

Trader Behavior vs Market Sentiment – Hiring Assignment

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2025-10-28

Executive Summary

This project analyzes 211,224 Hyperliquid trades from 32 wallets against the Bitcoin Fear & Greed Index to uncover behavior–regime edges and deploy a calibrated prediction policy that filters high-probability trades. Overall win rate is 41.13% with \$10.30M total PnL after fees and \$245.86k fees paid. Results confirm regimes matter, behavior matters, and even a weak classifier yields economic lift when used as a filter.




Figure 1: Executive dashboard of key results

Data & Preparation

- Cleaned/standardized trade schema; engineered pnl_after_fees, is_win, notional_usd, and regime.
- Sentiment merged per trade without loss: Fear 61,510, Greed 48,668, Extreme Greed 40,180, Neutral 39,563, Extreme Fear 21,303.
- Scope: 32 wallets, 246 coins, 2023-04-30 → 2025-05-01; overall win rate 41.13%; total fees \$245,857.72.

Four Trader Types (Behavior × Order Type)

What it shows: Crossing behavior (Contrarian vs Momentum) with order type (Maker vs Taker) yields four personas to route orders by regime.

- **Contrarian-Maker:** Best in Fear—contrarian edge + rebates; default in Fear with baseline or 9 decile score.
- **Momentum-Taker:** Best in Greed—captures momentum despite fees; use in Greed with 10 decile score.
- **Contrarian-Taker and Momentum-Maker:** Generally dominated; consider only with strong probabilities or liquidity constraints.

Differentiator 1 – Contrarian vs Momentum

What it shows: Stable behavior exists by regime; contrarians excel in Fear while momentum excels in Greed.

- Coverage: 28 traders; 14/14 split by median contrarian_delta.
- Outcomes: Contrarian—Fear 46.64% vs Greed 33.69% (PnL Δ +\$69.49/trader); Momentum inverts in Greed.
- Significance: $\chi^2=11.53$ (p=0.009) significant; per-trader t-test p=0.614 not significant.




Figure 2: D1: Contrarian delta distribution

Differentiator 2 – Taker vs Maker

What it shows: Order type creates a structural PnL gap magnified by fees and sentiment.

- Makers \$69.09 vs Takers \$35.63; taker fee impact $-\$1.776/\text{trade}$.
- Mann–Whitney significant ($U=4.596e9$, $p<1e-6$).
- Makers lead in Greed/Extreme Greed; Takers lead in Extreme Fear.




Figure 3: D1: Behavior \times Regime win rate.




Figure 4: D2: Avg PnL by regime & order type

Differentiator 3 – Risk & Tests

What it shows: Regimes shift risk-adjusted returns and pass multiple significance tests.

- Sharpe: Extreme Greed 0.088 > Neutral 0.057 > Fear 0.050; Profit Factor strongest in Extreme Greed (10.26x).
- Tests: t-test Fear vs Greed $p=0.040$; ANOVA $p=3.70e-5$; $\chi^2 p<1e-10$.
- Spearman $\rho=0.0398$ (weak but significant); Cohen's $d = -0.01$ (negligible).




Figure 5: D2: Win-rate by regime & order type




Figure 6: D3: Win-rate by sentiment

Differentiator 4 – Regime Strategy

What it shows: Maker-in-Fear / Taker-in-Greed rule needs score gating to avoid Greed underperformance.

- Edge vs baseline: Fear +\$20.13, Greed −\$20.93, Neutral 0.
- Route Maker in Fear by default; Taker in Greed only when score high.
- Introduce fee-aware thresholds in Greed.




Figure 7: D4: Strategy vs baseline (Avg PnL)




Figure 8: D4: Strategy vs baseline (Win-rate)

Differentiator 5 – Risk by Behavior

What it shows: Momentum smoother; Contrarian higher-beta and regime-sensitive.

- Momentum: higher Sharpe/Sortino ($\sim 0.059/0.087$), lower drawdown.
- Contrarian: higher mean but bigger drawdowns; allocate in Fear.
- Blend: momentum core, contrarian satellite in Fear.




Figure 9: D5: Sharpe by behavior




Figure 10: D5: Sortino by behavior

Differentiator 6 – Sensitivity

What it shows: Edges are fragile to regime-length shifts without probability gating.

- $\pm 20\%$ shifts: Strategy_Edge ~ -0.66 to -0.54 .
- Greed extensions hurt unless filtered; Fear extensions help modestly.
- Enforce probability deciles to stabilize.




Figure 11: D 6 : Sample Trade Counts by Shift

Differentiator 7 – Predictive Model

What it shows: Even a weak classifier adds value as a filter.

- CV ROC-AUC 0.427 ± 0.045 ; full-set ROC-AUC 0.536.
- Top features: momentum_in_greed, is_fear_regime, behavior_numeric.
- Group outcomes align with the regime logic.




Figure 12: D7: Model coefficients (| |)




Figure 13: D8: Actual vs predicted by behavior \times regime

Differentiator 8 – Calibration, Lift & Policy

What it shows: Calibrated probabilities enable profitable filtering.

- Calibration ROC-AUC 0.535, Brier 0.241.
- Decile 10 win rate 52.8% with avg PnL \$127.5; threshold = 10.
- Policy: Greed +\$102.19, Fear +\$55.27; Neutral negligible.




Figure 14: D8: Calibration curve (isotonic)




Figure 15: D8: Policy vs baseline by regime

Actionable Policy

- Route Maker in Fear; Taker in Greed only when predicted decile 10; Fear requires 9.
- Size taker orders conservatively unless score top decile and spread acceptable.
- Productionize: real-time scoring → gate → persona template (Contrarian-Maker in Fear, Momentum-Taker in Greed).