

**“NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2000-2014)”**

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DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all knowledge seeking persons who endeavor to learn and pursue education as the cornerstone to their lives. To those who believe strongly in hard work and determination and finally to all who support the efforts of persons who strive to better their lives through education.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CRA	Chairman's Risk Assessment
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
EAC	East African Community
EASF	East Africa Standby Force
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LAPSSET	Lamu Port Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport
MP	Member of Parliament
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSCA	National Security Council Act
NSPG	National Security Planning Guidance
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDRIP	Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
QICR	Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Matatu

This refers to the Public transport vehicles used in Kenya, they range from 14-25seater vehicles.

Mungiki

This is an illegal sect according to the Government, they however conduct criminal activities and operate in various regions across the country under an organized leadership.

National Security Strategy

This term refers to a plan by the state that identifies the ends (goals) a state desires to reach, means (resources) a state has at its disposal and those that can be easily acquired and ways (instruments of security) a state can employ to see the realization of the aspiration sought.

Wanjiku

This is a term that refers to the common person in the street. Its origin is from the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya and used as a female name.

ABSTRACT

The practice and theories in National Security Strategy have grown overtime since the Second World War. There have been developments in various fronts for instance the changing nature of threats which has necessitated change in technologies and strategies to protect states. In this century, there is less of inter-state war and more of intra state or state versus non state actors types of wars and this has consequently led to the paradigm shift from the classical to a wider approach to National Security as well as Strategic Studies. The interest of Kenya and the United States is drawn from the ambition of Kenya to become a hegemony in the Eastern Africa region maintaining its peace and security similar to the position taken by the United States as the super power and hence its dominance in matters relating to global peace and security. Behind these motives by both states lies the National Security Strategies that are followed for the realisation of the ambitions. For both states there are milestones and challenges faced though in different contexts and circumstances, some are similar whereas some are not. In this century the National Security Strategies should reflect the context and changing nature of the Strategic Security Environment. The Strategic culture should be encouraged and developed for the case of Kenya while the United States' needs to be consistent with its legislation. The study seeks to create an understanding of the two states and their responses to the threats they encounter through the National Security Strategies.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the history of strategic studies and gives an overview of the national security strategic concept. It discusses the background to the study, the problem statement of the research study and the justification of the study. The research objectives and the research questions that steered the research are also featured. It covers the literature review on national security strategy and highlights the literature gaps that affirmed the need for the study. Finally the theoretical framework, the research methodology used for the study and the chapter outline conclude the chapter.

1.2 Background to the Study

Intellectual drive in National Security studies was ignited in the late 1940s by Brodie¹ in his famous essay „Strategy as a Science“, which noted that „strategy was not receiving the scientific treatment it deserved either in the armed services or certainly outside them“. A great deal of scholarly work, including major theories and concepts was from then onwards expended by scholars mostly from America which still remain dominant in the current state of affairs and hence the reason for its selection as a case study.

This study looks in depth at the strategic security issues in the Republic of Kenya in a bid to appreciate them and upon that, consider the strategic security issues of the United States so as to draw lessons comparing and contrasting the two states. However, unlike in the developed states where strategic studies and security is a culture, there is less academic literature on security and strategic issues among the „developing states“ and perhaps the need for a strategic culture. This therefore shows the different priorities various governments have or rather the prominence of non-military issues which are sufficiently researched on better than military subjects.

The Republic of Kenya has its share of insecurities just like many other states in the international system, and while there have been solutions to some challenges others

¹ Brendan Taylor, „*The Evolution of National Security Studies*“, National Security College Occasional Paper No. 3, Australian National University, April 2012, pp 2-7.

are yet to be resolved. This therefore calls for a different approach which as this study suggests an inclusive and cohesive National Security Strategy, drawing insights from an old democratic state such as the United States acknowledging that they too have their own flaws as well. The United States has cultivated a Strategic culture since 1947 and has continued to guide the operations in the defence and foreign policy extensively, through the Goldwater Nichols Act the frequency of the National Security Strategy was change to annual submission by the President. This is not the case at this point in time, there have been recommendations for change in legislation or adherence to the legislation. The study finds its skeleton in these issues and seeks to address them adequately.

1.3 Statement of Research Study

The Republic of Kenya has been guided by three constitutions since its declaration of the Republic in 1964. Various institutions have been created as a result of historical events which shaped the politics and structures of the government. With regard to security, the institutions established by the constitution include The Kenya Defence Forces, The National Intelligence Service and The National Police Service which are all subordinate to civilian authority. Other institutions include the National Security Council, a Defence Council, the National Police Service Commission and the Independent Police Oversight Authority. In each of these institutions and organs there is an office designated for the function of coordination. However there are no efforts yet in the formulation of a National Security Strategy that is inclusive both at the vertical (that is, Non-State actors) and horizontal levels (that is, State Actors) and this implies that the various inefficiencies within each organ will until then affect the assurance of security in the country.

The essence of a National Security Strategy cannot be ignored in this century where issues and threats are interlinked and cannot be addressed singularly such as terrorism, insurgencies and transnational crimes which have threatened the state time and again. There is an urgent need for harmonization of efforts from all security organs, stakeholders, citizens and most importantly from a unified political front. This study examines the importance of a National Security Strategy to Kenya as a panacea to its insecurities in contrast with the United States”.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The need for the study is brought about by the quest for a long term security strategy which will be a panacea to the security challenges experienced in Kenya, bearing in mind its complexity and dynamic nature. The findings of the research will enhance the understanding of the existing security frameworks and institutions in a bid to identify factors that hinder proper measures in addressing national security and propose suitable adjustment to the policies in existence. The content of the study seeks to enrich the field of academia in especially security strategy studies by providing a reference point to students and to those who pursue knowledge in this field. The recommendations proposed will eventually benefit the citizens of the world, the region and Kenya since the guaranteed security of Kenya creates a safe world in the long term.

1.5 Objectives

1.5.1 Overall Objective

What insights can be acquired on National Security Strategy best practices based on the United States of America's experiences for Kenya?

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

1. To assess the nature of the strategic security environment of the Republic of Kenya.
2. To examine the National Security Strategies of the United States of America.
3. To compare and contrast the security strategies of the governments of Kenya and USA.

1.6 Research Questions

1. What is the nature of the Strategic Security Environment of the Republic of Kenya?
2. How are the National Security Strategies of the United States of America?
3. What comparison is there between the National Security Strategy of Kenya and that of the United States?

1.7 Literature review

The definition of Strategy in this research project is one by Jablonsky², where he defines strategy as the employment of the instruments of power to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives, slightly differing with Clausewitz who defined strategy as „the

² David Jablonsky, "Why Is Strategy Difficult?", Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992, reprint, 1995.

employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war³. Closer to Clausewitz is Von Moltke who defined strategy as „the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view“⁴. This view by Moltke and Clausewitz was at a period of the Napoleonic Warfare (most useful beginning for students of strategy) where war was characterized by its escalation rather than moderation, it was at the time a clash between whole people’s on issues such like political and physical independence⁵. During this period the concept of strategy developed from the “the art of the general” which primarily focussed on the battlefield conduct of affairs to be coming the business of arranging a nation’s full disposition for war in both peacetime and during war⁶.

Industrial revolution greatly influenced war due to the development of more lethal and efficient firepower such as the introduction of breech-loading firearms and also in areas of transport and communication where there was development of rail-roads which resulted to rural-urban migration which further led to mass education which was manipulated by the governments to their advantage⁷. The American Civil War 1861-1865 was the first war that was fought with new military products during a time when nationalism and ideology gained prominence⁸ albeit the epitome army at the time was the Prussian with superb planning, efficient and detailed mobilisation, use of the best weapons, good training, the general staff system and its Clausewitzian inspiration⁹.

Non-military aspects of war were emphasized at the time by France after being defeated by Prussia, the theory of the offensive questions of morale and spirit also referred to as “*l’offensive a l’outrance*”¹⁰. The writings of Charles Ardant du Picq¹¹

³ Carl Von Clausewitz, “*On War I*”, (trans. J.J. Graham, 1908), reprinted London: Routledge, 1966, p.165

⁴ This is as quoted in B.H. Liddell Hart, “*Strategy: The Indirect Approach*”, London: Faber, 1967, 6th Edition, p344

⁵ Ken Booth, “*The Evolution of Strategic Thinking*” in Ken Booth et al, “*Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies*”, Croom Helm Ltd., 1975, p22

⁶ Ibid

⁷ David Jablonsky, “*Why is Strategy Difficult?*”, in J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., (ed.), “*The U.S Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*”, “*Theory of War and Strategy*”, (Vol. 1, 4th ed., July 2012, U.S.A. Govt. Print) pp3-10

⁸ Ken Booth, Op. Cit. p25

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Ibid

concentrate mostly on tactics while stressing the essence of morale and discipline of the soldiers. Consequently „the spirit of offensive“ was adopted in French strategy playing a big role in the great slaughter of 1914-1918 where strategy was considered as “the comprehensive direction of all elements of national power to achieve the national objectives”¹². This can be attributed to the influence of the French Revolution when war became the business of the people and there was seemingly no end to the resources mobilized as there was vigor and enthusiasm which governments and citizens showcased¹³.

According to Clausewitz¹⁴ the involvement of the people and improvement of technology led to the complication of the formulation and implementation of strategy by the addition of “primordial violence”, hatred and enmity which acted as a blind force to form with the government and army the remarkable trinity. Handel further notes that by the end of the 19th century, there was a need to have domestic consensus by the government which had implications for the conduct of strategy first at the National level and also within the basis ends and means paradigm¹⁵. At sea, there was structural reorganization, technical innovation and readjustments strategy and tactics¹⁶ mostly by the British, though voluminous books on sea power with concentration on the role of navies in a state’s foreign policy were written by American Captain Alfred Mahan.

During the period of the Armed Peace (1871-1914), there was increased military planning during peacetime with *ne plus ultra* example from Alfred Von Schlieffen (Chief of General Staff of the German Forces 1891-1905) who believed that detailed advance planning from mobilisation to victory was essential and possible before the outbreak of any war. In Clemenceau’s words “War is too serious a matter to be left to generals”¹⁷,

¹¹ Charles Ardant du Picq, “*Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern*”, trans. Col. John Greely & Major Robert Cotton, (Harrisburg P.a.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1947) pp 118-129

¹² Henry E. Eccles, “*Military Power in a Free Society*”, (New Port, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979) p70

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, “*On War*”, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp 592-593

¹⁴ Ibid pp 609-610

¹⁵ Handel Michael, “*War, Strategy and Intelligence*”, (London: Frank Cass, 1989) p 82. See also Dennis E. Showalter, “*Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of Grand German Strategy*” in “*Grand Strategies in War and Peace*”, Paul Kennedy (ed.), (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991) pp 110-111

¹⁶ The classic work on this period (The Armed Peace (1871-1914)) is the series by A.J. Marder, “*From Dreadnought to Scapeflow*”, London, OUP, 1961-71, 5 Vols.)

¹⁷ Ken Booth, Op Cit., p29

this implies that the changing nature of war was becoming complex and significant efforts towards pooling resources of widest range of a society's relevant intelligence together was of utmost importance¹⁸. Other developments included mechanized warfare which led to cheap victories by Hitler's Forces from 1939 through 1945¹⁹, air power led to policies which Lippmann²⁰ neatly summed up as "too pacific in peace: too belligerent in War". Air power to enthusiasts like Italian Giulio Douhet²¹ offered a means of avoiding the need for surface combat at all proving the most systematic and the most influential of the air power theorists.

Naval warfare changed with the aircraft carrier emerging as primary force at sea consequently increasing efficiency of the submarine²² during the Second World War. Notable is that the war was marked with more practical developments than theoretical developments, however in theory complication arose due to the intercourse of the national military strategy and the other strategies which come from the elements of power that operate within their own strategic paradigm and contribute to the overall design of national security strategy²³. Strategy remains the most challenging of all art²⁴. The nuclear age was then followed by the "The Golden Age" where efforts towards understanding theory and practice were demonstrated. One feature worth noting is that modern strategists unlike the professional military thinkers are concerned about the ends and means²⁵. Essential to the period is that the conceptual frameworks that were advanced in the 1950-1960s have stood up to the test of time thus enriching the understanding of the strategic world today²⁶.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid pp29-34

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Giulio Douhet, *"The Command of the Air"*, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward McCann, 1942), pp11-16

²² Ken Booth, Op Cit.

²³ David Jablonsky, Op cit. p 9.

²⁴ Kennedy B., *"Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition"*, p7. During the Roman Republic, for example, Roman foreign policy was affected by the distrust and fear felt by the ruling patricians for the plebeians of Rome on the domestic front. Barr, Consulting the Romans, p. 6

²⁵ B.H. Liddell Hart, *"Strategy: The Indirect Approach"* (London:Faber,1967) p335.

²⁶ Ken Booth, Op Cit. p42-45

American strategist Schelling set out his own distinctive approach to strategic analysis such as the „game theory“ to the problem²⁷. According to Gray, “the second wave” has reinvestigated the already established views on strategic stability and technological innovation, the nature of arms race and utility of arms control processes the utility of nuclear power and military powers, the assumption of rationality and has also diverged to refining expertise in area studies and decision making²⁸. By the beginning of the 20th century war was conducted in various dimensions according to Howard who named them as: the operational, the logistical, the social and the technological²⁹. He insists that no successful strategy could be crafted without taking into account all the dimensions³⁰. „Military power has to be manipulated in peacetime rather than used in wartime- strategy of crisis management“³¹ and that the military security which has for a long time been the primary concern of governments ought to be accompanied with other security considerations³².

The expertise of the psychologist, sociologist, political scientist, military scientist among others is required to understand the strategic environment and maneuvers to be made³³. Brodie argues that “there is no science where judgements are tested in blood and answered in the servitude of the defeated”³⁴. Critics have dismissed the “society of academic strategists” as new civilian militarists and have disregarded their much alluded conceptual frameworks as immoral and misbegotten³⁵. On moral grounds, they have been faulted to be “hard-nosed” leaving the ethics out, also that their “realism” is a combination of dehumanised cynicism and naiveté³⁶. Their methodologies have also been

²⁷ Thomas Schelling, *“The Strategy of Conflict”*, (New York, Oxford Uni. Press, 1963)pp 187-192

²⁸ Collin S. Gray. *“The second Wave: New Directions in strategic studies”*, Journal of the Royal United Services, Institute for Defence Studies, December 1973, Vol. 118, No.4, pp 35-51.

²⁹ Michael Howard, *“The forgotten Dimensions of War”*, represented. In his *“The Causes of War”*, (London: Temple Smith,1983), pp 101-109

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ McNamara, “There’s no strategy any more- only crisis management” as quoted by Michael Howard, *“The Transformation of Strategy”*, Brassey’s Annual 1972 (London, William Clowes and Sons Ltd. 1972)p 8

³² This broadening of interest with its implications for the discipline is well reflected in the annual *“Strategic Survey”* produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

³³ Ken Booth, Op Cit.

³⁴ B. Brodie, *“Strategy In The Missile Age”*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959

³⁵ Ken Booth, Op Cit.

³⁶ Ibid

critiqued more so that they have been pseudo-scientific and do not fathom real political world³⁷.

Wylie argues on the contrary that: *“I do not claim that strategy is or can be a “science” in the sense of the physical sciences. It can and should be in intellectual discipline of the highest order and imagination...thus, while strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgement can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory and perspective”*.³⁸ As an art, Clausewitz notes that its exemplification was by Frederick the Great, who embodied both strategy and policy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 are considered to be a classic example that demonstrated “an element of restrained strength ...ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation”³⁹. According to Mwagiru, he gives a framework for the analysis of National security strategy of which will be looked into keenly. He argues that in the absence of an operational framework, making and implementing national security strategy becomes an exercise in futility⁴⁰.

He cautions policy makers not to fall into the trap of believing that the formulation of such an analytical framework is a mindless exercise in theory because theory gives form and tends substance to the national security that is formulated and guides the process of its design formulation and implementation⁴¹. Thus national security strategy cannot be made in a vacuum, it needs a basis for its rationalization and explanation and a specific world view on which it can be grounded.

1.7.2 The Three Legged Stool Model

According to Mwagiru the three legged stool model identifies three bases for national power which includes economic, military and diplomacy and uses these to explain a basis for national security strategy formulation⁴². These three bases constitute those that are tangible that is economic and military and those that are intangible like

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Admiral J. C. Wylie, *“Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control”*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 10

³⁹ Clausewitz, Op Cit. p 179

⁴⁰ Ibid pg. 4

⁴¹ Ibid pg. 5

⁴² Ibid

diplomacy which involves activities such as propaganda, negotiations, communication and signaling a specific policy or change in policy to other actors in the system⁴³.

Mwagiru argues that power, lies in its redolent imagery and on its insistence on engaging all the instruments of national power in conceptualizing national security formulations⁴⁴. In the attempt to construct a theory of strategy, Lykke⁴⁵ develops a framework to understand the strategic environment and the process of strategy. He contends that if any of the legs is too short then the risk becomes too great and there is likelihood that the strategy will fall over and it is the job of the strategist to minimize the risk through balance the means, ways and ends⁴⁶.

The Ends/Objectives explain “what is to be accomplished”, Ways/Courses of Action refer to “how the ends are to be accomplished” by the use of resources, Means/Resources define “what specific resources are to be used” in applying the ways to realize the objectives⁴⁷. The examination of strategy is in its suitability (whether it relates to the objectives), feasibility (whether the action can be accomplished by the means available) and acceptability (whether there is justification of the costs to the importance of the effect desired)⁴⁸. Mwagiru argues that the African stool’s strength lies in the power of its suggestive imagery and the determination to engage the instruments of power in the strategy formulation process⁴⁹. However among the major weaknesses of the model, is that it is based on the traditional thinking about strategy- military oriented, where threats to national security are largely physical. It miscarries to understand that the security architecture of the third world is quite dissimilar from that of west⁵⁰.

In support of this, Ayoob notes that: “*When we turn to the Third World, however, we find a different situation altogether. The three major characteristics of the concept of state or national security in western states – its external orientation, its strong linkage with system security and its virtually indistinguishable nature from the security of the two*

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid 5...pg. 5

⁴⁵ Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy”, Chap. In “Military Strategy: Theory and Application”, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989) pp 3-8

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid p 153

*major alliance blocs – are, in the Third World, if not absent, so thoroughly diluted as to be hardly recognizable when compared to their counterparts in the west...the sense of insecurity that these states – and more particularly their regimes suffer from emanate to a substantial extent from within their boundaries rather than from outside. This does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are not. But the mix of internal and external sources of threat to these state structures, and particularly to their regimes, is quite often weighted in favour of internal sources”.*⁵¹

The second limitation of this model is that its appreciation of the character of third world states to national security issues is faulty and consequently it does not take into account domains of security such as societal security which cannot be ignored in third world states⁵². The other inadequacy of the three legged stool is that it does not take seriously into account issue of the coordination of national security strategy formulation and implementation which is fundamental to the success of the whole strategy⁵³. This provides a need to re-look at the conceptual framework and its design.

1.7.3 The Four Legged Stool Model

The new model introduces the fourth leg which takes into account national security of the state as well as introducing a new source of national power⁵⁴. It ensures that issues like Societal Security that were not previously addressed are vividly noted⁵⁵. The model also introduces a band which joins the four legs of the bar stool model as symbolism for a coordinating mechanism and for the stability of the stool⁵⁶. The Instruments of power in a state are the capabilities that a state has to protect its interests within and beyond its borders, and are indispensable especially when it comes to the processes involved in national security strategy. These include: the economic instrument of power includes economic sanctions, foreign aid, export controls and trade policies which range from the

⁵¹ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World”...This excerpt is quoted from Makumi Mwagiru, Op Cit.

⁵² p 153

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid

restrictive access to liberal access to national markets⁵⁷. The diplomatic instrument: represents the power of persuasion; done via negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral; includes public policy statements that are meant to sway other states and is conducted efficiently when backed by other instruments of power⁵⁸.

The information instrument is responsible for gathering information about others and also spreading information about a state. The intelligence instrument comes in to collect and analyse information which is from either open sources, hidden sources or through counterintelligence mannerisms⁵⁹. The methods of collecting information ranges from Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Image Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)⁶⁰. Noteworthy is that the work is clothed in uttermost secrecy as it involves disturbing political processes abroad sometimes through psychological warfare also known as propaganda⁶¹. The Military Instrument according to Gutteridge is a symbol of national prestige which no self-respecting country can do without⁶². He argues that: *"The Army joins the flag, the national anthem and other symbols and in some cases is itself joined by national air and shipping lines as the outward sign of independence and progress"*⁶³. The strength of a military is crucial for the survival of any state though serious worries caused by the acquisition of military power are dwarfed by the worries of trying to manage without one in an unpredictable environment⁶⁴.

However noteworthy is that military preponderance doesn't directly translate to political victory though there is a serious connection⁶⁵. Walter Millis argues that: *"The great military establishments which exist are not practically usable in the conduct of international relations and in general are not being so used today; and if it were possible*

⁵⁷ D. Robert Worley, "Instruments of Power" Chapter in *"Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A critical examination of the U.S National Security System"*, (John Hopkins University, 2006)pp 11-13

⁵⁸ Ibid pp 17-22

⁵⁹ Ibid pp 8-10

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² W. Gutteridge, *"Military Institutions and Power in the New States"*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964) pp 40-41

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ John Garret, *"The Role of Military Power"* in John Baylis et al, *"Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies"*, (Croom Helm Ltd. 1975) pp 50-63

⁶⁵ Ibid

*to rid ourselves of the whole apparatus- the military establishment and the war system they embody, international relations could be conducted far more safely and efficiently and more creatively in face of the staggering real problems facing humankind than is now the case*⁶⁶. What Millis ignores is that a good deal of the military might is most useful when not in use, that the strategic power is to promote peace and security by avoiding or preventing wars rather than winning power⁶⁷ and in the case that it is used it represents the impotence of a state⁶⁸. Schelling sees war as a „bargaining“ or a „tough negotiation process“ to make the adversary conform rather than to defeat or weaken⁶⁹.

The elements of power are relative from one country to the other, and hence the kinds of strategies. One common issue is the responsibility of the strategist in ensuring that the instruments of power are applied to the concepts that will eventually realize the objective(s) or interests of the state. Yarger notes that the best calculation of the ends, means and ways can be done only through the strategic appraisal process which quantifies and qualifies the known and unknown of the strategic environment and identifies what is important in regard to strategy formulation⁷⁰.

1.7.4 The Strategic Appraisal Process

The process has seven steps these are: the Stimulus Requirement, Determine and Articulate Interests, Determine Intensity of Interests, Assess Information, Determine Strategic Factors, Select Key Factors and finally Formulate Strategy⁷¹. The first step is to understand the reason or requirement for the strategy. The purpose of this is to provide the required motivation and focus, legitimacy, authority and impetus to the formulation and implementation of strategy⁷². The next step involves sorting out, identifying and articulating interests from policy intentions coming from multiple and contradictory

⁶⁶ W. Millis, *“The Uselessness of Military Power”* in R.A. Goldwin (ed.), *“America Armed”*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961) p38

⁶⁷ John Garret, Op Cit.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ T.C. Schelling, *“Arms and Influence”*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966) p 173

⁷⁰ Richard H. Yarger, *“The Strategic Appraisal: The Key to Effective Strategy”*, in J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., (ed.), *“The U.S Army War College Guide to National Security Issues”*, *“Theory of War and Strategy”*, (Vol. 1, 4th ed., July 2012, U.S.A. Govt. Print) pp 53-64

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Ibid

sources ranging from executive to legislative branches, general to more specific statements, physical and non-physical conditions, things to be protected, created, promoted⁷³.

The levels of intensity include the survival⁷⁴, the vital, the important⁷⁵, and the peripheral⁷⁶. The survival interest if unfulfilled results in instant massive destruction of any or all aspects of the main national interests⁷⁷. The vital interest if unfulfilled will have immediate consequence for the core state interest⁷⁸. The Important interest if unfulfilled results in harm that eventually affect the core national interest⁷⁹. The peripheral interest if unfulfilled leads to damage likely to affect the core national interest⁸⁰. In the assessment of information a holistic mindset is useful as date relating to any of the aspects of the strategic environment, including tangible and intangible attributes and knowledge, interactions, relationships and assumptions⁸¹ from as many sources as possible. When determining strategic factors, Clausewitz argues for the use of “*coup d’oeil*” which is the „quick recognition of a truth that the mind would originally miss or perceive only after long study and reflection“⁸².

The determination of the strategic factors involves being able to perceive the most crucial flows from a thorough assessment of realities and the possibilities of the environment strengthened by the comprehension of its nature and strategic theory⁸³. The Key Strategic Factors are those which the strategist considers are at the heart of the interaction within the environment that should or ought to be used, influenced or countered to protect or advance the identified interest⁸⁴. Formulation of the strategy is at its ripe moment once the other processes are superbly done. The strategic appraisal

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Donald E. Nuechterlein, “*America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980’s*”, Lexington, KY: (The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p4

⁷⁵ Nuechterlein, labeled the important as “Major”.

⁷⁶ U.S. Army War College, “*Course directive: National Security Policy and Strategy Academy Year 2007*”, pp 106-108

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Clausewitz, Op.Cit. p 102.

⁸³ Yarger, Op. Cit. p 53-64

⁸⁴ Ibid

framework among other things has absorbed the strategist in the strategic environment from the outlook of the specific national interests and has provided indicators for the potential forthcoming issues⁸⁵. Meinhart argues that a healthy *weltanschauung* is important to keep a proper perspective on the soundness of a strategy and to know when and whether modification or a new strategy is needed.⁸⁶

1.8 Summary of Literature Gaps

Following the review of literature, this study has observed that the nature of the Strategic Security environment of Kenya is not covered. It has also observed that the literature on the National Security Strategies of the United States is available due to the fact that scholarly work began with the Americans following World War II, this study therefore seeks to examine them. The study seeks to establish comparisons between the National Security Strategies of the United States and that of Kenya. There literature review has appreciated the different contexts the two states find themselves, and as such it also seeks to examine the differences whilst drawing lessons for both states.

1.9 Theoretical framework

Strategic thinking finds its roots in the realism theory of international relations, the theory's tenets include the argument that the international system is made up of states which have human personalities such as inherently competitive, selfish, aggressive. The theory contends that states are the key and main actors in the international system, they are rational in their interactions with other states. The realists define the global system as anarchic, meaning a state of lawlessness where there is no overarching authority on any state in the system. This state of anarchy creates a situation known as a security dilemma, where as one state seeks to defend itself through increase in armaments, the other states feels insecure and further seeks to increase its own storage for weaponry.

A state known as insecurity dilemma is also brought about since when the second states feels insecure and accumulates more weaponry than it deep before, the first state gets even more insecure and desperately increases its capacity too. The realist also argues that the global system is one of a self help system where the survival of any ones state

⁸⁵ Richard Meinhart M., "Leadership and Strategic Thinking" in "Strategic Thinking", (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007) pp 36-37

⁸⁶ Ibid

depends solely in its ability to defend and take care of its own needs. Within realism there are two views, the first is the Offensive realists lead by John Mearsheimer who argues that even states that only want to be secure act aggressively because the international system forces them to do so⁸⁷. He continues that great powers that have no reason to fight each other are merely concerned with their own survival; nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system⁸⁸.

The other view is the Defensive realists who claim that the nature of International politics forces all states to focus on preserving their own independence by forming balancing coalitions rather than on maximizing their own power. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security however increased power may not serve to that end. The study finds this theory ideal in especially the development and creation of the National Security Strategy. The state in developing the strategy believes that it has the core mandate of securing its borders, people, infrastructure and that which it sees as a priority on its own. The state acknowledges that the international system is highly competitive and as such the Strategy takes proactive measures in securing itself as well as preventive measures to preserve and retain its independence. The competitive and selfish nature is evidenced in this study by the lack of consultations on the National Security Strategy among states and the clandestine nature in which Security matters are handled in any state in the international system.

2.0 Methodology

The study is by design descriptive. The type of data used for this study is secondary data. The data collection tools employed in this study include the Case Study approach, data sheets from institutions and schedules and reports for various institutions. The sources of data for this study include: internet sites; journals available online; articles and publications from the internet; books from the internet courtesy of google books, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Library, the University of Nairobi Library, Parliamentary Library and bookshops within Nairobi; and legal documents from both countries. The

⁸⁷ John Mearsheimer, (2001,3)

⁸⁸ Ibid

type and nature of data used was both qualitative and quantitative as was necessitated so as to bring about some arguments clearly. The analysis was descriptive, employing the collected data and examining it in context so as to bring about a solid argument for the study.

2.1 Chapter Outline

Chapter One

Chapter one introduces the topic of the research project by setting the broad context, the statement of the problem, literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses and the methodology of the study.

Chapter Two

This chapter will focus on the analysis of the Strategic Security Environment that Kenya finds itself in. This is important so as to provide a bird's eye view on the issues that affect Kenya internally and externally looking at their intensity and impact to the security of Kenya. A National Security Strategy can only be crafted upon consideration of the State's interests, actors, issues, objectives, threats, power and capacity to realize its set goals.

Chapter three

Case Study section, will look at the structure of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America from 2000-2012. The analysis will be based on the various regimes in place comparing and contrasting mannerisms in which the National Security Strategy was shaped.

Chapter four

Critical Analysis Section, this chapter analyses the challenges and opportunities facing security strategies in Kenya and the United States of America, seeking to compare and contrast their structures.

Chapter five

Here there will be the summary, conclusions followed by recommendations proposed.

CHAPTER TWO

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter takes a descriptive stance covering the strategic environment in which Kenya finds itself in. This will necessitate the need to review the State values that the state institutions and people uphold, the State Interests as defined by the state, this will be broadened to look at domestic, regional and international interests. The State objectives will also be examined, and finally the State threats as identified by Security organs of the State, government departments and ministries, Statesmen, Regional Organizations, Research Institutions, Inter-Governmental Institutions as well as „Wanjiku“. These will also be broadened to cover domestic, regional and international threats acknowledging the changing nature of the international strategic security environment.

2.1.1 National Versus State Security

For the purposes of the research project Kenya will be recognized as a State-Nation rather than a Nation-State. Among the characteristics that a Nation-State possesses is a deep and profound bond between the State and the Nation where the needs and interests of the Nation are those of the State. The case of Kenya does not stand this description as at the moment there is no sense of nationhood within the country due to the divisions embedded in the social, political, economic structures along ethnic lines although there are measures in place to address this critical concern. This remains a sacrosanct threat, interest; objective and policy that neglect of it will result to a situation where Kenya is both a weak nation and a weak state.

Noteworthy is the definition of security according to Chapter 14, Article 238 (1) of the constitution of Kenya: *“National security is the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests”*. The questions of Security for Whom, for which Values, from what Threats, by what Means, at what cost, in what timescale, at what level of security, are the main concerns for this

chapter and as such will be able to give a preview of how the Security Strategy for Kenya should look like

2.2 The State Values

To begin with, Chapter 2, Article 4 of the Constitution of Kenya states that⁸⁹: “The Republic of Kenya shall be a multi-party democratic State founded on the national values and principles of governance referred to in Article 10.” Chapter 2 Article 10(1) states that: “The national values and principles of governance in this Article bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them: (a) applies or interprets this Constitution; (b) enacts, applies or interprets any law; or (c) makes or implements public policy decisions. Chapter 2 Article 10(2) continues that: “The national values and principles of governance include: (a) patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and participation of the people; (b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised; (c) good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and (d) sustainable development...”

The two articles lead to the question of whether the State interests are the same as the National Interests as outlined in Article 10. The history of Kenya has shown that there can be State Interests, Regime Interests, Personal Interests and Nations’ Interests in this case referring to the temporary amalgamation of different ethnic groups within the state for a common cause. All or any of these are at times reflected in the State’s foreign policy; objectives pursued by the state and consequently lead to the image of the state. The importance of values cannot be undermined as this is the spirit that drives and fuels the state institutions and the population at large. Values of the State determine the level of interaction between Kenya and other states, just as a human being finds close companionship to others who share similar values even among those with same interests. The interactions by Kenya have more been about its Interests which change from time to time rather than the Values.

During the Kibaki Regime (2002-2013), there was increased cooperation with China for the purposes of Economic Development, this was a different approach from the Moi

⁸⁹ The Constitution of Kenya, 2010

Regime which was seen to be more inclined to the traditional allies who included European States who had for a long time been the Models for development for Kenya as well as many African and Developing States. China due to its non-democratic state is different from Kenya since Kenya is a Multi-Party democratic State under Article 4 of the constitution and among its values under Article 10 includes the virtue of democracy and participation of people. Whether the move from value based interactions to interest based interactions will be beneficial or catastrophic, only time will tell.

2.3 The State Interests

Interests to any state is the most crucial as it marks the end goal for any particular activity exercised by the state. They define the outermost limits of choice beyond which responsible statesmanship ought not to trespass as doing so jeopardises the security, and perhaps the survival of the state⁹⁰. Robert Good⁹¹ argues that the process of identifying the National Interest involves the trouble of reconciling necessity and principle: the necessity being that of protecting the interests of the group for which one plays as trustee and the principle being that of unidentified fidelity to values like justice and equality. Mwagiru contends that the task of dealing with a concept as indefinable as the national interests – which sketches the contours of strategy, is to settle on taking its formless nature as part of the tool that ought to be focused on in the formulation of a national security strategy⁹². Acknowledging the complexities, this section will be looked at in terms of Kenya's Interests at home, within the region and at the international level. This approach will aid in the later analysis of the harmony of the foreign and domestic policies adopted thus far.

⁹⁰ Robert C. Good, "The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's Debate with Morgenthau and Kennan", *The Journal of Politics*, (Gainesville, Florida), Vol.22, No.4, Nov 1960. pp 597-619

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Makumi Mwagiru, "Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya", (National Defence College Occasional Papers on Security, No.1, 2008) p 4

2.3.1 Domestic Interests

The domestic interests of the state are expressed in various policy documents, among the main public policy documents is the Development Strategy “Kenya Vision 2030” which is based on three main pillars⁹³: Economic pillar which anticipated a Gross Domestic Product growth rate of 10 percent from 2012; Social Pillar which expects a just and cohesive society in a clean and secure environment; and the Political Pillar which is hopeful for a democratic system founded on issue based politics that respects the rule of law and protects the rights and freedoms of every individual in Kenyan society. Noteworthy is that there has been more emphasis placed on the Economic pillar more than the rest, this is evidenced by the reforms brought in by the NARC (National Rainbow Coalition) Administration from 2002-2008 contrary from the presidency of Moi which was not his main priority⁹⁴.

The sustained growth is accredited to the peaceful political transition and an „orthodox“ economic reform agenda branded as the Economic Recovery Strategy for employment and wealth creation⁹⁵. There was also a fiscal control enhanced from 2003/2004, interest rates declined, external assistance began to recover, investor confidence as well as growth prospects got better⁹⁶. The social aspect also improved as the incident of poverty dropped from 52% in 1997 to 47% in 2005/2006⁹⁷, programs such as the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the Local Authority Transfer Fund, the 2009/2010 Economic Stimulus Programmes meant for redistribution of income from richer to poorer households were initiated⁹⁸. The major step made was the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010 through a pacific plebiscite which among numerous changes has introduced the devolution, a re-definition of the office of the president, created the Senate and the National Assembly as part of Parliament, an Independent

⁹³ Kenya Vision 2030

⁹⁴ Paul Collier and Njuguna S. Njuguna, “*Strategic Choices: Strategies for Growth*” in Christopher S. Adam, (et al), “*Kenya Policies for Prosperity*” Oxford University Press 2010.pp 20

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Ibid p25

Electoral and Boundaries Commission, a reconstitution of the judiciary and criminal justice system⁹⁹.

The political aspect (Governance) reforms that were started include:

1. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 which set up Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission as Kenya's top anti-corruption organ.
2. The Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 which established the Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA) with the objective of promoting integrity, transparency, efficiency, fairness and public confidence.
3. The Privatization Act 2005 which created a Privatization Commission that ensured transparency in the privatization of state owned enterprises, while strengthening accountability, efficiency of resource employment.

A collective interest across the country horizontally and vertically is the implementation of the constitution which began with the Jubilee Coalition's term in office 2013 since its realization will ensure Political, Economic, and Societal Security.

2.3.2 Regional Interests

Regionalism as espoused by the Foreign Policy Framework for Kenya¹⁰⁰ remains a cornerstone of Kenya's foreign policy interests. The Regional Interests are projected through the involvement in the East African Community, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the African Union. Within the EAC, the focus has been economic integration, social integration and political integration respectively. This is due to the fact that the EAC is the most crucial foreign policy vehicle as well as a major trading and investing bloc¹⁰¹. Kenya happens to be the regional trade hub with a share of 33% of intra-regional trade attributed to its larger private sector¹⁰² and also the transport link to the world for many of the countries¹⁰³ due to its geographic position and deep harbours at

⁹⁹ Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability", A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Africa Program, June 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Republic of Kenya, "Foreign Policy Framework", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² African Development Bank, "Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011-2015", September 2011

¹⁰³ Ibid

the coast. This position puts Kenya at an advantage as therefore the State intends to maintain if not improve this advantage through the Ministry of East African Community and Commerce.

Kenyan Banks taking advantages of the integrated financial market are now operating across the region with subsidies in South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda¹⁰⁴. It is the interest of Kenya to implement: the EAC Development Strategy 2011-2015 to improve the region's competitive nature; the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Central Africa) Medium Term Strategic Plan 2011-2015 which seeks to facilitate infrastructure programs and create a Multi-lateral Fiscal Surveillance Framework; and The (COMESA, EAC, SADC) CES Tripartite Agreement to which it has committed to and stands to benefit in the long run. Kenya hosts the Headquarters to the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) and is responsible for the generation and preparation of the Standby Brigade and the Planning Element (PLANELM) which ensures coordination with the police and civilian components as well as training and monitoring the Standby Force¹⁰⁵. Formally the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the EASF was established during the 6th Extra-Ordinary Council Ministers meeting held in Nairobi on the 18th June 2010 to show existence of multi-dimensionality¹⁰⁶.

The member states include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea and South Sudan¹⁰⁷. Kenya's interest in maintaining regional security will be determined by the level of engagement with the institutions. Within the framework of IGAD, Kenya intentions include providing support and leadership so as to make it an effective regional instrument for dealing with regional problems¹⁰⁸. As such Kenya hosts a liaison office in Nairobi and has been instrumental in forging pacific settlement of the conflict in Sudan versus South Sudan before after secession especially when the government declined to send military forces to South Sudan earlier this year to resolve the dispute. As part of the African Union, Kenya

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ African Peace and Security Architecture, "2010 Assessment Study".

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Republic of Kenya, "Foreign Policy Framework", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009

supports the implementation of the Common African Defense and Security (CADSP) to advance an environment conducive for development¹⁰⁹.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Kenya has taken a lead role in the intervention in Somalia which has been unstable and as a result proved to be a source of insecurity to the region's economic and political security. Kenya backs the creation of a United States of Africa though as a gradual process that prefers the strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) which will enhance the capacity for Africa's economy while simultaneously positioning the continent as a game changer in global economy and politics¹¹⁰. The top most agenda of Kenya with regard to the Common Market for East and Central Africa (COMESA) is to ensure the participation of the private sector in the bloc¹¹¹. The New Partnership for Africa's Development and the 2006 African Peer Review Mechanism report is a platform in which Kenya supports the governance reforms in the region.

2.3.3 Global Interests

Internationally Kenya is a member of the United Nations, and hosts the Headquarters to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UNHABITAT). This headquarters have proved beneficial to the country and efforts towards maintenance of the offices have been amplified since other countries expressed concerns of hosting the headquarters. The Kenyan government established the office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) to support prerequisites and requirements of the UN systems including infrastructure and security, engagement of the Group of 77 (G77) and African states so as to protect against the weakening of UNEP¹¹². Another function of the office is the creation of opportunities for young professional Kenyans into the UN system¹¹³. Kenya supports the UN Security Council reforms to include a democratic and representative, it also supports actions that aim towards better representation of

¹⁰⁹ The Republic of Kenya, "Foreign Policy Framework", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009

¹¹⁰ Ibid pp25-32

¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Ibid

developing countries in the policy making organs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund¹¹⁴.

As a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Kenya continuous to support the DOHA Round which will result to fair trading practices, elimination of subsidies in agricultural products and improve market access¹¹⁵. Being a member of the Commonwealth, Kenya maintains close relations with the member states and as such disruption of the cordial relations is unlikely. Kenya has dominated the Commonwealth games in athletics and this has led to popularity of the Kenyan athletes and improved the image of the state. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has been a useful tool in the promotion of democracy, human rights, trade, investment, debt management, private sector development¹¹⁶. The Commonwealth Youth Fund has been instrumental in cultural and development cooperation¹¹⁷.

The Cotonou Agreement which was enforced from April 2003 looks to improve Kenya- European Union Partnership over the next 20 years. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will be Kenya's priority in the negotiations with the EU¹¹⁸. Kenya has interests in most of the states at a bilateral level due to its main exports which include Tea (21%), cut flowers (13%), coffee (6.1%), legumes (3.9%), passenger and cargo ships (1.8%)¹¹⁹ and as such it needs a robust international market. The top exporting states include Uganda (12.05%), Tanzania (12.03%), Netherlands (10.28%), United Kingdom (9.82%), United States of America (8.17%)¹²⁰ and its major income earner being tourism which can only be sustained through the steady inflow of tourists from other states. For a long time, revenues from tourism have contributed immensely to the GDP and due to this the state has a lot to lose when the industry is destabilized.

Kenya's top five imports are Refined Petroleum (19%), Packaged Medicaments (2.9%), Cars (2.8%), Delivery Trucks (2.1%), and Hot-Rolled Iron (2.1%)¹²¹. The top

¹¹⁴ Ibid

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/ken/>

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

importing states are India (26.85%), China (19.74%), South Africa (5.07%); Japan (4.59%), United Kingdom (4.3%)¹²². This puts it in a vulnerable position thus the need for tactful diplomatic engagements with states it imports from. The „Look East“ Foreign Policy has cemented relations with China, South Korea, Japan and other emerging economies. Kenya has remained the largest recipient of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Africa from Japan since 1986, the Tokyo International Conference on Africa's Development (TICAD) has provided a forum for Kenya's engagement and this continues to boost the countries opportunities for growth¹²³.

The Bi-laterals with China are continuously being strengthened through the China-Kenya Investment Forum 2006 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). With India, the Indo-Kenya Trade Agreement of March 1981, the India-Kenya Joint Trade Committee, the India-Kenya Joint Business Council and the Most Favoured Nation status the two have accorded each other are evidence of the deep and long relations between the two¹²⁴. India is Kenya's potential source for technology in the engineering, electronics, pharmaceuticals, Information Technology and a prospective market for its agricultural besides mineral projects¹²⁵. In the Americas, United States of America relations with Kenya since 2001 have been intimate at the political, economic and strategic levels. There has been cooperation in fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean seaboard¹²⁶. In Latin America, Brazil has been the focus through the establishment of the embassy in 2006 and also via the Brazil-Kenya Joint Commission for Cooperation¹²⁷.

Kenya pursues the observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as well as other regional groupings¹²⁸. Kenya-Israeli relations have been embedded in strategic cooperation for instance in arms trade, when the Israeli Defense forces rescue team came in the aid of Kenya during the 1998

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Ibid

terror attack¹²⁹. There has been cooperation through MASHAV- the Center for International Cooperation which is involved in training medical practitioners; the Israeli „Gadna“ experience has influenced the establishment of the Kenya National Youth Service¹³⁰. The new focus has been the engagement of Israeli“s investment in horticulture and tourism¹³¹.

2.4 The States Objectives

There are four objective states pursue according to Spanier¹³². These include:

- a. Security against possible external military threats. This ensures the preservation of a state“s territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence.
- b. Prestige-this is a state“s reputation for power among other states.

“It is subjective and intangible because it depends on the perception of other states- it means that it will not be challenged and will thus avoid war, may gain compliance with its demands, again without having to threaten or fight. A nation’s prestige may outlast its power. Prestige vanishes if as is likely, the waning state suffers a setback, the challenger acquires prestige¹³³.”

- c. National Welfare, this he refers to as the “Economic Pie” which needs to be expanded to the satisfaction of all stakeholders in a bid to avoid political instability and conflict arising out of frustration and uneven distribution of the resources.
- d. Promotion and protection of ideology, this is essential as it defines the role of the believing state in bringing about this future circumstance.

The objectives of Kenya are vividly expressed and summarized in Kenya“s Strategic Plan 2009-2013¹³⁴ which forms the basis of Kenya“s priorities, they include: Promotion of Economic development and prosperity through regional cooperation and strategic partnerships by the increase of capital inflow, harnessing the existing sources of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) whilst inviting new sources and improving technological

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Ibid

¹³² John Spanier, “Games Nations Play”, (7th Ed), Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1990, pp75-86

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ These were proclaimed during Institute of Security Studies(ISS) and Hanns Seidel Foundation(HSF) Seminar Report, “Kenya’s Foreign Policy and Geostrategic Interests”, held on the 10th May 2012 at the ISS Seminar Room.

advancement through suitable and sound technology; Enhancing Peace, Security and shared regional prosperity as the future of Kenya is tangled to the stability and development of Kenya's neighbors; Engaging in preventive diplomacy; combating international terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and Supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development¹³⁵.

At the domestic level, according to Maj. Gen. Mohammed H. Ali¹³⁶, who was the former Commissioner of Police, the role of the police force role was to provide an enabling environment for all economic activities since a guarantee of security translates into the confidence of both the local and foreign investor. The main objective of the Kibaki regime then was Poverty eradication and the improvement of the standard of living for each and every Kenyan¹³⁷. The role of the Administrative Police as the implementer of Government initiatives prioritized The Constitution of Kenya, The National Development Plan 2002-2008, The Performance Improvement Policy Strategy in the public service 2002, The Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth and employment creation 2003-2007¹³⁸. This reflects the objectives of the state at the time and the realization of these plans would address the root causes of crime in the country.

2.5 Threats to the state

According to the National Intelligence Service Bill, 2012¹³⁹ "threat " means –

- a. Any activity relating to espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, organized crime, or intention of any such activity directed against, or detrimental to the integrity, sovereignty, economic well-being or other national interests of Kenya and includes any other activity performed in conjunction with any activity relating to espionage, sabotage, organized crime, terrorism or subversion;
- b. any activity directed at undermining, or directed at or intended to bring about the destruction or overthrow by unlawful means of the constitutionally established system of government in the Republic;

¹³⁵ Republic of Kenya, "*Foreign Policy Framework*", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009

¹³⁶ The Kenya Police, "*Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police 2004*", p1

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Administration Police Strategic Plan 2004-2009.p22

¹³⁹ National Intelligence Service Bill 2012

- c. any act or threat of violence or unlawful harm that is directed at or intended to achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic objective or change in Kenya and includes any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit any such act or threat; and
- d. any actions or intentions of foreign powers within or outside Kenya that is detrimental to national security and is clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to the well-being of the Republic and its citizens or any other person lawfully resident in Kenya; But does not include any lawful advocacy, protest or dissent unless carried out in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d);

2.5.1 Domestic threats

The former National Security Intelligence Service Director, Michael Gichangi in 2012, mentioned the following threats to Kenya's national interest and security, these are: the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and the experimentation of democracy. He argued that "We have expanded democracy without institutional capacity to manage democratic space"¹⁴⁰. The Police force in 2004 identified the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as a major factor in the fight against crime¹⁴¹, and this was attributed to the porosity of the borders¹⁴². Other threats include reduced economic growth leading to unemployment and poverty, regional instability in the neighboring states, technological stagnation, increasing gun culture¹⁴³. The Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 2004, Mr. Joseph Kamau, identified terrorism, cyber-crime, trafficking of human beings, money laundering as new threats that led to the need for more training to officers in the department¹⁴⁴.

The 2007 post- elections violence though unique from the previous electoral related violence brought out issues that have over time continued to ail the state. The Waki Report for instance identified the growing politicization and proliferation of violence and

¹⁴⁰ http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000059565&story_title=Gichangi-says-MRC-threat-to-security

¹⁴¹ The Kenya Police, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police 2004".pp ix-xi

¹⁴² Administrative Police Strategic Plan 2004-2009.p13

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ The Kenya Police, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police 2004",p67

the growing power and personalization of power around the Presidency¹⁴⁵, in addition the Akiwumi Report argues that even though the promise of getting land from those who were displaced was used to entice youth into violence, the desire for political power and not land hunger was the causal factor¹⁴⁶. The ethnicization of politics has led to a grave lack of State unity and lack of a national identity for Kenya. Political alignments are largely along tribal lines, this is reflected in the composition of members of the political parties where majority belong to a particular tribe and are used as vehicles for tribe prosperity especially in appointments to senior government positions. This practice of nepotism and discrimination, stirs up tensions among different tribes, which politicians take advantage of especially during periods of election campaign leading to clashes politically motivated.

Insurgency as a threat can be said to have been dealt with though the underlying issues behind the insurgencies are yet to be fully addressed, the main cause being land. For instance the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) which was formed in reaction to the land redistribution plans in the western region of Kenya¹⁴⁷. Between 2006 and 2008 the insurgent group hurled an insurgency against the government to discontinue the eviction of people from Mount Elgon land and they ended up attacking people who were suspected of siding with the government¹⁴⁸. Despite the military defeat by the joint Police and Kenya Defense Forces in 2008 operation “Okoka Maisha” resulting to the execution of the core members, the group began charging illegal taxes, attacking though with less intensity, and defacing among those who had refused to comply¹⁴⁹. The Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) with similar notions of secession in the coastal region were also silenced using military force, though land issues continue to play a big part in the insecurity experienced and politics.

¹⁴⁵ The Waki Report, pp 22-35

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Responses to Information Requests”, 25 September 2012... see http://www.justice.gov/eoir/VII/country/canada_coi/kenya/KEN104194.E.pdf

¹⁴⁸ Ibid

¹⁴⁹ Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2010. Chapter 6. “Marginalisation and the Rise of Militia Groups in Kenya: The Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force.” By Adams Oloo in “Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa”. See <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/MilitiasRebelsIslamistMilitantsNov2010.pdf>

With the advancement of technology in the twenty first century, cyber security defined by the Kenya Cyber Security Report 2014 (KCSR) as “the security of the cyberspace providing guidance to address issues arising from the gaps between different security domains in the cyberspace environment while at the same time providing an infrastructure for collaboration. It focuses on addressing the need for efficient and effective information sharing, co-ordination and incident handling amongst the four stakeholders.”¹⁵⁰ This has become a priority to the government as cyber- crime has contributed to a loss of 2 billion Shillings annually¹⁵¹. Financial fraud being at the top of the list of Cyber –crimes, is attributed to the proliferation of bandwidth down to the grassroots which in turn opens up the country to the world and affects the economy in terms of financial losses¹⁵². The specific cyber threats 2012/2013 include Insider threats, VoIP PBX Fraud, Social Media, Denial of Service Attacks, Botnet Attacks, Online and Mobile Attacks, Mobile Money Fraud, Cyber Espionage.

A clear indication of the vulnerability of the state to these kind of threats have been evidenced when the Banking Regulators website was hacked in July 2013 by hackers claiming to be from the Gaza region, the effect was that the site’s exchange rate section had been flooded by messages in French and English in a Marquee that scrolled through the site¹⁵³. Another incident was the hacking of the Ministry of Transport’s site in March 2014. The image that welcomed visitors to the website read: “*All Muslims are together, the CYBER WAR will be appeared all countries which are not respecting Islam*”¹⁵⁴. The Social Media has been a platform for Al-Shabaab to spread its propaganda and empower internal factions providing a voice of dissension where group members, Somali citizens and the globe can access- this was projected during the live tweeting by the group during the Westgate Mall Attack in 2013¹⁵⁵.

Cyber bullying has become a concern for many Kenyans online, the increase in use of text messages and emails to spread rumors, postings on social networking sites,

¹⁵⁰ Kenya Cyber Security Report 2014 (KCSR) “*Rethinking Cyber Security- An Integrated Approach: Processes, Intelligence and Monitoring*”, Serianu Cyber Threat Command Centre, 2014.

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³ Kenya Cyber Security Report 2014, Op Cit.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

shaming pictures, videos, websites and fake profiles of high profile individuals and politicians¹⁵⁶. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission Act of 2008 criminalizes hate speech, however there is absence of a dedicated Social Media Law and for that reason the Social Media will continue to be a source of threat to the society which is fragmented along ethnic lines. The refugee problem at the Dadaab Camp is a State concern, the rate of inflow is at 6,000 refugees per month from Somalia exceeding the limit set which is 90,000 to the current number which stands at about 500,000, and the effect of this has been food insecurity, leading to drought that has afflicted the region¹⁵⁷.

2.5.2 Regional Threats

The East African states constitute a diverse group yet interconnected. The security concerns in the region include: the volatility of the Somalia Situation, the Conflict in Darfur, stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Djibouti-Eritrea Conflict, Piracy off the coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden, Post-Referendum issues between Sudan and South-Sudan which includes border demarcation and the status of Abyei, Civil conflicts among Islands of Comoros, restive state of affairs along the border between Rwanda and DR Congo¹⁵⁸. The situation in Somalia ceased to be a regional issue and is now a concern to the state; however Kenya cannot handle the situation by itself due to the financial capacity of the State.

The reasons for the intervention according to Throup¹⁵⁹ include: cross-border attacks by free-lance Somali criminals that acted as the immediate trigger (these attacks were the murder of a British tourist and capturing of the wife, the abduction of a Frenchwoman who later passed on in captivity and the kidnapping of two Spanish aid-workers from the Dadaab refugee camp in September/October 2011); concern about the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya which is traced to the 1990s; worsening condition in the northern pastoralists region of Kenya, personal economic and political interests of senior Kenyan

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

¹⁵⁷ David W. Throup, "Kenya's Intervention in Somalia", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 16, 2012..see www.csis.org

¹⁵⁸ African Development Bank, "Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011-2015", September 2011.

¹⁵⁹ David W. Throup, "Kenya's Intervention in Somalia", Op Cit.

politicians and soldiers from North Eastern Ogadeni Somali community. Other indirect causes that are seen to have led to the realization of Operation Linda Nchi are the recurrent raids by Ethiopian Armed groups in Turkana with substantial slaughter of Kenyans and livestock theft over the past year, the standoff with Uganda over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria and the Yoweri Museveni's derogatory remarks concerning the Kenya Defense Forces as being respectable for military parades and football competitions¹⁶⁰.

The Kibaki regime was determined to restore order in the country's northern marches where security had deteriorated since an Ethiopian attack on Al-Shabaab forces in 2010, this was intended due to the construction of a deep-water port at Lamu to serve as the terminus of new pipelines from Uganda and South Sudan costing about 30 billion dollars over the next 30 years. The consequences of the involvement have been: Increase in the Kenya Annual Defense expenditure from about 800 million dollars to about 1 Billion dollars, topping all other states within the region; the financial burden and casualties which stands at about 180 million dollars and 50 deaths per month; grave consequences on the economy of the North Eastern region and in the tourist sanctuary of Lamu county where local fishing industry has been completely tampered with¹⁶¹.

2.5.3 International Threats

The threats from the international system cannot be neglected in this century where globalisation has been a catalyst to crimes. Among the threats that affect Kenya include:

2.5.3.1 International Terrorism

International Terrorism effects on Kenya began with the 1998 Bombings of the U.S.A Embassy, thereafter in 2002, a Bomb at the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa led to the death of 16 people. Before Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, Kenya was not a direct target of the terrorists attack and the effects to the citizens were more of a collateral damage. After the intervention of the Armed forces into Somalia Kenya has been a direct recipient of bombings targeting private property such as the four-day Westgate Siege which

¹⁶⁰ Institute for Security Studies and Hanns Seidel Foundation Seminar Report 2012, Op Cit.

¹⁶¹ Ibid

resulted to the death of 67 civilians and wounded hundreds- an attack that culminated as a result of efforts by Al-Shabaab and its Kenyan affiliation Al-Hijra¹⁶², other attacks after the Westgate range from churches to „matatus“ as such instilling fear in the man in the streets. Other issues supplementing these attacks include the radicalization of the youth at a time when there is high unemployment rate, porous borders and corrupt officials at the borders which hasten the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

2.5.3.2 Piracy

Piracy in itself was among the reasons that led to the intervention to secure economic interests with the main target being the control of the port of Kismayu which has been the main source of revenue for the Al-Shabaab who controlled the fishing activities and affected the flow of ships into the Port of Mombasa. Figures calculated by Inchcape Shipping Services, based in East Africa¹⁶³ approximated the costs of imports and exports having risen dramatically as a result of the piracy surge that led to the addition of shipping tariffs, since insurance companies have had to bloat their fees to account for the risk involved to traversing pirate invested waters. In 2008 a total of 35 cruise ships called at Kenya ports, with optimisms that these numbers may grow to 50. Since then, the number of cruise liners operating in Kenyan waters has dwindled to zero. The Kenyan Economy was forfeiting an income of about US \$ 15million a year.¹⁶⁴ The effect of this on "Wanjiku" is food price inflation as the fishing industry is under threat hence a cause for alarm on the food security situation of the state¹⁶⁵.

2.5.3.3 International Migration

International migration arises due to factors including but not limited to the pursuit for greener pastures, maltreatment by the home government, civil violence as a consequence of poor leadership, natural disasters as well as environmental stress. A threat arises to the sending country as they may re-group and overthrow the government and to

¹⁶² See <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13509/strategic-posture-review-kenya>

¹⁶³ Figures elucidated in email correspondence between Inchcape Shipping Services and the Kenya Maritime Authority, as provided for by the latter.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

the accepting state they may lead to the alteration of ethnic balances thus disrupting identity or generate crime. The consequence of International migration to Kenya are not limited to drug trafficking, terrorism, poaching. The Kenya Wildlife Service with the help of INTERPOL- an international policing organization is tracking the modus operandi of criminals who are involved in smuggling of narcotics and bullion hidden in shipments of wildlife artifacts as well as fraudulent passport applications. For instance in August of 2009, Operation Mamba II- a combined operation involving Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania targeting counterfeit medical products, resulted in 83 police cases being opened and the prosecution of a number of individuals suspected of being involved in the illicit trafficking of medical products. The operation got strong backing from the World Health Organization and International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (IMPACT)¹⁶⁶.

The presence of the shared Kenya-Ethiopia and Somalia border turns into a safe haven for armed groups- criminal gangs and militia who commit acts of violence and then cross to the safety of their home country and disappear¹⁶⁷. The “Bermuda triangle” for instance (that is Near Mandera), is unpatrolled, ungoverned and porous. Somali militias enter Kenya in pursuit of rival combatants and Somali Armed Bandits take the same risk when mounting a cross border raid¹⁶⁸. Further south Somali armed bandits have until recently stolen vehicles and even looted the Kenyan Police station at Liboi and then moved back to Doble¹⁶⁹. Another dimension to view the conflict is Nationalism espoused by Jingoism. This can be characterized into Diaspora annexing nationalism, Hegemonic nationalism, Oppressive nationalism, Ethnic nationalism. Relevant to Kenya is Diaspora annexing nationalism which happens when the main factor is unification of national brethren – a common observation in Part Nation-States such as Somalia.

The Shifta War between Kenya and Somalia was as a result of the native Somalis’ quest to unite with the other Somali’s who were, after Kenya’s independence, considered citizens of the State. Hence their efforts for unification and secession were considered as threats to territorial integrity of Kenya. However over time there has been some form of

¹⁶⁶ Information obtained from www.interpol.org

¹⁶⁷ [www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20(2).pdf)

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

clandestine communication between the Somalis in Kenya and those in Somalia and consequently smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons to aid in an effort to cause terror and anxiety in the citizens and government of Kenya through attacks in populous zones such as Nairobi and Mombasa¹⁷⁰. Contemporary political systems or representation, voting, administration, rights and land access in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia are increasingly based explicitly or implicitly based on ethnicity¹⁷¹. The result is not only pandemic of localized and partial but insidious ethnic cleansing, but also a hardening of previously fluid ethnic identities in the region, and a level of ethnic mobilization not seen previously in the area¹⁷². The present-day environment of ethno-politics in the border area is an existential crisis with massive consequences¹⁷³.

2.5.3.4 Climate Change

In a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in the spring of 2013, 57% of Kenyans identified climate change as a major threat to the state¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁵. Furthermore the International Food Policy Research Institute reported that the shifting rainfall patterns as a result of global warming are expected to change the distribution of cereal crop yields by 2050¹⁷⁶. The report also cautions that various areas of the heavily populated Rift Valley in yields of the staple crop maize, which could devastate some subsistence farming communities and initiate new short term ethnic and land-based conflict¹⁷⁷. Environmental issues as a result of climate change are a source of conflict between and within states. Relevant to Kenya are concerns like water scarcity which reduce economic performance of the state, agricultural production, hunger and poverty.

A contemporary example is the Kenya-Somali border dispute where growing evidence suggests that the poorer tier of pastoralist households are increasingly facing

¹⁷⁰ [www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20(2).pdf)

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² Ibid

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ See <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/11/08/despite-challenges-africans-are-optimistic-about-the-future>

¹⁷⁵ <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13509/strategic-posture-review-kenya>

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98782/in-kenya-climate-change-could-create-new-breadbaskets>

¹⁷⁷ <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98782/in-kenya-climate-change-could-create-new-breadbaskets>

immiseration¹⁷⁸. Destitute pastoralists form an important portion of the new urban populations where prospects for employment are bleak¹⁷⁹. Heightened communal anxiety over access to scarce resources- pasture, wells, jobs are easily exploited by politicians and others to promote divisions and foment violence¹⁸⁰. Environmental degradation of the Delta is also leading to a changing habitation in the region which forces the Dasaanage (Merrille) of Ethiopia to encroach more onto Kenyan territory as the Delta expands¹⁸¹. Some of the Ethiopian Dasaanage live 8-12 kilometers inside Kenya¹⁸². Furthermore drought and its associated scarcity of resources forces Turkanas to migrate towards Ethiopia for fishing and access to markets for purchases of food from their agro-pastoral neighbors. The concentration of the two communities over water and pasture has often led to clashes.

2.6 Chapter Summary

Having looked at the prerequisites into the process of coming up with a National Security Strategy, it is evident that the process should be inclusive in terms of the stakeholders. The threats, interests, objectives are connected and multiple ways to address the issues should be considered, this includes military and non-military ways to address the most pressing concerns facing the state. Other issues facing the state include International Financial Markets which affect directly the speed of business locally and regionally. The International Energy Market is one which has led to inflation and dependency which makes the state vulnerable upon any significant changes. The cases at the International Criminal Court which have led to strained diplomatic relations between Kenya and the West have led to political consequences such as the abstention from voting by France, Britain and the U.S.A in the United Nations Security Council in November 2013¹⁸³. Kenyan diplomats faulted the three of “humiliating Africa” and “reckless abdication of global leadership” in a vote that would have led to the deferral of

¹⁷⁸ [www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20(2).pdf)

¹⁷⁹ Ibid

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_603.pdf.

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13509/strategic-posture-review-kenya>

Kenyatta's trial for a period of one year¹⁸⁴. There is urgent need for a holistic approach in identifying and coming up with a solution that will save the state as soon as possible.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

CHAPTER THREE

UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will outline the fundamentals that have shaped the National Security Strategies of the United States. The period 2000-2013 will cover the three administrations: The Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration's priorities and focus points during their reign respectively.

3.2 Democratic Peace Theory

A theory that seems to have guided the strategies for the three presidents is the Democratic Peace Theory rooted in Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace". The theory argues that Peace is a reasonable consequence of the relations of states with a republican system of government¹⁸⁵. The republican constitution "gives a favourable prospect for the desired consequence, that is, perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that, they should be cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war"¹⁸⁶. On the concern between democracy and republican form of government, he argues that "the mode of government is incomparably more important to the people than the form of sovereignty"¹⁸⁷ - in this case democracy.

Kant's paradigm differentiates through certain criteria authoritarian, non-democratic, autocratic forms from the democratic form of government. The distinction being that a republican form of government is based on the rule of law that is governed in a representative manner through a separation of powers, esteem for human rights, interdependent social and economic relations. Together these criteria are indispensable

¹⁸⁵ Jeff Pugh, "Democratic Peace Theory: A Review and Evaluation", Centre for Mediation, Peace, Resolution of Conflict International, (CEMPROC) Working Paper Series, In Peace, Conflict and Development, April 2005. See the link <http://www.cemproc.org/democraticpeaceCWPS.pdf>

¹⁸⁶ Immanuel Kant, "*Perpetual Peace*", On History translated by L.W. Beck, R.E. Anchor and E. Fackenheim (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) p97

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

and adequate to create stable peace between the two states with the confidence that this peace will withstand according to Kant¹⁸⁸.

John Owens also contends that “liberals view foreign states with prejudice. Prima facie, they believe that, irrespective of physical capability, liberal states are safe and illiberal states potentially dangerous. The ground of this belief is the premise that states whose governments respect their citizens’ autonomy will behave rationally and responsibly while coercive governments may not”¹⁸⁹. Another trend noticed is that there is a better acknowledgement of the wideners and deepeners schools of thought and a shift from the narrower and traditional view. This is demonstrated during the Obama administration where there is more focus on domestic security as the corner stone in ensuring international security. The Clinton and Bush administration focussed more in dealing with international security issues and the result especially during the Bush administration was economic instability within the state.

3.3 The Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy-1999

The strategy was drafted and presented by December 1999, with the main objectives being to enhance America’s security, bolster America’s economic prosperity and promote democracy and human rights abroad¹⁹⁰. The strategic priorities of the Key strategist- The president were: to promote peace and security in important regions around the world; creation of more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and competitive trading structure that also profits others across the world; increase the cooperation in fighting security vulnerabilities locally and internationally; protection of the environment and health of U.S. citizens and firming up the intelligence, military, diplomatic, law enforcement apparatuses needed to meet the challenges faced¹⁹¹.

The strategists recognized the following as the National Interests. The categorization of the interests falls into vital interests, important interests, Humanitarian and Other interests. The vital interests are described as “those of broad, overriding importance to the

¹⁸⁸ Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997 pp286-287.

¹⁸⁹ John M. Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War*, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1997.

¹⁹⁰ Section 603 of the Goldwater- Nichols Defense Department Re-organization Act of 1986.

¹⁹¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, *“A National Security Strategy for a New Century”*, December 1999

survival, safety and vitality of our nation, the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well-being of our society and the protection of our critical infrastructures including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems and emergency services from paralyzing attack”¹⁹². The important national interests are “those that affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. For example the regions in which we have sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows. Our efforts to halt the flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in that country, our participation in NATO operations to end the brutal conflicts and restore peace in Bosnia and Kosovo and our assistance to Asian allies and friends supporting the transition in East Timor are examples”¹⁹³.

The humanitarian and other interests are for instance “responding to natural and man-made disasters, promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights, supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military, assisting humanitarian demining and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection”¹⁹⁴. The spread of democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and interests. Whenever possible, we seek to avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a range of partners, including other governments, international institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations. This may save lives but also prevent crises from getting worse and becoming a greater drain on resources”¹⁹⁵.

The strategists also acknowledged the following as threats to the U.S. These were categorized as Regional or State-Centered Threats, Transnational threats, spread of dangerous technologies, failed states, foreign intelligence collection and lastly environmental and health threats. The identified regional or state-centered threats are the countries with capabilities and aspiration to jeopardize national interests through either coercion or aggression, threaten the sovereignty of their neighbors, their economic

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Ibid

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Ibid

stability, international access to resources, those states that improve their offensive capabilities including efforts to obtain or retain nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the capabilities to deliver these weapons over long distances¹⁹⁶.

The trans-national fears include terrorism, drug, human, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration as well as cyber- attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage to critical infrastructure which could come from terrorists or criminal and hostile groups. The spread of dangerous technologies was mainly concerned with Weapons of Mass Destruction which could inflict danger to the U.S citizens, allies and even troops abroad¹⁹⁷. The recognition of failed states as a threats came from the fact that they can threaten regional and U.S interests. The definition of failed states according to the strategy is “states that cannot provide basic governance, safety, security and opportunities for their populations, generating internal conflict, mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases, environmental disasters, mass killings and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups¹⁹⁸”.

With regard to foreign intelligence collection the strategy identifies both traditional and modern intelligence techniques used against American military, diplomatic, technological, economic and commercial secrets. Environmental and health issues are perceived dangerous since they can undermine citizens’ welfare and compromise the economic and humanitarian interests abroad for generations. For instance, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Polio, which are likely to lead to the loss of lives on a scale only real in wars or terrorist activities¹⁹⁹. The strategy outlines that the U.S must be a leader abroad as it would guarantee security at home, hence the engagement mechanism was the devotion of resources to military, diplomatic, intelligence, so as to remain a reliable security partner for the international system even though the international community is reluctant to act at times²⁰⁰. The engagement was set to be selective, focusing on threats and opportunities that are most relevant to the interests so that the greatest difference can be

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ Ibid

gained²⁰¹. To effectively shape the international environment, the tools of foreign policy, that is, diplomacy, military force and domestic preparedness efforts ought to be prepared to act alone despite the enhanced international cooperation with allies and the UN System²⁰².

3.4 The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy-2002

"Our Nation's course has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace- a peace that favours liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent" -President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002.

A key event that shaped the thinking of the strategist was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York. Just as Roosevelt's, the basis for the strategy comes from the shock of surprise. The events of 7th December 1941 revealed that distance alone could not protect Americans from physical attack at the hands of inimical states whereas the events of 9/11 made it clear that deterrence against states give insufficient safeguard against attacks by a bunch of criminals who can impose the kind of destruction only states fighting wars could be capable of achieving²⁰³. The lesson learned was that weak states like Afghanistan can pose as great danger to the interests of strong states. It noted that poverty does not make poor people turn into terrorists and murderers however poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels²⁰⁴.

The strategy firmly outlined that nations have responsibilities and hence for freedom to prosper there ought to be accountability. Those that enjoy freedom must fight terror, those that depended on international stability must aid in the prevention of the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and those that seek international aid must govern themselves wisely so as to spend the money responsibly²⁰⁵. The following were ways in

²⁰¹ Ibid

²⁰² Ibid

²⁰³ John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term", in "Foreign Affairs", January-February 2005, Vol. 84, No. 1.pp 2-15

²⁰⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002

²⁰⁵ Ibid

which the goals of the strategy were to be achieved, they include: championing ambitions for human dignity; strengthening alliances to overcome global terrorism and labour to prevent attacks against us and our allies and friends; working with others to resolve regional conflicts; prevention of the enemy's attack on U.S., its allies and friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction; ignition of a new age of global economic growth by means of free markets and free trade; expansion of the circle of development by opening societies and putting together the infrastructure of democracy; developing agendas for cooperative action with other centres of global power and the transformation of America's National Security institutions to encounter the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century²⁰⁶.

3.5 The Second Bush Administration's National Security Strategy- 2006

The second strategy Bush had a chance at informing was at the height of the war on terror which was characterised by the policy of pre-emption. John Ikenberry argues that "this created the appearance of a global policeman who reports to no higher authority and no longer allows locks on citizen's doors"²⁰⁷. The strategy came about at a point when the administration had worked to win multi-lateral support for its first act of pre-emption for preventive purposes but ended up gaining less support than expected. The following were among the reasons for failure of international support for the Invasion in Iraq: "the outdated structure of the United Nations Security Council which better reflected the balance of power of 1945 than 2003; the appearance Bush gave of having decided to go to war with or without that body's consent; the difficulty of establishing a credible connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda; the absence of incontrovertible evidence that the Iraqi dictator really did have Weapons of Mass Destruction; the distrust that lingered from Bush's unnecessarily harsh rejections of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty"²⁰⁸.

Forging ahead with the second strategy, Bush sought more assertive and hardline means to approach his second and last term of his presidency. This can be ascertained in the strategy where it upheld that America faces a choice between the path of fear and the

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term", Op. Cit.

²⁰⁸ Ibid

path of confidence. The path of fear symbolized by isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment and this mode appealed to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. The path of confidence which the key strategist sought for choose leadership over isolationism, the quest of free trade and open markets above protectionism, the pursuit of the foes abroad rather than waiting for them to reach in our country, the resolve to shape the globe and not be merely shaped by it and to impact events for the better instead of being at their clemency²⁰⁹.

The strategy recognized a new threat, the threat of totalitarian ideology not grounded in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion that advocates for intolerance, terror, repression, murder and enslavement²¹⁰. In responding to the threats, the strategy only added one new move on top of the previous ones in the 2002 strategy, that is, the engagement of opportunities and confrontation of the challenges of globalization²¹¹.

3.6 The Obama Administration's National Security Strategy-2010

The strategy Obama brought forth took a different direction focusing on the homeland security, welfare of the citizens as the foundation to lead abroad, this is unlike the Bush Administration where his insistence on democratizing middle-east to achieve relief from terrorists and achieve security resulted in the economic crisis in the country. Obama sought to grow the economy and reduce the deficit, develop clean energy that can power new industry and unbind the U.S from foreign oil while saving the planet, pursue science and research that enables discovery and project innovation as America's foundation of power²¹². The strategy while calling for a comprehensive range of national actions and a broad conception of what constitutes national security underscored: the essence of commitment to the renewal of the economy which is among the main sources of American power; provision of quality education for children; enhancement of science and innovation; transformation the energy economy into creation of new jobs and industries; lowering the cost of healthcare for the people and businesses and reduction of the Federal deficit²¹³.

²⁰⁹ The United States of America National Security Strategy, 2006

²¹⁰ Ibid

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² The United States of America National Security Strategy-2010

²¹³ Ibid

The whole of government approach initiated would complement efforts of integrating homeland security with national security including the unified coordination among Federal, State and local governments in the prevention, protection against and response to the threats and natural disasters²¹⁴. The approach prioritized Defense, Diplomacy, Development, Homeland Security, Economic, Intelligence, Strategic Communication, The American People and the private sector²¹⁵. The national interests identified by the strategy take in: the security of the U.S, its citizens, and U.S allies and partners; a sturdy, innovative and rising U.S. Economy in an open international system that upholds opportunity and prosperity; reverence for universal values at domestically and around the world; and an international order influenced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through resilient collaborations to meet global challenges²¹⁶.

3.7 Chapter Summary

The strategies of the USA have taken an external approach believing that the security of the state comes from securing other regions across the globe; this subordination of internal issues has now been elevated and has become the premise for the current strategies especially during the Obama administration. From the Clinton to Obama strategy, there is insistence of the values of the U.S.A. as the foundation of the objectives. The Clinton strategy underpinned American leadership as the muscle of the democratic ideals and values, it states that the spread of democracy, advocacy for human rights, and respect for the rule of law not only reflects the values of Americans but advances both the prosperity and peace²¹⁷. The Bush Strategy states that “the U.S.A will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity”²¹⁸.

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ Ibid

²¹⁶ Ibid

²¹⁷ The United States of America National Security Strategy-1999

²¹⁸ The United States of America National Security Strategy-2002

CHAPTER FOUR

A COMPARISON OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF KENYA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the differences and similarities of the National Security Strategies of Kenya and the United States of America. The areas that will be assessed include the definitions of National Security Strategy, the policy frameworks, the instruments of security and the actors involved in the process of National Security Strategy.

4.2 The Definition and Scope of National Security Strategy

A National Security Strategy for the Americans is a document which according to the National Security Act of 1947, section 108 (b) serves the purpose of comprehensive description and discussion on:

1. Worldwide interests, goals and objectives that are vital to the national security
2. The Foreign Policy, worldwide commitments and national defense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and to implement the National Security Strategy
3. The proposed short and long term uses of the political, economic, military and other elements of power to protect or promote the interest and achieve the goals and objectives as in paragraph (1)
4. The adequacy of the capabilities to carry out the National Security Strategy including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power to support the implementation of the National Security Strategy
5. Such other information as may be necessary to help inform congress on matters relating to the National Security Strategy

Dale describes an effective National Security Strategy for the USA as one that: sharpens priorities and refines approaches; provides a single shared vision for all concerned agencies; clarifies the various roles and responsibilities of all agencies so as to effectively plan and resource; offers a coherent baseline for congressional oversight; communicates the state's intent to key audiences; covers an array of concerns such as

economy, energy, environment and traditional military affairs²¹⁹. It is worth noting that the Obama Strategy has taken a deeper and wider approach to security issues focussing more on homeland affairs and has emphasized the need to be strong at home so as to lead abroad. This can also be seen in the policies adopted for instance the Obama Healthcare Reforms and Immigration to which he has actively supported amidst criticism from the Republicans in the Senate where they hold the majority of the seats following the Mid-term elections.

For Kenya, there is no legislation that defines what a National Security Strategy is or meant to achieve. However there has been mention of the term National Security Strategy among the elite in parliament. For instance the “National Security Strategy of “Prevent, Deter and Defeat” for the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia”²²⁰. This was during a discussion concerning the financing of the security agencies and the need to be accountable especially for the security organs. The other mention of the National Security Strategy was by the President, Uhuru Kenyatta during the High Level Seminar on National Security Strategy where he mentioned that the document should contain: the clarification of the security context within which the state operates; coherent national aspirations and plans; identification of elements of power and resources; and ultimately bring forth the optimal output and impact to the state²²¹. He continued that, Strategy should be informed by the real and present reality of pervasive security threats and calibrate available resources and elements of power against clearly identified priorities and desired ends²²².

The scope of the Strategy in Kenya should also recognize the homeland issues as core, this is for instance among the expectations by the President appreciating the nature of threats from geography, demography, economic conditions, lack of elite consensus on National Security, pursuits of powerful global state and non-state actors, ineffectiveness

²¹⁹ Catherine Dale, “National Security Strategy: The Mandates, Execution to date and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, August 6th, 2013.

²²⁰ The National Assembly, Official Report, Tuesday 12th July 2005.

²²¹ The President’s Speech on National Security Strategy, During a High Level Seminar on National Security Strategy at Kenya School of Government, October 31, 2014. See www.president.go.ke/president-speech-on-national-security-strategy/

²²² Ibid

and weakness in functions and capabilities of the state²²³. Strategy should also encompass the fundamental capabilities and aspirations of the state which include a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, management of public finances, effective administrative control, delineation of citizenship rights and duties, investment in human capital, formation of the market, provision of infrastructure, entering into international agreements and public borrowing, the means to enforce the rule of law as well as the management of the assets of the state including but not limited to natural resources, environmental and cultural assets²²⁴.

4.3 The Policy and Legal Framework

The Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, changed the frequency of the National Security Strategy Report to an annual submission. It is now well documented in the National Security Act of 1947, Section 108 (a) as amended by the Goldwater Nichols Act 1986(amending title 50, Chapter 15, Section 404a of the US Code) :

1. The President shall transmit to congress each year a comprehensive report on the National Security Strategy
2. The National Security Strategy Report shall be submitted on the date on which the President submits to congress the budget for the next fiscal year
3. The National Security Strategy Report shall be submitted not later than 150 days after the date on which the President takes office

The Act goes on to specify in Section 108 (c) that each National Security Strategy Report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. On the contrary, the submissions of the National Security Strategy Report have not been in accordance with the law. From the year 1987 till 2000, there was a yearly submission except 1989 and 1992. However the George W. Bush Administration submitted two in September of 2002 and March 2006 while the Obama Administration has submitted two in May 2010 and May 2013. The debate on frequency has had various responses, while some advocating

²²³ Ibid

²²⁴ Ibid

for a submission once per four years²²⁵ while others arguing that the broad contours of the global security do not change significantly to necessitate an overhaul of the state's outlook as frequent²²⁶.

In Kenya, the closest to a National Security Strategy Report is that submitted annually by the National Security Council in Accordance with Section 16 of the National Security Council Act of 2012 and most specifically Article 240 (7) of the Constitution which states that "The Council shall report annually to parliament on the state of security of Kenya". Since the inauguration of the new government under the 2010 constitution there has been only one Report to Parliament covering 2013.

4.4 Synchronization of the National Security Strategy

In this area, both states have had inconsistencies and uncoordinated approaches. For instance, the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Report (QDR) with its embedded National Defence Strategy was issued in September 2001 before the G.W. Bush Administration issued its first National Security Strategy in September 2002²²⁷. The National Military Strategy followed later in 2004 and its publication preceded the National Defense Strategy in March 2005 sowing lack of coherence²²⁸. Ideally, the National Security Strategy might inform the Quadrennial Defence Report (QDR) and its National Defence Strategy(NDS), which ought to inform the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), these should inform the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review(QDDR) the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review(QHSR) and the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review(QICR), consequently after cross-reference to ensure that no conceptual gaps or overlaps appear in the final implementation of the National Security Strategy²²⁹.

The case of Kenya is no difference, there has been a large disconnect in the security agencies namely the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence Service and the

²²⁵ The "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), recommended placing the legislative requirement for an annual National Security Strategy with one for a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) conducted by the National Security Staff.

²²⁶ Ibid

²²⁷ Catherine Dale, Op Cit.

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Ibid

National Police Service leading to uncoordinated and ineffective response during emergencies such as the Westgate Mall Attack on 21st September 2013²³⁰. This is also noted from the State of the Nation Address by the President where he highlighted the need for coordination and collaboration from the institutions that seek to preserve state and national security²³¹. Ideally, the National Security Strategy should be the blueprint and manual from which the National Defence Strategy (NDS), the National Intelligence Service Strategy (NISS) and the National Police Service Strategy (NPSS) should find their existence and breathe.

4.5 Prioritization and Assignments of Roles and Responsibilities

This area is another mutual concern where there is lack of clarity on which institution should play which part when it comes to the National Security Strategy. For instance the case of the USA, the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG) named ten priority missions however lacking the specific actors to carry out the missions²³². This caused frustration and suggestions calling for the institutionalization of National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG)- an internal and classified team at the national level, this could be a product of a Strategic Review Process that might lead to an unclassified strategic guidance eventually satisfying the two audiences in one broad effort-i.e. the internal and external²³³.

This idea in the Kenyan case shows that the role of the National Security Council under Article 4 (1)(b) in the National Security Council Act as to “prioritize the programs or activities that address the internal, foreign and defense interests on the National Security of the Republic”. The council is also mandated under Article 4 (1)(e) of the same Act as to “identify and develop strategies to enable the security organs to respond to internal and external threats to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. These provisions give the Council powers to assign roles and responsibilities to the Security

²³⁰ Peter Aling’o, “Politics and Terrorism: Kenya’s ticking time bombs”, ISS Today, 4 July 2014. see <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/politicking-with-insecurity-and-terrorism-the-ticking-time-bombs-that-kenya-must-confront>

²³¹ The State of the Nation Address, 27th March 2014 by the President, Uhuru Kenyatta at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi. see http://www.apsea.or.ke/index.php/documents/cat_view/24-president-speeches

²³² Catherine Dale Op. Cit.

²³³ Ibid , (Interviews with Department of Defence, 2011, 2012, 2013)

organs hence coherent approaches towards the National Security Strategy implementation. This backed by Article 240 (3) of the Constitution which states that “The Council shall exercise supervisory control over National Security Organs and perform any other functions prescribed by National legislation”. With the composition of the National Security Council being very inclusive, there is no doubt that the implementation process will be orderly and logical.

4.6 Strategy and Resourcing

Strategy is authoritative and powerful only when it is able to shape budgetary decision making procedures and processes²³⁴. The issue on money versus security and which comes first is an endless one similar to the hen and the egg argument. The art of strategy is displayed in the management of the little resources available to a state so as to meet the desired ends identified by the state. The strategists here need to look at the list of objectives set out by the political elites and the nation at large, consider the resources at their disposal and the instruments they will use to implement the strategy and satisfy the needs and wants of the state. As the economy of a state grows so are its needs and in terms of security specifically. In Kenya for instance, the increase in the Gross Domestic Product since 2002 has necessitated the need to reinforce the security agencies and more so after the entry of the Kenya Defense Forces in Somalia and the subsequent growth of the economy. This is evidenced by the following analysis of summary of Estimates:

²³⁴ CRS Report, R42997, “A unified National Security Budget?: Issues for Congress”, Coordinated by Catherine Dale

Table 1: Showing the summary of expenditures in Security sector of Kenya 2002-2014

YEAR	SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES (IN KSHS. MILLION)		
	INTERNAL SECURITY	DEFENCE	INTELLIGENCE
2002/2003		14,338	3,000
2004/2005		20,394.35	4,145.45
2007/2008	29,773.88	27,540.00	6,025.00
2008/2009	32,729.73	39,061	8,158.62
2009/2010	43,743.2	41,209.5	7,702.0
2010/2011	45,973.6	48,525.8	10,118.3
2011/2012	52,257.9	50,393.7	10,627.1
2012/2013	61,917.3	57,757.3	14,061.1
2013/2014	100,798.2	70,040.4	13,414.0
2014/2015	100,731.20	74,577	14,867.00

Source of data: Institute of Economic Affairs, Budget Guide for MPs, 2002-2014

The Case of the USA is similar, where there has been increased budgetary allocations for Defence purposes since the year 2000. This is regardless of the state of the economy which has had its ups and downs, the following table shows that even at the worst economic depression the funding to defence purposes continued to increase. However since the year 2011, the budgetary allocation has been reducing, this can be attributed to the Obama policies regarding active engagement in conflicts in other regions instead preferring indirect assistance as well as the continued focus on human security. The table also shows that the allocations will continue to diminish over time unless a different National Security Strategy is adopted in the next general elections.

Table 2: Showing the total federal outlays, Federal Unified Budget (Dollars in Millions)

Fiscal Year	Allocation to National Defence
2000	294,363
2001	304,732
2002	348,456
2003	404,744
2004	455,833
2005	495,308
2006	521,827
2007	551,271
2008	616,072
2009	661,023
2010	693,498
2011	705,557
2012	677,856
2013	660,037
2014	626,755
2015	612,305
2016	589,214
2017	589,735
2018	592,021

Source: National Defense Budget, Estimates for FY 2014, Office of the Under Secretary for Defense (Comptroller), May 2013

4.7 Approaches to Strategy

The two states have different methodologies in coming up with the National Security Strategy. The United States has for a long time had the Palace Model in developing strategy. This is where the president through his team of selected advisors formulate and come up with a strategy under his auspices. There have been various ways of how strategies have come to being, for instance through the internal and external means. The case for the internal avenue is evidenced by President Eisenhower's project "Project Solarium" that was meant to re-examine the Containment Policy toward the Soviets following the death of Stalin in 1953. The project methodology included forming three teams of seasoned military personnel and civilians who were practitioners, they were then assigned a strategy to defend and elaborate. The next six weeks were spent at the National War College and at the end each team presented before the President, the National Security Council, Senior Military Leaders and others their best cases and approaches of strategy²³⁵.

The other approach-external avenue, suggests that more than one external reviews be done concurrent with the crafting of the National Security Strategy. For instance, the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (QDRIP) which paralleled what the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) did in 2010²³⁶. The Kenyan situation is unexplored since issues regarding National Security Strategies are considered confidential or are non-existent. However there seems to be only one way where the government without checks and balances from external influences drafts the strategies. The country has had several National Defence Strategies from the Ministry of Defence, other strategies from the National Police Service and National Intelligence Service as separate yet related Strategies.

²³⁵ Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, "Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium", Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd Quarterly 2006. USA

²³⁶ Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, Co-Chairmen, "The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century", The final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 2012, xix-xxi and 100-103.

4.8 Chapter Summary

There are areas where the contrasts between the two states are deep and areas where the similarities are at the same level though different contexts and security environments. Such areas like resources are shared in the sense of their unavailability and the constraints states face economically. The experience gathered by the USA has contributed to the strong and vibrant strategic culture they have currently. The Kenyan Strategic culture is young and needs to be legitimate through enactment of legislation around it, and putting in place administrative functions to the existing National Security Council framework that will see the fruition of the National Security Strategy and eventually establish a culture.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the summary of findings and recommendations proposed based on the chapters discussed. The last section of this section will suggest areas for further studies which seeks to find place within the academia and be useful to students of Strategic Studies and National Security.

5.2 Summary of Findings

Following the first objective, the study on the nature of the strategic security of Kenya the following findings were drawn: the 21st century challenges need to be resolved holistically using both or a combination of military and non-military strategies; most threats came from within rather than away from the borders hence the need to strengthen internal institutions; the threats are multiple and interrelated as such very coherent strategies need to be developed so as to meet the needs of the state.

The study based on the second objective two, the study on the United States' National Security Strategies, the following were the findings: from the beginning of the first strategy to the latest strategy there has been consistency in highlighting the values that drive the American strategies and policies; there is continuous emphasis on the need to maintain the state of being the superpower and this defines and directs the nature of the strategies; there is also a paradigm shift in the concentration of the human security aspects of late, this is concurrent with the pull-out of the American forces which had occupied foreign territories and the reduction in the budgetary allocation to National Defense purposes.

From the last objective three, the study on the contrasts and comparisons of the National Security Strategies of Kenya and the USA the following were the findings: there are similarities in the positions held by both states as regional hegemon which gives them responsibility beyond that of internal issues; there are also budgetary constraints from both states however the difference lies in the political will; for the case of the USA the timing and consistency in delivering the National Strategies; for the case of Kenya

there is need to build a strategic culture so as to have coherent solutions and coordination under one institution in this case the National Security Council.

5.3 Conclusions

Based on objective one, the nature of the Strategic Security Environment is one characterised by dynamic and interrelated threats and interests. The threats of the 21st century as well as prior ones are becoming increasingly dangerous and have the capabilities to stall the efforts already in place if more “digital” solutions are not adopted.

Objective two, observes that the American National Security Strategies have been adapting to the global as well as local dynamics and hence their ability to address current challenges. There is political will in addressing National Security concerns including the recognition that USA is a superpower and needs to maintain that position until further notice.

Following objective three, the Kenyan and American cases share more and can learn from each other. The constitution of Kenya has borrowed several aspects from the American legislation on matters concerning security institutions. There is more that can be learnt from the practice and culture of National Security Strategy.

5.4 Recommendations

From objective one, this study highly recommends the enactment of legislation to guide the process of National Security Strategy formulation so as to respond effectively to the security threats facing the state. There is also need to have the National Security Council as the coordinating institution of the Security Agencies add to their mandate the power to be more than just overseers and to have “teeth” in dealing with ineffective departments within the security architecture of the state. This will enhance the levels of accountability and systems of checks and balances which will lead to better performance of the security agencies upon their successful implementation. The process of involving the people in developing the National Security Strategies is also recommended, this is because the majority of the threats lie within the territories where the state has and should have complete sovereignty. The essence of this engagement is to enhance collaboration

between the Kenya Police Service and “Wanjiku”, as well as enhance civil military relations of the state.

Based on objective two, the study recommends that the National Security Strategies of the USA should be consistent and that the discussions around the timing and frequency of the Strategies should be concluded as soon as possible. This will also aid in the coherent reviews by other agencies especially the Quadrennial Defense Reviews which will be conceived from the National Security Strategy.

Following objective three, there should be more engagement between Kenya and the USA for the benefit of building the strategic culture not only for the regions but the continents in which they exist. In cognizant of the benefits brought by having a disciplined strategic culture, this should be spread to all regions if not all states.

5.5 Suggested Areas for Further Research

Having concluded the study, there are other areas that would have been crucial to this research project however due to unavoidable circumstances, the scope and nature of the study not all could be addressed. These areas include:

- a. The analysis on the effectiveness of the instruments of security at the behest of each state with regard to the implementation of the National Security Strategy.
- b. The content of the National Security Strategy of Kenya. All efforts made to get the documents were to no avail as regulations around it are too strict, yet the document is meant to serve all Kenyan. The state should if possible develop copies for public view and those which are to be kept confidential for the security practitioners and scholars.
- c. A comparative strategy of the African Security Strategies, in light of the Pan African spirit and African Union Security engagements with states.

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Appendix I

Instruments of Data Collection

Open Ended Questionnaire

Questions

1. Does the Government of Kenya have a National Security Strategy?
2. What are the main threats to Kenya's National Security?
3. How does the Government of Kenya implement its National Security Strategy?
4. What challenges are faced by the Security Organs of the Republic of Kenya?
5. What are the best approaches to curb the security challenges of Kenya?