



30/july/18

(secret writing)  $\leftarrow$  Greek  
CRYPTOGRAPHY



if  $\text{key}_1 = \text{key}_2$  Symmetric key crypto.

$\text{key}_1 \neq \text{key}_2$  Asymmetric key crypto.

Steganography :- add text in a medium & then send.

Attack on comm. channel or on subject can be of 2 types

(1)

Active attack :- modify info & send false modified info to receiver.

(2)


Passive attack :- content specific or address specific. Where they address sue info without any modification.

CIA Triad

Confidentiality Integrity Availability

- C → Sender is sure about the receiver
- I → The form of message will be same without any modifications.
- A → After so many checks the availability should not be affected.

C I A  
There must be a proper balance b/w all these three terms.



Security & Time complexity.

CIA is achieved by :-

① Authentication

② Authorization

①

Where the credentials of a user are checked & verified is known as Authentication: (fingerprint, face recognition, retina etc).

②

After login → Authorization tells labour the access, invitation & permissions for particular use.

③

Reception :- When the attack is content specific. Eg (A) & (B) company. At B - B fetches detail of employee of A - 'e incr' its prod.

④

Address specific :- checks the address & attack on vendor address.

⑤

Integrity :- modification in data

⑥

Repalying :- sending many times under or Repudiation :- denies for the msg.

Availability denial of service attack (DDoS) :-  
many siequear at a time so that even  
with user can't use that.

### Components of encryption-Decryption

- ① PlainText
- ② Ciphertext
- ③ Encryption algorithm
- ④ Decryption algorithm
- ⑤ Key

### Symmetric key cryptography

↓  
Substitution

Transposition

- |                          |                            |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| algo / cipher            | algo / cipher              |
| ① secure                 | ② less secure              |
| key required             | ③ no key required          |
| Substitution takes place | ③ Re-shuffling takes place |

so we use generalized caesar cipher.

$$CT = (PT + K) \mod 26$$

very (0 - 25) which is known  
only to comm. party

Book :- William Stalleys ~~prefers~~  
→ forgeries

- Note :- Before cryptography -  
either use ~~compression~~  
compression :- Merging of more data  
together & separated using keys.  
less efficient.

NOTE Stream cipher :- when one alphabets are encrypted one by one  
 i.e. block cipher :- one or more alphabets can be encrypted.

31<sup>st</sup> July 18.

### Playfair Cipher

Here we will use stream ~~block~~ cipher

PT = COMPUTER { encrypt this PT using key into ency form.

key = CRYPTO

② AE

CT = A → B

so, CT(AE) = BO.

Circular cipher E → O

eg ① BD

So CT for BD will be just near

alphabets for each so,

BD = DE.

Assumption about I/J is that they will rarely/never occur together in a text.

3 cases for paired alphabets.

when they are in same row.

①

eg ① BD

So CT for BD will be just near

alphabets for each so,

BD = DE.

③

CT = A → B

so, CT(AE) = BO.

Circular cipher E → O

eg ① BD

for same column :-

eg BN.

Move downwards, (immediate below element)

B → H N → W (BN) → HW

④

Different Row different column.

eg AQ.

for first alphabet :- move in the row for the first alphabet

for second alphabet :- move in the column for the second alphabet

find the strike power.

A → D

AQ (ct) = DM

Q → M

R	O	C	I	R	Y	P	T
O	A	B	D	E			
F	G	H	I	J	K		
L	M	N	O	S			
U	V	W	X	Z			

⑤ make a box of size

26 alphabets

but 25 block

so put I/T

together.

classmate  
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6<sup>th</sup> Aug '18

## AFFINE CIPHER

find CT for COMPUTER  
 $C = f(T) = QRZCAT.$

### Limitation

- ① X can be a alphabet & a filler to
- ② Use only for alphabets
- ③ If lie on the same position.

Que. PT = P I T U N I V E R S I T Y X

KEY = BCDQR

B	C	D	Q	R
A	E	F	G	H
T	R	L	M	N
O	P	S	T	U
V	W	X	Y	Z

$$\text{CT} = (AP + B) \bmod 26$$

both are keys.

$$\text{let } A = 5 \quad B = 8.$$

A  $\rightarrow$  Multiplicative key  
 B  $\rightarrow$  Additive key.

If we put A=1 then, it will a case of Caesar cipher.

Condition :- A & 26 (mod value) both should be coprime.

for plainText from cipherText

$$P = A^{-1}(C - B) \bmod 26.$$

Note. Both works only for Alphabets.

BLUOTK WADUMOZY

A	- 0	J	- 9	S	- 18
B	- 1	K	- 10	T	- 19
C	- 2	L	- 11	U	- 20
D	- 3	M	- 12	V	- 21
E	- 4	N	- 13	W	- 22
F	- 5	O	- 14	X	- 23
G	- 6	P	- 15	Y	- 24
H	- 7	Q	- 16	Z	- 25
I	- 8				
K	- 9				

A	F	R	1	N	E	C	P	H	E	R	
0	5	5	8	13	4	2	8	15	7	4	17

Given  $A = 5$ ,  $B = 8$ .

$$\text{for } A = 0 \times 5 + 8 = 8 \quad H = 7 \times 5 + 5 = 43 \\ \text{for } A = 1 \times 5 + 8 = 13 \quad R = 12 \times 5 + 5 = 65 \\ \text{for } A = 2 \times 5 + 8 = 28 \quad N = 13 \times 5 + 8 = 73 \\ \text{for } A = 3 \times 5 + 8 = 43 \quad E = 4 \times 5 + 8 = 28 \\ \text{for } A = 4 \times 5 + 8 = 58 \quad C = 2 \times 5 + 8 = 18 \\ \text{for } A = 5 \times 5 + 8 = 83 \quad P = 15 \times 5 + 8 = 83$$

A	F	R	1	N	E	C	P	H	E	R	
0	5	5	8	13	4	2	8	15	7	4	17

### for inverse

$$5A^{-1} = 1 \pmod{26}$$

use hit & trial find no. which  
gave 1 remainder on  $\pmod{26}$

$$53 \times \frac{5}{2} \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$105 \times \frac{5}{2} \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$A^{-1} = 21$$

### EULER TOTIENT FUNCTION ( $\phi$ )

$$\phi(p) = (p-1)$$

$\downarrow$   $\phi$  function of a prime no.  $p = (p-1)$

Note:- ① If you want to find  $\phi$  for a non-prime no. then you have to break that value into prime no.

$$\text{ex: } \phi(6) = \phi(3) \times \phi(2)$$

$$(3-1) \times (2-1) = 2$$

euler totient tells that their are such number of coprime no. below that number. e.g.  $\phi(5) = 4$

If for eg.  $\phi(6) = 2$

then

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

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$$\begin{array}{r} \cancel{23} \\ \times \begin{bmatrix} 10 & 4 \\ 2 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \\ \hline \cancel{26} - 22 = 4 \end{array}$$

$$26 - 22 = 4 \Rightarrow E$$

$$\text{for } P = 3(25 - 2) \mod 26 \\ \Rightarrow (23 \times 3) \mod 26$$

~~9 Aug 19~~  
CT = MURMUSCX

$$\begin{array}{l} K = 9 \\ A = 2 \end{array}$$

Similarly for all Firewall

$$\text{Soln} \quad P = A^{-1}(C - B) \mod 26 \\ = 9^{-1}(C - 2) \mod 26$$

### TRIPLE CIPHER

$$\begin{aligned} 9^{-1} \mod 26 &= 9 \\ 9 \cdot 9^{(26)-1} &\Rightarrow 9^{12-1} \mod 26 = 9^4 \mod 26 \end{aligned}$$

PT, K condition with key is that it will be in the form of square matrix  $N \times N$ .

No. of blocks of plain text is  $N \times 1$   
Similarly cipher text is also  $N \times 1$

$$CT = KP \mod 26$$

$$\text{Ex } (N \times N)(N \times 1) = (N \times 1)$$

$$81 \mod 26$$

$$\equiv$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \\ C_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} K_{11} & K_{12} & K_{13} \\ K_{21} & K_{22} & K_{23} \\ K_{31} & K_{32} & K_{33} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P_1 \\ P_2 \\ P_3 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{for } W &= P = 3(21 - 2) \mod 26 \\ &\Rightarrow 57 \mod 26 \Rightarrow 57 = P \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{for } W &= P = 3(21 - 2) \mod 26 \\ &\Rightarrow (3 \times 20) \mod 26 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \cancel{60} \\ \times \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \hline \cancel{60} - 26 = 34 \end{array}$$


$$P = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$PT = NO \quad \text{ANSWER}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \cancel{PT} \\ \times \begin{bmatrix} P_1 & P_2 & P_3 \\ P_2 & P_3 & P_1 \\ P_3 & P_1 & P_2 \end{bmatrix} \\ \hline \cancel{PT} - 26 = 18 = 1 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \cancel{PT} \\ \times \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \hline \cancel{PT} - 26 = 18 \end{array}$$

**PolyAlphabetic :-** for a single alphabet cipher's  
monoalphabetic :- always different cipher  
always same



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$$C_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 13 \\ 14 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 2 \times 13 + 3 \times 14 \\ 7 \times 13 + 8 \times 14 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 26 + 42 \\ 91 + 112 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow & \begin{bmatrix} 68 \\ 203 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26 \\ \Rightarrow & \begin{bmatrix} 16 \\ 24 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 8 \\ V \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

$\frac{16}{26}$   
 $\frac{24}{26}$   
 $\frac{8}{26}$   
 $\frac{V}{26}$

$$\text{for AN } C_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 13 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 2 \times 0 + 3 \times 13 \\ 7 \times 0 + 8 \times 13 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 39 \\ 104 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow N$$

for S10

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 22 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 2 \times 18 + 3 \times 22 \\ 7 \times 18 + 8 \times 22 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 36 + 66 \\ 126 + 176 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 102 \\ 302 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 24 \\ 6 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 4 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{for RR } \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 4 \\ 19 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \times 4 + 3 \times 19 \\ 7 \times 4 + 8 \times 19 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 8 + 51 \\ 28 + 135 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 59 \\ 164 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 7 \\ 8 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow H$$

5

P1 → NO ANSWER

C1 → QV NAHQH

From cipher text to Plain text

Ques P = K<sup>-1</sup> [C] mod 26

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 6 & 7 \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} Q \\ V \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$

find inverse of the matrix. A =  $\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix}$

$$A^{-1} = \frac{1}{ad - bc} \begin{bmatrix} d & -b \\ -c & a \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 6 & 7 \end{bmatrix}^{-1} = \frac{1}{14 - 18} \begin{bmatrix} 7 & -3 \\ -6 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -3 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -3 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \mod 26$$



$$\begin{bmatrix} 17 & 17 & 5 \\ 21 & 18 & 21 \\ 2 & 2 & 19 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$17(300) = 17(357) + 5(6)$$

$$5700 = 6069 + 30$$

139

Cofactor matrix.

$$K^c = \begin{bmatrix} + & - & + \\ - & + & - \\ + & - & + \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} (18x_1 - 21x_2) & (18x_1 - 21x_2) & (21x_2 - 18x_1) \\ (19x_1 - 5x_2) & (19x_1 - 5x_2) & (12x_2 - 17x_1) \\ (17x_1 - 5x_2) & (17x_1 - 5x_2) & (19x_2 - 17x_1) \end{bmatrix}$$

(21x2 - 18x1)

Note: negative, fractional & values greater than 26 are not allowed. To take mod 26 until the value

VIGENÈRE CIPHER

$$PT = \begin{matrix} X & Y & Z \\ D & E & F \\ T & U & V \\ I & J & K \end{matrix} \text{ A } W \text{ X } Y \text{ P } W \text{ M }$$

$$CT = (PT + K) \bmod 26$$

$$\Rightarrow CT_i = ((PT_i + K_i)) \bmod 26 = (23 + 3) \bmod 26$$

$$PT_i = (CT_i - K_i) \bmod 26$$

$$\text{Transpose } adj(K)^{-1}(K)^T = \begin{bmatrix} 300 & -357 & 6 \\ -313 & 313 & 0 \\ 267 & -252 & -51 \end{bmatrix}$$

Note: This is a polyalphabetic cipher i.e., it uses different cipher values for one character.

VIGENÈRE SQUARE

$$PT \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} A & B & C & D & E & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ B & C & D & E & F & G & H & I & J & K & L \\ C & D & E & F & G & H & I & J & K & L & M \\ D & E & F & G & H & I & J & K & L & M & N \\ E & F & G & H & I & J & K & L & M & N & O \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \end{bmatrix}$$

$$K^{-1} = \frac{1}{939} \begin{bmatrix} 300 & -313 & 267 \\ -357 & 313 & -252 \\ 6 & 0 & -51 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$K^{-1} = \frac{1}{3} \begin{bmatrix} 100 & -104 & 89 \\ -121 & 104 & -89 \\ 2 & 0 & -17 \end{bmatrix}$$

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16 Aug '18  
Polyalphabetic

### ROTOR CIPHER OR ENIGMA M/C CIPHER

$$\begin{aligned} \rightarrow CT_2 &= (4+1) \bmod 26 \\ \rightarrow &(24+8) \bmod 26 \\ \rightarrow &32 \bmod 26 \\ \rightarrow &6 \Rightarrow G \end{aligned}$$




Wheels cannot move to



b  
c  
d  
a

$ADC = CDB$ .



a  
b  
c  
d

c  
b  
a  
d

d  
c  
b  
a


a  
d  
c  
b

How to generate key?

Assumption :- Rotor moves only one place at a time

### VERNAME CIPHER

PT, K, CT Random key generator



Encryption  
algo

ROTATION SCHEDULE			
E	F	A	afe
P	A	B	pt = bee
B	C	D	(B)ab
C	D	E	cba
D	E	F	stationary
E	F	G	after rotation
F	G	H	cdb
G	H	I	edc
H	I	J	cd
I	J	K	ct = BCA
J	K	L	de
K	L	M	f

Transp.  
(KFC)  
(CC)All are  
STRONG  
(WKS) (Without  
key) CIPHER

$$PT = PEDCA$$

[Plain Text]

[Cipher Text]

E	A	C	T	A
P	B	D	F	B
A	C	E	A	C
B	D	F	B	D
C	E	F	A	C
D	F	B	D	F

S	P	O	L
I	T	I	O
N	C	I	P
H	E	R	Z
O	I	R	S
I	N	H	R
M	P	C	E
R	S	O	Z

on rotation CT  $\Rightarrow$  vacdae (PT  $\rightarrow$  CT)  
 times Left Right

for CT  $\rightarrow$  PT

[DADFD]

(With key)

column no is not given but key is given.

entries always to (1-9)

prev. example

PT :- TRANSPOSITION CIPHER

key given (1324)

divide text into 4 column

1 3 2 4

Here everything depends upon the

depth we are transforming Rail fence cipher to transposition cipher.

R i f n e i h n

a l e c i p e

CT  $\Rightarrow$  Rifnehralcpeo

CT :- TSI NH A O IIR R P T C E N S O P Z

1 2 3 4

(Modern block cipher) - all used

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FESTAL NETWORK (STRUCTURE).

The way you did encryption will be exactly same i.e used for decryption

PT for PT  $\rightarrow$  CT

same


we use  $k \Rightarrow k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4$

CT  $\downarrow$   
so for  $CT \rightarrow PT$   
we use  $k \Rightarrow k_4, k_3, k_2, k_1$

key is divided into subkeys.

subkeys used for encryption is reversed & used for decryption.


PLAINTEXT



Generalise form

$$\begin{aligned} L_i^o &= R_i^o - 1 \\ R_i^o &= L_i^o - 1 \oplus f(R_{i-1}^o, K_i^o) \end{aligned}$$

XOR



DES (Data Encryption Standard)

64 bits

56 bits

48 bits

8 parity bits

56 bits

48 bits



8 parity bits

48 bits

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21<sup>st</sup> Aug '18

## DES (Block cipher algorithm)


Ques  
Explain DES structure

- Our Sbox - if given state of and its role
- Our given PT initial permutation
- Our 64 bits - 48 bit conversion

64 bits  $K = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C, D, E, F$

64 bits  
one less

$K^+ = 56 \text{ bits}$



$k_1, k_2, \dots, k_{16}$

$K^+ = 56 \text{ bits}$   
 $1, 2, 9, 15$   
 $16 \text{ bits}$

$C_0$        $D_0$       swap

28 bits    28 bits

$C_0 = 10101$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$1010$
$D_0 = 10111$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$0010$
$C_1 = 01010$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$0101$
$D_1 = 01111$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$00101$

like PT we have another  $K_1$   
 $P_1$  for  $56 \rightarrow 48$

## Summary

① key  $\rightarrow$  64 bits

② Ptable  $\rightarrow$   $8 \times 8$  Table

acc to table arrange position.

③  $K^+ = 56$  bits

C<sub>0</sub> D<sub>0</sub>  
20bit 20bit

④ left circular shift  
for {1, 2, 9, 16}  $\rightarrow$  1 bit L.C. shift.

for rest of all  $\rightarrow$  2 bit L.C. shift.

⑤

$$K_1 \Rightarrow C_1 D_1 \quad K_2 = C_2 D_2$$

key  
01 go to 01 Raw

$S_1$

$S_2$

$K_1$

[0/p]

00  
01  
10  
11  
0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111

take the first & last bit out of the

another table will be there to convert 56 bit  $\rightarrow$  48 bits.

for all numbers by  $K_1 \rightarrow K_1^+$   
so all will be converted into

$K_1^+ \rightarrow K_1^+ (48$  bits)

after making these sub keys they will be XOR with expanded Data and X will be created.

X = 101010010111 - 1010

↓  
6 bit 6 bit  
↓  
48 bits

↓  
8 boxes will be formed

which will take 6 bit as 0/p  
& give 4 bit as 0/p

Note: This complete to first 1 round like this 16 rounds will takes place

for even a lit change in PT, a lot of change occurs in X.  
known as

A VLAUNCH effect



$N = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$  (integers)  
 $\rightarrow$  can be positive  
~~negative~~  
~~values~~

$$\begin{aligned} Z_N &\rightarrow \text{additive inverse} \\ (a+b) &\equiv 0 \pmod{N} \rightarrow \text{find all pairs of} \\ &\text{multiplicative inverse} \\ (a \times b) &\equiv 1 \pmod{N} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \times 2 \\ 5 \times 5 \\ 7 \times 7 \\ 9 \times 1 \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

$$-13 \pmod{100} \equiv 87$$

Extended Euclidean Algorithm  
to find multiplicative inverse

b under  $Z_N$

9	$g_4$	$g_2$	$t_1$	$t_2$	$t$
10	$g_3$	$g_1$	0	1	-3
3	$g_2$	$g_0$	1	-3	10
1	$g_1$	$g_0$	-3	10	
0	$g_0$	$g_0$			

$$-3 \pmod{10} \quad (\text{t}_1 \text{ is associated value})$$

$$0 = 10 - 3 \pmod{10}$$

$$\approx 10 - 3$$

$$\approx 7$$

$$\begin{aligned} g_4 &\leftarrow g_2 \\ t_2 &\leftarrow 1 \\ \text{while } (g_2 &= 0) \end{aligned}$$

$$g_1$$

$$g_1 \leftarrow g_4 - q_4 g_2$$

$$t \leftarrow t_1 - q_4 t_2$$

$$q_4 \leftarrow g_2$$

$$t_1 \leftarrow g_1$$

$$t_2 \leftarrow t$$

$$t_4 \leftarrow t_2$$

b  
b under  $Z_N$

$$g_3 \pmod{100} \Rightarrow g_3^{-1} \pmod{100}$$

$$g_3^4 \pmod{100} \cdot 29 \times 29 \pmod{100}$$

$$g_4 \quad g_2 \quad g_1 \quad t_1 \quad t_2 \quad t.$$

$$4 \quad 100 \quad 23 \quad 8 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad -4$$

$$2 \quad 23 \quad 8 \quad 7 \quad 1 \quad -4 \quad 9$$

$$7 \quad 8 \quad 7 \quad 1 \quad -4 \quad 9 \quad -13$$

$$1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 9 \quad -13 \quad 100 \quad g_2(t)$$

$$1 \quad 0 \quad -13 \quad 100 \quad -92 \quad 8 \quad -13 \quad \overline{\overline{100}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Q1} &\quad 23 \pmod{100} \\ &\quad 23^2 \pmod{100} \quad \approx 87 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Q2} &\quad 23^4 \pmod{100} \cdot 29 \times 29 \pmod{100} \\ &\quad 23^8 \pmod{100} \cdot 29 \times 29 \pmod{100} \\ &\quad 23^{16} \pmod{100} \cdot (29 \times 29) \pmod{100} \end{aligned}$$

$$(23^6 \cdot 23^{16} \cdot 23^4 \cdot 23^2 \cdot 23)$$

extended euclidean algorithm

Multiplicative Inverse  
of 11 in  $\mathbb{Z}_{26}$

$q$	$r_1$	$r_2$	$t_1$	$t_2$	$x$
2	26	11	4	0	1
11	4	3	1	-2	5
1	4	3	1	-2	5
3	1	0	5	-7	26
0	-7	26			

$$\begin{aligned} &\Rightarrow -7 \pmod{26} \\ &\Rightarrow 26 - 7 \pmod{26} \\ &\Rightarrow 26 - 7 = 19 \end{aligned}$$

Fermat's theorem

If  $p$  is a prime no. &  $a$  is a true integer, condition  $a$  is not divisible through  $p$  (i.e.  $p$  is not divisible by  $a$ )

$$a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 170 \\ 1356 \pmod{171} \\ \hline 1 \end{array} \right\}$$

$$a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{or } a^{p-2} = a^{-1} \pmod{p} \Rightarrow a^p \pmod{p} = a \pmod{p}$$

Q

$$c^{10} \pmod{11}$$

$$c^{11-1} \pmod{11} = 1 \pmod{11} = 1$$

Q

$$3^{12} \pmod{11}$$

$$(3 \pmod{11} \cdot 3^{11} \pmod{11}) \pmod{11}$$

$$(3 \pmod{11} \cdot 3 \pmod{11}) \cdot 3^{10} \pmod{11} \pmod{11}$$

$$\Rightarrow 9$$

Q

$$5^{15} \pmod{\text{mod } 13}$$

$$(5 \pmod{13} \cdot 5^{14} \pmod{13}) \pmod{13}$$

$$(5^2 \pmod{13} \cdot 5^{13} \pmod{13}) \pmod{13}$$

$$\Rightarrow 8.$$

Q

$$456^{17} \pmod{17}$$

$$(456 \pmod{17} \cdot 456^{16} \pmod{17}) \pmod{17}$$

$$14.$$

Q

$$7^{16} \pmod{7}$$

$$7^{17-1} \pmod{7} = 1 \pmod{7}$$

Euler's theorem

If  $n$  and  $a$  are positive integers  
then according to Euler theorem

$$\boxed{a^{\phi(n)} = 1 \pmod{n}}$$

Q

Fermat theorem is not applicable because 35 is not a prime number

$$\begin{aligned}\phi(35) &= \frac{\phi(7)}{7-1} \times \frac{\phi(5)}{5-1} \\ &= 6 \times 4 = 24\end{aligned}$$

$$6^{\phi(35)} \pmod{35} = 1 \pmod{35} = 1$$

Q

$$20^{62} \pmod{7^2}$$

$$\phi(7^2) = \frac{\phi(49)}{49-1} \times \frac{\phi(7)}{7-1}$$

$$49 - 6 = 43$$

$$20^{60} \pmod{49} \cdot 20^2 \pmod{49}$$

$$400 \pmod{49} = 15 \text{ ans}$$

Q'

$$7^{222} \pmod{10}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\phi(10) &= \phi(5) \times \phi(2) \Rightarrow 4 \times 1 = 4 \\ 7^4 \pmod{10} &= 1\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(7^4 \pmod{10})^{55} \cdot 7^2 \pmod{10} &\pmod{10} \\ (49 \pmod{10}) \pmod{10} &\pmod{9} \text{ Ans}\end{aligned}$$

## Assignment


Q1 what are different security services provided by security mechanism to counter various types of cryptographic attacks.

Q2 Categories different types of modes of operations of block cipher.

Q3

Different b/w (i) Cryptography & Steganography  
(ii) confusion & diffusion  
(iii) Stream & Block cipher

User 1 Public key Cryptography



Q4

$$x = 2 \pmod{3}$$

$$x = 3 \pmod{5}$$


$$x = 2 \pmod{7}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{we can solve using CRT}$$

$$M_1 = \frac{M}{m_1} = \frac{M}{3}$$

$$M_2^{-1} = M_1^{-1} \cdot M_3^{-1}$$

$$M_2^{-1} = (a_1 \times M_1 \times M_1^{-1} + a_2 \times M_2 \times M_2^{-1} + a_3 \times M_3 \times M_3^{-1}) \pmod{M}$$



$$M_1 = 3 \times 5 \times 7 = 105$$

$$M_1^{-1} = \frac{1}{3} \pmod{105}$$

$$M_2 = \frac{105}{5} = 21$$

$$M_3 = \frac{105}{7} = 15$$

priv key

$$M_1^{-1} \rightarrow 35^{-1} \pmod{3}$$

$$35 \phi(3)^{-1} \pmod{3}$$

$$35^{-1} \pmod{3}$$

$$35 \pmod{3}$$

$$2$$

## Chinese Remainder Theorem

$$x = x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \quad \dots \quad (1)$$

$$x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \quad \dots \quad (2)$$

$$x \equiv a_3 \pmod{m_3} \quad \dots \quad (3)$$

sender	private	public	Authenticat.
sender	public	confidentiality	Date

$$M_1^{-1} = 21^{-1} \text{ mod } 5$$

$$\approx 21(45)^{-1} \text{ mod } 5$$

$$\approx 213 \text{ mod } 5$$

$\therefore$

$$M_1^{-1} \approx 15^{-1} \text{ mod } 7$$

$$\approx 15 \phi(7)^{-1} \text{ mod } 7$$

$$\approx 155 \text{ mod } 7$$

$$\approx 45935 \text{ mod } 7$$

$$\approx 4 \text{ mod } 7$$

$$x = (2x_35x_2 + 3x_1x_21 + 2x_{15}x_1) \text{ mod } 105$$

$$\approx (140 + 63 + 30) \text{ mod } 105$$

$$\approx 233 \text{ mod } 105$$

$$\approx 23$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Qn} \\ \text{GCD}(12345, 1111) \\ \text{GCD}(1275, 50) \\ \text{GCD}(1237, 1947) \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{GCD}(12345, 1111) \text{ GCD}(9, b) = \text{GCD}(b, a \text{ mod } b) \\ (50, 5) \quad \text{GCD}(b, 0) = b \\ 25, 5 \text{ mod } 5 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{(25)} \quad 0 \quad \text{GCD}(1275, 50) \\ \text{GCD}(50, 25) \\ \text{GCD}(25, 0) = 25 \end{array}$$

CR Theorem

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Qn} \\ X = 4 \text{ mod } 7 \\ X = 5 \text{ mod } 11 \end{array}$$

$$X = 7 \text{ mod } 13$$

$$X = 12 \text{ mod } 17$$

use

$$X_1 = a_1 \text{ mod } m_1$$


$$X_2 = a_2 \text{ mod } m_2$$

$$\begin{array}{l} M_1 = \frac{M}{m_1}, \quad M_2 = \frac{M}{m_2} \text{ find } M_1^{-1} \\ M_1^{-1} = \frac{1}{m_1}, \quad M_2^{-1} = \frac{1}{m_2} \end{array}$$

Public key cryptography

key  $\leftrightarrow$  private  
key  $\rightarrow$  public

Chinese Remainder Theorem



$\rightarrow$  If sender uses private key, then receiver have a corresponding public key for that which ensures authentication. (User (sender) confirms)  
 $\rightarrow$  If sender uses public key then receiver uses private key corresponding to that which ensures confidentiality.

$$M = 7 \times 11 \times 13 \times 17 = 17017$$

$$M_1 = \frac{17017}{7} \Rightarrow 2431$$

$$M_3 = \frac{17017}{13} \quad M_4 = \frac{17017}{17}$$

$$= \underline{\underline{1309}} = \underline{\underline{1001}}$$

~~Step~~

$$2431^{-1} \text{ mod } 7$$

$$(2431) \phi(7)^{-1} \text{ mod } 7$$

~~Step~~

$$(2431)^5 \text{ mod } 7$$

$$(2)^5 \text{ mod } 7 \rightarrow 32 \text{ mod } 7$$

~~Step~~ 4.

~~Step~~

$$M_1^{-1} = (1547)^9 \text{ mod } 11$$

~~Step~~ 8

### RSA Algorithm (provide confidentiality)

Public key cryptography algorithm.

M<sub>3</sub><sup>-1</sup>  
M<sub>4</sub><sup>-1</sup>

~~find~~

$$\left( a_1 M_4 M_4^{-1} + a_2 M_2 M_2^{-1} \right) \text{ mod } M$$

prime No.: -  $p \neq q$  (distinct prime no.)  
find a value  $n = \text{multiple of } p \times q$

( $n = p \times q$ ) part of any public or private key  
find  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$

To calc. public key ( $e$ ):

$$\text{GCD}(e, \phi(n)) = 1$$

for verification

$$x = 4 \text{ mod } 7 \quad \text{put } x = 1552 \\ \frac{x}{7} = 1552 \text{ (2)} \quad \text{Rem should be 4.}$$

$$\frac{45}{7}$$

$$\frac{42}{7}$$

$$\frac{32}{7}$$

(4). verified

Chinese remainder applied only when mod values  $\phi$  are coprime.

Like num in Ques [7, 11, 13, 17] are coprime

To calculate private key corr so that  
 $d \cdot e = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$  public key

$$\begin{array}{l} p=11 \\ q=13 \\ n=pq \end{array}$$

$$\phi(n) = 60$$

public key can be any no.

60

either 7, 11, 13, 17 --- (any no. smaller than 60)

Suppose we take 7 private

$$e=7$$

$$d \cdot 7 \equiv 1 \pmod{60}$$

$$\begin{aligned} d &= 7^{-1} \pmod{120} \\ &= 7^{(120)-1} \pmod{120} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 7^{120} &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^2 &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^4 &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^8 &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^{16} &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^{32} &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^{64} &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ 7^{128} &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \end{aligned}$$

$$d = 7^2 \pmod{120}$$

$$d = 49 \pmod{120}$$

$$\text{public key } (e, \phi(n)) = 1$$

$$\begin{array}{l} n=11 \times 13 \Rightarrow 143 \\ \phi(n) = 10 \times 12 \Rightarrow 120 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} p=11 \\ q=13 \\ n=pq \end{array}$$

Cipher Text  
 $C = M^e \pmod{n}$  encrypted value  
 for verification  
 starting M &  
 $M^d \pmod{n}$   
 must be similar.

$$\begin{aligned} 7^4 &\equiv 1 \pmod{120} \\ d &= 103 \end{aligned}$$

$$7^4 \pmod{143} \Rightarrow 49$$

## CA $\rightarrow$ Certifying Authority.

RSA algorithm  
for 2 different parties:

large prime no.  $\rightarrow p_A, q_A$        $p_B, q_B$   
 $n_A = p_A \times q_A$        $n_B = p_B \times q_B$

exponent  
 $\phi(n_A) = (p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)$        $\phi(n_B) = (p_B - 1)(q_B - 1)$

public key  $(e_A)$        $(e_B)$

$1 < e_A < \phi(n_A)$        $1 < e_B < \phi(n_B)$

private key  $(d_A)$        $(d_B)$

$e_A \cdot d_A = 1 \pmod{\phi(n_A)}$        $e_B \cdot d_B = 1 \pmod{\phi(n_B)}$

public key of all are stored in CA.  
A want to contact B then it will ask for B's public key from CA (Certifying Authority).

A  $\leftarrow$  B

sender

receiver

$A \rightarrow CA$

(B)

$M = M^{\text{msg}}$

encrypted

decrypted

$-23 \pmod{60}$

$60 - 23 \pmod{60}$

$60 - 23 = 37$

Ques       $p = 7$        $q = 11$        $m = 5$

$n = 77$   
 $\phi(n) = (7-1)(11-1) = 60$

$1 < e < \phi(n)$

Suppose  $e = 13$  public key.

$13 \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

$d = 13^{-1} \pmod{60}$

$d = 13 \cdot 60^{-1} \pmod{60}$

Soln

9	24	24	24	24	24	24
4	60	13	8	0	1	-4

1	13	8	5	1	-4	5
---	----	---	---	---	----	---

1	8	5	3	-4	5	-9
---	---	---	---	----	---	----

1	5	3	2	5	-9	14
---	---	---	---	---	----	----

1	3	2	1	-9	14	-23
---	---	---	---	----	----	-----

1	0	-1	0	14	-23	50
---	---	----	---	----	-----	----

1	0	-23	60
---	---	-----	----

sender take public key from CA & encrypt msg using that key then private key is used by rec receiver to decrypt the same msg.

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private key = 37

same by user  
torrent etc.

message send to be = 5

Cipher text =  $M^e \bmod n$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{5^{13}}{5^{13} \bmod 69}$$

$$(5^2 \bmod 77) - 5^{14} \bmod 77 \bmod 77$$

~~53~~ 48.

$$(48 \cdot 48 \cdot 48 \cdot 48 \cdot 5) \bmod 77$$

$$(26 \cdot 42080) \bmod 77$$

26

42080

$$22 \sqrt{680}$$

44

$$26 \cdot 54 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 344 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 300 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 539 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 362 \bmod 77$$

decryption

$$22 \sqrt{680}$$

44

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 27 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 67 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 67 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 3 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26 \cdot 5 \bmod 77 \\ 26 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$26^{37} \bmod 77$$

~~26~~ 26

$$(60)^{10} 26 \bmod 77$$

$$(58)^9 26 \bmod 77$$

$$(37)^2 58 \cdot 26 \bmod 77$$

$$60 \cdot 45 \bmod 77$$

$$2700 \bmod 77$$

Ques Assign  
find cipher text for "HELLO"

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

(I)

(J)

(K)

10 sep '18.

## Key Management

In this keys are known to authentic parties only

Public key distribution  
↳ shared secret key distribution


(i)

Public announcement (broadcasting)  
A have public key of all

A sends msg to B using public key of C so that C knows that msg comes from C (Authentication)

Drawback:- Public key visible to all.

(ii) Public key directory





(iii) Key certification

If two communication occurs b/w 2 parties again & again then KDC provide certificate to both i.e. used for authentication & KDC is not disturbed again & again

Drawback:- same as above.

(iv) Key distribution centre









$$\# \quad (c_1 d)^{-1} \bmod p = c_1^{p-1-d} \bmod p$$

$$5^{11-1-3} \bmod 11$$

$$\Rightarrow 5^7 \bmod 11$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} c_2 \\ c_2^2 \\ c_2^3 \end{array} \right. \bmod 11 \\ & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (5)^3 \\ 125 \\ 25 \\ 7 \end{array} \right. \bmod 11 \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \underline{\underline{3}}$$

$$c_2 \equiv 3 \bmod 11$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{4} \\ \times \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \textcircled{2} \\ \times \end{array} \quad M$$

Ques

$$p = 107 \quad c_1 = 2 \quad M = 66$$

$$\text{Let } d = 5 \quad 1 < d < 105$$

$$\begin{array}{c} e_2 = e_1 d \\ \Rightarrow 2^5 \bmod 107 \end{array}$$

$$M = 66$$

Suppose

$$\begin{array}{c} C_{p,2} \equiv e_1 \bmod p \\ \Rightarrow 2^4 \bmod 107 \\ \Rightarrow \underline{\underline{16}} \end{array}$$

$$(c_1 c_2) = (16, 11)$$

$$D = [c_2 (c_1 d)]^{-1} \bmod p.$$

$$16^{109-1-5} \bmod 107$$

~~$$256^{25} \bmod 107$$~~

$$\begin{array}{c} 16^{101} \\ (42)^{50} \end{array} \bmod 107$$

$$\begin{array}{c} 16^{25} \\ (52)^{25} \end{array} \bmod 107$$

check

$$16^{101} \bmod 107$$

check

$$\begin{array}{c} 16^{101} \\ 64^{25} \end{array} \bmod 107$$

check

$$\begin{array}{c} 16^{101} \\ 11^{25} \end{array} \bmod 107$$

check

$$\begin{array}{c} 16^{101} \\ 11^{25} \end{array} \bmod 107$$

$$c_2 =$$

$$(66 \times 2^5) \bmod p$$

$$(61)^2 \bmod 107$$

$$3721 \bmod 107$$

$$(11)^2 \bmod 107$$

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107  $\sqrt{1024}$

107  $\sqrt{963}$

107  $\sqrt{963}$

107  $\sqrt{963}$


107  $\sqrt{963}$

## Revision

~~K~~ KHC bits  
=  $K_1$  bits

Feistel Network

Key Generation



Explain Feistel structure  
key components  
significance of no. of rounds & fn.  
our algorithm you can use

Note:- for decryption we reverse the keys-

use IC.S.I.N. [28 bits]  $\rightarrow$  [28 bits]

for resp.  $d_1 = 10101 - 1010$   
2 bit CS.  $R_1 = 01010 - 0101$   
 $k_1^+ = 01010 - 10101 \dots$   
all rounds  $[R_i^+ = 10101 - 01010 \dots]$

$$\text{then } K_1 = L_1^+ + R_1^+$$

$$\text{Round } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} L_2^+ = 10101 - 1010 \\ R_2^+ = 01010 - 0101 \end{array} \right.$$

$$R_2 = L_2^+ + R_2^+$$

, and do on for 16 rounds

for converting 64  $\rightarrow$  56 (different table)  
converting 56  $\rightarrow$  64 (2nd table)

DES Question

Explains structure


key specif:

To calc initial per

Role of S-Box

IP box from S Box

generation by sub key, from



## Sessional Paper

- ① Public key - Asymmetric  
Private key  $\rightarrow$  Symmetric
- ②  $456^{17} \bmod 7$  - prime  
 $\therefore 456 \bmod 7 \rightarrow 14 \bmod 7$
- ③ for symmetric no. of keys  
 $nC_2$  or  $n(n-1)/2$
- ④ relative prime  
 $(f(c), 2)$ : This value means there are 2 no. less than 6 which are coprime  
 $(1, 5)$
- ⑤  $A^t \bmod n \rightarrow$  possible only when  $A, n$  are coprime  
So we start Question Decryption  
key was not possible.

15/07/18

## Message Authentication :-

Attacks on communication channel

- ↳ Traffic Analysis
- ↳ Masquerading
- ↳ Repudiation
- ↳ Content Modification (Attack is to check message authentication)
- ↳ Source Repudiation (to check message authentication)
- Sender is a valid user. (by checking that it is using private key to send).

## Message Authen



- Message
- MAC
- Hash algo.
- Message (variable length to fixed length)
- Hash
- One more

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provide ability to verify author, date & time of signature  
authenticate message content date  
Page  
be verified by third parties to receive deposition

Digital signature (mechanism for making authentication)

reverse the initial crypto process  
sender  $\rightarrow$  private key of Authentication  
receiver  $\rightarrow$  public key of sender

initial crypto process  
sender  $\rightarrow$  public key of confidential  
receiver  $\rightarrow$  private key

initial crypto process  
sender  $\rightarrow$  public key of confidentiality  
receiver  $\rightarrow$  private key  
  
this is followed and called as  
digital signature

```

graph TD
    Direct[Direct] --> Arbitrated[Arbitrated]
    Arbitrated --> Direct

```

How to generate & use digital signature

- ① Generation
- ② Apply verification.
- ③

user have a msg [M]

```

graph TD
    subgraph HashTable [Hash Table]
        direction TB
        H[Hash function] --> B[Buckets]
        B --> L[Linked List]
        L --> E[Element]
        E --> K[Key]
        K --> V[Value]
        V --> S[Storage]
        S --> F[Free]
        F --> B
    end

```

The diagram illustrates a Hash Table structure. It starts with a 'Hash function' block at the top, which points down to a 'Buckets' block. The 'Buckets' block contains a 'Linked List' block, which points down to an 'Element' block. The 'Element' block contains a 'Key' block, which points down to a 'Value' block. The 'Value' block points down to a 'Storage' block, which then points down to a 'Free' block. Finally, the 'Free' block points back up to the 'Buckets' block, forming a circular flow.

The diagram illustrates a block cipher structure. A box labeled "key" is shown above a box labeled "M". An arrow points from the "key" box to the "M" box, with the label "XOR" written above the arrow. Below the "M" box is another box labeled "key". To the left of the "key" boxes is a large bracket spanning both, with the label "key" written above it. The entire assembly is enclosed in a large rectangular frame.

91 62330

DATA  
PAGE  
CLASSMATE

Assumption :-

- (1) Same Hash values.
- (2) same methods must be used for encryption as well as decryption.

Digital signature :-  
Digital signature is a communication process where sender and receiver both are applied in

$$\begin{array}{llll} p = 17 & q = 19 & r = 7 & m = 24 \\ m = 17 \times 19 \end{array}$$

$$\text{private key } \Rightarrow d \cdot e = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

ج

$$\frac{3}{2} \quad (2) \quad 7/3 \bmod 289$$

卷之三

Scanned with CamScanner

47  
95  
2

$$95 \bmod 288$$

$$(49)^4 \bmod 288$$

$$(97)^{23} \bmod 288$$

$$(193)^5 \bmod 288$$

$$(193)^2 \bmod 288$$

$$97 \cdot 97 \cdot 193 \cdot 97 \cdot 49 \cdot 97$$

$$\text{Total} = 247$$

Q

$$p = 7 \quad q = 13 \quad e = 5 \quad M = 35$$

$$n = 7 \times 13 = 91$$

$$f(n) = 72$$

$$d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{f(n)}$$

$$d = 5^{-1} \bmod 72$$

$$[d = 29]$$

private key.

$$\text{Sender} \Rightarrow 35 \bmod 91$$

→

In normal RSA we use public key but for DSS RSA we use private key.

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

RSA M(P)

RSA R(P)

RSA S(P)

RSA V(P)

RSA P(P)

RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA G(P)

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

RSA M(P)

RSA R(P)

RSA S(P)

RSA V(P)

RSA P(P)

RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

RSA M(P)

RSA R(P)

RSA S(P)

RSA V(P)

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RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

RSA M(P)

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RSA V(P)

RSA P(P)

RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA F(P)

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RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

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RSA S(P)

RSA V(P)

RSA P(P)

RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

RSA C(P)

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RSA C(P)

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RSA S(P)

RSA V(P)

RSA P(P)

RSA Q(P)

RSA N(P)

RSA H(P)

RSA F(P)

RSA E(P)

RSA D(P)

Suppose private key =  $x$   
 $3 < x < 9$

calculate public key [with  $x$ ]

$$y \rightarrow x^2 \pmod{11}$$

$$y \rightarrow 2^2 \pmod{11}$$

$$y \rightarrow 4.$$

$$\text{For key generation} \quad y \rightarrow x^2 \pmod{11}$$

Example. Generating Signature Value:

$$\text{PlainText} \rightarrow w \rightarrow H(M)$$

$$v_a = (w^k \pmod{p}) \pmod{q}$$

$$\begin{cases} 0 < k < q \\ \gcd(k, q) = 1 \end{cases} \quad b = k^{-1}(w + va) \pmod{q}$$

$$\text{signature} \rightarrow (a, b)$$

for verification

$$\begin{aligned} a &= (4^3 \pmod{11}) \pmod{5} \\ &\rightarrow 4 \end{aligned}$$

$$w = 54$$

$$\begin{aligned} b &= 3^2(54 + 3 \times 4) \pmod{5} \\ &\rightarrow 3^2(66) \pmod{5} \\ &\rightarrow 3^2 \pmod{5} \\ &\rightarrow 9 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x &= b^2 \pmod{5} \\ u_1 &= w x \pmod{5} \\ u_2 &= a x \pmod{5} \end{aligned}$$

$$v_a = (w^u, y^{u_2} \pmod{p}) \pmod{q}$$

if this value =  $a$

$$\text{Signature } (4, 2)$$

$$\text{Verification: } x = 2^2 \pmod{5}$$

$$(2^4)^2 \pmod{5} = 3^2 \pmod{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} p &= 11 & q &= 5 & n &= 2 \\ 10 &\equiv 1 \pmod{11} \\ \Rightarrow & 2^4 \pmod{11} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{public key}$$

$$y \rightarrow 4^2 \pmod{11}$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$\text{private key}$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$\text{public key}$$

$$y \rightarrow 4^2 \pmod{11}$$

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$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$\text{private key}$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$\text{public key}$$

$$y \rightarrow 4^2 \pmod{11}$$

$$y \rightarrow 9.$$

$$\text{private key}</math$$

$$U_1 = (54 \times 3) \bmod 5 = 2$$

$$U_2 = (4 \times 3) \bmod 5 = 2$$

$$Z = 2^1 \bmod 3 \Rightarrow Z$$

$$U_4 = 3 \times 2 \bmod 3$$

values:  $(4^2 \times 2^2 \bmod 11) \bmod 5$   
 $\Rightarrow ((16 \times 8) \bmod 11) \bmod 5$   
 $\Rightarrow 9 \bmod 5$

$$\boxed{4} = a \text{ Verified}$$

Ques  $p = 7$ ,  $q = 2$ ,  $k = 2$ ,  $H(m) = 3$

$$q_m = 3$$

given

$$2^6 \bmod 7$$

using  
 $(p-1)$

$$\boxed{4}$$

$n, h$

$$\chi = 2$$

$$y^2 = 4^2 \bmod 7$$

$n$

$$a = (4^2 \bmod 7) \bmod 3$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{2}$$

$$p = 7$$

$$q = 2$$

$$p \times q = 14$$

$$2^6 \bmod 7$$

$$\boxed{4} \Rightarrow 16 \bmod 7$$

$n, h$

Ques  $p = 7$ ,  $q = 11$ . find D.S using RSA  
also verify  $M = 10$

$$n = 7 \times 11 = 77$$

$e = 11$  (co-prime,  $\phi(n) = 60$ )  
 $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$

$$\phi(n) = 6 \times 10 = 60$$

$a \rightarrow \text{msg}$ ,  $s \rightarrow \text{sig}$ ,  $m \rightarrow \text{mod}$

public key  $\Rightarrow 13$

private key

$$e \cdot d = 1 \bmod \phi(n)$$

$$\Rightarrow d = 13^{-1} \bmod 60$$

$$\boxed{n \Rightarrow 37} ; \quad \boxed{y \Rightarrow 13}$$

private key

Digital sign  $S = M^d \bmod n$

$$p \times q$$



23/10/18.

Message authentication.

$$\begin{aligned} & 10^{33} \bmod 77 \\ & (23)^6 \cdot 10 \bmod 77 \\ & (67)^9 \cdot 10 \bmod 77 \\ & (23)^4 \cdot 67 \cdot 10 \bmod 77 \\ & (67)^2 \cdot 67 \cdot 10 \bmod 77 \\ & 23 \cdot 67 \cdot 10 \bmod 77 \end{aligned}$$

Signature message =  $10$

Verification

$$M^1 \cdot S^e \bmod n$$

$$(23)^6 \cdot 10 \cdot \bmod 77$$

$$(67)^2 \cdot 10 \cdot \bmod 77$$


$$10 \rightarrow M$$

8

$$\begin{aligned} & M^1 \cdot S^e \bmod n \\ & M^1 = 10^{13} \bmod 77 \\ & (23)^6 \cdot 10 \cdot \bmod 77 \\ & (67)^2 \cdot 10 \cdot \bmod 77 \\ & 10 \rightarrow M \end{aligned}$$


Verified

$\Rightarrow$  [MAC]  
Sender  
[m]



use of key, will add authenticity

Receiver



Authentication

code


then, message  
authentic as well

as integrity is  
maintained.

Q1. difference b/w CMAC & HMAC.  
Q2. Explain composition fn

30/09/18


MDS | SHA



512 x multiple


- 1) Add Padding bits into message
- 2) Add length bits
- 3) Initialize MD Buffer.
- 4) divide / separate into 512 block
- Op

$$|M| + |P| - 64 = \text{One 512}$$



### Message Authentication

Key Distribution Center.



First, A will communicate with KDC & KDC will provide with the session key. Then A will pass that key to B. Then, B will communicate with KDC & also pass the key. If both the key are passed by KDC & A & second key from B to KDC matches then A & B will communicate.


Three servers will exist by KDC:-  
 → Authentication server (AS) { with KDC }  
 → Ticket grant server (TGS) { with KDC }  
 → sever

	SHA 1	SHA 224	SHA 256	SHA 512
Block Size	512	512	512	512
MD	160	224	256	512
Rounds	80	64	64	80

classmate  
Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Page \_\_\_\_\_

classmate  
Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Page \_\_\_\_\_

Both server are kept under  
As for client recognition &  
Second one for key tokens.



client request to each and as per  
request keeps on fulfilling it goes  
forward.

Step 2  
client send a request to server  
with TGS to AS.

AS will send session key & ticket  
to client.

Step 3

TGS will send to Ticket to AS.  
a ~~key~~ ticket to client to connect  
with the required server.

Step 4  
server will decrypt that ticket  
& give access to client.

Session key is time constrained.

→ Suppose time limit is 10 sec &  
the session takes more than 10  
secs so, server will declare that  
invalid user.

→ KERBEROS 4  
→ KERBEROS 5.

↓ modification  
→ client's time is increased for the  
session.  
→ Client can comm" to multiple server  
at a given time.



15 NOV '18

## PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)

Entities can be

- Registration Authority
- Certification authority. (Verification to validating authority.)

Expl :- user give credential to RA. It will give it to CA after that stamp is given by CA then request is transferred back to RA.

So we can RA act as our intermediate between user & user.


Validation authority plays important role to avoid repudiation.

# Certification standard = X.509

format

Version -
Algorithm -
Issuer Name -
Subject Name -
Validation -

## PGP (Pretty Good Privacy).



Because sender uses random key  
receiver will not receive data directly.

Generally used in email transfer.

Used of SIMME

Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension

Convert all text formats into ASCII-Z

compression algorithm

U - [ ] - [MIME] — O — [MIME]

compression  
 is provided by  
 various algo.

→ all algorithm gives different result  
 we can use single algo multiple  
 times but it will increase time  
 complexity.

<u>Ques</u>	<u>symbol</u>	<u>frequency</u>
A		15
B		4
C		6
D		6
E		5
		39

<u>bits</u>	<u>codes</u>	<u>freq</u>	<u>bits Required</u>
1	A	15	15
3	B	4	12
3	C	6	18
3	D	6	18
3	E	5	15
			87

for single A we require 1 bit  
 if we use 3 bits

- SOL"
- ① Arrange in dec" order of freq"
  - ② Combine lesser &
  - ③ again step 1.

use Huffman algo.

→ If we use Huffman then we require 87 bits to represent all. of compressed?

If we use traditional way then ASCII -8 will use  $39 \times 8$  bits

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= 15 & A &= 15 & A &= 15 \\
 B &= 7 & \Rightarrow D/E = 11 & \Rightarrow B/C = 13 \\
 C &= 6 & B &= 6 & D/E = 11 \\
 D/E &= 11 & C &= 6
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= 15 \Rightarrow B/C/D/E = 24 \\
 B/C/D/E &= 24 & A &= 15
 \end{aligned}$$

assign 0 to freq

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \textcircled{O} \text{ } \textcircled{D/C/F/E} \\
 \textcircled{O} \text{ } \textcircled{B/C} \quad \textcircled{D/E} \text{ } \textcircled{1}
 \end{array}$$

Note:-

Entropy is the max. unit upto which any algorithm can compress a particular data.

→ no algo can give 100% result so value after compression will be the ~~max~~ no. more than entropy.

- \* Differentiate b/w substitution & transposition cipher, with the help of example  
Given  $p=17$ ,  $q=13$ ,  $n=11$ . Generate cipher text using RSA.

$$p = 17, q = 13 \Rightarrow n = 17 \times 13 = 221$$

$$\phi(n) = (16)(12) \Rightarrow 192$$

$$1 < e < \phi(n)$$

$$\text{GCD}(e, \phi(n)) = 1$$

Let  $e$  be 11 public key.

private key

$$d \cdot e = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

$$d = 11^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

$$11^{-1} \pmod{192}$$

$$192(11)^{-1} \pmod{192}$$

$$11^{31} \pmod{192}$$

$$(121)^{15} \pmod{192}$$

$$(49)^7 \pmod{192}$$

$$(49)^3 \pmod{192}$$

$$49 \cdot 49 \cdot 49 \pmod{192}$$

$$49^6 \pmod{192}$$

$$49^3 \pmod{192}$$

$$49 \pmod{192}$$

$$1 \pmod{192}$$

$$11^{-1} \pmod{192}$$

$$11 \pmod{192}$$

$$152 \cdot 100 \cdot 11 \bmod 22$$

184

Verify

$$M \Rightarrow C^d \bmod n$$

$$\Rightarrow 124^{35} \bmod 221$$

$$(127)^7 124 \bmod 221$$

$$(212)^8 127 \cdot 124 \bmod 221$$

$$16^4 127 \cdot 124$$

$$(35)^2 127 \cdot 124 \bmod 221$$

$$120 \cdot 127 \cdot 124 \bmod 221$$

210

- (iii) User may ~~use~~ ~~choose~~ exchange and use a replay attack to gain entrance to a server or to disrupt operations.

Kerberos provide a centralized authentication server whose job is to authenticate users to servers & servers to user.

Kerberos 4 (MULLIS, STEIGER)  
Kerberos 5 (KOHLS)

Motivation

→ security of individual computer is secure but when it comes about workstation security is a major issue b/c is more complex than day

classmate  
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Kerberos

### 3 Approaches to Security :

- ① Assume the identity of user or user using their workstation & enforce a security policy based on user IP using server
- ② User authenticates them to server
- ③ Require the user to prove his or her identity for each service invoked.

Kerberos Report include :-

- ① Secure
- ② Reliable
- ③ Transparent
- ④ Scalable.

### Kerberos 4

→ uses Authentication Server (AS) that knows the password of all users & stores these in a centralised database.

→ AS shares a unique secret kept with each

Server (in a secure manner)

→ ~~secret~~ <sup>secret key of user</sup> ~~password~~ <sup>password of user</sup> ~~sharing~~ <sup>sharing</sup>

- 1) C → AS :  $IDe \parallel P_c \parallel IDv$
- 2) AS → C : Ticker
- 3) C → V :  $IDc \parallel Ticker$

Ticker =  $E(K_v, [IDe \parallel ADC \parallel IDv \parallel TS_1 \parallel TS_2 \parallel H_f(v)])$

another secure approach includes (TGS) Ticker Granting Server. Hypothetically

Once per user logon session

- 1)  $C \rightarrow AS : IDe \parallel IDv \parallel Ticker_{TGS}$
- 2)  $AS \rightarrow C : E(K_e, Ticker_{TGS})$

Once per type of service

- 3)  $C \rightarrow TGS : IDe \parallel IDv \parallel Ticker_{TGS}$
- 4)  $TGS \rightarrow C : Ticker$

Once per service session

- 5)  $C \rightarrow V : IDe \parallel Ticker_v$

$$Ticket_v = E(K_{TGS}, [IDe \parallel ADC \parallel IDv \parallel TS_1 \parallel TS_2 \parallel H_f(v)])$$

Difference b/w Ker 4 & Ker 5

- ① environmental shortcomings :-

(i) ~~ency system dependence~~ - version 4 uses one

DES, & use any of the encryption technique

(ii) ~~internet protocol dependence~~ :- Version 4 req IP

version 5 uses any type of strength

allowing any Nto address type to be used

(iii) ~~management~~ :- Version 4 & 5 uses

ticket lifetime :- Version 4 & 5 uses minutes

to max time to 1280 min, version 5 arbitrary

## X.509 Certificate



VERSION	1	2	3
CERTIFICATE SERIAL NO.			
ALGORITHM			
PUBLIC KEY			
SUBJECT NAME			
ALGORITHM			
PUBLIC KEY			
SUBJECT PUBLIC KEY			
ISSUER UNIQUE IDENTIFIER			
EXTENSIONS			
ALGORITHM			
PUBLIC KEY			
ENCRYPTED			

All version

## IP Security Architecture

Important Docs.

- ① RFC 2401 :- Overview of a security architecture
- ② RFC 2402 :- Description of a pack authentication extension to IP & IPv6.

- ③ RFC 2406 :- Description of a pack encryption extension IPsec & IPsec.
- ④ RFC 2409 :- Specification of key management capabilities.

Architecture :- general concept, security requirements, definitions & mechanism defining IPsec

Technology :-  
Encapsulating Security Payload :- (ESP) covers the packet format & general issues related to the use of ESP for packet encryption & optionally authentication.

Authentication Header (AH) :- covers pack formate general issues related to the use of AH for pack authentication.

Encryption Algorithms :- describes how various encryption algorithm are used for ESP.

Authentication Algorithms :- describes how various authentication algorithms are used for AH &


for the authentication option of ESP.

Key Management :- does that describes key mgmt schemes.

Demands of User Protection (DPI) :- values needed for the other does to relate to each other

§ identifies & key lifetime are examples.

### Architecture




## #

### Authentication Header

- Provide support for header data integrity & authentication of IP packets.
- ensures undetected modification to a packet's content in transit is not possible
- AH also guards against the replay attack.
- Authentication is based on Mac (Message Authentication code).

### Authentication Header



## #

### Encapsulating Security Payload

ESP is a protocol within the IPsec for providing authentication, integrity & confidentiality of the packet's data/payload in IP4 & IP6. ESP provides message payload encryption & the authentication of the payload & its origin within the IPsec protocol suite.

8 16 24

Security Parameter Index (SPI)

Sequence Number

Initialization Vector

Protected Data

Pad

Authentication Data

Pad length NextHeader

## # Combining Security Association

Individual SA can implement either AH or ESP protocol not both. But in some cases both protocols are required so for that we need multiple SAs for the same traffic flow.

Security Association bundle refers to a sequence of SAs through which traffic must be processed to provide a desired set of IPsec services.

SA can combine in 2 ways :-

- ① Transport adjacency :- Applying more than one security protocol to the same IP packet without interworking tunneling -  
→ Standard tunneling :- Refers to the application of multiple layers of security protocol effected through IP tunneling.

## # Key Management

It involves the determination & distribution of secret keys.

of 4 keys → 2 transmit & 2 receive (for both AH & ESP)

2 types of key mgmt :-

- ① Manual :- manually configure each system SAs & facilitate the use of keys in large distributed systems

consists of :-

→ Oakley key determination protocol (key exchange)

→ (based on Diffie-Hellman also)  
Internet Security Association & Key mgmt protocol (ISAKMP)

- provide :-  
(i) framework (ii) specific protocol support,  
(iii) formats etc.

## # Transport Layer Security &

Transport Layer Security

SSL → was designed with public review & input from industry & was published as an Internet draft doc.

subsequently, when a consensus was reached to submit the protocol for

Ask Sir about SSL & TLS

Internet Standardisation, The TLS working group was formed within IETF to develop a common standard.

### Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)

It is an open encryption & security specification designed to protect credit card transactions on the Internet.

Secure Electronic Transaction is an example of application of Credit Card

### Intruders


It is one of the two most publicized threat to security. Generally preferred as a hacker or cracker.

#### ① Masquerader :-

control to exploit a legitimate user's account

② Misfeasor :- authorised user who misuse his privileges or unauthorised user wants to access.

③ Clandestine User :- individual who seizes supervisory control of the system



password files can be protected by intruders in 2 ways

① One-way fn :-  
user → system  
password → fn  
fn → user

② Access control :-  
pass file limited to one or very few accounts  
user → system transform  
pass → pass + timestamp  
pass + timestamp → user

# Viruses & Related Threats

① Malicious Programs :-

viruses :- attaches itself to a program & propagates copies to itself to other program

worm :- program that propagates copies of itself to other computer

logic bomb :- trigger action when condition occur

Trojan horse :- program contain unexpected additional functionality

Backdoor (trapdoor) :- program modification that allows unauthorized access to functionality

Explains :- Code specific to a single or set of vulnerabilities.

Downloader :- prog that install our item or a file that is under attack.

Auto - rooter :- Malicious hacker tools used to break into tool generating new viruses automatically.

Spammer :- send large volume of unwanted flooders :- attack no computer to carry out denial of service attack.

keylogger :- Capture keystrokes

Rootkit :- Set of hacker tool used after broken

Zombie :- prog activated on an infected machine so activated to launch attack on other machine.

## # Firewall Design Principles

~~Surf~~ Goals for firewall are :-

- ① All traffic from Inside & Outside must pass through a firewall (achieved by blocking all the access to our system except our firewall)
- ② Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy will be allowed to pass.

## Limitation of firewall

- ① Cannot protect against the attack user bypasses the firewall.
- ② Does not protect against internal threats.
- ③ The firewall cannot protect against the transfer of virus-infected program files (because they are supposed to be perimeter).

## Faulted System

Book  
no smoke  
no notes

Probability  
mt same same  
 $\frac{365}{365} \times \frac{364}{365} \times \dots \times \frac{363}{365}$

$$n = 90\%$$

$$1, 2$$

$$2 \rightarrow 1 \times 364$$

$$3 \rightarrow 1 \times 364 \times 363$$

$$9 \rightarrow 1 \times 364 \times 363 \times \dots \times 365$$

$$23 \rightarrow 1 \times 364 \times 363 \times \dots \times 365$$

$$50 \rightarrow 1 \times 364 \times 363 \times \dots \times 365$$

$$57\% \quad 10\% \quad 99\%$$

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
W W W W W W W W W W

## Birthday Attack

Collision

$$\text{Hash}(x_1) = \text{Hash}(x_2)$$


$$\text{But } x_1 \neq x_2$$

$$12 \mod 10 = 2 \quad ? \quad \text{but } 12 \neq 2$$

Same birthday attacks.  
pair  $\rightarrow$  B. date  
(2 person same day)  
Pass exchange.

SHA 1

$$X(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$$




Padding  $\Rightarrow$  divide ip into 448 bits.

then use padding to make 512

$$448 + 64 = 512$$

512 words decimal



version version

## Motivation


$\rightarrow$  provide security via a distributed architecture consisting of dedicated user workstations (clients) & distributed over centralized servers.

$\rightarrow$  require the user to prove his identity for each service invoked.

$\rightarrow$  server prove their identity to client -  
Adv  $\rightarrow$  Secure, reliable, transparent & scalable

$\rightarrow$  use protocol Needham & Schaadler (NFS)

$\rightarrow$  C & S must keep kerberos to mediate their mutual authentication



## PPT

Dec '18.

Authentication Appl.

Developed to support app "never auth."

& digital signature

Kerberos (private-key auth)

Services  $\rightarrow$  X.509 (public-key auth)

## Kerberos

$\rightarrow$  Athena project post developed at MIT.

$\rightarrow$  Symmetric encryption (no public key)


$\rightarrow$  Centralized private-key management

authentication in a distributed system

$\rightarrow$  Authentication, Authorization, Accounting

etc

## Kerberos 4



- User logs on to work station & request service on host.
- Request ticket-granting ticket.
- Ticket + session key
- As verifies user access right in DB, creates ticket-granting ticket & session key. Result are encrypted using key derived from user's password.
- Request service granting ticket.
- Ticket + session key
- Workstation asks user for pass, with pass the decrypt KDC message then send ticket
- TGS decrypts ticket & authenticates verifier request then creates ticket for requested server

## Role of AS

- Role of AS → Knows all user pass & stores in a DB  
 → Shares a unique secret key with each server  
 → Send an encrypted ticket grant ticket → TGT contains a lifetime & stamp by AS  
 → Encrypted with a key only known by AS & TGS  
 → Return a service granting ticket containing TGT & lifetime

Kerberos 5

Prob :- Lifetime of no server auth to user  
 use a session key  
 Message exchange  
 As exchange to obtain Service GT  
 To TGS exchange to obtain Service GT  
 C/S authentication exchange to obtain service

## Ker. Environment consider


- (1) server no. of client, all registered on same Kerberos database
- (2) app server, sharing keys with same server

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## Kerberos Realms


- set of managed nodes that share the same Kerberos database.

### Multiple Kerber.



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## CA Heirarchy



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## Version 5

Certificate Revocation

→ review before expiry  
→ user's private key is compromised  
◦ user is no longer certified by authority  
• CA's certificate is compromised

## Small security enhancement

- ① Confidentiality
- ② Authentication
- ③ Message integrity
- ④ Non-repudiation of origin

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- fixes version 4 environment related bug
- new element for AS exchange
- (i) Realm, (ii) option (iii) timer (no None)
- GSS authentication exchange
  - Subject
  - seq No.
- Kerberos ticket flag

## PGP

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### PGP Email compatibility

- Binary data to send (encyrpted)
- Mail designed only for Text
- PGP must encode raw binary data  
printable ASCII char.

- radix 64 algo
- 3 byte to 4 printable char (map)
- append CRC

### PGP Public & Private key

- Many Pub/Pri key so need to select which to use for every session key

- ④
  - used same rule public key writing my
  - but it is insufficient
  - use key identifier based on user name
  - least sign if have 64 bits

### Key Ring


- public user knows all the public key of another user
- user that are known to our
- user contain public key pair for this user, indexed by ID & every key

### Signature required?

yes  
striping from X

NO  
 $X \leftarrow Z^{-1}(X)$

YES  
 $X \leftarrow E_{K_{pub}}[S]$



## S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)



- security enhancement to MIME email.
- original S/MIME was only text
- MIME provide support for various content types & multiparts messages.
- encoding from binary to textual form
- S/MIME added security enhancement

fn.

- enveloped data
- encrypted content & associated keys
- signed data
- encoded msg + signed digest.
- clear-signed data
- clear text msg + encoded signed digest
- signed & enveloped data
- nesting of signed & encrypted utilities

## S/MIME Cryptographic algo.

- 1) hash → SHA1 & MD5
- 2) dig sign → DSS & RSA
- 3) session key encry: Elgamal & RSA
- 4) msg encry → Triple DES

→ procedure to decide which algo to use

provide classmate  
① authentication  
② confidentiality  
③ key mgmt

## Benefits of IPsec

- 1) firewall security to all traffic crossing the perimeter.
- 2) transparent to end user router.
- 3) assures routine encryption.
- 4) security to individual user.

## services

- 1) Access control
- 2) Connectionless security
- 3) Data Origin authentication
- 4) Limited traffic flow confidentiality
- 5) Rejection of replayed packets -

Prop

[ESP]

uses padding

→ to expand plaintext to req. length.

→ to align pad length & next header

fields

→ to provide partial traffic flow confidentiality.

~~Prop~~ approach to intrusion detection




→ statistical anomaly detection

→ threshold

→ profile based

→ rule-based detection

→ anomalous identification




confi - only particular receiver can decrypt using  $PK$   
 sign + Author → only sender can encrypt for using  $PK$

## Mac encryption

- public-key
  - encryption provides no confidence of sender
  - Since anyone potentially knows public key
  - however if
    - sender signs message using private key
    - then encrypt with reciever's public key
    - have both secret & authentication
    - Again need to recognize corrupted msg
    - OR use of 2 public keys used on msg

To ensure all 3 authentication, confi, Signature



- provide confi because of  $KR_b$
- provide auth & sign because of  $KR_a$

## MAC

→ Generated by an algo that creates a small fixed-sized block.  
 ○ depends on both msg & some key  
 ○ like ency through msg & some key

→ append to msg as a signature

→ receiver → computation  
 ○ If = provide assurance →  $\text{msg} = \text{MAC}$   
 unaltered and comes from sender

Q Why use MAC?

A When only authentication is needed & we need authentication to persist longer than the encryption (e.g. archival uses)

### Properties

- cryptographic checksum
- MAC =  $C_k(M)$
- condenses a variable-length msg  $M$  using a secret key  $k$  to a fixed length

size authenticated


- Many to one fn
- Many msg (same MAC) but finding other needs to be very difficult.

### Requirement for MAC

- ① Infeasible to find another msg with same MAC
- ② Should be uniformly distributed
- ③ Should depend equally on all bits of msg

## Hashf

- arbitrary msg to fixed length
- H is public not keyed like MAC
- use to detect changes to msg
- Can use in various ways with msg multiple of 512.
- used to create OS (widely)



- Req:
- ① applies to any size fixed length of  $p = \frac{m}{n}$ . wherein  $n$  is length to compute  $H = H(m)$  for any msg
  - ② it is infeasible to find  $x$  such that  $H(x) = H(m)$ .
  - ③ XOR of msg blocks
  - ④ not secure.

## MDS

① padding  
converge to 448 modulo 512.  
msg is 64 bits sum of being a multiple of 512.

single 1 bit next 0's are appended at least 1 bit & at most 512 bits added

### ② Appended length

- 64 bit length msg appended in present case
- if  $b > 2^{64}$  then only lower order 64 bit are used

now msg is exact multiple of 512

- ③ Initialize MD Buffer
  - ④ 4 word buffer ( $A, B, C, D$ ) is used to compute msg digest
- each 32 bit register

- A = 01 23 45 67  
B = 89 ab cd ef  
C = fe dc ba 98  
D = 76 54 32 10

- ⑤ Process Message in 16 word block
- take 32bit as input & give 16 bit output

### ③ Output

O/p as A,B,C & D. begin with A & ends with D

#### Summary

- simple
- fingerprint or message digest of arbitrary length.

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A S Prob(S) = 3  
S S Prob(NS) = 2  
NS S

The election NS P(sport) / Average close game  
uses NS → P(Average close game / sport)  
over S

very S P(sport)  
clean S

Match S P(not a sport / Average close game)  
A S → P(Average close game / not sport)  
but S

forgettable S P(not sport)  
game S NS  
It NS  
was NS  
a NS  
close NS

election NS

$$P(A \text{ sport}) \neq P(\text{very} \text{ sport}) \neq P(\text{close sport})$$

$$\Rightarrow P(\text{game/sport}) \neq P(\text{sport})$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{2}{11} \neq \frac{1}{11} \neq \left( \frac{6}{11} \right) \times \frac{2}{7}$$

$$\therefore \frac{2+1}{11+14} \neq \frac{1+1}{11+14} \Rightarrow \frac{0+1}{11+14} + \frac{2+1}{11+14}$$

displace

$$\frac{2}{15} \times \frac{2}{15} \times \frac{1}{15} \times \frac{3}{15} \times \frac{3}{15} = 4 \times \frac{1}{15^4}$$

$$\Rightarrow 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 0 \cdot 0 \times 10^{-8} \times \frac{1}{3}$$

$$= \frac{1}{15^4}$$

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