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summary

(U) DEVELOPING SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS

(U) Summary

Moscow signaled its interest in establishing an active relationship with the leaders of the Sandinista revolution as soon as they achieved power in July 1979. Within less than a year, it succeeded in concluding a network of bilateral agreements in economic, cultural, and political areas. Since then, Soviet influence on the Government of National Reconstruction has remained strong; it is evident in Nicaragua's drift toward the socialist orbit and its general support for Soviet foreign policy positions in the international arena.

Moscow has displayed a preference for implementing those agreements that promise the greatest influence for the least expenditure and has kept its economic assistance sporadic and meager. There is considerable evidence, however, that the Soviet Union has made a significant, covert contribution to the Nicaraguan military, channeling equipment and weapons through Cuba and other surrogates. The Cuban-Nicaraguan route has also been used to transfer arms to Salvadoran insurgents.

Although close ties with the USSR have been openly criticized by Nicaragua's opposition leaders, Moscow's interest in promoting a viable opening into Central America, the Sandinista need for Soviet support, and a shared political ideology all provide impetus toward a closer relationship.

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(U) Background

The Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) announced formation of a Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) on July 19, 1979, after 16 years of struggle against the Somoza regime. In its final stage, the insurgency acquired a revolutionary character, with massive popular defections to the FSLN cause. The Soviets were careful to remain at a discreet distance from the actual conflict, but along with their propaganda support reportedly provided financial and military assistance through third parties, particularly Cuba, which had long been a patron of the FSLN.

The Soviet Union recognized the new government on July 20, 1979; by the end of the year, along with most of the East European countries, it had established formal diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. (Nicaragua's recognition of the Soviet Government in 1944 had never led to an exchange of diplomatic missions.) GRN expectations of substantial US economic and possible military assistance, plus Soviet uncertainty as to US reaction, were probable factors in the initial low-key approach both sides took to the development of bilateral relations.

US delays in extending aid evidently altered that approach. Various Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak delegations began arriving in Nicaragua in early 1980 as increasingly harsh anti-US rhetoric appeared in the Nicaraguan press. The March 1980 visit of a high-ranking Nicaraguan delegation to Moscow (followed by visits to several East European capitals), undertaken at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, marked the beginning of a decidedly pro-Soviet shift in Nicaraguan foreign policy.^{1/}

(U) Blueprint for Cooperation

The 14-member delegation included most of Nicaragua's leftist political leaders: junta members Moises Hassan and Sergio Ramirez, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, Interior Minister Tomas Borge, Agrarian Reform Minister Jaime Wheelock, and Economic Planning

^{1/} For a list of exchange visits since September 1979, see appendix.

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Minister Henry Ruiz. Moscow gave considerable publicity both to the visit and to the eight bilateral agreements (on trade, economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation) announced at its conclusion. The agreements, for the most part, were general in nature, representing a broad framework for cooperation. The only specific promises of Soviet assistance reported involved hydroelectrification and geological prospecting. No military agreements were announced.

Included in the projected ventures was a plan for cooperation between the CPSU and the FSLN. Although the FSLN is not technically a political party, the Soviets in this way implicitly accorded it the status and prestige of "vanguard" of the Nicaraguan revolution. This enhanced the legitimacy of the FSLN's efforts to consolidate its position among competing leftist forces at home, including the Nicaraguan Communist Party. At the same time, Moscow ensured itself ready access to the FSLN leadership, thereby opening opportunities to influence Nicaragua's political evolution.

In the ensuing year, the Soviets have diligently exploited these opportunities and gained a degree of political leverage in Nicaragua out of proportion to their material investment. Maintaining a steady stream of propaganda intended to bolster Nicaragua's international standing and, more importantly, the politically badgered FSLN at home, the Soviets have carefully selected the areas for specific agreements. These include:

--a June 1980 accord granting Aeroflot the right to make commercial cargo and passenger flights to Managua via Havana;

--a July 1980 cultural agreement providing for Nicaraguan photographic and crafts exhibits in and 100 scholarships to the USSR;

--a September 1980 agreement for the exchange of television and radio programs and Soviet technical assistance in producing such programs;

--a November 1980 agreement for the exchange of photo news services and the establishment in Managua of a TASS office manned by two Soviet correspondents; and

--a December 1980 agreement providing 195 scholarships for professional, technical, and post-graduate study in the Soviet Union; the dispatch of Soviet health-care professionals and athletic coaches to Nicaragua; the exchange of publications; the establishment of relations between cultural associations; and Soviet technical advice and institutional support for the reorganization of Nicaraguan higher education.

The Soviets remain cautious in promising economic aid, however, limiting themselves to a hydroelectrification feasibility study and promises of assistance in the eventual undertaking of a hydroelectric project. Prior to April 1981, Soviet-Nicaraguan economic and trade relations consisted almost entirely of studies of Nicaraguan conditions by teams of Soviet specialists in hydropower engineering, agriculture, geology, non-ferrous metallurgy, forestry, fisheries, and education. The only trade deal reported was a January 1980 arrangement for the sale of Nicaraguan coffee in exchange for unspecified Soviet technical assistance. (La Prensa reports that an initial December 1979 agreement for a Soviet purchase of 500 tons of coffee had been supplemented with one for an additional 1,000-ton purchase in January 1980 indicate that the Nicaraguans had had some trouble in negotiating a satisfactory agreement.)

Mid-1980 talks about the purchase of Lada automobiles seem to have bogged down, and no further trade agreements have been announced. The Nicaraguan Ministry of Foreign Trade recently indicated that Nicaragua expects 15 percent of its coffee exports for 1981 to go to "socialist countries" (i.e., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union), but is only "considering" the Soviet Union as an alternative market for sugar.

Soviet humanitarian assistance during the same period (i.e., prior to April 1981) was also meager, consisting of two shipments, in August 1979 and March 1981, of such items as medical supplies and "children's food." (Opposition claims that the USSR contributed only \$5,000-\$8,000 to the Nicaraguan literacy campaign have not been denied by GRN officials.)

New Impetus for Ties

(C) In the face of mounting economic and annoying political pressures, the FSLN in late November 1980 sent a delegation led by Wheelock and Ruiz to the USSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The delegation reportedly gave Moscow a \$500 million agricultural shopping list. The only announced result, however, was an "agreement by both sides to activate contacts between women, youth, unions and mass information systems." Moscow evidently was not ready to shoulder any new economic burdens.

(U) Visits by the group to the other countries were somewhat more rewarding. According to Wheelock, Czechoslovakia offered a \$20 million credit for development of the textile industry; Bulgaria offered a \$7 million credit for the mining industry and three other credits totaling \$18.5 million; and Hungary offered a \$5 million credit for public health. The agreement with Bulgaria was signed in January 1981, but the credits were spread over so many development projects that Ruiz was moved to complain

publicly about "financial offers which do not have enough economic backing." Nevertheless, Ruiz felt confident enough to talk of an imminent agreement with Bulgaria for development of a hydroelectric plant on the Yeye River, estimated to cost \$30 million. But no announcement of such a formal agreement has yet been made.

(U) The cutoff of most forms of US assistance to Nicaragua in early April 1981 (portrayed by the Soviet press as an aggressive prelude to a US invasion) precipitated a new crisis for the GRN, which had counted on US loans to purchase badly needed wheat. In response, the FSLN mounted a massive propaganda campaign to whip up public indignation at US "economic aggression." This had the troublesome side effect of generating public criticism of the lack of aid from Moscow. Although FSLN leaders attempted to justify that lack (for example, by referring to the physical distance between the two countries), they also set out on a new round of visits to Eastern Europe and apparently requested emergency aid from Moscow.

(U) In a surprise move, clearly calculated to exploit the US cutoff, Soviet Ambassador Shlyapnikov in late April announced the donation of 20,000 tons of wheat. (The Ambassador noted in his brief announcement that the wheat shortage had been "created by well-known international circles.") The Bulgarians followed suit by donating an additional 10,000 tons. The economic significance of the Soviet donation (estimated to be equal to a four-month supply) was probably of less importance than its timing and political effect. Coming as it did immediately prior to the lifting of the US embargo on grain to the Soviet Union, the gesture was portrayed in Nicaragua as a gift from a country which was itself the victim of economic aggression. Wide media coverage of the popular gratitude for Soviet generosity at least temporarily silenced Moscow's Nicaraguan critics. The action also bought valuable time for the FSLN to garner funding from other sources, such as Libya.

(U) Further Soviet gestures followed, including the loan, ostensibly for civilian needs, of two MI-8 helicopters with Soviet crews. The only offers that appear to be of immediate significance to Managua, however, are an emergency fund for the purchase of machinery, industrial equipment, spare parts and agricultural supplies, the use of a Soviet repair ship to service Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast fishing fleet, and several million doses of various vaccines. In offering to finance the construction of high-powered broadcasting stations, Moscow undoubtedly intends to enhance the FSLN role in spreading revolutionary rhetoric in Central America.

(U) In spite of the limited monetary value of this aid, Moscow's gestures indicate an awareness of the GRN's domestic problems and a desire to improve Soviet-Nicaraguan relations.

More meaningful assistance programs are likely to depend on the FSLN's ability to consolidate its political position and thereby assure Moscow of long-term security for its investment.

(U) Impact of the Soviet Presence

FSLN efforts to concentrate political authority in its own hands, gain control of communications media, and restructure the country's political organs, along with its self-promoted identification with authoritarian socialist countries, have led to opposition charges that the regime is moving toward a totalitarian communist system. One result of these perceptions has been the focusing of attention on the Soviet presence within the country as an indicator of GRN intentions. Another has been a growing debate between opposition spokesmen, particularly Alfonso Robelo, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) and former junta member, and government leaders on the dimensions of that presence.

The controversy began with a Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry statement in early 1980 that the Soviet Embassy would have a "large staff" and speculation that the number of personnel could reach 100. Based on official announcements of arrivals, by January 11, 1980, there were only 31 Soviets in Nicaragua, including 20 technicians.

By March 1980, there were rumors of a large number of Soviet journalists and "agents" in the country and further references to an embassy staff of 100. In May, US news media picked up rumors that Soviet personnel were building a military base in northern Nicaragua, a claim vehemently denied by the GRN and the Soviet Government. In the same month, however, the rumor was given new currency when Robelo, at a mass political rally, warned of a possible Soviet intervention in Nicaragua and called the existing Soviet diplomatic mission oversized. Linking the Soviet presence to the Cuban presence (by that time, large numbers of Cuban technicians were in the country), Robelo implied that the KGB was threatening Nicaragua.

Foreign Minister d'Escoto dismissed Robelo's charges as hysterical and asserted there were only nine "accredited" Soviet officials in Nicaragua. But Robelo later claimed there could eventually be as many as 300 Soviets attached to the embassy, because the Soviets were negotiating to purchase a building which could accommodate that number. Shortly thereafter, Ambassador Shlyapnikov announced that the embassy had a normal contingent of 11 personnel. Rioting in the Atlantic coast port of Bluefields in September 1980, said to have been sparked by the presence of Soviets and Cubans and recurrent press reports of Soviet military personnel and technical advisers in the country, has led to further suspicion that the Soviet presence is growing.

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In any event, Robelo's continuing campaign to increase his popular support by tapping anti-communist sentiment has caused considerable discomfort to resident Soviets, and may well have been a factor inducing recent offers of assistance from the USSR to offset its negative public image.

A Bilateral Military Relationship?

(U) Although both Moscow and Managua have given wide coverage to the expansion of official ties between the two governments, neither one has publicly referred to a military relationship. In the months immediately following the Sandinist victory, there were no indications that the Soviet Union was considering direct military aid to the FSLN. On the contrary, what appeared to be a round of East European visits in late 1979 by a Nicaraguan military delegation (including, in all probability, a stop in Moscow) failed to yield any agreement to provide such assistance--at least none has ever come to light. The absence of any mention of a military agreement following the March 1980 visit was viewed by some as confirmation that Moscow would maintain a position of noninvolvement in Nicaragua's military development.

(U) FSLN leaders were obviously successful, however, in convincing the Soviets that US hostility toward Nicaraguan political developments, threats from anti-GRN elements in neighboring countries, and political instability at home made it imperative that the regime's internal and external defense capability be strengthened. The Soviets may also have believed that regional conditions--the upsurge of violence in Central America generally and Nicaragua's availability as an arms conduit--were too promising to be ignored. Nevertheless, Moscow has been careful to maintain a facade of noninvolvement in whatever arms transfers took place, allowing Cuba to function as a base of operations and drawing in such surrogates as Vietnam on the margin.

(S) In the following months, there were recurrent reports that Soviet aircraft were delivering arms to Nicaragua from Cuba. Arms deliveries were also reported to be coming in by ship. Expected deliveries of military weapons and equipment were said to include automatic weapons, tanks, trucks, and small surface-to-air missiles. While some of the equipment delivered (particularly that intended for onward shipment to regional insurgents) is of Western manufacture, the Nicaraguan armed forces also have been receiving Soviet-made hardware.

(U) Soviet weaponry continues to arrive in Nicaragua, but the transshipment of arms to third countries apparently has dropped off sharply since late January. The possibility of US action to stop the flow, threats to cut off aid to Nicaragua, problems in maintaining the direct airlift of weapons into El Salvador, and the failure of the Salvadoran offensive in January are the most likely factors in the cutback of larger scale arms deliveries via Nicaragua. Moreover, Moscow may be concerned that its strategy of exploiting high-risk opportunities could undermine any long-term rapprochement with Latin America.

(U) On the other hand, cutting back support to Central American insurgencies via Cuba and Nicaragua may well be a temporary move designed to relieve regional pressures on the GRN and deflate the US-led campaign to expose Soviet involvement. Support for Nicaragua via the Cuban proxy and concurrent promotion of ties between the GRN and other communist states are, in any case, indicators of Moscow's steady and persistent efforts to secure a permanent foothold in Central America.

(U) Foreign Policy and Propaganda

Since the March 1980 visit, Moscow has enjoyed Managua's full support on a wide range of Soviet foreign policy lines (e.g., condemnation of the Camp David accords, deployment of US theater nuclear weapons in Europe), many of which have only marginal relevance to Nicaraguan foreign policy concerns. Soviet influence was particularly clear in the change between January 1980--when the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the UN expressed "concern" at the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan--and March 1980 when a Nicaraguan communique condemned the creation of international tension in Afghanistan by "imperialist and reactionary forces." Support for Moscow's positions is now common in such international forums as the UN and the Organization of American States. Coordination of views between the two governments on major international issues is likely to grow.

The increasingly well-organized Nicaraguan propaganda machine is already strongly supportive of Moscow's media effort to influence world opinion on events in Central America. The campaign's basic premises are that the Nicaraguan struggle was not only against Somoza but also, in broader terms, against US imperialism, and that conditions in such countries as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras closely parallel pre-revolutionary conditions in Nicaragua. The increase in regional instability is depicted as purely the

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result of a sociopolitical crisis brought about by repressive US policies intended to reverse the course of world history. Nicaragua is cast as a symbol of hope and a role model for other Latin American liberation movements, although too small and poor to provide anything but moral support to those fighting fascist forces "armed to the teeth" with US weapons.

(U) US Policy, the USSR, and Nicaragua

It is doubtful whether the suspension and cutoff of US assistance actually played a significant role in the development of Soviet-Nicaraguan ties, other than providing an incentive to both parties to be more open about their rapprochement.

--Closer ties between the two countries and the immediate shift in Nicaraguan foreign policy from ostensible nonalignment to a pro-Soviet stance date from the March 1980 meetings. At that time, the possibility of large-scale US assistance was still very much alive. The US had already extended considerable aid to the GRN.

--The departure from ruling circles of the moderates--such as Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz--was a clear indication that power rested with the leftists, on whom it was unlikely the US could exert a positive influence. The Marxist orientation of FSLN leaders promised an inclination toward the Cuban-Soviet models resulting from Cuban training and patronage.

--The possibility of obtaining meaningful Soviet economic aid was not a decisive factor in the FSLN drive to broaden its ties with Moscow. Indeed, FSLN leaders reportedly were well warned not to expect much economic help from that quarter. In terms of FSLN priorities, however, the need for major military contributions to be used for the consolidation of personal power was of far greater urgency than the need for economic assistance--and Moscow (via Cuba) was a more likely source for the former than was Washington. In spite of the paucity of economic aid from the Soviet Union, political and (unpublicized) military cooperation continues to develop.

Moscow's approval of Nicaragua's evolution into a Marxist state is clear from its policy of helping the FSLN fulfill its most pressing needs: the achievement of international legitimacy and consolidation of power at home. Outspoken support for FSLN political ambitions, and material support for the buildup of Nicaragua's internal and external military forces and propaganda machine (mechanisms crucial to those ambitions), has laid the groundwork for an increasingly close Soviet relationship with GRN leaders, in spite of any reluctance to aid in economic reconstruction. And by continuing to stimulate FSLN fears of an externally directed invasion aimed at the destruction of the GRN, the Soviets can ensure

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Nicaragua's cooperation in plans to exploit political instability in Central America in the hopes of establishing friendly leftist regimes.

A renewal of US assistance would pose little threat to Moscow's privileged position in the near-to-medium term. The most probable immediate result would be merely a muting of Nicaragua's virulent anti-US rhetoric. Over the long run, however, renewed US assistance could marginally increase the chances of a better FSLN disposition toward the US and provide a counterbalance to Soviet influence.

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
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(C/NF) APPENDIX - Exchange Visits*

September 1979	(U)	German Democratic Republic delegation led by Heinz Neukrantz, FDGB (trade union) Central Executive, meets with representatives of Sandinist Workers Central. Agreement is signed. Nicaraguan trade unionists will go to GDR for training; GDR will give Nicaragua a M1 million "solidarity consignment" including vaccines and teaching aids.
September 1979	(U)	Nicaraguan military delegation led by Defense Minister Bernardino Larios meets with representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for People's Defense.
September 18-22, 1979	(U)	GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer meets with junta members and Foreign Minister d'Escoto in Nicaragua; no agreements announced.
October 1979	(U)	Ambassador to Mexico Yurii Volskii heads USSR diplomatic delegation to Managua; meets with junta members and Foreign Minister d'Escoto to arrange for diplomatic mission.
November 1979	(C)	GDR trade delegation visits Nicaragua: 
December 1979	(U)	Nicaraguan Union of Journalists, led by Daniel Aguirre, visits Czechoslovakia.
December 18, 1979	(U)	Sandinist trade union delegation arrives in Moscow for one-month course at Higher School of the Trade Union Movement.
January 1980	(U)	Five-man Soviet trade delegation to Nicaragua for a 17-day visit; meets with

*Where information on arrival and departure dates is unavailable, only the month is given. Although relations with Eastern Europe and Soviet client states are not within the scope of this paper, visits to these countries have been listed to indicate Nicaragua's growing ties with the socialist bloc.

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Henry Ruiz and FSLN/government representatives to discuss activation of trade.

January 1980	(U)	Eleven-man Soviet delegation headed by A. Zimakov and 20 technicians arrives in Nicaragua to set up Soviet Embassy.
March 17-22, 1980	(U)	Fourteen-member Nicaraguan delegation headed by Moises Hassan, Tomas Borge, Humberto Ortega, and Henry Ruiz visits Moscow; meets with party/government leaders; signs eight agreements on political, economic, trade, scientific-technological, consular issues.
March 22-27, 1980	(U)	Delegation, as above, to Bulgaria; meets with Todor Zhivkov and party/government leaders; nine agreements signed. Defense Ministers meet.
March 27-April 2, 1980	(U)	Same delegation to East Germany; meets with Erich Honecker and party/government leaders; agreements signed on trade, economic, consular, scientific-technological, and cultural matters; agreement to establish Mixed Commission.
April 2-4, 1980	(U)	Same delegation to Czechoslovakia; meets with party/government officials; signs political, cultural, economic, and diplomatic agreements.
April 27-30, 1980	(U)	Daniel Ortega to Moscow; meets with Politburo member Tikhonov; no agreements announced.
April 30, 1980	(U)	Sandinist Workers Central delegation to Soviet Union at invitation of All-Union Council of Trade Unions.
May 1980	(U)	Same delegation as above, to Czechoslovakia.
May 1980	(U)	Nicaraguan Deputy Director of New Nicaragua News Agency, Francisco Hernandez, meets with ADN General Director Gunther Potschke in East Germany; agreement signed on exchange of photo news services.
June 1980	(U)	Nicaraguan Deputy Defense Minister Joaquin Cuadro leads military delegation

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to East Germany; meets with GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman.

June 1980	(U) New Nicaragua News Agency Deputy Director Hernandez to Czechoslovakia; meets with Director, Czechoslovak News Agency, Otakar Svercina; cooperation agreement signed.
June 1980	(U) Nicaraguan Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal to USSR; meets with Minister of Culture Demichev.
July 1980	(U) Bulgarian Politburo candidate-member Georgi Yordanov, to Nicaraguan victory celebration.
July 1980	(U) Romanian Executive Political Committee member and Central Committee Secretary Ion Coman heads delegation to Nicaraguan victory celebration; meets with FSLN/government leaders.
July 17-22, 1980	(U) N. P. Kalinin, Vice President, Supreme Soviet, USSR, leads delegation to Nicaraguan victory celebration.
July 18-25, 1980	(U) GDR Politburo member Werner Felde leads Socialist Unity Party Central Committee delegation to Nicaraguan victory celebration; meets with FSLN/government leaders.
July 21-23, 1980	(U) PLO leader Yasir Arafat meets with FSLN/government leaders in Managua; diplomatic relations established.
July 30, 1980	(U) Soviet technical delegation arrives in Managua for a three-month survey of gold and silver mines.
August 1980	(U) Director General of TASS Sergei Losev meets in Managua with Director General of New Nicaragua News Agency Carlos Garcia; cooperation agreement signed; 24-hour direct communication channel to Moscow to be set up.
August 1980	(U) Nicaraguan Minister of Fishing Industry Carlos Coronel to Third International Fishing Exposition in the USSR.

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November 1980 (U) Carlos Garcia, Director General of New Nicaragua News Agency to USSR; details unknown.

November 25-30, 1980 (U) Jaime Wheelock, Henry Ruiz, lead FSLN/ government delegation to USSR; meet with Boris Ponomarev and Nikolai Talyzin; sign cultural agreement.

December 1980 (U) Same delegation as above, to Bulgaria; signs economic, scientific-technological, and commercial agreements; meets with Zhivkov.

December 1980 (U) Same delegation to Hungary.

December 1980 (U) Same delegation to Czechoslovakia; meets with President Husak.

January 1981 (U) Nicaraguan delegation from the Union of Sandinist Youth visits USSR.

February 3-6, 1981 (U) Hungarian economic delegation to Nicaragua; signs technological cooperation agreement to send Hungarian experts in health and regional planning and to extend scholarships for study in Hungary.

February 20-29, 1981 (U) Carlos Nunez, President, Nicaraguan Council of State, leads delegation to 26th CPSU Congress.

March 1981 (U) Humberto Ortega delegation stops in Moscow on way to Vietnam.

March 1981 (U) Same delegation to Vietnam; no agreements announced.

March 1981 (U) Same delegation to Kampuchea; no agreements announced.

March 1981 (U) Same delegation to Laos; no agreements announced.

March 1981 (U) GDR economists participate in a planning and management course in Managua.

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March 22-26, 1981	(U)	Janos Peter, Deputy Speaker of Hungarian Parliament, heads parliamentary delegation to Nicaragua at the invitation of Council of State.
March 30-April 8, 1981	(U)	Henry Ruiz leads FSLN delegation to the Bulgarian Communist Party Congress; meets with Politburo member Lilov.
April 1981	(U)	Delegation from Hungarian National Assembly visits Nicaragua.
April 1981	(U)	Yevgenii Jedorov, Chairman of Soviet Peace Council, attends World Peace Council awards ceremony in Nicaragua; Ho Chi Minh prize to FSLN, Humberto Ortega accepts.
April 1981	(U)	Czechoslovak technical delegation meets with Henry Ruiz in Nicaragua; five Czechoslovak technicians to arrive, possibility of training Nicaraguans in Czechoslovakia discussed.
April 6-10, 1981	(U)	Victor Tirado (Commander of the Revolution) leads an FSLN delegation to Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress.
April 1981	(U)	Same delegation as above, to SED Congress in GDR.
April 10-15, 1981	(U)	Nunez delegation to Hungary; meets with representatives of Hungarian National Assembly.
April 15-17, 1981	(U)	Sandinist Workers Central delegation meets with representatives of Czechoslovak-Latin American Committee for International Relations; cooperation agreement signed (in Czechoslovakia).
April 15-18, 1981	(U)	Nunez delegation to Czechoslovakia; meets with Federal Assembly Chairman Alois Indra.

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