

Best Practice Authentication and Authorization

in distributed Business Scenarios with OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0

Master Thesis

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Thanks to ...

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Introduction

With the rise of social networks, online services experienced a revolution quite recently and thus have had a significant impact on the way private information gets propagated on the Internet. Developers split up solutions into backend and frontend applications and build their backend solutions as Application Programming Interfaces (API) which can be used to propagate services online. Published APIs can then be consumed by frontend applications or even third-party applications. This approach especially gained popularity with the rise of mobile and single page applications, which heavily depend on a light-weighted frontend. However using APIs to access the business logic means, that the trust relationship is not between two parties but also may include third-party applications. This uncertain trust relationship raises concerns of users and developers regarding security and privacy of personal information. Building trust is a substantial part for architects and developers when designing a system. In order to efface security and privacy concerns of users an advanced access and identity management system is needed. [cf. (Cirani et al., 2015), (Tkalec, 2015), (Røssvoll, 2013)].

1.1 Problem Statement

In traditional architectures, a third party receives the user's credentials for the user to be able to access information from the third party as stated before. Prasad, 2016 however points out that sharing the credentials with a third party might lead to security problems. Third parties might be responsible for fatal security gaps, for example by storing passwords in plain-text. *ibid.* further states that the compromise of one third-party will then lead to the compromise of the credentials of the end user. As a result, the safety of the secure resources cannot be granted anymore. Moreover, third-parties

will receive the comparatively more significant amount of access to the user data than needed.

Another concern is that users often are required to create new accounts for each service they want to use. On the one hand the process of creating a new account for a service can be annoying for the user because they have to burden of keeping track of multiple accounts and remembering multiple credentials. On the other hand the complex task of managing this accounts can led to problems like password fatigue and in the worst case to identity theft or the compromise of services [cf. Sakimura et al., 2014].

1.2 Research Question

What are feasible ways to implement authentication and authorization for enterprises that depend on adaptability and focus on modern single page applications? Furthermore, what are benefits of the token-based authentication with OAuth2 and OpenID Connect versus traditional authentication methods? The questions should be elaborated while considering common security risks of modern web applications.

1.3 Hypthesis

In modern architectures, the process of authentication and authorization of the user is often implemented by a third party. An example of a such an modern Infrastructure is the Cloud. Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017 suggest for identity management, to rely on standards and specifications that are widespread and documented. Example for tools and standards include Internet protocols for accessing services like REST, SOAP, and XML and federate identity standards for service authentication such as SAML, OAuth, and OpenID Connect.

The problem with these infrastructures is that the services are often offered for free but the services need the data of the user in order to work. To solve this problem a solution that uses modern Internet protocols and identity standards while not needing to provide the data of the users to a third party is needed. Therefore the current In this thesis, the focus is on modern distributed architectures and ways to provide users secure access to protected resources and confidential management of the user's credentials. The focus is on the protocols OpenID Connect an OAuth 2.0.

1.4 Method

The first priority was to make extensive research on the topic to get an overview of the current state of authentication and authorization methods. After the research before starting to analyze the different methods of authentication and authorization a case for an assessment is defined and described in detail. Based on this case an risk assessment is executed and the according level of assurance is determined. The level of assurance need for this case allows me to choose the appropriate technologies to mitigate risks and the impact of errors. With this set of technologies and example solution for a modern enterprise single page application is created to give a best practice example based on the theoretical gathered knowledge.

Related Work

"On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog"(Steiner, 2018)

The cartoon of *ibid.* showing two dogs sitting in front of a computer with the iconic title cited above became an illustration of how people view anonymity on the Internet. Being anonymous on the Internet however is not that easy anymore. The use of mobile devices has changed the way how we access information, interact with each other and share content. Digital services are used to access information opening fraught opportunities to attackers if they manage to impersonate someone successfully. With this change of user behavior the way we think of authentication and authorization methods has to adjust. Identity management is mandatory to provide a seamless user experience, including identity proofing process, authentication process and assertions in federated environments [cf. (Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017), (Corre et al., 2017)].

Users find themselves struggling using multiple devices, accounts, and services. The user's burden of this site-by-site account management is putting security at risk. The goal of new authentication and authorization solutions is to help the user managing his accounts by providing single-sign-on, based on an exchange of identity-related assertion across security domains in a scalable way [cf. (*ibid.*)].

2.1 Security Considerations

Before getting further into the topic of authentication and authorization, this section will shed light on some basic security principles, concerning authentication and authorization, that help to understand the need for authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Some basic design principles formulated by Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975 in 1975 were paraphrased by Neumann, 2013 and are still relevant today. The principles give an underlying overview of what should be the focus when designing a secure system. The first of the ten basic security principles formulated by Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975 is the economy of mechanism which means to keep a design as simple as possible. The next principle describes that access should not be explicitly denied instead it should be explicitly permitted. For example when using Access Control Lists (ACLs) all access should be explicitly denied by default. This kind of access control is called Fail-safe defaults. Furthermore *ibid.* states the complete mediation principle, that every access to every object has to be checked for authority without exceptions. A very important concept that is part of these ten principles is open design. The design of an application should not be secret, it can not be assumed that design secrecy will enhance security. This principle is applied in cryptography. The design of cryptographic algorithms is available for the public, just the keys remain secret. A wide used principle in authentication is the separation of privileges. Separation of privileges means that two keys should be used to protect resources if feasible and privileges should be separated. Furthermore every application and user should be provided with least privileges they need to complete their job. The existence of overly powerful mechanisms such as superuser is inherently dangerous - this is called least privilege. The least common mechanism principle compels to minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users. In authentication users often get frustrated with the complicated sign-in processes therefore the psychological acceptability should be kept in mind. Keep it simple. The design of the interface for the user should be easy to understand so that the user routinely and automatically applies the protection mechanism correctly. The attack factor or work factor how *ibid.* is important to protect sensible resources. Cost-to-protect should commensurate with threats and expected risks. It should not be possible to circumvent the mechanism with the resources of the attacker. The last one is recording of compromises which means to provide trails of evidence which are tamper-proof and difficult to bypass. All of these principles are important when choosing and authentication system and need to be considered carefully.

Besides formulating these very important principles which will be discussed in various forms, *ibid.* also discuss the terms "privacy" and "security". Those terms get frequently used by authors writing about information storing systems, like in this paper. However the terms "privacy" and "security" are often used very differently. *ibid.* for example, defines "privacy" as the ability of an individual to specify whether, when and to whom sensible information is released and "security" is described as a technique that can control who is able to modify resources on a computer. Another more recent description

of the terms "security" and "privacy" comes from Brooks et al., 2017. *ibid.* state the importance of the distinction between privacy and security. This distinction is between privacy and security are essential because there are security issues unrelated to privacy, just as there are privacy issues that are unrelated to security. While security concerns arise from illegal system behavior, privacy concerns arise from byproducts of authorized personally identifiable information (PII) processing. Even byproducts that are considered to protect PII can raise security concerns, for example, it can be questioned to which degree a tool for persistent activity monitoring should reveal information about individuals that are related to security purposes. However, security and privacy have in common that they want to protect personal information and resources or PII [cf. (*ibid.*), (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975)].

These security issues and privacy issues, of course, raise particular concerns for users as well as for companies offering authentication services. When it comes to protecting personal resources, there are three primary concerns. According to Todorov, 2007 those three concerns are Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. The term confidentiality means that personal information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized individuals and organizations. Integrity or integrity of information is protecting information from accidental or intentional tampering. Modification of confidential data may affect the data validity. Availability is the need to be able to access information at the time a user requests it. The availability of the services that exposes information has to be given as well. In an ideal world companies offering authentication and authorization services will do everything to use the best technologies regarding countermeasures to protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Establishing countermeasures, however, can be costly leading to a trade-off between costs and level of production of information. A typical approach to establishing information security management is to analyze risks first and then form counter measurements [cf. (*ibid.*)].

Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017 splits the risk assessment into different sections, rather than combining proofing, authentication, and federation of digital services into a single Level of Assurance(LOA). In order to provide the most effective approach each of the section is analyzed regarding risk and impacts of failure. The assessment should help to avoid errors and choose based the results which technologies and mitigation strategies should be chosen. Errors that can be avoided with an extensive risk assessment are identity proofing, authentication and federation errors. Identity proofing risks include an malicious applicant successfully poses as someone else or for example the impacts of collecting more information about an applicant then required. Choosing the right level of assurance in the identity proofing process gives robustness and confidence to the determination of an identity. The right authentication assurance level is

chosen to mitigate problems in the authentication process and the binding between an authenticator and a specific individual. An example for a potential error is the applicant may use credentials that not rightfully belong to them. And last but not least the right federation assessment helps to mitigate potential federation errors. Federation errors might occur when an identity assertion is compromised. Analyzing this risk makes it easier to choose an assurance level for each category therefore the risk get categorized of harm according to Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017:

- Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation;
- Financial loss or agency liability
- Harm to agency programs or public interests
- Personal safety
- Civil or criminal violations

Each of the categorize can then be rated with an potential impact level which can be either low, moderate and high. The result of this risk assessment can then be the basis of cosing the appropriate identity, authentication and federation assurance level. The assurance level determination is just relevant for analyzing risk of online transaction offered bey digital services and should not be used for the complete business process which may include offline processing in an completely segmented system.

The result of all design principles, security and privacy considerations should be a system, network or component that is trustworthy. According to Neumann, 2013 trustworthiness is given if an entity satisfies its specified requirement, after a reliable assessment. The requirements that deserve especially consideration are, those that are critical to an enterprise, mission, system, network or other entity. One of the requirements to make a system trustworthy is a reliable authentication and authorization process. These processes are discussed in more detail in the next sections.

2.2 Identity Proofing

The factors are an important part of the authentication process which result should be an authenticated user. However, to become an authenticated user the user has to go through certain steps on the way. These steps the user has to go through are enabled be typical components unique to the authentication process. Todorov, 2007 identifies three typical components that are part of the authentication the Supplicant, the Au-

thenticator and the Security Database. The Supplicant is the party that provides the evidence to prove the identity of a user or client. The result of the authentication process should be the authenticated user or client. The Authenticator, also called server, is responsible for ascertaining the user identity. After prove of identity, the authenticator can authorize or audit the user access to resources. Security Authority Database, which is storage or a mechanism to check the user's credentials. The storage can be represented by as much as a flat file, a server on the network providing centralized user authentication or a distributed authentication server [cf. (Todorov, 2007)].




Figure 1.1 Components of a user authentication system.

Figure 2.1: Components User Authentication System

It is vital that all the components like shown in (figure 2.1), of a user authentication system can communicate independently of each other. Whether or not all communication channels are used depends on the authentication mechanism and the model of trust that it implements. For example, the Kerberos authentication protocol does not feature direct communication between the authenticator and security server [cf. (ibid.)].

2.3 Authentication

“Digital identity is the unique representation of a subject engaged in an online transaction. The process used to verify a subject’s association with their real-world identity is called identity proofing” (Grassi, Garcia, and L. (2017))

A digital identity as explained above is the result of what is called the authentication process. It is a way of identifying the user as whom he claims to be. For a very

typical authentication process the user provides its username and password when the application demands it. If the user provides a correct username and password, an application assumes the user is indeed the owner of the account he wants to log on [cf. (Boyed (2012))].

The evidence provided by the user in the authentication process is called credentials. Most of the time as mentioned above credentials get provided in the form of username and password. Nevertheless, credentials also may take other forms like PIN's, key cards, eye scanners and so on [cf. (Todorov (2007))].

Credentials, which prove the identity of an entity and find use as authenticators in authentication systems, are called factors. Grassi, Garcia, and L. (2017) categorize following types of factors:

- Something the user knows - Cognitive information the user has to remember. Examples include passwords, PIN, answers to secret questions.
- What the user has - something the user owns. Examples include a security token, driving license, one-time password (OTP). What the user is - biometric information of the user. Examples include fingerprint, voice, and face.
- What the user is - biometric information of the user. Examples include fingerprint, voice, and face.

Other types of information which are not considered authentication factors but can be used to enrich the authentication process according to Dasgupta, Arunava, and Abhijit (2017) are:

- Where the user is - the location of the user can be used as a fourth factor of authentication. Examples include GPS, IP addresses.
- When the user logs on - Time can also be extracted as a separate factor. Verification of employee's identification in different office hours can prevent many kinds of grave data breaches. The time factor can easily prevent online banking fraud events to a great extent.

The authenticators are based on secrets that can be either public key pairs (asymmetric keys) or shared secrets (symmetric keys). Public key pairs consist of a private and a public key. The private key gets stored on the authenticator, the holder of the private key can use it to prove that he controls the authenticator. The verifier of the authenticator can then use the public key - most likely received with the help of a public key certificate - together with the authentication protocol to verify the identity of the user. Shared secrets can be either symmetric keys or memorized secrets. Both keys and

passwords can be used in similar protocols however, there is a huge difference for the user. Symmetric keys are generally stored on hardware, secrets have to be memorized by the subscriber which can lead to multiple vulnerabilities. The user chooses short memorable passwords while cryptographic keys are typically long enough to make network-based guessing attacks untenable user-chosen passwords may be vulnerable [cf. (Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017)].

To secure a solution properly, it should at least use two factors of the three listed above. To make use of more than one factor of a pool of potential credentials to verify the identity of a user is referred to as Multi-factor Authentication (MFA). The goal of multi-factor authentication is it to provide a layered defense and make it harder for unauthorized individuals to gain access. If one of the factors breaks, the service can still rely on the non-compromised authentication factors [cf. (Dasgupta, Arunava, and Abhijit (2017))].

Using just one factor is called Single Factor Authentication(SFA). *ibid.* clearly describes the drawbacks SFA has compared to MFA, primarily the universal used password-based authentication. The user needs to remember different passwords for multiple accounts, therefore, the user often reuses one password also known as password fatigue.

In an Interview by Tomkins, 2009 with Jon Brody, he explains Password Fatigue like the following. An average user has 15 accounts; some people might even have up to 30 accounts - far too much to manage appropriately. Users then tend to adopt specific password patterns like using simple passwords for nontransactional sites and complex passwords for banking sites. Since many complex passwords are hard to remember users also often reuse passwords for different services at one point - this is called password fatigue.

Besides password fatigue Todorov, 2007 draws attention to one of the significant challenges of secure user authentication represented by default passwords. Vendors often ship their devices with pre-configured standard passwords. Although vendors recommend changing default passwords, system architects and engineers often fail to do so because they are more focused on the business logic than on security causing security issues. Systems with default passwords are more straightforward to attack, for example by knowing or guessing the device the attacker has an easy time authenticating with the system accordingly.

Due to the problem of password fatigue and default passwords, one factor like a password might easily get compromised. The user can then no longer use the service until the repair of the system which can lead to a delay of the user when trying to access

necessary information. Also, there is a risk that the user does not notice the compromise of the single factor which can lead to devastating effects [cf. (Dasgupta, Arunava, and Abhijit, 2017)].

When designing an authentication process by using multiple factors the designers of the process should be acutely aware of the type of application and the information that has to be secured. For example, a solution for an international bank should have different standards than an app for a making a grocery list. On the one hand, challenging and complex authentication processes for trivial applications might scare away users. On the other hand, simple methods for applications protecting sensitive data might drive users away as well. Application designers should always try to find a middle way that suits both parties, the application owners and the users [cf. (Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017)].

To reflect on authentication it can be said that authentication is a very important part of every applications. As users are getting more concerned on security the pressure on developers grows to provide a solution that secures sensible data while keeping up usability standards, which can often be a trade-off. Complex applications need complex security which can mean high costs for individually developed solutions; therefore application developers should also think about using federate authentication solutions.

2.4 Assertion

The authentication and authorization process are very closely related to each other and for users often hard to separate. After the authentication process of a user, the application has now proof that the user is who he claims to be, but not every user is the same. After the user authenticates, the user may want to access data or services. Based on the information provided by the authentication process the application has the possibility to allow or deny the user to access information or services. In other words we have to check if the user is authorized to access data of a service. Furthermore authorization, offers granular control to distinguish between read, write or execute access to individual resources, typically access control list (ACL) are used for each operation [cf.(Todorov, 2007, Boyed, 2012)].

Systems offer a user login process or sign-in process, in order to receive the information necessary to make authorization decisions. The login process initiates the authentication process between user and the system. As a result of this process where the user has to proof its identity, the user receives a system or application specific structure. In

federated identity system this is called an assertion. The assertion holds an identifier and identification information about the user which can indicate for example what kind of resources the user can access. For every action the user then has to provide the assertion and based on the information provided within the assertion the user is then either granted or denied access. Another example for the usage of the assertion is the personalization of websites [cf. (Todorov, 2007), (Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017)].

In federate systems the verifier of authentication information of the user is called Identity Provider (IdP) and the party that receives and uses information is called the Relying Party (RP). In the context of the federate identification systems the user, or the one that is trying to access information from a system is called subscriber. The IdP generates an assertion for the verifier associate with the subscriber. This process allows subscribers to access multiple RPs without maintaining separate credentials and the process also supports single-sign on. Grassi, Richer, et al., 2017

Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017 defines different levels of federation assurance that define how assertion should be constructed and secured for a given transactions. Whereas each successive level has to fulfill the requirements of all lower level. For any assertion level the IdP has to make sure that an RP can not impersonate the IdP at another RP by signing the assertion. The signing of the assertion can be done by either a MAC using a shared key or a digital signature using an asymmetric key. The first level requires a bearer assertion, signed with approved cryptography by an IdP, for example OpenID Connect Basic Client profile or Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Web SSO Artifact Binding profile with no additional feature. The second level requires an assertion like, the OpenID Connect ID Token or SAML Assertion, to be encrypted with the public key of the RP, whereas the RP is the only party that is able to decrypt the bearer assertion. Additionally to the first two levels the last federation assertion level requires the subscriber to prove that he is in possession of a key that is bound to the assertion (holder of key assertion) and initially was used to authenticate to the IdP. For any assertion level the IdP has to make sure that an RP can not impersonate the IdP at another RP by signing the assertion. The signing of the assertion can be done by either a MAC using a shared key or a digital signature using an asymmetric key [cf. (ibid.), (Grassi, Richer, et al., 2017)].

One of the factors that differentiate the different federation assurance level is the usage of assertion binding. In order to choose an assertion binding one has to know if an RP requires additional proof that the assertion is bound to a certain subscriber or not. The two different kind of assertion binding to choose from are bearer and holder-of-key assertions. A bearer assertion can be presented by any party in order to proof

to have the bearers identity. This means that if an attack is successful in capturing an bear assertion representing a subscriber. The attacker could present the assertion or reference to the RP and impersonate the subscriber. The holder-of-key assertion in comparision holds a reference to a key which indicates which subscriber is representing the assertion. The key is signed and asserted by the issuer of the assertion.

2.5 Popular Federation Systems

Application security is a complex task and developing a customized siloed identity solution can be expensive. A Stand-alone identity store can besides being expensive also causes information assurance and administrative problems for organizations [cf.(JerichoSystems, 2018)].

A federate authentication or identity federation says Boyed, 2012 is a system that is maintaining its accounts, for example, username and password databases, with the help of third party service. Often big cooperate IT environments already use such solutions. Environment applications, for example, may trust an Active Directory server, an LDAP server or a SAML provider. Grassi, Garcia, and L., 2017 also claims that identity federation is preferred over some siloed identity solution that each serve a single agency or Relying Party (RPs). Furthermore *ibid.* lists certain benefits that come with using federated architectures, as can be examined before.

- Enhanced user experience. For example, an individual can be identity proofed once and reuse the issued credential at multiple RPs.
- Cost reduction to both the user (reduction in authenticators) and the agency (reduction in information technology infrastructure).
- Data minimization as agencies does not need to pay for collection, storage, disposal, and compliance activities related to storing personal information.
- Pseudonymous attribute assertions as agencies can request a minimized set of attributes, to include claims, to fulfill service delivery.
- Mission enablement as agencies can focus on the mission, rather than the business of identity management.

In the next section three very popular assertion technologies are discussed: SAML assertions Kerberos tickets and OpenID Connect tokens. Those technologies are not all possible assertion technologies. However they present the most commonly used in

federate identity systems.

2.6 Token-base Authentication

The way web developers write back-end applications has changed significantly with the rising popularity of single page and mobile applications. Backend-developers no longer spend a lot of time building markup. Instead, they build APIs for front-end applications to consume. The split up of front-end and back-end allows the back-end to focus on business logic and data management while the front-end solely focus on the representation of the content. The number one way single page and mobile web applications are authenticating users according to Tkalec, 2015 is token-based authentication.

Sevilleja, 2015 shares the view that token-based authentication is the modern way to handle authentication. Token-based authentication should be considered because of various factors. It is optimal for mobile applications which work in a stateless way and need to adapt to the sudden change of demand in a scalable way. Furthermore, token-based authentication provides extra security and applications can pass on authenticated users to other applications. However before taking a closer look at token-based authentication, it should be taken into account how *ibid.* and Tkalec, 2015 concluded that token-based authentication is the best alternative for modern web applications to authenticate their users. Therefore, Sevilleja, 2015 for example examines how authentication was done in the past. One approach to authenticate users used in the past that puts token-based authentication in perspective is server-based authentication.

Server-Based Authentication. A lot of modern-day API's built on the Representational State Transfer (REST) programming paradigm which basis is the HTTP protocol which is stateless as well. A protocol that is stateless does not recall the actions that were taken beforehand which means for example that if we authenticate the user, in the next request we have to authenticate the user again because the application will not know the user anymore [cf. (*ibid.*)].

The aim of server-based authentication is for the application to remember the user that logged on at the application. The application has to store the information on the server, which can be done in a few different ways on the session, usually in memory on the disk. The workflow of a server-based authentication starts with the server delivering the website and the user logging in with username and password. The server saves the

information from the user login info in a session. After the session is established, the session is checked on the server for every request. If the session is valid, the server returns the requested data to the server. However, since modern single-application and mobile applications are on the rise, this method to authenticate user shown some problems, especially when it comes to scalability [cf. (Sevilleja, 2015)].

The session handling with server-based authentication is especially hard on the server's bandwidth. Most of the time the session gets established in memory on the server when the user authenticates. This approach leads to an enormous overhead. The second problem with this approach is that the information of the user is held in memory on the server. Since more and more companies are moving servers to the cloud, this is not only a security issue but replicating servers to scale is limited. Also nowadays users want to access their data at any moment from every device. Providing the user with the possibility to access data across multiple mobile devices is vital, which means cross-origin resource sharing has to be enabled. With server-based authentication, it is possible to run into problems with the forbidden request when the user tries to access data from another domain [cf. (ibid.)].

Token-based authentication with JSON Web Token The most important thing about token-based authentication is that it is stateless, much like HTTP. The server does not have to hold the session of the user over an extended period on the server. Instead, the user can request resources by offering a token generated by an authentication server. The token send in the query string or Authorization header can then be validated at the resource server, and the secure resource will be returned to the user. The approach of using JSON Web Tokens gives one the ability to scale applications without considering on which domain the user logged on. Another advantage besides being scalable is that token-based authentication gives one the possibility to reuse the same token for authenticating the user. Therefore, it gets easier to build applications that share permission with other application because many separate servers, running on multiple platforms and domains can reuse the same token. The approach also gives performance advantages compared to server-side authentication because there is no need to find and deserialize the session on each request. However, since it is best practice to encrypt the token, the token still needs to be validated, and the content needs to be parsed. One way to implement token-based authentication is with the help of JSON Web Tokens. JSON Web Tokens are gaining popularity fast and are backed by huge companies like Google and Microsoft. Also the Internet Engineering Task Force defines a standard specification. OpenID and OAuth also use the JSON Web Token as a standard; therefore, the usage of the JSON Web Token will be explained in detail [cf.


```

9  Lmdvb2dsZS5jb20iLCJpYXQiOjE1Mjk3NDM1OTYsIm5hbWUiOiJDb25ueSBSYXVjaCIsc
10 InBpY3RlcmUiOiJodHRwczovL2x0NC5nb29nbGVlc2VyY29udGVudC5jb20vLWJFbEt3
11 aDVaNUJnL0FBQUFBQUFBQUFJL0FBQUFBQUFBQUk5rL0p5Qm1XTW9uYU1JL3M5Ni1jL3Bo
12 b3RvLmpwZyIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiOiJDb25ueSIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjo1UmF1Y2gi
13 LCJsb2NhbgUiOiJkZSJ9
14 .
15 yibOtrXy9_-cfOWytzwGuE4zqLv-MK_2-PYIKR_xecJt9ACnMnNMSmio6i8Vu7U061wF
16 OTb-qRennHbvy3lTRZLcTXttIrIUl-NdnZs2BrTSGWrw9aRzEjIHAXiY4fGRHj9VZXS_
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18 68C55tLJ87PWNm8WU1rCPOPbDVTjhYlqJKCpgUJ39_p_MXL_uHBZXrrvbOyV_tZVlw47
19 rjd8GFnBq1QqsYAR-6wrFbNL1pY6tPyriqZnQdi5KqYWPuWgPxbFDUfhZAmWXT8-PTsc
20 gQETEp8o3RvRHtfSu8Gx4UOhukt9_VxVdHmpFw

```

Listing 2.1: JWT Token

The JWT Token in the figure above is presented as a sequence of URL-safe base64url-encoded values. The different values are separated by a (‘.’) character. How many parts a JWT has is dependent on how the JWT is serialized. Either by using the JWS Compact Serialization or JWE Compact Serialization [cf. (Jones, Bradley, and Sakimura, 2015)].

To make sense of this JWT token in the figure above it is best to look at each of the three parts of the JWT separately. When decoding the first part of the JWT we receive a JSON object. Each part can be decoded individually but if a quick representation of a token is needed developers are best advice to use <https://jwt.io/>. The website not only decodes the information of the token it also verifies the token. The figure above shows a warning that pops up if the token is not flawless. The verification of the token and the signing is done with multiple libraries that inform about certain vulnerabilities of the JSON Web Token. The first decoded part of the JWT gives us the following JSON.

```

1 {
2   "alg": "HS256",
3   "typ": "JWT"
4 }

```

Listing 2.2: JOSE Header

The JSON object in 2.2 is the JOSE Header, representing the type of the token, the cryptographic operations applied and optionally additional properties of the JWT. Based on the information of the JOSE Header it can be explained if the JWT is a JWS or a JWE. When speaking of JWT we speak of one of the implementations of JWT because in fact JWT does not exist itself. Concrete implementation of the JWT are JSON Web

Signature (JWS) or JSON Web (Encryption). The figure below gives an optical representation of the structure [cf. (Siriwardena, 2016)].




Figure 2.3: JWT Inheritance

The 'type' Header Parameter we can examine in 2.2 indicates the kind of token, considering the example it is a JSON Web Token. The second parameter is the 'alg' Header Parameter and is specified in either the 'JSON Web Security (JWS)' reference documentation written by Jones, Bradley, and N., 2015 or the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) reference documentation written by Jones and Hildebrand, 2015. In this case the JWT is a JWS, since a JWE needs more specific Header Parameter. In the JWS the 'alg' Header Parameter gives information about the algorithm which was used to create the signature. Which kind of arguments are accepted by the 'alg' Header Parameter are explained in yet another specification called 'Json Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms' written by Jones, 2015. In the example 2.2 the 'HS256' algorithm is used, meaning that the JWS was MACed using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm. The definition of the 'alg' Header Parameter in the 'JSON Web Signature (JWS)' reference documentation is very similar to the definition in the 'JSON Web Encryption (JWE)' reference documentation except the cryptographic algorithm is used to encrypt or determine the value of the CEK. Jones and Hildebrand, 2015 also defines an 'enc' Encryption Algorithm Header, which is used for content encryption on plaintext. The authenticated encryption performed produces a cipher text and the authentication tag. Also for the 'enc' Header Parameter the valid arguments can be found in the 'Json Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms' written by Jones, 2015. The algorithm used must be an AEAD algorithm with a specified key length. There are further Header Parameter that can be defined, here are just the most important JOSE Header

Parameter for the purpose of this document listed.

The second decoded part of the example in 2.1 JWT Token, represents the claim set. The representation of the claim set is a JSON, where each key has to be unique. If the keys are duplicated one can either end up with a JSON parsing error or the last one of the duplicated keys is returned.

```
1  {
2    "azp": "407408718192.apps.googleusercontent.com",
3    "aud": "407408718192.apps.googleusercontent.com",
4    "sub": "112301938322810239712",
5    "email": "corneliarauch@gmx.at",
6    "email_verified": true,
7    "at_hash": "Rv2QB6hg1jt6QhtIXneieg",
8    "exp": 1529747196,
9    "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
10   "iat": 1529743596,
11   "name": "Conny Rauch",
12   "picture": "https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-bElKwh5Z5Bg/
13             AAAAAAAAI/AAAAAABNk/JyBmWMonaII/s96-c/photo.jpg",
14   "given_name": "Conny",
15   "family_name": "Rauch",
16   "locale": "de"
17 }
```

Listing 2.3: Claim Set

The decoded value from the example in Listing 2.1 of the Google OAuth 2.0 Playground Inc., 2018 returns a JSON object shown in the Listing 2.3. The claim set we receive is composed of mandatory and optional claims. Specifically requested in this example were the login, email and profile scope which effected the claims returned from the Google OAuth 2.0 API. Mandatory claims for the login with OpenID are iss, iat, aud, sub and exp and an optional claim that was returned from the API is azp. These claims will be discussed in more detail in the chapter about OpenID and OAuth 2.0. For the profile scope the specific claims that were returned are name, picture, given_name, family_name and locale. Email specific claims are email and email_verified. Furthermore identity providers can include additional elements that are neither mandatory or optional claims [cf. (ibid.), (Siriwardena, 2016)].

The last and third part from the example in Listing 2.1 represents the base64url-encoded signature. To know which kind of signature the decoded code is resembling

a peak at the JOSE Header will help. The JOSE Header as mentioned before gives information about the cryptographic elements that were used related to the signature. In case of Listing 2.4 the Google OAuth 2.0 API uses RASSSA-PKCS1-V1_5 with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. However the <https://jwt.io/> website does not provide us with the decoded public key.

```

1 {
2   RSASHA256(
3     base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
4     base64UrlEncode(payload) ,
5     Public Key or Certificate.
6   )
7 }
```

Listing 2.4: Signature JWT

To serialize an encrypted message, one has to follow either the JWS or the JWE specification. Each of the specification has the type's compact serialization and serialization. Google OpenID Connect uses the compact serialization. In fact, the OpenID Connect specification suggest using the JWS compact serialization or the JWE compact serialization. In this paper only the compact serialization will be discussed, the specification of the other serialization method can be either looked up in the JWE specification or the JWS specification. To call a JWS or a JWE, a JWT it has to follow the compact serialization [cf. (Jones, Bradley, and N., 2015), (Jones and Hildebrand, 2015)].

Aim of the JWS Compact Serialization is it to present content as a compact, URL-safe string, which is either digitally signed or MACed. It is not possible to use multiple signature or MAC in a JWS Compact Serialization and furthermore it is not allowed to use JWS Unprotected Headers. An unprotected header is a JSON object which includes the header element that are not integrity protected, which concludes that a protected header is a JSON object that is integrity protected by using MAC or digital signatures. A JWS Compact Serializations is represented as a concatenated string [cf. (Jones, Bradley, and N., 2015)].

```

1 {
2   BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) '.'
3   BASE64URL(JWS Payload) '.'
4   BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
5 }
```

Listing 2.5: JWS Compact Serialization

The first element is called the JOSE header which contains all the information that advertises the public key corresponding to the private key that was used to sign the message. Elements of the header include the `jku`, `jwk`, `kid`, `x5u`, `x5c`, `x5t` and `x5t#s256`. The second element is the JWS Payload or the content to be signed, which does not have to be JSON. To construct the message the following approach is used `ASCII(BASE64URL-ENCODE(UTF8(JOSE Header))) '.' BASE64URL-ENCODE(JWS Payload)`. The last element is the JWS signature, which is computed over the message that was constructed beforehand, using the algorithm defined in the JOSE header. These three key components together are called a JWS token. When using the JWE Compact Serialization the output is called JWE token. Compared to the JWS token, which we saw above the JWS token consists of 5 different key components [cf. (Jones, Bradley, and N., 2015), (Jones and Hildebrand, 2015)].

```

1 {
2 BASE64URL-ENCODE(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) '.'
3 BASE64URL-ENCODE(JWE Encrypted Key) '.'
4 BASE64URL-ENCODE(JWE Initialization Vector) '.'
5 BASE64URL-ENCODE(JWE Ciphertext) '.'
6 BASE64URL-ENCODE(JWE Authentication Tag)
7 }
```

Listing 2.6: JWE Compact Serialization

Both digital signatures and MACs can be used to provide integrity checking. However specification warns that there are significant differences that have to be considered when designing a protocol. MACs only provide the origination of the identification under specific circumstances. It is normally assumed that the private key used for the signature is only known by a single entity. Although in the case of MAC keys all the entities that use it for integrity computation need to know the MAC key in order to validate the message. That means that with MAC validation one can just tell if a message is generated from one of the entities that knows the symmetric MAC key and not where the message originated [cf. (Jones, Bradley, and Sakimura, 2015)].

2.7 Single Sign-On

The aim of Single Sign-On(SSO) is to design an authentication system that serves the interests of the user as well as the interests of the service provider. Whereas the user prefers a simple process, the service provider requires a complicated authentication procedure. Ironically trying to make the authentication procedure more secure often

leads to weakening the whole system due to the user always finding new ways to bypass it. An example mentioned before is password fatigue. Another challenge that SSO is trying to tackle is that standard web authentication solutions that require the user to login with a password, only authenticate the user and are not capable of providing access control or revealing additional information about the user. Most SSO solutions therefore try to combine the authentication process and authorization [cf. (Procházka, Kouřil, and Matyska, 2010)].

The paper *Taxonomy of Single Sign-On System* Pashalidis and Mitchell, 2003 identifies four generic architectures for SSO systems. A SSO system has to authenticate a user to A SP. Because authentication also implies identification, SSO systems have to incorporate the lifecycle management of identifiers that can take various forms. The paper distinguishes between two main types of SSO systems. The first type is ‘pseudo-SSO’ and the second type is ‘true SSO’. Typical pseudo-SSO are providing automatic authentication for all SP specific authentication methods after the user initially authenticated with the pseudo-SSO component, which is called primary authentication. The responsibility of a pseudo-SSO service is to manage all identities. A user may have multiple SSO identities for a single SP but in principle, one SSO identity corresponds to one SP. Compared to the pseudo-SSO system in a true-SSO system the user has to initially authenticate with the Authentication Service Provider (ASP) that is required to have an established relationship with all SPs. The relationship between the ASP and the SP has to be trustworthy. A key functionality of the true-SSO service is that the only authentication that includes the user occurs between user and the ASP. The SP will get notified of the authentication status, including information about the identity of the user, with so called authentication assertions. The categorization of SSO architectures can be further distinguished by the location of the ASP/pseudo-SSO component. This component can be either local to the user platform or offered as a third party service also called SSO-proxy. This further categorization leads *ibid.* to the four generic architectures mentioned above Local pseudo-SSO systems, Proxy-based pseudo-SSO systems, Local true SSO systems and Proxy-based true SSO systems.

When opting a particular SSO architecture one has to carefully consider the strength and weaknesses of each system. The paper therefore analyses the four generic architectures regarding to Pseudonymity and Unlinkability, Anonymous Network Access, Support for User Mobility, Deployment Costs, Maintenance Costs, Running Cost and Trust Relationships. Pseudonymity and Unlinkability refers to the fact that the user provides sensible information that needs to be protected and it should not be possible to correlate distinct identities of the same user and personal information and potential properties should not be linked to the user. The unlinkability cannot be guaranteed for

pseudo-SSO because the identities for the SSO are SP specific. To improve unlinkability Pashalidis and Mitchell, 2003 suggest to use an ‘anonymising proxy’, for local SSO system additionally services are needed for proxy-based SSP it can be integrated. User mobility is supported for proxy-based SSO, for locale SSO there need to be further services in place. The deployment cost are lower for pseudo-SSO systems then for true-SSO systems, however the maintenance cost are higher because if any SPs change the whole logic of the pseudo-SSO system has to change. The running cost of pseudo-SSO are likely to be lower than for true-SSO systems. For the pseudo-SSO systems, the trust relationship between users and SP may be dynamically changing depending on the implementation, for true-SSO the trust relationship is established between ASP and SPs and is always consistent. Generally speaking are pseudo-SSO systems more suitable for closed system where identity management is just for managing the life cycle of remaining credentials. For open system maintaining credentials is not enough. Appropriate privacy protection services and privacy-aware Identity Management schemes should be therefor integrated with true SSO schemes [cf. (ibid.)].

According to Lynch, 2011 two SSO solutions gained broad acceptance. On the one hand, SAML-based federations using SOAP, focusing on large enterprises also including governments and educational networks. On the other hand, the Web Authorization Protocol was introduced which is a combination of the Protocols OpenID and OAuth. SAML federations have been customized to address the security concerns of those institutions that typically have a large user base, significantly protected resources, complex authorization patterns and data and services spread across multiple domains. However, in a Web 2.0 world, the SAML solutions where seen as too rigid and too severe to maintain; a lightweight SSO was needed, therefore the Web Authorization Protocol was designed. The approach of this protocol is taking advantage of the lightweight RESTful APIs which are reusing the existing HTTP architecture features and the JavaScript Object Notation(JSON).

One of the well-known solutions based on Security Assertion Markup Language version 2 (SAML2) is Shibboleth. Shibboleth is one of the leading middlewares for building identity federations in a higher education sphere. To offer authentication, authorization and attribute assertion between entities. Procházka, Kouřil, and Matyska, 2010 identifies following entities defined by Shibboleth are Identity Provider (IdP), Service Provider (SP), Discovery Service, Metadata Operator and Federation Operator.

The discovery service is used to find the users organization IdP. The IdP defines an attribute release policy and releases different sets of the user’s attributes to different SPs. Users are only able to agree or disagree with the whole set of attributes because

the decision comes from the IdP. When the user tries to log on, to a service of a Service Provider, he gets redirected to a page where he can choose and IdP previously found by the Discovery Service. If an SP wants to provide its service to multiple federations it has to negotiate policy and technical detail with each federation operator. The federation operator manages the federation policies and introduces SPs and IdPs. Furthermore, the federations operator has to maintain and manage the information about all entities in a federation which is contained in the Metadata. A problem with this architecture is that the SP has to keep track of changes of the technical specification of various federation operators to maintain the configuration for each federation operator. A solution would be a significant federation registration, but this is indeed not possible because of technical and administrative severity and political will. This solution is also somewhat misleading for users since they have to maintain multiple credentials, select from multiple identifiers and so on [cf. Procházka, Kouřil, and Matyska, 2010].

According to *ibid.* Shibboleth is too restrictive, a solution with a centrally managed point of IdPs and SPs is preferred. Also, users should not have to deal with redundant accounts.

Chapter 3

Conclusion and Outlook

Your text here ...

Acronyms

ABI	application binary interface
ACL	access control list
GUI	graphical user interface
KISS	keep it small and simple
MITM	man-in-the-middle
OS	operating system
UART	universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter
UID	unique identifier

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