-STUDY GUIDE-

NATO

Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space

PADUAMUN2024

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Letter from the Secretary General

Hello and welcome to PADUAMUN 2024! My name is Mariagrazia Elena Pascarella Burger, and I am thrilled and deeply honored to be your Secretary-General for the 2024 edition of PADUAMUN. The journey leading up to this moment has been filled with excitement and anticipation as our team has worked tirelessly to ensure that this year's conference surpasses all expectations. We have left no stone unturned in our quest to make PADUAMUN 2024 truly exceptional.

My Model UN journey started in 2021, my first Virtual MUN where I received a Verbal Mention in the SOCHUM committee. But my first time enjoying and understanding what really Model United Nations is about was in the PADUAMUN 2022, I remember being extremely nervous from hours of practicing and memorizing, even tho I won Outstanding Delegate it was not until the PUCPMUN in Lima that I understood that I didn't need to memorize everything or be so nervous, it was also there when found my committee Disec securing a Verbal Mention. In 2023, my MUN journey expanded with participation in four conferences all of them being the Disec committees always working in doubles. In Lima, I attended NewtonMUN, SanSilvestreMUN, and MarkhamMUN, earning Honorable Mention, Best Position Paper Award, and Outstanding Delegate respectively. At PaduaMUN, I clinched the Best Delegate title. My most recent challenge was preparing and debating in the NHSMUN in New York, where I represented my skills in the LEGAL committee. As I look ahead to PADUAMUN 2024, To all participants, both seasoned veterans and newcomers alike, I offer a word of encouragement: seize this opportunity to shine. Showcasing your leadership, creativity, and collaboration skills will not only enrich your own experience but also contribute to the collective success of the conference. Together, let us engage in thought-provoking discussions, foster creative solutions, and forge lasting friendships. With that said, I extend my warmest wishes for a memorable and rewarding experience at PADUAMUN 2024. May this conference inspire you to reach new heights and leave an indelible mark on your MUN journey. I eagerly anticipate the vibrant debates, innovative ideas, and camaraderie that await us in August.

Until then, let us make PADUAMUN 2024 an unforgettable chapter in the annals of Model United Nations. I look forward to seeing you all in August!

Letter from the Committee Director

Dear Delegates, I am honored to welcome you to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committee at PADUA 2024. I hope this conference provides an environment of engaged debate, insightful discussions, and a community that supports your growth both as a delegate and as an individual. As your director, my aim is for you to leave PADUA MUN having had an enriching and fulfilling experience.

I come to you with two years of experience in Model United Nations, having had the privilege of debating at a Harvard MUN conference in Boston. Currently, I am studying economics at Universidad del Pacífico, where I am also a member of the consulting team, 180 DC UP helping non-profit organizations financial development. My journey in MUN started when I joined Peruvian Universities debate team. My experience in the team has been deeply rewarding, allowing me to engage in diverse perspectives and develop a nuanced understanding of global issues.

My passion for MUN is complemented by my enthusiasm for sports. Whether it's playing soccer, padel, or basketball, I believe in the value of teamwork, strategy, and perseverance—qualities that are equally essential in MUN. These experiences have taught me the importance of dedication and collaboration, which I bring to my role as your director.

The topic of preventing an arms race in outer space is both timely and critical. As technology advances and geopolitical dynamics evolve, the potential for conflict in this new frontier becomes more pronounced. Our discussions in this committee will focus on the importance of international cooperation, the role of existing treaties, and the development of new frameworks to ensure that outer space remains a domain of peace and scientific progress. As we prepare for the conference, I encourage you to immerse yourselves in research, think critically about the issues, and be ready to engage in constructive debate. Feel free to reach out to me with any questions or to introduce yourselves. I am excited to meet all of you and look forward to the dynamic and thought-provoking sessions we will have together.

Sincerely, Lorenzo Saldivar

History of the committee

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most enduring and influential military alliances in modern history, created as a result of the turbulent aftermath of World War II and shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War. Founded on April 4, 1949 in Washington, D.C., NATO was founded by 12 initial member countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The fundamental principle of the treaty, contained in article 5, establishes that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all, forcing the signatories to a collective defense. The creation of NATO was a response to the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its growing sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As Western Europe reeled from the devastation of World War II and faced the possibility of Soviet communism spreading further west, NATO's primary goal was to provide a unified defense against Soviet aggression and preserve security and stability of its member states.

During the Cold War, NATO played a key deterrent role against Soviet military ambitions, maintaining a strong military presence in Western Europe and conducting numerous exercises and operations to demonstrate its readiness and determination. During this period, NATO became a cohesive military alliance, strengthening interoperability between the armed forces of its members and establishing a collective defense strategy based on mutual aid and solidarity. The alliance faced its first test in 1950, when the Korean War broke out, prompting NATO to strengthen its defenses and demonstrate its commitment to global security. In the following decades, NATO's role expanded beyond collective defense to include crisis management, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping operations. One of its important engagements during that period was in the Balkans, where NATO led peacekeeping missions and played a central role in stabilizing the region amid ethnic and political unrest.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a moment of transformation for NATO. With the collapse of its main adversary, NATO

embarked on a process of adaptation and expansion. The alliance sought to strengthen stability in Europe by inviting the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Balkan states to membership, gradually expanding its membership to 30 countries by 2022. This expansion was not only a strategic measure aimed at strengthening collective security, but also a testimony. that NATO's role in promoting democratic values, institutional reform and economic development among its members. In the 21st century, NATO faces a new set of security challenges, including terrorism, cyber threats and hybrid warfare tactics. The Alliance has responded by modernizing its defense capabilities, investing in cutting-edge technologies, and adjusting its strategic posture to effectively address emerging threats. NATO operations have expanded beyond Europe, with missions in Afghanistan (as part of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) and other regions to fight terrorism and promote stability. In addition to its military role, NATO plays a key political role as a forum for consultation and transatlantic cooperation on security issues. It serves as a platform for dialogue between member states, allowing the search for consensus on strategic priorities, commitments related to defense spending and the promotion of shared values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Today, NATO remains a cornerstone of international security, committed to defending the freedom and security of its member states while promoting stability and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. As global security challenges continue to evolve, NATO stands ready to adapt and innovate, ensuring its relevance and effectiveness in preserving peace and prosperity for future generations.

Introduction to the topic

Preventing an arms race in space has become a central concern in global security debates, reflecting the increasingly complex landscape of space exploration and use. As humanity moves deeper into the cosmos, the potential for conflict on this frontier has increased, fueled by technological advances, geopolitical rivalries and strategic interests. Ensuring that space remains a haven for peaceful endeavors – such as scientific research, satellite communications and international cooperation – is critical not only for current security but also for the security of future generations.

The concept of preventing an arms race in space is rooted in the principles of international law and cooperation. At its center is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a landmark document that aims to maintain outer space as a nuclear weapons-free zone and prohibits the creation of military bases or fortifications on celestial bodies. However, the treaty does not specifically ban conventional weapons or military activities in space, leaving room for interpretation and potential challenges as the technology develops. In recent years, the debate over space security has intensified as nations develop capabilities to protect their own assets in orbit and potentially destroy adversary assets. Satellites, critical to global communications, navigation, weather forecasting and reconnaissance, are vulnerable to jamming or attack. The development and testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons by several countries (including direct-ascent missiles, co-orbital systems and cyber capabilities) highlights the growing militarization of space and the risks associated with potential debris fields that could threaten satellites operators of the future. space missions.

Efforts to prevent an arms race in space require a multifaceted approach that includes diplomatic initiatives, arms control measures, measures to build transparency and international cooperation. Key stakeholders, including space-capable nations, international organizations and non-governmental entities, must work together to establish standards of conduct and frameworks for responsible conduct in space activities. At the diplomatic level, initiatives such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) serve as a forum for dialogue and negotiation on space-related issues, including the prevention of an arms race. Proposals for legally binding instruments, such as the Outer Space Weapons Prohibition Treaty, have been discussed, but face difficulties in reaching consensus due to differing national interests and interpretations. Arms control measures, including voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, play a key role in strengthening mutual trust and reducing the risk of misunderstandings or misjudgments in space operations. These measures may

include exchanging information on space policies, intentions and capabilities, as well as notifications of space launches and collision mitigation maneuvers.

Furthermore, technological advances in space surveillance and monitoring capabilities are critical to monitoring activities in space, identifying potential threats, and promoting accountability for space-related actions. International cooperation on space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) is critical to mitigate orbital debris, reduce the risk of collisions, and improve the safety and sustainability of space operations.

Ultimately, preventing an arms race in space requires a commitment to preserving the peaceful uses of space for the benefit of all humanity. It involves promoting dialogue, building trust and developing norms of responsible behavior that reflect the common interests and aspirations of nations in the exploration and use of space. By strengthening international cooperation and supporting the principles of space governance, the global community can work together to preserve space as a realm of peace, progress and prosperity for future generations.

Past actions

The Outer Space Treaty (1967)

The treaty forbids countries from deploying "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" in outer space. The term "weapons of mass destruction" is not defined, but it is commonly understood to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The treaty, however, does not prohibit the launching of ballistic missiles, which could be armed with WMD warheads, through space. The treaty repeatedly emphasizes that space is to be used for peaceful purposes, leading some analysts to conclude that the treaty could broadly be interpreted as prohibiting all types of weapons systems, not just WMD, in outer space.

The treaty's key arms control provisions are in Article IV. States-parties commit not to:

- Place in orbit around the Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear weapons or objects carrying WMD.
- Install WMD on celestial bodies or station WMD in outer space in any other manner.
- Establish military bases or installations, test "any type of weapons," or conduct military exercises on the moon and other celestial bodies.



Other treaty provisions underscore that space is no single country's domain and that all countries have a right to explore it. These provisions state that:

- Space should be accessible to all countries and can be freely and scientifically investigated.
- Space and celestial bodies are exempt from national claims of ownership.
- Countries are to avoid contaminating and harming space or celestial bodies.
- Countries exploring space are responsible and liable for any damage their activities may cause.
- Space exploration is to be guided by "principles of cooperation and mutual assistance," such as obliging astronauts to provide aid to one another if needed.

Like other treaties, the Outer Space Treaty allows for amendments or member withdrawal. Article XV permits countries to propose amendments. An amendment can only enter into force if accepted by a majority of states-parties, and it will only be binding on those countries that approve the amendment. Article XVI states a country's withdrawal from the treaty will take effect a year after it has submitted a written notification of its intentions to the depositary states: the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)



The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), formally known as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. It is also abbreviated as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), though the latter may also refer to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which succeeded the PTBT for ratifying parties.

Negotiations initially focused on a comprehensive ban, but that was abandoned because of technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and Soviet concerns over the intrusiveness of proposed verification methods. The impetus for the test ban was provided by rising public anxiety over the magnitude of nuclear tests, particularly tests of new thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), and the resulting nuclear fallout. A test ban was also seen as a means of slowing nuclear proliferation and the nuclear arms race. Though the PTBT did not halt proliferation or the arms race, its enactment did coincide with a substantial decline in the concentration of radioactive particles in the atmosphere.

The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before it was opened for signature by other countries. The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October 1963. Since then, 123 other states have become party to the treaty. Ten states have signed but not ratified the treaty.

The treaty declares as its "principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" and explicitly states the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban (one that bans underground tests). The treaty permanently forbids the parties to the treaty from conducting, permitting, or encouraging any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater as well as "any other nuclear explosion" that threatens to send nuclear debris into another state's territory. The wording "any other nuclear explosion" prohibited peaceful nuclear explosions because of the difficulty in differentiating those from military tests without expanded verification measures.

The PTBT was a first of a series of nuclear arms control treaties in the second half of 20th century. The PTBT has been considered the stepping stone to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, which explicitly referred to the progress provided by the PTBT. In addition to the NPT, the PTBT was followed within ten years by the Outer Space Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972. In 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibited underground tests with yields above 150 kilotons.

Moon Agreement (1979)

It was noted that since the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was signed, technologies and society evolved, requiring a redefinition of the rights and responsibilities of citizens and governments alike in the use and development of outer space. The primary stated objective of the 1979 Moon Treaty is "to provide the necessary legal principles for governing the behavior of states, international organizations, and individuals who explore celestial bodies other than Earth, as well as administration of the resources that exploration may yield." It proposed to do so by having the state parties produce

an "international regime" that would establish the appropriate procedures (Article 11.5).

It has not been ratified by any state that engages in self-launched human spaceflight (e.g. the United States, Russia (or its predecessor the Soviet Union), or the People's Republic of China) since its creation on December 18, 1979, and thus it has little to no relevance in international law. As of May 2024, 17 states are parties to the treaty.

The Moon Treaty lays several provisions outlined in 21 articles. In Article 11, the treaty makes a declaration that the Moon should be used for the benefit of all states and all peoples of the international community. It reiterates that lunar resources are "not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." It also expresses a desire to prevent the Moon from becoming a source of international conflict, so that the resources should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.



When compared with the Outer Space Treaty, it reiterates most provisions, and adds two new concepts in order to address the exploitation of natural resources in outer space: to apply the concept of 'common heritage of mankind' to outer space activities, and to have the participating countries produce a regime that lays the appropriate procedures for orderly mining. Multiple conferences produced no consensus on these two items.

Current situation

Space has rapidly transformed from a distant frontier into an essential domain for modern security. Navigation, communication, and intelligence gathering all rely heavily on space-based infrastructure. This critical role extends not only to NATO operations but also to the national security of individual member states. However, this growing dependence on space coincides with a rise in security concerns.

The space environment is becoming increasingly crowded and competitive. Certain countries, particularly Russia and China, are actively developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. These capabilities pose a significant threat, as they could potentially disrupt or disable critical space assets, hindering access and operations in space. Furthermore, debris from ASAT tests creates long-lasting orbital hazards, endangering satellites and human life in space.

In response to these evolving threats, NATO prioritizes maintaining a peaceful and stable space environment. This commitment aligns with international law, particularly the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space. To achieve this goal, the Alliance focuses on enhancing Space Domain Awareness (SDA). Initiatives like the NATO Strategic Space Situational Awareness System (3SAS) aim to monitor activities and potential threats in space, fostering greater understanding and transparency. Additionally, NATO firmly condemns actions that undermine the peaceful use of space, such as reckless ASAT missile tests.

Several key developments have shaped NATO's approach to space security. In 2019, the Alliance adopted a dedicated Space Policy, formally recognizing space as an operational domain alongside air, land, maritime, and cyberspace. This recognition underscores the growing importance of space for NATO's collective defense. Further solidifying this commitment, the NATO Space Centre was established in 2020. This central hub facilitates coordination among member states on space-related activities, fostering collaboration and information sharing.

In 2021, NATO took a pivotal step by declaring that attacks from space could potentially trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, invoking collective defense. This declaration sends a strong message to potential adversaries about the potential consequences of aggression in space. Most recently, in 2023, the Alliance launched the APSS initiative, aiming to bolster space-based surveillance capabilities. APSS leverages a network of national and commercial satellites, creating a "virtual constellation" known as Aquila. This initiative will provide NATO with faster and more comprehensive intelligence, further enhancing situational awareness.

Importantly, NATO currently does not possess its own space-based weaponry and emphasizes the non-militarization of space. The Alliance relies on the space assets of member states and prioritizes the peaceful uses of space for collective security. Looking ahead, NATO seeks to maintain a technological edge in space through collaboration and innovation. This includes leveraging expertise within the NATO Science and Technology Organization network to promote advancements that benefit all member states. By prioritizing transparency, promoting responsible behavior, and fostering international cooperation, NATO aims to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure a secure and stable environment for the continued exploration and peaceful use of SP.

Case studies

China's huge commitment for a space fight with the USA

A new RAND report emphasizes China's rising risk tolerance and growing strategic maneuvers in space, an aggressive push forged to challenge US dominance in the domain. The RAND report examines open-source Chinese defense literature, providing a comprehensive overview of People's Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives on space-based escalation over the past two decades.

It asserts that China's leaders view the US as a dominant/strong but declining power and anticipate aggressive future tactics, including the growing militarization of space. The report says the PLA's strategy encompasses both deterrence and coercion, a tactical mix that aims to force adversaries to bend to its political objectives or face a devastating space-based war.

The report outlines their evolving views on space-based escalation. These reflect a growing desire to assertively shape the fast-evolving strategic environment. Initially, their strategic thinking was mainly theoretical, focusing on conflict prevention.

It PLA commitment and goals outline a four-step escalation ladder involving demonstrating space strength, space military exercises, disposition of space forces and space strikes. The strategy aims to coerce opponents into submission while avoiding full-scale conflict.

The report says the shift toward higher risk tolerance in space is significantly influenced by the PLA's view of the US as a declining power likely to resort to militarization. It also claims that Chinese President Xi Jinping's influence has shaped the PLA's increasing risk tolerance in space. RAND recommends that US officials should anticipate quick decision-making with little communication and not expect cooperation from the PLA in space crises. It says the US Space Force (USSF) should prepare for aggressive PLA actions in space even in peacetime.

In May 2023, Asia Times reported that China's mini space plane landed on an unspecified runway in the Gobi Desert after spending 276 days in orbit after its launch in August 2022.

China's spaceplane possibly landed near the Lop Nur nuclear test site, which has previously been utilized for spaceplane recovery, or at the Dingxin Test and Training Base, where the PLA-Air Force (PLA-AF) regularly conducts large-scale exercises. Chinese state media trumpeted the occasion as a noteworthy achievement in the nation's space program.

In October 2021, the Financial Times (FT) reported that China launched a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that orbited the globe before heading towards its target.

While the US expressed concerns about China's growing military capabilities, which it says contribute to regional and global instability, China portrayed the hypersonic missile test as a routine space vehicle test for spacecraft reusability.

China can also strategically pre-position its space forces for potential offensive operations. This approach includes launching and maneuvering space assets to create a sense of imminent threat, encouraging adversaries to reconsider their actions.

Russia's New Counter Space Weapon issue with the USA

In late 2019, the Russians launched a satellite that then released a second satellite. Both satellites then followed a National Reconnaissance Office satellite. Then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond compared them to Russian "nesting dolls." Several months later, U.S. officials said the sub-satellite had released another object, apparently firing a projectile at high speed.

U.S. officials have not previously publicly discussed the 2022 counter space payload, but they have highlighted other Russian counter space efforts. In 2021, Russia tested a direct ascent anti-satellite missile on one of its own spacecraft, destroying it and creating a massive debris field in its wake. And earlier this year, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb confirmed concerns that Russia is developing an "indiscriminate" nuclear weapon to go into space.

The U.S. has since cosponsored a resolution in the UN calling on all nations not to develop or deploy nuclear weapons in outer space. Russia vetoed that resolution, however, then introduced one of its own condemning all weapons in space.

Wood, representing the U.S. at the UN Security Council, decried Russia's resolution as "diplomatic gaslighting and dissembling." He revealed the new counter space satellite in a speech before a vote on the measure failed in the U.N. Security Council. The vote was a 7-7 tie, with Switzerland abstaining. The U.S. voted against it.

U.S. Space Force and Space Command officials have said that both Russia and China are ramping up their counter space efforts, developing and testing new weapons like lasers to dazzle satellites, the "nesting dolls," and a "grappling" satellite that can grab and two other satellites out of their orbit.

Bloc positions

The USA

The United States Space Force (USSF) is the newest branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, established to oversee military operations in space. Operating under the Department of the Air Force, it is led by the secretary of the Air Force. The USSF, with its smallest service size of 8,600 personnel, manages 77 spacecraft involved in critical programs like GPS and space surveillance. It traces its origins to Cold War-era initiatives, evolving through various organizational phases until its formal establishment in 2019 under President Donald Trump. The USSF's mission is to ensure U.S. freedom of action in space, conduct space operations, and safeguard national interests. Its responsibilities include providing space security, projecting combat power, enabling space mobility and logistics, ensuring information mobility, and maintaining space domain awareness. These efforts are vital to protecting U.S. prosperity and security by preserving freedom of action and offering independent military options in space operations. The USSF's mission is to ensure U.S. freedom of action in space, conducting operations and safeguarding national interests. Responsibilities include space security, combat power projection, mobility and logistics, information mobility, and domain awareness. Key commands like the Space Systems Command focus on developing and acquiring new space technologies, while the Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) prepares personnel for operations in challenging environments.

Field commands such as Space Launch Delta 45 manage specific functions like launch operations from Cape Canaveral, supporting DOD, NASA, and private launches. These commands collaborate with squadrons and other units to protect U.S. space assets amid increasing global competition. Adversaries' advancements in space capabilities have heightened threats, ranging from disruptive technologies to destructive anti-satellite measures.

Publicly known USSF assets include GPS and surveillance systems, weather satellites, and the secretive X-37B space plane. The USSF relies heavily on commercial launch providers like ULA and SpaceX for satellite deployment, seeking to expand partnerships in the coming years.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA'S)

1. How can the international community support the capacity building efforts of developing nations in space technology and governance?
2. How should the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors be defined towards preventing the militarization of outer space?
3. How can nations be encouraged to implement/improve transparency and confidence building measures?
4. What mechanisms should be put in place to verify compliance with treaties and agreements related to arms control and prevention in outer space?
5. How can international cooperation be enhanced to address the dual-use nature of space technologies that have both civilian and military applications?

Position paper requirements:

Formatting Requirements

Any position paper that does not have a bibliography will be immediately disqualified due plagiarism and the delegate will not be eligible to receive an award. Furthermore, this document should also be kept under the following format:

Font: Times New Roman 11 pts.

Line Spacing: 1.15

Margins: Standard margins

Pages: 1 page max. (excluding bibliography) Bibliography format: APA 7

Each delegate is responsible for submitting a Position Paper to the mail of the committee, by the 16th of August 11:59 PM. This must be in PDF format to the following email address: natopaduamun2024@gmail.com

For ease and to ensure no position papers are lost in spam, please send all of them with the subject “Position Paper - Your Country”.

II. Structure

- The first paragraph should include a brief introduction to the subject, always keeping in relation to your country. It is advisable to include data, catchy phrases and statistics of the topic that can be applied. Do not forget to explain the situation and the policy of the represented country (previous efforts made to deal with the matter, as well as current ones). Always keep in mind that you should focus on answering the question: "What is the reason why the topic is relevant to my country?". *This section should not be a repetition of what your study guide says. Instead, you should present the issue the way your country sees it.

- The second paragraph should include a brief summary of the past actions carried out by the UN (documents, programs, protocols, campaigns, among others) related to the issue being debated, always expressing the opinion of your country in relation to the measures that are being discussed. mentioning. Try to focus on those specific actions that have had an impact in your country, as well as those that have failed, and explain how your government believes these measures can be expanded or improved to make them work again internationally.

- The third paragraph should focus on proposing solutions that your country would like the UN to consider, always respecting your nation's policy and considering QARMAs in turn. Be creative and come up with original and actionable ideas that will help other delegates and their directors to remember your contribution to the discussion. These must be differentiated from already existing initiatives, or improve those that have failed in the past. Lastly, don't forget to write an attention-grabbing closing sentence.

Committee expectations

Dear Delegates,

As we conclude this study guide, I want to express my deep appreciation for your dedication and enthusiasm in preparing for the NATO committee on preventing an arms race in outer space. The significance of our topic cannot be overstated. As technological advancements continue to accelerate, the potential for both cooperation and conflict in outer space grows exponentially. It is imperative that we address these challenges with foresight, diplomacy, and a commitment to international peace and security.

Throughout this committee, you will have the opportunity to engage in rigorous debate, propose innovative solutions, and collaborate with peers. Your research and preparation will be key to your success in these discussions. I encourage you to delve deeply into your country's policies, understand the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape, and think critically about how we can collectively prevent an arms race in outer space.

Remember, the essence of Model United Nations lies not only in representing your country's position but also in working together to find common ground and develop sustainable solutions. Be open to new ideas, listen actively to your fellow delegates, and strive to build consensus. The future of space security depends on the ability of nations to cooperate and craft policies that ensure outer space remains a realm of peaceful exploration and development.

As you prepare for the conference, do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns. Your engagement and curiosity are vital to a fruitful and enlightening experience. I look forward to meeting each of you and witnessing the dynamic and insightful debates that will shape our committee's discussions.

Best of luck in your preparations, and see you at PaduaMUN 2024

Sincerely,

Lorenzo Saldivar, Director of NATO Committee

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