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# Multi And Threshold Signatures for Starknet (Warming up for Lisbon Hackathon)

Renaud Dubois

Ledger Innovation Team

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### Summary



(Classical) Signatures



Multi-Signatures



Threshold Signatures

### Summary

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  - Voting system
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A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents.



#### Definition ((Classical) Digital Signature)

A signature scheme is a tuple of function:

- Setup: returns domain parameters  $E(F_p), G, H$
- $KeyGen(E(F_p), G, H, seed)$ : returns (pvk, pubk) = (x, Q)
- $\blacksquare$  Sign(x, message): returns Sig
- $\blacksquare Verify(Sig,Q)$ : returns true/false

Formulaes for elliptic computations. Formulaes


#### **Properties**

- Unforgeable
- Non repudiation
- Not reusable

Most commonly used signature scheme is ECDSA (Bitcoin, Ethereum)

- implemented in Starknet/Cairo (P256, NTT/Stark friendly Starknet Curve)
- available in your favorite sdk Ledger

How to aggregate several authenticators into one authentication to a smart contract ?



A multi-signature is a digital signature allowing users to aggregate their keys in an aggregated public key. The signatures are also aggregated. Verifier API is unchanged.



#### Definition (Multi-Signatures)

A multisig scheme is a tuple of function:

- $\blacksquare$  (Setup, Keygen, Verify, Sign)
- $\blacksquare KeyAgg(Q_1, \ldots Q_n)$  returns  $X_n$
- $\blacksquare$   $SignAgg(Sig_1, \ldots, Sig_n)$  returns Sig


#### Advantages (over naive concatenation/trusted aggregator)

- only one signature over channel (bandwidth consumption)
- no need for a trusted aggregator (no remote private key, own your crypto !)
- no risk of contract failure (don't trust, no don't)
- verifier doesn't need to know the underlying group of users

Example: Musig2, compatible with BIP340

#### drawback

- requires Schorr (few implementations in crypto Libs, FIDO not in TLS)
- increased computational complexities for signers
- requires (off chain) communications between signers
- computation in 2 rounds (Sig1, Sig2)



#### Threshold-signatures

A (k,n) threshold signature (TS-Sig) is a digital signature allowing a subset (threshold) of k users from n to aggregate a signature .



#### Threshold-signatures

#### Definition (Threshold Signatures)

A multisig scheme is a tuple of function:

- $\blacksquare$  (Setup, Verify, Sign)
- $\blacksquare$  Distributed Keygen,
- $\blacksquare KeyAgg(Q_1, \ldots Q_n)$  returns X
- $\blacksquare SignAgg(Sig_1, \ldots, Sig_n)$  returns Sig


#### Threshold-signatures

#### Advantages (over naive concatenation/trusted aggregator)

- All of multisig (k = n is equivalent)
- More flexibility in access policy

Example: FROST.

### Disclaimer



#### EC-Schnorr and ECDSA

SetUP() : Pick a curve with parameters (p,a,b,Gx,Gy,q) ( weierstrass equations and formulaes ).

Operation	Sch <b>norr</b>	ECDSA
KeyGen	Q = xG	Q = xG
Nonce*	k	k
Ephemeral	R = kG	R = kG
Hash	e = H(m  R)	e = H(m)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s = k^{-1}(e + xr)$
	Sig = (R, s)	Sig=(r,s)
Verif	R' = sG + eQ	$r' = (es^{-1}G + rs^{-1}Q)_x$
	Accept if R'=R	Accept if r'=r

(\* nonce generation may use RFC6979 for misuse resistance)

### Musig2: using Schnorr additive properties

Schnorr's part is linear in (k, x) and linearity is cool:

$$s(k,x_1)+Sig(k,x_2)=s(k,x_1+x_2), \quad \forall x=x_1+x_2 \ s(k_1,x)+Sig(k_2,x)=s(k,x), \qquad \forall k=k_1+k_2 \ \text{(while ECDSA has degree two monomial in } (k,x))$$



Linearity allow homomorphic additions. Idea: split X into  $X = \sum a_i X_i$ , k into  $k = \sum k_i$ .

### Musig2: using Schnorr additive properties

Operation	Schnorr	Insec_Musig
KeyGen	X = xG	$X_i = x_i G$
KeyAgg	( - NO.	$X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X_i$
Nonce*	k	$k_i$
Ephemeral	R = kG	$R_i = k_i G$
Aggregate R	1- 1	$R = (\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i.k_i).G = k.G$
Hash	e = H(m  R)	e = H(m  R)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s_i = k_i - a_i x_i e$
Aggregate s	- \	$s = \sum s_i = k - xe$

### Musig2: using Schnorr additive properties


Musig2 uses a vectorial nonce of length  $\mu$ , injected in previous Insec\_Musig scheme.

Operation	Schnorr	Musig2
KeyGen	X = xG	$X_i = x_i G$
KeyAgg	4	$X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X_i$
Nonce*	k	$ec{k_i} = (k_{i1}, \ldots, k_{i\mu})$
Ephemeral	R = kG	$ec{R}_i = ec{k_i} G$
Hash Nonce	-	$b = H(X  R_0 \dots R_\mu  m)$
Aggregate R	- \	$R = \sum_{j=1}^{\mu} b^{j-1} (\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i . k_i) . G = k . G$
Hash	e = H(m  R)	e=H(m  R)
Sign	s = k - xe	$s_i = (\sum_{j=1}^{\mu} k_i j b^{j-1}) - a_i x_i e$
Aggregate s	-	$s = \sum s_i = k - xe$

### Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle


Thresholdisation use the principle of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, which is in fact a reed solomon erasure code.

Goal: Given enough shares, it is possible to reconstruct the initial value.



### Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle

Lagrange interpolation enables to switch from points to polynomial coefficients using the following formulaes:



The transformation L from  $(P_0 \dots P_k)$  to  $(a_0 \dots a_k)$  is a linear transformation in x.

Sidenote: This is closely related to the principle of FRI used in starks.

### Musig2: Thresholdisation Principle

#### Key ideas:

- lacktriangle interprete aggregated secret key as a polynomial P of degree k,
- each share (user secret key) is a point of the polynomial,
- blind the computation in the curve domain to per orm the aggregation only handling public elements,
- replace  $\sum_{i=0}^{n}$  in previous scheme by Lagrange polynomials,
- some more steps are necessary (commitments) to avoid cheating.

Read FROST for full description.

### Use cases



#### Multi factor authentication to Starknet Contract

Implement enhanced policy access to assets.



#### **Access Policy**

- Low amount: Host (hot wallet) only
- High amount: Host (smartphone) + HW wallet (Nano)

Use WebAuthn (FIDO) into Starknet?

#### Voting system

Reduce risk and complexity of a contract implementing a voting system. A vote is adopted only though a valid TS-Sig.



#### Gnosis advanced

 $\blacksquare$  implement a threshold voting system, with  $k=\frac{n}{2}$ 

### Ledger/Starknet Musig2

Specificities of Musig2 Starknet (ease Prover/Verifier computations)

- Addition of EC-Schnorr to Cairo contracts
- Uses Pedersen Hash as core hash function
- Uses Starknet curve as elliptic domain
- Implement x-only verification

The implementation is a generic one (takes hash and elliptic domain as SetUp parameter). The aim is to overlap

- with B340 if selecting P256k1 and SHA256 instead (TBD).
- with RFC Eddsa if selecting Ed25519.

### Ledger/Starknet Musig2

#### Current state

- Schnorr verification available in Cairo,
- High-level simulation in Sagemath of full protocol (Sign/Verify for a pool of users)
- Musig2 implementation on top of a virtualization layer (only integrating bolos for now)
- currently working on thresholdization

C Library (Nano Signer)

Cairo Code (Contract Verifier)



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### Ledger/Starknet Musig2

#### Next steps

- Thresholdisation,
- Compatibility with Ed25519 (FIDO compliance)



C Library (Nano Signer)

Cairo Code (Contract Verifier)



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#### Starknet Hackathon



#### Join the team for:

- Front end integration (wallet, current development over Argent) over verifier (Cairo) or signer (C)
- Integration of a different accelerator/library in the virtualization layer(C)
- Contribute to the threshold version (Sagemath/C)

## Questions?





#### C Library



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Slides



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Multi And Threshold Signatures for Starknet

#### Cairo&Sage



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