

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

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ABSTRACT. Phil 129: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason taught by Professor Samantha Matherne.

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1. 1/22/24 LECTURE: EARLY MODERN BACKDROP, THE SUBJECTIVE TURN IN
MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY, RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM, SYLLABUS

Early modern philosophy and science. Then situate Kant against this early modern backdrop. What Kant gives us: is a subjective turn on philosophy. Then we'll dive into how Kant responds to rationalism and empiricism.

Travel back to the 16th and 17th century. What happens in European thought when we get to the scientific revolution? The dominant model of science is aristotelian and ptolemaic – earth is at the center of everything. When we are thinking of how everything is structured in Ptolemy:

- (1) terrestrial (earth, air, fire, water)
- (2) celestial

The thought was that each thing had an essence which orients how it behaves. When we get to Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, we shift to heliocentric – sun is at the center of the universe. And we get a mechanistic theory of matter. Matter in motion. We have physical laws which express what causal interaction matter and motion have, and ones that we can analyze mathematically.

In the ptolemaic way of thinking, there's a certain privilege that the earth has in universe. And there's a hierarchy – celestial essence is cool. But in the mechanistic theory of matter, everything gets reduced to matter in motion that can be mathematically described and predicted. This is the philosophy that came from the scientific revolution.

Privilege of earth and human being – naturalistic model challenges thinking about human being as privileged in some sort of way. So in philosophy: come up with a new metaphysics.

We need a new normative theory – aesthetics, political philosophy, moral philosophy. How do we reconcile these normative theories

reductivist model of human – reduces everything to chemical processes and atoms. what happens to normativity if you reduce everything. How do you explain the "shoulds" that govern us, the normative stuff, with this reductivist/naturalist philosophy.

Rationalist and empiricists are trying to navigate this tension. What do we do with normative philosophical theory given this revolutionary change in how we think about the world?

Rationalists — appealing to reason. Reason and rationality are not governed by the natural world. Come up with a new metaphysics to deal with normativity.

Empiricism – What can we know through experience is the only basis for normativity. Universal and necessary truths (true for all people and all times) – empiricists are very skeptical of such normative claims that traditional philosophers have claimed.

In between these two responses, is where Kant emerges. The overblown claims of rationalism and the hyperskepticism of empiricism: Kant provides the subjective turn in philosophy. We need to set limits to philosophy: here is what philosophers can claim, and here is what philosophers cannot claim. He is going to index these limits to the human being. His radical move: within the domain of human experience, of what we can know, we can make legitimate philosophical claims, but as soon as you try to depart from the domain of the human being like about God, then you are no longer making legitimate claims. Kant: can only make justified philosophical claims when you are talking about human being and human perspective. Reigns in the metaphysical pretensions of rationalists, but don't we need to be skeptics in the domain of human experience: can make claims universal and normative.

Kant: Limit pretension of rationalism, and limit skepticism of empiricism.

Kant's Copernican revolution. Just as Copernican thought we need to recenter Sun as center instead of Earth. Kant thought: we need to reorient and anchor all of our philosophy to human.

In this class we will be reading what is known as the first critique: the critique of Pure reason (1781/1787). 1781 edition is called "A", and 1787 is called "B." Kant included A in the B edition.

Kant coins "theoretical philosophy:" metaphysics and epistemology. Goes on to write two more critiques. Second critique (1788): critique of practical reason (about ethics and moral philosophy). Third critique (1790) critique of power of judgement (aesthetics, biology).

Kant is a systematic philosopher. When thinking through human being and human experience, he thinks of the various ways in which we relate to the world. What are the ways in which we relate to others in our ethical and moral relations? (Second critique). How do we aesthetically relate to world in beauty and sublime (Third critique). After Kant: German idealists – Hegel, etc. reject Kant's subjective turn in philosophy. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard or the romantics, they really embrace Kant's turn.

Big topics in theoretical philosophy that Kant is struggling with that emerge from rationalism and empiricism.

- (1) epistemology – study of knowledge. how do we know things? what can we know?
 - What is the source of knowledge? Aristotle: from the senses, build knowledge from induction on experiences. Plato: from reason.
 - What kinds of knowledge are possible for us? Universal (true for all people and time) and necessary (couldn't be otherwise) truth. $2+2=4$ is a universal and necessary truth. Moral truths are candidates for universal and necessary truths – all human beings have dignity. Is it possible to arrive to these universal and necessary truths? Or are they all contingent and relative, depending on context and time?
- (2) metaphysics – the study of what most fundamentally is. The study of what is most fundamentally real. The reality you're experiencing, is it real?
 - General metaphysics – what is in general? Fundamental building blocks that makes up everything that exists. God, angels, humans, the chair – what are the fundamental building blocks?

- Special metaphysics – specific types of beings. God: theology, (Human) Soul: Psychology, Spatiotemporal world: Cosmology

Remark 1.1. Heidegger says that the distinction between general and special metaphysics is very important to Kant.

For certain empiricists, general metaphysics will bil down to the cosmology.

Kant: we have a empirical self, transcendental self. We have different/private/individual empirical selves, but we all share transcendental selves. From Kant's perspective, going to be possible to know certain truths together because we share the transcendental selves. Kant is slightly giving into the conceit: is to participate in the sense that there's something universally shared.

Kant's racism and sexism: wants to say there's a shared transcendental selves, but makes empirical claims that undercut the humanity of people of color+women.

Rationalism and empiricism: a brief overview. Kant buys into the following certain imperfect picture of rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz.

(1) Epistemology

- Source of knowledge: reason is the source of knowledge. The senses can be confusing. Rely on deduction. Descartes says we have innate knowledge, and we can deduce from them. Leibniz: if we are looking for knowledge, reason first.
- Kinds of knowledge: universal and necessary truths can be achieved if deduced. from axioms, deduct. Descartes, Spinoza: try to present their ethics and philosophy mathematically.

(2) Metaphysics

- The general metaphysics is substance. The pen is the subject. Color, smell, shape are substances. S
- Special metaphysics: think of god-soul-world, and analyze these via substances. What is the substance status of God, soul, world? Are they different substances? Causal relations between God, soul, substance? Does God cause soul and world to exist? Can soul and world casually interact?

Core empiricists: Berkeley, Hume, Cockburn

(1) Epistemology

- Source: senses. Can bring in reason to reflect on sense perception. Induction on empirical evidence.
- Kinds of knowledge: contingent. can never get to universal necessary truths because who knows what the future may bring. what about mathematics? That's what Kant thought, and thought it was a big hole in Hume's thought.

(2) Metaphysics (Locke, Hume), skeptical about metaphysical claims. Empiricists: what even is substance? Nobody can give an explanation that doesn't just relate to these metaphors. Hume is going to attack substance and causality. Hume: Normally when we talk about casual relations, we talk about cause and the effect necessarily follows. A necessary relation. All we can say about causality. A happens and B does not follow in the future. Causality really come to certain habits on the basis of experience.

Lightning and thunder. Casual? Hume would say no: you have just been habituated into thinking its causal.

- general:
- special:

Substance and cause will continue to recur in Kant, because they are the core of rationalist philosophy. The empiricists attack substance and cause.

Hume on theology: God, soul are mostly fictional. beliefs about god and soul are subjective projections and fictions that we create, that we need to leave behind in some sort of way. What is Kant's diagnosis?

Kant's theoretical philosophy: Descartes and Leibniz's claims about God and the Soul are illegitimate. But also, we can make universal and necessary truths in the human domain.

Space is just structure of human experience. index of arithmetic, tied to time, structure of human experience.

2. 1/24/24 LECTURE:

Questions for Matherne

- (1) You said that substance and causality would come up repeatedly in Kant, so I wanted to get a better feel for Hume's criticism of causality: if I tackle someone, and they fall over, did I not cause them to fall over? What would Hume say to this.
- (2) To get a better feel of universal and necessary truths – are the words universal and necessary a phrase or separate words? Would a rationalist be able to deduce a universal but unnecessary truth? Or be able to deduce a necessary but not universal truth?
- (3) In the reading, there is a genus representation. Perception is representation with consciousness. What is another example of a representation? Helps me get a better feel of what representation means.
- (4) I think we can agree that the number 1 is a concept. But is it an idea, i.e. made up of pure concepts, i.e. beyond the possibility of experience? I feel like there is a strong argument for there being empirical concepts making up the concept of the number 1.

Kant is giving a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Kant is giving us a method to completely revolutionize how we do philosophy – how we do epistemology (source of knowledge, what can we know) and metaphysics (substance and cause, god, soul, etc.).

Letter from Kant to Marcus Herz. The Key to metaphysics. Recall, general metaphysics (substance, causality) and special metaphysics (god, soul, world). Kant believes he discovers key insight that will unlock all of metaphysics. What is the ground of the relation of our representations to objects? Kant thinks contemplating this question will unlock metaphysical insights.

What is the ground of relation of representations to an object? For Kant, **representation** is the basic state for our mental state. What our perceptions, feelings, thoughts, these are all basic states – called representations.

Relation means reference. What makes it possible for a mental state in us to refer to something outside of us? What makes what is in us, objective, something bearing on the world or not?

If metaphysics is possible, Kant says we need to ask this more basic question: what are the conditions in which our representations (mental state) refer or fail to refer.

Different ways representations can refer:

- Empirical causation. Sometimes there is an object out there in the world, that can cause a representation in us as an effect. Sensory perception is one example.
- Creative causation. Representation (design of a building) – i.e. William James Hall exists as an effect of representation.

Kant describes substance, causality, god, soul, world as specific types of representations within us. Intellectual representations, or pure concepts. When he talks about a pure concept – it does not have a source in experience. Ideas that are just built into reason and don't depend on experience. Do these pure representations refer to objects or not? Are they robust in their correspondence to objects, or are they merely empty fictions?

Kant: what is the ground of the relation of representations to an object, for these pure representations. Whether and how there is a ground of relation of pure representations to an object?

When thinking about Kant's subjective turn in philosophy: we need to limit philosophy to domains of human experience. So the legit metaphysics: objects of human experience. These objects in some sense depend on pure representations. Illegitimate metaphysics: objects that transcend human experience. The only thing we can experience is space and time.

Causality and substance are a part of our metaphysical picture (chairs, trees, how they depend on the mind). But concepts like God, soul, belong to these illegitimate metaphysics.

"1" is a pure concept. Its source is in the mind and not experience ??? Come back to this.

Kant's theory of mind: we have sensibility that makes us receptive to objects outside of us. We need to be positing objects outside of us that are causally affecting us.

Kant's theory of human mind. Sensible plus intellectual. Fundamental capacities (faculties) of the mind – i.e. representation types.

- sensibility (the receptive side of us) – i.e. sensations and intuitions
- two intellectual capacities: understanding and reason
 - understanding (active, thinking by way of judging) – i.e. concepts
 - reason (active, inferences between judgements) – i.e. concepts

The ladder:

- (1) representations (mental states)
- (2) representations with consciousness (perception), some representations are without consciousness i.e. you can't access consciously
- (3) perception

cognition, representation that refers to some object in the world. (this is how Kant will also use cognition). intuition – immediate relation to object, and singular. immediate relation means it stands in a direct acquaintance/relation with the object. to say its singular, means it is of a particular object.

empirical concepts have their source in experience. pure concepts have their source in the intellect (understanding and reason).

Built into understanding and reason is a certain set of pure concepts. If you're an empiricist, you think this is false. Pure concept has its origin in intellect. two types of pure concepts because two parts of our intellect. Pure concepts of our understanding is **Categories**. Pure concepts of our reason is **ideas**.

Categories include substance and causality. **Ideas** include God, Soul, etc. Categories refer to objects of experience. Whereas God, soul, etc. will fail to refer to objects. In the course of this book: categories there is a ground of relation to objects (they do refer). Ideas do not refer.

Kant also thinks there are also empirical and pure intuitions. Space and time are not concepts, but pure intuitions and not empirical intuitions.

Where does 1 come from? It is a pure intuition, bound up in space and time.

Important definition:

- (1) There is a genus called **representation** in general
- (2) Representation with consciousness is **perception**
 - Perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is **sensation**
 - An objective perception is a **cognition**
 - A cognition immediately related to object and is singular is an **intuition**. Intuition is divided into empirical and pure intuitions. 1 is a pure intuition (relates to space and time).
 - A cognition that is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things, is a **concept**
 - * A concept is either **empirical** or a **pure concept**. A pure concept that has its origin in understanding is called **categories**, a pure concept that has its origin in reason is an **idea**. God, Soul, etc. are ideas and Kant proves they do not refer to objects. Categories do refer to objects.

How do we acquire pure concepts if they are not from experience? Some argue that they're just built into our mental hardware. Transcendental aesthetic – intuition. Transcendental logic – understanding. Transcendental dialectic – reason.

The method of how to determine the key metaphysical question: is critique. A critique of pure reason is self-referential.

Sensibility and understanding – the court rules in their favor. Pure reason – illegitimate claims of God, soul, etc.

3. 1/26/24 SECTION 1

What is the will for Kant? What kind of representation is it?

- Kant has more faith in the metaphysical status of the "will" as opposed to God, soul, world.
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4. WEEK 1 READING

Important definition:

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5. 1/29/24: B PREFACE

The distinction between a priori and a posteriori cognitions, and analytic and synthetic judgements. What are legitimate and illegitimate claims we can make with reasons?

The real problem of pure reason: how are synthetic judgements a priori possible?

Recall the secret of metaphysics in Kant's letter to Hertz: whether and how it is possible for a priori representations to relate to objects.

We have representations from empirical sources. But we have representations which are not from empirical sources. A priori representations that are built into human reason. The question is: do those a priori representations relate or correspond to objects, or are they empty?

What a priori representations are at stake? We look at Kant's theory of human mind. We have two fundamental types of cognition according to Kant:

- Intuition – we stand in immediate direct relationship.
- concepts – the concept of a hall will have certain general properties that all halls have.

We also have **apriori intuitions** and **apriori concepts**. They are built into human reason. Kant believes that space and time are a priori intuitions. And we have two sets of a priori concepts: categories (of understanding) like substance and cause, and ideas (of reason) like god and soul.

The key problem of metaphysics: Kant is interested in whether a priori intuitions (space and time), a priori concepts (categories and ideas), relate to objects.

Kant argues that a priori intuitions, space and time, do relate to objects. And categories (a priori concepts of understanding) do as well. But not ideas (a priori concepts of reason) like god, soul, world.

The method in which Kant investigates these a priori representations, is by reflecting within ourselves and our mind.

- (1) A Preface: critique, self-reflection, where we self-select on what is universally shared by all. There are universal shared structures that all of us participate in together, regardless of when and where they are born.
- (2) B Preface: copernican revolution.

We are now moving towards the B preface. First, Kant talks about what a science is. It is a body of knowledge that

- doesn't get stuck
- you don't keep starting over
- possible to achieve unanimity among researchers.

Kant provides examples of bodies of knowledge which are sciences. For example, Aristotelian logic, mathematics, experimental physics, etc. Kant believes that if philosophy is to be taken seriously, then it must be a science. Why study philosophy of mind if you can do experimental psychology?

Intersubjective validity and objectivity, Kant will argue, are tightly related. That you can have intersubjective agreement (doesn't get stuck, don't keep starting over, possibly to achieve unanimity among researchers) is because the bodies of knowledge, will actually correspond to some object. Like could you just make stuff up and it qualifies as being a science, is it still objective – is it actually real? And Kant will argue yes.

Kant is going at the foundation of metaphysics. This is a classic philosopher move. Kant believes metaphysics is built on a flawed assumption, and if we correct these foundations, then maybe metaphysics will be on the path of science.

Whether we have intuitions or concepts, traditional metaphysics assumes that they correspond to objects. But Kant argues that we have not made headway in metaphysics under this assumption. So Kant argues that: we should have an alternative assumption. **Kant's hypothesis:** objects conform to our cognitions.

What kind of cognitions do we care about in metaphysics? We care about cognitions that are apriori to any experience. If it's the case that some objects conform to our cognition, then we can know about those objects apriori of any experience. This is Kant's hypothesis, and his copernican revolution.

So now we investigate the fundamental types of apriori representations, and see whether objects conform to these apriori representations (a priori intuition, apriori concepts [categories, ideas]). Kant argues that **objects of experience** conforms to apriori concepts of understanding (categories, like substance and cause), and objects which transcend spatiotemporal world and human experience like god and soul, **"things of themselves,"** do not have some conformity to the apriori concepts ideas.

legitimate metaphysics will be metaphysics about appearances which conform to the mind. **illegitimate metaphysics** – metaphysics about things in themselves.

Of course, traditional metaphysics was up to "things in themselves." So Kant argues that they are empty. Kant also calls "things in themselves" supersensible objects (because they transcend space and time).

Example 5.1. Since the idea of God is built into human reason, of course we are going to ask questions like "does God exist." But Kant argues that we have to recognize: we are never going to be able to make legitimate metaphysical claims. There is intersubjective validity (where philosophy is a science) that these questions are natural as humans are rational, but the intersubjective validity also implies that we cannot make legitimate claims. It is a natural predisposition built into reason, but the critique is: those questions are never going to have legitimate metaphysical claims. There are metaphysical questions that we can never answer.

Remark 5.2. Ernst Cassirer – very Kantian thinker who was interested in philosophy of science.

At the end of the B preface: "I had to deny knowledge of things in themselves, I had to make room for faith." Kant thinks that even though theoretical cognition of things in themselves is not possible – faith (glaube) in things in themselves is possible. Kant believes this is important in his moral philosophy. The idea that we have freedom is apriori concept of reason (idea). That you are a spontaneous source of your choices. Kant thinks that this is an idea. We cannot have theoretical cognition of things in themselves. Nevertheless, we have faith/belief. The second critique about faith/belief.

Theoretical cognition vs. practical cognition. Practical cognition is cognition of our will and morality. Theoretical cognition is about how we can understand the world around us. Kant believes that there are epistemic grounds for practical cognitions.

In the first critique, Kant is interested in a specific epistemic state, in theoretical cognition. This is the end of the B preface.

In the **B intro**, specify the cognition at stake in metaphysics. A priori vs. aposteriori cognitions. These are the two basic types of cognition that we can have, distinguished by their epistemic course.

- A posteriori cognition has its source in experience, so otherwise labeled as empirical cognition.
- A priori cognition, source other than experience. Kant will also describe a priori cognition as pure cognition. For example, $2+2 = 4$. The source is not any experiential fact of the matter. There are some pure mathematical truths, that make $2+2 = 4$.

But how is $2+2 = 4$, of source not experience? In Kant makes a claim on page 136. Although all our cognition commences with experience, it does not on that account arise from experience. Kant is drawing a distinction between what is the temporal beginning of cognition (commencement) and what is the source of that cognition (that from which the cognition arises). In certain cases, even though you have a cognition that commences with experiences, there is a temporal occasion in which you discover $2+2 = 4$, it does not have its ground or origins in that experience.

The two criteria for a cognition to be an apriori cognition:

- (1) necessary (modal) (could not be otherwise)
- (2) universality (anybody, whether now in the past or future, should assent to the truth of that claim).

Way to distinguish $2+2 = 4$ between William James Hall being very tall – in Kant's view, $2+2=4$ is necessary truth could not have been otherwise, and William James Hall being tall could have been otherwise and thus is not necessary.

Why is "1" a pure intuition? First, it is an apriori cognition. Its source is other than experience. It is necessary and universal.

Is there a posteriori cognitions that could be necessary? Water is H_2O is both empirical and necessary.

6. 1/31/24

The *real problem* of pure reason: how are synthetic judgements a priori possible? Today:

- (1) Types of cognition a priori vs a posterior
- (2) synthetic vs. analytic judgement

- (3) The real problem of pure reason
- (4) sensibility
- (5) what are space and time?

Kant wants metaphysics to be on the secure path of science. Kant's hypothesis for getting metaphysics back on this path: the Copernican revolution. We are supposed to assume that objects conform to cognition, instead of cognition conforming to objects. If objects conform on cognition, then we will be able to make judgements a priori.

Metaphysics: analyzing the sense in which objects conform to cognition.

Let us now talk about the type of cognitions involved in metaphysics. On Monday, we ended on thinking about a posteriori vs. a priori cognition. The criteria for something to be an apriori cognition is: necessity + universality. Truths that we cognize apriori are truths that could not be otherwise, and universal across space and time.

Example 6.1. Observing water is made up of H_2O . This is an empirical observation, is an a posteriori cognition. Could there be a posteriori cognition that involves necessity and universality?

Kripke: 'Naming and Necessity' book.

So in metaphysics, we are dealing with apriori cognition. But also, the cognitions that Kant deals with in metaphysics is synthetic. Let's talk about synthetic vs. analytic judgements for Kant.

- Kant's paradigm for judgement is Aristotelian. A judgement is modeled after "S is P." "A penguin is a bird." "All bodies are extended." On both sides of the judgement "S" and "P" are concepts. Some philosophers are short. In synthetic vs. analytic, he's thinking about how does the subject concept relate to the predicate concept. **thinking about the concepts that underlie the linguistic expression.
- **Analytic judgement:** predicate concept is contained in subject concept. judgements of clarification. identity judgement. "human beings are rational." "bachelorettes are unmarried."
- **Synthetic judgement:** predicate concept lies outside of subject concept. judgements of amplification. "some philosophers are short." "all bodies are extended." "all bodies are heavy."

Page 141 of First Critique: "on the difference between analytic vs. synthetic judgements."

So what does it mean for a predicate concept to be contained in a subject concept? Analytic judgements are those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity. former judgements of clarification, synthetic judgements are judgements of

For rationalists, analytic judgements are the most important for metaphysics. Analyzing concepts we get to all metaphysical truths. Kant wants to say rationalists are mistaken, because not all of metaphysics opened on analytic judgements. Kant says synthetic judgements are more important. the thing that makes synthetic judgements are things in addition to concepts. Kant makes the case that the cognition that really matters is synthetic judgements.

Maaß: what is contained in each concept, varies from person to person. One critique of Kant. If you see gold, you might see it as yellow metal. Other person

might think it is a malleable metal. It is going to idiosyncratically vary. Quine revives this argument: there's no way to get to an analytic judgement without going through synthetic judgements. Anderson defends Kant against these critiques. He denies that containment of concepts is just psychological thing, but are logical relations. That when we are talking about analytic judgements, we are thinking of genus species. This means that analytic judgements are pretty narrow – they must follow a genus-species hierarchy. They are usually definitional.

Extension of objects: logical vs. instantiation.

Most of the knowledge we gain about the world, is synthetic. William James Hall has 15 stories, is synthetic. All swans are white – discovered that in the course of experience.

Anderson's point: containment of predicate concept and subject concept must be definitional/can't instantiate, doesn't differ across space and time. This is why Leibniz crossing the bridge at a certain time is not an analytic judgement.

Analytic judgements are quite narrow. They are usually definitional. "Islands are surrounded by water." The definition of an island is surrounded by water, so this is an analytic judgement.

Remark 6.2. "even though all cognition commences with experiences, doesn't mean it arises from experience. "

Types of synthetic judgements that Kant acknowledges.

- empirical (judgements of experience).
- pure/apriori judgements. there's a way to somehow, independently of experience, that certain subject and predicate concepts are related but not containment. mathematics. mathematical judgements are synthetic judgements. $7+5$ is the subject concept, and if we analyze this concept, we know analytically there is some element, but it does not analytically follow that it is 12. so knowing that 12 is $7+5$ is a predicate judgement. one must go beyond (amplification) seeking assistance in the intuition (count figures..) through intuition that we combine the two together.

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good mathematics is discovered, bad mathematics is created. This is Kantian!!!

Set of apriori truths that are universal and necessary, that don't have their foundation in logic. You thought judgements in science are usually empirical. But Kant thinks that there are certain apriori principles which govern physics (Newton's laws of motion). When we are thinking about these basic physical laws. Not only are there certain examples in mathematics. pure (apriori) synthetic judgements. there are also apriori synthetic judgements in physics.

If metaphysics is possible to be a science. We cannot just make analytic judgements. we also need to make **a priori synthetic judgements**. But in order to make synthetic apriori judgements, the concepts need to correspond to objects right? Otherwise you just have a bunch of definitions that are empty.

Method, critique. parts of transcendental philosophy: mode of cognizing objects a priori. When you are doing transcendental philosophy, you are turning your gaze inwards. modes of cognizing objects that are apriori. this is all in turn with the Copernican revolution.

Two faculties or capacities for cognition.

- sensibility

- understanding

Look at these modes of cognizing, sensibility and understanding.. is there a way we cognize objects apriori through sensibility and understanding. in some sort of way. If you goto page 125, you get a table of contents.

transcendental aesthetic? transcendent logic is analytic categories and dialectic ideas??

kant's talking about intuition. takes place insofar as the objects are given to us. only possible if it affects the mind in a certain way. through the way in which we are affected by objects: sensibility.

- representation: intuition
- receptive, we are affected by objects. we are sensibly affected by the pen. the function of sensibility is to give us objects. sensibility's cognitive purpose is to put us in touch with the world. that's how we become acquainted with the world in some way. space and time are these apriori formal structures that are built into the nature of sensibility.

7. 2/2/24

Section leader OH on Tuesday 4-6 Emerson 209a. The freedom associated with Kant?

For Kant, why is red not an idea?

- so an idea is a pure concept which has its source in reason. it does not correspond to an object. page 173 B35: kant says color is a sensation. something that is encountered in the mind. representation with consciousness is perception. an objective perception is cognition. a perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state **sensation**. remembers kant's copernican revolution. objects conform to our representations. so red, affects us (and we as humans are the subject)? sensibility is the receptive faculty of the mind.

Provide a concrete example of some kind of representation listed in tree?

Define

- synthetic: if the predicate concept is not contained in the subject concept. if they amplify.
- analytic: judgements which clarify. if the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. usually limited to definitions.
- a posteriori: cognitions whose source are of experience.
- a priori: what is built into our human reason. what you can cognize before experience.

Read 146, 147 where Kant talks about color. Why pure math is possible, something about science.

8. 2/5/24

- (1) Sensibility
- (2) What are space and time?
- (3) Transcendental idealism.

Metaphysics, to get it on the pure path of science, we need to embrace: objects conform to our cognitions. It may be possible then to know things prior to experience, and this is what metaphysics is after. Are synthetic apriori judgements possible.

There are 2 stems of human cognition: sensibility and understanding. Going to beginning of transcendental aesthetic: Kant introduces us to sensibility, the faculty of intuition. Transcendental aesthetic is where Kant talks about sensibility. (original greek for aesthetic is aisthesis, meaning sensory and perception). Receptive faculty – human mind is affected by objects outside of us via our senses. The cognitive function of sensibility is giving us objects. If our concepts are to ever correspond, relate to world, they must go by way of intuition – sensibility is a crucial cognitive process because it is what puts us in touch with the world.

There are two types of intuitions: empirical and pure/apriori intuition.

- empirical intuitions are those that relate to objects through sensation
- pure intuition – \bar{c} form of order that we organize our sensations. 2 pure intuitions: space and time.

Look at a book. You might have different sensations, like the color of the book, the smell of the book. but you can also move

We are not just passive receptors to the world. Sensibility also organizes our sensations in some spatiotemporal order. Pure intuitions of space and time provide us this spatiotemporal ordering.

Example 8.1. Empirical intuitions – \bar{c} is Kant a conceptualist or non-conceptualist about them? Can you have an empirical intuition that doesn't involve a concept?

What are space and time? Kant's argument about time is analogous to his argument about space. So let's talk about what space is. He gives us two expositions about space: metaphysical exposition and transcendental exposition.

Metaphysical exposition: what fundamentally is our representation of space. Is it a priori or a posteriori? Is it an intuition or a concept?

Transcendental exposition: what synthetic a priori judgements flow from our basic representation of space. Kant's theory of geometry. **From our representation of time, is where our synthetic apriori judgements of arithmetic flow.

- space: way in which and by which we represent objects outside of us
- time: in which and by which we represent our inner states. (all the inner states we receive at the beginning of class, there is some temporal order).
- Newton, space is an actual entity, its this box.
- Leibniz: space is a set of relations between non-spatial substances (monads). reality is fundamentally non-spatial. there are these monads that make up the basis of reality. space emerges via relations among these non-spatial monads.
- They disagree. But they are both thinking of space as independent from human subject.
- Kant: space is a form of our mind. Our subjective constitution. it is a basic mental structure that is built into our sensibility, which orders and structures our subjective experiences. Kant is making it subject, and relative to the human subject as a whole, and not relative to the individual. Now, couldn't our representation of space correspond to these Newtonian and Leibniz objective definitions of space? Kant will rule them out.

Jumping ahead: things in themselves will be non-spatial. appearances will be spatial. relation of dependence between the space in which objects exist and our mind.

Metaphysical exposition: what fundamentally is our representation of space. Is it a priori or a posteriori? Is it an intuition or a concept?

- space has an apriori source. in order to experience things in spatial relation, they need to be in spatial places. how do you know the book is outside of you, or to the left of the water bottle? because they are in spatial places. and on the basis of those spatial places, that in which we can identify the relation between objects. unless we have a spatial framework and spatial places, we are not going to be able to detect the relations between objects. to have a spatial experience outside of you, you have to presuppose this representation of space. thus, the representation of space cannot be obtained through outer experience. we can't be deriving space from our outer experience, because our outer experience presupposes space in some way.
- space is a necessary intuition: imagine space with no objects in it. try to imagine objects without space, you cannot do it. this reveals that this representation of space grounds and is prior to any sort of outer experience. space is the *condition of the possibility* of outer experience and outer objects. Kant will often talk about apriori representations as conditions of possibility to some empirical experience or objects.
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if Newton, space is container, or Leibniz, if space is this relation between monads.. i.e. if space is an object that is a thing in itself, our representation of space would have to be aposteriori in some way. but since space is apriori, Kant thinks this rules out this Leibniz/Newtonian conception of space.

Arguments 3, page 175. What is the type of representation of space? It is an intuition, not a concept. All of our spatial experiences are just restrictions of *the* space. Concepts have to represent something general. There is only one space. Time is also just "one" time. So Kant says space and time satisfy the singularity criteria to be an intuition.

Argument 4: space is a representation of infinite given magnitude. space is given to us as something that is infinite (has no bounds).

There could be an infinite number of instances of book. but if you think about a relation between a concept and its instances. space, you think about the infinite parts of space, they don't stand under (are not instantiated), they are just within space. this is an immediate relation. the parts of space have an immediate relation to space. the concept book only has an immediate relation to its infinite instances.

So these two arguments are Kant's argument that space is apriori intuition. Page 176

Kant is insistent that mathematics is not fundamentally analytic. he wants mathematics to correspond to reality and is worried that it is just.

Kant: shows that space is apriori via the thought experiment. if we accept leibniz/newton, then our representation of space must be a posteriori. contradiction. so leibniz/newton are wrong.

Space is mind-dependent. – idealism, objects depend on human mind. all his argument has been leading to space being idealistic. this leads to Kant's transcendental idealism.

9. 2/7/24:

Kant's transcendental idealism. Midterm February 21st.

- (1) Kant's transcendental idealism
- (2)
- (3)

Last time we were talking about sensibility. Receptive part of understanding. Space and time are not independent of us, but are pure intuitions that are built into the structure of sensibility. Last time we worked through the arguments that space and time are 1. pure, and 2. apriori.

As Kant talked about space, he is working towards transcendental idealism. Conclusions about space.

Conclusions about space:

- the negative conclusion: space is not a thing in itself, in contrast to Leibniz and Newton.
- space is a pure intuition (intuition that is independent of our experience in some way). (intuition because it is one object, apriori, pure).
- positive conclusion: "we can accordingly speak of space and extended beings, and so on, from the human standpoint." space is nothing other than a subjective condition of sensibility, i.e. nothing but something built into the structure of the human mind.

Why could it not be both that space is a property of things in themselves and a structure of the human mind? Kant's view of space is idealist – i.e., space is mind-dependent in some sense. In what sense? It is mind-dependent because it is a pure intuition that is built into our mind. So Kant thinks we need to be idealists about space.

But he also makes a claim that space is empirically real (page 137, empirical reality in bold). "We therefore assert, the empirical reality of space, with respect to all possible outer experience, thought to be sure, its transcendental ideality, it is nothing when we leave aside the condition of all experience, and take it as something that grounds all things in themselves." To say space is empirically real, Kant is opposing the view that space is a mere illusion. You can say space is nothing but a form of our mind, then you might think space is just an illusion. But Kant says: it is not an illusion, there is an empirical reality.

Pink penguin is not real. It is an illusion. Illusions are private projections that isn't universally shared.

Kant says space is some sense public, something that we all have access to. Space is something intersubjectively shared. External objects are located in the space in that which it is understood.

With the pink penguin illusion, you're just projecting something that is not there. But space is there – we are all experiencing the one space, albeit different subsets as we spatiotemporally locate ourselves and external objects.

So even though space depends on the mind, it doesn't just depend on ourselves, it also depends on this thing we experience in common.

Space is something relational. It relates to our mind in some way. But if you're thinking about it in a Newtonian way, you're not thinking of it as relational. You think it's just a container in which everything exists. Although Leibniz does seem to be saying that space is relational. But Leibniz thinks monads are fundamentally not relational. Kant would say this is not fully appreciating the mind-dependent nature of space.

Kant's transcendental idealism: Kant's preferred metaphysical view of reality.

(1) Distinction thesis

- There is a distinction between appearances and things in themselves.
- synonyms: appearances = phenomena = objects of the senses, through the course of the transcendental aesthetic, we got that appearances are synonymous with spatiotemporal objects. something located in space and time. it is going to have a spatial or temporal quality in some form. often talks about appearances as relational in some way. pen takes up space – extension – has relation with the space it occupies. if you throw a pen, it is in motion, but to move, it must relate to space, and it also has a temporal profile, so a relation with time. appearances are relationally determined through and time.
- synonyms: things in themselves = noumena = supersensible objects (transcend sensibility). the conclusion in Kant's transcendental aesthetic is that things in themselves are not spatio-temporal. they exist outside of the realm of space and time in some way. often profiles things in themselves as intrinsic, and non-relational. thing in themselves are radically independent, they don't require a relation with something else to exist. some intrinsic nature that are not relationally determined like a pen being thrown.

(2) Idealism thesis

- Appearances are dependent on the human mind. Because appearances they have spatio-temporal form. but their spatio-temporal form relates to our pure intuition, which is depends on our mind.
- Kant thinks space and time are built into our Transcendental self. when he says space and time are infinite, he means it is limitless. space and time like without limit – like horizon, you can never reach the end of. horizontal representation of space and time.

(3) Empirical realism thesis

- When first critique came out, people thought Kant was saying the whole spatio-temporal world was just a figment of our imagination. but that's not what Kant is saying.
- passage B69
- If we are looking at a book, it is not just an illusion. It is spatiotemporal object, which depends on our mind. but not just illusion. we can publicly access the book, and make judgements. it is rectangular, and that property of rectangularity is some sense dependent on our mind.
- imperfect analogy, not perfect analogy: lots of ways to think about color. is it a figment of imagination, or out there in the world? if out there in the world, one would think of color as some dispositional property: some property of an object that is disposed to bring about a certain response in appropriate observers in appropriate conditions.

blueness if out there in the world, is a property of an object, that is disposed to bring about a certain sensation or mental state, in appropriate observers (certain kind of visual system, typical ways for human beings), appropriate conditions (inappropriate conditions would be like if it was completely dark in the room). this dispositional property of color, thinking of blue as property of object, but it is a relational property because of its dispositional nature.

- So one way to think about the empirical reality of space, time, and spatiotemporal objects, you can think of it in dispositional terms. the rectangularity of a book, is a property of the book, which is disposed to bring about a certain representation in appropriate observers in appropriate conditions.
- existence of appearances doesn't depend on mind. only saying that the form of those appearances depend on the mind. "for it is just this subjective constitution that determines this form as appearance." objects exists independently of the mind. but their form, their properties, depend on the mind in some way via their spatiotemporal relations.

(4) Ignorance thesis

- we cannot cognize things in themselves. we can cognize appearances since there is an empirical reality. what things are outside of space and time, is unknown to us. unavoidable ignorance to things in themselves. we are only acquainted with appearances.
- "a thing in itself, the transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner appearances, as an unknown ground of appearances." thing in themselves ground appearances (which sounds Leibnizian). things in themselves cause appearances. things in themselves affect us. ???
- 1. things in themselves are not spatial or temporal 2. they ground appearances (uses analytic judgements) 3. cause 4. affect us.
- Kant looks in trouble in 3 and 4. How to rescue Kant? Note Kant uses analytic judgements to argue that things in themselves ground appearances. The word appearance must already indicate a relation to. if we look at an appearance, it is an appearance of something. then the appearance must be connected to the something, which it is an appearance of. if you analyze the concept of appearance, it is not a self-sufficient being. it has a relation to that thing it is an appearance of itself. "rainbow-rain example:" think of rainbow as appearance, but it is not self-sufficient entity. it is an appearance of rain in certain lighting conditions. appearance has to be grounded in something else. labeling that thing as a thing in itself. if you stripped away the spatiotemporal form from an appearance, you're left with the thing in itself that the appearance is an appearance of.
- take a book. in your empirical intuition, given a spatiotemporal object, that exists outside of you as an empirical self. of course, we are empirical selves that occupy time and space in some way. so when he talks about empirical realism, he talks about this. but there's a deeper notion of existence of appearances. that it is independent of the human mind. this is tricky territory and apparently no one agrees?

- interpretation of transcendental idealism: 2 world versus one-world theories.
 - 2-world: appearances and things in themselves are 2 ontological realms. they are 2 realms which stand in some relation. phenomenism: appearances are nothing but phenomena in the mind. non-phenomenalist: appearances exist outside of the empirical mind.
 - 1 world: one world that exists that has two aspects. one ontological realm, and some aspects of this realm are relational and other aspects of reality have some kind of intrinsic nature. we could be considering various relational property of this books. but there could be some kind of intrinsic nature that something has, something non-relational about reality. aspect that depend on us.
 - what if we abstracted away from space and time

If you think reality is completely independent of the mind, then you are not an idealist.

10. SECTION 2/9/24

11. 2/12/24:

We are wrapping up Kant's transcendental aesthetic, the science of sensibility. We are now moving on to Kant's transcendental logic, his science of understanding. sensibility receptive faculty of our mind, orients us with respect to the world.

We are always oriented towards the question: is metaphysics as a science possible? More specifically, can we cognize anything about objects independent from experience? More specifically, apriori cognitions, and through apriori cognitions learn something about objects in some sort of way which amplifies them.

Thus: can we make synthetic apriori cognitions about objects? Page 192 of transcendental aesthetic, conclusion: here, we now have one of the required pieces for the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy. How are synthetic apriori judgements possible? Can do it for objects for which we have pure intuitions about, a subset of objects of possible experience.

Recall the copernican revolution: objects conform to cognition. In the transcendental aesthetic, we focused on particular objects: objects of senses/appearances/phenomena/spatiotemporal objects. We can amplify these objects prior to experience, because they conform to our pure intuitions, the argument for which is his transcendental idealism.

Example 11.1. William James Hall - you could guess how many floors it has. But how could you guess? Also shortest distance between two points is straight line. These are not analytic judgements, no containments. These are synthetic judgements, and Kant argues that the origin for these synthetic judgements are pure intuition because they relate spatiotemporally.

All outer experiences are next to one another in space. This is synthetic apriori judgement. (?)

So Kant believes that metaphysics is possible for spatiotemporal objects.

Now we are moving towards the 2nd stem of cognition: understanding, Kant's transcendental logic. Kant draws a contrast between understanding versus sensibility.

- representation types
 - understanding: some responsibility for concepts
 - sensibility responsible for intuition
- profile
 - the understanding is spontaneity (something is spontaneous if it can causally cause something, spontaneously processing, bringing forth representations),
 - sensibility is receptive (something can be causally affected, passively receiving, receiving representations)
- function
 - understanding allows us to think about objects
 - sensibility gives us objects.

How does this compare to the epistemology of rationalists and empiricists. Empiricists privilege sensibility, and rationalists will privilege understanding (they will argue, the epistemic source of knowledge is reason in some sort of way, sensibility doesn't really tell you). Kant says: we need both to have cognition. Offers an alternative to empiricists and rationalists. The only way to get to objects is a combination of both sensibility and understanding.

"Without sensibility, no objects would be given to us, and without understanding, none would be thought." So Kant is giving us a theory of cognition. A cognition is a mental state that corresponds to objects in some way. To be in this mental state, you need both intuitions and concepts. Why? Because you have to be in touch with objects. To be in a cognitive state, you need to also be intellectually processing the object in some way.

Remark 11.2. If you go back to his *Stufenleiter* (his genealogy of definitions). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation. Cognition, perception that relates to an object, is either an intuition or concept. He makes it seem kind of black and white here? How does this relate to his theory of cognition, which is that cognitions require both? Is there a contradiction? This is recent debate.

"Intuition without concepts are blind." For Kant, is it possible to be in a cognitive state, where we have only intuition? Or does all of intuitions require concepts, and do all of our concepts require intuitions in some way? Concepts without intuitions: idea of God, idea of Soul are prime examples of empty thoughts. God is beyond space and time, our intuition is all in space and time, so by definition we cannot intuit God, so cognitions we have about God are empty. I think the more interesting question is – is it possible to have intuitions without concept?

Transcendental deduction: how is it possible for pure concepts like substance, like cause, to relate to objects. It looks like understanding could operate without sensibility. So how do we know substance and cause are not empty? That they do have objects which correspond to them. Kant will argue that they do. Hume does not.

Logic: science of understanding. This domain will include formal rules of thinking, certain intellectual activities we can engage in, and certain representations (concepts).

Distinguishes between two types of logic. General logic and transcendental logic. General logic is closer to what we usually think of as logic, and transcendental logic is a special Kantian beast.

- General logic: has to abstract from objects, and focus on the pure form of thinking. General logic is pure (apriori). General logic is basically the kind of mathematical logic that we are familiar with. Given the nature of the intellect in general, what are the formal rules which govern intellectual thinking. Important: it is apriori. We have an apriori route to think about the formal rules of how we think.
- Transcendental logic: pure thinking about objects. General logic – we don't care about the objects, just formal patterns of thought. transcendental logic: pure concepts about objects. Transcendental logic has a domain of objects, contentful, because it will be concerned with objects in some way.

Prior to experience, can we have pure thinking about objects? Kant says yes, and this is in his transcendental logic. Questions: origin, domain of objects, and objective validity. If you have a pure judgement, like affect and cause, how do you know it has objective validity? Kant cares about true judgements: judgements which correspond to objects. What notions of truth emerges from the perspective of general vs. transcendental logic.

General logic gives us a *negative criterion of truth*. Any judgement that violates principle of non-contradiction, then it is not truthful and thus it does not correspond to objects.

Syllogism about God – they could be non contradictory. Ask, do they actually correspond with objects? General logic gives a negative criterion, but transcendental logic is the only way to actually prove it corresponds to an object. What are the conditions for having true thoughts, those that correspond to objects? – general logic gives a vibe check, but we really need transcendental logic. Transcendental logic gives a positive criterion.

Transcendental logic: pure judgements (apriori) about objects through concepts. (S is P). Then there are two subdomains:

- logic of truth: transcendental analytic, pure concepts of objects (categories)
- logic of illusion: transcendental dialectic, pure concept of reason = ideas.

some cases that which we can do pure thinking, and it is actually about objects. and there are some cases where we have set of judgements, which seem true because they are formally true, but there are no objects which correspond to them, and thus they are empty.

12. 2/14/24

Today we will talk about the metaphysical deduction of the categories. Transcendental deduction: where Kant argues that categories like substance and cause actually correspond to object. Outline today:

- (1) What is thinking?
- (2) Toward a theory of the categories.
 - the logical functions of judgment
 - the metaphysical deduction
 - the setup to the transcendental deduction

Thinking is judging through concepts, where concepts are functions, i.e. active tools for ordering/unifying representations together.

When Kant is talking about the nature of understanding, he sometimes describes it as the faculty of concepts (distinct from sensibility, which is a faculty of intuition),

or the faculty of thinking (as opposed to faculty of sensing, sensibility). We will see that thinking and concepts are bound up for Kant.

Recall Kant is thinking of judgement as "S is P," a subject concept and a predicate concept. Back in the Schufenleiter, concepts are representations of properties that some things share, and they don't immediately relate to objects like intuitions, but relate via common marks. Looking at a book, you are looking at the book in terms of common properties, you are seeing it through concepts.

Functions are active tools for ordering or unifying representations together. How concepts function in our cognitive lives. The concept of a body: one of the marks of a body is that they are divisible. This concept is like a function. It takes a body, and tells you it is divisible. The inputs are all sorts of intuitions you have. When you apply the concept to these intuitions, you are going to get outputs which amount to judgements, like the book is divisible, the board is divisible, and so on and so forth.

So concepts process your intuitions. And it is an active process. The understanding is spontaneous because it is a faculty of understanding.

Question 12.1. How does consciousness fit into this? Kant will argue that thinking is a conscious process. But are there judgements that don't require concepts? Like the professor is distinct from the blackboard. This feels immediate. Does it require judging through concepts? We will revisit this question later.

This process where you take intuitions and applying concepts to them so that it results in judgements, is a spontaneous process, in the sense that you are actively doing this. Spontaneous doesn't mean quick, it means active. As opposed to the passive way in which we receive sensory information (sensibility).

So part of why concepts have *mediate* relations to objects, is because they have to be routed through intuitions which have *immediate* relations to objects.

In the transcendental logic, Kant is concerned with pure thinking about objects, where pure thinking means "pure judgements through pure concepts," where pure concepts refers to categories like substance and cause, and pure judging refers to "principles." He will talk about "principles" in *Analytic of principles*, which we will discuss in the future. And he talks about pure concepts of the understanding in *Analytic of concepts*. Today we will talk about Kant's **Analytic of concepts**.

Big questions about categories (pure concepts of the understanding).

- (1) *What is the origin of categories?* What is the origin of concepts like substance and cause? Do they have an apriori/empirical source? In the transcendental aesthetic, we investigated the origin of space and time, where Kant deduced they had an apriori source. Here, Kant will argue that substance and cause have apriori sources. Rejecting Hume. He does this in his section "metaphysical deduction"
- (2) Objective validity question: are the categories objectively valid? I.e, do they refer to objects? Have in the back of your mind, Hume's skepticism. Hume would say substance and cause are not objectively valid – he would say they are empty fictions which we project, and do not refer to objects. Kant will say they do correspond to objects of experience. This argument is in Kant's "transcendental deduction."

Let's begin with the origin question. Claim: categories have an apriori source in the logical structures of thinking. Kant says that as we analyze our faculty of

understanding, there are certain apriori patterns of thinking which are built into understanding, and those apriori patterns will be the

Parallel: when we investigated space and time, we investigated the formal structure of sensibility, and that formal structure was the source of space and time. Formal structures means they are just built into the fabric of sensibility.

In the same way, the origin of categories will be in the formal structure of the faculty of understanding. This is how Kant will argue for the apriori origin of categories.

In "logical functions of thinking," Kant is contemplating what are the formal patterns for combining concepts in judgements that aren't self-contradictory? There are logically valid ways of combining concepts to form "S is P" – what are the formal possibilities of combining concepts in a non-contradictory way? For every judgement, there are 4 'moments'/aspects of that judgement:

- quantity: how much of the extension of the subject concept is contained in the predicate concept? all of the extension of the subject concept is included under the predicate concept, in which case you have a universal judgement. All A's are B's. But you could have some of the subject concept is included under the predicate concept, "some A's are B's," and you could have a singular version, "one A is B." (universal, singular, particular)
- quality: is the extension of the subject concept included in or excluded from the extension of the predicate concept? inclusion is an affirmative judgement. a negative judgement is when extension of subject lies outside of predicate concept (no A is B).
- relation: concatenation, "if," "or". categorical judgements is As are Bs. hypothetical judgement: "if there is perfect justice, philosophers would get a cappuccino everyday." disjunctive form:
- modality: what is the modality of every event and cause? thinking about them as possibilities. asotonic judgements: reflect actualities. some cappuccinos are sprinkled with cinnamon, so it is an asotonic judgement. apodictic judgement: are necessary. every event has a cause. shortest distance between two points is a straight line.

So the thought is: there are only so many ways you can combine concepts, because you have these formal patterns about judgements. So the idea is that: categories have its source in these formal structures of understanding. The source of category of substance, source of category of causality is in the source of hypothetical judgements. in the metaphysical deduction, is where Kant argues that the

Categories are concepts of objects. Substance and cause are pure concepts of objects in some sort of way. Specifically, they involve ordering/unifying intuitions through the logical functions of judgement.

The Book is blue. The book is a subject, object which the property of blueness adheres. When thinking of Book as subject, thinking of book as a substance, in which a property. So substance a concept gives a unifying function. Takes substances like a book, and spits out properties like blue. Categories allow you to find patterns of unity in your intuition. If As are Bs, then Cs are Ds: when you process what you intuit, in light of the hypothetical, when you translate logical relations into objectual relations, you translate it substance to property.

In the metaphysical deduction, we are going to again come back to this topic of cognition. Cognition involves intuition and concepts together. Intuition is what

gives us objects, and concepts helps us think about objects. What role do concepts play in the role of cognition, and what role do the pure concepts play in cognition, and specifically how do categories play a role in cognition? If categories are functions of intuitions/concepts.

3 stages of mental activity that result in cognition. The empirical version:

- (1) sensing stage: empirical intuition/manifold.
- (2) synthesis stage:
 - imagination stage: sensible capacity, but different from five senses. imagination can sensibly represent beyond what is immediately in front of us. we formed a sensible representation of a capuccino, even if its not in front of us. spatiotemporal representations that allow us to extend beyond what is immediately in front of us. use imagination in response to what is here and now, to fill out. for example look at a book: you only see front, but we are sensibly representing it as 3 dimensional object, imagination allows you to fill out that back side in a 3 dimensional way. imagination projects backside of this book, part of how you perceive this book. sensible synthesis of our empirical manifold, that fills it out in different ways. our imagination, brings spatiotemporal.
 - understanding stage: apply concepts.. in acts of judgement.

each make a distinct mental contribution, so that we can arrive to a robust cognitive state. Kant is trying to unpack how rich lived experience is. You look at a book. You see a book. But a lot is going on. Hume says that if you have just sensing, you can be in a robust cognitive stage. But Kant says: you must not only sense, but do something active that involves processing afterwards, to enter a robust cognitive stage.

The apriori version:

- (1) Apriori manifold (pure intuitions, space and time)
- (2) Apriori activity of imagination, in which we sensibly synthesize that apriori manifold.
- (3) understanding – apply pure concepts to what we have imaginatively synthesized, to obtain pure judgements. Kant argues that the pure concepts here equals the categories. It is the categories that allow us to intellectually unify that we are given through intuitions.

How do you bring order and unity to what you intuit? you use logical processes to process. Think of the category of substance. When you apply the category of substance, you are treating something as a subject that you are predicting things of. When you think of an object which properties adhere to, you are thinking of it as a substance. Or think of category of causality. Suppose you watch Prof Matherne throw the marker. Treating arm moving as an antecedent (if part), and projectile of marker (consequence, then). You are thinking of it as a cause and effect.

13. 2/16/24

14. 2/21/24: ARE THE CATEGORIES OBJECTIVELY VALID? THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION.

- (1) The transcendental deduction setup+transcendental arguments
- (2) The "B" deduction

- 2 steps
- sections 15-16: experience → apperception
- sections 16/17: transcendental/Original/Pure apperception.

We are concerned with categories, such as substance and cause.

- (1) origin: Kant argued that it is apriori, its source being the logical patterns of judgements. "If P then Q," logical rules is source of causality. "S is P," logical pattern is source of substance.
 - Hume would say causality is derived from experience from habitual observation.
- (2) Objective validity: whether and how categories relate(refer) to objects.

Hume thinks substance and cause are fictions that we project onto the world, and their source are a posteriori, not a priori. But in Kant's transcendental deduction, he is taking on this Humeian challenge trying to prove the objective validity of the categories.

He is using legal language about entitlements and claims in the transcendental deduction. Specifically *quid juris*. Specifically: we are thinking about entitlement to apply the categories to objects. With categories, through metaphysical deduction, we have concepts like substance and cause. And then Kant uses *quid iuris* to ask, are we entitled to apply these concepts or are they just mere fictions. Something about if someone steals your cow and you both go to court. They will try to argue you are not entitled to your cow. There are several types of deduction we could make.

- Empirical deduction, which deal with empirical concepts.
- Transcendental deduction, which deal with apriori concepts. Are we entitled to use them as objectively valid concepts, or are they merely empty? Start with apriori modes of cognizing objects, and that's our main point of orientation. When we are thinking about transcendental deduction in this context, we are thinking about these apriori modes, but also thinking about apriori concepts we have like, substance and cause, and are those objectively valid or not?

Fortune and fate, are we entitled to use these concepts in our deductions. He says no, they are empty fictions. Sometimes the concepts we use are empty and sometimes they are valid. So what is his strategy? (Look at "transition to transcendental deduction of categories"). There are only 2 ways that a representation can relate to an object (should be familiar from the Hertz letter).

- (1) If the object makes the representation possible (empirical)
- (2) If the representation makes the object possible – not about representation making the existence of object possible, but if the representation is determinant of the object in some way, and in particular the representation determines the form of the object. Note he makes this argument in the transcendental aesthetic about space and time. we have apriori representations of space and time, and these representations make the spatiotemporal form of objects of the senses possible (not their existence, but can determine their forms).

This second item is echoing his Copernican revolution. Also note, in transcendental deduction Kant uses the word "experience" all the time, but his definition is

technical. It is empirical cognition, where intuitions and concepts are combined together.

Example 14.1. Schematism – temporal profile of substance and cause. Section after transcendental deduction.

We can prove that the categories are objectively valid. If their formal conditions ?? There will be a difficulty, however, that will arise which did not arise when we were proving objective validity of space and time. space and time are objectively valid because they condition the form of appearances. but categories of understanding, however, no objects could appear before us, without being conditioned by space and time. but objects can appear to us without you applying the categories to it (faculty of understanding). we can be given objects without applying categories to it. this opens up the possibility that the categories are objectively valid. Thus, a difficulty arises which did not arise when dealing with space and time – despite subjective conditions of thinking, should the categories have objective validity. Space and time were the conditions of sensibility. He is going to try to say that categories are the conditions of experience

space and time conditions of empirical intuition. categories are conditions of experience. you could not possibly have experience (a higher mental state where you need to combine intuitions and concepts) without categories.

Remember he is using experience here to refer to a highly sophisticated cognitive state. Remember in the metaphysical deduction, there were 3 stages of empirical cognition.

- (1) (sense stage) – the manifold of empirical intuition
- (2) (imagination stage) – the sensible synthesis of empirical intuition
- (3) (understanding stage) – the thoughts (judgements) in which you apply concepts to intuition.

This is what you have to go through to get to empirical cognition. It is only at stage 3 that you are said to have arrived at empirical cognition. In the aesthetic, space and time are conditions of the first stage (sensing stage), and if the categories are objectively valid, he needs to show they are conditions for the understanding stage, when you apply a concept in a self-conscious way. Categories are objects of experience, where objects of experience is referring to this understanding stage.

To understand Kant's strategy, we introduce a framework that is used in the secondary literature to understand Kant. It's called a transcendental argument.

- (1) P1 You start with an uncontroversial premise. (Kant: there is experience).
- (2) P2 Controversial direction: Experience is only possible on the basis of categories.
- (3) P3 Inference to reality: categories are not just conditions, but determinant of form of object. The conditions of possibility of experience are also conditions of the objects of experience. (This is only possible for objects that are mind-dependent in some way). (idealist theory about these objects)

So entitlement: P3 to conclusion implies entitlement. Entitlement means we can actually apply these concepts to make legitimate claims.

For P2, categories condition the synthesis of intuition required for experience. Synthesis is referring to the imagination and understanding stage that lead to empirical cognition. Makes this move in 2 steps in the B deduction:

- (1) Sections 15-28: categories condition the synthesis of intuition in general
- (2) sections 21-26: categories condition the synthesis of empirical intuition in experience

Section 15: experience (empirical cognition) requires synthesis. You can't just be receptive of objects. Can't just be in sensing. You have to do some active (imagination + understanding stage). So all synthesis is an act of spontaneity (active process). Thus, synthesis tracks back to faculty of understanding (which is the active part of our mental faculties). This should all sound familiar. Now in section 16, he brings in apperception. Apperception is Kant's theory of self-consciousness. When we talk about experience in this robust cognitive state, he thinks it is a self conscious state, in which you as a thinker actively combine representations together. Synthesis requires this active combination of representations, there must be an agent, which Kant refers to as the "I." You as a thinker are combining representations; you are the spontaneous agent. Because there is this "I" that is engaging in the synthesis, issues of self-consciousness are pertinent at hand. This is why he is introducing apperception. What role does self play in synthesis. Let's define apperception = self consciousness.

- perception: conscious of something distinct from you
- apperception: self-consciousness. involves being conscious of something within you. thinking about how you are feeling. you just apperceived a state of yourself. representations that have a "my" stamp. two types of apperception.
 - empirical apperception:
 - transcendental/pure apperception: what sort of self is going on here. the self here is transcendental, universally shared, like a first person point of view. even though we have different empirical selves, we all have a first person POV. he doesn't argue that self is some substance. just this first person POV.

Remark 14.2. Early modern theories of self. Descartes, self = thinking thing (soul), immaterial, immortal, distinct from our bodies. self is some distinct substance. Kant rejects this (paralogisms) as rationalist metaphysics.

Hume: bundle theory of self. The self is nothing else except a bundle of perceptions.

There is an "I think" that must be able to accompany all my representations, otherwise they would be nothing to me. How can you experience some representation as this "my representation," you have to be able to "I think it." The "I think" is something that conditions representations which belong to you. He's not saying "I think" in fact accompanies all representations. But it has to be possible that "I think" accompanies. When you have desire for capuccino, the "I think" could accompany. but when you think it, it might not be "I think."

15. 2/23/24

inference to reality –

16. 2/26/24

We are talking today about Step 1 of the B deduction. "All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions."

But before we do this, we need to talk about Kant's theory of self-consciousness: transcendental/original/pure apperception.

On Kant's view, experience is something that involves self-consciousness. He analyzes self-consciousness via apperception. Perception is conscious of something outside of you. Apperception is conscious of something inside of you, namely one of your representations.

We can distinguish between empirical/pure forms of apperception. Empirical apperception is going to vary between each of us. And it's going to turn on each of us apprehending our empirical selves. In contrast, pure apperception will be of our transcendental selves. Pure apperception will be a transcendental condition of cognition.

There are 3 claims.

- (1) Analytic claim: the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations. self-conscious: must be able to be conscious of a representation that "belongs to me" as "mine," "my representation," "ascribable to the self" the "I think" is the vehicle in which a representation belongs to you. the way in which representations can come to "be mine" is when "I think" attaches itself to the representation. You don't need to consciously think the "I think," but simply that the "I think" can accompany the representation.
- (2) Synthetic claim: The "I think" must be able to synthetically unify all my representations. The "I think" is an activity where you synthetically unite together all the representations that belong to you.
- (3) Dependence claim: the analytic claim depends on the synthetic claim. there is an identical "I" that is being attached to each of my representations, so Kant's thought is what is the identity of that "I"? Why is it the same "I" across all my representations – because it is the "I think" which unifies all my representations. So the identity of the "I" is the identity of a synthetic activity.

Remark 16.1. In contrast, Descartes... "I" is thinking substance. Kant: Cartesian view is too thick. Separating "I" from the "mine" representations. Kant says: you cannot think of the "I" a part from the thing that's gluing together "my" representations. So the "I" is an a priori condition of the synthetic unity of "my" representations. Kantian view means: if you die, your "I" also ceases to exist, because your representations cease to exist. "I" is bound up in synthetically unifying your representations.

Remark 16.2. Humian view: "I" is a bundle of representations. you are constantly changing everyday. Kant: this is too thin of a view. Kant thinks dependence claim shows, you cannot be conscious of some "I" without this synthetic activity.

Hume: why can't you just have differential self-identical "I"s for each representation? Kant says: otherwise, as multi-colored diversity of "I" as representations.

Remark 16.3. How deep does our self-consciousness go in our representations? Are there representations that we could never be self-conscious of? Are there representations that could never be "mine"? Representations that are so back in the past, like when you were a kid, that is too far back for you to be self-conscious of.

When we are thinking about the identity of the "self," it turns on this activity where it synthetically unifies representations.

now that we have talked about what is "I," we have some better sense of what pure apperception is. perception of representations within us which does not depend on our empirical selves.

Section 17: Pure apperception is a transcendental condition of cognition, specifically the intuition + concepts stage (3rd understanding stage). When you are in this rich mental state called cognition, your cognitions must relate to an object. You may have a hallucination of something in front of you, it is not a cognition because the mental state is not actually relating to an object. This cognitive state depends on apperception. 'An object, however, is that in a concept of which, a manifold of a given intuition, is united.' When you are in a cognitive state, you deploy concepts of objects (concepts which refer to objects). Conceptually uniting intuitions is cognition. The "I think" is an activity of synthetically unifying representations, is exactly those.

How is it that you are uniting the book stuff in distinction from the finger on the book? Because you are thinking those representations/intuitions fall under "

Question 16.1. What is the status of our most fundamental representation of "I"? Probably pure. But it is not an intuition.

Skip ahead to Paralogisms: empty representation, form of "", proposition, logical subject of thought. Instability in how Kant thinks about what the status is of "I." Rule out the possibility that it is an intuition.

414: "on the ground of this doctrine, we can place nothing but the ismple ... wholly empty representation "I" of which one cannot even say it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept, through this "I" or "He" nothing thinks .. transcendental subject equals x?" what is this empty representation? what is this mere consciousness? First person point of view, a very particular kind of representation.

Section 18: 2 kinds of unity of self consciousness.

- (1) subjective, self: empirical selves. unity of representations is merely subjectively valid. association. our patterns of association will vary from person to person. Professor Matherne will say "bunny" and we will each think of something. these thoughts will vary from person to person. it is not shareable in some way. private empirical way of unifying representations. he wants to contrast this with:
- (2) objective. the self is pure/transcendental self. unity of representations are objectively valid (refers to objects) and universally valid (intersubjectively valid). the way in which we are objectively unifying representations is the same way that another responsible cognizer would objectively unify those representations.

the kind of unifying involved in cognition is objective, because cognitions refer to objects. it is not going to involve the subjective unifying.

Section 19: judgement. objective unity of apn is the unity involved in making a judgement. The "is" in "S is P" needs to be objectively and universally (intersubjectively) valid. "William James Hall is 15 stories high." This way of combining representations is objectively valid (corresponds to an object), and is the way in which anyone should judge the matter (universality, intersubjective agreement).

Page 251, bottom paragraph "relation of given cognitions ... distinguish relations as belonging to understanding.. in accordance with the laws of reproductive

imagination, which only has subjective validity, ... objective unity of apperception.. that is the aim.. to distinguish objective representations from the subjective"

The consciousness involved in staking the claim "this is how things are" and not just "this is how things seem," the "I" is involved.

17. 2/28/24

We are coming near the end of the transcendental deduction. Then we will move to the analytic principles, where he will give us synthetic a priori judgements which he will argue will correspond to objects. But first, let us conclude the deduction.

Last time, we were going through Step 1: All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions. Last time we talked about pure apperception, which was a transcendental condition of cognition.

Cognitions are objectively valid, while hallucinations are only subjectively valid (private validity). Kant thinks there's a kind of universal validity that is built into cognition, that any reasonable judging person will also have the same cognition. He's not drawing a relation between objective validity and universal validity.

For example, When Kant is thinking about rational metaphysics and specifically God, soul, etc., there is some universal validity to mental states we could arise there, but they are not objectively valid. So universal validity is not enough to be objectively valid.

Section 19: judgement deploys some kind of apperception. It is a self-conscious state. "William James Hall is 15 stories high." You are actively thinking it in a self-conscious way, because "I think" can be attached. So this apperception stuff is what we're supposed to get out of sections 18 and 19.

Now we are moving to section 20.

Remember that Experience is (empirical cognition)

- (1) Sensing stage
- (2) imagination stage
- (3) Understanding stage

Kant's steps toward transcendental deduction.

- (1) Experience is possible
- (2) In order for it to be possible, there must be some unity.
- (3) In order for a sensible intuition to have unity, the intuitions manifold must be brought under the synthetic unity of apperception. In order to have the unity of intuition in the synthesis stage of empirical cognition (experience), we need some activity of apperception which is synthesizing representations together, in order to produce this unified intuition. The unity of intuitions is a product of the synthetic activity of apperception. (Upshot of section 17).
- (4) Judgement is the action through which a manifold of a given intuition is brought under the synthetic unity of apperception. Categorical form of judgement is "S is P." Hypothetical form, "If P, then Q." If (Antecedent), then (consequent).
- (5) In the judgement involved in 4, a manifold of sensible intuitions is determined in accordance with the logical function of judgement. When you are making judgements about sensible intuitions, as you do in experience, the same thing holds – you need to be organizing your sensible intuitions in accordance with the logical functions of judgement. So 5 is like 4 but

applied to sensible intuitions. Categories are nothing other than functions of judging, insofar as a manifold of intuition is ju.... when he derives the categories from the logical functions of judgement. Categorical form of judgement "S is P", that lines up with the category of substance. When you treat something as intuition as subject, and P is property, you are treating the intuition as a substance. In the hypothetical form of judgement, If P then Q, then it corresponds to causality. You are treating P as a cause, and Q as an effect. Substance and cause are concepts of object which reflect when you apply a logical form of judgement to an intuition in some sort of way. In order for experience to be possible, we need to be unifying a manifold of intuition through judgement (through I think), and what does it mean, we are applying logical function of judgement (substance and/or cause). "William James Hall is 15 stories tall." You are applying the category of substance to make this judgement. When we are thinking of cognition as (intuition + concepts in some sort of way), the categories are a part of the concepts which help us experience.

(6)

(7)

(8) Insofar as .. categories are the conditions of the possibility of experience.

"Book is blue." A priori level. Intuition of blue book, manifold of different representations. In your experience of the book, you are affected by the book, you have an intuition of the book, you process it, so that you make an empirical judgement of the book. But Kant is interested in, at the abstract level, how can you make this judgement that this book is blue. When you are making this judgement, you are applying the category of substance to what you are intuiting. That the book is substance, and blue is a property. What are the a priori conditions that are enabling you to make that judgement.

Another way to think of the I think: you are the causal source of (spontaneity).

Sensibility and understanding differ in that understanding is spontaneous – causal source. Agency of the "I think" – you

Intellectual activity is some causal source of judgement.

At the end of section 20. What Kant has not attended to yet – what is our sensible life like? And how is our sensible life, as human beings as we are, shaped by the categories?

Kant, top down way. What is the character of human sensibility. Senses stage, imagination stage, etc... what does it mean to be the human sensible creatures that we are. Kant says there's something about our human intuitions as creatures with sense and imagination which depends on the category. He brings human condition into the picture. Categories are conditions for how human beings sensibly interact with the world, this is the second step of the deduction. The conclusion is, page 262: consequently, all synthesis through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories. Kant will try to show that for human perception to even be possible, the categories need to be possible in some sort of way. Human perception possible. (??)

Sections 22 and 23: do the categories have objective validity? Are the categories objective for things in themselves, or for appearances and phenomena. We get in these sections, restriction of the claim, objective validity for just objects of experience.

Restriction of the cognitive use of the categories. Categories have no other use than its application to objects of experience. To objects of experience (phenomena), not valid for things in themselves or numena. Draw a distinction between thinking vs. cognizing. Here you might have thought that thinking and cognizing were synonyms, but Kant here draws a sharp distinction between the two. Two components belong to cognition (first through the concept through which a object is thought at all, intuition through which it is given, for ??) Cognition involves intuitions + concepts. And this has to be the case because cognition is an objective state, state that has to relate to an object. But Kant has been insisting that intuition is what gives us objects. It is only through intuition that you can be in touch with objects. So if you want to be in a state of cognition, you have to be using intuition to get objects. But thinking, only involves concepts being deployed in some sort of way. You are combining concepts in a judgement. But you can never have an intuition of soul or god, because these are supersensible objects, beyond spatiotemporal world, so we can never intuit them, so our thinking can never correspond to objects. They are empty thoughts. To be in a state of cognition, we need intuition + concepts. And if we are recognizing that categories are transcendental conditions of cognition, because they are giving us some sort of unity to intuition, then the only objects that our objects can be corresponding to are those given to us through intuitions, which are just phenomena. So categories have cognitive use if we can think about objects in a cognitive way. But those are only objects of experience. So if you apply the category of substance to God or Soul, on the surface it looks like it would be a judgement. Looks like you've successfully deployed the category of substance. But Kant's thought is that it's an empty judgement because you have no intuition of God or Soul. Categories are only objectively valid with respect to the objects we can intuit.

Remark 17.1. Freedom is spontaneous causality. Because you have deployed concept of causality, you think it's objective, but it's not a cognition. You have no intuition of freedom. You can deploy category, but it will be empty in some sort of way. It is not a cognition.

In the aesthetic, we said there is experience = empirical intuition, the sensing stage of experience. Inference to reality: condition of possibility of empirical intuition, are also condition of possibility of the objects. Space and time and conditions of spatiotemporal objects.

Kant says: this is easy, because we should recognize that an object of experience appears in space and time, and nothing could appear in space and time... so the inference to reality goes quicker. But in the transcendental deduction, we are not just talking about conditions under which not just in space and time, but we are cognition? Apperception/categories? Go back to page 222. Setup of the deduction. Last paragraph, objects can appear before us, without needing functions of understanding. Thus, a difficulty is revealed here, that we did not encounter in sensibility, that subjective thinking... appearances can be given an intuition without functions of understanding. So Kant: inference to reality is much more difficult. So X equals pure categories, we have been focusing on, why are categories conditions of possibility of experience (because experience requires judgement and categories are required for judgement), but why is the way we deploy categories in making judgements, why does it condition those objects of experience. Why not just they condition how we think, and not condition objects? So to give you a sense of how it

will go: section 26, premise 2, experience requires perception, skip down to premise 8: categories are conditions of perception. Premise 9: categories are possibilities of experience, premise 10: inference to reality, conditions of possibility of experiences are at the same time conditions of objects of perception. So what we need to figure out, is why think the categories condition perception, and why the conditions of perception, are conditions of objects of perception.

In transcendental aesthetic, space and time condition empirical intuition, and the empirical intuition are the conditions of empirical intuition. Second step of B deduction: categories condition perception, the conditions of perception are conditions of the objects of perception. This symmetry hasn't emerged yet because we are focused on this intellectual stage.

In this sense stage, we are given this empirical intuition, manifold of intuition. At this imagination stage, we sensibly synthesize this manifold of our empirical intuition. In the understanding stage we are making judgements. First half of today we are talking about this understanding stage of making judgements. But perception here Kant refers to this imagination stage. Perception is what we arrive at when we through our imagination, sensibly i.e. spatiotemporally organize our empirical intuition. So this sensible synthesis is synthesis of apprehension. Not only do the categories condition our understanding stage where we are making judgements, the categories also condition perception (the imagination stage, where we are spatiotemporally organizing what we are intuiting).

- (1)
- (2) Experiences require perception
- (3) Perception involves synthesis of apprehension by imagination.
- (4) Synthesis of apprehension depends on space and time.
- (5) Space and time are not just forms of intuition, but also formal intuitions.
- (6) imaginative activity depends on space and time, and specifically formal intuitions, but if you are going to be organizing things imaginatively, you have to be depending on these formal intuitions of space and time
- (7) the formal intuition of space and time depend on the categories.
- (8) Therefore, categories are conditions of perception (imagination stage), ... then rest of the argument.

So what does it mean for perception to be conditioned by formal intuitions of space and time, and why do those formal intuitions depend on the categories?

18. 3/4/24

Reconstructions of the Transcendental Arguments in section 20 and 26 of the B deduction.

Argument in 20:

- (1) There is experience
- (2) Experience requires the unity of sensible intuition
- (3) In order for a sensible intuition to have unity, the intuition's manifold must be brought under the original synthetic unity of apperception
- (4) Judgement is the act through which a manifold of given representations is brought under the original synthetic unity of apperception
- (5) In the judgement involved in (4), a manifold of sensible intuition is determined in accordance with a logical function of judgement

- (6) The categories are concepts of objects through which a manifold of sensible intuition is determined in accordance with a logical function of judgement
- (7) Therefore, in order for a sensible intuition to have unity, the manifold of sensible intuition must stand under the categories.
- (8) Insofar as experience requires the unity of sensible intuition, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience.

Section 26.

- (1) There is experience
- (2) Experience requires perception, i.e. requires imaginative stage of experience.
- (3) Perception involves the synthesis of apprehension by imagination (imagination stage, middle paragraph of 261). Imaginatively taking up and synthesizing your senses.
- (4) The synthesis of apprehension depends on space and time (because what's happening at imaginative stage, what you have is sensible form of synthesis. look at book, you are spatially arranging your manifold into this square shape. throw marker, temporally organizing so that succession of motion is happening.)
- (5) Space and time are not just forms of intuitions, but also formal intuitions.
 - (bottom paragraph of 261, forms of outer and inner sensible intuitions a priori in representations of space of time. we knew this from the transcendental aesthetic. space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuitions, but as intuitions themselves which contain a manifold... he distinguishes between space and time as forms of intuitions, versus space and time as formal intuitions. as forms of intuition, space and time are singular wholes that precede their parts. infinite given magnitudes in some sort of way. Formal intuitions, representations of space and time as determined and unified in a particular way. triangle, circle, 3 second duration.) nobody has ever agreed on this footnote (with Kant, footnotes are most important because back then you couldn't edit a book you sent to a typesetter, you could only add footnotes.): representing space as an object. in geometry, engage with manifold of space and time that we are given through forms of intuition. empirical intuition – content of intuition is empirical, sensing of book. representation of form of intuition is formal intuition, like drawing a circle or triangle are formal intuition. forms of intuition condition the sensing stage. formal intuitions enable imagination stage. formal intuitions are generated by synthesizing forms of intuitions. formal intuitions are "made." in section 24, he introduces the notion of figurative synthesis of imagination. you get to a formal intuition by imaginatively taking up this given form of intuition, and synthesizing in some unified pattern. forms of intuition are most fundamental.
 - to have formal intuitions you have to synthesize forms of intuitions space and time. in this footnote, it gets controversial. people can't agree whether he is trying to revise his aesthetic. these are both hotly-contested debated.

- (revisionary): we need to reread space and time argument in aesthetic in light of the deduction). in the transcendental aesthetic, we get an account of space and time as pure intuitions. when talking about them as singular wholes preceding their parts and infinite in magnitude in some sort of way – and pure intuitions. but footnote says: pure intuition of space and time we got in aesthetic, presupposes synthesis. this synthesis depends on the categories. then in order to have pure intuitions of space, then you have to engage with categories. categories possibility of sensing stage. so if you are a revisionary reader, you think not only are categories condition imagination stage, they are also conditioning sensing stage. so revisionary might say, of the 3 sequential stages in experience, they are distinct in reflection but simultaneous in practice.
 - (supplementary): augment but don't revise the account of space and time in the aesthetic. instead, recognize that sensibility alone is responsible for these pure intuitions. infinite given magnitude. and what he wants to do in the deduction, if you want to actively take up space and time, in a way that enables imagination, categories are involved. if you are supplementary reader, you may think the 3 stages of experience are distinct but it is possible to sense without making judgements for example.
- (6) the synthesis of apprehension depends on formal intuitions of space and time.
-
- (7) the formal intuitions of space and time depend on the categories
- (8) therefore, the categories are conditions of perception (imagination stage, from 3 6 7).
- (9) therefore, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience
- (10) the conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time conditions of objects of experience (inference to reality)
- (11) Therefore, the categories are conditions of the possibility of objects of experience (from 9, 10).

Today we'll wrap up the transcendental deduction, and move on to the analytic of principles. He introduces a new analytic power, power of judgement. What sort of synthetic a priori judgements can we make when applying the categories? He will cause these his principles. In Kant's analytic of principles, he will give us the synthetic a priori judgements that we can make. Some metaphysical claims that Kant argues are legitimate.

Before we do this, we wrap up transcendental deduction by looking at the section 26 B deduction.

The transcendental argument:

- (1) There is experience
- (2) X is a condition of the possibility of experience
- (3) conditions of possibility of experience are conditions of objects of experience
- (4) Therefore, X is a condition of objects of experience.

Here X is the categories. Experience is a very complicated state involving 3 stages: the sense stage, the imagination stage, and the understanding stage. Kant

will argue that categories are conditions for perception, where perception is specifically referring to the imagination stage. He uses "synthesis of apprehension" to refer to the imaginative activities involved in with perception. Imagination is spatially organizing the blue and red stuff in distinction of the yellow and white stuff of your book. In the understanding stage, you conceptually synthesize or unify your intuitions in some sort of way.

Section 26

- (1) There is experience
- (2) Experience requires perception, i.e. requires imaginatino stage of experience.
- (3) Perception involves the synthesis of apprehension by imagination (imagination stage, middle paragraph of 261). Imaginatively taking up and synthesizing your senses.
- (4) The synthesis of apprehension depends on space and time (because what's happening at imaginatino stage, what you have is sensible form of synthesis. look at book, you are spatially arranging your manifold into this square shape. throw marker, temporally organizing so that succession of motion is happening.)
- (5) Space and time are not just forms of intuitions, but also formal intuitions.
 - (bottom paragraph of 261, forms of outer and inner sensible intuitions a priori in representations of space of time. we knew this from the transcendental aesthetic. space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuitions, but as intuitions themselves which contain a manifold... he distinguishes between space and time as forms of intuitions, versus space and time as formal intuitions. as forms of intuition, space and time are singular wholes that precede their parts. infinite given magnitudes in some sort of way. Formal intuitions, representations of space and time as determined and unified in a particular way. triangle, circle, 3 second duration.) nobody has ever agreed on this footnote (with Kant, footnotes are most important because back then you couldn't edit a book you sent to a typesetter, you could only add footnotes.): representing space as an object. in geometry, engage with manifold of space and time that we are given through forms of intuition. empirical intuition – content of intuition is empirical, sensing of book. representation of form of intuition is formal intuition, like drawing a circle or triangle are formal intuition. forms of intuition condition the sensing stage. formal intuitions enable imagination stage. formal intuitions are generated by synthesizing forms of intuitions. formal intuitions are "made." in section 24, he introduces the notion of figurative synthesis of imagination. you get to a formal intuition by imaginatively taking up this given form of intuition, and synthesizing in some unified pattern. forms of intuition are most fundamental.
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- (revisionary): we need to reread space and time argument in aesthetic in light of the deduction). in the transcendental aesthetic, we get an account of space and time as pure intuitions. when talking about them as singular wholes preceding their parts and infinite in magnitude in some sort of way – and pure intuitions. but footnote says: pure intuition of space and time we got in aesthetic, presupposes synthesis. this synthesis depends on the categories. then in order to have pure intuitions of space, then you have to engage with categories. categories possibility of sensing stage. so if you are a revisionary reader, you think not only are categories condition imagination stage, they are also conditioning sensing stage. so revisionary might say, of the 3 sequential stages in experience, they are distinct in reflection but simultaneous in practice.
revisionists argue that presupposes synthesis because the singularity of pure intuition of space and time is a unifying thing. so you need to be engaging in unifying.
 - (supplementary): augment but don't revise the account of space and time in the aesthetic. instead, recognize that sensibility alone is responsible for these pure intuitions. infinite given magnitude. and what he wants to do in the deduction, if you want to actively take up space and time, in a way that enables imagination, categories are involved. if you are supplementary reader, you may think the 3 stages of experience are distinct but it is possible to sense without making judgements for example.
- (6) the synthesis of apprehension depends on formal intuitions of space and time.
 - formal intuitions of space and time give us spatiotemporal patterns which we deploy to imaginatively unify our senses.
 - (7) the formal intuitions of space and time depend on the categories
 - why? because you are unifying your pure intuitions. this unification depends on categories?
 - (8) therefore, the categories are conditions of perception (imagination stage, from 3 6 7).
 - (9) therefore, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience
 - (10) the conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time conditions of objects of experience (s to reality)
 - (11) Therefore, the categories are conditions of the possibility of objects of experience (from 9, 10).

Section 24: 2 kinds of a priori synthesis.

- intellectual. has seat in understanding stage.
- figurative. has seat in imagination stage. bottom page of 256, definition of imagination. faculty of representing an object even without intuition or the object. faculty of intuition (sensibility), synthesis: spontaneity in accordance with the categories in which imagination determines the a priori forms of space and time.

- how you draw circle, imaginative activity represents a priori form of space and time, so it is unified. guided by our categories, and our concepts of unity. guided by understanding.

when you are perceiving a house. you have this whole manifold of intuition. to perceive (imaginative stage), you have to unify these senses into house shape. in effect, in perception (imagination), drawing shapes all the time. in the synthesis of apprehension, you are organizing what you are intuiting into these determinant spatiotemporal forms, and that is guided by these formal intuitions. which are representations of space and time that are determinant/unified. they are like stencils/patterns that guide you to get a shape of house.

Maybe Kant shows step 1 of deduction. Maybe even shown categories condition perception. Why should we think (inference to reality) the objects that we experience are conditioned by categories? It seems we've only shown categories condition this mental process. Straud: very grumpy in a very smart way about qualms with this inference to reality step made by Kant. Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances.

Nature – sum total of all appearances. Nature is mind-dependent. Laws of nature depend on the mind. Analyzes laws of nature, in terms of these synthetic a priori judgements, in which we apply the categories to appearances.

Principle of persistence of substance – substance persists, principle of causality... so Kant will be investigating the synthetic

the transcendental idealism we get... spatiotemporal objects sum is nature, nature is governed by laws, by laws reflect these a priori judgements where we apply categories to appearances. So all of nature depends on us. appearances are representations, so it's not weird to think that if there's connection among appearances (laws of nature), that the only source of those connections could be the categories, our mind in some sort of way. therefore categories conditions of objects of experience?

So we come back to the objective validity question.

- (1) categories are objectively valid, because they make objects of experience possible.
- (2) Kant's transcendental idealism: all of nature depends on categories in some sort of way
- (3) the possibility of metaphysics: could it be a science? synthetic a priori judgements, copernican hypothesis, if objects conform to our mind, then we can make synthetic a priori judgements about them a priori to experience.

19. 3/6/24: FROM THE 'HIDDEN ART' OF SCHEMATISM TO THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)

Kant's account of imagination in general, and its relevance to Schematism. He is thinking of imagination as a specific kind of capacity, that is sensible on one hand as it is responsible for spatiotemporally organizing intuitions, and imagination is in some sense spontaneous. While sensing is wholly passive, imagination is the spontaneous aspect of our sensibility, where we actively take up to order and organize

what we are experiencing. He will also call imagination the activity of: sensible synthesis. Our imagination actively takes up and organizes what we are given through sensibility.

But there are two modes of imaginative synthesis. There is an empirical mode, and a pure mode. In the empirical mode, what our imagination organizes is a manifold of empirical intuition. This is what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension, which produces this state of perception. This is what we were worried about in Section 26.

So when you look at the classroom board, you are apprehending – spatiotemporally organizing what you are sensing.

But there is a pure mode of imaginative synthesis. Organizes the a priori manifold of space and time. .. figurative synthesis, in section 24 of the B deduction. In section 26, the synthesis of space into an imaginative shape is a formal intuition.

Formal intuitions depend on categories in some sort of way, because there is some sort of unity which is guided by categories. This was all to organize that categories are objectively valid – condition the possibility of objects of experience.

We are moving towards the transcendental analytic. Recall the transcendental logic, the science of understanding. In this domain, Kant is concerned with pure thinking, which is judgement through pure concepts that relate to objects.

Now the transcendental analytic is concerned with the categories. The point of the transcendental deduction was to show that the categories are objectively valid, but Kant says they are only valid with respect to spatiotemporal objects, and not for anything that transcends possible experience. The second part of transcendental logic: analytic of principles. For Kant in this section, principles is synonymous with pure judgements, and synonymous with synthetic a priori judgements.

In the analytic of principles, he talks about power of judgement. Higher powers of cognition/”understanding in general.” This just refers to the intellectual stem of cognition. And there are three subspecies of the understanding/intellect in general:

- understanding in the specific sense, a faculty of concepts. in contrast with understanding in general, which is tantamount to thinking in general. in the transcendental deduction we were talking about understanding in the specific sense. understanding in general is synonymous with 'rules.' understanding is not itself the faculty through which we make these judgement.
- power of judgement/faculty of judgement. judgements are mental acts in which we combine two concepts together.
- reason – faculty of inference. inferences are cognitive acts which infer from multiple judgements.

Eventually we will get to the second part of our intellect, which is the transcendental dialectic. talk about reason logic of illusion, etc. But here, we are still in the domain of what Kant calls is the logic of truth. What are the synthetic a priori judgements we can make.

If we zoom in on the power of judgement, it is the faculty for subsuming particulars under rules. concept book, that is generated by understanding in the specific sense, but how do you recognize something is a book? that is a different capacity: capacity for recognizing that an instance goes under a concept or instantiating a concept. but why is he distinguishing between the understanding and the power of judgement? the thought is, having an intellectual facility for rules is not enough... you encounter an infinite regress problem with respect to judgement.

if you don't know what rizz is.... you look it up ... rizz, what is rizz? charisma. What is charisma? It is ball. What is blah?

So if the understanding is only a faculty of rules, then the understanding is not sufficient for a particular to fall under a rule. You look at someone and they have rizz. you can't be taught to recognize whether someone falls under this concept. This faculty for recognizing when an instance following under a rule, this is judgement. There is a special talent – natural gift – intellectual gift for recognizing that something falls under a concept. Kant says: you can have a concept, but lack the talent required to applying those concepts in concreto.

Suppose you have a musical concept *liek fortissimo*. sound played loudly. We can make a judgment: the symphony has *fortissimo*. We are applying this concept to something we hear. But in order to arrive to this judgement, we need to have a grasp on the sensible conditions for which it is legitimate to apply the concept *fortissimo*.

The sensible conditions are sonic conditions in some sort of way. The domain in which you are applying.. part of this special talent that is judgement, turns on having some grasp on the sensible conditions in which it is appropriate or inappropriate to be applying some concept. thinking about the pure case, if we have a concept like substance, we ultimately want to get to judgements about concepts, but we need facility for grasping the spatiotemporal conditions in which it is legitimate to be applying the category of substance. the schematism is supposed to lay out those sensible conditions for legitimate application of the category of substance. after the schematism, we get to the principles.

Your imagination has some sort of skill for giving you a grasp on what are the sensible conditions where you can apply a concept.

aside.

section 49 of Kant's 3rd critique: genius. if you have genius, you are able to augment concepts through creative metaphors. aesthetically expanding them in productive ways. dickinson, genius is to strike on these supprising but productive connections.

schematism chapter and schema. activity of imagination, plays this mediating role in judgement. in judgement in general, more specifically with synthetic judgements, you have some concepts that you apply to appearances. or apply it to intuitions, through which those appearances are given to you.

- empirical concept – empirical intuition
- pure case, where you have a pure concept, namely a category. and you're supposed to be able to apply this category to empirical intuition but how is that possible. empirical intuitions, and this gap is seemingly insurmountable, so this gap must be overcome.

in both of these cases, a schema is the bridge that enables us to apply concepts to intuitions. a schema gives us a sense of how the conceptual bits show up sensibly. the transcendental schema – pure representation that mediates concepts and intuition. a schema has both a sensible and intellectual profile. the sensible profile is that it is some spatiotemporal representation. and the intellectual profile of schema, it is a kind of rule that you can apply in multiple scenarios.

The schema of a triangle is distinct from an image. The image is the formal intuition you produce when you imaginatively synthesize space to give you the image of a triangle.

Triangle. images of triangle, representation of. schema: generic spatial representation that applies to all triangles.

Dog. all different dogs. but you have a schema of dogs, generic representation of dogs. concept of a dog, signifies a rule in accordance to which your imagination can specify the shape of a four footed animal in general.

Schema

- sensible side: spatiotemporal representation, image.
- intellectual side: rule for synthesis of apprehension. what's guiding your imagination is not just the intellectual rule of dog, you have an imaginative sense of the look of dogs (your schema), and that schema guides you in the synthesis of apprehension.

transcendental schemata, this is not going to vary between people. empirical schemata will vary between people. but transcendental schemata because we will not. they have pure rather than empirical source. we will all have the same schemata for applying substance. what is a transcendental schema? transcendental time-determinations.

Imagination can engage in this apriori synthesis of apriori manifold of space and time. In the schematism, Kant is focusing on time. We have an imaginative ability to synthesize time, and when you synthesize time into a determinant pattern, you have a time-determination, a transcendental schema of time. formal intuitions are tantamount to transcendental schemata. formal intuitions: space and time determined a unified kind of way. how you imagine space and time in a unified way, is through the schema.

Space is the intuition of things outside of us. Time is the intuition of things inside of us. All of our representations whether intuitions whether concepts, are in us. So all our representations are going to be under time. All of our empirical intuitions are temporal, not all spatial. Set space aside, focus on time, imagination is able to synthesize apriori form of time in accordance with categories,

substance applies in these temporal conditions. schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time. if you take category of substance, the schema for when to apply category of substance, is the persistence of the real in time. persistence is a temporal pattern. and your imagination, by schematizing. your imagination has some special art/skill that somehow a priori tells all of us that is when an object is persisting, it is valid to apply the category of substance. cause: succession in accordance with a rule. throw a pen, necessary succession, my arm then pen moves. necessary temporal succession, licensed to apply category of cause in this context. in order to make these synthetic apriori judgements, before we can just assert those judgements, we need our imagination to give a temporal grasp of the conditions on which it is valid to apply those categories. if you try to apply category to God, it is not holding in that case because God transcends time.

in order

20. 3/18/24

- (1) Transcendental doctrine of judgement recap
- (2) The system of principles aka the synthetic apriori judgements
- (3) the analogies of experience
- (4) The 1st analogy: substance

Transcendental doctrine of judgement. Looking at schematism. What are the sensible conditions in which the categories can be applied. Whenever we're making judgements, whether pure or empirical concepts, there are only certain sensible conditions in which it is valid to be applying those concepts. So if you want to make a judgement, you have to understand the conditions in which it is appropriate to make that judgement.

What are the sensible conditions for applying the categories? For judging something as substance? For judging something as cause and effect? For each set of categories, there is a set of temporal conditions which are sensible conditions for applying the category.

When it comes to the category of substance, the sensible condition is temporal persistence. Endurance through time.

Transcendental schema: identifies the temporal pattern, timed determination, and conditions in which it is valid to apply cause and effect. It is not valid to apply substance and cause and effect to, say, God or the soul which exists outside of temporal world.

Conditions for the categories having significance, i.e. having relation to objects, you can only do under these sensible temporal conditions. Sharp shift to temporality.

What sort of synthetic apriori judgements can we make? *The principles.*

Analytic judgements are judgements in which the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. The supreme principle is the principle of non-contradiction. If you have a statement like, "bachelorettes are married" – this is violating the principle of non-contradiction.

Synthetic judgements. Amplification of subject concept by predicate concept. What is the supreme principle? In the empirical case, it is experience. In the a priori case, it is the *possibility of experience*. What is the basis of combining subject and predicate concept in a synthetic way – there is a third element required for amplification. Empirical case, experience. Pure case, possibility of experience.

What is possibility of experience? 3 stages of experience. Sensing, imagination, understanding. Kant thinks there's an a priori case for each of these stages.

A priori structure of sensing: form of space and time, which we got in the aesthetic.

A priori structure of imagination: a priori synthesis (figurative synthesis, schematism) imagination takes up space and time synthesizes it into formal intuitions/transcendental schemata.

A priori structure of understanding: transcendental apperception + categories.

the supreme principle of synthetic a priori judgements is therefore: every object of experience (phenomena not noumena) stands under the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. must agree with the forms of space and time. must agree with formal intuition, has determinate shape and determinate temporal duration. therefore, can think of book as substance. prior to any experience, we can assert that all objects of experience stand under these possibility of experiences. that's why we can make synthetic judgements.

This a priori edifice, that objects of experience have to conform to, this a priori edifice gives us the basis for making these a priori synthetic judgements. Are we being a little fast and loose with this Necessary conditions for experience – objects? Inference to reality step.

A priori structure of experience, and objects which conform to a priori structure of experience, because of his transcendental idealism. Because objects conform to these a priori structures.

Kant's thought is that all our representations, no matter what, are in time. But only some of our representations have form of space. Representations outside of us have form of space. But not all representations have spatial form. All of our representations, though, are of time. Kant thinks that time is a more-encompassing form of intuition, than space, because no representation can be just spatial and not temporal, but they can be not spatial but is temporal. It's not that Kant doesn't want to think that space isn't important. But he is thinking of at the most fundamental level, what are the a priori conditions for making synthetic a priori judgements. And time is more ubiquitous, foundational than space in a certain way.

Kant has a fun section on what makes things countable or measurable. but we'll unfortunately skip this. We'll focus in on something called "the analogies of experience." Types of principles:

- (1) Mathematical principles, axioms, and anticipation
- (2) dynamical. existence of appearances. a priori conditions are necessary throughout for possible of experience, while existence of object of empirical intuition are only contingent. hence, principle of mathematical use, are unconditionally necessary, while principle of dynamical use, while they do have a priori necessity, but only under the condition of empirical thinking and experience. so dynamical principles have these contingent encounters, in which there is contingent existence. how do we come across appearances in the contingent course of experience, and we care about in dynamic principles the relations between existing appearances. how can we say something a priori about these contingently existing appearances.

In the analogy of experience, Kant thinks about in particular, how do we analyze the temporal relations between existing appearances. If we have the marker, at time 1 its in our hand, and time 2 its across the room. And what we want to think through, what can we say about the temporal relations between existing appearances. and that's not what we are concerned with in the mathematical principles.

Analogies:

- (1) Substance
- (2) Cause
- (3) Community

in what sense does every object of experience relate to the relational categories. Call substance the first analogy, cause the second analogy. all of the analogies have roughly the same structure. Kant states the basic synthetic a priori principle. In each case, there is a formulation of the principle in the first edition, which he rewrites in the second edition. Sometimes its clear how they relate, sometimes its unclear how they relate, nevertheless that's how it goes.

Let's start first with how Kant is thinking about the general principle of analogies of experience. General principle of analogies of experience: all appearances stand under the rules of the determination of the rules of their relation to one another.

The principle is, experience is possible only through the necessary connection to perception. So

- A edition: with respect to their existence, all existing appearances stand a priori under rules of the determination of their relation to each other in one time. determination of rules – fix whether relation is simultaneously or successively. Focused on their temporal relations.
- B edition: not talking about appearances at all. Experience is possible only through the representation of necessary connection of perception. Talking about the processes involved when we have experience. Perception is what we get at the imagination stage in experience. Imaginative synthesizing what we are given in empirical intuition. BUT when Kant thinks about experience in his technical sense, Kant aligns it with the understanding stage of experience. And when he's thinking of experience in this way, he's thinking of empirical cognition, in which we make judgements in which we apply concepts to what we empirically intuit. First step of B deduction. The appearances he's talking about, are nothing but the objects of experience which are conditioned by the a priori structure of experience. Experience conditions the possibility of the objects of experience. conditions for experience are the same time conditions for the objects of experience.

experience is empirical cognition, act on the basis of perception which determines how objects are. synthesis of perception which is not in itself is contained in perception, but contains the synthetic unity..... when you have experience, what you do in a certain sense, is synthesize your perceptions into an objective order. when you arrive at your judgements, not just how things seem, but how in fact things are. what this objective order is, crucial that we are thinking of these as temporal order. in experience, you determine what the objective temporal order is of the appearances you come across.

Kant thinks that when we are thinking of time, there's three fundamental temporal relations. 296, A177: 3 modi of time. persistence, succession, and simultaneity. persistence: endures through time, succession: temporal sequence, simultaneity: existence of things at the same time.

Kant argues: what this whole temporal fixing of objective order possible, is that we make judgements where we apply substance cause and community to what we experience. on the basis of applying the concept of substance, we experience some persistence. applying concept of causality, succession. applying concept of community, simultaneity.

how are objects objectively in time. categories are conditions for possibility of experience, how do we fix this objective temporal order in the course of experience.

we're going from more generic claims to specific claims. transcendental deduction, generic claim: to make judgements, need to synthetically combine things together through apperception, given these different categories. moving through principles, we are discovering the ways we are synthetically combining things together. we are still at a basic level, how do we experience things simultaneously or successively. but what are the specific features or parameters for that synthesis in experience. generic infrastructure of what makes experience possible in the first place, to what makes experience of simultaneity or succession in the first place.

Kant is heralded as forerunner of lived experience. Experience is the most rich thing that we have, and we just kind of overlook it cus we are not dwelling. But Kant wants us to dwell in the richness of experience.

Kant, Grothendieck revolution. tells me something about my time. he also says something about the joy I have in watching myself build this cathedral. the richness of experience, what it means to live, etc.

Argument for proving substance exist. Kant is giving a transcendental argument. there's experience, experience requires temporal ordering of things. in order to temporally order things, you have to have grasp of unity of time, cannot perceive time (why?), so you need in a stand-in for time, which is substance. substance is that which persists, all changes happen. so in order for experience to be possible, you need substance?

21. 3/20/24: KANT ON CAUSALITY

- Kant's theory of substance: the 1st analogy
- Kant's theory of causality – the 2nd analogy, Kant vs. Hume

Recall our discussion in the first few lectures of the semester. Kant is responding to the metaphysics of the early modern period. Specifically, responding to Spinoza et al's view on substance and cause.

Let us talk about substance and build our way up historically. Traditionally, substance refers to a substratum/subject that is a bearer of properties/accidents. Hume and Locke think that substance is an empty concept – you can only point to accidents and properties, but not a substance. So you get this question of objective validity with respect to substance. You have this logical concept, but is there anything in the world that actually corresponds to it, or is it an empty concept altogether. Kant in the first analogy is trying to give an argument that substance is an objective argument, that relates to objects. What Kant is going to argue that it relates to, is objects of experience, i.e. phenomena or appearances.

Right now, what we need to do is work through his argument on why the concept of substance has a grip on the spatiotemporal world that we experience. In the first analogy, we get a version of a transcendental argument, which recall is

- (1) There is experience
- (2) Substance is a condition of the possibility of experience
- (3) etc.

Reconstruction of B233-234

- (1) There is experience (assumed premise)
- (2) Category substance is a condition of the possibility of experience.
- (3) When thinking of this singular whole that is time, we should think of it as something that is persisting. It endures and persists. It doesn't pop in and out. Kant thinks that time as a whole is an enduring persisting unitary framework, in relation to which decide whether things are existing simultaneously or successively.
- (4) Time cannot be perceived by itself. Time in mind here is time as a form of intuition, which we met in the transcendental aesthetic. This pure intuition we cannot perceive. It's just this infrastructure that is built into your sensibility, which makes perception possible. It is an enabling condition of

perception, this background enabling framework, but itself is not perceivable. We can have stand-ins, like a clock, etc., but you're not perceiving the a priori form of time. This infinite totality a priori form of time. (Things that can be perceived, empirical domain. Things that cannot be perceived: a priori forms, formal intuitions enable perception, etc. Things that enable perception cannot be perceived).

- (5)
- (6) the only persisting stand in for time, ... whatever is the most fundamental nature of time which persists, then that is the stand in for time. then substance exists?

okay i fucked this up.... these notes are unsavable. Principle: in all change of appearances, substance persists. Substance is that which persists through all change of appearances.

Note this is a synthetic judgement. The argument for this is in Kant's first analogy. d

Category substance is a condition of the possibility of experience. because substance must be the stand in for time, so that we can assign simultaneity and succession. looking for absolutely persisting substratum. and this is then the substratum of the real.

Nature: all phenomena, spatiotemporal appearances. And things in themselves or noumena are outside this realm. Matter is in nature. It is the substratum of everything real. Whatever physics studies as the fundamental building blocks of nature.. that is what the substratum of everything real is. Kant just says matter because in the newtonian era physics he's talking about, they just call this fundamental building block matter. So you use the word stand-in or analog. The thought is: this substratum that physics studies, matter, that is the persisting thing that we treat as the stand-in for the persisting thing that is time. What do we lose by chopping out premise 3 and 4? Premise 3 and 4 are unpacking what it means to experience things in time. As existing in spatiotemporal world in simultaneity and succession. If you only have 1 and 4, leave it unspecified what it means for appearances to exist in time, so Kant is trying to specify what it means for appearances to exist in time.. to hook that time is persisting substratum.

Could read simultaneity/succession from objects – but Kant's worry there is that, what standard do you have to appeal to say that something is really simultaneous or successive. "I woke up when the birds were chirping. I woke up after birds were chirping." Who's right? You need an objective standard for what's simultaneous or subjective.

If you don't have only one time, you are not going to be able to objectively establish what is simultaneous or successive.

Relatively persistence, properties change.. when a substance's properties or accidents change, Kant calls it an alteration. The determinations of a thing. When you change, you come to have a new determination. Absolute vs. relative persistence. Relative persistence is something that we can experience. Book breaking in half? But absolute persistence characterizes substance so much so that, in the first analogy handout, substance is categorical. Substance is pure concept: concept of objects to which properties adhere.

Substance tracks objects of experience, namely this fundamental matter. transcendental argument, without this fundamental matter, experience wouldn't be possible?

Argument for causality. Causality is bound up in this whole account of substance. When we are thinking of cause and effect, we are thinking about different ways in which substance is existing. Page 304. All alterations occur in accordance with the laws of cause and effect. First paragraph of second analogy, rehashes what we just did in the first analogy.

All appearances of the temporal sequence, are collectively only alterations. Whenever things happen, whenever there are alterations, ways of existing, that is just a way in which the fundamental matter exists.

Let's think a little about the notion of causality as it is operating in the early modern period. This is a concept of a necessary connection between two events/states in some sort of way, such that if one happens, the other necessarily follows. If A then necessarily B. The rationalists have no problem thinking about causality. They have problems analyzing how causality works given minds, body, God, etc., but they agree there is a necessary connection. But Hume as ever, is going to be arguing that this notion of causality as involving necessary connection between two events or states, again, is a purely empty concept. And what Hume is going to argue, if you look at experience, you're never going to be able to find a necessary connection between two things. In experience, all you can find, is what you see he describes is the constant conjunction between A and B. But no necessary connection between A and B.. why? Because when we think of necessary connection, we are thinking of things that cannot be otherwise. But in Hume's view, experience is something that only gives us a basis of induction. On the basis of experience, for all we know, A and B come together, but on the basis of induction you can never know whether things could be different in the future. Lightning and thunder. In all your experiences of lightning and thunder, there is a constant conjunction between the two, you see lightning then hear Thunder. On basis of induction, you can predict knowing from the past, that if I see lightning, then thunder will follow in the future. But Hume says, on the basis of experience, you cannot know that it cannot be otherwise. Hume thinks that the best we can get on the basis of experience is some predictable pattern, a constant conjunction, but you cannot posit it as necessary – cannot be otherwise.

Hume: habit of expectation. Conditioning. When you see two things happen simultaneously, you are going to be conditioned, when one thing happens to expect the next to follow. Then Hume – this connection therefore we feel in the mind this customary .. all we are actually given in experience, is constant conjunction. Contingent connection, that gives us this habit of expectation. And then we project the concept of causality on this basis. So we treat this constant conjunction as if it is a necessary connection. But Hume thinks that this is a false inference. We sloppily slide that into our thinking. So that's why for Hume, causality is an empty concept, because he thinks there's nothing in experience that actually gives necessary connection. This is the Humeian challenge that Kant is going to take up in the second analogy. Kant: contra empiricists, causality exists in nature. But the latter bit, against rationalists: only able to legitimately deploy the concept of necessary connection in relation to appearances, nature, spatiotemporal objects, etc.

Way back when we were talkin about transcendental idealism, things in themselves cause appearances, this is part of why. Kant shouldn't have said this: causality really only applies to objects of experience.

Remark 21.1. Free will is some notion that you are your casual source of your future. We will get to causality and free will in roughly two weeks. But the second thing to say, is that Hume thinks that we use the word causality incorrectly. Kant agrees. The only legitimate way to use the language of causality is to describe a relation of necessity between two things.

Kant will say: we have experience. Then stuff happens in experience. Part of experience is of stuff happening. And Kant will argue that without causality, we would never be able to distinguish between a subjective perception of appearance, and an objective perception of appearance.

22. 3/25/24: KANT'S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM

Today's agenda:

- (1) The 2nd analogy: Kant on causality
- (2) The refutation of idealism. 1) idealism: formal vs. material. 2) Kant's proof of theoretical world.
- (3) Kant's transcendental idealism

Kant's analogy of experience. In the first analogy, we got Kant's account that all changes in appearance are changes in this underlying substance, i.e. matter. Second analogy: all of nature is governed by the laws of causality. Where we needed on class in Wednesday was with Hume's account of causality.

Again, when we are thinking of causality in the Humeian tradition, we are thinking of it as a necessary connection between two states or events, such that if one thing happens then the second thing necessarily follows. Of a sequence. Hume wants to argue that this is ultimately an empty concept. We talk of things as causal relations, but Hume argues that all experience gives us is the constant conjunction between two things. Empirically navigating the world, we never come across necessary patterns, but constant conjunctions that could be different.

Last paragraph on 308. Empirical derivation of causality, that Hume thinks is the origin of this notion of cause. Hume thinks over the course of experience, you incorrectly infer this notion of causality. So Kant is reminding us of the empiricist view on the origin of causality. Kant says then: if this were the case, if causality were empirical, then it would .. grounded not a priori but only on induction, therefore not universally necessary nor could not be otherwise. Hume thinks that there's some kind of induction. if experience is source of causality, then it is a merely empty concept. Kant will agree with this argument on the assumed premise, but doesn't agree with the basic premise.

Kant's strategy is to deploy a transcendental argument. What he's going to argue, is that the category of causality isn't an empirical concept: it's an a priori concept. He argued this way back in the metaphysical deduction (prompt 1 on midterm), source in the understanding. Category of causality is an a priori condition is the condition of the possibility of experience.

In the second analogy, we explore alterations/change/occurrence/happening (all synonyms in this section). When we encounter the substance that persists, it is always changing. When we are talking about alterations, happenings, we are talking

about a change in one way that substance exists to another way it exists. This language of "ways of existing," Kant will also describe it in terms of "accidents" or "determinations" of substance. Substance has different accidents, determinations which are always in flux in some sort of way. In the second analogy, we want to figure out what is governing alterations/change in substances. This presupposes everything discussed about substance in the first analogy.

In the second analogy, Kant will argue that causality ultimately the condition of the possibility of the experience that something happens (change in substance).

Kant's first analogy: one persisting substratum, persists through all changes in appearance.. substances don't arrive and perish.. because the substance we need for the possibility of experience cannot be momentary, it is that persisting kind. The one substratum.

- (1) There is experience
- (2) Experience is empirical cognition, cognition that determines an object through perceptions. worth remembering here: when Kant describes experience as an empirical cognition, he's saying that experience is something that purports to be objective. For Kant, experience here refers to a truth-apt state, not merely a subjective state.
- (3) We have experience that something happens. Experience of alterations, change, etc. Baseline that, we experience things happen. More specifically, we have cognition of an objective relation between two states A and B, such that A precedes B and B follows A in the object. Breaking this down: to say we have experience is to say we have empirical cognition, an objective state. In particular, what we cognize when we cognize something happens, is a relation between two states, two ways in which an object exists. Such that A precedes B, and B follows A in the object. Kant describes this necessary sequence as an objective order of succession. When we experience something happens, there is a objective sequence in two states of an object. Something that Kant uses: objective order of perception, boat starts upstream and then boat exists downstream, because the river has carried it.

This objective order of succession is in contrast to subjective orders of succession. For example, in our apprehension. Imaginatively apprehending objects, our imagination is always successive. When we walked to class, we had a sequence in apprehensions, kept successively taking in information, successive order of representations. Kant thinks that our apprehension is, no matter what, always successive. Kant is telling us: that when we experience that something happens, it doesn't just appear to us subjectively. In the object, we are taking there to be some change that is happening. Part of experience, requires being able to figure out when you are subjectively experiencing succession, and when there is actual succession in objects. With an objective order of succession, there is an experience of succession. A merely subjective order of succession, all you have is successive representations.

Bottom of 307: imagine everything is subjective succession. Kant says: in this way, we would only have a play of representations that would not be related to any object at all. that is, by means of our perception, no appearance would be distinguished from any other as far as the temporal

world is concerned.. nothing in apperaance determines a sequence as necessary. If all we had is play, we would never be able to distinguish objects as simultaneous or objective. But Kant takes it as obvious. When you look at William James Hall in a sound state, we can all agree it is 15 stories tall. If you say everything is a subjective order of succession, then everything would just be a dream.

- (4) We cannot cognize that something always happens. In order to experience that something actually happens, apprehension alone isn't enough. Why? Because apprehension is always successive, regardless whether the object is successive. All that apprehension could ever get you, is the subjective order of succession. But is apprehension tracking objective order? You can't tell just by apprehension.
- (5) We cannot cognize that something happens through perception of time itself, because we cannot perceive time itself. Perception of time itself won't help either. If you have perception of time itself, then you could figure out whether there is actually a succession in the object. But for reasons in the first analogy, Kant thinks we cannot have a perception of time itself. So you can't use that to figure out whether there's an objective order of relation.
- (6) Ultimately, it will be the category of causality that makes this experience of something happening possible. Rules out Humeian thought that habit is enough. In order to congize that something happens, must make a judgement about relation between A and B that A necessarily precedes B, and B necessarily follows A in accordance with a rule. When we arethinking about what empirical cognition is, it is a judgement. We are judging, judgements are objective. When we experience, what kind of judgement are we making? Judging relation between A and B, and A necessarily precedes B, and B necessarily follows A in accordance with a rule. In premise 3, there is no mention of a rule. But here, we are introducing: whent here's an objective order of succession, this sequence is in some sense, is rule-governed. The kind of rule that Kant takes, page 310: Kant is telling us, when you have a rule-governed sequence, one thing that is true: irreversibility in the sequence. not that you could perceive B before A, because there's some irreversibility. William James Hall: start from first floor to roof, or start from roof to first floor. The reason why you can reverse the order, because the object is not succeeding. But when you are observing an objective succession, you throw pen and it falls on the ground, you can't reverse the order of succession. So Kant takes there to be a sort of irreversibility in a rule governed sequence that involves necessity.

Irreversibility is not the only mark of necessity/objective succession. This determinant occurrence necessarily follows. We are getting a modal claim. According to which: if A is posited, then B inevitably and necessary follows. And the modal claim: gets us to the thought, there's some kind o firreversibility in what you're perceiving. Suppose you watch ship upstream then downstream. Ship upstream, then bird flies overhead. You could reverse the bird flying overhead, then see the ship upstream. Is reversible. But not true that ship upstream, there's always bird. Need this necessary connection between A and B, then B necessary follows. Points

to predictability. When we are thinking of a necessary connection between A and B, which is required for there to be an objective order: First, cannot reverse the sequence, and second: anytime A is posited, B necessary follows.

What kind of rule is this? Sometimes when Kant is thinking about the rule, he is treating it as a psychological rule. A and B perceptions. Objective rule, then A and B states of the object. But if you just treat it as a psychological rule, not clear it's enough. Kant will need this rule to be objective. Strawson: the bounds of sense, responsible for seriously rehabilitating Kant as a serious analytic philosopher in 20th century.

- (7) Category of causality (section 10, metaphysical deduction) Kant gives us an a priori deduction of the category of causality based on the hypothetical form of judgement (if A then B). Kant thinks that this gives rise to category of causality. Talking about this as category of causality. Logical content of category of causality. Premise 7, if you were to think of necessary rule-governed relation between A and B, you have to apply the category of causality, because that's the only way you could be thinking of a necessary connection. When you apply category of causality to this necessary sequence.. think of A as cause, B as effect. If A then B.
- (8)
- (9) Therefore, category of causality the condition the possibility of, experience that something is happening, is possible.
- (10) Run transcendental argument – Inference to reality. Category of causality condition of the possibility of objects of "experience that something is happening"
- (11) Therefore, objects of experience that something happens, alterations of objects, are only possible in accordance with the laws of causality.

Transcendental argument:

- (1) there is experience that something happens (1-3)
- (2) X is a condition of the possibility of experience that something happens (4-9)
- (3) Inference to reality – alterations/happenings, these objects are made possible by category of causality
- (4) Conclusion (12).

Remark 22.1. Kant is a transcendental idealist. Experience is in some sense mind-dependent. But remember, Kant makes a claim about empirical reality. Appearances are not just dreams or illusions. Appearances are empirically ruled, in the sense that they are publicly accessible and can converge on in some sort of way. They're not just mere figments of dreams – they are public spatiotemporal objects that we can converge in our judgements about. To say that experience is empirical cognition and to say it is objective, it is of these publicly empirically real publicly accessible objects.

23. 3/27/24: EXTERNAL WORLD, REFUTATION OF IDEALISM

Agenda for today:

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Let's step back and think a little about the nature of idealism. As we are thinking of idealism, we're really diving into issues of metaphysics. We spent a lot of time in epistemology – how do we cognize things, etc. – but now we are thinking of Kant's basic ontology.

Objects are in some sense, mind dependent. If you're not an idealist and hardcore realist, then you think objects are completely independent of the mind.

As we are working our way through Kant's thoughts, we can think of different types of idealism. Two types of idealism we could think about:

- Formal idealism. Kant endorses this. Form of objects depend on the mind, but not the existence of objects. If you go back to what we did in the transcendental deduction: representations do not cause the existence of objects, there's a different way representations are determinant of the objects, namely the form of the object. Transcendental aesthetic, we saw that in part, the spatiotemporal form of objects depend on the mind. Appearances depend on the mind. In the transcendental analytic, we also saw there is a categorical form of an object.. taking an object to be a subject, or to be a cause or effect. Those categorical forms also depend on the mind.
- In the refutation of idealism, Kant will contrast formal idealism with: material idealism. In material idealism, the existence of objects depend on the mind.

When Kant first published the First Critique, the criticisms against him were accusing him being a material idealist. But this is not what Kant meant – in the second edition of his First Critique, he tries to clarify that he endorses formal idealism and not material idealism. The refutation of idealism only occurred in the B edition, and not the A edition.

Let's take a closer look at what material idealism involves. Kant is really trying to reject the idealism that Descartes endorses. Kant distinguishes between two types of material idealism.

- Problematic material idealism per Descartes — Descartes doubts that the external world exists methodologically. Descartes' meditations on first philosophy. What Descartes does in the first meditation: imagine all your outer experience is fed to you by an evil demon. Descartes' second meditation: one thing I can never doubt, even if I doubt the external world exists, is that "I think." you're thinking, what if I'm getting tricked by the evil demon.. you will continue to be thinking. you can call the external world into doubt, but you cannot call into doubt yourself. "I think, therefore I am." There would be no way for thinking to go on if I didn't exist. Descartes in second meditation: this kind of inner experience that we have of ourselves thinking and existing. Descartes does actually think the external world exist, but to prove this, we must make inferences based on something that is indubitably true, namely existence of self.
- Dogmatic material idealism per Berkeley (pronounced Barkley) — metaphysical position: the external world doesn't exist. What exists is: ideas in the mind. Kant thinks though, that transcendental aesthetic disproves Berkeley. Kant argues objects in space, despite form depending on mind, are empirically real. Empirically real, transcendently ideal. Formally depend on our pure intuition of space, but nevertheless exists outside of.

What Kant described in the first analogy as empirical unity of time. There is one and only one time, in which everything in time occurs. And he thinks that that one and only one time, is what we converge on in the same sort of way. Empirically unified time, "objective time," that we all determine simultaneity and succession in accordance with. Berkeley is going to deny this. Rejects the idea that there is some empirically real one unified time. Berkeley think that this is just an imaginary projection of some idea.

Now Kant thinks that Descartes's idealism is problematic because... this inner experience depends on outer experience, i.e. experience of objects outside of us in space.

Theorem: The mere but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

Proof:

- I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. Glossing what inner experience is: as being conscious of my existence as determined in time. The "my" is appealing to our empirical self, as opposed to transcendental self. As with all experience, inner experience involves intuitions and concepts. Crucial part to having inner experience, is this time determination. Being able to determine whether the mental states you have are simultaneous or successive. Surely, inner experience is more than just figuring out whether our mental states are simultaneous or successive – of course, it does involve the content of our mental states for example .. but at its most fundamental state, inner experience involves determining simultaneity/succession of our inner representations. Figuring out the temporal relations between representation is a fundamental state of our inner representations.

In apperception, all of our representations are successive. but doesn't meant he objects are successive. Some sort of temporal flow. But that doesn't mean that the representations we are aware of as successive, were in fact successive. Similarly, representations we take to be simultaneous, might not be simultaneous after all. What does it mean to get the temporal order wrong in some sort of way?

In therapy: want cereal, feeling both anxious and indecisive. Therapist says: let's investigate this. Then you conclude: your anxiety is preceding your indecision. One thing that we can do: we can be mistaken of the order of our representations. You might think: your desire to help people is before your choice of action to do something nice. So you're positing first you're a better person. But then you might realize: you actually just manufacture good actions to make yourself better and say you're a good person.

- All time determination presupposes something persistent in perception.
- This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in mine, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Kant became unhappy with this, and gave a long explanation (once things typeset back then, easier to put things in the footnotes). The amended statement is: " But this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such they themselves need something

persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in time in which they change, can be determined.”

your representations are constantly in flux, they are not always persisting. so we need a different persisting stand-in. But you might say: Why isn't it the case we have some persisting inner intuition of ourselves? Couldn't there be a permanent inner intuition of our self. Empirical identity that remains constant all the time. Or think about: inner intuition is an imaginary intuition. What if you had an intuition of an imaginary friend. Bunny from Alice and Wonderland. Why couldn't you have an inner intuition of that bunny with you all the time. Is it so clear that there couldn't be a persisting inner intuition? Unclear. But Kant doesn't think so. Thus, the perception of this persistent thing, only possible through a thing outside of me, and not a thing inside of me. A different way to think of this thing outside of me: stuff outside of you, that causes you to have representations, read off the temporal order of the representations, to understand what caused you to have those representations. Simple example: I am thinking about idealism, and ten 20 minutes later you feel grumpy. The reason why you thought of idealism because you were reading first critique, so first critique was the outside object. The thing outside, when you are figuring out time order, it's the actual stuff causing you to have the representations.

Kant thinks we can only have inner experience, because there are things outside of us that cause representations and fix some order.

Some think that this is a very bad argument. Including Bertrand Russell.

- "thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and through the mere representation of a thing outside me"
- Conclusion: "consequently, the determination of my existence is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside of myself."

This is Kant's argument that the external world exists. Objects are only formally ideal. You can only "I think" if the external world exists. That is Kant's argument. Empirical reality of appearances, entails that they exist outside of us in space. And his argument in the refutation, is supposed to help us.

Survey what we have been up to for this past semester. Think back to the beginning of this class, where we raised Kant's question of metaphysics: is metaphysics as a science possible at all? Kant thinks that if metaphysics is possible, we need to make the Copernican revolution. We do not assume that all our cognition conforms to objects, but that objects conform to our cognition. At this point in the first critique, you are supposed to be convinced of this hypothesis: that metaphysics is possible, because we can make synthetic a priori judgements about the objects that conform to our cognition.

Recall there are two stems of cognition: sensibility (transcendental aesthetic) and understanding (transcendental analytic). We found in the transcendental aesthetic that there are a priori forms (pure intuitions of space and time) which are built into our mind that condition the possibility of objects of experience.

A priori forms of understanding that makes the objects of experience (empirical cognition) possible. Then in the analytic of concepts, which was about the objective validity of the categories. Then we went to the analytic of "principles," which

examined the synthetic a priori judgements which flowed from the categories being objectively valid – basic laws of nature.

The broad strategy has been the "transcendental argument." There is the uncontroversial premise, namely there is experience. And the a priori forms condition the possibility of objects of said experience.

Phenomena, transcendently ideal, but empirically real per the refutation of idealism. Objects that exist outside of us, that are transcendently dependent on our mind. The use of the understanding is restricted to empirical use (in relation to experience), and not in this transcendent way where we tried to transcend experience in some sense. We can cognize only phenomena, not noumena. But Kant admits that we have this urge to apply understanding to noumena. So the question is: why do we have this urge? Why do we try to overstep the boundaries of experience. Kant is going to argue that there is something about our reason itself, that pulls us in this transcendent direction.

So as we leave this island of truth, we go into the stormy seas and ask: what is it about our rational capacities that makes us want to make illegitimate claims?

24. SECTION NOTES 3/29/24

My section leader brought in a tree branch and a jar of candy and told us to take a piece of either if we'd like. Then she asked if we wanted to do a check in or an absurd question. We said absurd. So the question was "do you think Kant has ever met a black person." Her book is falling a part.

In the reformulation of the second edition, we see Kant juxtaposing substance and quantum, where quantum is to be thought of as matter. Substance is that which endures and persists through time. Quantum/matter neither increased or decreased – something about the inherent nature of it – fundamental building block of universe.

Nature is the sum of all appearances.

25. 4/1/24: THE ILLUSIONS OF REASON, KANT'S CRITIQUE OF RATIONALIST METAPHYSICS

- intro to the transcendental dialectic AKA the logic of illusion
- the capacity of reason – syllogisms and principles

We are moving to the transcendental dialectic AKA the logic of illusion, where here, Kant addresses and criticizes the rationalists' views on metaphysics.

We're going to spend a lot of time today on Kant's account of what reason itself is, and how it is the source of, in Kant's view, rationalist metaphysics.

To situate what we are doing in this portion of the first critique, we are working through Kant's account of the intellectual stem of cognition, which he sometimes refers to the "understanding in a general sense," in contrast to the sensible stem of the understanding. Kant will separate these two stems of the understanding.

The first is what we have been covering, namely the transcendental analytic – the logic of truth, where truth is thinking that corresponds to objects or objectively valid. In the transcendental deduction, we found the categories are objectively valid, and the system of principles we got an account of the synthetic a priori principles that govern having true thoughts. What we got is the cause and substance are true thoughts. True thoughts which deploy these concepts – substance and cause

– significant advance for empiricism. In these cases, cognition is restricted to phenomena (appearances). Kant is telling us that when we are thinking of the conditions in which we can have true thoughts, we must restrict cognition to phenomena that can be given to us through sensibility. Why? To have a true thought, is to have a thought of an object, the only way we can be given objects is through sensibility, so if you want to have a thought that contacts objects, you must have a thought that relates to what's given via sensibility.

Kant is thinking about the ontological claims of rationalist metaphysicists. When he says cognition is restricted to phenomena, it cannot extend to noumena. Kant distinguishes between two concepts of noumena. Kant is telling us, that when we are thinking of phenomena, of course we are thinking of objects that depend on our mind (relational objects), and he thinks that we can nevertheless think of these objects not insofar as they depend on our mind, but in of themselves and independent of our mind. So when we think of things in themselves, these objects have constitutions of themselves, they don't have this relation to us. So two concepts of noumena: negative and positive concept of things in themselves.

Negative concept of noumena: not objects of our sensible intuition. Objects of sensible intuition, then abstract our what remains when we think of the object as divorced from our mind, then what's left is an object whose constitution is a thing of itself. Spatio-temporal object, then abstract away the spatio-temporality of the object. This is a negative concept of a noumena, by thinking of objects that we have, and subtracting away the features which do not depend on our mind.

Positive concept of noumena: objects of non-sensible intuition. intellectual intuition. the kind of intuition that God has. God does not have sensibility, as it is receptive, God does not have the same receptive faculty that we have – so whatever intuition God has, it is not through sensibility. Noumena are what God intuit. Positive because you are just positing what can be received through divine intellect? Kant: certain humility we must have in our ontology. The only thing we can sense is spatiotemporal objects, but those objects which are spatiotemporal, they must have some non spatiotemporal features, that we could conceive them as things in themselves, but we cannot cognize those features. We can't know how they are independent of our minds other than they are independent of our minds. We have this tendency to overstep the limits of what we can cognize. Kant thinks that by positing this distinction, we can set the limits of our epistemic pretensions. In the transcendental dialectic, we are going to pursue the question: we have noumena, and particular concepts of noumena, and we'll get a logical conception of where they come from, and we'll ask whether they're objectively valid. Are they objective thoughts or empty thoughts?

This is the aim of the transcendental dialectic: the logic of illusion. If you go back to the first day of class, we talked about a branch of rationalist metaphysics – special metaphysics. There's three branches of specialist metaphysics.

- psychology (science of the soul)
- cosmology (science of world-whole)
- theology: (science of God)

These should be understood as sciences of particular noumena. These concepts are ultimately going to be objectively invalid. As we go through this critique of metaphysics, we'll eventually go back to Kant's transcendental idealism and we'll

want to think – how do these general concepts of noumena, write back to the noumena underlying (—??).

Remark 25.1. Transcendental idealism debates. One-world transcendental idealist, one set of objects with two different properties. Two world metaphysical idealist. phenomena and noumena are two worlds that stand in some relation to each other. Another way of thinking of transcendental idealism: epistemological doctrine. Deflationary, because if you have this reading, then you think that when Kant is talking about phenomena and noumena, he's not thinking of two metaphysical objects or two aspects of metaphysical objects, he's just making a claim of how we should think. One advantage of this epistemological reading, is Kant says things like "phenomena ground noumena, etc." so you can get Kant out of hot water by using this epistemological reading – "he's not saying.. he's just saying this is how we should think of things." Beginning in 2001, epistemological reading got really popular via the work of Henry Allison. The temperature of Kant scholarship has gone way towards the metaphysical direction. Now you can understand – why you might be pulled into the epistemological reading, but Kant does make metaphysical claims. -

Remark 25.2. The essence of things in themselves – you can only really say that they are things in themselves. They are not mind-dependent. That's all we are saying about things in themselves, which Kant says we can get to in a legitimate way.

The core claim of the transcendental dialectic is this: the metaphysical ideas of the soul, world-whole, and God have their source in reason itself. Kant will argue that there is an illusion that is a priori built into reason, and we will be able to recognize this illusion in our selves.

The basic notion of an illusion: mistaking something subjective for something objective. Kant alludes to things like, optical illusion. Optical illusion: something subjective, namely how something looks to me. Something objective: what actually is. Straight stick and submerge it in water. The stick will look wavy to you. but the stick is not wavy, it is straight. So you fall prey to an optical illusion. There is a species of illusion, which Kant calls, transcendental illusions. We'll rationally think of certain principles and ideals with respect to God, Soul, world-whole... they are subjective, but we fall prey to the illusion that they are objectively valid. This subjective stuff is actually empty. We have reason, things fundamentally built into reason, and these are subjectively necessary, because they are of the constitution of reason to have these principles and concepts built in – so it is necessary that we have the ideas of God, Soul, World. And we fall prey when we mistake these subjective things for objective things. Kant thinks that because they are a priori principles.. you cannot ever get rid of this transcendental illusion. Because it is a priori built into reason itself.

Now we dive into Kant's account of what reason is. Faculty of inference. Page 387 of dialectic: on reason in general. Kant is trying to think: what is distinctive about this intellectual capacity. Reason as the faculty of drawing mediate inferences, as opposed to immediate. Mediate references, aligned with traditional aristotelian logic, in terms of syllogisms. You arrive to a conclusion on the basis of two premises, mediated by a second argument. Syllogism, pattern of inference goes from a major

premise, rule, universal proposition. Minor premise: case of the rule. Conclusion: consequence that follows. So example:

Example 25.3. Major premise: all humans are mortal. Minor premise: all scholars are human. Conclusion: all scholars are mortal.

When thinking of reason in the context of principles: start with first principles, only once we have those fixed, reason then flows. But reason also establishes those first principles from which things follow. Principles should be thought of as universal propositions: All A are B. You are not going to have a syllogism if you don't have a major premise which will be a principle. That's a way they fit together. Principles of reason have their source in reason alone. If we have something like, in all change of appearance, substance persists. Not a principle of reason, because it doesn't have its source in reason alone. There are these special principles which only have their source in reason. Kant is going to tell us that, our syllogistic reasoning processes, can actually proceed in two different directions. Syllogism, can proceed by way of episyllogism or prosyllogism.

Episyllogism: inferring to further consequences from the conclusion. This is where we work our way from a major to minor premise to conclusion, and we work out what further conclusion follows. What's entailed by: all scholars are mortal. So through an episyllogism: alright, all scholars are mortals. And all mortals decay. Therefore, scholars will decay. So episyllogisms, you are just teasing our further consequences of what follows.

Prosyllogism: Looking for the grounds/conditions of a major premise. Why is it the case that all humans are mortal? What are the grounds/claims for the major premise to be true. You might say: all animals are mortal, and all humans are animals, therefore all humans are mortal.

These two models of inferences Kant takes to demonstrate the main ways we use reason to make inferences. Kant will say: it is a part of reason that we always want to make prosyllogism. This move in reason, is in accordance with a certain logical maxim (norm that guides our prosyllogistic reasoning). The fundamental logical maxim that governs reason in its prosyllogism. Page 392 top paragraph: the problem of reason is to seek the unconditioned for the conditioned. The unconditioned would be some fundamental ground of explanation which has no other explanation. BUt in our logical inferential activity, we are compelled to seek this unconditioned.

Remark 25.4. Kant's practical reason? Categorical imperative?

26. 4/3/24: THE IDEAS OF REASON, SOUL WORLD-WHOLE, GOD

- Reason as a capacity
- Ideas of reason. Origin question and objective validity question.

Kant thinks the idea of God, soul, and world-whole in nothing empirical but in the nature of reason itself. What we started thinking about, was on Monday: how is Kant thinking about the capacity of reason, which is the intellectual source for these ideas. We think of reason as the faculty of mediate inference, i.e. by way of syllogistic reasoning. Kant claims that reason is also the faculty of principles.

A major premise in a syllogism is a principle. On Kant's view, this syllogistic reasoning that we can engage in, can proceed in two different ways. Episyllogism, and prosyllogism. Episyllogistic reasoning, working our way in a descending order

to further consequences. Alternatively, prosyllogistically is what are the grounds for the major premise. Prosyllogism: what conditions our conditions.

Kant thinks that when we proceed prosyllogistically, we are governed by a kind of logical maxim, which is to seek the unconditioned for every condition. The unconditioned is a condition that has no further condition. Reason wants to get to a fundamental explainer which has no further explanation and is the fundamental explanation. We are always trying to think more deeply about the why.

Through our understanding, you have all these judgements and cognitions. Reason is directed towards those judgements and cognitions, telling you to seek those grounds for why those cognitions hold in some sort of way. Page 389.

Understanding: oriented towards objects. Reason, what is the grounds of our cognitions? As you ascend higher and higher in prosyllogistic reasoning, you can attain more unity in your cognitions of the understanding. Okham's razor: if you have two explanations which seem both viable, but one is more simple, you should prefer the simple explanation over the complex explanation. Because reason wants us to unify our cognitions into the simplest way. You will have a more unified system. System – parts depend on whole, whole depends on part. As opposed to aggregate, just a bunch of stuff. One thing that reason does: demand that we organize all of our cognitions into a system. So we see why all the parts are the way they are, see their interrelations, interdependencies, hierarchies, etc.

Kant thinks that what gets us into trouble with rational metaphysics is that we posit an ontological principle (which Kant also calls a transcendental principle) according to which.. when the conditioned is given the unconditioned is also given.

What is the nature of illusion? Mistaking something subjective for something objective.

It is the case that this logical maxim is built into reason. But is this objectively valid? Are there unconditioned objects that correspond to this maxim? In the transcendental dialectic, Kant argues there are no unconditioned objects which corresponds to this logical maxim.

Gravity vs. Soul. Gravity is conditioned by the world-whole in some sort of way. But the world-whole, is something which has no further conditions. So reason demands that you don't stop. And the thought is that the fundamental why is something you can never experience, it's just postulated by reason. So God, Soul, world-whole are fundamental whys that reason arrives at.

Logical structure of reason gives rise to pure concepts of reason, which Kant labels as ideas. Where do these ideas come from? (Logical structure of reason). Are these ideas objectively valid? (No).

Kant's origin of his conception of ideas is Plato's theories of ideas. Nobody agrees with Plato's theory of what ideas are. But anyway, a starting point. Platonic forms. On Plato's view. For anything in space and time is a kind of copy of an idea or a form. In Plato's view, these ideas/forms are perfect. Every instance is imperfect. Plato's theory of ideas, the ideas can't be borrowed from the senses – they don't have an empirical origin. they are not empirically derived. They are normative measures to assess what we experience. Nothing we encounter in what we experience, can be congruent with them. No particular can perfectly instantiate.

We should reject metaphysical status. Kant is going to locate ideas as concepts of the human mind. Other than internal in the human mind in some sort of way. Kant introduces the *stufenleiter* in the context of trying to unpack what an idea is.

Bottom of 398: the different kind of representations that we can have in our mind. Representations with consciousness and without consciousness. With consciousness, some refer to subject and some refer to object. Latter is cognitions. Two types of cognitions. Concept made up of notions – is an idea, concept of reason. Ideas are really just type of representation in the mind, pure concept of reason, which goes beyond the possibility of experience. Kant: ideas are supersensible, transcend limits of experience, that's what definitional of ideas. In contrast to pure concepts of understanding. Categories are also pure concepts, but concepts of understanding give us objects of experience so don't transcend spatiotemporal world.

Origin question: what is the source? Pure not empirical. The pure source is reason, specifically in the logical forms of syllogism. 399: Kant gives equivalence of metaphysical deduction of categories, for ideas. The transcendental analytic gave us an example of how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure concepts... the form of judgements transformed into the synthesis of ... now he says: in the same way, we can expect that the forms of the syllogisms, if applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the authority of categories, will contain the origins a priori for.. transcendental ideas...

Let to an unconditioned subject. Fundamental subject which could not be the predicate for anything else. For a hypothetical syllogism, if P then Q, think of P as some kind of presupposition / antecedent. So if you were looking some unconditioned thing from which all presuppositions flow, you're going to look for a presupposition that has no further conditions. Fundamental assumption from which all things flow. So you're going to get to an unconditioned presupposition, a first principle. Kant will often describe members of a syllogism as members of a series. Dependence relations between them. Virtue of being connected through all these dependence relations, there is a series of dependencies. Disjunctive syllogism, in exclusive terms. If something is not M, then something must be N.

Categorical syllogism: unconditional subject – soul. Hypothetical syllogism: unconditioned presupposition – world-whole. Disjunctive syllogism: unconditional system – God.

We derive the pure concepts of reason from the logical forms of syllogism, by translating the major premise into an unconditioned thing that would be the explainer of all major premises.

Kant is going to try to convince you that we should be thinking of the unconditioned subject, presupposition, and system to be soul, world-whole, and God. The way Kant tries to motivate it: when we are thinking of a pure concept of reason, we are thinking of it as a something that gives unity to judgements of the understanding. Gives unity to the cognitions of the understanding. if we are thinking of different types of cognitions of understanding that we could have, there are basically then 3 types of the understanding that we could have.

Judgements about the subject. Judgements about objects que appearances. Judgements about objects of thinking in general. Somehow we are going to use these notions of the unconditioned to be seeking some fundamental explanation for all of our judgements about subjects, about objects que appearances, and about objects of thinking in general.

Three types of judgements:

- about the subject. soul is the thinking subject that gives unity to all of our judgements in this domain. metaphysics of psychology.
- about objects qua appearances. world whole unconditioned unity that explains all appearances. metaphysics cosmology.
- about objects of thinking in general. god is unconditioned unity that explains all objects in general. metaphysics theology.

why world-whole gets hyphenated here. We are trying to think of the sum totality of all of nature. All objects of space and time that have ever been and shall be. Everything that is nature, in the past, future, present.. that is the world-whole. In metaphysics, we are not just investigating the world internal to our experience, we are trying to investigate the sum totality of nature. Antinomies – see that we say things if it is finite or infinite. If everything are composite or simple. This is cosmology.

When it comes to God, Kant is thinking about God in some sense as the seat of all possible predicates. A predicate is a possible way in which objects can be. Objects can be mammals or not mammals. Objects can be scholars or not scholars. God has all possible predicates in "it." We'll have to flesh this out more later. But basically, God is the seed of all possible predicates.

27. 4/8/24: THE ILLUSIONS OF THE SOUL – THE PARALOGISMS

we've moved from the logic of truth to the logic of illusion. where pure reason alone tricks us, invites us to succumb to certain illusions.

Again, we are looking at the God, Soul, world-whole.. and addressing the origin question and the objective validity question.

What we started doing on Wednesday was the origin of the ideas of reason in the logical activity of reason. Reason is the faculty for inference, and for mediate inference, which is reasoning by way of syllogistic activities.

Categorical syllogisms (All As are Bs), hypothetical syllogisms (If P, then Q), and disjunctive syllogisms (L is either M or N).

Kant thinks there is a logical maxim which tells us to seek the unconditioned for everything conditioned. When you are engaged in prosyllogistic thinking, you take your major premise as a conclusion of a syllogism, and look for the basis of that conclusion. Logic demands of us to seek that unconditioned thing from which all other conclusions follow.

Ontological principle: when the conditioned is given the unconditional is also given. Kant says we just take this logical maxim into an ontological being. The logical maxim is subjective, and the ontological principle is objective. Therefore, Kant argues this logical maxim – the ontological principle is an illusion, because we are mistaking something subjective for something objective. The ontological principle is the God, Soul, World-whole.

When we are thinking of an unconditioned thing in the categorical syllogism, we get an unconditioned subject — soul. Hypothetical domain, we seek an unconditioned presupposition – World-whole. Unconditioned thing in disjunctive syllogisms, looking for unconditioned system of all possible predicates, sum totality of predicates, in relation to which all objects would be determined – God. Kant will argue that there is a primacy of the unconditioned thing in the disjunctive realm. You can decide whether something is a subject or a presupposition. So the unconditioned things of categorical and hypothetical realm in some way depend on

unconditioned thing in disjunctive realm, which is this unconditioned system of all possible predicates.

How to make this transition from logical forms of syllogisms to ideas of reason, the intermediate step is: domain of judgements in which this syllogistic-form (logical form) is non-optional / required.

the domain of judgements in which the categorical syllogisms are required is: judgements about thinking subjects.

For hypothetical syllogisms, it is judgements about appearances (spatiotemporal objects conditioned in all sorts of ways). Appearances are causally conditioned. All appearances are spatially and temporally conditioned. Occupying a place in space – all places in space are conditioned by the whole that is space.

Disjunctive syllogisms, it is judgements of thinking in general. Broader domain than domain of judgements about appearances. When we are thinking of objects in general, we are thinking of something like a disjunctive syllogism.

Something necessary about hypothetical judgements about appearances because appearances are conditioned / always have presupposition. Something necessary about, when thinking of all possible predicates, we must engage in this disjunctive syllogism.

Every real object is determined with respect to all possible predicates. (Book is blue or not blue? It is blue. Book is a hard book or not a hard book? Hard book. Book is about philosophy? Yes it is about philosophy). Summative judgement about what this thing is. So Kant posits God as the *ens realissimum* (the most real being) – ground of all possible positive predicates. Every object in reality is going to be determined by all the concepts in God's mind. This is all in the ideal of pure reason, but we're not going to cover this section.

Pure concept of God, regardless of whatever culture you're in... cross-culturally we share some fundamental conception of God... and it is that fundamental shared conception of God.. Kant would argue is the God we are talking about here.

Objective validity – are the ideas of reason objectively valid or empty? We'll find that God, Soul, World-whole are empty. This notion of God is a logical construct.. it is an empty concept. God Soul World-whole, defined as these unconditioned things, are things in themselves that outstrip any experience that we have.

We are now moving towards the beginning of the paralogisms (a logical paralogism is a logical fallacy). Here we are discussing objective validity of the soul, the unconditioned subject we arrive at by applying our logical maxim of reason to seek an unconditioned thing in the domain of categorical syllogisms. We engage in logical fallacies all the time. The I think is the basis on which rational psychology.. the I think is pure .. when we are thinking of what the status of this "I think" is, it is really difficult to pin down what kind of representations/mental states this I think refers to. If you go to page 411, second paragraph "come to a concept..." The "I think" is a pure concept/judgement/vehicle for all concepts. The I think is very slippery. But Kant, like the rationalists, thinks we have some kind of grip on "I think." And Kant is going to argue that the main problem for the rationalists is that the "I think" is really a subjective condition of thought. Kant thinks that the Rationalist metaphysicists draw faculty inferences, from these subjective condition of thought to objective claims about the soul.

For example, on page 413. The soul is substance, Descartes thinks soul is substance, and the soul is simple (cannot be decomposed). Third, the rationalist

psychologists will say the soul is numerically identical – has personality(?). Finally, the soul can exist apart from the body. During our lifetime, conjoined with our body.. after we are dead, our soul can exist while our body has perished... Bread and butter, ontological claims about Soul that you get from rationalists. Various properties that get attached to the soul on the basis of these thoughts. Kant will argue that all of these objectively empty.

If we go to page 445 – subjective starting point of parallogism, subjective starting point – I think (transcendent apperception). When we are thinking of the I in transcendental apperception, wholly empty representation. The concept book is not an empty representation because whatever the I is... the I is wholly empty. He describes it as a mere consciousness, that attaches to all of our concepts and all of our judgements. The I think does not refer to some object. The I just brings consciousness to the judgement. That's why, the "I" or the "he" or the "it" the thing which thinks, because all that is contained in the notion of this "I" in its subjective conditions of thinking, some sort of transcendental subject = X. Take all the thoughts you're having, you think all those thoughts.. but it's not that the I is tracking some sort of object. The "I" is just making those judgements conscious in some way.

The basic claim is that, there are a set of logical features.. legitimately attribute to this I. Logical features of this I. we are going to hypothesize, this logical features of this I to ontological features of the soul. Bottom of 445. now in every judgement, I am always the determining subject of that relation which constitutes the judgement, however, that the I that I think, can always be considered as subject, and is something that does not depend on thinking.. must be valid.. this is an apodictic, identical proposition.. but it does not signify I as object, am for myself am a self subsisting object.... so Kant is saying we need to logically think of the I as a subject, not as a predicate. This is just how, according to Kant, we are built to think. Logical feature of the status of I. What we do is translate the logical claim.. I is a substance. Thinking substance. When we are talking about substance here.. ontological claims... the latter goes very far.. and hence demands data, that is not all encountered. Not merely what thinks as such. in order to assert this claim, we would need some data on which this claim could be grounded. but thinking alone, and thinking about the "I think" alone is not going to give us the relevant data. So what's happening here, is Kant is drawing a distinction between thinking and cognizing. On Kant's view, in order to think.. combining concepts together in a non-contradictory way. In order to cognize, you need intuitions and concepts together. So thinking is judging through concepts. Cognizing, you need to intuit objects. Kant's thought is that: while we have good grounds for thinking of the "I think" as a subject not a predicate, but if we were to cognize the "I" as a substance, we would need to be given the "I" as a thinking subject by some substance.. but it is beyond the spatiotemporal world, it is noumena.. so we cannot intuit something about "I."

The fact that you think, gives this wholly empty representation. but you're not yet cognizing. Rather, you can cognize any object only by determining a given intuition with regard to the unity of consciousness, of which all thinking consists. So if you want to cognize, you can't just think.. you have to be given this object in intuition. Thus, I can cognize myself,... only way to cognize yourself, is if you have an intuition of yourself. what's the self you can intuit? It's yourself as an

empirical subject. But this soul, is noumenon that transcends phenomena in some sort of way. Only way to legitimately cognize "I think" as thinking substance, is if you could intuit it, but by definition, out of bounds. SO all we can do with "I think," is think about it, and come up with these analytic judgements, reflects logical features about "I think," but we could never make these ontological claims about "I think" because we could not intuit.

We maintain that the "I" is a subject, not a predicate. Not substance. Logically simple subject. The "I" is distinguished, from other things.

Examples of logical features and the corresponding false ontological claims of "I": subject, not predicate. (false ontological claim: I is substance), as a logically simple subject $\neg i$ (false ontological claim: simple substance), I is identical $\neg i$ (false ontological claim: personality), I is distinguished from other things $\neg i$ (false ontological claim: immortality).

28. 4/10/24: THE REAL STUMBLING BLOCK FOR PHILOSOPHY, THE THIRD ANTINOMY: KANT ON FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

Agenda.

- The paralogisms
- The antinomies. The 4 cosmological ideas. The fallacious inferences.
- The 3rd antinomy – freedom and necessity.

Kant is thinking about the relationship between freedom and necessity. His thought is that everything in nature is causally determined. Whether that still leaves room for freedom – important in his practical philosophy, where he wants to argue we have some free will – is up for debate.

But first, let's wrap up our conversation about the soul from last time. When we think of rational psychology – some theory of soul, immaterial, immortal, separable from body in some way – rational psychologists make an illicit move from legitimate logical claims to illegitimate logical claims.

Let's go back to the transcendental deduction from many weeks ago. Page 246. "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations, otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all." All manifold of intuition must be accompanied by an "I think." Pure apperception.

So in the paralogisms when Kant is making a set of logical claims, he is really telegraphing the aforementioned "I think." The I think is a subject, not a predicate. This makes sense, because when we think of "I think" of apperception, it is the subject of the vehicle of ... The illicit move is to think of the "I think" as the thinking substance.

Subject vs. substance. Subject occupies a functional role in a judgement. S is P. The S is the subject. when we are talking about substance, we are no longer talking about something that merely has a logical function. It is a kind of object that we've read about in the first analogy. IN rational metaphysics, we are sliding from this okay logical claim about "I think" is subject, to this ontological claim that the "I think" is referring to some distinctive kind of substance, which Descartes calls a "thinking substance."

The next legitimate logical claim is that the "I think" refers to a logically simple subject. The metaphysical slide is that the I refers to a simple substance, an indecomposable thing.

The next legitimate logical claim is that the subject of the I think remains the same. The metaphysical slide is that it has some kind of personality, that it will continue in some sort of way after our body dies. A personal identity that is with us when we are alive, and persists after we die.

The last legitimate logical claim: thinking of the subject as distinct from other things. The metaphysical slide is to think that the "I" is a thinking substance, that is in some sense separable from bodies in some sort of way. Separable from this entire natural world altogether.

This is the basic territory that we were at last time. Kant believes that the general fallacious argument that all of these metaphysical slides make is the following:

- (1) What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject doesn't exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. (This just follows from what Kant already talked about. Logical notion of subject into object, what kind of object could it be, the only thing is substance. That's how we derived category of substance from the logical function of judgement in that context.)
- (2) A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.
- (3) Therefore, it also exists only as substance.

Bottom of page 447. BTW This "I" is the universal transcendental subject that we all share in common.

All As are Bs. The A is "What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject," the B is "substance."

C is an A. The C is "A thinking being, considered merely as such," and your A is "thought otherwise than as subject"...

Therefore, C is a B. C is "it" and B is "substance. The fallacy is equivocating the As, when there are different meanings. Equivocating of A premises. For example, "All banks are by a River. All United States banks are banks. Therefore, all US banks are by rivers."

A kind of object that we can cognize as a substance. It can't exist otherwise than as a subject. We are thinking of this book as a substance. Thinking of it as a subject, to which various predicates adhere. Blueness is a predicate of the book. In premise 1, objects of cognition. But in premise 2, we are thinking about a different kind of object.

In P1: the A object is an object of cognition. Given to us in intuition. But in P2: the object is an object of thought.

Imagine a pink bunny. And you give the pink bunny a name, like Fred. So, we could then make all of these judgements about Fred. But that doesn't make Fred a substance. Fred is just a logical subject. So we see, just because the "I" has a logical function, doesn't mean we can conclude it is a subject. Kant believes that this fallacy is underlying all of these basic metaphysical slides.

Remark 28.1. Kant claims that he is thinking of "I think" as just this logical thing. But when he talks about apperception.. he talks about synthetic activity to the "I think." Thinking of "I think" as spontaneous. What does it mean for a merely logical function to be able to engage in synthetic activity and it is spontaneous. So is Kant remaining true to what he is claiming here?

We can't perceive noumena, but we can perceive phenomena. Then what in the phenomenon realm can we perceive? Can we perceive forms of intuition like space and time, or can we also perceive objects that are in space and time. And what you got in the first analogy, is that you can't perceive the form of time. Could you perceive the form of space, form of space is an a priori structure of your mind, that makes perception possible. It's a kind of transcendental condition, rather than an object of perception. That's why we can't be thinking of any form of intuition as a relevant stand in. Because they are enabling perceptions, not objects of perception. That's a different line of argument for why we can't treat the thinking substance i.e. soul, as object of perception, because soul is noumena.

You can't perceive thinking substance. Rational metaphysicians are defining it as something outside of space and time. If it weren't, it wouldn't be indestructible, immortal, separable from body. So rational psychologists are on the hook for thinking of thinking substance that exists outside of framework of space and time, and that's why we cannot perceive it.

This was Kant's first major attack on rationalist metaphysicians. The next major stretch of Kant's critique of rationalist metaphysics is contained in the antinomies.

When it comes to this idea of the world-whole. We are thinking of this whole world, that conditions all appearances. When we talked about appearances, they are all conditioned spatially and temporally. We can also talk about ways in which appearances are materially conditioned. How are all appearances causally conditioned. What is the causal series.. finally, contingency conditions: Kant thinks: way in which everything exists, could it be otherwise?

The world-whole is an unconditioned object, that grounds all of these causal series. When we try to establish the spatially/temporally, materially, causally, contingency conditions of world-whole.. reason gets caught in itself. We can convince ourselves to think two wildly ... get caught in these antinomies, these conflicts, in how we establish the world-whole.

In the paralogisms, there was one way of thinking of the soul. In world-whole, there's two ways to think that gets us into conflicts – i.e. antinomies.

Thesis – i.e. rationalist. Antithesis – i.e. empiricist. What is the spatiotemporal structure of the world-whole. It could be finite, or infinite. Those are the only two possibilities for the world-whole, finite or infinite.

Thesis: world-whole is finite in space and time. And the antithesis is: world-whole is infinite.

- Thesis: rationalists
 - (1) World-whole is finite in space and time.
- Antithesis: empiricists.
 - (1) World-whole is infinite in space and time.

Suppose to accept assumptions of both side. Follow, then get absurd conclusion, and must accept other side.

The Key points Kant makes in reference to these contradictions: 2 moves to ward off the illusion. One move we'll work through is, Kant will point out the common fallacious inferences. Very lengthy discussion of transcendental idealism. When we work through these conflicts of reason. We have a further proof of transcendental idealism. The only way out of these conflicts is to recognize that there is distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

Premise 1: if the condition is given. Then the whole series of all conditions for it is given.

Premise 2: objects of the senses, i.e. appearances, are given as conditioned.

Conclusion: therefore, the whole series of all objects of the senses is given.

Spatiotemporal series, causal series, we're going to specify the relevant series. but in each of these cases, we are thinking of some whole series that is conditioning....(?)

Couple things that is going wrong in his argument. When we are thinking of premise 1, it's something we've encountered before. Kant thinks premise 1 is true, when we think of it as a logical maxim of reason. Prosyllogistic direction reason goes, guided logically by this maxim to seek the fundamental why. So at the bottom of 514. What happens is that... we make this illusory slide, in treating P1 as an ontological principle. Instead of resting.. logical problem. We metaphysically posit the unconditioned as an object that makes everything possible. So when we think of what's going on in the antinomies. What the rationalists are doing, well, we should investigate world as far as we can.. rationalists say: the world whole is this unconditioned object that is given to us as finite in space and time in some sort of way. So what gets the antinomy off the ground is making ontological assertions about the world whole, when all we are licensed in making, is the unconditioned or the world whole as a problem that should shape physics, drive us to investigate the nature of space and time and the material decomposition of the world, so we should be logically oriented by world whole, but the antinomies gets sucked into positing it as an object not as a problem. Makes it a transcendental rather than empirical problem.

515. Further, if the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves. Then when the first is given not only is the regress to second given as problem, but the latter is really given along with it. holds for all members of series.. complete series.. something simultaneous given. Synthesis of the conditioned with its conditions, is synthesis of mere understanding, representing things as they are, not paying attention to how we might get acquainted. in dealing with appearances, as mere appearances, are not given at all if we do not achieve acquaintance with them, then I cannot say with the same meaning that if the condition is given, then all the conditions as appearances are also given. and hence, and by no means, can infer the absolute totality of the series of these conditions.

so one thing Kant is trying to get us to note here, is that when thinking of what's conditioned in premise 1 and premise 2, there's another equivocation that's happening. rationalists or empiricist, when they are thinking about the conditioned and the conditions, they are really thinking of them in terms of things in themselves. The kind of ontology everyone is working with, only acknowledges things in themselves. But Kant is arguing what objects of senses are as conditioned things, what we learn is that these are appearances, and not things in themselves. And so what's happening in this argument, is that in premise 1, premise 2 talking about appearances, premise 3 deriving conclusions about appearances, equivocating objects that are spoken of in premise 1 and premise 2. To resolve antinomies, Kant thinks: only object we can be given in experience are appearances and not things in themselves. when thinking of first and second antinomy, world whole infinite or finite, or built up in simples or further decomposable.. what you are doing is that you could be given the world whole as a thing in itself, and you could predicate finitude or simplicity to it. But you can never be given the world whole... we are only given these

appearances. So we are never able to step outside world of appearances, what we are successively given. we cannot have an experience of whole world of appearances. can't have totalizing view. first and second antinomies.. cannot say world whole is finite or infinite. made up of simple or composites. we know there is this distinction between things in themselves.

In third antinomy: Thesis: there is freedom. Antithesis: no freedom. Everything is necessarily causally determined. Then, he brings up transcendental idealism, both the thesis and antithesis can be true, if we recognize that freedom is something that can govern things in themselves, whereas natural necessity governs appearances. What does it mean to think of things in themselves as having freedom? Motivate by thinking of our consciousness. This will be in the resolution. Big picture for next week: transcendental idealism, instead of undermining antinomies, actually reconciles the thesis and antithesis. once you have this ontological distinction, there could be two orders of causality that is governing these dimensions in some way.

29. 4/15/24: THE FINAL AIM OF REASON, THE REGULATIVE USE OF IDEAS

- (1) 3rd antinomy: freedom versus necessity
- (2) The objective validity question, ideas of reason
- (3) regulative vs. constitutive principles
- (4) The final aim of pure reason

We've been working through the idea of the world-whole. Kant's account of the soul, legitimate things we can say about soul... illegitimate things rational metaphysicians say... then Kant's critique of the branch of metaphysics called cosmology. Investigating the world as a whole.

The first antinomy, world needs to be finite or infinite. Second antinomy, world needs to be made up of simples, or decomposable into further parts. Third antinomy: world governed by natural necessity or no free will? fourth one which we will not read, something something.

World-whole -> when we try to wrap our mind around the world as a whole, we get to contradictions. Actually, the world is finite. Actually, the world is further decomposable. Governed by natural necessities. Contradictions, that are built into reason.

Remark 29.1. Hegel: reason starts with a thesis, then comes up with antithesis, then looks for some higher point of view so that it can synthesize both. This Hegel's view of reason is inspired of Kant's account of reason.

Hegel goes in for this strong absolute idealism as this way to reconcile everything. Kant is more humble compared to Hegel. Kant tries to reconcile these antinomies through transcendental idealism. You are going to be consistently caught up in these contradictory views of the world, unless you recognize the ontological distinction between appearances versus things in themselves. Could never look at world as a whole. It is a thing in itself, beyond spatiotemporal world.

Thesis: rationalist, antithesis: empiricist.

Thesis: there is freedom. Kant's definition of freedom: an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself. Practical freedom = freedom of will. A more pithy way of saying practical freedom is: self-determination. You are making a choice to

act in a certain way, that is not determined by anything outside of the core of yourself. When you engage in acts of self-determination, you are free from determination by sensible impulse or inclinations.

The antithesis: there is no freedom, everything happens in accordance with the laws of nature. Determinism. 2nd analogy. 2nd analogy: all appearances are governed by laws of nature. If freedom is possible, in some sense, it should fit with this prior account of determinism. Standing up in chair. Spatiotemporal event. Must be governed by prior causes. Is standing up determined in accordance with freedom? Does freedom ground that action or event in some sort of way, or not? That's what we're trying to figure out. We're never going to deny that there is determinism in the spatiotemporal world. For if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved. If appearances equal things in themselves, then there is no freedom. But if you buy into transcendental idealism, then appearances are distinct from things in themselves... then freedom is at least possible.

It is possible to reconcile freedom and natural necessity. The logical possibility that they can coexist. Only much later in the groundwork, (third section of groundwork to metaphysics of morals), does he actually try to prove.

Remark 29.2. Kant wants to prove that freedom is a practical stance. In the first critique, Kant is only setting up for the possibility of coexistence.

Can you think about a subject which is at once sensible, belongs to this world, and intellectual, such that on the basis of reasons, make choices which affect this world? Then you are thinking of the consistency between freedom and natural necessity.

Subject *S* is spatiotemporal, its sensible character. But *S* also has an intelligible character, makes choices which affects the world.

Moral law/categorical imperative: respect other persons as ends and never use them just as means.

Freedom for Kant is not do whatever you want... it is determining yourself in accordance with the law that you give to yourself. You are only free if you are determining yourself in accordance with law that you give to yourself... for example: determining yourself in accordance with respecting others as ends and not using them as means.

Objective validity question: ideas of reason are empty; don't refer. Quasi-transcendental deduction of ideas. Ideas of soul, God, world-whole – they regulate our efforts to understand ourselves and scientific endeavors. So we are supposed to hold onto ideas of reason, as symbols of what we are supposed to aspire to.

30. 4/17/24: WRAPPING UP TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC, KANT'S RACISM

Wrapping up transcendental dialectic, final aim of pure reason. Even though ideas of God, soul, world-whole are empty, they are necessary in our intellectual pursuits because they guide us in bringing systematic unity to our cognitions.

Then we will switch gears to Kant's racism.

Anton Amo – first African to earn a PHD in philosophy at European university. In his dissertation, he denies that humans have sensibility as a crucial part of our human soul. In a move aligned with Descartes, etc., any receptivity is related to

our bodies, not related to our minds or our soul. Defends a spontaneous account of the human mind. In the rationalist milieu, Kant will argue against this.

We've been working through pure reason – ideas. We've been dealing with two questions about the ideas of reason. The first is the origin question. They have a pure source. A priori source in reason itself, reason searching for that unconditioned explanation of why everything is the way that it is. The second question is the objective validity question. Strictly speaking, these ideas are empty. But in a loose sense, Kant believes they do have quasi or loose sense of objective validity. This is because we should not discard them – they have a productive role in experience.

Page 605. The middle paragraph of 605. In the transcendental deduction of the categories, when it comes to concepts like substance, cause, etc., we know they are objectively valid because they condition the possibility of experience, and by extension condition objects of experience. In the first and second analogies, we saw what flows from these categories – what is constitutive of objects of experience. There are certain concepts and certain principles, that make objects of experience possible in the first place. What exactly is this constitution relation? It's not that categories make their existence possible, but makes the form of objects of experience possible. Here is Kant is telling us that there is some kind of transcendental deduction that we get of ideas of reason, that has to be different from this transcendental deduction. The quasi objective validity of the ideas of reason – "regulative of experience." Distinction between what is constitutive of objects of experience, and what is regulative of experience.

Reason relates to the understanding and its cognitions. Reason directs true understanding towards a goal: systematic unity. Precisely determine the final aim of the ideas of pure reason. All the different judgements you could make about your body. Understanding can make all of these one off judgements. Reason directs us to having some systematic understanding of your entire bodily system and how the parts relate to each other. This is the unity that reason is orienting our understanding towards.

The idea of soul is guiding us towards unity of inner experience. You can posit the soul as if it was the source or ground of those inner states. The language as if: not actually saying we have a soul. But in a metaphorical way, it is as if we had a soul, that gives unity.

The idea of world-whole is guiding us towards nature. The multiplicity of natural phenomenon, posit the world-whole as if it is the ground for these natural phenomena. Indulge in as if thinking. The world-whole puts this regulative role in that it guides us to seek this theory of everything.

The idea of God is guiding us towards unity of all phenomena. Posit God as the ground of all inner and natural phenomena. Again – it is "as if." Can treat reason as a kind of "schema," analogy, schematic, orienting you in your scientific explanation.

Kant is making this necessary as if thinking that is built in. Objectively empty strictly speaking, we relate to them as having this necessary regulative use. Necessary as if in that we are engaging in.

Elements of human cognition: intuitions (sensibility), concepts (understanding), ideas (reason). They have proper use only in relation to possible experience and .. what are the elements of all human cognition. The use that these capacities have for us. Implicit in everything we have been working through in Kant's first

critique, is an account of the human being.. of the cognitive capacities that the human being has. In the third critique.. aesthetic capacities. Core values of enlightenment project. Value of humanity. Humanity is basis of our dignity. Humanist commitments in Kant's philosophy ... but makes also racist claims? What's going on.

Attribute a certain natural disposition to different races, and align various moral and intellectual characteristics, in a very white supremacist way.. white races have superior intellectual capacities. One of Kant's moral commitments: human beings should never be used merely as means. But respected as ends in themselves. Look at Kant's middle period moral writing.

3 basic strategies for dealing with Kant's racism.

- (1) bracketing strategy: doesn't actually bear on the core of that person's philosophical project. what we care about is not the man, but the ideas. the ideas are not influenced by the racism. we can acknowledge the racism, and bracket it as the ideas at hand. doesn't work for philosophers/artists whose project actually does reflect their immorality.
- (2) cancelling strategy: should this class be taught, should kant be not taught, should kant even be researched. reason to not cancel kant: instrumental reason: critical race theorist or feminist, you have to understand some kantian ideas because those prominent writers were kant inspired. the philosophical value of his ideas. critique of pure reason, includes some ideas of value, which are not located in any other text, because it is a revolutionary groundbreaking text.
- (3) confronting and continuing. confronting: look at the textual record where Kant is saying racist things. what kind of theory of race is Kant operating on? human beings are divided into different groups. second claim: these groups have some kind of geographical origin. third claim: these groups have certain heritable traits. fourth claim: Some assumed hierarchy among races.

In contrast, enlightenment humanism: 1. humanity – fundamental dignity. 2. humanity in universal terms. so universal fundamental human dignity.

these are in tension. are they bearing on the cognitive claims?

31. 4/22/24: THE CANON OF PURE REASON, MAKING ROOM FOR HOPE AND FAITH/BELIEF

Part of the first critique that is inching towards Kant's moral and practical philosophy. We'll talk about Kant's account of hope. "I had to deny knowledge to make room for faith/belief."

But first, we need to wrap up our discussion of Kant's racism. There's a tension between kant's philosophy and his racist attitudes.

- Kant's humanism. Human beings are deserving of a particular attitude, namely respect, because all humans have dignity and this intrinsic value. This is Kant's humanism. Also a part of this humanism is: there are certain universal human capacities.
- Kant's racism. Theory of race that arose from enlightenment period. Racial groups have geographical origin. Certain heritable traits that all these racial

groups have. Or some sort of intellectual/moral traits. These traits are now a part of races by their essence.

How to approach this tension:

- Mills – consistent egalitarian. Untermensch Kant distinguishes between humans and "under humans" or untermensch. Kant's view of what a person is – act for reasons.
- Allais – Kant is inconsistent because he is racist. Kant could be philosophically committed to his humanism. Racism as disrespect. Respect is owed to all human beings. Disrespect amounts to recognizing someone as a human being, but failing to treat them as such.

Metaphysics of morals – doctrine of right. Heart of Kant's political philosophy. Ideal theory of justice. Kant's think that because we are in nonideal condition of historical and structural injustice – then we all stand in wrongful relations to each other. Allais' thought is that in Kant's view, you cannot be a morally good person in these conditions of injustice, because you are structurally related to people in unjust sorts of ways. Although we have to strive for justice, the way we exist is profoundly unjust, and prevents us from having fully moral characters.

Kant's moral philosophy. We have moral capacities. We are selfish – fundamental. We want to be good people, but we are often motivated by self-love. We prioritize ourselves over the morally right thing. We are deeply selfish. For persons in power, they are implicated in injustice.

Doctrine of elements, doctrine of methods. Relationship between theoretical philosophy we get in the first critique, and the practical philosophy we get in the second critique. This transition project is discussed in the section we read today.

Human reason is something that can be expressed in a number of ways. Theoretical: knowing what is. What fundamentally is. Practical reason: oriented towards freely acting as we ought. Moral law. Freedom is not being able to be a teenager and do whatever you want — it is acting in accordance to what you ought to be doing. Domain of morality, justice. When it comes to theoretical reason, theoretical reason has to be disciplined.

Three fundamental questions that drive human reason. Top of 677. All interests of my reason: what can I know, what should I do, and what may I hope. This entire class has been about, what can I know – domain of theoretical reason.

What should I do – question of agency. Agents in the world where we are confronted with choices constantly. The domain of practical reason (groundwork, second critique – you should act on the basis of the moral law).

What may I hope? If I do what I should, what may I hope. Suppose you do act morally, freely, autonomously. In your own life, what can you hope for? This is something to get to the crucial aspirational part of being a human being. Kant ultimately argues that, the highest thing we can hope for – is the highest good. The highest good is a world in which happiness exists in proportion to virtue or morality. In this world, if you are a good person you are happy. If you are a bad person, you are unhappy. Kant will argue that we need to have some belief in God, to have hope in the highest good.

32. 4/24/24: BACK TO THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION, KANT'S SUBJECTIVE TURN

There are 3 fundamental questions that drive human reason: what can I know, what should I do, and what may I hope?

The first critique is focused on what we can know and what we cannot know.

Recall a question we considered at the beginning of class: the possibility of metaphysics. We can know empirical things, like William James Hall is 15 stories high. But we can also strive to know things that are not just empirical things. When we are in the domain of metaphysics, metaphysics is not just seeking empirical things. Metaphysics is really looking for some kind of a priori cognition or knowledge. Are synthetic a priori cognitions possible? As long as metaphysics operates under the traditional assumption that all of our cognitions conform to objects, then we'll never get anywhere. But if we make an experiment of precisely the Copernican revolution, that objects conform to some of our cognitions, then Kant thinks metaphysics is possible.

The Copernican hypothesis is that objects, in some sense, conform to our cognition. To our intuition. To our concepts.

In the transcendental aesthetic, the kind of cognitive capacities we analyzed sensibility, a receptive capacity, faculty responsible for representations that are intuitions, singular immediate. Distinguishes between two kinds of intuitions, empirical and pure intuitions. Empirical intuitions are representations that must conform to objects. William James Hall 15 stories tall. If we assume that all our representations conform to objects, then we can deduce anything a priori. On Kant's view, our pure intuition of space and time are structurally built into having sensibility. Sensibility structured by space and time makes empirical intuitions possible at all. Any object given to us sensibly, is going to conform to our a priori representation of space and time .. spatiotemporal features of an object, that is conforming to our mental constitutions. Spatio-temporal objects of the senses (appearances, and phenomena). Whole body of knowledge of appearances. Synthetic knowledge, don't arrive at through experience, arrive at it through thinking of the conditions of the possibility of experience in some way.

Transcendental Analytic. Understanding. We apply concepts to objects in a determinate way. Open eyes, and sense everything in front of you, it is chaos. But you carve up what you experience. You determine your experience by thinking "board" "book" "person". So we use concepts in thoughts to determine objects. So the understanding is the faculty of concepts we use in thought. Not all of our concepts are empirical. We have pure concepts, like the categories. Substance, cause. He derives these are pure concepts, not empirical, purely from the logical form of judgements. In particular, he shows that these pure concepts of substance and cause are conditions of the possibility of experience. What are objects of experience. Categorical form of objects of experience: take book, think of it as substance that persists through time. Throw marker, some causal structure in what you're experiencing. When we say our pure concepts of substance and cause condition the possibility of objects of experience, we mean it makes it possible for object to have the form of substance, and the form of causality.

Transcendental argument: there is experience. X (a pure concept) is a condition of the possibility of experience. Inference to reality: X is condition of the

what is it for object of experience to conform to possibility of experience. when we think of spatiotemporal form of object, william james hall, substance form or causal form, those formal features of objects of experience depend and conform to pure intuitions and pure concepts. so the argument: there is experience, something will condition possibility of experience, then we get inference to reality: forms of objects of experience depend on these conditions of the possibility of experience, therefore, the pure intuition or pure concept is a condition of the object.

Nature: sum total of all appearances. absolute substance that persists, and alterations, changes in appearance. some alterations (happenings, we are talking about a change in one way that substance exists to another way it exists) with minds, without minds. creatures with minds, human beings in particular, we'll have sensibility and understanding. through understanding, we have outer sense and inner sense. What we are supposed to think by this point.

After the transcendental deduction... go to system of principles. Fundamental principles Kant deduces: In all change of appearance, substance persists. All alterations occur in accordance with the law of causality. Somebody like Hume thinks: sure, we act as if substance and causality are objectively valid concepts. But Hume thinks it's just an illusion. but Kant argues against this skepticism. it is true that, these principles are true, because without them, experience wouldn't be possible, but even Hume should note that experience is possible.

Possibility of metaphysics. The deep worries that metaphysics is nothing but mock combat.. Kant will argue metaphysics is possible, but only metaphysics of human experience. Metaphysics of the objects that we can experience. Kant is giving us a distinctive kind of knowledge that philosophy can give us. Salvage the possibility of metaphysics in the human experience. Of course, what this means, is that no metaphysics is possible, beyond the bounds of human experience. Of course, Kant is thinking of humane experience, as empirical cognition.. requires intuitions, concepts, etc. Metaphysics about something you cannot intuit.. you'll just have empty thoughts. Rationalist metaphysics.. bankrupt procedure, it's not about the objects that we can come into contact with.

Reason in the transcendental dialectic. Always looking for fundamental why. In this quest for the fundamental why, reason posits these ideas, unconditioned objects, which explain everything. We have the idea of the world whole, we have the idea of God. precisely concepts which transcend all experience altogether. Supersensible.

However, there is a positive use of ideas. Let's hold on to these ideas for various reasons. so one of those reasons is tied to , the regulative use of ideas for knowledge itself. Soul god world whole, push you to get the most systematic understanding of inner and outer world. Kant thinks there's also a practical use of reason too.

Practical here means moral use, domain of choice, domain of agency, domain of relating to other people. So not only are there epistemic benefits, practical benefit. What should I do: is the answer here we should act on the basis of morality.

Kant says: make your choices based on moral reasons. not through inclinations. like respecting the dignity of other human beings.

What can you hope for in your life if you do what you should: Kant argues that the best thing we can hope for, is the highest good. The highest good is a world in which happiness is proportionate to virtue.

What could be a guarantor of highest good.. God and the future life. the highest good requires some being, all knowing and all powerful, to make the highest good possible. where does the future life come in: it's everybody, in a state such that their morality is in proportion with their virtue. And Kant thinks that: there must be some kind of future life. Need some future life, where God can guarantee that balance. lots of debate of how Kant is thinking of future life here. anyway, as rational creatures we have these ideas of god soul world-whole... what do we do with them? they have normative role. they have this moral practical role to play for us. we have to think of God and immortality of soul and etc., as conditions in which the highest good can be obtained. So you practically, commit yourself of thinking about God and future life, as conditions of this moral inspiration.

How to hold in your mind, this hope of god, soul, after life, while knowing it is not true? Kant is makes an argument if you think that morality is more than a figment of the brain, if you think morality has consequences, then you need to hope in the highest good. But how can Kant make all these arguments when he said metaphysics has to be bounded to domain of human experience? Here is Kant's epistemic pluralism. We have judgements or propositions that we form. we adopt different kinds of epistemic attitudes, towards our judgements in some sort of way. last paragraph of 684: taking something to be true. epistemic attitude.. the thought is: we don't just assert judgements, we take those judgements to be true. Kant's epistemic pluralism: there's different kinds of epistemic attitudes that we can take to different propositions. Difference between knowing something, and believing something. what kinds of justifications do we have for our judgements. when you know something, you take yourself to have objective or subjective grounds. subjective grounds. when you know something, you take it to be true, to have objective grounds. in Kant's view, knowing something is the gold standard of our epistemic efforts. but, we can't "know" anything about God, soul. but we can still have belief. Denies knowledge to make room for faith. The german for faith is "glaube." we can believe in God, believe in a future life, because we have subjective grounds for doing so. subjective feature of us, that when we think of ourselves as moral agents, we can't stand the thought that it doesn't matter. that every single time you try to respect dignity, you can't stand the thought it doesn't matter. we have to hold onto hope to hold on to what makes us be human.

There is a future life. take it to be true, only in the form of belief. Can't know there is a God.

SEcond critique: practical reason.

Third critique: beauty and aesthetics.

We have said so much to be said about the human experience. Once we can take human experience as our starting point. Is that we just keep discovering the richness. Moral, aesthetic, etc. Why Samantha Matherne teaches the first critique, because Kant says, we as humans are the most philosophically interesting thing. "Thanks everyone!"