

Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics

Gregory Koger

University of Miami

Seth Masket

University of Denver

Hans Noel

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

What are the primary factions within the Democratic and Republican parties, and to what extent do rival factions cooperate? We address these questions using a unique data set of information sharing between party organizations, media outlets, 527s, and interest groups. Using social network methods, we identify two major information-sharing clusters, or *expanded party networks*; these networks correspond to a liberal/Democratic grouping and a conservative/Republican grouping. We further identify factions within each party network, but we find a high degree of cooperation between party factions. That is, our data suggest that beneath the intraparty disagreements we observe in primary elections and policy debates there is a subterranean pattern of organizational cooperation.

Keywords: *political parties; political networks; 527 organizations; interest groups; party polarization*

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.

—James Madison (1787)

Authors' Note: Please address correspondence to Gregory Koger, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6534; e-mail: gregory.koger@gmail.com.

As in all the *Federalist Papers*, Madison (1787) in *Federalist 10* argues for the benefits of the proposed Constitution. He does not merely warn against the “mischief of faction,” he offers a remedy. The Constitution, Madison claimed, would “guard against” factional discord. Bringing all the states under one government would bring a tangle of differences together, and those differences would not be easily overcome by some group with interests at odds with the whole of the country. Madison makes an empirical claim about politics in a large republic: By drawing together a great “variety of parties and interests,” a federal republic like the United States will hinder party organization. In its broadest sense, this article tests whether factions joined together in a party coalition cooperate for mutual advantage despite their differences.

There is reason to believe that Madison was essentially correct. For decades political scientists have highlighted the weakness and divisions of the two national coalitions that prevent parties from articulating clear stances and implementing party programs (American Political Science Association, 1950; Wilson, 1885). Despite evidence that contemporary political parties are “polarizing” (e.g., Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005; Hetherington, 2001; Jacobson, 2004; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Theriault, 2008; but see Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2004), news reporting on modern political parties suggests strong conflicts within each party. The Republican Party is reportedly divided between probusiness conservatives and social conservatives, between those who prioritize tax cuts and those who prioritize fiscal restraint, and between advocates of insular versus expansionist foreign policy. Democrats are reportedly split between a moderate Democratic Leadership Council/New Democrat wing and a liberal, more ideologically purist wing. And although the Democratic Party appears unified in opposition to the Iraq War today, they were notably torn internally between war supporters and opponents from 2003 through 2005.

How important are these intraparty cleavages? If Madison is right, then beneath the surface, any national coalition will be rife with factional disagreements that limit cooperation among party members. At the same time, cooperation is the essence of party. For a party to succeed, its diverse factions must work together to elect candidates and pass legislation. Despite occasional disagreements highlighted by the media, each party organization works with elected officials, allied interest groups, and affiliated media outlets to strengthen their coalition and achieve policy change. Diversity may hinder the ability of parties to unify, but it does not completely prevent cooperation.

This article finds evidence of partisan cooperation in an unlikely context: transfers of the names of donors and subscribers between political organizations. Using the methods of social network analysis, we identify factions within the information networks of the Republican and Democratic parties. We also find, however, that there is significant cooperation between these factions. We interpret this as evidence that the organizations that comprise modern American parties work with each other despite disagreements over goals and tactics.

This article builds on a companion work that also analyzes political parties as social networks (Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009). Both works are based on a unique data set of name exchanges between political organizations collected between January 2004 and April 2005. In our previous article, we found two distinct groupings of name-exchanging groups: a liberal/Democratic cluster and a conservative/Republican cluster. We interpret this finding as evidence that there are two polarized *expanded party networks* consisting of *formal party organizations* like the Republican and Democratic National Committees, interest groups allied with one party or the other, and magazines that generally traded information within one expanded party or the other.

The theoretical distinction between the formal party and the expanded party is important. Much of the parties' literature focuses on formal party leaders, organizations, and elected officials. Following a new strain of thinking (Cohen, Karol, Noel, & Zaller, 2008; Dominguez, 2005b; Dominguez & Bernstein 2003; Grossman & Dominguez, 2009; Masket, 2009; Monroe, 2001; Schwartz, 1990; Skinner, 2005), we argue that real American parties are broader and less hierarchical than the formal party. Thus, a modern "party" includes interest groups, consultants, 527s, and perhaps even partisan media. This more expansive party, or some variant of it, has been dubbed the extended party, the party matrix, the expanded party, the party in the street, and an informal party organization. Scholars advancing this agenda have begun to use the techniques of social network analysis, usually focusing on a subset of party actors for whom data can be gathered, such as campaign consultants (Doherty, 2005), political protesters (Heaney & Rojas, 2007), campaign donors (Dominguez, 2005a), and fund-raising solicitations (Koger et al., 2009).

This article extends the "party-as-network" approach to the topic of party factions. Factions present a challenge to informal party cooperation. A robust party cooperates despite its internal divisions, whereas a weak party can be so paralyzed by factionalism that it ceases to cooperate as a party at all. Thus, if we claim that the extended network of interest groups and activists is part of the party, it is important that factional divisions not

overwhelm their common interests. If the extended party is acting as though it has a unified goal, we expect to find little factionalism in list sharing between organizations. To the extent that we do find factionalism, it is evidence that the party is failing to coordinate. We begin with an overview of party factions in modern politics and a discussion of factions in research on parties. Next we describe our study and present our results. Finally, we discuss the implications for the study of party factions.

Network Cooperation

Like Madison (1787), we take for granted that “the latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.” Although economic class is a primary source of political differences, variation in religion, region, economic sectors, race, gender, and personal loyalties can separate parties from each other or contribute to the internal balkanization of major parties. Party leaders often strive to make one dimension or another the primary basis for distinguishing the two major parties, but to do so requires suppressing intraparty divisions on other issues (Miller & Schofield, 2003; Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1983).

A party that is organized as a network can accommodate this diversity. In a network party, politicians, donors, and interest groups can cooperate without losing their autonomy or suppressing their diversity. The component groups of a party coalition, including politicians, interest groups, and activists, have a shared interest in presenting a united front in elections and governing, because a divided coalition is easily trumped by a little strategic cooperation (Schattschneider, 1942). At the same time, these component groups hold an ongoing debate on the themes and priorities of their respective parties.

At times, a party faction may feel that its interests are best served by a minimal level of cooperation in Congress, a strategy adopted by many Southern Democrats during the mid-20th century (Rohde, 1991). Or, a party faction (labor unions, African Americans) or its Congressional advocates may defect from the “united front” as a form of protest, because its membership may refuse to support the party position. Nonetheless, we expect that members of a party coalition usually have a common interest in winning elections. Members of a party coalition also have an interest in each other’s survival and expansion to the extent their success is tied to the party’s overall fate.

In the empirical test below, this is our *main hypothesis*: organizations in a party network will cooperate to promote the survival of fellow party actors and will be less factionalized than voters loyal to the same party. As a contrasting *null hypothesis*, we might expect that cooperation among party-affiliated organizations is significantly impeded by factional divisions similar to those we observe among party-affiliated voters. Because the organizations target voters for donations, any pattern in donor lists might simply reflect patterns in that target audience. The next section elaborates on our baseline expectations.

Factional Structures in the American Electorate

Factional structures within the modern national parties are a topic of great interest to the media. Backed by some scholarly work (Belloni & Beller, 1976; Bernstein, 2005; Dominguez, 2005a; Green & Farmer, 2003; Green & Shea, 1996, 1999; Polsby, 1981; Reiter, 1981; Shea & Green, 1994), political journalists frequently discuss factionalism and its impact on elections, policy development, and legislative voting. Following are some brief sketches of the types of factions we would expect to observe within the national parties during the period of our study (2004-2005).

The Democratic Party

Will Rogers's (2004) famous comment, "I'm a member of no organized political party—I'm a Democrat," captures a widespread (if rarely tested) belief that the Democratic Party is composed of diverse groups that struggle to cooperate. The sources of such rifts are plain to see. The party is home to both labor unions, which depend on the existence and growth of manufacturing jobs, and environmentalists, who are willing to sacrifice manufacturing jobs to protect the ecosphere. It is home to gays and lesbians and many groups that are profoundly uncomfortable with extending rights to gays and lesbians. For much of the 20th century, the Democratic Party was home to both Northern civil rights advocates and Southern segregationists.

With so many candidates for factional splits, it is useful to look for some systematic treatment of the possibilities. A recent poll study by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2005) suggests that three major groups of citizens tend to identify with the Democratic Party.¹ One group is *Liberals*, who comprise 17% of the general population and tend to hold views secular, internationalist, and anti-Iraq war. Second, *Disadvantaged*

Democrats (10% of the population) strongly support government benefits but are more religious and socially conservative than Liberals. Third, *Conservative Democrats* (14% of the population) are also more religious and socially conservative, and they are moderate on foreign, economic, and social issues relative to the general population.

If, contrary to our expectations, party networks did not display elevated levels of cooperation, we would expect political organizations to mimic these divisions among partisans in the electorate. They might also be likely to reflect divisions on the most salient issue of the time. From 2004 through early 2005, when we conducted our research, the primary schism in the Democratic Party concerned the Iraq War, as illustrated by a split among Democratic presidential candidates during the 2004 race. Of the candidates considered viable in early 2004, only Vermont Governor Howard Dean was on record opposing the war. The other major candidates, Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and John Edwards (D-NC) and Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO), had all initially supported the war and struggled to distance themselves from the Bush administration's conduct of the war. Because our data set was collected during the 2004 nomination contest, we might expect to see this split manifested in some way by the candidate committees. Howard Dean would be expected to have ties to antiwar groups and publications, whereas the other major candidates would be aligned with prowar (or at least less adamantly antiwar) nodes. Additionally, we would expect to see a division among the activist groups and publications themselves.

The news media also report tactical disagreements within the Democratic Party. That is, even where there is broad agreement on policy, there may be sharp disagreement over whether to directly confront Republicans or not.² Such disagreements were on display during the 2002 leadership battle for House minority leader. Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, who would ultimately win the post, called for an aggressive stance toward President Bush and the House majority. "Where we do not have our common ground," she said, "we must stand our ground" (Hulse, 2002). Her main rival in that leadership battle was Representative Harold Ford of Tennessee, who described Pelosi's politics as "destructive and obstructive," adding, "I don't think Nancy Pelosi's kind of politics is what's needed right now" (York, 2002). Such disputes over tactics often parallel ideological disputes between liberals and moderate Democrats, with the former urging confronting the Republicans and the latter urging conciliation. In addition to factional disputes based on the Iraq war, we might also expect to find a broader separation between the ideological camps of the Democratic Party.

The Republican Party

Although Republicans are often considered more unified than the Democrats, President George W. Bush's efforts to forge a majority coalition may have intensified long-standing divisions within the party. The Pew poll discussed earlier also identified three subsets of Republican voters. *Enterprisers* (9% of the general population) are socially conservative but prioritize tax cutting and opposition to government regulation. *Social Conservatives* (11%) and *Progovernment Conservatives* (9%) prioritize moral issues and personal religiosity but differ from Enterprisers in their ambivalent attitudes toward business and open immigration. Progovernment Conservatives, in particular, support government spending for a social safety net (Pew, 2005; Rogers, 2004). This creates the potential for intraparty conflicts over budgeting, immigration, and the relative importance of advocating conservative positions on social issues. Such quarrels suggest that the groupings identified by the Pew poll make it challenging for party leaders to keep taxes low and spending high indefinitely.

In addition, social issues have caused rifts in the Republican ranks in recent years. One of the most notable of these is abortion. In the Pew poll, roughly 40% of each Republican faction and a majority of swing voters opposed making it more difficult for a woman to get an abortion. However, very few pro-choice Republicans have won nomination for elective office, keeping intraparty tension on this issue largely out of the spotlight. Similarly, disputes over beginning-of-life issues have divided Republican officeholders' attitudes toward stem cell research. A 2006 bill to expand federal support for stem cell research, supported by many congressional Republicans including Senate majority leader Bill Frist (Tennessee), was the victim of President Bush's first veto.³

Indeed, the relative unity among Congressional Republicans, at least during the time that this study took place, belied fierce disagreements among Republican voters and activists. As Karol (2005) noted, the Republican majority leadership worked hard to structure roll call votes such that business and social Republicans remained unified, but the occasional splitting vote did get to the floor. Votes to extend preferential trading status to China, for example, reliably split business conservatives (who value China's inexpensive labor force and enormous consumer market) from social conservatives (who detest China's embrace of communism and its crackdowns on democratic reformers and Christians). Outside of Congress, the party leadership has no agenda control to suppress this division. We therefore might expect to see a separation between business groups and socially conservative groups within the Republican Party network.

Data and Method

We collected data on transfers of donor information between political organizations. The names of donors and subscribers are of considerable value to political actors. Cultivating a good list of people who are willing to donate to a cause can demand a great deal of time and energy. Rather than develop a list on its own, an organization will frequently purchase or rent such a list from a like-minded group; lists are frequently traded or sold among interest groups, magazines, formal party groups, candidate campaign committees, and other organizations.⁴ The typical exchange is for an organization to lease some subset of its mailing list to another organization or publication for a single usage in exchange for a rental fee, which varies with the size and quality of the list (Kaufman, personal communication, September 22, 2005). In the vocabulary of social network analysis, each exchange is a “directed” relationship, with one actor sending and another receiving information with no reciprocal exchange implied.⁵

Such exchanges enable the lending organization or publication to both earn money and assist a like-minded group. For example, those who donated to Howard Dean’s presidential campaign would be likely to donate to other progressive candidates and causes across state lines, and whomever Dean decides to give his list to would obtain a great advantage in fundraising. By tracking a body of addresses as they are sold or traded across organizational lines, we can map the contours of a modern party network.

Our first challenge was to collect data on information exchange within extended party networks (EPNs). To do so, we gave donations and subscriptions to an initial sample of 50 candidates, political organizations, and publications in January 2004, using a unique name for each contribution. We then tracked subsequent solicitations to each name. The initial sample was selected to include an ideologically diverse set of formal party organizations, magazines, and interest groups, and (at the time) every major candidate in the presidential race. We held the address (a post office box) and donation size (\$25) constant; for periodicals, we chose the subscription offer closest to \$25. When we received subsequent solicitations from organizations outside the initial sample, we were able to trace the unique name from its source to its recipient. For example, in February 2004, we donated \$25 to Americans for Democratic Action using a unique name; we subsequently received solicitations from America Coming Together and Project Vote Smart to the same name.

Our initial sample was like a drop in a wide pool, and our goal was to see where the ripples led. We therefore donated \$25 under unique names to each subsequent solicitor in November 2004 (110 new donations) and April 2005 (170 new donations). This “following-up” technique is known as *snowball sampling*. Our use of snowball sampling imposes limits on our inferences that we note below when appropriate. Essentially, comparisons between organizations in the initial sample and those in subsequent samples are complicated by the different lengths of time we observe their behavior and by the selection bias used for the second and third waves—only connected groups are included. However, our approach is appropriate for this exploratory study: Because we know little about the expanded party, it was appropriate to let it reveal itself through the name-trading process. Furthermore, the financial cost of sampling organizations puts a premium on identifying organizations that actively trade names.

This process yielded a sample of 289 organizations in three waves. For this analysis, we excluded all California-specific organizations (e.g., the *Los Angeles Times* Family Fund), as this project was designed to explore the national party networks. Seventeen organizations—obviously all in the initial wave—exchanged no information.

Two general patterns are worth noting. First, the network is not very dense. There were 518 connections between all the actors (or “nodes” in social network vocabulary) out of a possible 83,232. This is unsurprising, because we expected that many transfers would not happen (e.g., *National Review* to the Democratic National Committee), and, even within an expanded party, we would not expect instantaneous transfers of information among all actors. Second, most actors tend to be primarily sources or consumers of information. Thirty-five organizations both gave and received information; the rest were *either* name sources or name takers. A more formal measure of this property is dyad-based reciprocity, that is, the proportion of all connections between actors that are reciprocated. For our data, this score is 0.0197%.

The next section analyzes our data in greater depth under the headings of polarization and intraparty dynamics. For simplicity, we explain the details of our methods as we go rather than present the techniques and outputs separately. Generally, however, all analysis was conducted within UCINET 6 and all figures were created using the embedded NetDraw software.⁶

Results: Party Polarization


Although we explain our findings about party polarization in far greater detail elsewhere (Koger et al., 2009), it is necessary to summarize those results here. In simply plotting out the interaction of the 289 actors involved in our study, we discerned very clear boundaries between the two EPNs. For one, we discovered no direct links from any Democratic formal party organization (the Democratic National Committee [DNC], Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, or Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee [DCCC]) to any Republican formal party organization (Republican National Committee [RNC], National Republican Senatorial Committee, or National Republican Congressional Committee). Neither formal party is trying to woo voters through buying donors lists from the other formal party nor, if either party is trying, is the other formal party selling. The formal party groups, at the very least, are polarized.

But what of the EPNs? To examine this, we used the NetDraw program's *faction* algorithm. It attempts to discern coherent subgroups within a given network arrangement. In applying this function to the entire data set, a strongly polarized party landscape emerged, as can be seen in Figure 1.⁷

Figure 1 portrays the polarized nature of the information-trading network. The largest faction, boasting 183 nodes, is the liberal/Democratic expanded party network, shown on the left as triangles. The next largest faction, with 70 nodes, is the conservative/Republican expanded party, shown on the right as squares. Both expanded party networks suggest a core-periphery structure, with a dense inner network of closely connected groups and a fringe of "pendants," that is, groups with only one connection. The number of nodes involved renders it inconvenient to label each group, but the distribution corresponds to the expectations of most observers. The Democratic expanded party includes the Democratic formal party organization, interest groups such as the Sierra Club, the National Organization for Women, and People for the American Way, publications like *The Nation*, and the 527 group, America Coming Together. The Republican expanded party network includes publications like the *Weekly Standard* and *Human Events* and interest groups such as Club for Growth and Focus on the Family. For clarity, some groups are listed as a third faction consisting of alternative health publications and Howard Dean's presidential campaign.⁸

There are relatively few links between the Democratic and Republican expanded party networks. Just 15 of 518 transfers were between groups in different major expanded parties. These links, moreover, are almost exclusively by media outlets that solicit readers across the great divide—for

Figure 1
The Polarized Network: A Three-Faction Depiction



Note: Created by NetDraw's "spring embedding" algorithm with equal edge weight and node repulsion. The Democratic EPN is depicted as triangles, the Republican EPN as squares, and the "Other" faction is circles.

example, the *Economist*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and *Mother Jones*. It is not surprising that publications were more likely to solicit customers in both networks. Subscribing to a magazine is not the same as donating to a cause, and politically interested people may want to read a variety of publications. Because many media actors are deeply committed to some notion of objectivity, they can offer something to consumers who generally disagree with a publication's perspective.

Although some media sought customers across the political spectrum, there were no connections between the Democratic or Republican formal party organizations and organizations in the opposing expanded party network. That is, the Democratic National Committee did not solicit *Human Events* readers, and the Republican National Committee did not solicit donors to EMILY's List, and so on. Thus information sharing is much more likely to occur within two distinct camps rather than across the spectrum. In particular, interest groups involved in name transfers seemed to trade only with formal party organizations and interest groups within one party network or the other.

Factionalism

We identified party factions using NetDraw's faction algorithm within each of the EPNs. Several caveats must be noted at this point. First, the limited number of nodes and transactions limits our understanding of the relationship between organizations within the same party, particularly because we observe these ties within a network that is slowly revealing itself. Second, divining and interpreting factions from these clusters is as much art as science. The NetDraw software will discover different factional alliances given different search parameters, and of course, the meaning of a given factional arrangement cannot be determined by a machine. Within these constraints, we attempted to determine whether party networks were factionalized along the same lines as party-affiliated voters, as our null hypothesis predicts.

The overall results are presented in Table 1 reports the number of trades within each faction ("intrafaction ties"), between members of a given faction and members of other factions ("interfaction ties"), and the External-Internal (E-I) score for each party and for each faction. The E-I Index is simply the number of interfaction ties minus the number of intrafaction ties, divided by the total number of ties. It varies from 1 (all ties are between factions) to -1 (all ties are within factions; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988).⁹ If a party is factionalized, its E-I index will be negative and statistically significant.

One key point in Table 1 is that the Democratic Party factions seem to cooperate quite closely. There are two groups that trade more with other factions than with their own members, and the overall E-I index is *positive* and above a null expectation of .080.¹⁰ On the other hand, the Republican Party seems to be divided into three clusters. There is a very large cluster that includes most of the formal Republican organizations and the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign, and organizations in this cluster mostly trade with each other. Second, there is a small faction of evangelical and socially conservative organizations that is fairly isolated and a third hodgepodge grouping that is also isolated. The overall Republican E-I index is -.835, with a statistically significant difference from a null expectation of -.125. Thus the Democratic network displays a minimal level of factionalization, whereas the Republican name-trading network appears to be significantly factionalized.

On the Democratic side, we found evidence of three functioning factions, which can be seen in Figure 2.¹¹ The dominant cluster, shown as triangles, includes 113 of the 183 organizations, including Democratic politicians and official party organizations. This faction also includes traditionally Democratic interest groups such as Common Cause, People for the American Way, EMILY's List, and Americans for Democratic Action.


Table 1
Summary of Party Factions

	Intrafaction Ties	Interfaction Ties	External-Internal Index
Democratic factions			.206
Charity and environment	20	136	.744
Media and disease research	60	131	.372
Party, politicians, and liberal groups	216	183	-.083
Republican factions			-.835*
GOP politicians and party, etc.	144	8	-.895
Evangelicals, NRSC	20	5	-.600
Miscellaneous	14	3	-.647

Note: GOP = Grand Old Party; NRSC = National Republican Senatorial Committee Democratic expected value for E-I index is 0.080. GOP expected value for E-I index is -.125.

* $p < 0.05$.

Figure 2
Factions Within the Democratic Network



Note: This map was generated in NetDraw's "spring embedding" algorithm. Only nodes with two or more edges are shown.

These groups, not surprisingly, share their member lists with the DNC and the DCCC. They are closely tied to the formal party structure, and some confer with formal party groups about legislative strategies, message development, and campaign management (Sinclair, 1995, 205-259). This would seem to be the "Democratic wing of the Democratic party," and there is extensive trading within this faction.

Interestingly, the interest groups in the “Democratic” faction provide lists to a number of small interest groups and publications, and this relationship is not reciprocated. One interpretation of this behavior is that general interest groups that give rather than receive information are subordinate to the recipients of their information (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Yet their reasons for providing mailing lists to smaller organizations may be threefold and not necessarily signs of subordination. First, they may simply do it to make money, financing their larger party activities by selling lists to smaller groups within the Democratic network. Second, they may provide this information because they have it available. Because they are general interest groups, they attract many more members than the more narrowly tailored groups do. Third, they may be acting as gatekeepers to the party, because they decide which smaller groups get access to the resources of the Democratic EPN.

A second faction is centered on the Sierra Club and Nature Conservancy and is shown as squares in Figure 2. As Table 2 indicates, 6 of the 13 organizations in this faction are environmental interest groups.¹² Finally, a peripheral “liberal” faction which includes UNICEF, the *New Republic*, and the *New Yorker* is shown as circles. Groups in this faction generally do not share readership names with the formal Democratic Party apparatus and are not central to the EPN.

What is of particular interest is that none of these factions is isolated. Although we can distinguish them from another, it is clear that they share resources with each other to the benefit of the greater party. Moreover, they do not particularly mirror the factions that the media would expect. The more central faction, which includes the major party committees, might be seen as the more pragmatic wing. But it also includes more ideological groups such as People for the American Way and the American Diabetes Association. The more peripheral groups are not dominated by the antiwar organizations. So we do not see factional cleavages between groups based on the Iraq War, ideology, or the factions within the Democratic-leaning electorate.


We also do not see cleavages motivated by other concerns. Even groups that would seem to be natural competitors appear to be working together. The Sierra Club and the Nature Conservancy, after all, have similar agendas and are competing for the same donors. Yet they share lists with each other. They do not appear to be putting their own group’s membership list above the larger agenda.

On the Republican side, we observe two splinter factions and one large “general” group. Figure 3 shows a three-faction breakdown of the Republican network (see also Table 3). Again, there is a single dominant faction that includes all Republican politicians, two of three formal party organizations, and 51 of 70 Republican groups overall (including pendants). This faction is tied together by the name trading of three publications: *Human Events*, the *National Review*, and *The Weekly Standard*.¹³

Table 2
Composition of Democratic Factions

	Faction A	Faction B	Faction C
Business	15% (2)	5% (1)	2% (1)
Interest group	0% (0)	16% (3)	42% (27)
Interest group—environment	46% (6)	11% (2)	9% (6)
Independent party organization	0% (0)	0% (0)	3% (2)
Politicians	0% (0)	0% (0)	13% (8)
Media	15% (2)	42% (8)	16% (10)
International relief	15% (2)	11% (2)	8% (5)
Medical organization	0% (0)	16% (3)	2% (1)
Party organization	8% (1)	0% (0)	3% (2)
Miscellaneous	0% (0)	0% (0)	3% (2)
Total groups	13	19	64

Figure 3
Republican Factions



Note: This map was generated in NetDraw's "spring embedding" algorithm. Only nodes with two or more edges are shown.

The other two "factions" in the Republican network were small and based on the actions of outlying nodes: the Citizen Leader Coalition on one side (squares) and a weekly magazine, *The Week*, on the other side (triangles). As Table 1 shows, these factions are insulated from the main grouping.

To some extent, this factional pattern is consistent with our null expectation that the Republican Party would be split among business and cultural conservatives. The faction centered on the Citizen Leader Coalition is composed

Table 3
Composition of Republican Factions

Type	Faction A	Faction B	Faction C
Charity	6% (1)	0%	0%
Interest group	11% (2)	75% (3)	33% (1)
Media	39% (7)	0%	67% (2)
Party organization	11% (2)	25% (1)	0%
Politician	28% (5)	0%	0%
Think tank	6% (1)	0%	0%
Total	18	4	3

primarily of organizations linked to religious issues, for example, the Chinese Ministries International, Chosen People Ministries, Coral Ridge Ministries, Jerry Falwell's Liberty Alliance, and the Susan B. Anthony List (an antiabortion organization). However, we did not expect that the evangelical faction would be much smaller than the main faction (51 vs. 13 organizations) or that the main faction would be internally diverse and include socially conservative groups like the Focus on the Family and the American Life League.

The central role of the media in the Republican network is not surprising. Conservative think tanks and publications were at the center of the ideological movement (Nash, 1996). William F. Buckley conceived of the *National Review* as a publication that would unite the diverse strains of conservatism under one banner, focusing on what they have in common and downplaying their differences. It thus makes sense that these publications lead the way in bridging differences in the party.

The existence within both parties of limited factionalism in which actors often aid their competitors suggests an undercurrent of cooperation between members of each EPN. Although there may be tensions between the segments of a party at the mass level and disagreements between party leaders at the elite level, we find a pattern of information sharing across party factions, especially within the Democratic coalition. This pattern contrasts with the low level of trades across party lines by groups that are ideologically similar.

Discussion

This article confirms the existence of EPNs and analyzes their internal factional structures. We do so by tracking the transfer of donor and subscriber lists between formal parties, candidates, interest groups, and the media. We employ social network analysis to identify patterns in the name game.

We find a clear pattern of polarization between two major networks of ideological teammates. It is no surprise that the national Democratic and Republican committees do not exchange information. However, the chasm between the formal party organizations extends to the two constellations of interest groups and magazines that cooperate with each formal party. A simple measure of this broader polarization is that there is no path from one formal party entity to an organization of the opposing party. When we partitioned the actors into three factions, we noted two distinct major factions: one liberal and Democratic and the other conservative and Republican.

Our data also suggest that cooperation within each party is not substantially impeded by ideological factionalism. In our sample, the Democratic Party was especially cooperative, with ample name trading between party factions. The Republicans did seem to be somewhat divided, with one large grouping that included most of the party organizations, candidates, and conservative magazines and two splinter groupings. The internal divisions that Madison predicted would prevent any one faction from controlling government may be real, but they can also be overcome.

These results should be interpreted with care. First, we should note that the extended parties we identify in this study are not exclusive. There are many other organizations that informed observers might categorize as affiliated with a political party (e.g., National Rifle Association with the Republicans; MoveOn.Org with the Democrats) that do not appear in our data set. This work focuses on name exchanges, which groups only do if they solicit small donors or new members from the general population. Second, the links we find between specific organizations and the Democratic or Republican parties are often indirect. We should not be hasty to label as "partisan" specific organizations with a low number of indirect ties to parties. However, we have more confidence that the general patterns of polarization and cooperation across factions that emerge from these indirect relationships are valid and noteworthy.

Finally, as with any exploratory work, additional research is required to validate and extend this project. It would be helpful, for example, to vary the size of initial donations or location of mailing addresses, to change the initial sample for a snowball study, or to use a large-scale one-time survey. On a conceptual level, much additional research can be done to identify party network cooperation in other domains of political life, e.g., fundraising, campaign staffing, and lobbying coalitions. Furthermore, additional research is needed to explain which interest groups will cooperate with a party and which will remain unaffiliated (see Heaney & Rojas, 2007, for one such work). We hope that our effort sparks additional investigation of EPNs.

Notes

1. The Pew study uses cluster analysis of about 2,000 respondents to divide the population into nine groups on the basis of their issue positions and ideology, three of which are predominantly Democratic.

2. Reiter (1981) suggested that intraparty divisions are becoming decreasingly ideological and more focused on tactics.

3. Prominent business conservatives, including National Association of Manufacturers president John Engler and U.S. Chamber of Commerce Vice President Bruce Josten, have complained about their party's obsession with cultural conservatism among federal court nominees at the expense of business issues (Weisman & Birnbaum, 2005).

4. Despite the growth of the Internet as a means for joining organizations and donating money, direct mail continues to be a primary means by which people find out about new organizations and join them. Indeed, direct mail and the Internet seem to complement each other, allowing consumers greater opportunities to learn about groups and candidates and to send money. In the overall direct marketing industry between 2001 and 2006, sales increased by an average of 5.8% annually, and fundraising increased by 3.3% annually (Direct Marketing Association, 2006; Interview with S. Hendricks, Director of Public Affairs, Direct Marketing Association, April 3, 2007).

5. The antonym of a directed relationship is a "symmetric" relationship in which a relationship between two actors is necessarily equivalent for both. Marriage, for example, is a symmetric relationship; if A is married to B, then B is married to A. On occasion, two interest groups may orchestrate a symmetric sharing of lists, but the typical industry practice is a one-way rental (Kaufman, personal communication, September 22, 2005).

6. This software is available at <http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/>. Readers interested in learning more about social network analysis may begin with Hanneman and Riddle (2005) and Wasserman and Faust (1994).

7. The node layout is based on NetDraw's "spring-embedding" algorithm. Spring embedding is an iterative fitting process designed to place nodes with the smallest path lengths between each other closest together while separating them enough to ensure readability. For the sake of clarity, unconnected groups were deleted before distributing the nodes into factions.

8. When we attempted to divide the nodes into four or five factions, there was little change. When groups are classified into two factions, all the points in the "Other" faction are lumped with the Republican EPN. This has the curious effect of lumping Howard Dean, current chair of the DNC, with the Republicans. Why? Dean's campaign shared names with Wellness Advisor and Biotech Research, which also received names from *Mountain Home Nutritionals*, which in turn received information from the conservative publication *Human Events*. In the absence of any Dean campaign ties to the Democratic EPN, this remote link was enough to tie Dean to the RNC.

9. To calculate this statistic, we ignored the direction of the ties.

10. The null expectations and statistical significance are based on 5,000 random permutations, in which the factional lines and network density are constant and ties between organizations are randomly distributed. The "null expectation" is the mean value of the E-I index from those permutations.

11. These factions were identified using the "factions" algorithm in NetDraw. The algorithm identifies factions that maximize within-faction ties and minimize between-faction ties for a given number of factions. For both parties, we tested for as many as 10 factions and a 3-faction partition provided the best fitness score.

12. The coding in Tables 2 and 3 is by the authors based on the Web sites of the organizations. A "business" is a for-profit organization engaged in direct marketing. An "interest group" has as a major goal change in U.S. policy. "Politicians" include candidates for President or Congress or individuals who seek contributions to a personal organization (e.g., Alan Keyes). "Medical" organizations seek to cure a major illness or health problem, for example, the American Diabetes Association. "Charities" and "International Relief" organizations provide direct aid with little effort to change U.S. policy.

13. The combination of snowball sampling and sparse data may make our analysis of the Republican Party sensitive to high-volume name sellers. That is, a group that enters our data set in mid-sequence (such as the Citizen Leader Coalition) and sells its names to several unique buyers may create the appearance of a "faction."

References

- Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2005). Why can't we all just get along? The reality of a polarized America. *The Forum*, 3(2).
- American Political Science Association. (1950). Toward a more responsible two-party system: A report of the committee on political parties. *American Political Science Review*, 44(3, Supplement), 1-98.
- Belloni, F. P., & Beller, D. C. (1976). The study of party factions as competitive political organizations. *Western Political Quarterly*, 29, 531-549.
- Bernstein, J. (2005, October). *Network research, factions, and the next agenda*. Paper presented at the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics Conference on the State of the Parties: 2004 and Beyond, Akron, OH.
- Cohen, M., Karol, D., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2008). *The party decides: Presidential nominations before and after reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Direct Marketing Association. (2006). *The power of direct marketing*. New York: Author.
- Doherty, J. W. (2005, September). *Organized by competition: Candidate-consultant networks in California legislative campaigns*. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Dominguez, C. B. K. (2005a, September). *Groups and the party coalitions: A network analysis of overlapping donor lists*. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Dominguez, C. B. K. (2005b). *Before the primary: Party participation in Congressional nominating processes*. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
- Dominguez, C., & Bernstein, J. (2003). Candidates and candidacies in the expanded party. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 36, 165-169.
- Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2004). *Culture war? The myth of a polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Green, J. C., & Farmer, R. (Eds.). (2003). *The state of the parties: The changing role of contemporary American parties* (3rd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Green, J. C., & Shea, D. (Eds.). (1996). *The state of the parties: The changing role of contemporary American parties* (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Green, J. C., & Shea, D. (Eds.). (1999). *The state of the parties: The changing role of contemporary American parties*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Grossman, M., & Dominguez, C. B. K. (2009). Party coalitions and interest group networks. *American Politics Research*, 37, 767-800.
- Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). *Introduction to social network methods*. Riverside: University of California, Riverside.
- Heaney, M., & Rojas, F. (2007). Partisans, nonpartisans, and the antiwar movement in the United States. *American Politics Research*, 34, 431-464.
- Hetherington, M. C. (2001). Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization. *American Political Science Review*, 95, 619-631.
- Hulse, C. (2002, November 9). The 2002 elections: The Democrats. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- Jacobson, G. C. (2004, April). *Explaining the ideological polarization of the Congressional parties since the 1970s*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Karol, D. (2005, September). *Party coalitions, interest groups and the limits of unidimensionality in Congress*. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Koger, G., Masket, S. E., & Noel, H. (2009). Partisan webs: Information exchange and party networks. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39, 633-653.
- Krackhardt, D., & Stern, R. (1988). Informal networks and organizational crises: An experimental simulation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 51, 123-140.
- Madison, J. (1787). Federalist 10. In *The Federalist Papers* (Article No. 10).
- Masket, S. E. (2009). *No middle ground: How informal party organizations control nominations and polarize legislatures*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2006). *Polarized America: The dance of ideology and unequal riches*. Boston: MIT Press.
- Miller, G. J., & Schofield, N. J. (2003). Activists and partisan realignment in the United States. *American Political Science Review* 97, 245-260.
- Monroe, J. P. (2001). *The political party matrix: The persistence of organization*. Ithaca: State University of New York Press.
- Nash, G. H. (1996). *The conservative intellectual movement in America since 1945*. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
- Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. (2005). *Beyond red vs. blue: Republicans divided about role of government—Democrats by social and personal values* (Survey Report). Washington, DC: Author.
- Polsby, N. (1981). Coalition and faction in American politics. In S. M. Lipset (Ed.), *Party coalition in the 1980s* (pp. 153-178). San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Reiter, H. L. (1981). Intra-party cleavages in the United States today. *Western Political Quarterly*, 34, 287-300.
- Rogers, D. (2004, November 4). The Bush victory: Republicans bolster majorities in Congress; blow to Senate Democrats Boosts agenda of business and social conservatives. *The Wall Street Journal*, p. A8.
- Rohde, D. W. (1991). *Parties and leaders in the postreform house*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). *The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in America*. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Schwartz, M. A. (1990). *The party network: The robust organization of Illinois Republicans*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Shea, D., & Green, J. C. (Eds.). (1994). *The state of the parties: the changing role of contemporary American parties* (2nd ed.). Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Sinclair, B. (1995). *Legislators, leaders, and lawmaking*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Skinner, R. M. (2005). Do 527's add up to a party? Thinking about the "shadows" of politics. *The Forum*, 3(5).
- Sundquist, J. L. (1983). *Dynamics of the party system: Alignment and realignment of political parties in the United States*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Theriault, S. M. (2008). *Party polarization in Congress*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). *Social network analysis: Methods and applications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weisman, J., & Birnbaum, J. H. (2005, May 24). Business groups tire of GOP focus on social issues. *The Washington Post*, p. E01.
- Wilson, W. (1885). *Congressional government*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- York, A. (2002, November 9). *Harold Ford crusades to save the Democrats*. Retrieved October 13, 2009, from http://dir.salon.com/story/politics/feature/2002/11/09/pelosi_ford/index.html

Gregory Koger is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Miami. He studies legislative politics and elections, party organization, and lobbying. He is the author of *Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate* (2010).

Seth Maskett is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Denver. He studies party organization, state legislatures, campaigns, and elections. He is the author of *No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures* (2009).

Hans Noel is an assistant professor of government at Georgetown University and a Robert Wood Johnson Scholar of Health Policy Research at the University of Michigan. He studies the development of party ideologies, legislative politics, and parties in presidential elections. He is the coauthor of *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform* (2008).

For reprints and permissions queries, please visit SAGE's Web site at <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>.