## Home Assignment 2 EITN41

## Anon

**A-6** What is the purpose of the random values  $R_1$  in a Mix?

The purpose of using random values  $R_1$  in a Mix is to hide the correspondence between inputs and outputs to the Mix.

Without  $R_1$  the input to the Mix would be  $K_1(K_a(R_0, M), A)$ . It would be trivial for an attacker to encrypt the output  $K_a(R_0, M)$ , A with the Mix's public key  $K_1$  and do a lookup in a list of recorded input messages and find the corresponding input, effectively linking origin and destination.

**A-7** When sending a mail through several Mixes, there are several public keys involved:  $K_1, K_2, ..., K_n$  and  $K_a$ . What happens if one does not use  $K_a$ ? Does this risk the anonymity of the sender?

If  $K_a$  is used, the output of the mixes look like this:

$$K_a(R_0, M), A$$

Without using  $K_a$ , the output should be:

$$R_0, M, A$$

This means that the randomness  $R_0$  is superfluous and the message M is sent in plaintext. This does not directly mean that the sender's anonymity is risked, but it could be deduced from M.

**A-8** Briefly explain how using several Mixes versus an onion routing circuit differ both in terms of latency and in cryptographic primitives used for encrypting the traffic.

blah

- **A-12** Regarding replay attacks on Mixes, two protections are suggested in the lecture notes. Which? Would you say that any of them is the better choice? Show how the two strategies can be combined and how this can make the protection more efficient.
  - 1. Calculate hash for each input message and store this. Do a lookup of all subsequent messages, if one matches, throw away.
  - 2. Include a timestamp in each input, to verify that the message is 'fresh'.

One difference to consider is the storage and computational issues with using hashes: computational for calculating hashes and doing later lookups, storage for storing hashes of all messages, whose cardinality can be quite large.

## TODO: write abt combination

**A-13** It is straightforward to generalize the N - 1 attack to an N - k attack, 0 < k < N. Describe the N - k attack.

The general idea of a N-1 attack is to reduce the size of the anonymity set for a user. An attacker controls exactly N-1 inputs to the Mix (total inputs = N). The attacker knows the recipients to their N-1 messages and therefore the only message they didn't send is the one sent by the victim. The generalization of this is that an attacker controls N-k inputs. Even if this attack is not as effective as the N-1 attack, it still reduces the anonymity set of a target user to the size k, which from the attackers point of view is something positive.

**A-15** In the disclosure attack on mixes, explain m, N, n and why a Mix is insecure if  $m \leq \lfloor N/n \rfloor$ .

- $\mathbf{m}$  The result of a successful attack. m sets with exactly one recipient, then these m recipients are Alice's communication partners.
- N The total number of users in the anonymity system.
- n The number of receivers in a batch.
- **A-26** A TCP handshake consists of the client and the server exchanging three messages: SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK. Explain why, in Tor, Alice can connect to a webserver and expect the TCP handshake with the server to be performed with low latency.

blah

**A-28** Show that the SSL/TLS handshake, when RSA is used, does not provide perfect forward secrecy.

blah