601, 1998.

Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements. *American Economic Review*, 97(4):1374–1406, 2007.

Joanne Gowa. Alliances, market power, and postwar trade: Explaining the GATT/WTO. *World Trade Review*, 9(3):487–504, 2010.

Week 5 (Sep. 23): Political Economy of Exchange Rates

- J. Aizenman. The Impossible Trinity (aka The Policy Trilemma). In Gerard Caprio, Thorsten Beck, Stijn Claessens, and Sergio L. Schmukler, editors, *The Evidence and Impact of Financial Globalization*, pages 381–390. Academic Press, San Diego, 2013.
- Jeffrey A. Frieden. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization*, 45(4):425–451, 1991.
- Beth A. Simmons. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton University Press, 1994 (Chapters 1, 3, 4).
- William Bernhard and David Leblang. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments. *International Organization*, 53(1):71–97, 1999.
- Stefanie Walter. A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences. *International Organization*, 62(3):405–438, 2008.

Recommended:

David Leblang. To Devalue or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4):533–560, 2003.

David A. Steinberg and Krishan Malhotra. The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy. *World Politics*, 66(3):491–529, 2014.

David A. Leblang. Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(4):599–620, 1999.

Hélène Rey. Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence. *NBER Working Paper*, No. 21162, 2015.

- Peter Alexis Gourevitch. Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s. *International Organization*, 38(1):95–129, 1984.
- Benjamin J. Cohen. The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of International Monetary Cooperation. In Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz, editors, *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, fifth edition, 2009.
- David Andrew Singer. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review*, 104(2):307–323, 2010.
- J Lawrence Broz, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data. *IMF Staff Papers*, 55(3):417–444, 2008.
- Joseph Jupille and David Leblang. Voting for Change: Calculation, Community, and Euro Referendums. *International Organization*, 61(4):763–782, 2007.
- Joshua Aizenman, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito. Monetary policy spillovers and the trilemma in the new normal: Periphery country sensitivity to core country conditions. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 68:298–330, 2016.
- J. Lawrence Broz. The Domestic Politics of International Monetary Order: The Gold Standard. In Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz, editors, *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, fifth edition, 2009.
- Barry Eichengreen. Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System. In Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, editors, *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. Routledge, New York, fourth edition, 2000.
- David A. Leblang. The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World. *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(1):69–91, 2002.
- David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. *International Organization*, 60(1):245–262, 2006.
- David Leblang and William Bernhard. The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies. *International Organization*, 54(2):291–324, 2000.
- Jeffry A. Frieden. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Princeton University Press, 2014.
- David H. Bearce. Not Complements, But Substitutes: Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments, Central Bank Independence, and External Currency Stability. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(4):807–824, 2008.
- David H. Bearce. A Political Explanation for Exchange-Rate Regime Gaps. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1):58–72, 2014.
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Week 10 (Oct. 28): FDI, MNCs, and Global Value Chains

- Quan Li, Erica Owen, and Austin Mitchell. Why Do Democracies Attract More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Metaregression Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(3):494–504, 2018.
- Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4):741–762, 2008.
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- Edmund J. Malesky. Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(1):97–119, 2008.
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Week 11 (Nov. 4): Foreign Aid, Oil, and the Resource Curse

- Michael Lewin Ross. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics*, 53(3):325–361, 2001.
- Kevin M. Morrison. Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability. *International Organization*, 63(01):107–138, 2009.
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Week 12 (Nov. 11): Migration, Labor, and Globalization

- Anna Maria Mayda. Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3):510–530, 2006.
- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):61–84, 2010.
- Neil Malhotra, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2):391–410, 2013.
- Margaret E. Peters. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States. *International Organization*, 68(4):811–844, 2014.
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Alexandra O Zeitz and David A Leblang. Migrants as Engines of Financial Globalization: The Case of Global Banking. *International Studies Quarterly*, 65(2):360–374, 2021.

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- Alisha C. Holland and Margaret E. Peters. Explaining Migration Timing: Political Information and Opportunities. *International Organization*, 74(3):560–583, 2020.
- Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang, and Jessica C. Teets. Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration. *World Politics*, 66(3):406–445, 2014.
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- Rafaela M. Dancygier and Michael J. Donnelly. Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and Attitudes toward Immigration. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(1):17–35, 2013.
- Nikhar Gaikwad and Gareth Nellis. The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2):456–472, 2017.
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- Richard B. Freeman. Are Your Wages Set in Beijing? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):15–32, 1995.
- Julian di Giovanni, Andrei A. Levchenko, and Francesc Ortega. A Global View of Cross-Border Migration. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13(1):168–202, 2015.
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Week 13 (Nov. 18): Diffusion, Contagion, and Interdependence

- Thomas Oatley. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization*, 65(2):311–341, 2011.
- Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations. *International Organization*, 69(2):275–309, 2015.
- Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *The American Political Science Review*, 98(1):171–189, 2004.
- Sarah M. Brooks. Globalization and Pension Reform in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49(4):31–62, 2007.
- Xun Cao. Networks as Channels of Policy Diffusion: Explaining Worldwide Changes in Capital Taxation, 1998–2006. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(3):823–854, 2010.
- Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward. Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization. *International Organization*, 60(4):911–933, 2006.

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Sarah M. Brooks. Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization Around the World. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(2):273–294, 2005.

Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization*, 60(4):811–846, 2006.

Sarah M. Brooks, Raphael Cunha, and Layna Mosley. Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors' Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(3):587–601, 2015.

Cristina Bodea and Raymond Hicks. International Finance and Central Bank Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1):268–284, 2015.

Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz. Paths to Financial Policy Diffusion: Statist Legacies in Latin America's Globalization. *International Organization*, 66(1):95–128, 2012.

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- Detlef Jahn. Globalization as ‘Galton’s Problem’: The Missing Link in the Analysis of Diffusion Patterns in Welfare State Development. *International Organization*, 60(2):401–431, 2006.
- Alexandra Guisinger and Nancy E. Brune. The Diffusion of Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13(1):1–27, 2017.
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- Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. *International Organization*, 60(4):781–810, 2006.
- Kurt Gerhard. Weyland. Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform. *World Politics*, 57(2):262–295, 2005.
- Christian Houle, Mark A. Kayser, and Jun Xiang. Diffusion or Confusion? Clustered Shocks and the Conditional Diffusion of Democracy. *International Organization*, 70(4):687–726, 2016.
- David Levi-Faur. The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598(1):12–32, 2005.
- Chang Kil Lee and David Strang. The International Diffusion of Public-Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning. *International Organization*, 60(4):883–909, 2006.
- Xun Cao. Networks of Intergovernmental Organizations and Convergence in Domestic Economic Policies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(4):1095–1130, 2009.
- Xun Cao. Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network Explanation of Policy Changes. *World Politics*, 64(3):375–425, 2012.
- Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery. Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization*, 63(03):559–592, 2009.
- Thomas Oatley, W. Kindred Winecoff, Andrew Pennock, and Sarah Bauerle Danzman. The Political Economy of Global Finance: A Network Model. *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(1):133–153, 2013.
- Covadonga Meseguer and Fabrizio Gilardi. What is new in the study of policy diffusion? *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(3):527–543, 2009.
- Fabrizio Gilardi. Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes? *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3):650–666, 2010.
- Robert J. Franzese and Jude C. Hays. Interdependence in Comparative Politics: Substance, Theory, Empirics, Substance. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):742–780, 2008.
- Ann E. Towns. Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion “From Below”. *International Organization*, 66(02):179–209, 2012.

Harvey Starr. Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2):356–381, 1991.

Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper. Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence Theory and Model Specification. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(7):819–849, 2012.

Marc Howard Ross and Elizabeth Homer. Galton’s Problem in Cross-National Research. *World Politics*, 29(1):1–28, 1976.

Skyler J. Cranmer, Bruce A. Desmarais, and Benjamin W. Campbell. The contagion of democracy through international networks. *Social Networks*, 2019.

Week 14 (Nov. 25): *Thanksgiving Day Holiday; No Meeting*

Week 15 (Dec. 2): [Project presentations](#)

Dec. 10: [Final paper due](#)