\square

Multi And Threshold Signatures for Starknet (Warming up for Lisbon Hackathon)

Renaud Dubois

Ledger Innovation Team

October 19, 2022

Summary



(Classical) Signatures



Multi-Signatures



Threshold Signatures

Summary

- Signatures, MultiSigs and ThresholdSigs
 - Basic Concepts
 - Under the hood
- 2 Use cases
 - Multi factor authentication
 - Voting system
- 3 Ledger/Starknet Musig2, call for Lisbon



SCAN ME

A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents.



Definition ((Classical) Digital Signature)

A signature scheme is a tuple of function:

- Setup: returns domain parameters $E(F_p), G, H$
- $KeyGen(E(F_p), G, H, seed)$: returns (pvk, pubk) = (x, Q)
- \blacksquare Sign(x, message): returns Sig
- $\blacksquare Verify(Sig,Q)$: returns true/false

Formulaes for elliptic computations. Dictionnary of curves parameters


Properties

- Unforgeable
- Non repudiation
- Not reusable

Most commonly used signature scheme is ECDSA (Bitcoin, Ethereum)

- implemented in Starknet/Cairo (P256, NTT/Stark friendly Starknet Curve)
- available in your favorite sdk Ledger

How to aggregate several authenticators into one authentication to a smart contract ?



A multi-signature is a digital signature allowing users to aggregate their keys in an aggregated public key. The signatures are also aggregated. Verifier API is unchanged.



Definition (Multi-Signatures)

A multisig scheme is a tuple of function:

- \blacksquare (Setup, Keygen, Verify, Sign)
- $\blacksquare KeyAgg(Q_1, \ldots Q_n)$ returns X_n
- \blacksquare $SignAgg(Sig_1, \ldots, Sig_n)$ returns Sig


Advantages (over naive concatenation/trusted aggregator)

- only one signature over channel (bandwidth consumption)
- no need for a trusted aggregator (no remote private key, own your crypto !)
- no risk of contract failure (don't trust, no don't)
- verifier doesn't need to know the underlying group of users

Example: Musig2, compatible with BIP340

drawback

- requires Schorr (few implementations in crypto Libs, FIDO not in TLS)
- increased computational complexities for signers
- requires (off chain) communications between signers
- computation in 2 rounds (Sig1, Sig2)



Threshold-signatures

A (k,n) threshold signature (TS-Sig) is a digital signature allowing a subset (threshold) of k users from n to aggregate a signature .



Threshold-signatures

Definition (Threshold Signatures)

A multisig scheme is a tuple of function:

- \blacksquare (Setup, Verify, Sign)
- \blacksquare Distributed Keygen,
- $\blacksquare KeyAgg(Q_1, \ldots Q_n)$ returns X
- $\blacksquare SignAgg(Sig_1, \ldots, Sig_n)$ returns Sig


Threshold-signatures

Advantages (over naive concatenation/trusted aggregator)

- All of multisig (k = n is equivalent)
- More flexibility in access policy

Example: FROST.

Disclaimer



EC-Schnorr and ECDSA

SetUP() : Pick a curve with parameters (p,a,b,Gx,Gy,q) (weierstrass equations and formulaes).

Operation	Sch norr	ECDSA
KeyGen	Q = xG	Q = xG
Nonce*	k	k
Ephemeral	R = kG	R = kG
Hash	e = H(m R)	e = H(m)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s = k^{-1}(e + xr)$
	Sig = (R, s)	Sig=(r,s)
Verif	R' = sG + eQ	$r' = (es^{-1}G + rs^{-1}Q)_x$
	Accept if R'=R	Accept if r'=r

(* nonce generation may use RFC6979 for misuse resistance)

Schnorr s part is linear in (k,x) and linearity is cool: $s(k,x_1)+s(k,x_2)=s(k,x), \quad \forall x=x_1+x_2 \\ s(k_1,x)+s(k_2,x)=s(k,x), \quad \forall k=k_1+k_2$ (while ECDSA has degree two monomial in (k,x))



Linearity allow homomorphic additions. Idea: split X into $X=\sum a_iX_i$, k into $k=\sum k_i$.

Operation	Schnorr	Insec_Musig
KeyGen	X = xG	$X_i = x_i G$
KeyAgg	(- NO.	$X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X_i$
Nonce*	k	k_i
Ephemeral	R = kG	$R_i = k_i G$
Aggregate R	1- 1	$R = (\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i.k_i).G = k.G$
Hash	e = H(m R)	e = H(m R)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s_i = k_i - a_i x_i e$
Aggregate s	- \	$s = \sum s_i = k - xe$


Musig2 uses a vectorial nonce of length μ , injected in previous Insec_Musig scheme.

Operation	Schnorr	Musig2
KeyGen	X = xG	$X_i = x_i G$
KeyAgg	4	$X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X_i$
Nonce*	k	$ec{k_i} = (k_{i1}, \ldots, k_{i\mu})$
Ephemeral	R = kG	$ec{R}_i = ec{k_i} G$
Hash Nonce	-	$b = H(X R_0 \dots R_\mu m)$
Aggregate R	- \	$R = \sum_{j=1}^{\mu} b^{j-1} (\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i . k_i) . G = k . G$
Hash	e = H(m R)	e=H(m R)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s_i = (\sum_{j=1}^{\mu} k_i j b^{j-1}) - a_i x_i e$
Aggregate s	-	$s = \sum s_i = k - xe$

Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle


Thresholdisation use the principle of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, which is in fact a reed solomon erasure code.

Goal: Given enough shares, it is possible to reconstruct the initial value.



Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle

Lagrange interpolation enables to switch from points to polynomial coefficients using the following formulaes:



The transformation L from $(P_0 \dots P_k)$ to $(a_0 \dots a_k)$ is a linear transformation in x.

Sidenote: This is closely related to the principle of FRI used in starks.

Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle

Key ideas:

- lacktriangle interprete aggregated secret key as a polynomial P of degree k,
- each share (user secret key) is a point of the polynomial,
- blind the computation in the curve domain to per orm the aggregation only handling public elements,
- replace $\sum_{i=0}^{n}$ in previous scheme by Lagrange polynomials,
- some more steps are necessary (commitments) to avoid cheating.

Read FROST for full description.

Use cases



Multi factor authentication to Starknet Contract

Implement enhanced policy access to assets.



Access Policy

- Low amount: Host (hot wallet) only
- High amount: Host (smartphone) + HW wallet (Nano)

Use WebAuthn (FIDO) into Starknet?

Voting system

Reduce risk and complexity of a contract implementing a voting system. A vote is adopted only though a valid TS-Sig.



Gnosis advanced

 \blacksquare implement a threshold voting system, with $k=\frac{n}{2}$

Ledger/Starknet Musig2

Specificities of Musig2 Starknet (ease Prover/Verifier computations)

- Addition of EC-Schnorr to Cairo contracts
- Uses Pedersen Hash as core hash function
- Uses Starknet curve as elliptic domain
- Implement x-only verification

The implementation is a generic one (takes hash and elliptic domain as SetUp parameter). The aim is to overlap

- with B340 if selecting P256k1 and SHA256 instead (TBD).
- with RFC Eddsa if selecting Ed25519.

Ledger/Starknet Musig2

Current state

- Schnorr verification available in Cairo,
- High-level simulation in Sagemath of full protocol (Sign/Verify for a pool of users)
- Musig2 implementation on top of a virtualization layer (only integrating bolos for now)
- currently working on thresholdization

C Library (Nano Signer)

Cairo Code (Contract Verifier)



SCAN ME



SCAN ME

Ledger/Starknet Musig2

Next steps

- Thresholdisation,
- Compatibility with Ed25519 (FIDO compliance)



C Library (Nano Signer)





SCAN ME



SCAN ME

Starknet Hackathon



Join the team for:

- Front end integration (wallet, current development over Argent) over verifier (Cairo) or signer (C)
- Integration of a different accelerator/library in the virtualization layer(C)
- Contribute to the threshold version (Sagemath/C)

Questions?





C Library



SCAN ME R. Dubois (LIT)

Slides



SCAN ME

Multi And Threshold Signatures for Starknet

Cairo&Sage



SCAN ME

October 19, 2022