

# Non-Fungible Token-based Electronic Voting System: Specifications, Threats and Advantages

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## Abstract

Research in electronic voting systems has been constant and fruitful since the 1970s, when the introduction of commercial cryptography provided the tools and methods for such critical operations. Despite a few exceptions for testing purposes, no systematic use of remote electronic voting systems has occurred.

A significant breakthrough occurred in 2009 with the introduction of the decentralised computational paradigm through Bitcoin, the world's first cryptocurrency, and the distributed ledger technology that supports it. Researchers soon started applying decentralised concepts and using distributed ledger's features to propose e-voting systems from a decentralised approach, which revealed itself superior right from the start. As a consequence, the field moved to use the new paradigm soon after, and new proposals employing the latest distributed ledger features are still appearing.

This article characterises the evolution of e-voting research through the years and presents a novel architecture based on smart contracts and Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), a recent addition to the distributed ledger ecosystem. We explore the inherent advantages of this new concept, as well as its development framework, to present the architecture of a fully mobile, decentralised electronic voting system using NFTs as the main vote abstractor.

## 1 Introduction

Modern democracies are critical to technological advances, as they provide citizens with levels of comfort and security that allow them to divert their time and energy away from basic survival towards research and innovation. This is

a transversal effect across society, with all sorts of mundane activities getting progressively easier and even automated, with each technological advance.

Yet, the exercise that keeps these same modern democracies running still resists innovation. Most elements that characterise a modern society, e.g., banking, farming, food processing, education, healthcare, etc., have improved thanks to technology. Except voting. Apart from a few minor upgrades on the voting act itself, the fundamental mechanics have remained mostly unchanged.

From dropping clay shards in a pot to selecting an option on a touchscreen, there has not been a change significant enough to bring this process to the same levels of practicality as other activities. Votes submitted in an electronic medium can be counted faster, but other than that, current electronic voting still limits voters geographically and does not contribute to making elections easier or cheaper to organise.

This is not an indication of a lack of interest in the research community. In fact, the modernisation of voting systems has been an active area of research in general, and the digitalisation of voting systems has been researched actively since the advent of commercial cryptography. A landmark article by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [34] established the basis for commercial cryptography, a research area that was confined to governmental (i.e., military) applications until then. This publication spearheaded the development of several cryptographic tools, particularly schemes for symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption systems. Among the earlier proposals for asymmetrical cryptosystems were the *Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)* [92] cryptosystem, which relies on the factorisation of large prime numbers, and the *ElGamal* [36] cryptosystem, which uses the intractability of computing discrete algorithms.

In the specific context of e-voting, these advancements were followed by approximately three decades of e-voting research based on a centralised, server-client paradigm that produced a significant number of academic proposals that used cryptographic tools such as encryption, digital signatures, one-way hash functions, etc., to create secure and transparent e-voting systems.

This was the state of e-voting research until 2009. At the end of that year, blockchain broke into the mainstream through Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, introduced through a landmark paper [82]. After Bitcoin’s solidification as the first truly digital currency, others followed, improving not only the currency feature but also adding support to different applications. Six years later, the Ethereum blockchain [33] was launched, and with it the concept of a blockchain virtual machine, a functional abstraction of the cumulative resources available in the network nodes, which could be used to run code synchronously—referred to as *smart contracts*—in a subset of the network nodes. Ethereum’s version of this virtual machine is named *Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)* [6]. Though Bitcoin already offered some capacity to execute scripted code in a distributed manner, this was not its main feature and thus was quite limited in that regard. Ethereum was the first blockchain to offer explicit support for smart contracts, but other public blockchains created after followed it in this regard. Smart contract support is a base feature for most public blockchains currently, which has made this concept almost ubiquitous in the blockchain ecosystem. Other

examples of blockchains with smart contract support created after Ethereum include *Cardano*, *Solana*, *Tron*, *EOS*, *Polkadot*, and *Flow* [29].

The applicability of blockchain to the e-voting context was clear from early on, and e-voting research migrated to this new approach to take advantage of these features. The first academic articles detailing e-voting systems using a blockchain appeared in 2016, and since then, the interest in this new research approach has increased steadily. Nonetheless, blockchains were used towards serving e-voting purposes mostly through adapting their cryptocurrency capabilities to tally votes instead of balances, or more recently by taking advantage of the programming flexibility offered by smart contracts.

*Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)* are one of the latest additions to the blockchain ecosystem. Section 3 presents a detailed explanation on this concept. NFTs encapsulate the concept of *digital object* by taking advantage of the cryptographic capabilities of blockchains to establish unique sets of records that establish ownership relations between a digital object and an account. NFTs have used their object-like capabilities extensively to represent digital art and collectibles.

This paper extends the ecosystem of blockchain-based e-voting systems by proposing one using NFTs and their unique capabilities to abstract ballots as digital objects. We take advantage of the mechanics used by blockchains to securely mint and transfer NFTs between smart contracts and users to establish a secure, private, but also transparent e-voting framework. Presently, there are multiple NFT architectures available for this purpose, each with strengths and weaknesses that can affect such a system in the long run. Additionally, this paper presents a version of the main protocol using the two more popular NFT architectures available, namely the contract-based approach used in Ethereum, and a newer account-based approach that also introduces the *resource* concept which simplifies the creation of digital objects.

The paper continues with a state of the art in Section 2, where we discuss the evolution of e-voting systems research. Section 5 details a generalist approach to the problem at hand and is followed by a description of the two specific approaches considered in Sections 6 and 7. A security analysis of the proposed solution follows with Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper with a final conclusion and a discussion over open problems.

## 2 State of the Art

The history of e-voting systems research details an evolution process that was triggered by the first proposals resulting from the commercialisation of cryptography, up to the latest decentralised proposals using blockchain as the technological basis.

Cryptography was mostly used for military purposes throughout history, but its commercialisation has opened up new avenues for secure communication and data integrity in various fields, including voting. This shift has enabled the development of innovative e-voting systems that aim to enhance transparency and security in electoral processes, where it was used to protect communications

on the battlefield. Commercial cryptographic applications were inexistent until the publication of [34] in 1976. This paper showed how to create an encryption cryptosystem from an intractable mathematical problem. Problems such as the factorisation of large primes and prime-based logarithms are practically impossible to solve in one direction, but given a solution, it is trivial to verify its correctness. For example, for a given large prime number, it is very time- and effort-consuming to find two smaller prime numbers that, when multiplied, result in that large prime. On the other hand, it is trivial to verify if any given pair of smaller prime numbers is a solution, i.e., we get the large prime when the smaller primes are multiplied by each other.

[34] presented the first proposal for a non-military, non-proprietary cryptosystem, but it was quickly followed by other articles detailing alternative solutions and exploring other sources for intractable problems. [96], [27], [36], and [92] proposed the first commercial cryptosystems based on symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption keys. The applicability of these cryptographic tools in an e-voting context was clear, and the first e-voting proposals based on these concepts soon followed. These early systems are characterised by cryptographic tools derived from research on commercial cryptography, such as blind signatures [24], mix-nets [25], homomorphism in threshold cryptosystems [96], and cryptographic proofs [46].

Research in e-voting systems progressed towards the establishment of security classification criteria, such as *accuracy*, *privacy*, *eligibility*, *verifiability*, *convenience*, *flexibility*, *mobility*, and *robustness*. A simple example that illustrates this process is the usage of asymmetrical encryption keys to encrypt voter data, thus protecting the *privacy* of the voter. A proposal that uses such a scheme can claim that it establishes voter *privacy*. Yet, a formal definition of such criteria has been notoriously absent from related literature. [83] was among the first to attempt such characterisation, with subsequent publications, such as [43], [10], [59], [65], [69], [58], [8], and [26], continuing this trend. These articles followed the rationale that the more secure a system is, i.e., the more security criteria it implements, the more it can assure a user that he/she can trust his/her choice to it. Over time, these cryptographic tools became a fixture in all e-voting proposals in this initial 30-year window of research in centralised e-voting systems. This is a limiting paradigm since it constrains the whole system by establishing a single point of attack or failure while also reducing system scalability, due in great part to the demand of a large amount of resources, such as primary and secondary storage, computational power, network bandwidth, etc., to implement these criteria.

Scalability is an important characteristic that can hinder a wide adoption of the proposed system. Contemporary elections can go from simple exercises, where the system is expected to process up to a thousand votes at one point, to nationwide events that require the processing of millions of votes instead. The relationship between the scalability of a system and the amount of available resources is quite evident in the analysed literature. Proposals from this era confirm that the ones that satisfy the most security criteria also establish a computationally complex and demanding system that is often limited to small-

scale elections. As an example, in [30], [85], [57], and [84], this trade-off was shifted towards security and transparency at the expense of scalability; hence, these systems are all limited to small-scale elections, as the authors declare. Conversely, [15], [16], [89], [60], [87], [86], [73], and [80] present simpler scalable systems, but whose adoption in large-scale elections requires a sacrifice in security and transparency due to a lower number of security criteria implemented.

We were able to find examples of real-world implementation of e-voting systems. For this case, we were only interested in systems that addressed the criterion of *mobility*, i.e., a voting system that does not restrict voters geographically, in part because these proposals did not follow any of the academic ones that preceded them. There was no interest in electronic proposals that limited their users to traditional polling places, since they infuse a degree of privacy and security that derives solely from the surrounding election apparatus. The more notable exercises in recent history that match this criteria were run in Canada in 2013 [47], Estonia in 2005 [52], Switzerland in 2005 [17], Norway in 2011 [38], France in 2012 [90], and Australia in 2015 [48].

This analysis uncovered a separation between academic e-voting research and the systems that are experimented with in real-world scenarios, given that most real-world remote solutions considered were developed through contracts awarded to private companies. As a consequence, specific technical details are kept private as patented intellectual property, with any technical information about them available only from review reports, which makes any further analysis a difficult endeavour. In large-scale elections, the scalability effort quickly grows out of the capacity of small organisations and individuals, leaving governments as the only organisations with enough resources to implement them. This generation of e-voting systems proved that the concept is sound and that it is possible to use electronic means to establish elections with greater accuracy and security for their participants.

A shift towards a decentralised approach to this issue initiated with proposals that used blockchain merely for transport and record, in part as a consequence of the "imposition" of using Bitcoin's blockchain, since it was the only mature public blockchain available at the time. Proposals such as [110], [31], [19], [70], [95], [108], [35], and [12] used a script function available in Bitcoin transactions to add voting information to the blockchain data. These authors used Bitcoin's *OP\_RETURN* function, which receives an 83-byte wide string as input and adds it to the transaction metadata as the function's output (depends on the version of the Bitcoin protocol). Furthermore, this method is infeasible for large-scale use because a Bitcoin transaction necessarily involves exchanges worth a considerable amount of money, as well as being a notoriously hard-to-scale blockchain due to its high block rate. Bitcoin adds a new block every 10 minutes, which severely limits the rate of operations that this blockchain can withstand.

The popularisation of public blockchains attracted interest from other platforms, which triggered the development of software frameworks used to create and deploy custom blockchains with proprietary access control and offered more flexibility to applications. As such, researchers deployed custom-made solutions in customisable frameworks such as Hyperledger Fabric, Quorum, and Multi-

chain. Publications such as [63], [7], [23], [20], [109], [61], [81], [40], [62], [49], [56], [74], [111], [5], [51], [101], and [75] take advantage of private blockchains tailored to a voting application. As such, they paid for the increased flexibility with a lack of network support. It is difficult to establish a privately accessible network with enough active nodes that can establish a satisfactory level of redundancy.

A significant breakthrough arrived with the introduction of the smart contract through the Ethereum blockchain, specifically through the implementation of a *Turing-complete* processing platform, named *Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)*, that can execute code scripts in a decentralised fashion by splitting and distributing the instructions through the active nodes in the network. This opened up new research avenues in the e-voting environment. A few years after Ethereum’s debut, the first proposals used smart contracts to establish the logic of the system in a decentralised approach, such as [76], [64], [32], [44], [54], and [79].

Some researchers did base their solution on the Ethereum network, but they did not resort to smart contracts; instead, they explored the increased flexibility and additional application support of this network, employing similar methods as the ones in earlier proposals. [50], [103], [55], [67], [97], and [22] provide examples of this strategy.

The same time period saw several blockchain-based proposals for electronic voting systems in a real-world scenario. Small organisations are putting forward these proposals. But unlike the centralised approach, these solutions have significant overlap with the academic proposals considered. Among these real-world examples, we cite *Follow My Vote* [37], *TiVi* [99], *Agora* [2], and *Voatz* [102]. The remarkable difference between the nature of approaches regarding their real-world applications is a strong indicator of the potential of blockchain in this scenario. Real-world blockchain-based e-voting solutions follow the academic approach much closer than their centralised counterparts.

The real-world solutions indicated are end-to-end applications, but other proposals are just protocols used to set up e-voting systems instead. These are not complete solutions, as the ones indicated thus far, but instead "recipes" that, if followed, can be used to establish a secure and transparent e-voting system. [68] presents a concise summary of the most relevant Ethereum-based protocols in existence. Most of the logic employed in these protocols is already abstracted through smart contracts already deployed and publicly available in the Ethereum blockchain, such as the *MACI (Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure)* protocol [21], *Semaphore* [91], *Cicada*, and *Plume*. It is important to notice that none of these protocols employs NFTs as an abstraction of votes as well. There are references to NFTs in the protocol description, but these are used to exemplify how the protocol handles ownership of digital objects or uses NFT ownership as a means to verify the identity of a voter, but never as the main data element carrying the voter’s choices.

To finalise this section, we attempted to review any e-voting proposals that were using NFTs explicitly in the voting process. Any usage of NFTs in any capacity in a remote voting system was considered relevant, yet our search

was unable to find a single complete proposal that combined both. For this purpose, we consulted the main academic databases, namely *Google Scholar*, *Science Direct*, *IEEE*, and *ACM*. We started the search using a broader search term, namely, "e-voting" and "NFT," as well as expanded acronyms and other variations, without much success. The closest article to an NFT-based e-voting system we were able to find was [94], where the authors use SoulBound NFTs, a special case of non-transferable NFTs that can potentially be used for identification purposes [107], to circumvent the need for a trusted third party to implement *eligibility*, i.e., if a voter is allowed to vote in a given election or not. The proposed system only interacts with these NFTs during the voter validation phase.

[18] and [1] do mention Non-Fungible Tokens, but they do it more as a product of their literature review rather than as an integral component in the solution. To conclude this search process, [3], [9], and [106] produced extensive surveys around the potentials and usage of NFTs, as well as providing a list of future challenges where this technology can be determinant. [3] does mention a potential application of NFTs in governance applications, but without specifying voting or even elections in any capacity. [106] listed challenges limited to purely digital applications, namely gaming, virtual events, digital collectibles, and metaverse applications. [9] provided a broader survey and identified a larger and more specified set of potential applications for NFTs, but none of them related to governance or e-voting.

This analysis reveals a research gap regarding the application of NFTs in an e-voting context. Public blockchains have been quite successful in deploying the NFT feature in a secure and transparent fashion. NFTs are currently being transacted at a high rate in public blockchains and are able to do so securely and privately, which is the type of behaviour expectable from a trusted e-voting system.

### 3 Introduction to Non-Fungible Tokens (NFT)

*Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)* followed cryptocurrencies as another example of digitally unique constructs, which also contribute to the concept of *digital scarcity*, but with functional differences. As implied in the name, NFTs are not fungible, i.e., unlike Bitcoin or Ethereum cryptocurrency tokens, which are interchangeable and can be transacted as fractions of a unit, every NFT is digitally unique and can only be transferred whole. A user can have only a fraction of a Bitcoin in an account (0.56 BTC, for example), but the same is not valid for NFTs. Either a user owns it whole or not. Just as well, users can exchange any cryptocurrency tokens among themselves.

The NFT concept is transversal to all blockchains, but since the concept was introduced through the Ethereum chain, the NFT standard is regulated by two *Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIP)*, namely EIP-721 and EIP-1155, to define a set of base requirements (variables and functions) that a smart contract needs to implement to conform to the standard. The *Ethereum Request for*

*Comments-721* (ERC-721) [42] and ERC-1155 [41] standards regulate NFTs in Ethereum. It is possible for someone to define an NFT outside of these standards since they are not legally enforceable in any fashion. Yet, since the inception of this concept, the vast majority of published NFTs follow this standard since this gives them a level of default interoperability that is hard to achieve otherwise. If a given NFT implements the standards indicated, other users and developers have the guarantee, due to technological requirements that are "forcibly" implemented through the usage of these standards, that the variables and functions defined in the interface are implemented in the NFT contract, similar to what already happens with interfaces in object-oriented programming paradigms.

The application potential of this technology regarding digital collectibles has in itself motivated the creation of NFT-centric blockchains, such as Flow [53], which were developed towards overcoming aspects that make NFT mechanics too expensive, both in gas spent, resources allocated, and execution time, in more general-purpose blockchains such as Ethereum, for example, as well as online marketplaces dedicated solely to the commercialisation of NFTs (e.g., OpenSea [88]) as long as the NFT smart contract implements the standards indicated.

Unlike cryptocurrencies, NFTs can store metadata on-chain. Yet, because of the high cost associated with writing operations, in most cases, to optimise cost, most of the metadata stored in an NFT is a URL that can be automatically resolved to an off-chain resource, typically an image, a video, or any other type of digital file. This is the most common approach with artistic NFTs and even most digital collectibles [100].

### 3.1 NFTs vs. Cryptocurrencies

In a blockchain context, NFTs represent objects, while cryptocurrencies are variables. Though most NFTs produced thus far represent **digital** objects, there are no strict requirements in that regard. NFTs can easily be used to represent physical objects, or more correctly, to establish ownership of those physical objects in a digital distributed ledger, but so far the emphasis has been on keeping everything in the digital realm. The amount of cryptocurrency owned by an account is determined by either a balance value stored in the governing contract or by determining the Unspent Transactional Output (UTxO) value associated with the account. Ethereum maintains a balance record while Bitcoin processes transactions UTxOs to determine account balances. Adding data to a blockchain using only cryptocurrencies is a challenge in itself, since these do not provide a direct mechanism to write arbitrary data into a block. Before the NFT standard, researchers looking to use a cryptocurrency-based blockchain for alternative applications had to be creative in that regard.

Bitcoin was the only research alternative until the introduction of Ethereum in 2015. Bitcoin added new functionalities periodically, and its 0.9.0 version introduced the *OP\_RETURN* instruction to the execution set. This instruction always writes its input, unchanged, into the transactional data that gets written in the blockchain [11], which provided researchers with a practical alternative



to sending arbitrary data to a blockchain.

NFTs and smart contracts provide much more efficient and flexible means to achieve the same result. As indicated, NFTs are defined as digital objects, i.e., a pre-defined data structure that can contain several internal parameters, or even other objects if needed. Minting NFTs writes their metadata into a block. Depending on the blockchain architecture, this data can be changed afterwards, but, typically, changes to the NFT metadata require a digitally signed transaction, which can only be produced by the owner of the account that owns that NFT.

### 3.1.1 Token Burning

Token ownership in a blockchain is abstracted by the ability of a user to access the containing account, namely, the capability of that user to generate a valid digital signature that can sign a transaction to transfer that token to some other location. Deriving an account address from a private encryption key is trivial, but the opposite is computationally infeasible. The blockchain establishes ownership mechanics through this asymmetrical relationship.

Up to the point of this writing, there is no known private encryption key from which it is possible to derive a *zero address*, i.e., an account address composed solely of zeroes (0x00000...), which implies that no one "controls" that address. Transferring a token to this unrecoverable address effectively "burns" it. Once a token goes into the *zero address* account, no one can move it out of it due to the lack of a valid private key that can sign the required transaction. Therefore, "burnt" tokens are considered as if they were destroyed when in reality they are simply stored in an account that no one is able to control [6].

## 4 NFT Architectures

### 4.1 Contract-based NFT Architecture

NFTs implemented under a contract-based approach have all their information, namely token metadata and ownership records, stored in the blockchain in a memory location dependent from the deployment address for the smart contract that implements the token. Ethereum is a good example of a contract-based blockchain. NFTs in Ethereum are created and regulated by smart contracts deployed in the network. The contract code is stored in a block whose address works as the base for memory allocation within the scope of the contract.

This approach allows for simpler NFT deployments. Also, all NFT related information is kept in the same location as the smart contract itself, which makes these contracts easier to analyse regarding determining the state of NFTs minted by it. On the other hand, it also provides a single point of failure for this system. If the smart contract is deleted, all NFT information is deleted as well, thus destroying all NFTs minted from the contract as well.

## 4.2 Account-based Architecture

Account-based blockchains are more complex due to the added capabilities of their accounts. In these blockchains, an account is more than a balance pointer. It also includes a storage space area that can store smart contract code and other digital objects.

NFTs in this context are programmable digital objects, quite similar to the ones produced by object-oriented programming languages, thus fairly more complex from the software perspective than their contract-based counterparts. NFTs in account-based models have internal parameters as well as their own functions, all inside a neat software wrapper that makes these constructs more complex to build, but more easier to understand. Minting one of these NFTs is similar to creating a new object from a software class.

In this model, smart contract code is stored in a different location than any digital objects that it can produce. In this regard, contracts can produce objects and store them in the same address, or transfer them immediately after creation to another account. This removes the limitation identified previously in the contract-based approach. Deleting a contract from an account-based blockchain does not destroy the tokens, or other digital objects, produced thus far. It may diminish their capabilities, since it is not possible to refer to the minting contract anymore, but it does not invalidate any products from it.

## 4.3 Resources in Account-based Blockchains

Account-based blockchains create an environment where accounts are independent objects, accessible and modifiable only by their owners, and capable of storing digital objects independently from the smart contracts that create them. The move away from a more centralised architecture, as it happens with the contract-based approach, creates issues regarding the uniqueness of digital objects, such as NFTs.

Towards addressing this issue, account-based blockchains developed a *Resource-Oriented Paradigm (ROP)*, a programming paradigm conceptually similar to the Object-Oriented Paradigm (OOP) from general purpose programming languages such as Java or C++. Resources are digital objects characterised by internal parameters and functions, thus similar to the objects created under a OOP paradigm, but with key differences: resources can only exist in one logical location at a time. Once created, resources need to either be saved into storage or explicitly destroyed at the end of the process that creates them. Resources cannot be copied and each must be unique in the system, i.e., the digital object representing one must have a unique set of internal parameters. The uniqueness requirement is often met by establishing a base id parameter and ensuring that each digital object produced under the specification gets a different id. These requirements are usually abstracted into token standards which, when imported into a contract, behave as a list of requirements that the contract must fulfil to become functional.

The mechanics that regulate resources in this type of blockchains allow for

these objects to exists outside of the boundaries of the minting contract. Resources can be stored and transferred between accounts independently from where and if the minting contract is deployed. It also allows for these digital objects to remain functional if the minting contract gets deleted, thus making for more reliable and flexible, albeit more complex and resource demanding, blockchains.

## 5 General Approach to a NFT-based e-voting system

The e-voting system proposed in this article uses smart contracts to establish an NFT-based framework that uses these tokens as the abstractors of ballots. We use the features offered by the NFT standards indicated in Section 3 to establish mechanisms to create, edit, and transport these tokens along the system while simultaneously protecting both the identity and the choices of a voter transparently and securely. Fig. 1 presents a paradigm agnostic general diagram for this proposal.




Figure 1: General architecture of an NFT-based e-voting system.

The proposed system is not a fully centralised one, as can be stated from Fig. 1, mainly due to the intrinsically restrictive nature of elections, which typically establish *a priori* rules to determine who is eligible to vote or not. The ample nature of these rules (age limit, professional background, nationality, membership in an organisation, etc.) requires the existence of a trusted third party to define and enforce them.

### 5.1 Voting Process

1. The process begins with a voter interacting with one of the voting booth smart contracts in the available set. Providing multiple points of entry into the system via the creation of multiple but functionally identical voting booth smart contracts increases availability and security by multiplying

the effort that an adversary has to endure to pervert the system to his or her favour by a similar factor. Users interact with the contract by calling a public function that starts by inferring the eligibility status of the user.

2. The list of eligible voters needs to be provided and managed by an external third party that regulates the election, due to the sensitive nature of most elections. For a detailed explanation of the approaches to determine voter eligibility, please refer to Section 8.3.2, where two potential approaches that achieve the same result are detailed.
3. The eligibility status determines the next course of action:
  - a. The voter is not eligible. The process stops and informs the voter of the reason for this interruption.
  - b. The voter is eligible. The voting booth smart contract proceeds with minting a Ballot NFT and transferring it to the voter.
4. The voter makes his or her choice by editing the NFT's metadata accordingly. Editing an NFT's metadata is a relatively simple operation, but it still requires a level of technological knowledge that may be out of reach for most people. Contract functions abstract the NFT metadata edition process. This function also applies the necessary encryption layers required to preserve voter privacy. From a storage point of view, Ballot NFTs are stored under the voting booth contracts during the election period, where they can be replaced if the voter changes his or her mind, and move to the tally contract once this period ends. This process also removes the unidirectional link between the voter and his or her submitted NFT, which disables the multiple vote casting feature as well. Please refer to Section 8.2 for additional details on this feature.
5. After submitting his or her choice into the Ballot NFT's metadata, the voter returns the token back to the voting booth smart contract. We make no assumptions about the storage location of this token at this point.

The voting booth smart contract stores all Ballot NFTs whose encrypted metadata contains the choice of a voter.
6. The submission of a valid vote triggers the return of a success receipt, i.e., the hash of the transaction used to return the Ballot NFT to the voting booth smart contract.
7. The process described was replicated through several voting booth smart contracts used to divide the election period from the tally period, using a temporal condition to switch the functionalities available in the voting booth contracts.

During the election period, voting booth contracts accept and validate voter requests, as well as process Ballot NFTs for successful voter requests. The end of the election period triggers the start of the tally period. During it, voting booth contracts refuse voter requests by default, either to mint

a Ballot NFT or to submit a previously minted token, while they transfer all stored tokens thus far to a tally contract.

With all Ballot NFTs under the control of the tallying smart contract, the counting can begin once the data is ready, i.e., all encryption layers and randomising elements (salt) are removed from the vote data.

Once finished, another public contract function retrieves the final tally. The contract stores the tally results for future reference and auditing purposes.

The general approach described morphs into two different systems depending on the type of data storage paradigm employed by the blockchain used to implement this system. Sections 6 and 7 detail the two options in greater detail.

## 6 Contract-based Approach

Fig. 2 summarises the contract-based specification of the general system.




Figure 2: Contract-based version of the e-voting system proposed.

The crucial aspect to take into account with this version is how contract-based blockchains store smart contract-related data. All data related to a smart contract, from token ownership records to token metadata (in the case of NFT-generating smart contracts), is stored "into" the contract, i.e., in a block array referenced from the block where the contract was deployed. Ethereum, the best example of a contract-based blockchain, establishes the storage space for each contract as an "astronomically large array" starting from the deployment address of the smart contract, and extending it by  $2^{256}$  slots of 32 bytes each, a number close to the number of atoms in the visible universe, hence the astronomical adjective. Ethereum simplifies storage under this model by skipping 0 (zero) values, i.e., only non-zero data is actually stored in the blockchain. For example, if a contract establishes a counter initialised to 0 as an internal parameter, as long as this variable retains the value 0, there is no blockchain storage used to

store this value. Ethereum reserves a slot upon declaring the variable, but no write effort happens until that variable changes.

Simple parameters are stored sequentially from the deployed address, using as many slots as required to fit all the required data. Arrays and mappings in Ethereum have a dynamic nature in the sense that they can be initialised as empty but can append and remove elements at will. These structures require a more complex storage system to allow for arbitrary growth, but they still get stored within the same "astronomically large" storage space.

In this approach, all storage locations are identified by the base deployment address and the index of the slot where that particular data piece begins to be stored. The actual data can extend itself over several consecutive slots, an approach similar to how the data of a given file in modern operating systems is spread through several storage blocks (which in this case do not need to be arranged consecutively), which implies that if this base address is lost, so do the rest of the data stored using this reference point.

In the system indicated in Fig. 2 represents a system that uses this approach to save data. Voters start the process by interacting with the voting booth smart contract and request a Ballot NFT for a given election. Towards this, voters provide the required data to infer over their eligibility for the voting exercise at hand. If found viable, the contract mints a new Ballot NFT to the voter, which consists in creating a set of concurring entries in a set of internal mappings that uniquely establish the ownership of that Ballot NFT to a single voter.

When the voter receives confirmation that he/she "owns" a Ballot NFT, it means that there is a series of records in a voting booth smart contract editable by the voter and no one else. This is the essence of token ownership in a contract-based scenario. From here, the voter interacts again with the contract but now to change the token metadata according to his/her election choices. This change occurs in the smart contract data stored in the blockchain. The contract limits the edition of token metadata to its owner, but this data is stored under the contract's storage space, so voting in this scenario realistically changes the contract data stored in the blockchain.

From here, the rest of the process consists in changing the ownership records in the contract to reflect the new ownership changes. After minting, the ownership of a Ballot NFT is transferred to the voter that requested it. After voting, the voter transfers the token back to the voting booth contract. From the blockchain standpoint, this consists in changing the owner address in the corresponding contract mapping from the voter account to the deployment address of the contract. This process can be repeated multiple times for a single voter if he/she decides to recast or revoke the last Ballot NFT submitted. Once the voting window closes, the voting booth contracts remove the data that links a stored Ballot NFT to a voter, a requirement to allow for recasting or revoking Ballot NFTs, and transfers the anonymised ballots to a tallying contract. This contract finishes the election process by removing the last layer of encryption, tallying, and publishing the election results.

## 7 Account-based Approach

Fig. 3 displays the proposal system under an account-based blockchain environment.




Figure 3: Account-based version of the e-voting system proposed.

In this scenario, each actor identified, namely the voters, the voting booth and tallying contracts, have their own accounts. Ballots are modeled as resources, as indicated in Section 4.3, therefore they can only exist in one location, i.e., account, at a time, are not possible to copy, and only their owner can destroy them.

The process starts with the voter interacting with a voting booth contract. The voter provides necessary information to determine his/her eligibility status in the present election, and if the query returns a positive outcome, the voting booth contract complies by minting a new Ballot NFT and transferring it to the voter. Next, the voter makes his/her selection by editing the token metadata accordingly and transfers the Ballot NFT back to the voting booth contract. All vote information is encrypted.

The voting booth contract keeps all returned Ballot NFTs in its account storage until the end of the voting window. This allows for voters to be able to recast, or even revoke, their votes if desired. Once the election is over and the tally begins, voting booth contracts anonymise the Ballot NFTs, which locks the choices since these cannot be replaced or revoked anymore, and transfers all tokens to the tallying contract. This final contract removes the encryption layer, computes and publishes the results.

## 8 Security Analysis and Additional Features

### 8.1 Data Encryption

In order to achieve and maintain voter privacy, data published in a publicly accessible ledger needs, at least, a layer of encryption to be applied to it before entering the public structure. This encryption must provide two functionalities:

prevent other users from determining the voting options of a specific voter or voters and prevent the calculation of the final tally before the intended process step.

Asymmetrical encryption schemes are a simple and efficient solution for this problem. Our proposed system maintains three essential actors: voters, voting booth contracts, and the tally contract. Each actor can create a pair of asymmetrical keys and distribute the public key, but for our specific case, this task is limited to the smart contracts. This removes complexity from the voter perspective and deposits it into programmable software scripts. As such, each voting booth contract and the tally contract generate a pair of asymmetrical encryption keys, with the public key in each one provided to a voter alongside the Ballot NFT used to contain their election choices.

From this generalised scheme, we were able to identify four potential approaches to address vote data privacy, each one related to an encryption key sharing scheme:

- **Each voting booth smart contract uses a different public key from an asymmetric encryption pair to encrypt any sensible information before setting it as the NFT’s metadata.** Smart contract code is transparent once it is published on the blockchain, so it is not possible for the contract to store the private key from that pair without invalidating the encryption itself.

To maintain a level of decoupling, voting booth smart contracts can only encrypt data while keeping decryption functionalities limited to the tallying contract. This is not a limitation of the technology but a security strategy. The transparency argument also applies to the tally contract, which means that we cannot store any private encryption keys in it without invalidating the encryption scheme. As we have established in Section 5, our solutions assume the existence of a trusted third party, which can be used to store the private pairs of the encryption keys used, under reasonable safety. This encryption problem can be solved by implementing the decryption function in the tally contract only, but in such a way that it requires the private encryption keys to be provided as inputs to the function as well as the data to be decrypted. Fig. 4 exemplifies the process described thus far.

The system is more secure if each voting booth smart contract uses a different encryption key, but this security comes at the cost of increased system complexity. Decrypting the data requires multiple inputs, and a single erroneous byte in the transmission of one of the private keys can invalidate the whole election.

- **All voting booth smart contracts use the same public key from an asymmetrical encryption pair to protect NFT metadata.** This approach is functionally similar to the previous one but logistically simpler because all NFT metadata is encrypted with the same key.






Figure 4: Metadata encryption scheme using multiple encryption key pairs.

In this case, only one encryption key pair gets generated, with the public key freely distributed and used over the whole system and the private key safely guarded by a trusted third party. As with the previous case, voting booth smart contracts can only encrypt data, with the decrypting responsibilities falling solely on the tallying contract and the correct input of the private encryption key from the trusted third party.

This alternative achieves a simpler system though through the sacrifice of security. It is logistically simpler to keep a single key secure than multiple ones. Fig. 5 illustrates this approach.

- **Use a threshold cryptosystem and homomorphic properties** to keep vote data encrypted throughout the whole process. If a threshold cryptosystem is used to encrypt the vote data, we can use homomorphic operations directly on the encrypted data to calculate a (still encrypted) final tally, the only element requiring decryption in this scenario [13] [93].
- **Use Adi Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme [96]** to split a private key  $D$  from an asymmetrical encryption key pair into  $n$  pieces. Shamir's secret sharing scheme requires that only  $k$  of these pieces be able to reconstruct  $D$ . This scheme also requires the use of a  $(k, n)$  threshold cryptosystem, where  $n = 2k - 1$ . With such a scheme, an adversary needs to obtain at least  $k$  pieces to be able to subvert the system while being able to use a single encryption key for all. As long as an adversary is unable to obtain as many as  $k - 1$  pieces, reconstructing  $D$  is still computationally infeasible. This scheme effectively combines the advantages of the first two discussed with a minimal increment in solution complexity.




Figure 5: Metadata encryption scheme using a single encryption key pair.

#### 8.1.1 Data Obfuscation

Vote data is double encrypted with the tally contract key and the respective voting booth contract key, i.e., the public encryption key provided by the voting booth contract that mints the Ballot NFT requested by a voter. A double encryption scheme increases the solution space for the resulting ciphertexts, which makes a statistical analysis of the encrypted votes harder, but not impossible. In any election, the universe of choices for a given question is finite. If no additional obfuscation methods are employed, especially if any encryption efforts are performed with a small number of encryption keys, the solution space for generated ciphertexts may be small enough to warrant the use of statistical tools that can provide relevant information about the final result before the end of the election.

For example, consider an election that requires a voter to choose one of four choices: *A*, *B*, *C*, or *D*. Consider also a simple encryption scheme that advances the selected option ten positions in the alphabet. With only one encryption layer, the solution space is simply *K*, *L*, *M*, *N*; therefore, determining the final tally without decrypting the vote data becomes a trivial operation in this case. Adding "salt," i.e., a piece of random data, to the plaintext before encrypting it solves this issue by extending the solution space so that statistical analysis is infeasible.

The difficulty of obtaining true random values in a purely deterministic blockchain is well known [6], but for our purpose, a pseudo-random number is sufficient since we are not using it to generate critical system information. Using portions of a hash digest is a popular option to obtain pseudo-random values in a simple and fast fashion. Popular hash functions, such as the ones in the *keccak* family used in the Ethereum blockchain, can be applied to an-

other pseudo-random piece of data, such as the current UNIX timestamp, for example, to obtain these salt values.

### 8.1.2 Private Key Management

The universe of key pairs is equal to the number of smart contracts used to support the election. The transparent nature of these contracts prevents any sensitive information from being published in their code, namely, writing the private keys in the corresponding contracts defeats the whole encryption effort since anyone can check the contract source code and decrypt data stored under it. We solve this problem by relying on the trusted third party that we are already using to determine voter eligibility.

## 8.2 Multiple Vote-Casting

Multiple vote-casting is a feature used to combat vote coercion, here defined as someone that can influence how a voter casts his or her choice either through positive (money offers, gifts, etc.) or negative (blackmail, threats of violence, etc.) reinforcement. Vote coercion defeats the purpose of the election. This approach was implemented in e-voting solutions such as the Estonian i-Voting system [72], the Norwegian e-Vote project [38], and TiVi, a blockchain-based e-voting solution [99]. Voters can submit multiple votes electronically, but only the last one makes the tally. The Estonian i-Voting system, which was deployed in Estonia's 2005 national elections in parallel with a traditional paper ballot system, prioritised the physical vote over the electronic one as well.

The idea behind this approach is to remove incentives from coercers. Even if they are able to "convince" someone to vote against their will, voters always have the opportunity to replace the coerced vote later on or, in the Estonian case, vote physically if they are unable to do so freely from an electronic platform.

We intend to implement a similar, NFT-adapted feature in our proposed solution. The increment in solution complexity is negligible since we already benefit from the fact that we operate with digitally unique NFTs as vote abstractors. In our approach, we considered a strategy based on the replacement of submitted Ballot NFTs, i.e., once submitted, the metadata of a Ballot NFT cannot be altered, but a submitted token can be replaced by another cast at a later stage, as long as it happens within the voting window defined.

To implement such a feature, we need to ensure the storage strategy used allows for future replacements of submitted tokens while simultaneously ensuring voter and vote privacy, i.e., that any voter information, as well as their choices in the current election, is protected. To ensure privacy along the whole process, the system applies multiple layers of encryption to sensible data, with the public encryption keys shared within the contract code.

The contract stores Ballot NFTs using a hash map. The hash value used to index Ballot NFTs is calculated before the submission of the Ballot NFT, at the user level, where his or her personal information is available and can be prepared such that it produces a unique indexing hash. The usage of already

unique identification numbers in this process, such as a National ID number, a Tax Revenue Service ID, Social Security Numbers, etc., ensures this outcome.

Fig. 6 represents the full process flow:




Figure 6: Implementation logic to allow for multiple vote casting.

The submission of a Ballot NFT also includes a hash digest that is unique for all voters and can be used to retrieve that Ballot NFT cast previously by a voter without revealing its contents. During the election period, voting booth contracts store the Ballot NFTs. The actual storage location for these tokens is dependent on the blockchain architecture considered, but it is not critical for this explanation.

Double encryption of the vote data by a pair of keys supplied from the voting booth contract and tally contract ensures vote privacy, but the private encryption keys required to decrypt all the voting data need to be securely stored during the whole exercise. A sensible approach is to entrust them to the same trusted third party that ensures the integrity of the list of eligible voters, but other options may be of consideration.

During the election window, users can request and submit multiple Ballot NFTs, each replacing any one previously submitted. The link between the tokens and their owners breaks once the voting window closes. This operation also removes the layer of encryption that could be used to divide the tokens per voting booth, thus achieving anonymity between the voters and their choices. The tally contract stores VoteNFT tokens in no specific order.

Removing the last layer of encryption from the token's metadata and computing the final result determines the final tally. Another potential, more private approach consists of computing the tally homomorphically and decrypting only

the final result.

### 8.3 Security Analysis and Assessment of Threats

The security of e-voting systems has been the subject of academic research, and it has coalesced around the definition of security criteria, such as voter privacy, transparency, accuracy, etc. The implementation of these criteria through cryptographic features increases the security of the system against dishonest actors. A simple example is using encryption to protect the information in a vote to achieve vote privacy. The number and type of criteria used for this characterisation differ from publication to publication, but some attempts have been made over the years to normalise this exercise. In one of the latest publications dedicated to this effort, [4] presented a literature survey that established a series of five criteria deemed "minimal" as the base set from an analysis of a number of publications that employed such characterisation to determine the security offered by the proposed solution.

Alongside this analysis, we also include an assessment of potential threats included in each criterion considered. [112] includes a detailed list of potential threats affecting e-voting systems without differentiating between any of the architectural paradigms considered. We adapted this list to our architecture and repeated the threat analysis from the reference point of a decentralised e-voting system.

The following analysis is going to focus on the following security criteria:

1. Accuracy—A voting system is accurate if it does not allow for changes to a vote after submission, changes to the final tally, or invalid votes.
2. Eligibility—Voting systems that allow only registered or valid voters to submit votes implement eligibility.
3. Privacy—A private voting system is able to remove all the links between personal information of the voter and the vote submitted.
4. Verifiability—A voting system is considered verifiable if it allows for independent confirmation of the submission of a vote by the voter.
5. Robustness—A robust voting system is able to prevent and even withstand the actions of dishonest voters to prevent the successful and accurate completion of the voting exercise.

The framework for minimal security criteria presented in [4] provides a framework for security analysis of this proposal.

#### 8.3.1 Accuracy

In both approaches considered, once the NFT is written into a block and is part of the chain, the contents of a vote become immutable due to the computational infeasibility of modifying data on the chain.

The final tally is the output from a smart contract function, which adds transparency to the process but does not negate the possibility of an erroneous result or detect any invalid votes. The smart contract uses a function to ensure the correct format of a vote before counting it. Assuming a deterministic computation of the final tally, this means that changes in it imply unauthorised changes to the number of Ballot NFTs submitted. An expansion of the previous reasoning negates this scenario as well. Such a change to the number of votes and the number of Ballot NFTs stored implies adding and/or removing information from the blockchain, which we have already stated is computationally infeasible.

**Threat Assessment** The accuracy of an e-voting system is affected by adversarial activities such as

- Wiretapping
- DNS attack
- Malicious code on client
- Hardware modification, substitution, and interception
- Software modification, deletion, edition, trojan horses, information leaks, trapdoors, and viruses

Basing our solution on a blockchain immediately nullifies many of the threats considered above. The immutable and transparent nature of blockchain makes threats based on an adversary being able to alter the system’s software and/or hardware irrelevant, as well as any threats from wiretapping communication channels. Deploying software as smart contracts prevents unwanted and undetectable changes to the code. Blockchains also notoriously abstract most hardware characteristics from their overall workings, so as long as nodes execute protocol code as intended, any hardware alterations do not pose a threat.

The most serious threat from this list is the existence of malicious code on a client. The core of the system runs on a distributed, public network, but the submission of individual votes requires an interface that is served from the client side. Realistically, an adversary can replace this interface with a different one without the user noticing it. The risk here is the loss of private information, such as private encryption keys and personal information. If an adversary is able to, for example, control the interface used by someone else to submit votes, such as controlling an unlocked and previously authenticated device (theft, blackmail, threats of violence, etc.), installing remote control software in a device without the owner’s permission, etc., he or she can submit a vote under another person’s identity. It is difficult to protect the system against such a deep level of control. To counter this threat, the system includes a multiple-vote casting feature. But in the end, the detection of an erroneous submission falls on the voter. The voting booth smart contract provides voting receipts and a history of interactions with the contract itself to ease the detection process. As indicated

above, the actions that an adversary has to undertake to be able to cast a vote as someone else can be considered criminal offences with penalties foreseen in most legislative frameworks.

### 8.3.2 Eligibility

The sensible nature of elections prevents the full decentralisation of an e-voting system, at least regarding the presence of a trusted authority that determines the individual eligibility of each voter based on whatever rules exist to regulate a given election (e.g., age, nationality, professional status, etc.). Unless an election is free, i.e., without any regulations regarding who can vote, there is a requirement for a mechanism to implement limitations on the set of voters that are eligible to participate in it.

For our proposal, we consider two approaches to solving this problem in a decentralised fashion:

- Store eligibility information in a centralised database and access it from the blockchain environment using an oracle. Any oracle used for this effect replies to a query in boolean format, i.e., if a voter is (*true*) or is not (*false*) eligible to participate in the election based on the data returned from the centralised database.
- Use a cryptographic accumulator to prove membership in the eligible group of voters. We can use a cryptographic accumulator’s properties to infer if a given piece of data related to a specific voter is present in the root value or not. This process is faster and more efficient than checking the existence of a record in a database by searching it exhaustively.

Another possible strategy is used in [94], where the authors used SoulBound-NFTs, a type of non-transferable NFT, for identification purposes. Unfortunately, these NFTs are still in their infancy regarding their development. As such, the present solution omits them. Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.2 provide additional details regarding the two approaches considered in determining voter eligibility in our solution.

**Oracle Accessible Centralised Eligibility Database** The basis of our eligibility problem derives from the limitations of current blockchain implementation in storing large quantities of data. Though it is technically possible to do so, storing even a small list of eligible voters directly on the chain is very inefficient, both from an economic (due to potential gas costs) and resource management perspective. This issue is a pertinent one across several application domains.

[39] presents an exhaustive study on strategies proposed to allow blockchain to access off-chain data. Among these, oracles stand out as one of the most promising in terms of flexibility and ease of implementation. Blockchain oracles are implemented as smart contracts that use their functions to query data from the outside, namely by requesting it from an external source, similarly to a regular API. Oracles decrease the gap between blockchains and the external world,

which has awarded them the moniker of "blockchain middleware". Cryptocurrency exchanges rely on oracles to allow trades between cryptocurrencies from different blockchains. The value of each tradeable cryptocurrency is currently very volatile and often dependent on speculative factors. Since blockchains themselves do not store the exchange rate of their native token relative to a fiat currency, which is the parameter to consider in inter-blockchain trades, this information is kept instead in "traditional" centralised sources that maintain APIs that can be used to retrieve this information remotely. Oracles are often used in these cases to retrieve the exchange rate of the tokens involved (external information) and provide a fairer exchange of tokens (internal operation).

Oracles fit quite well in our solution. Eligibility data is stored in a conventional, centralised database, and the eligibility state of a given voter is obtained by invoking a function in the smart contract that implements the oracle. Oracles increase the centrality of the solution while potentially creating a point of failure in the system. External data sources do not subject themselves to the blockchain protocol and data redundancy that ensure their integrity; therefore, they can become corrupt with less effort. Therefore, using an oracle in this fashion also requires a trusted third party to ensure the integrity of the external data, which moves this solution away from a purely decentralised one.

**Cryptographic Accumulators** Cryptographic accumulators, also known as set accumulators, are cryptographic primitives that use unidirectional hash functions to represent a set of elements through an *accumulator value*, a single and constant-size value that can be used to determine if a given element belongs to the set without revealing the set contents at any point of the verification process. A hash function  $y = H(x)$  is such that it receives an input  $x$  with arbitrary length to produce a fixed-sized output  $y$ , also known as *hash digest*. The unidirectionality of the hash function derives from the fact that

1. For all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  it is computationally easy to calculate  $y = H(x)$ .
2. For all  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , it is computationally infeasible to find  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  such that  $H(x) = y$ .

A desirable hash function is also one that provides collision resistance, i.e., it is computationally infeasible to find two input elements,  $x_1, x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , such that  $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$ , which enables hash digests to be used as data fingerprints, a strategy commonly used to ensure data integrity during communications, software certification during distribution, etc. Among the various use cases of cryptographic accumulators, we highlight *anonymity enhancement* and *identity management* as the most pertinent for our case. Set accumulators can be static or dynamic, depending on their ability to add and remove elements from the original set without requiring the re-calculation of the *cumulative set* [71]. For our particular context, static accumulators are preferable. By publishing the *cumulative value* of the set of eligible voters using a static accumulator, this means that the list of eligible voters "is closed," meaning that, for better



or worse, no voters can be added or removed after this publication without changing the *cumulative value* published.

[14] introduced set accumulators as, in a simplistic fashion, the hash digest of the cumulative value of the hash digests of the elements of the set. To determine the *cumulative value* of a set accumulator, one begins by determining the hash digest of every individual element. Individual values are paired and concatenated, and the result rehashed to obtain the values for the next level. The process repeats until a single value—the cumulative value—remains. Fig. 7 illustrates this process.




Figure 7: Simple example of an accumulator to represent a set of strings.

An independent verifier can verify the membership of an element by obtaining a minimum of partial results and recalculating the *cumulative value*, starting with the element whose membership he or she desires to verify and combining the successive hashes with the ones provided. If the *cumulative value* matches the one published, the unidirectionality and collision resistance of the hash function ensure that the element does belong to the original set.

Cryptographic accumulators present a solution that benefits from the advantages of storing relevant data directly in the blockchain while keeping that data to a minimum of the required storage space [104]. This approach is not novel: in [28], the authors use accumulators to optimise a UTXO (*Unspent Transaction Output*)-based blockchain by storing the *accumulated value* of the UTXO set in the blockchain instead of the whole set. [105] apply cryptographic accumulators to authenticate users in an *IoT* (*Internet Of Things*)-based blockchain, similarly to our proposed strategy.

Our approach is to use a set accumulator to obtain the *cumulative value* of all eligible voters and then use membership functions to determine if a given voter is eligible for the exercise based on the output from the membership function. This eliminates the need to access external data sources while keeping the additional data stored in the chain to a minimum.

## Threat Assessment

- Impersonation
- Falsification of messages
- Spoofing
- Man-in-the-middle Replay attacks

### 8.3.3 Privacy

The importance of the storage mechanism is critical to determining how we can achieve voter privacy in the system.

In a contract-based approach, the link between Ballot NFT data and the entity that created it is maintained solely in the data structure that maps a specific, unique Ballot NFT to an address. The privacy of a voter depends on the difficulty in determining the identity behind these addresses, an issue transversal to all blockchains. It is possible to use statistical tools that analyse blockchain transactions to increase the probability of discovering who is controlling an address, but these often rely on the existence of a significant number of transactions with that address. If a voter uses a specific address solely for voting purposes, this threat diminishes greatly. The pseudo-anonymity of blockchain operations plus the added layer of encryption to the sensible data ensure voter privacy in this system.

Account-based blockchains simplify this by assigning protected storage domains. This ensures that any sensitive operations happen in a cryptographically protected personal space. To gain access to such space, an adversary needs to discover the private counterpart of the asymmetrical encryption key pair used to set up the account, i.e., by breaking an encryption cypher. If the strength of the keys used is sufficiently high, this task should be computationally infeasible, thus also achieving voter privacy within the account-based approach.

### 8.3.4 Verifiability

Implementing this solution in a public blockchain allows us to benefit from transparency regarding the verification of data once it gets written into a block, which in our particular case is in the form of NFT metadata. As with any other NFT published thus far, their contents are open to consultation for anyone, namely, the image, video or audio clip, text, etc., that got encoded into that NFT. Unfortunately, this level of transparency also defeats any attempts to keep voter data private, thus negating the *Privacy* feature described in Section 8.3.3. But as it was also indicated in this section, any sensible data written into the public blockchain (regardless of the storage approach considered) needs to be protected to implement even the weakest form of voter privacy. This opens up two practical approaches to implementing vote verifiability:

1. If a vote is published after being encrypted using public encryption keys whose private counterparts are being carefully controlled by a trusted third party, as suggested in Section 6, a voter can verify the correct submission of his or her vote by comparing the ciphertext in the metadata for the Ballot NFT associated with his or her address (this is valid for both contract and account-based storage approaches) to the result of a re-encryption of his or her original vote. The voter is unable to decrypt the data directly in the Ballot NFT metadata because that would require knowledge of the private encryption keys, which are kept secure by a trusted third party. A voter is able to verify his/her vote at a later stage simply by replicating the data encryption process. If the result matches the value in the blockchain, the vote remains unchanged. This approach requires the use of "salt" to prevent an adversary from executing the same exercise, as mentioned previously in Section 8.1.1. This strategy mimics others used to establish secure communications over insecure channels, as detailed in [78] and [77].
2. A simpler and more practical alternative is to "fingerprint" vote data with a hash digest, using all data present in the Ballot NFT metadata, for example, and including it as another parameter in the Ballot NFT. Like the previous approach, voters can ensure that their vote remains unchanged after submission by re-creating the vote and re-hashing it. If the digest obtained this way matches the one written on-chain via the Ballot NFT's metadata, the encoded vote is exactly the same as the one just reproduced. This also opens the possibility of an adversary using this method to break the privacy of voters. If an adversary knows the format used and sufficient personal data from a voter, he or she can determine the voter's choices by obtaining the hash digest written in the submitted Ballot NFT metadata, by brute force if needed. As such, the use of "salt" or any other parameter exclusive to the knowledge of the voter needs to be used to ensure vote verifiability without compromising vote privacy.

### 8.3.5 Robustness

Blockchain-based systems benefit directly from the security they derive from the cryptographic methods they use to establish basic data integrity. The effort required to change the value of a vote or the final tally is as computationally infeasible as manipulating a block of transactions in a double-spending attempt.

Determining voter eligibility with an external database, through an oracle, for example, is a potential source of corruption. Any off-chain elements are, by definition, weak points of a decentralised system since they represent an exception in the paradigm. This threat can be mitigated by the use of hash digests of the list of voters and their data, published once a valid and final list is achieved and verified periodically to detect unwanted modifications.

## 9 Conclusion

Electronic voting systems are still an active area of research and a playground from which some important cryptographic concepts derive. This has transitioned e-voting research to a new age regarding the fundamental approach considered, thanks to its recent integration with blockchain technology.

This proposal presents a decentralised, remote electronic voting system that takes advantage of the properties of non-fungible tokens, as well as the Flow blockchain and its Resource-Oriented Paradigm. The organisation and features offered by this new approach support the design of a private, secure, transparent, verifiable, and mobile voting system whose proof of concept is to be derived from the strategy presented in this text.

This also proves the suitability of the NFT concept as a transport mechanism within public networks.

This paper defines a concrete roadmap to produce a working prototype towards a secure and remote e-voting system. Another important aspect that determines the usability of this proposal is scalability; specifically, what are the limits of the supporting blockchain regarding the scope of operation of this system?

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