

# Post Quantum Cryptography

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- There are certain computational problems that we suspect to be non polynomial-time for classical computers but polynomial time on a quantum computer (i.e. factoring)
  - For some computational problems, they give only polynomial speedups at best
- In this class, we will focus on honest parties using classical computers, but adversaries using quantum computers
- It very much looks like classical cryptography but we have to:
  - Base our cryptography on computational problems that seem hard for both classical and quantum computers
  - Set the parameters of our schemes (i.e. secret key lengths) to defeat quantum attacks
- Even though current quantum computers are far from being made:
  - People can use store-now-decrypt-later attacks
  - The U.S. government will force suppliers to use post-quantum by 2027, so all major tech companies will support them

## Grover's Search

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We look at the following problem called **unstructured search**:

- Given a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , find a value  $x$  such that  $f(x) = 1$  if one exist
- With a classical computer, this requires a  $\Sigma(2^n)$  brute force approach

Grover gives a quantum circuit with size  $\text{poly}(n)|f| \cdot 2^{n/2}$  where  $|f|$  denotes the size of  $f$  as a Boolean circuit

- If  $f$  is efficient, this is roughly size  $2^{n/2}$
- For  $n = 128$ , a classical computer takes  $2^{128}$  invocations of  $f$  while a quantum circuit uses  $2^{64}$  invocations

## Decryption under Known-Plaintext

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Suppose we have a symmetric key encryption scheme that takes an  $n$  bit key  $k$  and a  $10n$  bit message  $m$ , with a  $10n$  bit ciphertext

- Suppose we have a ciphertext and we know the key  $k$  is unique
- We define a function that is 1 if  $x$  is a valid key to produce the cipher text and 0 otherwise

Grover Search can find the key in time  $2^{n/2}$ , giving a square root speedup

- Therefore, if we are aiming for 128 bit security, we need to use at least 256 bit encryption keys

## Shor's Algorithm

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We look at the problem **period finding**:

- Suppose we have integers  $d$  and  $N$  with a function  $f : \mathbb{Z}_N^d \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^d$
- We want to find a non-zero value  $\Delta \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$  such that for all  $x$ , we have  $f(x) = f(x + \Delta)$

Classically, this requires super-polynomially many queries to  $f$  and apparently exponential when  $d$  is large

- A quantum circuit of size  $\text{poly}(\log N)$  can solve this problem with good probability, which is an exponential speedup!

## Discrete Log Problem

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The discrete log problem is a classic one from cryptography given as:

- Given a group  $G$  of prime order  $q$  with generator  $g$  and a problem instance  $h \in G$  for a random  $h \in G$
- Find the unique value  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  such that  $h = g^z$

This is crucial for factoring numbers in RSA via Euler's Totient Theorem, and Shor's Algorithm gives a way to use period finding to solve it