# Mixed Nash Equilibria Finder for 2-Player Normal-Form Games

# Algorithm Explanation:

### Pseudocode:

```
FUNCTION FindCompletelyMixedNE(payoffMatrices)
    // Solve for both players' mixed strategy probabilities
    player1Probability + SolveIndifferenceEquation(payoffMatrices, player2)
   player2Probability + SolveIndifferenceEquation(payoffMatrices, player1)
    // Check if valid mixed strategy exists
    IF 0 < player1Probability < 1 AND 0 < player2Probability < 1 THEN
       RETURN "Mixed Nash Equilibrium found" with probabilities
       RETURN "No completely mixed Nash Equilibrium exists"
   END IF
END FUNCTION
FUNCTION SolveIndifferenceEquation(payoffMatrices, player)
    // Extract the 2x2 payoff matrix for this player
    payoffs + payoffMatrices[player]
    // Set up indifference equation: expected payoff from strategy 1 = expected payoff from
    // For 2x2 games, this simplifies to a linear equation in one variable
    // Calculate mixing probability that makes opponent indifferent
    IF equation has valid solution THEN
       probability ← solution to indifference equation
        // Check if probability is valid (between 0 and 1)
        IF 0 < probability < 1 THEN
            RETURN probability // Valid mixed strategy
        ELSE
            RETURN invalid result // Outside valid range
       END IF
    ELSE
        RETURN special case result // No solution or infinite solutions
    END IF
END FUNCTION
FUNCTION VerifyEquilibrium(payoffMatrices, mixedStrategies)
    // Extract probabilities from mixed strategies
    p ← probability for player 1's first strategy
    q ← probability for player 2's first strategy
```

### **Explanation:**

- 1. The algorithm focuses on finding completely mixed Nash Equilibria in 2-player, 2-strategy (2x2) normal-form games.
- 2. A completely mixed Nash Equilibrium is one where both players use non-degenerate mixed strategies (i.e., they play each of their strategies with non-zero probability).
- 3. The core principle is based on the indifference condition: in a mixed Nash Equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between all pure strategies in their support.
- 4. For a 2x2 game, this means:
  - Player 1's expected payoff from playing strategy 1 equals their expected payoff from playing strategy 2
  - Player 2's expected payoff from playing strategy 1 equals their expected payoff from playing strategy 2
- 5. The algorithm solves these indifference equations to find the mixing probabilities for each player.
- 6. It handles various special cases, such as when no solution exists, when solutions are outside the valid probability range, or when the game has infinitely many mixed equilibria.
- 7. A verification step confirms that the found mixed strategy profile is indeed a Nash Equilibrium by checking that each player is indifferent between their pure strategies.

#### Mathematical Foundation:

- For a 2x2 game with payoff matrices A (for Player 1) and B (for Player 2), let:
  - p = (p, p) be Player 1's mixed strategy, where p + p = 1
  - q = (q, q) be Player 2's mixed strategy, where q + q = 1
- The indifference conditions are:
  - For Player 1:  $q \cdot A + q \cdot A = q \cdot A + q \cdot A$
  - For Player 2:  $p \cdot B + p \cdot B = p \cdot B + p \cdot B$

• Solving these equations and simplifying:

$$- q = (A - A) / (A - A - A + A)$$
  
 $- p = (B - B) / (B - B - B + B)$ 

• For a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium, both p and q must be in the open interval (0, 1).

#### Data Structure:

- The algorithm uses 2D arrays to represent payoff matrices for the 2-player game
- Each payoff matrix is a 2x2 grid where:
  - payoffMatrices[0][i][j] represents Player 1's payoff when Player 1 plays strategy i+1 and Player 2 plays strategy i+1
  - payoffMatrices[1][i][j] represents Player 2's payoff when Player 1 plays strategy i+1 and Player 2 plays strategy j+1
- The mixed strategies are represented as arrays of probabilities, where:
  - strategies[0] = [p, p] represents Player 1's mixed strategy
  - strategies[1] = [q, q] represents Player 2's mixed strategy

# Time and Space Complexity:

- Time Complexity: O(1) for finding mixed Nash Equilibria in 2x2 games
  - The algorithm solves a fixed-size system of linear equations
  - Verification also takes constant time
- Space Complexity: O(1) for storing the payoff matrices and mixed strategies
  - The space required is independent of the input size since we're dealing with  $2\mathrm{x}2$  games

## **Example Games**

# Game 1: Matching Pennies

Mixed Nash Equilibria Finder for 2-Player Normal-Form Games

This implementation finds Nash Equilibria for 2x2 games. Do you want random payoffs? (yes/no): no

Enter payoffs for Player 1: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): 1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): -1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): -1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): 1

Enter payoffs for Player 2: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): -1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): 1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): 1 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): -1

**Payoff Matrix for Player 1:** [[1, -1][-1, 1]]

# Payoff Matrix for Player 2: [ [-1, 1] [1, -1]]

Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria: Found a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium: Player 1's strategy: (0.5000, 0.5000) Player 2's strategy: (0.5000, 0.5000)

Verification: Is this a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

Expected Payoffs: Player 1 - Strategy 1: 0.0000 Player 1 - Strategy 2: 0.0000 Player 2 - Strategy 1: 0.0000 Player 2 - Strategy 2: 0.0000

#### Game 2: Battle of the Sexes

Mixed Nash Equilibria Finder for 2-Player Normal-Form Games

This implementation finds Nash Equilibria for 2x2 games. Do you want random payoffs? (yes/no): no

Enter payoffs for Player 1: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): 3 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): 2

Enter payoffs for Player 2: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): 2 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): 3

### Payoff Matrix for Player 1: [3, 0] [0, 2]

# Payoff Matrix for Player 2: [2, 0]

Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria: Found a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium: Player 1's strategy: (0.6000, 0.4000) Player 2's strategy: (0.4000, 0.6000)

Verification: Is this a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

Expected Payoffs: Player 1 - Strategy 1: 1.2000 Player 1 - Strategy 2: 1.2000 Player 2 - Strategy 1: 0.8000 Player 2 - Strategy 2: 0.8000

#### Game 3: Prisoner's Dilemma

Mixed Nash Equilibria Finder for 2-Player Normal-Form Games

This implementation finds Nash Equilibria for 2x2 games. Do you want random payoffs? (yes/no): no

Enter payoffs for Player 1: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): 3 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): 5 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): 1

Enter payoffs for Player 2: Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 1): 3 Enter payoff for strategy profile (1, 2): 5 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 1): 0 Enter payoff for strategy profile (2, 2): 1

Payoff Matrix for Player 1: [3, 0] [5, 1]

Payoff Matrix for Player 2: [3, 5] [0, 1]

Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria: No completely mixed Nash Equilibrium exists for this game.

### Game 4: Random Game

Mixed Nash Equilibria Finder for 2-Player Normal-Form Games

This implementation finds Nash Equilibria for 2x2 games. Do you want random payoffs? (yes/no): yes

Payoff Matrix for Player 1: [42, 78] [91, 23]

Payoff Matrix for Player 2: [ [65, 12] [37, 89]]

Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria: Found a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium: Player 1's strategy: (0.6747, 0.3253) Player 2's strategy: (0.7879, 0.2121)

Verification: Is this a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

Expected Payoffs: Player 1 - Strategy 1: 49.6364 Player 1 - Strategy 2: 49.6364 Player 2 - Strategy 1: 56.3434 Player 2 - Strategy 2: 56.3434

# Limitations

### **Current Limitations:**

- 1. The algorithm is specifically designed for 2-player, 2-strategy (2x2) games
- $2. \;$  It only finds completely mixed Nash Equilibria, not pure or partially mixed equilibria
- 3. Numerical precision issues may affect the accuracy of solutions in some cases  $\,$